Sunday, November 25, 2007

Fear--And How To (Ab)use It

The Geek in former days enjoyed England. It was a great place to visit in all respects.

Not now. Now, if you held a gun to the Geekmo's head and said, "Get on the plane or I'll shoot," the Geek would have to answer, "Pull the trigger. It's faster and won't hurt so much."

"Why's that?" You ask.

Simple. To paraphrase Lincoln Steffen's (in)famous statement about his trip to post-revolutionary Russia, "I've been over to the future and it doesn't work."

In recent years, England has become a dystopia of intrusive nanny statism, which not only bodes to become worse, but may serve as a model for the United States.

British politicians have become masters and mistresses of exploiting fear. Preying with great success on public apprehensions, many of which were artificially generated, the governments of Blair and now Brown have successfully turned the "sceptered isle" into a paranoid nation of health Nazis and safety Fascists.

The Geek sets to one side the health Nazism to focus on the issue of safety and security.

Pushing the fear button of terrorism, Her Majesty's Government has put a number of liberty reducing measures into place. Since success breeds ambition, HMG now hopes to put further intrusions into place.

The most worrisome of these is the national identity card scheme.

"What's that got to do with us?" You object.

Plenty. It is not unlike the Real ID plan foisted on us in the wake of 9/11. And, like the Real ID exercise in government intrusion, it bodes well to be the nose of the camel in our private, personal tents.

OK, the real rub is that our government, in tandem with the British, is seeking to heighten our fear of shadowy figures labeled "terrorists," to put each and every one of us under greater scrutiny not only as regards actions and behaviors once thought private and personal but to examine (and, if possible) control and limit our words, or access to the words of others and even our very thoughts.

You shake your head slowly. "Come on, Geek! You're getting paranoid."

The Geek wishes that might be the case, but he can't. There are three reasons. Human nature. American history. HR 1955, "The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act."

Walk through the reasons with the Geek and see if we're in tandem when we get to the end. OK?

First of all, the nature of we humans. Fear is the primal emotion. It is the most powerful of the many to which we are all heir. It is the emotion that serves to protect us--or destroy us. Because of its power and universality, it is the best tool for those who wish to manipulate us whether genuine terrorists, advertisers, or politicians.

Another universality of human nature links with the first. Politics is all about power as the Geek has written previously. Politicians seek to maintain and expand their power over the perceptions, beliefs, and behavior of those subject to their sway.

The use of fear is an almost fail-safe way to expand the authority of government and the politicians which comprise it.

Now, let's take a short look at American history. Relatively recent history, the years after the Second World War when the greatest fear of Americans was Communism. For just over ten years, Americans were bludgeoned with fear of Communist subversives in our midst, Communist spies under our beds. It was a time of blacklists, silent lips, books not written or, if written, not published, books not read, thoughts not shared.

It was a time which bears the name of one man, Joe McCarthy, the Republican junior senator from Wisconsin.

Get a grip on this. Senator McCarthy might have given his name to this period of great fear, but he didn't manufacture--or exploit--the fear on his own. He had ample assistance from a number of bellowing stegosaurs such as Pat McCarran (D-NV) and Karl Mundt (R-SD).

(A side note: Karl Mundt once described the Constitutionally embedded rights of free press and freedom of speech as "extreme privileges," which shows the mentality of the fear provoking, power hungry politicos of a half century ago.)

Behind and above all the bloviating, hyperventilating congresswallahs was the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover, his tight-suited, white-shirted Special Agents and the Feeb's extensive files fed and led the great Anti-Communist Crusade as it rolled over lives, careers, and reputations without regard to truth or honesty.

The juggernaut rolled on and on through the Fifties, the Sixties, and into the Seventies crushing almost all who sought to stand up to it, to block it, to slow its destructive careening across the American political and social landscape.

It sputtered for awhile in the late Seventies only to lurch back to a simulacrum of life in the Eighties when Ronald Reagan brought us "Morning in America." Then, finally, the Great Crusade seemed to have died for once and for all with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Heck, the Commies were gone. It was "the end of history."

Now, like one of those Nightmare on Elm Street movies, the mentality which produced the Great Anti-Communist Crusade is back. The cause of the fear may have changed but the goal remains the same.

The fear to be stoked and exploited now?

Simple: Terrorism. (Notice, that is not the actual adversary of the US or the West today. As you know, the real enemy is Islamism and its violent arm, Jihadism.)

The goal?

Equally simple: Increased governmental power over ideas, words, beliefs, and, thus, behavior.

This brings us to the third reason, the reason that links past and present, the US with the United Kingdom.

HR 1955. (There is a delicious irony to this bill number. 1955 was the year after McCarthy was censured by the Senate for disrespecting the body, but it marked an uptick in the Great Anti-Communist Crusade.)

Sponsored by Rep Jane Harman (D-CA), the bill passed the House with only six dissenting votes just over a month ago and now rests with the Senate Homeland Security and Government Operations Committee. (You might recall that Joe McCarthy gained his renown as chairman of a Government Operations subcommittee.)

Ms Harman's bill seems innocuous enough as it simply establishes a non-partisan study commission charged with investigating how radicalization might occur among Americans as well as how terrorism might become an expanded homegrown threat. It also provides for the commission to propose legislation to avert threats and for the establishment of an "Excellence Center" to continue to devise ways and means of countering homegrown terrorism and ideological radicalization.

(The entire text is available for your edification and deliction at this site if you want it fast. http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/cgi-bin/blogs/voices.php/2007/11/25/p21365)

Legislation always looks innocuous, filled with good intentions, written to seem both rational and fear reducing. If you don't believe the Geek, take a look at the Communist Control Act or the McCarran-Walters Act. They were written to seem limited, prudential, fear reducing. In their effect they were anything but.

The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act in conjunction with the hopelessly mis-named USA Patriot Act points at a future every bit as grimly marked with federal government intrusion in the words, thoughts, and behaviors of Americans as that already underway in the United Kingdom.

Privacy is central to a full, effective life. The ultimate, most basic purpose of a liberal state is to protect, jealously guard even, the rights of privacy which make a citizen a whole, self-actualizing individual.

The mantra of the Blair and Brown ministries, "if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear," will soon be heard here, brayed to the skies by the congresswallahs seeking to terminally undermine our God (and Constitutionally) given right of private existence.

Recently, a high ranking US intelligence official blithely declared that we Americans would have to redefine privacy given the technology currently existing. He missed the point. It is our choice what and how much of ourselves we will display to the world on the Internet. We decide how we will either expose or conceal ourselves in the virtual universe.

Our choice. Not the government's.

Freedom means the right to choose. To choose whether to be naked to the world or not.

In so far as the past is prologue, to the extent that England shows the wave of tomorrow, fear exploiting politicians will do whatever they think necessary to deny us the right of choice, the freedom to be private selves. It is up to us to stop the newest juggernaut before it crushes us all.

We don't surrender to the Jihadists. We must not surrender to fear and fear mongers in Congress.

Thursday, November 22, 2007

Are Muslims The Vipers In Our Nest?

Religious beliefs formed the foundation of the United States nearly two centuries before the country came into existence. We (sort of) acknowledge that fact with our continued celebration of Thanksgiving. The original celebrants of Thanksgiving were a group of religiously intolerant fugitives from the "blasphemous" air of Anglican polluted England.

Make no mistake about it. The Puritans saw themselves as the only "real" Christians. In their estimate the Church of England was as un-Christian as the hated Roman Catholic Church. Nor were they any more willing to accept any other "dissenting" groups such as the Quakers or the motley bunch assembled around Roger Williams in the Rhode Island Colony.

The Puritans came to New England to hold themselves "pure" and prepare for a return to the "world" in order to redeem it when God so directed.

So, they drank, fornicated, repented every Sunday and went back to drinking and fornicating with the occasional time out to hunt "witches." A nice Godly crew, right?

Religious intolerance continued well into our collective national history as shown by the anti-Catholic bias that continued through (and beyond) the Nineteenth Century. The Democratic Party was branded as the party of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" after the Civil War, and the distrust of Catholics continued into the Twentieth Century as seen in the campaigns of Al Smith in 1928 and John Kennedy thirty-two years later.

In recent years the Christian Right has brought back the fires of the Puritan witch hunts in at least metaphorical form with judicial and political litmus tests which subordinate economic and other considerations to an amorphous mass dubbed "values." These "values" whether a position on women's rights to control their reproductive lives, the relations between people of the same (or opposite) sex, or stem cell research have taken pride of place over such matters as the ways in which our tax money might be spent or even the issue of war and peace.

H. Rap Brown once said that violence was as American as apple pie. He might have more accurately averred that religious bigotry and myopia were as American as cherry pie.

Now we have to face the bedrock of religious belief and its perversion in a more concrete and potentially threatening way. We have to take a hard and long look at the position of Muslims in American society.

Muslims currently make up only a small percentage of the American population. However that percentage is bound to grow, perhaps significantly given immigration and the increased number of conversions, particularly among Americans of African ancestry.

Europe has already been faced with the difficulties of an increasing number of Muslims. We must not only observe--and learn, we must also examine how Islamic jurists define the responsibilities of a Muslim living in a non-Muslim country.

For a start, take a look at http://www.meforum.org/article/1761. The author gives a well-balanced synopsis of the state of play regarding the determinations offered by various Islamic clerics/jurists on the relationship between the Muslim and the non-Islamic society in which he lives.

Douglas Farah offers a less-than-positive stance on this article in his post (which is reposted on the Counterterrorism Blog) http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/278/in-some-ways-the-crux-of-the-matter.com. He emphasizes the duty laid upon Muslims to consolidate their position and seek the creation of a global Islamic state.

The creation of a new, presumably global, caliphate is the end goal of Islamism. Various Islamist writers from Qutb to bin Laden have made this clear. Further, whether Islamist or not, the assorted Islamic jurists and clerics have asserted that the corrupt, decadent West will and must accept Islam.

In a similar way, Islamic clerics and jurists of all stripes agree that the first loyalty of a Muslim is to Islam, not the state. This is not a restatement in updated terminology of the old canard held to be true for so long in the US that the first loyalty of a Catholic is to the Pope and not the State. The Islamic community is held to be an alternative to the nation-state, a superior option which can and will be brought into existence thus replacing the Western invention.

Politically articulate and aware Americans would be well-advised to study Islamic formulations regarding the relation of Muslim and state. Each of us must reach a well-founded position on this critical matter. Unless we do so we face two dangers. Each is as bad as the other.

The first is that Muslims who reject our view of separation of religious community and secular state will be able to use the liberties of our Constitution and political system to our ultimate disadvantage.

The other is that we Americans will dip deep into our well of religious bigotry and intolerance to make judgments and take actions which will do us long term harm.

It is a long, hard, and winding road between the idiocy of mindless, uncritical multiculturalism on one side and base bigotry on the other. Finding the road requires judgement based on knowledge. Keeping on it requires a clear awareness of who we are and what we are all about.

Wednesday, November 7, 2007

Is The Islamist War Getting Wider--And Longer?

The prime difficulty with fighting a limited war in support of policy is that both sides have to agree to keep the show under control.

In the Korean War, which should be seen as the prototype of modern period limited war, that was the case. The US along with the USSR and the PRC wanted to keep the war limited in space and means.

None of the three saw any advantage in widening the war geographically. As a result, the US did not bomb north of the Yalu river even though airbases there were sanctuaries for North Korean and PRC fighters. In an often overlooked quid for the American quo, neither the PRC nor the North Koreans attempted to interfere with the lines of communication between Japan and South Korea.

The Soviet Union may have made a mistake when Joe Stalin gave the thumbs-up to the North Korean plan for a quick war in the South, but it did not worsen the error by seeking horizontal escalation at a place and time of its choosing. The US leadership fretted over the Soviet potential but finally came to the realization that it wasn't going to happen.

Another non-starter was the desire expressed by the American proconsul in Asia, Douglas MacArthur, to either "turn Chaing loose" or to go ahead on our own and dump atom bombs on Chinese targets. MacArthur's vision of both horizontal and vertical escalation across the nuclear threshold had a fair measure of support among some of the more stegosaurian types in Congress, the press, and the public.

The politically beleaguered Truman Administration kept on course. Korea was not a crusade of roll-back. It was a carefully limited war in support of one particular policy--containment.

The Korean War was seen symmetrically by the three major powers. By the tacit agreement of congruent national interests, the war was kept limited in scope, means, and goals.

The current administration has shown itself completely gripless concerning the nature of limited war. Or, if you prefer a more sinister interpretation of the past six years, it has shown itself to have no interest in limiting the wars which we are fighting.

The Geek admits that the second, the sinister, interpretation is implied by the grandiose and completely out-of-touch-with-reality phrase, "global war on terrorism." Even so, the Geek cannot pump up enough paranoia to make the charge.

The invasion of Afghanistan could, charitably, be characterised as a limited war in support of policy. At least the goal was limited: Eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The geographic scope was limited. The means were limited.

Arguably the goal and means were too limited...

"What's that!" You interrupt.

The Geek believes a case can be made for contending our goals and means were too limited in the beginning of our Afghan adventure. The interlocking, negative goals of eliminating Taliban and al-Qaeda were necessary but not sufficient.

The accomplishment of either or both of the negative goals required the setting and accomplishment of a complementary positive goal. Afghanistan would have to be (re)constituted as a functioning social-economic-political entity. As is so often the case in life, the positive goal would be far harder to accomplish than the negative.

The limitation of means, specifically the refusal of the current administration to deploy sufficient troops, assured that not even the negative goal could be accomplished. The replacement of men by technology, of boots on the ground by Tomahawks from submarines, made sure that both Taliban and al-Qaeda would be damaged but not destroyed.

Machiavelli wisely counseled the Prince not to leave any wounded enemies. The current administration developed and executed a plan of overly limited war on the cheap that created wounded enemies in wholesale lots.

Not only was the attack on Afghanistan too limited in goal and means, it was too limited in scope.

Before you squawk in outrage, let the Geek continue, please. As the desperately flawed endgame strategy of the Reagan Administration demonstrated, it is impossible to achieve anything in Afghanistan without considering Pakistan.

The current administration should have known this. All the information was right there. In the archives as well as in the living memories of individuals who had played key roles in the denouement of the American proxy war in Afghanistan during the Reagan-Bush years.

Taliban was the creation of Pakistan. The Islamists of the Zia al-Huq period in Pakistan made sure that this "Student" organization came into existence; that it was supported; that it gained military ascendancy over rivals in the Afghan internal wars.

There were two reasons for this "tilt to Taliban" approach within the government and military of Pakistan. One was ideological--Islamism to be precise. The other was the perceived need for "strategic depth" to the north and west against the threat to the east and south--India.

The second reason may seem idiotic from the perspective of the US, but it had (and has) power within the Pakistani government and military. This perceived strategic need links directly, even intimately, with the ideological cause.

India has a potent advantage over Pakistan in geographic area, population, and economic strength. In all the features of "hard" power, India has it all over Pakistan. The only possible counter to this advantage was the increase of Pakistan's resources in territory, population, and, most importantly, the social/cultural/political coherence of its human assets.

If Pakistan could extend its sway over not only Afghanistan but potentially beyond that region into the Islamic societies of at least some of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, it could off-set many of the Indian advantages. The off-set could be made even more potent if the Islamic population could be made coherent by ideology--Islamism.

This strain of thinking gave rise to the Pakistani support of Taliban as well as the efforts of A.Q. Khan. The combination of Islamism and nuclear proliferation would do much to assure that Pakistan would have superiority when the bell rang for the next round of Indian-Pakistani fighting. (It might even make war unnecessary as the Indians realized the shift in what the Soviets used to call the "correlation of forces.")

Instead of taking a long, hard, cold look at the realities of Pakistan and its international politics before sending Tomahawks to Kabul, the current administration simply assumed that the new military strongman in Islamabad, General Musharraf, would be a staunch ally in the effort. It kept on with the long standing, and not particularly well advised, policy of tilting toward Pakistan.

Gosh, the Geek knows that the Indian government to say nothing of particular personalities within that government can be extremely annoying. India has a long record of irritating US administrations going all the way back to that of Harry Truman. Just because the lads (and lassies) in New Delhi have been aggravating doesn't mean they are threatening to either the United States or Pakistan.

By overly limiting goals, means, and geographic scope to the war in Afghanistan, the US assured that the war could not remain limited. It would spill over into Pakistan whether we or the government of Pakistan wanted it to. Over time, the spill over would be of such magnitude as to threaten the continued existence of the Musharraf regime.

None of what is happening right now in Pakistan should have come as a surprise to anyone with even a cursory understanding of the region's history over the past fifty years. The way in which the current administration planned and executed its invasion of Afghanistan kicked the rock over the edge. Now we are seeing the avalanche.

Had the US not invaded Iraq it might have been able to retrieve the situation in Afghanistan by putting enough boots on the ground. The Geek believes this would have been unlikely. By the time the current administration would have realised that the "shock and awe" approach to limited, unconventional war didn't work, Taliban and al-Qaeda would have already gone to ground in the Tribal Agency areas of Pakistan.

The choice would have been between sending the new boots to Pakistan or depending on military assistance to the Pakistanis to boost their ability to fight the Islamist groups on their own territory. The highest probability is that the current administration would have taken the latter course.

In short, we would have done in Pakistan what we have been doing. With the same results. Inevitably the war would have widened. And lengthened.

As it was, the current administration opted for horizontal escalation by invading Iraq. Not surprisingly, the opposition, the Islamists, have sought horizontal escalation of their own.

There is no doubt that the war with the Islamists which was forced upon us on 9/11 will widen more. This will occur whether or not the current administration takes military action in Iran.

What's the lesson in all of this?

Simple. Define the political goals, both negative and positive which will bring about a better state of peace from at least the American perspective. Limit the geographic scope of the war by correctly understanding not only the dynamics in play within the target country but between it and other regional actors. Use means that will allow the accomplishment of the goals within the limited geographic scope of the war. Finally, it is necessary that goals and means combine to effectively deny the opposition the opportunity to seek horizontal escalation.

If a country (us in this case) can't define goals, scope, and means such as to assure a better state of peace is achieved rapidly enough to prevent horizontal escalation; if coinciding national interests cannot be at least tacitly enlisted to hinder horizontal escalation, then don't go to war. Find some other way to project national power so that the goal might be achieved.

Monday, November 5, 2007

Did Musharraf Have Another Choice? Do We?

The Geek has been waiting for General Musharraf to take the big step of imposing martial law ever since the contretemps between his regime and the Pakistani Supreme Court a few months back. The Geek can't say that he has been anticipating the inevitable with any degree of glee, 'cause that ain't the case.

Pakistan reminds the Geek of an incident he experienced some years back at an Air Force Base. The then brand new F-111 was being displayed on Armed Forces Day. It did a slow, dirty pass over the runway in front of the crowded bleachers. Suddenly the plane's nose pitched up. Diamond shaped shock waves hit the concrete below as the pilot hit throttle up.

In the stands every man who was a pilot stood up, fists clenched, mouths forming the words, "Oh, shit," as he willed the airplane to keep flying. All the non-pilots remained sitting, many applauding what they believed to be a fine piece of exhibition flying.

It was fine flying for sure as the pilot kept the bird balanced on its afterburners until it was past the stands. Then it pancaked in.

Pakistan has been like that F-111, nose up in a full stall but powered on by a combination of international will and the flying ability of General Musharraf. Experienced observers, like the flyers in that long ago crowd, knew that something was dreadfully wrong with the country, knew it would crash, but hoped the crash would be delayed--and survivable.

With the imposition of martial law under whatsoever term is like putting full emergency military power to the afterburners. It is a short-term, desperate attempt to avoid catastrophe. If it fails, the crash will be fast, hard and deadly.

Musharraf's action may be his only viable option. His indictment of the Supreme Court has merit. It should not be cast aside as political posturing by a power-hungry despot.

The Court has acted as if it were far more concerned in settling political scores with the military junta than in being an effective collaborator in the task of developing democratic stability in Pakistan. The position taken by the Court at the behest of opponents of Musharraf that the validity of the presidential election would be decided weeks after the election of Musharraf had taken place must rank as an act of judicial stupidity or sabotage far surpassing the akin act taken by the US Supreme Court in December 2000.

The General's references to the growth of terrorist and insurgent activity in recent months are the truth. If anything, they are an understated version of the reality within Pakistan,

Much of the dramatic upswing in Islamist/Jihadist activity must be laid directly at the feet of Musharraf and his military partners. Would you like an example?

OK, here it is, The Frontier Corps formed initially by the British generations ago to patrol the border between what are now Pakistan and Afghanistan is a paramilitary force. It lacks equipment, modern weapons, training, doctrine and good command and control. It's morale is shaky as exhibited by mass surrenders upon occasion. The loyalty to the government of many of its members is questionable.

Sounds good, right?

Now the best part. The Frontier Corps does the heavy lifting in the Tribal Agency territory where Taliban and al-Qaeda relocated following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Frontier Corps is the primary opponent of the rested, regrouped, refitted, resupplied and reinforced Islamist presence in North Waziristan and elsewhere in the Tribal Agencies.

And, now for the kicker.

The US has provided over ten billion dollars in aid to Pakistan since 9/11. Most of that money was for the purpose of military assistance so that Pakistan could be a more effective ally in the "global war on terrorism."

This must mean that the cash went to the Frontier Corps and other counterinsurgency oriented forces. Right?

Wrong!

In a fit of incredible stupidity on the part of Musharraf and the current American administration which allowed it to happen, most of the bucks went to better equip the conventional Pakistani military forces. To better prepare the Paks for another rematch with India, perhaps? Or maybe the deep thinking neocon ninnies of the current administration hopes that Pakistan might invade Iran and force a little regime change?

Phooey!

Musharraf and his coterie of appropriately bemedaled associates want a conventional army, want the prospect of yet another go-around in the Kashmir. Want to win (or at least not lose badly) the next time. If any American had shown the temerity to inquire as to the utility of high performance aircraft or heavy artillery to the hard but low tech realities of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, the Musharraf regime would have played the "necessity to keep the army happy card."

There is some truth to that. The army is the most stability oriented institution in Pakistan. It is the only truly "national" structure in an otherwise basically feudal, tribal country which might become a nation someday.

The army and police forces are the afterburners on Musharraf's jet now. He has no choice but to rely on them to keep him and Pakistan around him from a free fall to disaster.

That's bad. Even worse--we have little choice except to hope the afterburners keep flaming. That means we have to keep the fuel--the Geek means money--flowing.

The Geek feels frustration out the ying-yang over the current state of play in Pakistan! It's not like it couldn't be seen coming. We've been through it before.

We went through it in Vietnam. One damn stupid bunch of tunnel visioned bumblers after another whipsawed South Vietnam until it was ready to fall apart. Each time the Washington deep thinkers and pragmatic strategists decided we had no choice except keep on supporting the bunglers du jour in Saigon and hope for the best. (The one time we didn't. The time we decided on a little exercise in guided regime change, matters went from disastrous to catastrophic. The Geek refers to the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem.)

Heck! We've even been through it before in Pakistan. Twenty or so years ago, we turned responsibility for the endgame in Afghanistan over to the Paks. The result? Chaos followed by Taliban for Afghanistan. For us and the rest of the world the result was A.Q. Khan--and the increased power of the Islamists in the Pakistani armed forces and intelligence service.

Pakistan may hold a geographically critical position. The Pakistani government is not an ally. It cannot be given the fissures running through its society and polity alike. It can be a partner in an endeavor where Pakistani and American national interests are closely coinciding. That is if and only if the Pakistani regime and its use of our assistance is very closely and very coldly monitored and directed.

The current administration blew the requirement for close scrutiny and direction. In that way it became the equivalent of the hydraulic valve that failed and caused the F-111 to crash in front of the Geek and hundreds of others.

Back then the superb competence of a General Dynamics test pilot assured that no one died or was even seriously hurt when the plane smacked the ground. The Geek doubts that General Musharraf is so skilled.

Saturday, November 3, 2007

Ayman al-Zawahiri Raises The Stakes

Physcian turned al-Qaeda strategist, al-Zawahiri comes on hot and heavy in his hot off the recorder tape today. While the linkage between al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) is not exactly a recent development despite what many mainstream media reports indicate, the tape is interesting. Perhaps important. Perhaps even very important.

For good reason, Americans focus on the Mideast. Like a precision guided munition on steroids, we keep an unblinking eye on Iraq. A blinking eye on Afghanistan. An occasionally opened eye on Israel.

For Americans, the huge swath of North Africa doesn't exist.

For Islamists and Jihadists, North Africa is a wide open theater of operations not yet properly exploited. That is the real importance of the new al-Zawahiri tape.

In it the man in the shadows behind Supreme Icon bin Laden names the new targets: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco. None of these are unimportant little geographic pimples on the map of Africa. None are without recent experience with Islamist threats.

Algeria came within a gnat's eyebrow of voting in an Islamist regime a few years ago. The coup-by-election was forestalled by the Algerian armed forces. Blood flowed fast and hard. While the flow has slackened to a comparative trickle, the combat continues in the souks and in the mountain villages alike.

Tunisia has not been a monument to stability either. The Islamists are alive, well, and killing someone nearly every day. The Tunisian government barely survived the turbulence brought by Arafat and company when they transferred from Lebanon to Tunisia twenty some years ago. Arafat and his coterie of gunslingers and bombthowers have long since departed but not the fissures they left behind.

Libya is not as stable as it once was. Gaddafi is getting on in years. His years of drug use have taken a toll on mind and body alike. The unifying pressure once conveniently supplied by American opposition has faded into the mists of the Cold War. His state security bureau is no where near as efficient as it was back when the East German Stazi provided necessary training and advice. Worst of all, Gaddafi blinked--hard--when we invaded Iraq, (The Colonel didn't need us bombing his tent again.)

Out in the Libyan desert, between the oil pumps and tanks, the Islamists mutter and the Jihadists plot.

Quite recently Morocco has been the scene of several dramatic, if relatively under covered by the mainstream media, acts of Jihadist terror. King Mohammed sits on a throne every bit as unstable as that occupied by King Abdullah of the House of Sand.

Al-Zawahiri is well aware of the weaknesses present in all of these countries. He seeks to exploit them for the benefit of the Islamist cause.

Let's listen in.

"Islamic nation of resistance and jihad in the Maghreb, see how your children are uniting under the banner of Islam and jihad against the United States, France and Spain."

Later the ex-doctor added, "Support... your children in fighting our enemies and cleansing our lands of their slaves (Moamer) Kadhafi, Zine El Abidine (Ben Ali), (President Abdelaziz) Bouteflika and (King) Mohammed VI." The quotes are from the French press agency's translation, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gwwodPc1iWAWogDHpT0pFoMr9bWw.

France, Italy, and Spain all have more directly threatened interests in the countries on al-Zawahiri's little list. Oil leads the list, of course. Beyond that, the European states have wider economic interests which gradate into strategic military and political concerns. All must also view with a fair degree of disquietude the prospect of absorbing a refugee flood if terror attacks rise to a critical level.

The question of economic destabilization as well as that of refugee generation must raise some alarm throughout the European Union. The issue of Muslim immigration is not exactly a below the radar scope matter in most EU members right now.

Islamists have a real need to spread Jihadism beyond its current venues. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been checked--severely. Taliban and its adherents are under increasing pressure in Afghanistan. Pushed by the recent upsurge in Islamist/Jihadist activities, the Pakistani strongman has taken the extreme action of declaring a State of Emergency. It is too early to see how this might play out.

The potential for Pakistani collapse may be high but no one can safely bet that the US would stand by merely wringing its hands. Whether or not the US finds itself deep in the Pakistani morass, the Islamist cause is best helped by horizontal escalation of its war on the West.

That consideration probably lies behind the al-Zawahiri call to Fatah to both overthrow the PA chieftain, Abbas, and join with al-Qaeda and LIFG in one big war.

Horizontal escalation is (or should be) the single greatest nightmare of the deep thinkers in the current administration and the war planners in the Pentagon. In the past, the potential of Soviet horizontal escalation served to inhibit US policy makers and executors alike. (It was one of those if-we-do-this-in-Asia, the Soviets can do something in Berlin considerations.)

So far, the current administration and its critics have been notably silent on the horizontal escalation potential in the "global war on terrorism." There seems to have been some sort of unjustified assumption that we and only we had the initiative in this war.

We made the same mistake in Vietnam. It was one of the main reasons we were shocked to the depths of our collective political will by the Tet Offensive in 1968.

There is no need to be shocked now. The brains of al-Qaeda, the only one of the leadership cadre who might deserve to be termed a political-military strategist, al-Zawahiri, has announced the intent to escalate the war horizontally at a place of the enemy's choosing.

Iran is not the only game in town. Neither is Israel and the West Bank/Gaza Strip.

The current administration and its neocon ninnie supporters need to get a grip on that.

Al-Zawahiri has made that clear. Whether we like it or not, the game will widen.

China--"Not A Threat At This Time?"

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is on his way to the Peoples' Republic of China. As ever he is diplomatic, averring that China is not yet a "threat" to the United States. Presumably he spoke with respect to direct military confrontation only.

Why the limitation?

Because China is, has been, and will continue to be a direct threat to US interests generally. In time it will become a greater direct military threat to us as well.

The Chinese regime has shown a limited capacity and willingness to work alongside the United States as in the recent successful negotiations with North Korea. Chinese national interests were directly involved as were those of the other states engaged in the lengthy process with the rogue Korean regime.

In other situations where the physical interests of China are not directly, substantially, and materially involved, China has proven itself to be an obstacle to multi-lateral diplomatic efforts. The most blatant example of this is the Iranian nuclear matter. China (along with Russia) came to the recently concluded London meetings of the P5+1 without any apparent sense of urgency and without any real preparation as to the time line for the third round of sanctions.

In a closely related matter, the Chinese government is selling J-10 fighter-bombers to Iran. These aircraft are the state of the Chinese art. This continues the fine record established many years ago by Beijing as a willing supplier of more-or-less advanced weaponry to international troublemakers.

Of course it helps that Iran has lots of oil for sale and the PRC needs lots of oil--preferably cheap. Domestic demand for petroleum products is growing even faster than Chinese predictions.

China has not been noteworthy for its stance on Burma. While there is no probability that the Chinese are in the running for the Global Human Rights Award, it might still be in Beijing's interest to show a modicum of support for international efforts to reform the Burmese junta's behavior. The Chinese have the economic leverage. The government simply has chosen not to use it.

(The Indian government also has the leverage and has also refrained from using it.)

Even in Northeast Africa where the Chinese also have significant economic leverage, Beijing has shown no willingness whatsoever to cooperate with international efforts in Sudan.

Do we see a pattern here?

The Peoples' Republic of China is not simply nor solely a threat to US diplomatic interests and efforts. No. It's not that simple. The PRC is a threat to international efforts generally. Efforts jointly undertaken by countries with diverse national interests. Efforts undertaken by governments that do not agree in whole or perhaps even in part with the stance(s) of our current administration.

International collaboration on humanitarian, human rights, and nuclear non-proliferation are driven not simply by subjective, self-defined national interest but by a realization that some matters are of such import that mere national considerations must be placed at least temporarily to one side.

The Chinese regime is unwilling to do this. It is unwilling to work effectively with multi-lateral efforts unless direct national interest is at risk.

In this as in the PRC's cavalier attitude toward such matters as export safety, or transparency in military spending, research, and development, Beijing has shown itself an international delinquent. That alone is enough to make them a threat to us--and others.

Then there are some other little matters---

Chinese espionage and cybernage directed against multiple targets both military and industrial here in the US as well as within other countries. The Geek is perfectly well aware that all countries possessing the capability for spying do so. On everybody they can. The status of ally or enemy is not so much a hindrance as an inducement.

The Chinese seem to have been going over the edge in the practice however. Even compared to their nearest rivals in the Great Global Spook Derby, the Russians. Come on, guys! Really, New Zealand? Was that really, really necessary?

How about the Chinese space program? Sure, everyone is talking space now. Even some countries in Africa which should be far more concerned about how they are going to feed their (rapidly expanding) population are bidding to become "Mission Control" of the continent.

The Chinese are serious. And, seriously capable. The technology is readily available to support even their announced, expansive idea of establishing a moon base in the next couple of decades. All it takes is time and money. Beijing has both.

Space programs are inherently military even when run by a civilian agency. All space related technology has immediate, easy direct transferability to military usages. In a real sense, the Chinese efforts in rocketry and space science are a ramp-up of the country's capacity as a military threat.

China may not be a direct military threat to the US right now, today. But the clock is ticking. And, it is not ticking in our favor.

Get a grip on this before you buy the next "Made in China" product.

All sales of such goods helps the Chinese government. Every time we shop at Walmart or a similarly bottom line driven "corporate citizen," our money is helping an international delinquent which has already threatened US national interests. A country so propelled by subjective, self-defined national interests that it is unwilling to collaborate in well-intended, widely supported multilateral measures.

Every dollar flowing to China helps this massive bad boy of the globe develop greater financial muscle to support its pursuit of its national interest.

Remember what Lenin said?

"The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them."

These are words the Chinese government lives by today. Why help them hang us?

Friday, November 2, 2007

The Geek Makes A Fearless Forecast

In the near future, Pakistan will go Islamist. Not Islamic--that's what it is now--but Islamist. You know, like Iran. But, perhaps to an even greater extent.

There are a number of indicators in the open literature that show a continuation and even an increase in trends within Pakistan which extend back at least three decades. These include the recent poll showing limited support for fighting either al-Qaeda or Taliban. Take a look at the details in, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/oct07/PakAlQaeda_Oct07_quaire.pdf.

Another poll found strong support for the greater inclusion of Sharia (Islamic customary law) in the legal system of Pakistan. According to the poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, seveny-six percent of those questioned favored including Sharia. See the results of last month's poll at http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/Pakistan%20Poll%20Report.pdf.

The same sources make it clear that any unilateral US effort at "hot pursuit" of Taliban or its foreign components into Pakistan would be rejected by the majority of the Pakistani population. Any effort by Musharraf or a Musharraf-Bhutto combination to allow US raids into the Tribal Agencies would be particularly fraught with political peril as only a small minority of borderland dwellers go so far as to approve of a purely Pakistani military effort against the guerrillas.

Ready for more unpleasant news from "our key ally" Pakistan?

OK. Here it is. Between a third and a half of the Pakistanis have a favorable opinion of the various groups ranging from al-Qaeda (at the low end of approval) through Taliban (in the middle of the range) to various indigenous Jihadist groups (at the high end.) Put together with the emphasis on customary Islamic law, which is a key component of Islamism's ideology, the approval of Jihadist groups makes clear that the Pakistanis are not inclined to support the American efforts against Islamism/Jihadism.

Regardless of the soothing mood music coming from our State Department (for a Pakistani report of the Muzak from State, see http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?193233), the reality is quite different. Neither the 150 megabucks per month expended by us on Pakistan since 2001 nor the current administration's call for an additional 60 megabucks to be focused at the Tribal Agencies, particularly North Waziristan, has made any measurable difference in the ani-US, pro-Islamist stance of the Pakistani population.

The search for "moderates" in Pakistan reminds the Geek of the similar chasing after mirages during the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-80. There may be "moderates" in Pakistan today as there may have been individuals of similar inclination in Iran twenty-eight years ago.

So what!

"Moderates" in Iran back then or in Pakistan today are utterly irrelevant. If they exist, they are so insignificant in numbers or so unimportant in political or military position that they might as well live on the back side of the moon.

The US State Department may actually believe what its spokesman said the other day that "Pakistan is undergoing a political transition... [including] moderate forces within the Pakistani political system working together for a moderate Pakistan". If the deep thinkers in Foggy Bottom actually think this is the truth, they aren't worth the money we're paying them.

Remember the Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence agency were behind the creation and success of Taliban in Afghanistan. Remember, A.Q. Khan could not have engaged in his wholesale efforts at nuclear proliferation without the knowledge and agreement of the same two organisations. Remember, the performance of the Pakistani Army despite recent small scale successes has been somewhere between poor and inexcusably pathetic.

US pressure may have resulted in the deployment of nearly 100,000 military and para-military personnel into conflict areas. But this pressure cannot make the armed forces perform well nor maintain a will to combat over time. The Times of India reports in detail on some of the losses and difficulties encountered by the Pakistani forces as they reluctantly lumber into action. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Multiple_conflicts_bleed_Pak_army/articleshow/2503763.cms.

The Paks have promised an "all out" military effort to rid the Tribal Agency border region of Taliban and similar "militants." But, they have made the same promise in the past. Repeatedly. Considering the heavy losses and poor morale of the troops, this promise will not last long.

The current administration needs to get a grip on a fundamental reality.

We are not engaged in a "Global War on Terrorism" as it would have us believe. We are actually fighting a total war against Islamism and its armed component, Jihadism. This means simply that the real battlefield is not the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The real battlefield in Pakistan and elsewhere is the minds, the collective worldview of the people. The genuine strategic challenge is to find a way to convince a critical mass of the Pakistani population (as well as the populations of other Islamic countries) that the best future for them does not rest with the cramped Islamist notions but with the melding of Islamic and Western ideas and structures.

The development and application of that type of strategy will not be simple nor fast. All that can be said is that without acknowledgement of the actual enemy in the current struggle, there is no chance of doing it.

We had better do it now and well. Remember, Pakistan is a nuclear power.

We had better shift gears darn fast--Pakistan is like an eighteen wheeler balanced on the edge of a steep cliff. It may tumble tomorrow.

Thursday, November 1, 2007

Lessons? From Our Wars

The United States has fought a bunch of wars in the last one hundred years. Some have gone by almost unnoticed--interventions in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Others have undergone intense scrutiny--World Wars I and II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars as well as our current undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq.

From all these wars lessons of a sort have been learned not only by our military but by We the People as well. Some of these lessons have been real, material, and have served to improve both decision making about entering war and our war fighting capability. Other lessons have been misleading, or even down right false.

The Geek thinks it might be time to take a look at some of these lessons, both true and false and see how they can be used to evaluate the American position today. The exercise might help us to more accurately assess probabilities for war in the near term.

The First World War sits astride history as the Great Fault Line, a total discontinuity between that which existed before August 1914 and that which happened after November 1918. That war gave rise to many of the problems bedeviling the world today in the Mideastern wreckage of the Ottoman Empire.

The American public took one great and greatly wrong lesson from World War I. It went by one word--Isolationism. The World War did not deliver a conclusive victory from the American perspective. Neither did it result in a better state of peace, again from the American point of view. The world was not safer for democracy. Russia became the Soviet Union. The seemingly undefeated nature of the German Army gave rise to the "stab in the back" theory which was so important to the rise of National Socialism less than twenty years after the guns fell silent on the Western Front.

The American military did learn some few but valuable lessons. These included the centrality of being ready to go to war before you went there. Not that it mattered. We the People and our representatives assured that this lesson would go for nothing as we hunkered down in an Isolationist "Fortress America."

World War II caught us not only by surprise (although it shouldn't have) but unready for real war against real gun-toting enemies. Hard fighting--and an enormously efficient industrial plant--along with the ability of the Russians to die in great numbers while killing lots of Germans brought victory in Europe. Industrial capacity reinforced by very hard fighting against an opponent inferior in numbers but superior in his willingness to die brought success in the Pacific.

We the People learned a very big--and very misleading--lesson from WW II. To be successful, a war must be total in nature. All restraints must be cast off. Total dedication, total ruthlessness of force application brought total victory. Victory through unconditional surrender.

For us the paradigm of war was established. War was forced on us by an absolutely evil enemy. We mobilized our total capacity and total political will. We fought with the determination to inflict maximum death and destruction upon the enemy at the lowest possible cost in American lives. The enemy was totally defeated, left naked and defenseless. At our mercy.

With our sword at the enemy's throat we Americans said, "Rise. Go hence. Sin no more." Ruthless in war, we were merciful in victory. That was the Good War.

The military learned some long lived lessons from World War II as well. Rapid maneuver so as to bring overwhelming firepower to bear on a single critical point in the enemy's defenses all orchestrated and controlled by effective technologies of command, control, and communication assured the quickest, lowest cost victory possible.

Ever since WW II, the American military and naval forces have emphasized moving, shooting, and communicating so that time and lives might be saved. In a war between opponents having rough parity in technology, industrial capacity, and social/political organisational complexity, this is appropriate.

The question left hanging in the air by both the popular and military lessons learned from WW II is simple: How often has the WW II paradigm been operative? How often in our history before or since WW II has the US engaged in total war of a bloody and decisive nature with the outcome being the unconditional surrender of the enemy?

The overlooked answer to the unasked question is one word--none. Not even the War Between the States qualifies. The end state was not unconditional surrender. Not even the vengeance ridden Republicans such as Thad Stevens could make it so. The reasons are self-evident.

Less than five years after V-J Day we were at war again. In Korea. The war no one wants to remember. The war of false lessons for both We the People and the military.

The Korean War was arguably the most important war we Americans fought in the 20th Century. It, not WW II, represented the true paradigm of war.

The Korean War was a limited war in support of policy. That is the big lesson to take away from the three blood soaked years on the ridges of the Land of Morning Calm.

The US policy goals in Korea were simply to apply the Doctrine of Containment to the Far East and to effectively establish the UN as an instrument for supporting that doctrine. It was not a grand crusade to eradicate communism in Asia despite what some Republicans of the day thought.

Contrary to what Douglas MacArthur (in)famously said, there was a substitute for victory. After the Peoples' Liberation Army rudely cured us of a bad case of "victory disease," the US government, if not We the People, understood that not losing was the best possible substitute for victory.

Specialists in the foreign policy community of the Cold War learned one lesson from Korea. It was that limited wars in support of policy were possible provided they were short in duration, low in casualties, and, most importantly, public support could be maintained.

The military relearned that firepower kills and maneuver in rugged terrain requires air transportation capacities far greater than those possessed in the early Fifties.

Vietnam challenged the lessons of Korea and WW II alike. First of all the war was not "forced" on us. Even in Korea we could assure ourselves that war had been forced upon us by a seemingly unprovoked North Korean invasion. Second, the generation coming of draftable age between 1965 and 1970 was different in several salient respects from earlier cohorts of draftees.

These differences between the Vietnam and earlier wars were not factored into the lessons learned by either We the People or our military. The American public, its government, and to a significant extent our Armed Forces agreed on a slogan, "No More Vietnams!" They disagreed on just what this slogan might mean in practice.

To some it meant simply keep the troops home, or on the Trace facing the Crimson Tide on the yonder side of the Iron Curtain. No more little wars. No more interventions. No more adventures in counterinsurgency.

To others, particularly those in the military, the big lesson of Vietnam was: We Ain't Goin' Nowhere 'Less We Got Two Things!"

The two things?

Monolithic public support and political will was first. The second was simply overwhelming force. Force enough, lethality enough, to assure a quick, decisive, and, above all, cheap victory.

The military gave full form to its lesson learned from the Vietnam experience in the so-called Powell Doctrine prior to Operation Desert Storm. It worked. The war was short, seemingly decisive, and very low cost in American lives.

Overlooked initially was the simple reality that the war had not resulted in a genuine defeat of the Iraqi government. We had accomplished our minimum necessary goal--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Other, more expansive, goals had been quietly forsworn as the US invasion hit its hundredth hour.

Korean War style "not-losing" had taken precedence over WW II model "victory." Prudence prevailed over any crusading impulse.

Move, shoot, communicate in order to find, fix, and destroy the enemy were reinforced in the US armed forces as the sovereign recipe for the kind of war the American public would support. That is a war which is short, bloodless, and appears to be decisive.

Off to one side, the rising generation of neocons, not yet the ninnies they would become, drew their own lesson from Operation Desert Storm as well as a superficial review of the performance of the Israeli Defense Forces in the Six Day and Yom Kippur Wars. When combined with the WW II paradigm and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, their mis-guided lesson learned would give rise to the "shock and awe" approach to war put into practice in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Remember, the expansive goals enunciated by George H.W. Bush in the run-up to Operation Desert Storm regarding the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and so on were quietly abandoned as the realities of combat in urban areas were considered. It was at least tacitly acknowledged within the Bush Administration and Pentagon that we had no plans and no capabilities for a prolonged occupation of Iraq. The diplomatic, military, and economic resources were simply not there for both a WW II type unconditional surrender by the Iraqis and post-war rebuilding of the country.

On the sidelines over the next eight years, the neocons (now evolving into ninnies) grumbled that the war had not been finished. It would have to be ended--correctly, some day in the future. The nagging increase in terrorist actions by groups typified by al-Qaeda as well as the humiliating spectacle of American troops put to the knife by rag-tag thugs in Somalia boosted the neocon conviction that the Cold War winning US would have to permanently abate the growing nuisances in the Mideast.

A final misleading lesson was learned from the application of air delivered firepower in the Bosnian intervention. Seemingly, a handful of precision guided munitions from American and NATO platforms forced an end to the intransigent regime in Belgrade and brought low-cost democratic peace to the long violent region.

The events of 9/11 met the WW II paradigm. War was forced on the US by a palpably evil enemy. Diplomacy proved useless. Only the military option remained.

If the neocons of the White House and Pentagon had stopped to review the actual as opposed to the ostensible lessons of the American wars of the 20th Century, they would have realised that the WW II paradigm was not actually applicable. The Korean War model was the one to use.

The invasion of Afghanistan was a limited war in support of policy. Our policy goals were twofold. The lesser was the capture or death of Osama bin Laden and others directly associated with the 9/11 attacks. The greater goal was the demonstration that Islamst groups or regimes would not be immune from an American retaliation. In short, the larger goal was deterrence.

By not examining the good and substantial reasons why Operation Desert Storm stopped short of "total victory," and considering what would be required on the days, months, and years following the moment of invasion in Afghanistan, the neocon ninnies assured that not only would victory prove elusive, but that simply "not losing" would be very difficult.

It is true that firepower kills. but killing does not necessarily result in victory. Similarly "shock and awe" may have a very short-term success, but in and of itself does not assure either victory or not losing.

The decision to invade Iraq cannot be attributed to any historical model. The Baghdad regime had not even appeared to "force" war on us. There was no reason for the exercise in regime change. Beyond those self-evident considerations, the current administration gave no apparent considerations to the actual requirements for reconstituting Iraq as a fully functioning state following any successful US invasion.

In Iraq, the neocon ninnies have created something new in American history--a paradigm of how to throw away a war. If they had set out to create a pattern labeled "How to Lose," they could not have done better.

In recent weeks, the American military has been charged with a mission unique in its history--retrieving victory (or at least not losing) from the jaws of defeat. As a policy, the invasion of Iraq richly deserves the failure to which it was plunging only a few months ago. As a nation, we deserve better. The world deserves better of us.

Right now, the military is doing the right things on the ground to give us and the world the better which we deserve. If these efforts bring at least some semblance of success, it will be interesting to see what new lessons We the People, our representatives, and our armed forces learn.