Get a Grip!

Third Time, Lucky?

2011-10-29T15:23:00.000-07:00

The US tried. It failed. Ethiopia tried (with US backing.) It failed. Now it is Kenya's time. The third country up in an attempt to restore some semblance of order to the bloody chaos called "Somalia." Will this effort end as did the two predecessors with failure, humiliating withdrawal, and the leaving of a geographic expression with no real reason to exist as a state in even more of a sanguinary mess?

The US failed as a combination of mission leap, one disastrously ill-planned operation, and the lack of both a policy focus and political will in and around the Oval. When Bill Clinton inherited the "humanitarian" operation initiated by George H.W. Bush, he neglected to define the goal of the force deployed in country. For reasons which escape rational analysis, his administration decided it was necessary to engage in regime change. This was odd as there was no real regime to change but rather a welter of tribal leaders engaged in a robust contest for supremacy. The man on the top at that moment was particularly unpleasant but no threat to the long term prospects for the Somali people.

In a fit of absent mindedness, someone decided--and others farther up the food chain confirmed this choice--to go after the Unpleasant Guy On Top. The result was the loss of nearly two dozen special forces troops, the bodies of whom were depicted being pulled around, naked, in the dirt of the streets by gangs of cheering women. This nauseating vision was displayed on the televisions of Americans with the result that Clinton and Company determined to cut and run rather than take proper action against the Somalis responsible.

This loss of political nerve was not justified and counterproductive, not only in Somalia but all over the Arab and Muslim world. It was this ostentatious failure of testicular and policy fortitude which gave the muscle to Osama bin Laden and his odious outfit as well as other advocates of violent political Islam.

With American support and assistance, the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia in the opening years of this century. They were successful in toppling the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was an effective government albeit given to policies and means antipathetic to American and Western norms. The ICU was speedily replaced by "the Youth" better known as al-Shabaab. This crew was orders of magnitude more dedicated to the cause of austere, violent political Islam than the ICU had been.

The Ethiopians rapidly found out that they had bitten off far more than they (or their now preoccupied American sponsors) could chew and swallow conveniently. For two years the Ethiopians held on, never secure even in their own bases, unable to broker a coalition of Somali tribal leaders willing to take over the burden of freeing their own country from the ever less popular zealots of al-Shabaab. Finally, the Ethiopians tossed in their towel and departed, leaving the field to the victorious "Youth."

From there it has been all down hill not only for the people caught in Somalia but for the West generally. As international diplomats played the game of creating a government and the African Union--well at least two member countries--deployed "peace keeping" forces to the center of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab consolidated its hold on the southern third of the country while pinning the Transitional Federal Government and its AU troops to a few blocks around the presidential palace.

During the same time, ambitious Somalis found a new and very profitable line of work--piracy. Even now with warships of several dozen navies on patrol, the maritime marauders commandeer ships every week with tens, no, hundreds of millions of dollars of ransom collected. The consensus of "experts" around the world is the pirates will not be defeated unless and until there is a functioning government with effective control of the Somali coast.

In recent months, the Gangbangers of Somalia, both landbased and maritime, have expanded their actions to include the kidnapping of Westerners frequenting expensive Kenyan resorts within in a convenient distance of Somalia. This has perturbed the Kenyans mightily. Even more disconcerting to Nairobi has been the tsunami of refugees flowing over the border. The tidal wave has grown since the drought enhanced famine has been worsened by al-Shabaab's stopping of food aid by international agencies.

The hundreds of thousands of Somalis self-dumped on Kenya is an unacceptable economic burden on the country. More, it represents a clear national security threat given Somali claims on the northern portion of Kenya and the large number of al-Shabaab agents living in Nairobi and Mombasa.

Kenya has clear reasons to see the end of al-Shabaab at least in the southern portion of the place. With this in mind, Nairobi aimed at the Somali port city of Kismayo. The port is the major source of al-Shabaab revenue: taxes on trade, particularly charcoal, headed for Yemen. It is also a prime source of pirates.

With its invasion, Kenya is doing a service not only for itself but for the West generally. Al-Shabaab is a threat not only to African states and the sea lines of communication but more broadly. Not only is it "officially" allied with al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab has direct operational links with al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and Nigeria's Boko Haram. Adding al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to the mix is apparently in the works. Given the widespread proliferation of weapons including MANPADS from the old Libyan arsenals, it is to be expected that al-Shabaab's military competence and potential for transnational terror will grow.

The biggest question is simply: Will Kenya succeed where others have failed?

The prognosis is, at best, mixed. The Kenyan armed forces have no real experience with war, even the limited sort of which al-Shabaab is capable. The forces are large, reasonably well equipped and trained, but without combat experience, it is hard to see if these factors are all that important. The launch of the invasion just as the annual rains were scheduled to start (they commenced on time) shows a lack of proper planning. The two thousand men across the border have been bogged down in the mud for some days now with the mechanical transport totally immobilized.

Overall the force (ten thousand at most) seems too small to deal with a highly mobile opponent along with the demands of MOUT--if the Kenyans do reach Kismayo. The Kenyan air dominance will not matter once their ground forces are in close contact with al-Shabaab fighters. The fight will become a slogging match between the mechanized, fire power heavy Kenyans and the more mobile, lightly equipped guerrilla opponents.

At that point, it will be what all asymmetrical wars must be--a contest of political wills. Already there are indications that the Kenyan opinion molding elite lack the stomach for a protracted war, which is exactly what the invasion will become without a game changer.

There is only one game changer which might be available. Not the African Union. Not the other states of the Horn of Africa. Nobody local is capable of altering the nature of the war.

The role of game changer properly belongs to NATO. Fresh off its "victory" in Libya, most of the NATO combatants already have a dog in the fight--the pirates. Certainly NATO ships have been heavily involved in the anti-pirate patrols and have actually killed pirates!

The leaders of France, the UK, the US and perhaps some of the others will be well advised to man up and back the Kenyan play. NATO has the aircraft, the ships, the logistics, the special forces, the intelligence assets necessary to change the game in Somalia quickly and surely. The pirates along with the bloody hands of the brutal killers of al-Shabaab provide more than enough justification for entering the war, even for invoking the doctrine of R2P.

There is no need to invoke the UN. Even the opposition of the AU can be ignored with impunity. The morass of Somalia is intolerable now--and will only get worse should the Kenyans suffer the same fate as did the Americans and Ethiopians. A robust NATO effort will be gratefully acknowledged (even if privately only) and might even silence some of the loud voices criticizing the alliance's efforts in Libya.

Get on with it, Messers Sarkozy, Cameron, Obama--the history books are waiting.

Foreign Policy Success? What Successes?

2011-10-27T15:34:00.000-07:00

The MSM have been spilling a lot of ink over the "success" of Obama's "leading from behind" doctrine as exhibited in Libya. Some experts in the field of geopolitics have gone so far as to extend the Libyan outcome as being but the latest in a string of unappreciated but real "successes" or at least non-failures attributable to the Nice Young Man From Chicago.

All things considered, there has been one real victory achieved by President Obama. His combination of responding to domestic political pressures--particularly the pervasive Democrat fear of being seen as "weak" on national security--combined with lofty, progressive rhetoric of the Bill Clinton sort has removed foreign policy from the election table. From his decision to allow the lethal takedown of Osama bin Laden to the murky way in which the US backed into the Libyan adventure in regime change, Obama responded more to the dictates of the public's political mood than any realistic assessment of US diplomatic needs and goals.

While it is no doubt true that defense and foreign policy will not play any discernible role in the 2012 election, which is a misfortune to say the least, the canny political sense of the incumbent in denying the Republicans any point of legitimate attack constitutes a real advantage to the Obama campaign. Also offering powerful assistance to the president's reelection effort is the combination of amazing ignorance and retro thinking which typifies the current elephantine field in its collective consideration of America's role in the world.

It is to be regretted greatly that none of the current GOP aspirants have yet gone after the record of failures which is the record of the present administration. The universe of discourse is both vast and central to the near and mid-term future of the US.

Consider Iraq. Yes, we are out of the place. That is good. But the cost of our exit has been to see failure left in the wake of the endeavor. True, the initial blunder belongs for all eternity to George W. Bush and his neocon ninny soulmates. But the Obama people knew the withdrawal date fixed by the Status of Forces Agreement was looming. They also knew that total withdrawal would be dangerous, perhaps fatally so for Iraq. So did the Iraqis. Yet, with nearly three years to act, the administration failed to find a formula which would allow sufficient troops to stay with the requisite legal immunity. Rather than search for the obvious alternatives to an act by the Iraqi parliament, Obama opted to get out of Dodge--and place the blame on the Boys In Baghdad.

Some success that--for the mullahs in Tehran and their local Iraqi henchmen.

In Afghanistan, the Obama authorized "surge" provided two results. The first was a short duration set of battlefield victories, which were meaningless given the publicly announced draw down and pull out dates giving the adversaries all they needed to know to stay the course. The second accomplishment of the Obama surge was to provide political cover and advantage as the surge forces come home before the elections.

The result was to embolden both the Taliban and Haqqini network as well as their Pakistani handlers. A second result was to undercut the will of the Karzai government to conduct the needed reforms, to develop an effective national force, or to prosecute the war with vigor. Along with the totally wrongheaded firing of General Stanley McChrystal, the date certain withdrawal schedule did nothing to enhance either the will or the operational ability of US and other foreign forces to conduct their mission with high morale and the most effective approaches on both the tactical and operational levels.

What a "success." Yes, for Islamabad and their proxies in Afghanistan.

Then there is Israel and the Palestinians. The Obama policy not only froze a bad dynamic in place, it worsened matters to a point that the two state solution has become even more unlikely now than at the end of the reign of George W. The truckling Cairo speech raised Arab expectations to a level that could not be met by a mere American president, particularly one whose guiding star was provided by domestic politics. As if that were not bad enough, the president has a very bad personal as well as political relationship with the Israeli prime minister, which in no way made it probable that Israel would go along with Washington's policy preferences.

What a success--if you are Palestinian head of government Abbas.

The "Arab Spring" had to be a success, right? After all it was the triumph of democracy over autocracy, and how can anybody see that as other than a success? Sure, it was--if you are a member of an austere, political Muslim group. As was the case in Iran all those long years ago, the legendary power of the people, the voice of the democratic ballot box, the exercise of free voting, will most probably bring austere Muslims into power. And, once there, it will take more than merely voting to get them out. (Once again see Iran as the paradigm.)

How about the "war on terror?" Fortunately our intelligence, law enforcement, and military forces are highly competent, so we have not suffered a homeland hit for ten years now. None of this is due to brilliant policy on the part of Mr Obama and his "team." On the policy level, the Obama administration has been every bit as clueless as its predecessor. BH Obama is no more willing than was George W to acknowledge that terror and other forms of asymmetrical war we have faced for more than a decade have been and are predicated on the religion. The same religion serves as the motivation of the various austere, political Islamists who carry out the acts of war and terror. Failure at the basic level of knowing the nature and character of the enemy assures the overall war will not be successful.

OK, the Geek hears you object, what about the standing of the US in the eyes of the world? It's gotta be better now than when Cowboy George was in the Oval.

You betcha, bucko. It is. And, more importantly, it is not. But that is a subject for a different post. Maybe tomorrow if the weather and the tetchy computer allow.

The Hardest Thing To Do--Nothing

2011-10-23T13:56:00.000-07:00

The signs of ascendant, austere, political Islam are unmistakable in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The sharply Islamist party, the Renaissance Party, is expected to hold a plurality if not an outright majority in the new constituent assembly in Tunisia. In Libya, the outgoing head of the National Transitional Council (NTC) announced changes in banking and family law to make Libya more Shariah compliant. In Egypt, the Salifists who are the granddaddy of all the austere, politically oriented Muslim groups, are battling with the Muslim Brotherhood for the number one spot in the forthcoming government, with the inevitable result being the triumph of austere political Islam as the two entities share far more than not.

Throughout both Egypt and Libya, both Christian and Muslim communities are under direct, physical attack. The Sufi shrines, venerated graves, and mosques in both countries have been vandalized, even destroyed by armed men bearing the symbols of Salifist affiliation. As the world well knows, the Coptic Christians of Egypt have been brutalized, killed even, not only by mobs of the austere and violent but by security force personnel as well. In Egypt as in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Christians have become a highly endangered species, occupying the same slot in the local social and political ecology formerly possessed by Jews.

There can be no doubt but the austere groups--the Salifists, the Wahhibists, the Deobandis--are well on their way to establishing operational dominance in the countries of the "Arab Spring" as they are in Pakistan and the Arab Peninsula. The Shia equivalents have done the same in Iraq. The outcome in the next few months will not meet the expectations of the Western leaders and governments which embraced the purportedly democratic fervor of the "Arab Spring."

In the context of looming disappointment, the opinion molders of the West would be well advised to consider a chain of events which hit the tipping point twenty years ago in Algeria. Back in 1991, Algeria was experiencing the same basic problems as ignited the "Arab Spring." There was very high unemployment, particularly among the educated youth. The economy was stagnant despite oil riches. Internal divisions of tribal and class origin split the nation. The long running autocratic government was out of ideas, and, more importantly, out of perceived legitimacy.

The government decided to call for elections. The campaign was loud, enthusiastic, energetic. Algerians went to the polls with joy, believing a real future beckoned. When the votes were counted, the government, its supporting elite, and the armed forces were shocked. The parties of the austere, political Islamists had won.

The army nullified the elections. Next it took power directly. Then, quite predictably, violent unrest started. By the time the shooting stopped, more than 150,000 Algerians were dead. Scores of thousands more had been wounded. Even more had been jailed. Many of these had been tortured.

Even today, more than a decade after the internal war ended, the scars remain. Despite the return of a semblance of democracy, a sort of "guided democracy," the echoes of the police state soldier on. Voices are quiet and furtive. After sunset, streets are weirdly quiet, a testament to the curfews of the period of military rule. The government supported Gaddifi until the bitter and bloody end. And, jobs are still scarce, the economy still in doldrums, regardless of the special relation with France.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

There is no real probability that rule by austere Muslims will see the end of the myriad economic and social problems which propelled the demonstrations which brought down ben-Ali, forced the military to toss Mubarak to the wolves, and led to the NATO enhanced violence in Libya. Prayer, beards, and putting women in garbage sacks will not assure jobs--particularly for the over educated, Western oriented youth which served as the shock troops in Tunisia and Egypt or provided many of the trigger pullers of the revolt in Libya.

Islam and the Koran will not, pace the Muslim Brotherhood's two best known slogans, be the answer. When the faces of disappointed revolutionaries are rubbed in the mud of reality, the most probable result will be another round of violence. Also, topping the list of outcomes to be expected will be the charges levied by the austere Muslims running affairs.

The folks in charge will accuse a sinister conspiracy on the part of the "Zionists" and the US for any and all failures. There will be calls for jihad to defend the new, faith based governments against the cabal of Jews and Americans. The path blazed by Iran (and to a lesser extent, Pakistan) will be traveled by the incoming regimes of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.

The countries will either go the way of successfully focusing anger on the mythical enemies in Israel, the US, and Europe or dissolve in a welter of internal war and blood. In the latter case, it is to be expected that the military will step in to restore order in a manner akin to the process which drew a bright blood red line through Algeria twenty years back.

Absent a miracle of Biblical proportions which will do the impossible--squaring the circle of austere Islam with the real requirements for success in the contemporary world--the picture which will be painted across much of the Mideast and North Africa over the coming months and years will be ugly as hell. The challenge to opinion molders and senior governmental wallahs will be to watch. To watch while doing nothing.

Given the past record of Western colonialism, neo-colonialism, or plain vanilla intervention and interference, the West, including the US, has no viable alternative. Rightly or wrongly, many, perhaps most, citizens of the countries in the regions see the West, its governments, its institutions, its corporations, its policies, its militaries as the props and supporters of dictatorships, the adversaries of indigenous desires, internal perceptions of dignity, as both indirect and direct exploiters, and as "the Crusaders" bent on the destruction of Islam. The truth or falsity of this belief set is irrelevant. What is relevant is simply that the beliefs are widely and deeply held.

The only viable option for the West, for the US, is to keep out. The people in the several countries must travel the very rough road alone. We must not even seek to use "soft power" methods to shorten the journey or pave over the worst parts of the road.

All we can or should do is make it clear that internal affairs of any and every Muslim majority state is of no concern to us. Beyond this, we must make it plain that any export of political Islam, most importantly, any export by violent means, will be met by robust, very robust means. As long as the austere, politically motivated Muslim governments keep it at home, they will be left to their own devices, but should they cross their borders, we will stop them by means of our own choosing.

This posture will be difficult, very difficult for NGOs given to humanitarian goals to accept let alone support. It is an unfortunate truth that any approach other than patient watching and vigilant guarding of our interests will make life worse both for us and the people who live under the sway of Salifists and others of their ilk. This is a stinging nettle of the sharpest sort, but we all need to get a grip on it.

What Victory(ies)?

2011-10-21T15:13:00.000-07:00

Today The Clueless Guy In The Oval announced (as expected) that all US troops other than the embassy guard will be out of Iraq by the end of the year. Instantly if not sooner, the political flacks which surround the Oval sprang into action averring with straight faces that this was the desired result as well as the fulfillment of a major campaign promise.

What a crock!

As American military and diplomatic officials including both the past and current Secretaries of Defense have maintained with a fair degree of passion, the continuation of a US military presence was essential for assuring that the past nine years, something on the order of a trillion dollars, and, most importantly, over 4,000 lives had not been wasted. Iraq's internal stability is very fragile on the best of days--and there are damn few of those. In addition, the Iranians present a clear and present threat against which Iraq has no credible means of either deterrence or defense. Beyond that, the Iraqi forces need much more training in their new weapons systems as well as in the areas of intelligence, logistics, air support, and communication.

Over the past year, the Obama administration had and threw away numerous opportunities to keep a suitable number of training, combat support, special operations, and combat forces in Iraq. The alleged block was the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to grant immunity from Iraqi judicial processes to the US personnel.

This, too, is a crock.

The administration--the president--insisted that legal immunity be granted by specific action on the part of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. This would have been politically impossible as the Obama foreign policy "team" must have known. There were other means of obtaining the requisite immunity which would have sidestepped the field of mines which constitutes the Council of Representatives as well the total Iraqi parliament. The simplest means would have been to list the names of each and every spook, special operator, trainer, and trigger puller on the embassy personnel roster, which would have made diplomatic immunity automatic. The Iraqi ForMin was wide open to this gambit as were other senior members of the Iraqi executive branch.

While it is true that Allawi--the head of the opposition bloc which was narrowly and questionably defeated by Maliki's bloc--complicated the matter, the US had and has sufficient juice with Allawi to end the stall he introduced. In short, there were no insurmountable obstacles in Baghdad to continuing the American presence even at the level of 20,000 troops.

The real deal was the Nice Young Man From Chicago was and is hoping that by bringing the last troops home against the rhetorical backdrop of declaring victory he will gain political mileage for the upcoming reelection bid. He has been purposefully willing to toss aside the last nine years, the trillion dollars, and the lives of more than 4,000 Americans for personal, partisan reasons.

The same applies to the specious claims of victory in Libya following the killing of Gaddifi yesterday. It was not a victory for the US. Nor was it one for NATO. While it is true that without the US/UK/French/NATO air campaign, on the ground advisers, weapons and equipment supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic game playing, "Brother Leader" would still be oppressing the Libyans and haunting the international scene. But, the only "victors" were the assorted militias who did the fighting and dying--and who will now claim the rewards.

It will be up to these sundry groups of trigger pullers as well as the myriad of tribal and religious leaders who more or less control the men with the AKs to decide which reward will go to who. The probability of continued and escalating violence is somewhere between high and extremely high. Rewards will be claimed and fought over. Payback will be the word of the day for months to come. The body count, already high, will increase. The NTC is losing support, in large measure because its actions and decision making are as transparent as a sandstorm. Regional, tribal, and religious loyalties far exceed any attachment to something called "Libya" or the "Libyan nation."

The death of the "King of Kings of Africa" removed whatever thin and tenuous glue held the competing factions and their guns together. Now it is a matter of every region, every tribe, every city, every clan, even every individual for him or itself. Every man raises his AK or RPG or MANPAD against every other.

There is no "victory" here for the US or France or the UK. There is and will be only more challenges to regional stability, regional peace, to international efforts on behalf of these worthy end states. There is utterly and absolutely nothing for the US--or Mr Obama--to crow about or see as a good lesson for tomorrow.

There is only the hope on the part of the president and his advisers that the Libyan adventure in "leading from behind" will bolster his fading reelection chances. (Note the recent Gallup poll placing his approval rating at the new low of 41%.)

Iraq is frail. Libya is even worse. The risks and sacrifices taken and made in both have been in vain by any rational calculus. One can only hope that the Obama campaign will not be aided by these false "victories."

Once More, Adrift At The Policy Level

2011-10-12T15:13:00.000-07:00

"Somebody will have to pay!" So said a high level Saudi royal (is there any other sort of royal?) regarding the Iranian plot to ace the Saudi ambassador to the US. Secretary of State Clinton as well as Vice President Biden made the customary formulaic statements about somebody, somewhere, somehow being "held accountable," in connection with the same bit of outrageous but normal Iranian diplomatic conduct.

Throughout the rarefied levels of the American government, there has been much bloviating and bleating about just how terribly Iran has violated international law and custom about the corporeal sanctity of diplomatic persons. This predicate was followed by earnest statements about the need to forge international solidarity against the rapscallions of the Iranian Islamic Republic. To this end, special missions have been dispatched to brief and enlist the full support of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC), and the Arab League.

By golly, this will sure show the ayatollahs, mullahs, and imams, won't it?

Of course, the Iranians have not only denied the existence of the plot, they have engaged in the expected counter accusations. At home a number of Iranians interviewed by the AP indicated there was no way anyone in Iran could have been either so ill-advised or so creative as to have developed the plot, let alone put it into initial operation.

It is easy for a skeptic to doubt the plot, it is too redolent of Hollywood thriller elements to be totally plausible. The only problem is that it is a very competent covert/clandestine operation completely in line with other previous Tehran initiated assassinations.

The al-Quds component of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is quite experienced, highly motivated, has excellent operational mechanisms, and is well acquainted with the drug trafficking organizations (DTO) of Central and South America. Given this last consideration, it is to be expected that the IRGC would turn to the drug smugglers of Mexico to actually conduct the mission. While it is a tad surprising that the men in Tehran turned to an American citizen rather than use one of their agents already resident in Mexico, the use of the dual national did provide some potential advantages.

It was fortunate (almost too convenient) that the DEA had a credible and reliable informant asset on tap to play the role of a Los Zetas member, but that may be clarified as to dynamics and timing as the legal processes unfold. Manssor Arbabsiar, the dual US/Iranian national, lives in Corpus Christi, so he would have been quite familiar with the Zetas and their extensive record of highly competent killings carried out with the flair and skill of an experienced special operations force.

The hiring of a group with the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct a bombing at a Washington, DC restaurant for a mere 1.5 million dollars is a feat of excellent bargaining. If the hit on the Saudi ambassador was carried out in conjunction with a set of simultaneous bombings on other, unrelated targets, the net result would have been to decouple any hint of Iranian sponsorship or involvement.

The combination of several, simultaneous bombings with the use of readily available explosives (which category includes military grade munitions such as C4) and equally common electronic components would have complicated the investigation further, reducing the probability of discovering the Tehran connection. A further fog would have resulted from the inevitable claims of responsibility which would have flooded the ether, an eventuality which would have grown with the size of the body count. Every group espousing violent political Islam, including those which are totally notional, would have jumped in with an appropriately worded media release.

As the investigation floundered about in the many leveled swamp of false flags, inconclusive forensics and competing claims of authorship, the ayatollahs and their operational tools could have sat back, smiling with grins wider than the Cheshire Cat, knowing the truth, a truth they would keep to themselves. Of course, the Saudis would have had their suspicions (as would the Americans), but without a case meeting legal standards, neither arrests nor military retaliation would have been politically feasible.

In short, the plot in outline is highly credible in all respects. Assuming the puppet masters in Iran and the operational assets in Mexico and the US observed standard operational security measures, the probability of detection either before or after the event would have been low. The probability of attaching the tail to the Iranian donkey would have been even lower.

It was either a matter of awesomely good luck or an intelligence coup of the first water which allowed the plot to have been penetrated so early and so successfully. The fact that the US did penetrate and did arrest a key conspirator in no way undercuts the brilliance of the concept--nor provide a firm basis for assuming the whole deal was an American confection.

The question which confronts the US (or at least the administration) is what to do now. Not to go into hyperventilation mode, the Iranian plot does constitute, or did once constitute a cause of war. The plot was not simply a crime. It was much more. It was an act of war. Asymmetrical war is still war. And that is what the Iranians intended. The killing of a third party national of diplomatic status, thus a protected person under international convention, along with a significant but unknowable number of Americans by an infernal machine is every bit as much an act of war as the attacks of 9/11.

It is no less an act of war by virtue of having been detected and thwarted before culmination.

The US would be fully justified by undertaking a military response. Such a response is equally justifiable under international norms and law if conducted by covert/clandestine means or by open use of force. There is, of course, no real possibility of the current administration exercising this latter option. The American public to say nothing of the federal budget would not sit still for an open act of war. The possibility of failure would inhibit any low visibility, light footprint response against either the IRGC or its masters.

Inhibition is not the same as prohibition. The US has engaged in covert/clandestine actions intended to impair the Iranian march to nuclear threshold status. These serve as a paradigm for a suitable response to the plot.

It is to be hoped that behind the wall of indignant oratory spewing forth in Spindletop fashion from the highest circles inside the District there is some quiet and sober consideration of who might be a suitable candidate for being "held accountable." Targeted killings of high ranking military or paramilitary figures might be distasteful in some quarters, but there is something far worse.

That something is allowing the senior decision makers of the al-Quds force or the IRGC to be reinforced in their view that the US is nothing more than a "paper tiger." Unless the US does show its displeasure in a quiet but robust way, we will continue to be seen as week, indecisive, on the decline--and a suitable venue to wage a nasty little war.

Going To Hell In (Allah's) Bucket

2011-10-10T15:20:00.000-07:00

Due to cloudy weather, the demands of woodcutting (winter is a-coming on) and the debilities of age, the Geek has been kicking back reading the news from around the world and generally coming to the conclusion that a large segment of the globe and its attendant population is going to hell in a bucket. And, the hand carrying the bucket is a collective one--the aggregate of the large and rapidly growing advocates of austere, political Islam. Not to put too fine a point on the knife of reality, the single largest problem resident in the global political order is not the economy, nor is it "global warming," not even American "arrogance" and "unilateralism."

The problem confronting all of us today, whether or not we like the idea, is simply Islam. Islam is the necessary and sufficient foundation of that most detestable phenomenon, austere political Islam. In both its violent and non-violent forms, political Islam, particularly the most common sort, the variety growing from the austere roots of Salifism, Wahhibism, and Deobondism, constitutes the single largest threat to international and national stability, order, and peace.

In all the hosannas ringing out during the days of the "Arab Spring," a simple and critical fact was ignored by the political and opinion molding elites in the US and the rest of the West. That seemingly willfully ignored ground truth was the power of austere political Islam to attract and mobilize adherents during periods of great political, social, and economic turbulence. Also ignored by all the applause makers of the West was the companion fact: As uncertainty increased due to the many, often violent changes in all aspects of life, the appeal of austere political Islam would necessarily grow.

Humans are genetically programmed to fear uncertainty, to be risk averse, to seek security in the storms of change. Islam, more than any other religion promises certainty, assures security--if only the rules of the faith are followed absolutely and completely. Islam also provides a roster of acceptable scapegoats upon whom blame can be foisted and whose persecution onto death is given positive sanction. The combination of rule based security and approved scapegoats affords a powerful appeal to austere Islam of the Salifist sort or of the Wahhibist variety.

The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt caught it perfectly in its slogan: Islam is the solution.

When fear or apprehension or anxiety or insecurity threaten, the bracing and strict requirements of austere Islam in its political expression do constitute the solution. The irrefutable fact that life under the rigor of austere Islam is unlivable in practice is no bar to the inherent appeal of the promise given by the faith. The equally irrefutable fact that Islam is inherently incompatible with modern economics, contemporary technology, or even the oft asserted "universal" rights of all humans is likewise no barrier to its attractiveness to people suddenly confronted with all enveloping upheaval.

We have seen the direct correlation between social and political tumult and the rise of austere political Islam in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, and, over the past nine months, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

It is worth noting that ten and more years ago, Pakistan was peaceful. Back then, before George W. Bush presented the "with us or suffer the consequences" ultimatum to the government of Pakistan, sectarian violence was essentially unknown. Also a stranger to Pakistani life was the horrid specter of "honor killings." Also absent were suicide bombings. Even the FATA was relatively quiet. Karachi was not the political murder capital of Asia (or, to err on the side of accuracy, the world.)

The peace left never apparently to return with the influx of Taliban from Afghanistan. The ISI undoubtedly believed it could continue to exercise full operational control over Taliban, the Haqqani network, and all the other entities predicated on violent political Islam. ISI and the rest of the military and government committed an error in this belief. In justification stands the reality that the destruction of critical elements of traditional society and its polity which occurred in the wake of the Afghan invasion promoted an unexpectedly rapid growth in fear and uncertainty which resulted in an ever widening recruit pool for the advocates of austere violent political Islam. Events outpaced the capacity of ISI to control its monsters.

In the Big Three of the "Arab Spring," Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the organizations of austere political Islamists were not only the only groups ready to take advantage of the new situation. That was reasonably widely understood even if belittled here in the US and elsewhere in the West. What went by unnoticed was the automatic appeal of austere political Islam to the uprooted, the suddenly unmoored, the majority of the people living in all three countries.

Islam is the answer, the solution for those who crave certainty, security, a firm mooring in the new, white waters of "democratic change." Only austere political Islam pretends quick, easy, certain remedies for all the myriad ills resident in the gales of social, political, and economic change blowing through the high deserts and crowded cities of each and all of the Big Three. Not surprisingly, the Salifists, the Wahhibists, have gained the most support in record time.

Equally unsurprising has been the fast boost increase in "honor killings," and overt persecution of Christians, which has been seen with particular drama in Egypt. While most visible in the Land of the Pharaohs, these uniquely Islamic crimes have been occurring in Tunisia and Libya. (It is worth noting that fear of the same happening in Syria has motivated Christians and other sectarian minorities to side with the Baathist regime regardless of other considerations.)

In Libya, the values and imperatives of austere political Islam have been demonstrated in the persecution of sub-Saharan Africans. The rebels have averred repeatedly that the victims (if, indeed, there were any) had been Gaddafi "mercenaries." This excuse is fantasy. The vast majority of black Africans singled out for persecution were not fighters but simply guest workers, most of whom happened to be non-Muslim. This second consideration is non-trivial when assessing the basis of rebel behavior.

The groups advocating austere political Islam will be the new ruling class in each and every of the Big Three. The inevitable failure of the new regimes to address effectively the economic concerns of the citizenry will be met by charges of "infidel" or "Zionist" or "apostate" directed counter-revolutionary conspiracies. Blood will flow in attempts to quash dissent or divert attention. The afflicted countries will, like Pakistan, become less rather than more stable, less rather than more peaceful, less rather than more prosperous. Dissent and repression will lock in a mutual and deadly embrace.

As the societies grow less stable and life less secure, there will be an accelerating move to more austere, more inclusive forms of political Islam. Nothing else can be expected given that tumult and fear demand the anodyne of certainty--the only anodyne promised by Salfiism and the rest of the austere ilk. The predictable failure of Salifism and the rest to provide an effective cure will (as in Iran) result in more and more repression.

The search for outside sponsors of failure along with the religiously sanctioned need for scapegoats will have a high probability of resulting in war. War with Israel is highest on the list, but there can be other candidates as well--including Turkey which can be cast in the role of the model which failed or branded with interference in internal affairs given Ankara's search for Ottoman Empire 2.0. The mere fact that the combined armed forces of the Big Three even if augmented by other Arab or Muslim states will be defeated will be of no moment should the austere Islamists running the show see war as the only way to stay in power.

Looking at the Mideast or North Africa or Northwest Asia or almost anywhere austere political Islam has and is making headway provides no pleasure. Rather, it provokes a strong desire to engage in projectile vomiting.

Only ten years and a month ago, the world looked like a good place to enjoy life. Thanks to advocates of austere violent political Islam, that all changed. Worse, there is no way back to the good years before the Muslims of Osama bin Laden's world view forced the entire globe into Allah's bucket on the road to hell.

Small Straws In A Stiff Wind

2011-10-01T15:08:00.000-07:00

There are weeks when the Geek has regretted his lifelong interest in matters of war, diplomacy, and the shadow lands of covert/clandestine affairs. The past month of so has been one of those periods. It is not that the world has suddenly been infected by a fulminating virus of peace and love. Quite the contrary. Rather the intellectual languor has been promoted by the combination of events having unfolded in a drearily predictable factor and the lack of imagination exhibited by the Deep Thinkers and Bold Actors on all sides of all the many conflicts, armed and otherwise.

A useful example of both predictability and the lack of imagination is presented by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. The energetic dismantlement of the New Mexican borne cleric is both welcome and long overdue. The fact that he was accompanied on his trip to paradise by the one time resident of North Carolina, Samir Khan, rendered the event all the more pleasurable.

Anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the UAV campaign in the FATA and the building of a base convenient to Yemen from which Agency operated Predators might make their lethal flights well understood that Awlaki's days were numbered, and that the number was small. The violent death of the genius of Internet (and personal) radicalization became as certain as sunrise when he was placed on the "kill or capture" list last year. Despite the inevitable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the ACLU and other advocates of human rights above the dictates of real life, and regardless of the equally certain condemnations of "extrajudicial execution" already resounding around the world, the Obama administration by it's listing of the imam let it be known that the governing considerations were those of war--a war in which Awlaki had voluntarily enlisted and waged with ever growing success.

With the failure a few months ago to capture Awlaki by a force of Yemeni personnel backed by USSOCOM assets, the only option was killing, and the only practical tool was provided by a Predator launched Hellfire. The only time limits were imposed by the requirements for constructing an operational base and gaining from both Yemeni and national technical means sufficient actionable intelligence. When fractured open source reports out of Yemen a couple of weeks ago indicated a diminishing of drone traffic over the area of Yemen in which Awlaki's tribe holds sway with a ramping up over territory to the country's north, it became evident that the endgame for the preacher was underway.

The removal of Awlaki and Khan from the board is good. But, it is drearily predictable that it is not much more than that. The strike in no way lessens the nature or effectiveness of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). Had the reported inclusion of AQAP's chief bombmaker in the body count not been later retracted, the Hellfire would have well and truly hurt the group. As it is, the most that can be said is the killing has had a marginal beneficial impact by reducing AQAP's capacity to use Internet radicalization with the same effect in the future that it has in the past.

Neither the killings nor the knee trembling on the part of human and civil rights lawyers and groups will change the nature of the ongoing war between advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states and people of the world. The bad guys will keep on being bad actors. The administration and any future one as well will use whatever means are necessary within the broad limits of proportionality to defend the country and its allies against attacks of whatsoever nature.

If there is any alteration in the future, it will be in the direction of placing increased reliance upon UAVs and other means of long range, low signature, low cost of commitment war fighting. The use of special forces teams and UAVs has been both tested and proven in the harsh laboratory of the FATA as well as the one next door in Pakistan. Both capabilities can be of great assistance in countering the potential threats resident in AQAP, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.) Both may be required urgently against the latter threat if AQIM demonstrates greater capability as the result of having tapped into the arms stream flowing from the looted arsenals of Libya.

A greater use of UAVs will provoke an enormous consternation on the part of the usual suspects--the NGOs involved with human and legal rights as well as the apologists for countries which wish ill to the US but cannot match the American technological capacities. There will be more and more political strange bedfellows both domestic and international as the US leans more heavily upon the impersonal, remotely controlled deliverers of death from above. There will be demands beyond count for new conventions to bar such devices as Predator. There will be calls for a moratorium on the use of these infernal machines until the law can catch up with the new technologies.

The only reply to those who believe the Predator and its tribe are inhuman and inhumane is,"Phooey!" It is far better for a single Awlaki to die downrange than to see real war with its effects, unpredictable in detail but certain to include hundreds if not thousands of dead--most of whom will be civilians.

The Predators will continue to fly over Libya even long after NATO's warplanes have packed up and gone home. They will be overhead to observe not only the intended targets of weapons being smuggled or saboteurs preparing but also the probable agony of protracted internal war as the joy of liberation turns into the pain of political disagreements of a very fundamental nature.

Libya (and its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt) is also drearily predictable. Much of the reason for this observation is found in a remark made by a Salifist Tunisian, 23 years old and holder of a degree in engineering who, when interviewed, opined, "We Salifists are the majority. Democracy is rule of the majority. Why should we allow the minority (secular oriented Tunisians as well as their non-Salifist fellow countrymen) dictate how we should live?"

By this question as well as similar content expressions by legions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, and their supporters in the West, the young man demonstrated just why the "Arab Spring" will turn into a Winter, a most harsh and bitter Winter. The promoters of democracy show they well understand democracy in and of itself but fail to see the necessary corollary: Democracy is the tyranny of the majority.

Unless properly constrained within the firm dikes of a representational republic and held in check by dams formed by both division of powers and an independent judicial system, democracy is tyranny pure and simple in which the rights of the minorities are either non-existent or tenuous at best. In the rush to embrace democracy without the time necessary to build the essential dikes and dams, no citizen is secure, no rights and liberties are permanent, nothing is safe from the fads and fantasies of public opinion and the winds generated by demagogues.

Libya, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, but quite like Yemen and Afghanistan or other Islamic states, has the additional burden of tribalism. This is not to say tribalism is bad. It isn't. Tribal identity is predominant in several states to the point that they are not real, integrated nation-states but rather collections of tribes sharing a flag.

The attempt to force tribal based societies and polities to pretend they are Western nation-states is doomed to fail. Don't believe? Take a look at Somalia. It is not a failed state because it never was a real state. Rather it was an artifact created by Western diplomats who used the only model making sense to them--the nation-state. The same is true of Afghanistan. Much of the inherent instability there results from ignoring the tribal nature of the human terrain in order to pretend we can make it into a Western style state.

When looking at Libya or Yemen or, to a lesser extent, Syria, the same dynamic is present--tribes forced to act as if their members owed a higher loyalty to the state. The example of Iraq is instructive here. As long as we outsiders insist on democracy and the nation-state as the touchstone of legitimacy, we are helping to doom the targets to a long, harsh Winter.

Even if tribalism of the usual sort is absent as it is in Egypt and Tunisia, there is a functional equivalent at work. That is the existence of differing interpretations of Islam and thus the relation of the faith to the state. The ground truth is Islam carries the seeds of its own failure as a foundation of state. This actuality has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan. People may think they want to live in a Shariah based system until they are actually in one. The proponents of austere Islam have and will find that their vision of life is totally unattractive to most people. Then, they must (as do the austere Islamists of Iran) rely upon naked force to oppress their way to continued power.

Put together, the two forms of tribalism, traditional and religious, along with unchecked democracy point to a long, bitter Winter of pronounced discontents. This, in turn, implies a high possibility of protracted or episodic internal war in all its manifold and evil forms. Such is the result of ill-advised exercises in "nation-building" or regime change or support of the "peoples' will.

Coming full circle, the several downsides of either intervention or unthinking support are circumvented completely by using Predators or even special forces units. These approaches to defending against hostile intents and acts minimize the probability of unintended consequences. Predators do not engage in "nation-building," neither do they change regimes. They kill people in serious need of being killed.

To this end, the killing of Awlaki is one important small straw in the very stiff winds of the coming Arab Winter.

The Empire Wants To Strike Back

2011-09-26T16:03:00.000-07:00

This time around the "empire" is not the US, pace Comrades Hugo and Fidel. The empire in question does not yet exist in its desired, reincarnated form. But, given the ambitions of Turkish prime minister Erdogan and the almost done deal between his country and the mullahs next door in Iran, it is not unfair.

The jefe grande of the Ottoman Empire 2.0 is, like his predecessors, terribly upset by the Kurds. Again in imitation of his non-Islamist forebearers, Erdogan is dreadfully keen on wiping the several groups fighting for Kurdish independence out of existence for once and all. The Supreme Guardian of the Revolution, just like the Shah during the days of the ancien regime, shares the sentiment heart and soul.

The US as well as the (presumably) US backed regime in Iraq are caught somewhere in the middle. Baghdad has a much larger dog in the fight to be sure. Iraqi Kurdistan, which is legally semi-autonomous, is the most stable and prosperous place in the partially rebuilt country. It is not simply Kurdistan's wealth and security that has raised hackles not only in Baghdad but through much of Iraq. No. Rather the deep distaste for Kurds and their region is about the only thing upon which the minority Sunnis and majority Shia can and do agree.

Way back in the mists of history (that is before World War I resulted in a massive exercise in creative cartography), Kurdistan was a territorial whole. It had so existed for a mort of centuries both before and after the Ottoman Turks came to supremacy in Stamboli (or Istanbul, if that is your preference.) The carving up of the old Empire was accomplished courtesy of the machinations of mid-level bureaucrats serving their masters in France and Great Britain. In what was one of the greatest sins committed against the self-determination of nations principle dear to the heart of Woodrow Wilson, the Kurds found their tight little nascent state divided between French run Syria and English operated Iraq with small amounts allocated to the Turkey of Ataturk and the Shah of Persia.

Had this violation of American policy not been allowed to take place, Kurdistan would have long ago been recognized as the independent sovereign state its people wanted (and want) it to be. But, as was so often the case, Wilson believed that the League of Nations (his centerpiece ideologically) would solve the injustice--an injustice he himself acknowledged.

For many decades, the issue rested silently in the mountains which constitute most of "Kurdistan." But that came to an end when the respective "occupying" governments came to realize what resources resided in them thar hills. Oil and hydroelectric resources to be precise. Iraq battened fat off the oil while Turkey saw the rivers as the source of both agricultural and industrial riches. The Iranians and Syrians saw potential in the fast running waters if not the oil and vowed to get their share.

With every passing year, the resources of "Kurdistan" have become more and more critical to Turkey and Iraq. While the other two states have not profited so much, both Tehran and Damascus see the danger resident in a successful separatist movement. The Syrian government both before and after the Baathist came to power sought to suppress the language, culture, and political identity of the Kurdish population. The same has been the case in Iran under both secularist shah and Islamist grand ayatollahs.

Right down to the present day, the central government of Iraq has used all methods fair and foul alike to limit the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan. The only thing keeping Baghdad from emulating the muscular methods of Saddam Hussein in the region has been the military capacity of the Kurdish peshmerga, which could fight the national army to a bloody standstill.

Over the past quarter century, the Kurds have been waging a low level defensive insurgency against both Iran and Turkey. The PKK (shooting Turks) and PJAK (doing the same with Iranians down range) have been a thorn in the side of their target states. Because Turkey is a NATO "partner," the US determined that the PKK is a terrorist organization. Since Iran is a hostile state, the US has not yet made the same determination regarding the other group, the PJAK (aka "good terrorists.)

Comes now Recip Erdogan to announce an impending agreement with Iran to mount a joint effort presumably involving ground as well as air forces against those pesky Kurds and the heavily fortified base camps high in the mountains. The reason to presume a ground effort is the abject failure of air assaults conducted by the Turkish air force to do more than move a few rocks around as well as kill a small number of civilians who did not find shelter in time but who in their deaths provided excellent propaganda material for the Kurds.

So far there has been no reported word from the Iraqi government regarding this proposed violation of sovereignty. Perhaps the Iraqis are more easy going about such matters then are, say, the Pakistanis. Or, the central government might be hoping for a good excuse to move large forces into Iraqi Kurdistan, forces which once there will not be quick to leave.

Nor has the Obama administration made comment on the proposed joint action--except implicitly. For some while the US has been providing intelligence information to Ankara concerning the PKK. This shared catch includes imagery and ELINT obtained by Predators. Now, the word has leaked out that the Obama crew is contemplating basing Predators in Turkey.

Not one to be asleep at the switch, Erdogan has responded by offering to purchase or lease a few Predators so as to cut out the middleman. Considering that the Paks have wanted to do this for a long while now, it would be quite a diplomatic and political coup for Erdogan to achieve the goal.

Not to put too fine a point on the Kurdish Question, there is ample evidence to the effect that the Kurds and their proposed state meet the tests provided in the UN Charter as well as subsidiary conventions. With Iraqi Kurdistan as the linchpin, there is no doubt but the hypothetical Kurdistan would meet the requirements of the Montevideo Convention. Considering this inconvenient context, US policy regarding the Kurds is flatly wrong.

The finding that PKK is a terrorist entity was based simply on the role Turkey theoretically plays in NATO while the similar act by the European Union dates back to the days when Turkey was knocking on the EU door. In short, these actions had little if anything to do with "terrorism" per se and much to do with extraneous political considerations.

Silence in the Oval regarding the odd couple military plans must fall in the same category. Arguably, the decision to share catch with Ankara and the basing of Predators in Turkey constitute another bribe to Erdogan for allowing the installation of the US X-band radar. The decision to allow this anti-Iran move has resulted in severe blowback from Tehran, so the Turkish prime minister probably wants additional compensation.

There is only one open question. No, that question is not will the US switch its policy regarding the Kurds and their right to and desire for a state of their own. Nor does this question involve the notion of granting the government of Iraqi Kurdistan its request of redeploying US forces within its borders. The present administration lacks both the depth of regional understanding and the political will to do either--even if each would be in American national interest.

The only remaining question is whether or not Obama and his "team" will cave and sell-lease a few spare Predators to Erdogan, and through him, the Iranians.

Wanna make a bet?

A Bad Day For (American) Politicians On TV

2011-09-24T14:39:00.000-07:00

Two politicians, one Democratic--President Obama--and the other a Republican presidential wannabe--Rick Santorum--embarrassed themselves and, in so doing, tossed a pie in the faces of many Americans. Of course, it is a bit unfair to equate the two as one is a member in good standing of a large but still fringe group of We the People and the other is the chief executive of a country which is still a Great Power even in its self-inflicted decline.

Santorum, in his bid for commemoration in the Hall of Exceptional Bad Taste In Politics was assisted by members of the audience present for the Fox/Google Debate in Florida. A large portion of the audience was comprised of the same sort of self-destructive Republicans as had made noteworthy performances in two previous debates. These people constitute the slavering red meat eaters of the intellectually challenged segment of the Party of Elephants whose most evident characteristics are a lack of good taste, a deficiency in empathy, and, most importantly a strong unconscious desire to lose elections.

The former senator from Pennsylvania and champion of the farther Right shores of the badly misnamed "social conservative" wing of the GOP was goaded into a profound demonstration of deep ignorance regarding the realities of military life particularly during wartime by a question posed by a gay soldier currently stationed in Iraq. The question had to do with the deletion of "don't ask, don't tell" (DADT) so that homosexuals can serve openly in the US armed forces.

Needless to detail at length, Mr Santorum is against the current policy. He would seek to turn the calender back to the years of DADT with the accompanying demand that non-heterosexuals engage in a combination of deceit and denial. Leaving aside the political impossibility (and ignoring the boos issuing from the oral cavities of the denizens of the Very Very Right) suffice it to note that Santorum's stated desire to emulate Dr Who or Mr Peabody constituted the lesser part of his exceptional ignorance of military life.

The peak of Santorum's idiocy and lack of knowledge came when he stated, "any type of sexual activity has absolutely no place in the military."

That observation is a show stopper for sure. As any and everyone who has spent time in any of the armed forces knows, sex is a constant and highly favored activity often bordering on obsession. So it has been since Achilles was a private. So it will be as long as young people are found in a military service. Even years hence when combat is delegated to machines, it is highly probable that the people monitoring the killbots will have a hard time keeping their utilities buttoned tightly.

Not since the anti-sex campaigns of World Wars I and II when the American morality police pretended that our troops were so pure of heart and mind that they must be protected from the evils of prostitutes both amateur and professional has anyone betrayed the degree of out-to-lunchness exhibited by Mr Santorum. If, indeed, he really does believe what he said, then he has disqualified himself from serious consideration for any office of trust and confidence under the Constitution by virtue of pure, unadulterated ignorance and irremediable stupidity (or ideological blindness.)

A far more important bit of televised damage was inflicted on the US by President Obama's speech to the UN General Assembly. It was more than enough to make a person squirm in raw and unrelieved embarrassment as the POTUS delivered a set of remarks which could have been written by the execrable foreign minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman. The kindest explanation for the presidential exhibition of seriously pathetic policy arises from the overarching Obama need to be reelected--and the crucial relation between that goal and the Israel Lobby.

As the recent by-election in New York demonstrated, there is a strong current of unhappiness with Obama's stance on Israel within the American Jewish community. Shoring up support in this portion of the eroding Democratic base is an urgent matter. Not surprisingly, more than a few political analysts both here and abroad have identified this as the prime mover behind the Obama position, which constituted a nearly complete reversal of policy (such as it was) a year ago.

The problem with this explanation even if it is as accurate as appears, is that international politics is a more unforgiving arena than the domestic sort. Very real lives are at stake. Very real countries with equally real interests are in play. The issue of an Israel-Palestinian settlement is inherently existential in nature and does not allow for the flexibility or retakes common in domestic affairs.

The president threw away the good offices stature once enjoyed by the US. The strident tones and relatively extreme nature of his position taken in the context of past stances undercut any possibility of Washington being seen as an honest broker seeking a fair and equitable solution to the several seemingly intractable problems besetting the Israelis and their Palestinian interlocutors.

This leaves the task to such as the European Union or the Quartet with the US playing a marginal role at best. Mr Obama's "approved by AIPAC" speech also eroded to the point of nonexistence any influence Washington might have had with the Palestinian Authority or its Mideast state supporters. Worse, the president appeared to put the US squarely in opposition to the majority of the "Arab Spring" movers and shakers.

This last consideration is arguably the most critical of all. While the US would see its influence reduced in any event as the groups espousing austere, politically oriented Islam will be the power either in or behind the throne in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere, there was and remains no need to reduce influence all the more. The status of the Palestinians ranks high as a motivator on much of the "Arab street." While it is more than a bit hypocritical that this was not the case in the ancient days when Jordan "occupied" the West Bank and Egyptian troops held the supreme hand in the Gaza Strip, it is a reality today which must be recognized and addressed by American policymakers.

Obama's Mideast policy (to use the term generically only) has been and remains an area deserving of the attentions and ministrations of FEMA. He and his "team" have done the seemingly impossible--gotten each and every aspect wrong for more than two and a half years. Far more than even George W. Bush, the Nice Young Man From Chicago has managed to alienate every stakeholder in each and every Arab state as well as non-Arab countries such as Turkey. The UNGA address was the final nail in the coffin of American presence in the Mideast.

Santorum (with the able aid of the boo happy bunch) humiliated the Republican Party in the eyes of all but the most avid of elephants. Mr Obama did much more. The president managed--without assistance--to put the US firmly behind the eight ball throughout the rapidly changing Mideast.

No American president has done that before. No American president in search of reelection has ever degraded the influence of his country in pursuit of votes. Finally, Mr Obama has something real to apologize for.

Hey! Israel--Before Cheering, Look At Taiwan

2011-09-22T14:40:00.000-07:00

Much ink both real and virtual has been spilled in Israel as well as pro-Israeli outlets in the US praising President Obama for his forthright stance regarding US support of the embattled and increasingly isolated Jewish state. Even a man who has to be a bete noir around the Oval, Benjamin Netanyahu, almost broke his arm patting Obama on the back.

Given the context of the impending UN action on the request for recognition requested by the Palestinian Authority, the outpouring of hosannas is not surprising. However, the Israelis and their American supporters would be well served by taking a close look at the Obama administration's handling of the request by the government of Taiwan for a significant upgrading of their aerial self-defense capacities.

By way of background, it must be recalled that the US is committed to assure that the island nation has sufficient means to defend itself against attack by the Peoples Republic of China. This commitment is contained in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. This piece of legislation was a key part of the complex mechanism by which the US finished the job of facing the reality that the PRC was a real state with a real government deserving of both American diplomatic recognition and the status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The TRA was designed by members of the Congress to assure that Taiwan would not be taken over by the mainland by either the reality or threat of military attack. It was passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses of the Democrat controlled Congress and quickly signed by Jimmy Carter.

Until recently, the act served to assure that the US sold or provided military means adequate to the task of deterring Beijing's ambitions to reclaim the "rebellious" province. Things changed in the past decade as the Chinese military underwent a transformation. The vast modernization program has resulted over the past few years in the PRC developing a massive preponderance of force.

During the last two years of the George W. Bush administration, the Taiwanese government forwarded a set of requirements for an expansion and modernization program including new F-16 fighters and submarines. A portion of the request was filled before the days of Bush/Cheney came to an end. A second part was filled (along with supplemental items) by the Obama administration. Along the way, the submarines were deleted by the US side. The desired F-16s of the C/D model remained in limbo.

In limbo they stay today. The administration did not deny the request but offered in its stead an upgrade package for the 160 or so F-16 A/B variants in the Taiwanese inventory. The upgrade package for these now aging aircraft (dating back to 1992) do not include new engines capable of higher speeds and greater combat endurance. As a consequence, the improvements in sensor, guidance, and weapons suites do not give the Taiwanese air force the additional capacities needed to survive in the air against the several hundred more modern, more competent, mainland fighters.

In a slight but pardonable exaggeration, the average Taiwanese pilot flying an "upgraded" F-16 might survive long enough to shout, "Mayday" before being shot down. This is not the end the congress had in mind when it passed the TRA.

Whether or not the Nice Young Man From Chicago simply capitulated to Beijing's opposition to this (or any) arms deal with Taiwan is, as they say, "a subject fit for adjudication." The fact remains that the Obama "team" effectively eviscerated the TRA.

Given the continued force draft development of the PRC's air, naval, ground, and missile forces as well as the probable running down of American air and naval power in the Pacific, all that Beijing needs to do is be patient for a couple more years and then take back the "lost" province with a short, sharp, and decisive little war. The US will be able to do nothing other than ask the Security Council for a resolution. That, of course, will be vetoed by the Chinese.

The Obama administration's interpretation of American responsibilities under the TRA gives a strong hint as to the reliability of his steadfastness under pressure. No political leader in Israel should see the president's words at the General Assembly as other than empty rhetoric. Even the prospect of an American veto of the PA's request shows no depth of commitment, no willingness to run real risk.

Should some larger consideration enter the American field of view, the seemingly resolute support of Israel radiated yesterday will evaporate with blinding rapidity. All that need be kept in mind is that before the PRC embarked on its massive rearmament program, Washington went ahead with arming Taiwan, showing total indifference to the whims of Beijing. Now, affairs are a bit different.

Should the OPEC bully boys decide on another oil embargo, the US would be sorely tested in its relation with Israel. Should such a hypothetical occur during the run up to a presidential election, it is doubtful that the smart money would be placed on the Israeli connection trumping.

Fifty years ago, the hard hearted, cold eyed Charles de Gaulle acted on a belief that many Europeans shared when he ordered the creation of an independent French nuclear force. He was of the view that the US would never place Chicago at risk to defend Paris. We will never know if the general was right, but his apprehension was well placed and well rooted in history. The US has not always been noted for consistency over administrations, particularly if new and unpleasant realities develop as they have in China.

The takeaway for Israel is both simple and disheartening. As Taiwan has found out over the past four years, an American promise--even one enshrined in law--is not bankable. How much less is a piece of oratory given by a president up for reelection in a tough environment?

Elite Ideals Meet Democratic Realities

2011-09-18T15:04:00.000-07:00

The Eurozone is in trouble. Deep, deep trouble. It has been for more than a year now. Tons of money and words beyond count have been expended in the effort to keep the Euro afloat despite the great gashes torn by the sovereign debt loads of Spain, Italy, and, the mother of them all, Greece.

Bankers have wept and wailed. Politicians have viewed with alarm while making promises that all will be well in the sweet bye and bye. Emergency meetings have been held, recently on an almost daily basis. Special funds have been established. Experts from the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund have developed plans, made demands, issued words both threatening and reassuring.

Still the "crisis" rolls along, a tsunami. And, like all tsunamis, the wave was not self-created but rather is the result of tectonic forces.

In the case of the Euro-debt tidal wave, the underlying tectonic forces are found in the nature of national politics. National political dynamics whether in Germany, Greece, France, or Finland are the cause of the seemingly economic disaster.

The economics of the current Eurozone are easy to understand. Greece and the other so-called PIGS borrowed money, a lot of money. More money than could be repaid without causing pain and misery within each state's population. For some years, the payments could and were made--sometimes with more borrowed money. With the onset of the Great Recession four years ago, the assorted PIGS led by Greece had more and more difficulty meeting extant obligations. As a result, the cost of borrowing more money on the international market ramped up. Ramped up a lot.

The economic slowdown around the world assured that the PIGS, again led by Greece, would have to make tough choices between meeting sovereign debt obligations or meeting domestic obligations ranging from salaries to pensions, from housing subsidies to underwriting the costs of medical treatment. The money to do both simply did not exist.

Absent the Eurozone, Greece would have done something many states have done in the past. Athens would have defaulted on its sovereign debt. Walked away from it. Given the bankers and other holders in due course a haircut. For a period of time, Greece would have had difficulty borrowing on the international market, but that would have passed.

Argentina took the default route a few years back. Today it is in better economic shape than it has been in more than three quarters of a century. Default like currency devaluation imposes only short term costs while usually providing the basis for long term benefits. Greece would have been able to do the same had the Euro not existed.

The common currency, the Euro, like the countries which use it, the Eurozone, exists as a tribute to a concept which owes much to idealism. The Euro, the Eurozone, the European Union are all tributes to High Minded and Lofty Thinking. The notion which propelled all was that of creating a federated Europe, thus preventing future conflict both violent and economic. The visionaries who created the European Union, the Euro, and its zone were convinced that a new, supra-national Europe would put the final nail in the coffin of nationalism and all it spawned for once and all.

Insofar as the EU is concerned, the visions have not yet been so challenged by real world forces as to discredit the dream, at least not entirely. The same cannot be said for the Euro.

The Eurozone was created as a monetary union but not a fiscal one. This has meant that the countries of the zone cannot have a common tax, or a common limit on public expenditures, or a common policy on wages and pensions. More importantly, the zone cannot provide for the orderly and automatic transfer of wealth from richer countries to poorer ones as is the case in another federal union, the one called the USA.

As a result, the Eurozone as an entity could not head off profligates like Greece before the crisis occurred. Nor could the Eurozone as an entity assure the automatic coverage of Greece's "overdrafts" from a common treasury.

Back in the Nineties, when the Euro and its zone were under construction, the assorted Deep Thinkers did debate whether or not the zone would be restricted to a monetary union. The downsides of this limited approach were understood. The overarching concern of the politicians involved in creating the zone had to be sure their respective national legislatures as well as the public which elected each would accept and support the new currency and the mechanism behind it.

In short, an accurate understanding of the limits of democratic acceptance put a necessary constraint on the ambitions of those creating the Euro. It was believed by these people as well as the national elites who welcomed the new expression of European integration that the Euro and its zone were but an intermediate step on the road to full federalism.

Even in its limited form, the monetary union was not greeted with universal hosannas and paeans. There were hard fights in the countries which opted to join the zone. Some states, most notably the UK, decided to stay out in the cold.

The force at work in the UK and within the opponents of the zone was democratically expressed nationalism. "Not to worry," murmured the Eurocrats, "federalism will come. Good times along with the European Union and its parliament will work wonders on the reactionary nationalists."

Wrong!

The Eurofanatics might have deprecated those who opposed the Euro along with those who were against the expansion of the European Union's sway in terms similar to those employed by President Obama and others of his ilk regarding people living in "fly over country," but in doing so they forgot that the hoi polloi had the franchise--and were willing to use it. The Great Recession exacerbated the already growing sense of frustration infecting many in Europe.

The frustration was the product of being, as one Irish woman put it during the vote on the Lisbon Treaty expanding the authority of the EU, "over governed." The climate of frustration over the attitudes and behavior of the political, media, and academic "elite" of Europe was enhanced by the ever growing and ever more evident presence of non-Europeans on the local soil.

The tone deafness if not blatant ideologically predicated stubbornness of the elites with a constant message of multiculturalism and end-of-nationalism stimulated the rapid growth of nationalist political parties across Europe. From Norway to Italy, from France to Austria, people in growing numbers saw and felt themselves to be strangers in a strange land, powerless pawns subject to dictates from Brussels and under siege by hordes of newcomers.

The push back was and will continue to be strong. Election after election with few hesitations have shown the increasing strength of nationalism and the parties which traffic in this commodity. The message has not been lost on the current occupants of elected office.

The American Treasury Secretary and his British colleague have warned the politicians of Europe to take immediate and decisive steps to end the market turmoil caused by the Greek sovereign debt. Both men made this abundantly clear when they sat in with the European finance ministers this past week. Both have good reason to be worried, very worried. A melt down in the European financial sector will have adverse consequences for both the UK and US. Great adverse consequences for two national economies not yet recovered from the Great Recession.

The European politicians did not need the Anglo-American warning. They are perfectly well aware of what is going on. It is just that they and their bosses in Berlin, in Athens, in Paris cannot do anything given the mood of the respective electorates.

The average German and counterparts in the Netherlands, Finland, and even France are not thrilled by the prospect of never ending bailouts of the "improvident" PIGS. The average Greek or Italian or Spaniard is equally disenchanted with having the quality of life beat down by remote bureaucrats from Brussels or the IMF. Undoubtedly, all hands would be quite willing and able to express their disapprobation come the next election.

The elites both in and out of government overlooked the basic truth here. The elites in their ideological fervor have far outrun the limits of general public approval. At the same time, they had forgotten the "unenlightened" members of the hoi polloi have a leash and collar on each and every elected proponent of European togtherness and multiculturalism called elections.

The Greek default crisis served to remind national politicians that the public was willing and able to administer a mid-course correction to policies of which it disapproved. The reminder has taken the form of apparent indecisiveness in the highest circles of European leadership--starting with Chancellor Merkel. Ms Merkel and the others are not indecisive; they are afraid of the costs of making a decision.

Ideals are wonderful. No one should neglect to have them. However, in the world of politics, particularly the politics of the world, it is critical that ideals not be decoupled from the realistic appraisal of what will be both accepted and supported by the majority of the politically articulate within society.

The creators of the Euro and its zone ignored this precept. As long as the world generally and Europe in particular enjoyed prosperity without precedent, all went well regardless. But, as was inevitable, the good times stopped, the dues collector came around. Unfortunately, in the case of the Euro, it looks as if the dues will be collected not only in Greece or in Germany but everywhere, even in the US.

The takeaway?

Simple. National publics are like armies as General George Patton once observed. "They are like pieces of cooked spaghetti. You can't push them. You can only pull them along, slowly."

Ethno-Religious Democracy And The Next Mideast War

2011-09-17T15:57:00.000-07:00

Turkey has declared rhetorical war on Israel. To err on the side of accuracy, the Islamist leaning government in Ankara has been escalating words to almost the this-means-war level over the past few days. Behind this development resides not only an ambition of regional power status but the explosive growth of a new Turkish nationalism based on the merging of ethnic and religious identities, which has substantially replaced the strongly secularist predicated sense of national self inaugurated by Kemal Attaturk.

The target of Turkey's ever more intemperate attacks has likewise reinvented its sense of national identity on the merging of religion and nationalism. When founded, Israel was both a Jewish state and an outpost of European socialist thought which centered upon secularism.

The seismic shift in Turkey's national identity came only in the past decade when the long ignored peasant population of the Anatolian highlands moved to the urban centers of Ankara and Istanbul in large enough numbers to form an effective political base for the AKP, a party whose roots ran deeply into the rich soil of political Islam. When the internal migrants, searchers for a better life, joined with the equally ignored Muslim clerical establishment, it became possible to organize the discontented and marginalized new arrivals into a potent political base. This, in turn, brought the AKP to power--a power it has developed further by defanging the military and the secular elites of the cities.

The shift of Israeli politics from the secular left to the ethno-religious right started back in 1977 when Likud tapped the pool of resentment felt within significant segments of the Israeli population. By melding a new coalition of expansive hyper-nationalists, new immigrants, and the more religiously minded, Likud was able to gain power. As the years went by, the nationalist and religiously observant right was strengthened in numbers by arrivals from the Soviet Union, and, after the collapse of that state, its ruins.

The movement to the right was accelerated by the First Intifada and the consequent bloodletting imposed by the Palestinian terrorists. This reaction on the part of the Israeli public was to be expected. Terror is normally counterproductive. With every suicide bomber, every rocket, every new outrage, the median of Israeli politics moved more and more into the right hand lane.

The external pressure joined with the Second Intifada to push Israelis even more into the harsh and uncompromising position of national identity based on the juncture of Jewishness and Israeli-ness. This dynamic was fully predictable as pressure consolidates political will long, long before it fractures it. In this context, it is easy to see why the ill-advised efforts by the Obama administration to put the screws to Israel generally and the Netanyahu government in particular were counterproductive failures.

The result is the current loggerheads relation between mirror image politicians--Erdogan and Netanyahu--along with the daggers drawn nature of Turkish-Israeli relations. A larger consequence of national identities based on the merger of ethnic and religious definitions is looming as the "Arab Spring" rolls into Fall, a Fall which will be marked with a very early freeze.

Democracy is dangerous. The power of this truth informed the thinking of the authors of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. Democracy is nothing more or less than the popular expression of whatever fad, fancy, or fantasy can be employed effectively to move voters to mark one person's name preferentially.

Among the many fads, fancies, and fantasies which can be employed to this end, none are more powerful than nationalism and religion. The advocates of political Islam in Egypt, in Libya, in Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Arab Muslim states know this perfectly. Knowledge need only to be put into action.

In the classic treatment of revolution, Anatomy of Revolution, the author makes a key point. Although only ancient offensive insurgencies were considered in this book, the power of this one observation has been enhanced by each and every revolution which has succeeded in the post-World War II years.

The point?

Revolutions move to the extreme. That is to say, the group with the most radical agenda for change following the overthrow of the old regime will win. The reasons for this inevitable move to the extreme are few and simple. The more extreme the group, the more sweeping will be the changes contained in its agenda. In addition, the more extreme groups are tightly organized, their action plan is simple, easy to understand, and addresses fundamental fears and aspirations held by the majority of the public.

The Muslim Brotherhood, the Salifists, and others advocating political Islam are all tightly organized. All have agendas which are virtually interchangeable, making group merger thinkable. And, most importantly, all have action plans which are predicated on the strictures and requirements of Islam as well as the notions of dignity and pride resident in nationalism.

In all the countries involved in the dramatic events of the past nine months, the advocates of political Islam enjoy great advantage over their secular opponents. Not only are the assorted groups well organized and possessed of a radical agenda, all make profound appeals to both Islam and national pride. "Stand tall, you are Egyptian" is a chant virtually identical to the more recent, "Stand tall, you are Muslim."

The necessary inference from what has been observed and reported throughout the Mideast and North Africa is simply that Egypt, Libya, and perhaps others will move to the totalistic national sense of self which has been in play in Turkey and Israel. One implication of this trajectory is that Turkey will fail to reestablish the Ottoman Empire. Another, far more disturbing one considering all that has been at work in the Israeli political system is that war will become far more likely in the near to mid-term.

The next war will sneak up on the West. This is to be expected. The elites of the West generally discount nationalism as a spent force, a ancient relic which has outlived whatever usefulness it once may have possessed. At the same time, the Western elites of politics, the media, and academia pretend that religion does not exist as a real force in the lives of people and the policies of governments.

In the US, in the West, the leaders of state and molders of opinion alike will not see what is happening on the Arab streets and states alike. What will not be seen, cannot be prevented.

Pleasant thought, eh?

Don't Veto The Palestinian State

2011-09-16T14:26:00.000-07:00

Palestinian Authority jefe grande Abbas has tossed down the gauntlet to Barack Obama and the rest of his "foreign policy team." The PA will seek full membership in the UN as a sovereign state Abbas declared in a highly reported speech to his fellow countrymen.

This move seems to be a very severe defeat for both Israel and the Obama administration. The Netanyahu ministry has done everything short of declaring war on the PA. The Obama "team" including the president has not been much more restrained, threatening (or promising, if you prefer) to veto the move when it comes before the Security Council for action.

A veto would not be looked at with favor in the Arab states generally as was made palpably clear in a recent op-ed piece in the WaPo by one of those interminable Saudi princes and diplomatic heavyweights. Participants in outdoor sports favored by the "Arab Street" such as riots and suicide bombings will be much less restrained in their disapprobation.

Advocates of realpolitik have noted that even admission to the UN either as a state or a state observer will change nothing for the better on the ground. There is much to justify this view. Likewise there is much to support the dystopian notions that the Palestinians will use either state observer or state status to cause a world of hurt for Israel in the assorted UN sub-agencies and the International Criminal Court.

The pessimistic interpretations do not, however, merit the US using its veto power in the Security Council. Doing such would only assure the PA would take its petition to the General Assembly in search of the consolation prize of state observer status, which would give it all the trouble making possibilities along with assuring a very large can would be tied to Uncle Sam's tail.

A far better course of action for the Obama administration to take is that of delay. The process established for seeking recognition as a state by the UN provides an almost infinite mechanism of creative stalling. The formal request must first go to the Secretary General. The Secretary General does not have to handle the matter instantly but can request further information before forwarding the request to the Security Council. Doing this can take weeks--or months.

The Security Council can also demand more information as well as proof that the proposed Palestinian state meets all the diplomatic requirements for state status. This means the Council can find itself caught in a set of hearings and debates over the degree to which the Palestinian Authority and the territory under its purported control does in fact constitute a fully functioning state. Given the deep and growing divide between the West Bank based Palestinian Authority and its rival in the Gaza Strip, Hamas, and the fiction that Palestine constitutes a single entity, this could lead to a number of second thoughts within chanceries seemingly committed to the idea of Palestinian statehood.

A full fledged inquiry and debate within the Security Council could even have the potential to undercut any move in the General Assembly for state observer status. This is not a nontrivial benefit given the uncertainty and ambiguity extant within the European Union for this gambit. The US might even enlist the cooperation of Russia in seeking a complete airing of whether or not the Palestinian state really exists by quietly noting that any approval by either the Security Council or the General Assembly would constitute a bad precedent from the Kremlin's point of view considering the current ethnic and religious unrest in the Northern Caucasus. The name, "Tibet," whispered in certain ears might elicit a reasonably favorable response from Beijing.

The point is the US could lobby effectively for a prolonged inquiry by the Security Council, which would buy that most precious of commodities--time--for bilateral diplomacy to make another run at the moribund "peace process" between Israel and the PA. Abbas would have his political posterior covered enough to keep him in his tenuous position for some while since he would have delivered on his promises and cannot be held personally responsible for UN protocol.

Sure there would still be some riots, some bombings, some threats of worse from the "Arab Street" and other usual Muslim suspects such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but what else is to be expected? The US would be spared the major problems which exercise of the veto would bring.

The Israelis, or at least some of them, would not be thrilled but, again, what else would you expect? A delay might allow calmer heads (assuming there are any) around Netanyahu to provide sound counsel respecting the recommencement of talks with Abbas and company. There is even the faint prospect that the Obama administration might find the right magic to convince Netanyahu to wake up to the new and alarming political realities in his neighborhood, realities which cannot be addressed by simple words and the implied threat of Israeli military displeasure.

A delay would benefit all interested parties. A veto would not. It looks like a no-brainer. Of course, being the simplest and safest way to go means it is not acceptable to either the Deep Thinkers or the ideologues who populate too much of the foreign policy world, not only here but everywhere.

Shanksville Joins Gettysburg

2011-09-11T11:58:00.000-07:00

Pennsylvania is home to the eternal resting places of many American heroes. The most recent to join that honored company are the passengers and crew of United flight 93. Forty Americans, randomly selected by the vagaries of travel and schedules. Forty men and women thrown together by blind and impartial fate. Forty fellow citizens who in a few minutes of life, a few minutes for which nothing in their collective experience could have prepared them, made a collective decision of magnificent courage.

These Americans decided to die not on their knees as fearful captives but as free people fighting. Free people fighting--whether literally as was the case of those who died at Gettysburg or metaphorically as is the reality for so many of us and our ancestors seeking to do more than simply survive in the face of adversity--has defined the American nation and its collective character since our beginning.

Amid the saccharine, multi-cultural, interfaith, touchy-feely drivel which spread as a sentimental and cheapening miasma through the Tenth Anniversary commemorations, the stark bravery of the Flight 93 Forty shines as the real torch of humanity. Their sacrifice, taken freely after a democratic vote, offsets the evil of the Muslim terrorists and mass murderers. They, like the first responders who entered the Twin Towers while all who could leave were doing so, redeem humanity from the stain placed upon it by the Muslims who killed with the words "Allah akbar" on their lips.

Contemplating the forty who died on the remote field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, one can only wonder, "Would I have been so brave? Would I have chosen to die on my feet fighting rather than on my knees in fear?" One can only be thankful not to have had the dreadful necessity of making this choice.

The ceremony at Shanksville as well as those at the Twin Towers and the Pentagon made the Geek think about the tenth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Geek was alive and sentient at the time of the tenth anniversary, 7 December 51. He was an avid follower of the to and fro movement of the war the US was fighting at the time, the "police action" in Korea. His memories were quickly confirmed: There was no particular commemoration of the Japanese strike. Certainly, there were no high profile events involving past and present presidents of the US as has been the case this weekend. Headlines focused on the war in Korea, the economy, and even crime but not on any marking of the anniversary of the event which did well and truly change both the US and the world.

It has been said with nauseating frequency that 9/11 changed the US and the world in ways both profound and impossible to describe. The Geek remembers saying just that to Her Geekness as the first reports came over the radio. (Ten years ago there was no satellite Internet or television available in the canyon.) The Geek and the many pundits were wrong. At least the Geek is willing to admit that.

The events of 9/11/01 did not change the world. The changes, particularly the open warfare between advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states of the world, had been underway since the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Muslim based resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, both dating from 1979. Al-Qaeda had been in existence for years before the manned cruise missiles hit New York, Washington, and the field outside of Shanksville. Osama bin Laden's declaration of war was six years old. The US had already been attacked both at home (World Trade Center 1993) and abroad, in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya, and Tanzania.

9/11 made the war unmistakable and inescapable. While the strategy and tactics employed by the US in response may well have been faulty and counterproductive, the war was not of our making or wanting. While the idea of a "global war on terror" is both logically flawed and impossible in the real world, the continuation of the war and the threats of terror behind it are not of our making, our desire, our policy. The "war" both past and future is the sole creation of those who espouse and practice violent political Islam.

There is no doubt but most Americans want out of this perhaps never ending war, but such is impossible. We are all rather like the passengers and crew on flight 93, the challenge, the threat, the war has been brought to us by others, by others who desire to harm, to kill, to destroy us and all we and our ancestors have created. Like the Flight 93 Forty we have to choose: Fight for freedom or die on our knees captives to fear.

The Next Ten Years

2011-09-10T14:51:00.000-07:00

The US (and a hell of a lot of other countries) is approaching the zero point marking the official start of "The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT.)" To err on the side of accuracy, the US had already been in a war against advocates of violent political Islam for eight years when the hijacked passenger aircraft were turned into cruise missiles.

Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention. Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED. The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression. The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort. The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.

The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor. It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched. It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.

Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead. At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states. The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.

Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11. Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader. Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.

As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace. Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country. Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.

The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan. The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations. The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.

The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation. Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.

Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow. AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure. Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.

In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance. AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao, "a paper tiger."

The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated. There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.

The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population. AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs. Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor. They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.

The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis. In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures. This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed. Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.

The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen. Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority. They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power. (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)

There is an important caveat to this. Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly. This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam. They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.

Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted. Neither should they be diminished. The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces. The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers. In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants. It is OK. A fact of life. But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.

When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US. The winner would be AQAP.

The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen. In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.

We did this once before. In Vietnam. The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.

Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated. But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.

Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only. The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP. Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam. Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.

What Is Erdogan Smoking?

2011-09-08T16:00:00.000-07:00

The Islamist-leaning jefe grande of the AKP and prime minister of Turkey, Recip Erdogan, is proving to be something of a regional loose cannon. It is one thing to demand an apology from Israel for the badly mishandled boarding of the Mavi Marmora, but it is a far different matter to threaten war.

Make no mistake about it, the bellicose prime minister's promise/threat to provide naval cover for future "aid" flotillas headed for Gaza is the next best thing to a declaration of war against Israel. Erdogan might not like it, but the Israeli blockade of Hamas ruled Gaza does conform with international law as well as the customs of war at sea. That inconvenient truth has been made clear time after time, most recently in the Palmer Report. The report severely criticized the Israelis for the conduct of the blockade but emphasized that the blockade per se was and is totally legal.

This means that any Turkish naval units convoying the "aid" vessels would be seeking to break an internationally recognized and legal blockade by armed force. That is a pretty good operational definition of war. Perhaps the huffing and puffing PM did not realize that as he allowed his mouth to run away from adult supervision, but if the Turkish navy shoots, the Israelis will shoot back, just as sure as it is hot as hell in Texas.

Having made the promise/threat, the AKP government now had best hope that no pro-Palestinian group will take up the offer. Given that the "humanitarian" NGO behind the Mavi Marmora flotilla has very close ties to the government, it may be expected that at least that group, IHH, will be controllable. But there are many other entities willing to use the specious cover of humanitarian aid convoys to embarrass Israel and, given the Erdogan commitment, perhaps start a war which will end the Zionist menace once and for all.

Certainly there are enough entities, including both state and non-state actors, which fervently desire an end to Israel. Of these, most would be willing to manipulate a face off between Turkey and Israel into the long hoped for War of the Final Solution. Erdogan's promise/threat darn near invites some group to do just that.

There is the chance that Erdogan was motivated not only by his ambition to recreate the Ottoman Empire in an updated form but also by an exaggerated belief that his navy could simply intimidate the Israelis into allowing the Turk protected "aid" convoy to steam unimpaired to port in Gaza. The Turkish navy is much larger than its Israeli counterpart. The TCG has eight former US Perry class frigates as well as more modern classes including eight MEKO vessels. The Turks also can deploy an impressive number of smaller combatants headed by six French built corvettes.

The Israeli navy is small in comparison. However the almost microscopic coastal defense oriented IDF naval forces include three highly competent Dolphin class submarines whose tube launched missiles constitute a serious threat to any surface opponent. Far more importantly, any confrontation between Turk and Israeli would occur within very easy range of the Israeli land based air force. The Turks have no credible way of countering the Israeli air threat. Period.

Israeli air dominance means it is game, set, and match to those fighting under the blue and white flag of Israel.

Erdogan is apparently too busy contemplating his diplomatic brilliance to remember the hortatory advice which ended the sci-fi classic, The Thing, "Watch the skies!"

The Islamist PM has also overlooked the vast difference between impressing the Arab street with anti-Israeli oratory (very good) and saber rattling (which scares the hell out of the same street.) Turkey has gained a whale of a lot of traction in the Mideast by cocking a snoot at Israel by way of words and diplomatic rupture. This does not mean the Arabs or their governments, either new or old, are hoping for a return of the Ottoman Empire under any guise. Nor are all hands thrilled by the prospect of a new regional war whether initiated by intent or miscalculation.

The same dynamics and considerations apply to the second of Erdogan's promises/threats. The expansive, not to say delusional, PM also declared that the Turks will guarantee the maritime commons and subsea resources against Israeli exploitation. This is a more comprehensive commitment than the convoying of humanitarian flotillas. At the same time, it places the Turks in a more vulnerable position by greatly enlarging the possibility of starting a war of miscalculation. It also places Turkey in the role of regional semi-hegemon pretending that no one can drill below the water of the Eastern Mediterranean without Ankara's remit. This is a preposterous assertion which will alienate not only the government of Cyprus but a host of others as well.

Alienation takes many forms. And, alienation can have a host of consequences, none of which is positive from Ankara's perspective.

For example, the present Egyptian government (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) may be happy with the new military agreement between itself and Turkey. It may be pleased with the prospect of joint military, naval, and air exercises to be held early next year. But, neither SCAF nor any successor government other than one dominated by the more extreme Salifists would be thrilled by a joint war against Israel. After all, the Egyptians are a lot closer to Israel and know from experience what that can mean if the bullets fly and the bombs fall.

Every Arab state is too preoccupied currently with internal problems to seek a war. If a war of miscalculation would ensue after a Turk-Israeli shoot out at sea, there would be few Arabs rushing to the frontline. The Turks would find themselves rather alone in the matter.

Erdogan (who now deserves the Joe Biden Award) has no choice in the real world now other than to back down. Fortunately for him the walking back can be done quietly. He and the AKP will lose a bit of street cred, but that is preferable to losing a war.

They Just Have The Wrong Enemy

2011-09-07T15:19:00.000-07:00

Back in 1918, the Great Powers, victors over Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire did a bit of practical work, redrawing the maps of Europe and the Mideast. Supposedly high on the list of priorities for this exercise in practical cartography was the uniquely American proposition called, "self-determination of peoples." This noble bit of High Mindedness was honored more or less with respect to the splitting up of the old Hapsburg domains, but was it observed only in the breech when it came to dismembering the Ottoman lands.

When the hyper-idealistic Woodrow Wilson confronted the real world of secret deals and the fruits of wartime exigencies, he discovered that his notions of self-determination had been preempted by an assortment of understandings both formal and otherwise between Great Britain and France. One of these rather under the table deals dealt with the area called Palestine. This area along with the coterminous Trans-Jordan had been divided according to two contradictory undertakings. One, the Balfour Declaration, promised Jews a "national homeland." The other, an agreement between two bureaucrats, Sykes and Picot, created two protectorates, one under British rule and the other under French.

This exercise in international can kicking is still with us today in the form of the seemingly endless conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. (By the way a body of American experts on the region advised President Wilson to fight this one to the death as the result would be a century of bloodshed. Rarely have experts been so right.)

Almost overlooked was the simultaneous division of Iraq and Syria into British (Iraq) and French (Syria along with its appendage, Lebanon) protectorates. Embedded in both Iraq and Syria as well as in the rump state of Turkey and the country then called Persia was a people long separated from their neighbors by language, customs, and culture but not religion. This nation now split among four states was the Kurds.

The Kurds were not at all happy with this division. Nor should they have been. According to the principle of self-determination, the Kurds merited their own state, the state of Kurdistan. But, these unfortunate folk lacked any representative in Versailles. Unlike the Arabs way down south, the Kurds had provided no service to the Allied cause. Unlike the Arabs, the Kurds had no access to powerful British political figures. Neither did they gain the attention of imperial minded bureaucrats. As a result, they were casually and cruelly consigned to minority status within four states.

Almost immediately, the Kurds commenced a defensive insurgency in each and every of the four countries to which they had been so cavalierly assigned. The insurgency has not ended to this day. Like the conflict between Arab Palestinian and Israeli Jew, the conflict gives no hint of ending soon, or ever.

The Kurdish people are an ancient hill folk. Like hill dwellers almost everywhere, they are excellent warriors. It deserves mention that the great Muslim fighter who kicked Crusader butt with great effect, Saladin, was a Kurd. While today's Kurdish fighters may not have either the military genius or bent to chivalry which marked the legendary Saladin, they are not slouches in the craft of guerrilla war as may be attested to by the marked lack of success enjoyed to date by Turks and Iranians alike.

Other than in Iraq where the Kurds have a semi-autonomous province under sole Kurdish control, it is accurate to say the Kurds live under occupation by a foreign force. In Turkey, in Syria, and in Iran, the majority Kurdish areas are under direct military control. Indeed, in at least two of these countries, the degree of military control equals or exceeds that exercised by Israel over the Palestinians of the West Bank and far outstrips that of Gaza.

The Kurds are denied equal treatment in all three states to a degree never reached in the West Bank or Gaza. They are denied the use of their own language. They are not allowed to conduct their own education. They are not provided with the same level of governmental services including access to economic development as the majority populations in all three states. In short, the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iran have been pushed to the margins, had their culture and language robustly attacked as a matter of policy, and are subject to an array of legal disabilities as well as informal discrimination.

From any perspective, the Kurds have suffered far more deprivation of status, rights, and opportunities at the hands of the governments and majority populations of Turkey, Syria, and Iran than the Palestinians ever were during the years since June 1967. At the same time, the Kurds have a claim on statehood which equals or exceeds that made by the Palestinians.

In sharp contrast with the Palestinians, the Kurds have waged their multi-generation insurgency with remarkable humanity. Unlike the Palestinians down to the present day, the Kurdish fighters sharply limit their attacks to military and constabulary targets. The intentional attack of civilians is almost unheard of. Compared to the Palestinian way of war, the Kurds take care to reduce collateral damage to a minimum. In the usually dirty business of insurgent warfare, the Kurds are relative good guys. The Palestinians are very much of the opposite hue.

These ground truths demand a question or two. Where are the liberal groups in the West? Where are the groups espousing boycotts, divestiture, or deligitimatization of Iran, Syria, and Turkey? Where are the UN resolutions condemning the suppression of the legitimate rights of the Kurds by Ankara, Damascus, Tehran? Where is the UN Human Rights Council with resolutions, special rapporteurs, and other displays of condemnation or concern?

In the last few years, advocates of Palestinian statehood have proliferated with a speed which boggles the imagination. Campaigns of boycotts, divestiture, and sanctions have spilled forth in mighty torrents. The UN and its lesser creatures have shown a tender concern for the Palestinians without precedent. The High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West have taken the Palestinians--rockets, suicide vests, and AK-47s included--into a warm embrace.

All blame for whatever happens in the Mideast between Israel and the Palestinians is quickly, automatically, ascribed to the evil doing, racist, Zionist occupiers. Even when a Jewish infant dies, throat slit as it slept near the dead parents and elder siblings, it is seen as the direct result of the Zionist occupier.

Meanwhile, the Turkish air force bombs civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan while Iranian artillery does the same without even the mildest whimper coming from the assorted advocates of self-determination around the world who are so quick to condemn the Zionist occupiers. Even Syria is exempt from criticism as it denies the most basic rights to Kurds resident in its borders.

Why?

Why two "victims" (one, the Kurds, arguably more deserving of the term) with two such wildly disparate responses from the "international community," the human rights congeries, and politicians around the world?

The answer is as simple as it is ugly. The Kurds are predominantly Muslim. So also are the oppressive majority populations in each and every of the four states. The Palestinians are mainly Muslim. Their putative oppressors are Jewish.

And, now the really nasty part, antisemitism is as rife in the West as it is endemic to the Muslim states. In the West, this ancient, evil mindset hides behind the currently respectable facade of being "anti-Zionist" or, even better, as a euphemism, "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy."

It is OK in the West to look at Muslim oppression of Muslims with total indifference. In the Muslim majority states, the same is true to an even greater extent because to condemn the Muslim majority for oppressing a Muslim minority is to commit that great Islamic sin of fitna, of introducing fission in the great Islamic ummah. The single towering fiction in Islam is that of holding the community of believers to be one huge, happy family. So, no hand is raised, no voice either, to stop the oppression of Kurds by Muslim Turks, Muslim Iranians, or Muslim Arabs.

The fiction of Islamic unity is nothing compared to the larger concoction in the West. The concealing of antisemitism behind the thin and torn scrim of "anti-Zionism" or "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy" is not simply hypocritical, it is a moral delict of the highest order.

Any way you cut it, the groups and individuals in the West who brandish the cudgels on behalf of the Palestinians while maintaining a discrete silence with respect to the Kurds are examples of moral decay without equal. It is a very severe indictment of the High Minded in the West who by their careful selection of who deserves support show themselves to be both dishonest and antisemitic to the core.

The people and groups so staunchly supporting the Palestinians (including the UN, the UN Human Rights Council, the assorted NGOs, and the individuals who espouse sanctions, boycotts, and divestiture) will deserve respectful attention when and only when they exhibit the same level of concern for the Kurds as they do the Palestinians. Unless and until these worthies are as willing to condemn and seek to delegitimatize the Turks, the Iranians, and the Syrians, they merit no hearing.

Rather, these groups and individuals should themselves be blackguarded as the antisemites they are. Any less is to endorse their wicked position.

Yes, Bibi, Great States Do Apologize

2011-09-06T14:30:00.000-07:00

The apparent center of gravity in the current degradation of relations between Turkey and Israel is the failure of the latter to offer an acceptable, formal apology for the nine deaths which occurred at the hands of IDF personnel during the encounter between Israel and the utterly bogus "relief" flotilla headed by the Mavi Marmora. The Palmer Report concluded that while Israel had international law and custom on its side as regarded the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, the enforcement of the blockade as well as the resultant deaths constituted an egregious act of overreach.

The incident on board the ship handed anti-Israeli elements, including the Islamist leaning AKP government of Turkey a heaven sent opportunity to make much propaganda at the expense of the Jewish state. In this context the Turks have demanded repeatedly that Israel not only provide compensation for those wounded and killed by IDF members but also provide an acceptable apology. Israel has agreed to compensation but has balked over the idea of an apology. Prime minister Netanyahu has maintained that doing so would damage Israeli public morale among other sinister things. In this he has been backed (or exceeded) by the always ready to breath fire foreign minister, Lieberman. The far right of the Israeli political spectrum has been monolithic in the rejectionist stance adopted by Netanyahu.

It seems that the Netanyahu government believes that an apology for an action seen as being defensive in nature and not overdone in view of the provocations offered by activists on board the Mavi Marmora who were armed with bludgeons and similar weapons would somehow lessen Israel in the eyes of its citizens and the world generally. This is an utterly specious notion.

The first reason for declaring the Netanyahu stance specious is simply that the raid was poorly conceived and even more poorly executed. It seems preposterously arrogant that the raid's planners and commanders did not anticipate any armed resistance to the IDF boarding party. Did these experienced military officers really, really believe the activists sponsored by a group with a long record of hostility to Israel would not seek a confrontation? Or, were they of the view that the simple arrival of the dreaded IDF would cause an instant collapse of will on the part of the activists? Either flies in the face of both experience and realistic military planning.

To put it bluntly, the boarding was as badly botched as, for example, the special operations force attempt in Somalia twenty years back which resulted in Blackhawk down. The IDF blew it pure and simple when they mounted the assault. This is not a mark against the troops who fast roped down to decks filled with men ready and eager for a violent confrontation, men who were willing to court and accept death at the hands of the IDF, men willing to be martyrs for the faith and the cause.

Apologizing for your own side's errors is no shame--only a transient embarrassment for those in charge. Admitting that better thinking, better planning, better timing, better methods and tactics would have resulted in a death free takeover of the ship is no sin, no humiliation, but rather an expression of a willingness and capacity to learn from mistakes.

The second reason the Netanyahu posture is specious not to say vacuous is simply that great nations can and do apologize. By this the Geek does not mean the bogus exercises of mea culpa engaged in by President Obama for American "transgressions" both real and imagined but in all cases resident in the far distant past. No, the Geek means such examples as that provided by General Stanley McChrystal, sitting, legs crossed, feet bootless, on the rug covered floor of an Afghan stone hut apologizing for fatalities inflicted by forces under his command upon civilians, upon members of the family in whose house he sat.

The humble, human gesture of offering apologies for lives cut short in no way humiliated the general, nor the forces in his command, nor the nation in whose service he and his people fought. Rather, it demonstrated that a great and powerful country disposing military force of nearly unlimited power could admit it did inadvertent wrong, wreaked unintended havoc and death--and, most importantly, could acknowledge and apologize for it.

Unlike General McChrystal, there will be no need for Mr Netanyahu to face the kin of those who died at the hands of the IDF. Mr Netanyhu will not have to take off his shoes, sit on the floor, and personally say, "I am truly sorry for the deaths my men caused and the pain inflicted upon you by our actions. Mr Netanahu can do the job by written words, words carefully crafted by diplomats and vetted by politicians, words which can be totally insincere provided they do not read as such. It can be an antiseptic charade without any requirement for the direct person-to-person dynamic which involved McChrystal.

True, the Turks will crow over an apology. The Erdogan government will distort it, use it to advance Turkey's status in its ambitious plan of a neo-Ottoman Empire. That will be to the shame of Ankara not Israel. And, it is debatable that the resultant propaganda will be any more destructive of Israel's interests than is the ongoing festering crisis of diplomacy and trade.

Best of all, the issuance of an apology puts the ball back in the Turk's court. The apology would place the onus on Ankara to put up or shut up, to restore the status quo ante or admit the whole issue was false, a gambit intended to put Israel on the unending defensive, a way to back out of the previous policy of cooperation between the two countries. This manner of clarification is in Israel's interest, is it not?

Get a grip, Mr Netanyahu! An apology is in your interests. It is in the better interests of your country. Offering one will not diminish Israel; it will buff the country's image and status around the world and in the US. It will not even bruise your ego. It might even enhance your sense of self. It will have been you who called the Erdogan bluff.

Turkey's Foreign Policy--Clever Calculation Or Flat Out Stupid

2011-09-05T15:12:00.000-07:00

Until very recently, the announced foreign policy of Turkey under the Islamist leaning AKP has been one of "zero problems" with its regional neighbors. This exercise in fantasy started to crumble under the bitter winds of the "Arab Spring."

Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi. The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain. The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.

After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters. Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels. In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.

Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad. The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran. Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.

The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom. Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."

The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days. At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen. By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.

The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance. Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.

The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident. Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer." The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship. Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora. Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.

The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so. The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.

As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.

It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan. So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians. It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.

Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq. While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders. This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.

One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.

It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want. The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed. They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.

The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border. This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing. The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any. In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.

Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge. They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible. They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible. They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan. Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.

The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy. The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside. True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp. Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.

Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey. But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support. As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders. Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.

Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.

Going To Hell In A Bucket

2011-09-04T14:45:00.000-07:00

To paraphrase a mantra of the early (1920s) self-help movement, the Mideast and coterminous regions appear "in every way and every day to be growing worse." For those of us who are fans of collapse and chaos, these are the glory days for the benighted folk living in the vast arc from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf and beyond to the point where sand dunes meet the surf in Morocco.

Pakistan remains what it has been for some years now, a national definition of the old military term SNAFU. You almost have to feel sorry for the Pakistanis. In the rush to use Islam of the Wahhibist flavor to unify the nation, the result was not only to undercut whatever potential for unity might have existed but to assure the place would dissolve into a bloody froth of differing views of what sort of Islam held the total truth for the Pakistani national identity.

The crimson foam of theological disputation conceals but does not mitigate the other divisions which constitute the political and social terrain of Pakistan. Corruption is an ever present "flavor of the day," providing the basic diet of politics and business. The Baluch defensive insurgency refuses to simply go away despite the fervent desires of Islamabad. The national judiciary would provide much comic relief were it not for the tragic results of its combination of lethargy and incompetence. The national fisc is a disaster area such that the country depends upon international aid (aka protection money and bribes) so that the army can continue to prepare for the hoped for next round of war with India.

Arguably, the real world challenges of inefficiency, bankruptcy, insurgency, corruption, broken government, and general poverty would be solvable were it not for the more powerful threats presented by the aforementioned religious disputes. Stripped to the politically incorrect essentials, Pakistan is rumbling dangerously close to the cliff of failed state status due to the Islamic tendency to stay stuck in a war of religions, or, more properly, a war of competing sects not all that unlike those which left the German states in utter ruin nearly four hundred years ago.

The same dynamic of warfare between conflicting interpretations of theology threaten to turn the "Arab Spring" into an endless winter of very violent discontent in Egypt and, perhaps, Libya, as well as other countries--here Syria comes to mind. No matter the gloss applied by Western journalists, academics, and politicians, the ugly face of conflict between adherents of austere Islam, Salifists, Wahhibists, and others of similar ilk with adherents of less austere forms as well as "secularists" can be seen easily.

Bad ideas do not die. It does not matter to the True Believers of austere Islam that the appeals of their form of Islam have been shown in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and elsewhere to have a short life in the real world. The seeming exception of Iran can be explained easily by reference to the numerous and well equipped internal security forces. The lesson of life remains the same. Austere Islam is not acceptable to the vast majority of Muslims and can be imposed and maintained only by robust, eternal repression.

Taliban in Afghanistan had outworn its welcome before the Americans arrived a decade back. Al-Qaeda in Iraq rapidly expired as a direct result of its dreadful behavior in Anbar province. Even in Somalia, the "kids" of al-Shabaab have insured their own ultimate defeat by their efforts to forcefully impose an unacceptably harsh interpretation of Islam on a people who previously wore their Islam lightly.

These lessons are lost on the Salifists of Egypt, a group which has not garnered the attention in the West lavished on the better known Egyptian Brotherhood. It might be noted that a self-proclaimed voice of Salifism in Egypt, a man named Ismaili, has a very good chance of becoming Egypt's first democratically elected president. The Salifists are dead set against peaceful relations with Israel. Rather they are fully committed to seeing an end to the Jewish state. Even more than the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's Salifists are anti-West, anti-American. They are also of the view that the current regimes in the region are apostate and must be overthrown.

The Salifists of Egypt are four square in favor of Shariah. They are equally firm in their opposition to making any accommodation to the West (or Western tourists.) Some would go so far as to treat the monuments of Egypt's long pre-Islam history as "unlawful" suitable to be treated as Taliban did the great statutes of the Buddha. Others would allow them to exist--hidden behind protective screens.

The Salifists are not so evident in their presence in Libya. The invisibility doesn't imply absence. Rather, it is indicative of caution, the same sort of caution which impelled the Renaissance Party in Tunisia to deny its goals and interim agenda for weeks after the collapse of the old regime. It is a caution bred of the hard experience of Salifists and kindred souls in the deadly war between them and the Algerian army twenty years ago. While the old regime in Egypt suppressed Salifists as it did the Muslim Brotherhood, the Algerian armed forces obliterated these advocates of political Islam.

The Salifists, the Brotherhood members, the Wahhibists, all those who espouse austere and politically oriented forms of Islam learned the lesson and keep their heads well down until such time as they can be raised with impunity at the least and an expectation of victory at best. Splits between "secularist" militias and those representing the advocates of austere, political Islam are already apparent in Libya. There is not yet fighting between militiamen without beards and those whose faces are bearded (but lack mustaches--a clear sign of Salifist tendencies), but there is no reason that today's lack of inter-group trust will not degenerate into exchanges of fire in the not too distant future.

Egypt, Tunisia, Libya all face very large problems in the wake of their respective adventures in regime change. Big as the problems might be, seemingly insurmountable as the challenges seem, there is no reason to believe that each state and its people would not be able to overcome them. That is, there would be no reason were it not for the presence of religious disputes. The dynamic pitting those of powerful austere beliefs against all others bodes well to assure that each case is more likely than not to fail in achieving the goal of a more or less open, more or less democratic, more or less free market society, polity, and economy.

Once again it may be politically incorrect but it is not inaccurate to observe that each of these states is likely to dissolve in a welter of sectarian violence not unlike that which occurred in Iraq. This eventuality is not in the interests of regional or global stability--to engage in an exercise of belaboring the obvious. It is also an eventuality which cannot be halted or mitigated by Western action or inaction.

The takeaway? To paraphrase the campaign mantra of Clinton in 1992: "It's the religion, stupid!"

One More Victory?

2011-08-29T14:28:00.000-07:00

The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad. The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered. It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.

Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.

Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity. The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.

The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date. The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice. The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.

There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan. That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil. Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally. The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine. Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.

Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray. Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making. As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues. More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.

Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime. There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause. But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite. Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."

Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point. His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint. However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.

The same dynamic applied in Iraq. The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural. The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate. The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.

As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border. Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities. In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.

As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance. This man is Muqtada al-Sadr. He is a Shia cleric. He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context. He runs a very large and rather competent private militia. And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.

The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing. Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price. For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.

The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran. The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.

A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon. Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government. The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level. The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.

The departure of the Americans will have two results. One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations. The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.

Isn't that a fascinating prospect?

The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real. The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad. Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.

President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not. They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik. Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.

Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box. Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France. The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.

Libya is in a profound state of flux. It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed. The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on. Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.

So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department. While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.

Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it. Doesn't it?

The "Fall" Of Tripoli And Other Polite Fictions

2011-08-23T15:40:00.000-07:00

You will recall no doubt that NATO air forces have been operating under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution to "protect" civilians caught in the crossfire between rebels and troops loyal to noted humanitarian, African "King of Kings," and Brother Leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi. To some of the NATO countries such as Germany and Turkey, even this limited mission was unacceptably broad and all too fraught with the possibility that someone, somewhere, somehow might kill someone else. To other members, the US, the UK, and France come to mind, the only way to accomplish the prescribed action was through the removal of Gaddafi.

Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime. When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure. It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.

In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west. The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation. Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.

The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces. Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO." Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.

The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate. Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size. The associated body counts were equally small. In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.

As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties. That should have raised flags with all observers. There were darn few dots to connect. The rebels were suddenly more effective. "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target. There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.

Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control. In the past couple of days, due in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.

The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet. In a sense there is no real reason. After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains? Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans? Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?

Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya. A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth. The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.

The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable. The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary. The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.

The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel. Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli. In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.

The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies. Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it. On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush. But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.

A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People. That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan. Hooey! Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone. He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country. This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi. There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.

There is a final polite fiction. That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli. Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental. The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction. The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars. Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.

The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little. Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men." No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off. For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.

A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq. That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not. Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.

The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi. It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise. It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace. It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime. None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.

That challenge?

Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.

If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.

Smart(?) Power In Action

2011-08-19T15:42:00.000-07:00

The other day Hilary Clinton and Leon Panetta were on stage at the National Defense University. In the course of the action Ms Clinton bragged on the use of "smart power" by her boss, The Nice Young Man From Chicago, with respect to the Syrian conundrum. She went on to imply strongly that the graduated escalation of economic and diplomatic sanctions in support of the anti-government demonstrators was both without precedent in American diplomatic history and (drum roll, please) constituted a paradigm for the future.

This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.

While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.

Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.

The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.

Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.

The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.

Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.

A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.

These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.

The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.

The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)

The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.

The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.

While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."

By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)

Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.

The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.

This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.

"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)

Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.

Rick Perry And The Big, Bad World

2011-08-14T12:32:00.000-07:00

As had been expected for several weeks, Rick Perry has entered the GOP contest. Of this the Geek is both glad and positive. Governor Perry appears to possess the stomach and head necessary for a down and dirty campaign against the Nice Young Man From Chicago which is singularly lacking with other Elephant hopefuls.

The Geek became a fan of Texas politics during the years necessity compelled him to live and work in the Lone Star Empire. The doings at that model of law making decorum called the "Lege" were and are as fascinating as the inner workings of the Cook County (Ill.) Democratic machine. The emergence of Perry showed him to be a man having a strong, visceral understanding of the political soul of most Texans. Over the past year Perry's performance has demonstrated that this gut level talent is not restricted to the denizens of the LSE but extends to many of We the People.

It is important to enter an important caveat here, a warning of relevance to international politics. Other significant leaders who have exhibited a strong, visceral understanding of their people's national politics such as Vladimir Putin have seen that understanding stop abruptly at the border. They have little if any understanding of the political mood or mode of other people in other countries.

Governor Perry stated strongly in Charleston that he was a strong believer in "American exceptionalism," which places him in very sharp contrast with the relativistic Mr Obama. This posture while laudable in itself demands yet another caveat in the arena of global affairs. The "exceptionalism" part of the phrase consists of characteristics, attributes, and values which are under a permanent export ban. American exceptionalism is not only made in America by dint of suffering, war, political struggles, and endless effort, it must forever stay in the land of its fabrication. It is unique to us for it is uniquely us and ours. No bayonet, no tank, no stealth fighter, no UAV, no aid program, no propaganda effort, no executive order or congressional enactment can force its export to other, foreign soils. As a transplant it must fail.

On his campaign website, Mr Perry avers that his service as a C-130 driver as well as his many foreign trips as governor give him insight into the needs of American diplomatic and national security policy. While it is true that the governor flew Herky birds with numerous RONs and TDYs, the result would be an intimate acquaintance with nocturnal resorts of entertainment and recreation but little contact with the dark doings of foreign chanceries or the gavottes in distant corridors of power. (To this truism any person with a peripatetic military experience can attest.) And, as governor Mr Perry's overseas jaunts were in the interest of the economic development of the LSE not the national interests of the US.

In his speech at Charleston, the Texan was more than kind when he characterized whatever passes as foreign policy within the Obama administration as a "muddle." It is, of course, far worse than that. It is even worse than a collection of blunders wrapped in empty, high sounding rhetoric. Rather, it is an ideologically driven exercise in ad hoc reaction coupled with a set of self-defeating visions of how the world ought to be if only it were designed in Left leaning academic salons located near the University of Chicago campus.

At least implicitly (if Rick "No One Crosses Me and Lives" Perry can ever be merely implicit) the Texas Cyclone of Prayer vowed to change this. He evidently intends to assure the US once again walks tall and proud on the international stage. This would be a welcome change after the years of "leading from behind" but carries with it yet another, larger caveat.

This caveat resides in the coterie Perry has assembled to date as his advisers on foreign and national security affairs. Without notable exception, it is comprised of neocon ninnies out of the years of the Bush/Cheney administration. At the head of the list is the execrable Doug Feith, the top architect of the debacle in Iraq. Other members have an equally illustrious record. From their post administration writings and speeches, it is apparent they have neither learned nor forgotten a single iota. None have seen the failings produced by their own ideologically predicated view of the world and the role of the US in that world.

Unless Governor Perry expands his advisory staff, there is a very grave danger that his understanding of the abilities and limits of American power will be as disastrously off the mark as were those of George W. Bush. Neither the US nor the world can live with yet another ideologically predicated misreading of what the US can and cannot do with respect to the internal workings of other countries.

It is important to note that not since George H.W. Bush left office has the US enjoyed the services of a president who was both internationally focused and relatively bereft of ideological blinders. The many years of Clinton, George W. Bush and His Hindmost, Barack Obama--each with either or both a disinterest in foreign affairs or ideological predicates of overwhelming power--have seen the steady decline of the US as a Great Power with influence and potency. Given that the next president will be laboring under serious budgetary constraints, the question of the relations of the US with the rest of the world as well as the American capacity and will to defend and advance its national interests will be under very severe challenge.

More than ever we will need a president who realistically assesses our national interests and tailors our diplomacy and military to protect and advance those interests regardless of extraneous considerations including ideological preferences and prejudices. The next president will face a world which remains what it always has been--a dangerous place replete with countries which oppose us and our interests and actors both state and non-state who wish to do us harm. The world will also contain countries which share values and norms with us and with which we have coinciding national interests.

The next president must do what the present incumbent has failed to do with striking obviousness--parse between the enemies and the allies. He must be able and willing to cozen and stroke the latter while drawing in a credible manner the necessary lines in the sand regarding the former.

As Perry lacks any significant foreign policy experience and whose direct experience with military affairs and war fighting is limited to the perspective offered from the cockpit of a C-130, he will depend heavily on his foreign policy and national security teams. Given his first picks as advisers, there is, unfortunately, little if any reason to be hopeful in this regard.

In the future national interest as well as his own personal political fortune, Governor Perry ought to fire the present advisory staff. It is the only smart and prudential thing to do. He has to put daylight between himself and George W. Bush, and listening to the old gang of neocon ninnies is not the way to offset the inevitable Obama camp attacks seeking to make Perry look like the much disliked (not to say hated) Bush, Jr.

(Full disclosure in blogging statement: The Geek is not angling for a job with the Perry camp as he is constitutionally incapable of working for anyone.)

Afghanistan Or Pashtunstan--A Back-to-the-Future Ending

2011-08-13T14:41:00.000-07:00

Overshadowed by the Great Debt Ceiling Battle, the Great Downgrading, and the Miracle of the Job Free Recovery, the US has reached a very critical crossroad in Afghanistan. In truth we haven't just reached it, we have pushed for it, rushed to it, and sought it with the eagerness of a drowning man clawing for the sky.

The US wants out of Afghanistan in the worst sort of way. With the exception of some military people, most but not all of senior rank, the current political leadership of the US along with most of We the People want out, right now if possible, but tomorrow at the latest. This is the ground reality regardless of President Obama's patent bromide about pressing on regardless delivered in the wake of the Chinook shoot-down and the deaths of more than two dozen men from Boat Six.

Of course, We the People, the congress, and the Clueless Guy in the Oval would like it best if the US can get out of Afghanistan with a modicum of dignity and a sufficient simulacrum of success to offset the billions of bucks spent and the hundreds of lives sacrificed on the alter of "nation-building." Congressman Ron Paul was speaking for many besides himself at the Iowa debate when he denounced the American adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan while warning against any repeat in Iran. Heads no doubt nodded in agreement across the country as he delivered his neo-isolationist message for the umpteenth time.

One unnecessary and unjustifiable war is reaching its quite unsatisfying conclusion. As the Iraqi excuse for a parliament dithers over whether or not to invite American "trainers" to remain in country after the last day of this year, it has become brilliantly clear that only Saddam Hussein lost to a greater extent than did the US over the course of this long, bloody exercise in regime change.

Iran has emerged as the big winner in the contest as shown by Baghdad's alignment with Tehran over the question of Syria. This is simply the most recent, most dramatic example of the triumph of Shia faith over all other considerations in the deeply divided human terrain of Iraq. But, far outside of international politics, in the quotidian dealings of business, it is instructive that US companies have lost out repeatedly and consistently to competitors from China, Russia, and Europe for the lucrative opportunities available in the country which was--we were assured--going to pay for the costs of liberation, rejoice in new democratic freedoms, greet American troops as the French did after D-Day, and generally rally to the American flag.

Not to put too fine a point on it, the US lost in the Iraqi gambit. And, now, we face losing in Afghanistan as well. No, we will not be defeated in the field by Taliban, the Haqqani network, and their Pakistani backers. There are simply not enough lucky shots by RPGs to do that. Rather, we will conspire in our own defeat at the hands not of Taliban alone, nor by the combination of Taliban and Pakistan but rather by the joint efforts of "our man in Kabul," Hamid Karzai, the Pakistanis, and Taliban.

Karzai wants out of the war with a fervor which surpasses even that of the US and its partners in the ISAF. To this end he has been seeking a species of separate peace with Taliban for some time now. He has been seeking this goal not through the public means of the Supreme Peace Jurga, a large, unwieldy and totally implausible group, but through low key, private, and ever-so-discrete conversations in the presidential palace as well as out of country locations.

The glue which would hold any peace agreement together is simply that Karzai as well as the overwhelming majority of Taliban is Pashtu speaking. They are all good Pashtuns on the Secret Peace Bus. As the Pakistanis understand and support the Pashtun super-tribe due to its domination of the key border areas of the FATA, there is no doubt but Islamabad is well represented on the Peace Bus as well. This means their strategic political position in Afghanistan will be protected in full.

The ethnic Uzbeks, Tajjks, and Hazaras constituting the majority of the population in northern Afghanistan are not represented on the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pashtun Peace Express. These are the same people who suffered the most under the rule of the Taliban and whose Northern Alliance comprised the bulk of the indigenous fighters cooperating with the American invaders ten years ago.

It is not surprising that the old Northern Alliance is silently reforming. It is no surprise that the non-Pushtu population is rearming at a great rate of knots. Nor will it be surprising when renewed civil war greets the announcement of a peace brokered by Pushtuns for the benefit of Pushtuns. Last of all, there will be no surprise when the US greets the peace with loud applause and the ensuing internal war with a complete and utter silence.

It is not that the Deep Thinkers around the Oval are unaware of what is taking place in Kabul. Even if the totality of American intelligence assets was detained on matters of tactical and operational focus, the US is aware of both the ongoing Karzai effort and the probable outcome(s.) The former head of Afghanistan's premiere intelligence service, Amrolah Saleh, has been all but shouting it from the minarets since he was forced from office last year by Karzai.

Saleh is not only very highly respected by intelligence professionals from the US, the UK, and elsewhere, he is personally honest, not at all corrupt, and, most important, committed to the notion of an Afghanistan which includes all the several ethnic groups on a basis of equality before the law as well as in politics. He is post-tribal to a fault. And, in Afghanistan, being post-tribal in worldview is a grave fault.

Saleh's message is simple, easy to corroborate, and very well rooted historically. Should the Great All Pashtun Peace Express arrive at its destination, the result will be fatal for Afghanistan. In short, Afghanistan will return to what it was the day before the first American boot hit Afghan soil. A predominantly Pushtu, religiously predicated, and robustly violent Taliban will run the southern two thirds of the country to the advantage of Islamabad while the reconstituted Northern Alliance will fight a defensive insurgency based upon ethnic identity in the final third.

A decade or more of war, hundreds of American lives, billions of dollars to say nothing of the indescribable sufferings of the Afghans caught in the crossfire, will finally result in a back-to-the-future ending. Worst of all, there is virtually nothing the US can do about it.

We were doomed in our efforts the moment George W. Bush and his neocon ninny crew decided to engage in nation-building in Afghanistan in lieu of a simple, straight forward punitive expedition. In the rush to invade Iraq so as to teach the Arabs a lesson in how to elect good men which was not needed or indicated, the men of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld administration assured we were on a mission-impossible in Afghanistan.

Now we must reap the harvest of the seeds those intellectually challenged, ideologically driven men planted. We can see the crop now, a government which is a broken, rotten travesty, a people demoralized and victimized by a war in which none have a direct stake, an army and police force which exists more in name than in the field, and an "ally" in Pakistan which is an adversary in all but name. All that is needed to complete the harvest is the "success" of the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pushtun Peace Bus.

When that happens--and it is question of when not if, the US will be (including Vietnam) 0 for 3 in large scale interventionary operations. That record is not simply pathetic, it is one of self-inflicted defeats unrivaled by any other major country in recent history. (Even the French were only 0 for 2.)

Does this mean that Ron Paul is right? Does it mean the US would be best served by an isolationist posture? It does imply that the US is so preposterously pathetic in its efforts at muscular nation-building that we should abandon any future efforts in that direction. Of course, the world may not be willing to let us off so easy--and we may not be able to resist future temptations to do good.

The Geek has some thoughts on those questions. (No shock there.) Stay tuned. He will be back.

Time For The "Nuclear Option"

2011-08-09T15:12:00.000-07:00

The US and assorted other civilized states have been making noises and ugly faces for some years now over the Iranian efforts to attain nuclear weapons. Diplomatic and economic sanctions have been employed. So have more robust measures ranging from the more or less covert such as computer viruses to the rather obvious, the shooting of nuclear researchers.

Th net result has been the continued and accelerating Iranian quest for the bomb.

Years ago, the notion of Iranian science or work in advanced technology would have been seen quite properly as an oxymoron. During the early days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, science and technology were downgraded severely as a matter of theologically predicated policy. It was only years later, years marked by the stalemated bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War, that the mullahs and ayatollahs changed their religious tune. Only after the near defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Iraq convinced the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution that the deity did, after all, will Iran to have sufficient and sufficiently advanced weapons to protect the revolution.

Science and technology came back to the front and center of Iranian governmental life in the late Eighties and beyond. Oil money poured into new and reinvigorated institutes and university departments. Chief among these were those entities which dealt with nuclear research and development as well as key support systems of nuclear weapons including but not limited to ballistic and guided missiles.

The Iranians deserve great credit for accomplishing much over the next two decades. In both nuclear and missile development, they were very much on their own. Only South Africa was as internationally isolated during its nuclear development period--and even then the Pretoria regime received some assistance from Israel including supplies of tritium necessary for boosted fission as well as fusion bombs. Other than some early model centrifuges from A.Q Khan's ring in Pakistan, the Iranians pulled themselves up by their own fission bootstraps.

The monolithic Western governmental opposition linked with the earlier conviction that only a nuclear capacity would assure Iranian survival in a future war to enhance greatly the firm belief that the possession of nuclear weapons was an existential matter. The existential foundation of the nuclear option was reinforced by Tehran's observation of how the US treated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Islamabad Bad Boys were handled with gentility and respect by Washington for one simple reason--Pakistan had the bomb.

This meant that should Iran match Pakistan's accomplishment, the result would be elevated status on both the global and regional stages. Not only would the "Mahdi Bomb" assure Iran's survival as an Islamic theocracy, it would propel the country to the status of regional hegemon and global actor of real potency. These were two very fine reasons to bear heavy burdens and make great sacrifices for the years it would take to develop a credible nuclear capacity.

There is no doubt but the many sanctions regimes imposed, particularly those of recent origin focusing on shipping and insurance, have place very heavy loads on the Iranian economy. There is no doubt but the sanctions taken in total have forced the Iranian government and people to make sacrifices over and above those required by the inefficient and repressive nature of the government.

Most importantly, there is no reason to conclude that the sanctions and diplomatic pressures have modified Iranian behavior--other than to make the mullahs and their frontmen more intransigent, more creative in sanction evasion, and more committed to acquiring the bomb no matter what the price.

Not to put too fine a point on the matter, in the battle of political wills between the US led West and Iran, it is the latter which is winning. In this context, the Iranians have introduced a form of game changer--a new generation of improved centrifuges which will reduce greatly the time needed to turn twenty percent enriched uranium into weapons grade stuff. Further, they have acted in a prudential manner, placing the new fast-spinners in deep dug bunkers.

Now ninety plus senators have urged the immediate introduction of a game changer from the American perspective. In a letter to the president, this overwhelming majority of the senate have demanded the imposition of sanctions against the Iranian central bank, the bank created some fifty years ago to act as the interface between the consumers of Iranian oil and the Tehran government. This move, described as the "nuclear option," would, if enforced, prevent the clearing of payments to Iran from all purchasers of oil.

For its part, the government of Iran has stated this move would constitute "an act of war."

While not being an armed action, the isolation of the Iranian Bank Markazi would be the equivalent in effect of the US freezing of all Japanese assets in the summer of 1941. That action, the culmination of a long campaign of escalating economic pressures, prevented Japan from acquiring oil and other strategic materials from the US. This gave the government of Imperial Japan the choice of a humiliating surrender to American political dictates or war.

As you know, the Japanese chose the second alternative. The decision makers believed that the fortunes of war might favor Japan given other constraints operating on the US including the ongoing Great Depression and a preoccupation with Nazi Germany.

It would not be irrational for Tehran to make the same choice today or into the near future. The US is in the throes of a severe economic challenge including possibly the second of a double dip recession. It is still engaged in an unpopular and seemingly inconclusive war in Afghanistan. The current administration is perceived as both irresolute and feckless.

The senators hint at the possibility of legislation compelling the imposition of the ultimate sanction should the president decide not to use the authority he already has to make the move. This make the challenge both direct and definitely non-trivial. As the choice is both clear and stark, it will be difficult for Mr Obama to "lead from behind" or equivocate. And, it is debatable whether or not he has the political capital necessary to stare the senators down.

Were the Iranians to choose war, now is the least-worst time for us to fight it. Looking ahead, there is no doubt but the American military will be significantly weaker a year or two hence. The budget battles assure the Pentagon will take a heavy hit. In this context is is important to recall that people close to the Oval have intimated the president would be happy to see the military budget at or below fifteen percent of total expenditures. This would be a funding level not seen since the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

We forget how unready the US was for World War II. We forget how difficult it was to mobilize our industrial resources and manpower for that war. Perhaps most important, we overlook the fact that playing the sort of catch-up now that we did so well seventy years ago is quite impossible. It is no longer feasible or even possible to undertake the kind of forced draft military build-up today which we did between 1941 and 1944. The radical changes in military technology have been responsible for this ground truth as they are for the companion reality that a draftee based armed force is not possible.

Right now or in the next few months, the US is quite capable of decisively defeating Iran should the latter be so ill-advised as to treat our imposition of the "nuclear option" as a literal act of war. Further, it is a war which would be widely supported by We the People--provided only that it was fought as a retaliatory and punitive action without any follow-on occupation and rebuilding of the place.

President Obama is long overdue in making a defecate or get off the pot decision about Iran and its search for the bomb. We have played the escalating sanction game long enough and have had more than sufficient opportunity to have observed the counterproductive results. Diplomacy of the talk sort has also run its course without beneficial results.

The senatorial letter is forcing a final decision. Either we have to admit that we can live and the world can live with a nuclear capable Iran and all that implies or we have to take the final, decisive act. The president would be best off acting on his current authority so he will look as if he were actually a "decider guy" as George W. used to put it. Better to look as if you are acting of your own volition than to be seen as being frog marched by the senate.

Should Iran respond with war-like acts either directly or through surrogates, by overt military actions or through terrorism, let it be. As George W. memorably put the matter, "Bring it on!"

The Bugs Bunny "What A Maroon!" Award Returns

2011-08-07T15:41:00.000-07:00

It has been some time since the Geek last bestowed the highly coveted "What A Maroon! Award." This has not been due to a dearth of candidates. Quite the contrary, the past several months have been awash to the scuppers with moronic policies and the severely intellectually challenged folks behind them. Simply, there have been entirely too many possibilities to single out just one each and every week.

Fortunately, a person has emerged from the fog of merely inept, incompetent, brain dead wonks and pols inside the Beltway. Finally there has been an act of such unmitigated idiocy that the Award must be bestowed.

The envelop, please. Riiippp. Raise the slip of paper inside. Read the distinguished name of the winner.

"And, the winner is.....(drum roll.) Lick lips in anticipations. "The winner is Hillary Clinton!" Applause.

That's right, bucko. The recipient is our most distinguished Secretary of State. Ms Clinton gets the Award not for her efforts to push back on the eviscerated foreign aid budget. Nor for her opposition to the cuts to the Foreign Service appropriation. No. Those were not moronic.

Well, what then? Is this belated recognition for Hilary's hard work to bring about the Libyan policy morass? No, although a strong case can be made for her receiving at least an honorable mention in this area.

SecState Clinton deserves the "What A Maroon!" Award for her recent collaboration with the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC,) the Turkish proponent of political Islam and historian manque, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in the area of preventing religious defamation. In an announcement datelined Jeddah, Ms Clinton and Dr Ihsanoglu declared the US would host a series of meetings to focus on the implementation of a UN Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.

This measure passed by the discredited Human Rights Council last March is intended to combat in an "urgent" fashion the growth of something called "Islamophobia." While carefully avoiding the use of either the word "Islam" or "Muslim," the intent of the resolution to single out the faith of the Prophet for special protection is clear. The fifty plus Muslim majority states of the OIC have long pushed for the criminalization of any written, spoken, or graphic consideration of any aspect of Islam in any manner other than the adulatory. After many failures, the OIC and its supporters such as Russia and China succeeded in getting 16/18 passed by a minority of the HRC members.

It is always essential to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of the OIC membership is well known for limiting free expression and inquiry. The same is true of states which have sided with the OIC in its efforts to stifle open expression and the equally free inquiry which accompanies expression. Some OIC states, such as Pakistan, whose delegation introduced 16/18 as well as its numerous predecessors, has blasphemy laws of the most draconian sort enshrined in law.

It is equally necessary to recall that OIC states such as Egypt are (in)famous for the easy availability of antisemitic billingsgate such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Throughout the Muslim states, Judaism is defamed in the worst imaginable ways and in all media. Christianity is no better treated. Nor is Hinduism. Or Buddhism. Or minority groups within Islam such as the Alawites of Syria. All religions other than the most mainstream versions of Islam are fair targets for "defamation." Even the two largest subgroups of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia are willing, even eager, to "defame" the other.

Of course this "defamation" is not seen as such by the Muslims. To a good Muslim, the other faiths are either bastions of the infidel or expressions of apostasy. Thus, it is impossible by definition to "defame" them. Having not submitted to the unique Muslim view of the deity, adherents to all other faiths are fair game for whatever vitriol any Muslim cares to spill forth.

Logically, as the only "true" faith, only Islam merits protection as only Islam can be "defamed" by the vile slanders of the infidels and apostates. It is not extreme to assert that even the most objective, fact based, well documented assessment of Islam is automatically "defamatory" if it comes from the tongue or pen of an infidel or apostate. Considered from a Muslim perspective, the HRC resolution and all national policies or actions which arise from its application can serve to protect only Islam as only Islam resides in the realm of true faith.

As a dedicated adherent of political Islam, the OIC Secretary General is willing to do whatever is necessary to advance and protect the interests and position of Islam. Thus, it is not surprising that he seized upon the Norwegian tragedy to argue that now more than ever the states of the West must move quickly and effectively to turn the theory of resolution 16/18 into legal practice. The unfortunate reaction of so many in the Western and American elites to the berserker act of Brevik gave added power to Ishanoglu's argument.

The elites in the post-Brevik days continued and amplified their assertion that any criticism of Islam or any linkage of Muslims with terror serves the end of alleged "rightwing extremists" with the results such as those in Norway. This exercise in absurdity and political correctness automatically plays into the censorious hands of the OIC. Somehow, even the most objective and well-documented negative interpretations of Islam or the relation between the tenets of the faith and violent political actions are seen by the left leaning elites as being responsible for the action of Brevik. Without any documentation, the same people argue that a myriad of potential Breviks are lurking all through Western and American societies waiting to be triggered into violence by some less than hosanna laden treatment of Islam or Muslims.

Showing her elite credentials and leftward bent, Ms Clinton signed onto the OIC's gag-the-infidels gambit. No matter what her intentions are and no matter what the outcome may be, the secretary's agreement to a series of meetings oriented to putting 16/18 into practice gives the Muslim "speechophobic" move a legitimacy it does not deserve. Her action provides an imprimatur to a resolution which strikes at the heart of the most basic and critical right resident in Western societies.

Free inquiry and expression is a protean right. It is also a right from which many others emerge. It is so basic to Western liberties and Western economic, social, political, and cultural development that it is simply impossible to separate free speech from the West as it exists today. The utter absence of any real free inquiry and expression in the countries of the OIC goes far to explain why these states are comparatively backwards in all respects.

The irrelevance of rights, including that of free expression and inquiry, in Muslim majority states is not surprising. Islam, unlike other major faiths, has no inherent concept of rights. Islam is all about duty. Believers have duties to the deity and to other believers, but, as good slaves, they have no inherent rights. In sharp contrast, other faiths, particularly those preeminent in the West, not only acknowledge the existence of rights, rights which are inherent to the human condition, but exalt those rights by stating clearly and repeatedly that the exercise of rights requires the concomitant acceptance of duties.

To the faithful Muslim, the Western emphasis on rights constitutes a world through the looking glass. It is not comprehensible to the good and faithful Muslim with his focus on knowing his duties and executing them with willing joy. The Muslim has a duty to protect his religion against the words of the infidels and apostates. His duty goes so far as to seek to prevent the infidel and apostate from sullying the faith by even an honest and objective narrative treatment. The Muslim has a duty to exalt his faith above all others, which means he is allowed to attack the "false" beliefs. His double standard is not hypocritical but rather is an honest expression of duties and beliefs.

Ms Clinton is not a Muslim as far as is publicly known. She is, however, an American. As a holder of an office of trust and confidence under the Constitution, she has taken an oath of office swearing to protect and defend the Constitution to the best of her ability. She is a lawyer by education. Putting the two aspects of Ms Clinton's life together, it must be concluded that she understands the OIC backed resolution is repugnant to the Bill of Rights.

She became a "maroon" of the highest order when she did not meet the demand that the US support 16/18 with any reaction other than gales of derisive laughter.

Carrying Water And Doublethinking

2011-08-06T14:15:00.000-07:00

Leon Panetta is an old Chicago pol. He came of political age as a cog in the oldest, longest running, smoothest operating machine in the US--the Cook County Democratic Party. As such, he knows well the primary duty of a machine man--loyalty to the Boss. By definition the Boss is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Barack Obama.

Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach." Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.

Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size. And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well. If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.

Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11. In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.

Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated. Al-Qaeda is not dead. It is not on some sort of Islamic life support. It is not even gravely ill.

The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed. It has changed profoundly from its original form. Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.

In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system. It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser. None of this obtains today. Nor has it obtained for some time. Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.

Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam. Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.

The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises. Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original. "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group. It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.

The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea. This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.

In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea. It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct. The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam. These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics. Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West. Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.

Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda. Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies. The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.

Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone. In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles. AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat. AQIM is growing. Rapidly.

The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe. This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better. In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death. Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.

AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria. Kidnapping Europeans. This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy. In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort. Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago. Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe. There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.

Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say. Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year. Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US. It is one more rapidly growing threat.

Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge. He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground. He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today. Probably on a larger scale geographically.

Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American. Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits. When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.

Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI. That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols. It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there, that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US. If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.

Butchering A Sacred Cow

2011-08-04T15:37:00.000-07:00

The Pentagon is already scheduled to take a big hit in the money department. In addition, the landmine laden wording of the debt ceiling increase bill assures that should the "super committee" not come up with the requisite 1.2 trillion bucks in additional cuts over the next decade, the "national security" portion of federal expenditures will take another, larger whack. Potentially, the "national security" community could lose over a trillion bucks during the next ten years.

The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security. There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing. On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear. Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.

As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations. As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year. The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.

As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier. The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board. (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.) The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War. And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.

By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron. Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago. It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.

As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released. Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities. The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.

A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted. The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.

The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions. The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack. The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.

The reality was far different. As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support. The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.

Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home. In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.

Will is one thing. Ability is quite another. Political will is perishable. It can flourish. Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight. Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11. But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices. And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.

Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness. The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US. Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer. After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised. It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies. Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).

This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm. The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it. Dollars must be considered. Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things. But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.

The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values. We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power. It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.

The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity. We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical. As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.

The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies. Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia. Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam. The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum. This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.

None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped. But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.

Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner." There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities. It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.

Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US. His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities. And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.

Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget. In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast. By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place. We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming. Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.

Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.

A Slick Trip Down The Islamist Tubes?

2011-08-02T15:37:00.000-07:00

The Islamist AKP has gained an apparent unassailable superiority over the armed forces of Turkey. The shocking simultaneous "early retirement" of the military chief of staff and three other service commanders over the weekend seemed to have put the final nail in the coffin of the military's role as the ultimate guarantor of Turkish secularism and the legacy of Ataturk.

The act came on the eve of the semi-annual meeting of the combined armed forces senior leadership with the head of the civilian government, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and has been seen by many observers, Turkish as well as foreign, as a welcome sign of Turkey having become a normal democracy where civilian supremacy over the military is a given. In the past, there has been a great deal of discomfort in the US and Western Europe over the periodic military excursions out of the barracks and into the presidential palace. The European Union (or at least France) demanded that the armed forces be defanged as a prerequisite for membership.

The recent mass resignation must be taken in conjunction with the ongoing trial of nearly three hundred past and present senior commanders (ten percent or so of the entire flag officer complement) on charges which are at best politically motivated and most likely fabricated in whole or major part. The massive series of arrests over the past year or so constituted the AKP's direct attack on the military, which was the only plausible obstacle to permanent Islamist domination of Turkish politics.

The armed forces and AKP have been at daggers drawn since the once-banned AKP won power in 2002. The military missed its chance to send the Islamists packing in the wake of the narrow electoral victory mainly out of regard for EU sentiments and a proper regard for the benefits of EU membership. As the years slipped by, the chances for a military coup slipped away until they were lost beyond any hope in the most recent election where AKP took no prisoners at the polls.

Erdogan had made much of his stated intent to pursue EU membership even though it was more than slightly obvious that France would spare no effort to block the application. The economic success of the AKP has been based not on trade with the EU but upon increased ties with the Mideast and the Turkish speaking Central Asian Republics. In the process, a new class of very rich middlemen and entrepreneurs drawn from urban migrants originating in the Anatolian highlands has become a key component of the AKP base. These new millionaires join with displaced peasants in the slums of Istanbul and Ankara and "conservative" clerics to provide the electoral majority.

The rivals to the AKP drive to the east have been the senior officers of the armed forces along with the "traditional" business and commercial elite of Istanbul. The military has at its upper ranks men who are far more Western in their outlook, far more liberal in their views as well as far more educated than the mass of the political class and the new moneyed class. Their instinctive perspective is Western. That of AKP and its base runs to the East, to the Muslim marches of Central and Northwest Asia--and the states of the old Ottoman Empire.

The seemingly decisive victory of AKP over the inheritors of Ataturk is not universally welcomed in Turkey. There are more than a few Turks who fear that without the army as a counterweight there will be no limits on Erdogan and AKP. There is an undercurrent of apprehension that now the Islamists will be free to pursue the goal of reestablishing the old caliphate with all that implies. Others, unsurprisingly, pooh-pooh that notion and welcome AKP confining the armed forces to a subordinate role and, thus, allowing a return to the values and norms of the pre-Ataturk era.

Very few Turks are aghast at the new diplomatic muscle enjoyed by Ankara in the Mideast and Central Asia. Likewise, very few resent the new economic options brought by the "Ost politik" practiced by Erdogan. Other than some trepidations over Turkey's ever closer ties to Shia Iran, there have been few complaints over the foreign policy of Erdogan and company. There is definitely majority support for the very hard line drawn by Erdogan over Israel, particularly the IDF takeover of the Mazi Marmora "humanitarian relief" ship over a year ago.

The net effect has been the tilting of the longstanding conflict between nationalist and Islamist, secularist and Islamist in favor of the latter. For the moment this is just jake with the majority of Turks. But, there is likely to be a quick withdrawal of support for AKP should there be heavy handed attempts to "purify" Turkish society of "infidel" aspects. So far, the party has been sensitive to this dynamic and has moved only slowly to "Islamify" Turkey.

Almost overlooked in the political discussions of the resignations has been another, critical subject: The impact of Turkey's Muslim oriented "Ost politik" on NATO. In as much as Turkey's membership in the alliance has been considered, it has been in the boilerplate terms of "NATO's second largest army." As if size matters.

Turkey's large army is also quite irrelevant to NATO in the post-cold war period. Not only is the army incapable of any effective action outside of Turkey, it has not shown any particular utility in the local "forever war" against the Kurdish defensive insurgency. Pace NATO public statements (or those of Admiral Mullen), the armed forces of Turkey are totally irrelevant to NATO today and into the future.

The armed forces of Turkey, while large, are also largely immobile, poorly trained, indifferently equipped, overly expensive, a drain on the Turkish fisc, and a political drag on the alliance. The new Erdogan ministry strongly opposed the US driven invasion of Iraq making much political hay from proclaiming the operation as a "war on Islam and Muslims." In addition, the Turks have been a major non-participant in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the AKP government bitterly opposed the no-fly zone and its follow-on in Libya.

There is no reason not to believe that Turkey has passed along critical NATO information to Iran as a part of its charm offensive with Tehran. The same may be true regarding the opposition in Afghanistan and, possibly, Libya. Having Turkey in NATO today is tantamount to having the Italy of Mussolini sitting in on the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff during World War II.

If it is true, as it appears to be, that the Islamists have won in Turkey, the time has come to restructure NATO without Ankara. The hoary alliance is at a difficult crossroads. There is looming, embarrassing failure in Libya joining with the rush for the exit in Afghanistan to undercut any lingering credibility accruing to it. Given further that most NATO members have shown an ability to hit the funding targets akin to the performance of a visually impaired sniper, the time is now to rethink the alliance. The time is now to contemplate the impossible: The dissolution of NATO.

It is questionable whether or not NATO has any utility or even relevance to the world of now and tomorrow where the major enemy of any and all civilized states are the advocates of violent political Islam. The best way for civilized states to counter the threat resides not with NATO or any other Cold War artifact but rather with "coalitions of the willing," ad hoc structures of states with coinciding national interests which perceive the threat from violent political Islam or the challenges presented by any particular failed, failing, or hollow state in similar ways.

As George H.W. Bush showed during the Gulf War, the ad hoc coalition can work well provided the necessary preliminary diplomatic work is done with care. Even George W. Bush's ham handed counterparts worked reasonably well. In comparison, the NATO effort in Libya has been an example of how not to go about the task. While this can (correctly) be blamed on the relative absence of the US from the shooting war, the real lesson to be learned is that the effort was not undertaken by a genuine coalition of the willing.

The AKP has taken Turkey away from the West. Its lurch to the lands of Islam is understandable and even forgivable. It is, after all, a choice made by the Turkish electorate--at least up to a point. We can have no beef about it.

Rather, we should embrace the Turkish policy. We should use the stimulus to take a long hard look at the role of NATO in our alliance system, and jettison it as currently constituted unless a very strong argument can be made for its continuation. The inclusion of Turkey was contextual to the cold war; it has no permanent root in the Atlantic community. This is the geographical, cultural, and political reality. We should admit it with at least as much honesty as have the Turks.

The ideological and political blocs of the world have reformed since the end of the bi-polar world. Turkey has recognized this. The AKP has acknowledged bluntly that religion and language ties trump the artifacts of global alliance politics. Erdogan and company have chosen their side.

The US and Western Europe can and should do no less.

Norwegian Ethical Exceptionalism

2011-07-31T13:59:00.000-07:00

Svein Sevje, Norway's ambassador to Israel, delivered a rather unique ethical proposition in an interview the other day. Presumably reflecting the official position of the leftwing government in Oslo, the ambassador opined that Palestinian terror attacks against Israeli civilians were more morally justifiable than the bombing and shooting actions of Brevik a week before.

This stance makes manifest the belief within the highest circles of Norwegian politics that the throat slitting of a sleeping infant along with slightly older siblings and the parents during the hours of darkness by a group of Palestinian men was not a criminal act but rather the necessary and understandable consequence of Israel's ongoing semi-occupation of the Palestinian Authority governed West Bank. The fact that Israel continues to dominate in most salient respects the Palestinian population of the lands taken from Jordan during the Six Day War apparently makes right any and all terrorist outrages committed against any and all Israelis. The actions of Mr Brevik in sharp contrast cannot be justified in any way, shape, or form.

With respect to the latter contention, the Geek is complete agreement. Considering the first proposition, the one holding Palestinian Muslim throat slitters, gunslingers, suicide bombers, and rocket firing gangs totally blameless is, in the Geek's estimate, a mind boggling exercise in cultural relativism. Stripped to its essentials, the ambassador's remark as well as the government policy it reflects holds that there is no such critter as an absolute standard of right and wrong, moral and immoral, ethical and unethical.

This is a destructive, preposterous position which serves to undercut the norms and values which, while developed in the West over centuries of bloodshed, have become the centerpiece of such testaments to hope and aspiration as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Before the rise of the pernicious notion of cultural relativism, the West generally held that there existed a set of ethical (or moral, should you prefer) absolutes which served to define rigidly the outer limits of acceptable individual and state conduct. These absolutes served to progressively render the West more peaceful, more humane, more given to fairness and acceptance, more willing to negotiate, and less ready to reach for the nearest trigger.

These absolutes, primarily predicated upon Christian and Jewish concepts, made the West an evermore kind, decent, generous, and humane place. These bright and shinning lines separating the acceptable from the unacceptable also served to make the wars of the West somewhat less brutal, somewhat less all consuming in their butchery, a bit more ready to seek the possible as opposed to the ideal outcome.

In recent years the rise of cultural relativism, the idea that no culture, no society, no system of beliefs or norms and values was in any way superior to others, has risen to grasp the elites of the West in its bony, clutching fingers. Particularly, people of the Left have allowed themselves to be mentally and morally strangled by the notion of relativism by coming to accept the proposition that by doing so they make themselves paragons of "fairness," of "open mindedness," of "acceptance," and of "tolerance." As the Left elite of academia, of politics, of the media have embraced relativism, these public opinion molders have sought to marginalize anyone who disagreed from the glories of relativism as "racists," or "xenophobes," even as "fascists."

To believe and argue that not all cultures, not all societies, not all belief systems, not all norms and values are equal in moral or ethical strength became politically incorrect to the highest degree. To accept relativism was to be progressive, fair minded, and sophisticated. The best way to parse between a member in good standing of the elite, the hoi olligoi, and a hairy palmed, knuckle dragging, slope browed denizen of the hoi polloi was on the basis of acceptance or rejection of cultural relativism.

Norwegians, particularly those on the Left and in the elite of politics, media, and academia have prided themselves and their country on its open minded, fair, and tolerant acceptance of those different from themselves. That is, of course, laudable--up to a point. The point comes when recurrent acts of terror including those of the most bestial sort are excused as the legitimate response to "illegal" military occupation. That point comes when acts of equal barbarity are assessed as morally different with one justified by purely contextual matters including cultural differences.

It is ironic in the extreme that the Norsk ambassador by his words reinforced one of the main points made at great and repetitive length in Brevik's manifesto--the pernicious pervasiveness of cultural relativism in Norway and Europe generally along with the lethal effects of this belief on political and social structures. Mr Sveje and the government which issued his credentials just don't get it. Neither, one might surmise, do a large number of Norwegians--and Europeans as well as Americans.

The "it" that Sveje and others don't get is simply that both history and contemporary affairs demonstrates clearly that some cultures, some societies, some norms and values, some belief systems, some governmental systems are better, more ethical, more moral, if you prefer, than others. In this context, it is clear that the West is superior in all ethical respects to the Muslim states. The West has gone through a very, very long learning curve of blood, destruction, mass death, suffering on a cosmic scale, and has come out purified in many essential respects. At the same time, the West is aware of its ongoing imperfections and continues to seek to rectify them.

The West may not have been blameless. But, in comparison to Muslim states and societies, it is not blameworthy today. And, in this connection Israel must be considered to be part of the West.

Consider the reaction throughout the West to Brevik's one man massacre. Universal condemnation even from those who share the fears of "Islamification" expressed by the terrorist murderer. Christian entities and clerics have been monolithic in their denunciation of Brevik's actions.

In sharp contrast Osama bin Laden remains a celebrated hero in Muslim societies and states. So do his emulators, his subordinates, his followers, and successors.

Consider Somalia. Thousands starve. Tens of thousands flee starvation. The Muslim group, al-Shabaab, prevents famine relief while engaging in an orgy of religiously predicated violence. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation sits back with folded hands and indifferent expressions watching the famine do its deadly work apparently convinced that starvation on this cosmic scale is the will of the deity such that any relief effort would be blasphemy at best, apostasy at worst.

At the same time it is the West which seeks to provide succor to the displaced and dying Somalis. It is the West which provides food and money, management expertise and aircraft, trying desperately to save lives written off by al-Shabaab and the OIC.

Consider Israel. While there are Israelis both in and out of government who are intransigent in the extreme, there is also a large, vibrant contingent of civil society and religiously motivated Israelis seeking peace, willing to see Palestine come into full, free existence. At the same time, the Palestinians are unwilling to grant Israel's right to exist (Hamas) or unwilling to acknowledge the realty that Israel is a Jewish state (Fatah.) The historical record demonstrates clearly that the "sins" of the Israelis are far outnumbered by those of the Palestinians--going back over eighty years.

Consider terrorism around the globe. How often does one read of radical extremist Buddhists taking hostages or detonating suicide vests? How many violent political Hindus fly aircraft into civilian structures shouting praise to one or another of their pantheon? Are Catholics, or Lutherans noted for their commitment to "martyrdom operations?" The use of terror attacks, of IEDs, of suicide bombings is almost exclusively the dominion of Muslims in service to what they perceive as their duty to their almighty.

No, Mr Ambassador, you are wrong. Dangerously wrong. Your attitude and that of your government and the Norwegian elite behind that government are sabotaging all that makes the West what it is. You, with your dedication to the specious and historically unjustified notion of cultural relativism, are attacking all which has been learned over a score of deadly, bloody centuries by the West and which makes the West today the last best hope of humanity.

Murder is wrong. Period. Terror, which is to say, murder for a political goal, is wrong. Period. The Arab Muslim slitting the Jewish infant's throat is equal in evil to Brevik with his bomb and gun. Period. Get a grip on it, Svein.

Christian(?) Terrorism and Cultural Relativism

2011-07-25T14:16:00.000-07:00

Reading the manifesto of Anders Behring Brevik is a bit of a trudge, a long yomp uphill with wind and a cold rain in your face--and mud sucking at your boots. But, it is worth it. More than, say, the Unibomber's treatise on the ills of technology, the Norwegian's great effort, "2083: A European Declaration of Independence" provides real insight into a warped mind. In this it is not unlike reading Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" against the US some fifteen years ago.

This is an appropriate analogy as Mr Berserker Brevik is a mirror image of the assorted practitioners of violent political Islam. Brevik, like bin Laden, made a list of quite valid objections to key aspects of contemporary life in the areas of the world in which each lived. Bin Landen's negative views of US policy to (and presence in) the Mideast were neither lunatic nor trivial. Brevik's critique of both multiculturalism and the impact of assimilation resistant Muslim immigrants upon Western Europe are also neither lunatic nor trivial.

The objective, intellectual predicates of bin Laden and Brevik were unobjectionable. Neither was over the edge in their thinking in and of itself. Where each went over the edge was in the manner by which they made their thoughts manifest. It was in the reliance upon lethal violence as the only way of obtaining redress for unacceptable conditions that the two men--one a Muslim with Salifist roots and the other a "fundamentalist" Christian (whatever the word "fundamentalist" might mean in this specific case)--became brothers in spirit.

The spiritual kinship between Brevik and his Muslim opponents carries a risk for all of us in the West which needs both recognition and effective addressing. The public opinion molding "elites" of Western academia, journalism, and politics, as well as many of us in the non-elite are damned currently with an overabundance of fairmindedness, openmindedness, tolerance, and a desire to accept the other which is evident only in its absence within the ranks of those who subscribe to political Islam.

This tendency, which is both a source of strength and weakness within the West, is already evident. The NYT has set its sights on those who have written and spoken negatively regarding Islam--particularly those cited and quoted in "2083." There can be little doubt but other individuals and organs will take the same censorious path.

This is as wrong as a soup sandwich--and as dangerous as tossing sweating dynamite against a stone wall. Any effort to suppress open and critical assessment of negative aspects of Islam such as the myriad contained in political Islam, particularly the form which admires and employs violence in pursuit of its goals, simply because as one person quoted by the NYT put it, "words have consequences," is both anathema to the ideals of the US and other Western states but dangerously counterproductive. Regardless of individuals such as the apparently delusional Brevik, there is a crying need to expose the dark underside of Islam.

Had Brevik been a Muslim, his actions would be applauded by many around the majority Muslim countries--and within the self-segregating Muslim enclaves dotting the European landscape from Norway to the UK to France, Germany, and beyond. But, Brevik was purportedly a Christian, and thus his actions receive only the condemnation they deserve from Christians around the world.

In this there resides the most significant distinction between the two religions. Islam celebrates violence undertaken in either the defense or the expansion of the faith. Christianity denounces violence. Regardless of the many, many times that Christians have violated their faith, the reality remains unchanged--Jesus was not the Man of the Sword (or the bomb or the semi-automatic rifle.) There is no faith rooted excuse or reason for offensive violence. There can be and is no greater difference between the two largest monotheistic religions than that.

Whether the people and opinion molders of the West like the idea or not, there is and will be for some while to come a struggle between the advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states. As part of this struggle there will be ongoing attempts to use the openmindedness, the tolerance, the desire to be fair which characterizes the West against it. The only defenses against this are understanding of the nature and motives of the adversary and a willingness to reject the pernicious concept of cultural relativism.

Cultural relativism hides behind the bland and "fair" term of multiculturalism. This doctrine holds that no society, no polity, no culture is inherently "better" or "superior" to any other. Cultural relativism holds that it is impossible to have absolute standards regarding human behavior, that all standards can be applied only within specific cultural contexts, preferably only by individuals living within the context.

This idea is, of course, utter bilge. The Christians who condemn the acts of their fellow, Brevik, show this. So do the Norwegians who make no excuses for their fellow countryman. In this affirmation of condemnation there is a recognition of a universal principle--murder most foul is just that, murder most foul. It cannot be excused nor justified by even very legitimate concerns. There is no excuse.

It is the willingness to condemn Brevik which gives the West the right to condemn the actions of his spirit brothers of al-Qaeda or Taliban. Murder most foul is murder most foul. No excuses. No moral justification. No resorting to theological spinning and weaving.

In sharp contrast, Muslims of the Mideast and Northwest Asia have been willing to pile vitrupitation upon vitriol in their consideration both of Brevik and the early speculation that a Muslim group might have been behind the atrocities. At the same time, there is not and never has been the slightest rejection of the murder most foul committed by Muslims in the name of the Prophet and faith.

In this difference resides the justification for not censoring criticism of Islam. In this difference resides the need to continue critiquing that which deserves it within Muslim ranks. Brevik is an anomaly and has been cast out as such both in Norway and throughout the West. In the lands of Islam, however, Brevik's spirit brother, Osama bin Laden, remains a hero, a model, a zenith to which all too many aspire.

Consider that difference and ask yourself, "Are all cultures really equal?"

One More Famine In Somalia

2011-07-21T13:48:00.000-07:00

Records of both history and climate data show recurrent droughts have hit the horn of Africa generally and Somalia in particular with regularity. It was a drought induced famine which invited the US humanitarian intervention in the dismal geographic expression called Somalia during the waning days of the George H.W. Bush administration. This adventure in feeding the starving brought with it a bout of mission creep and finally the humiliating withdrawal of US personnel following the ill-advised, poorly planned, and hastily executed failed raid on a chief warlord.

Since then the US has provided aid, humanitarian as well as military, to the Somalian people and their most recent experiment in government, the Transitional Federal Government. The aid has been cut substantially in recent years due to well founded concerns that it might have been benefiting the al-Shabaab gunslingers more than the civilians for whom it was intended. When the Mighty Warriors of the Koran ordered an end to the activities of international aid organizations including the UN, American aid functionally ended along with that provided by other civilized states.

The situation in al-Shabaab dominated portions of the country has grown ever worse. Partially, this is the effect of the drought. But more it has been the result of the combination of ineptitude and brutality which is the hallmark of al-Shabaab's notion of proper governance according to the finer points of Islam. The joining of hunger beyond description and fear of the thugs of Islamic purity has resulted in a flood of refugees pouring into vastly overcrowded camps in Kenya and new rather informal facilities in Ethiopia--a country where famine also stalks the land.

The UN and international organizations such as Oxfam have declared that an official famine exists in large portions of Somalia. Oxfam has pointed the great finger of blame at the US and the European Union, alleging that both entities have been slow and inadequate in their response to the emergency despite ample warnings and importuning.

The Flying Finger of Guilt is misplaced to say the least. The US has increased its food aid to the region, including an additional twenty-eight million bucks worth of food for Somalis. The EU has done likewise. At the center of affairs the UN believes it can successfully negotiate a mode of existence with al-Shabaab which will allow the food and accompanying aid workers to work in the regions they dominate. But this remains an open question.

Dark hints have been made to the effect that the ongoing US effort to counter both al-Shabaab and its close affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, are complicating the business of making a deal with the gunsels of al-Shabaab. The necessary inference is that the US should stop its semi-clandestine war with both advocates of violent political Islam. Ironically, Oxfam, the same group which deplores the US drone attacks on al-Shabaab fighters has also mentioned the need to invoke Responsibility to Protect in order to meet the current crisis. Of course, R2P would require a massive military campaign including ground combat forces, but that seems to have eluded the Lofty Minded of Oxfam.

In their orgy of finger pointing at the West, the folks at Oxfam and other NGOs seem to have overlooked a couple of salient facts.

Fact the first: The states of the African Union have contributed not even penny number one to famine relief in the Horn.

Sure, Kenya is taking a hit with the refugee camp, the largest on Earth, but that does not make up for the utter lack of interest in helping on the part of the AU generally. This reinforces the perception that while the AU likes to talk about African solutions to African problems, they are unable or unwilling to do more than talk. Let the West do the heavy lifting seems to be the unstated motto of the Union.

Fact the second: The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference) has provided no money, no food, no logistics, no nothing. Perhaps the OIC has forgotten that Somalia is a majority Muslim state--a member of the organization. Perhaps the OIC and its over fifty members have forgotten the many strictures regarding the Muslim obligation for charity. Perhaps the OIC is simply too worried about something they call "Islamophobia" and cartoons of the Prophet to notice a few hundred thousand starving Muslim women and children. Or, perhaps the OIC and all its members--some of whom have most of the money in the known universe--simply believe it is the Will of Allah that so many perish so wretchedly, and thus it would be blasphemous at best to intervene with food aid.

The West ought to propose to the OIC the following deal. You pay and we will feed. You fork over some of your petrodollars and we, particularly we Americans, will provide food at fair market price to be distributed in Somalia or the refugee camps. You pay for transportation and distribution. And, if we need to use force to get the food past your fellow Muslims in al-Shabaab, you pay for the bullets necessary.

Of course the money heavy governments of the OIC will not accept this deal, fair as it is. This means the taxpayers of the US and the other civilized states will have to carry the freight for some generations to come. It is both a curse and a blessing that the West has learned through past experience that some things, like mass starvation, are simply unacceptable. So, Westerners will do the heavy lifting while the AU and OIC sit by with folded hands and indifferent expressions.

Frankly, the idea in and of itself flatly rankles the Geek's rear end. Famine should be equally unacceptable to the governments of the AU and, even more, the OIC. The fact that both seem totally unconcerned about the bitter reality of life and death in the Somalia of al-Shabaab stands as stark accusation against not only the two organizations but the religious faith which purportedly provides the foundation of one.

Egypt (Or Its Generals) Looks To Ataturk's Turkey

2011-07-17T15:07:00.000-07:00

In a set of moves which is in no way surprising, the supreme command of Egypt's armed forces is seeking a continued, large role in the upcoming government. The reason for the sudden political aspirations of the generals is not hard to unpack. They are more than a tad scared of the Muslim Brotherhood and other advocates of political Islam.

Both the Washington Post and New York Times have taken note of the development. That implies the US government will soon do so as well. One would hope that the Deep Thinkers of the current administration have already taken cogniscence of this development, but you can never be sure given the number of blunders which constitute the Obama and Company's excuse for a Mideast policy.

It is clear both from the US media accounts and those appearing in Egypt that the senior leadership of the Egyptian armed forces sees the military as the guarantor not only of territorial sovereignty but also the integrity of the government. As the ultimate protector of state, nation, and government, the Turkish model is completely accurate.

Until the recent stare-down between the Islamist predicated AKP and the military, the people of Turkey not only allowed but expected the army to take over whenever the civilian government was unable or unwilling to put a stop to internal violence of whatsoever origin and goal. Parsing the public remarks of Egyptian generals in recent days, it is evident that they see the army as the only neutral party able to impose and maintain peace between highly motivated contestants willing and able to resort to violence in pursuit of political goals.

The armed forces' moves in the direction of greater authority to be exercised over an indeterminate span of time has perturbed some of those who provided the muscle of the "Lotus Revolution." Many of these individuals see the armed forces' counsel, the transitional government, as having stolen the fruits of the revolution, of having become a set of Mubarak clones. This sense of betrayal has motivated the recent sit-in demonstrations in the same Cairo square as those which brought down Mubarak.

Months ago as Mubarak prepared to call it quits, the demonstrators chanted, "The Army and the people are one!" Now to many, the memory of that chant rings hollow and empty. Many in the younger demographic segment of the Egyptian population no longer see the armed forces as a protector or the powerful force multiplier which assured Mubarak had no choice but abdication.

The generals who run Egypt behind the screen of carefully chosen civilian political nonentities have made concessions to the outraged "kids" in the square. Hundreds of senior police officials were forced to take early retirement. Mubarak, his sons, and close associates have been arrested and face trial on a number of charges even though the armed forces high command had promised initially to spare the aging autocrat this fate.

The concessions have not been enough to satisfy the dissidents. They could not be. The very success of the protesters assures that. In a completely understandable way, the heady aroma of having dumped the dictator has clouded a lot of folk's judgement. The armed forces commanders have recognized something of which the dissidents are either totally unaware or, at best, have a dim awareness.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a threat to any sort of secular Egypt. The Brotherhood has employed very slick public relations moves to convince many in the West, in the US particularly, that the MB is not a collection of Muslim crazies with delusions of power. The leadership, or at least the visible portion, has denied any ambition of taking power--immediately. They have publicly distanced themselves from any imposition of Shariah upon the state--again immediately. They have declined to run a candidate for president and will not enter a candidate in many of the upcoming parliamentary elections. The message is: See, we are not hell-bent on taking over Egypt, of establishing a new Cairo caliphate.

Not unlike the senior echelons of the world's foremost seat of Islamic learning, al-Azhar university, located in Cairo, the commanders of the Egyptian military do not believe the Muslim Brotherhood's protestations of innocence. Alone or in conjunction with other apostles of political Islam, including those willing to use violence, the Muslim Brotherhood will move as quickly as is politically expedient to establish a Shariah compliant state, a Cairo Caliphate. This is what the generals hope to preclude.

Kemal Ataturk had the same fear in the wake of World War I and the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. He and his fellow officers knew the power of Islam, its raw emotional force acting on a people who had been oppressed and humiliated for years. The inevitable internal violence which would accompany a religious conflict would destroy Turkey at worst or, at best, prevent its entering the modern world for generations. The Turkey of Ataturk would be resolutely secular--and the army would guarantee that.

In the days following the Second World War, the Turks discovered that secular political ideologies could be as violent and disruptive of social and political life as any religious conflict. Thus, the army was expected, empowered really, to step in and take over whenever political passions overflowed the dikes of civil discourse. Much as the periodic military takeovers bothered the states and people of Western Europe, the Turks saw them not only as unexceptional but quite necessary.

(Her Geekness was a student at METU in the early Seventies when the Left and Right exchanged gunfire on campus. She found no dissenting voices--save among the ideological combatants--when the army moved onto the streets and lowered the noise level to a saner level.)

The Egyptian generals are not any less perceptive than Ataturk and his supporters. They know the Egyptians and the Muslim Brotherhood with the fine grained detail that no foreign observer can muster. They also are aware that the armed forces of Egypt (like those of Turkey in an earlier period) have a level of universal approbation that no other institution possesses. They fear the passions of a long oppressed people which can be tapped with ease in the full flush of democracy poorly understood as to practice. They fear with good reason the potential power of the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies, a power which can unleash the passions with no good result for Egypt.

The move by the senior commanders to keep a firm hand on the levers of power is both prudential and justifiable. It can be hoped that they use the firm hand with caution and restraint, a caution and restraint which was often lacking under Mubarak and Sadat. If they fail to use their authority in a controlled and minimal way, their failure will bring more problems, problems which cannot be solved by tanks and troops. For decades the Turks played the game well, so there is a paradigm for the Egyptian military to follow.

It is questionable whether or not the Obama administration recognizes the motives of the generals in Egypt. It can be hoped that the Deep Thinkers will understand that stability in Egypt and the region requires not only an exercise in plausible democracy but also mechanisms to assure the passions will not swamp a civil society and a polity sailing in new and troubled waters.

Well, one can hope. Can't one?

A Democracy Fails

2011-07-16T15:18:00.000-07:00

Israel was established as a Western heritage democracy. In and of itself this was an amazing phenomenon. There was little in the history of the Jews, either in Biblical days or in the long centuries of the diaspora which linked democracy with the Jewish tradition. Yet the driving personalities of the Zionist movement as well as those who fought for an independent Jewish state insisted on bringing the democratic ideals of Western and Central Europe to the country which was simultaneously ancient and new.

The seamless merging of ancient and modern can be seen in two defining characteristics of Israel and the Zionists who worked so long and hard to bring the dream to fruition. The long dead language of Hebrew was brought back from the linguistic graveyard. Democracy was embraced. King David could walk the streets of Israel today and understand all that was said around him. But the Biblical King would not begin to understand the democracy which is, or to err on the side of accuracy, was basic to Israel.

One of strongest reasons so many Americans supported Israel with ardor and depth during the Fifties, Sixties, and beyond was its highly evident commitment to democracy. When someone stated that Israel was the only outpost of democracy in the Mideast during the first forty or fifty years of the state's existence, it was simply a recognition of reality. In more recent years, the same claim must be seen not as a statement of fact but rather the product of the propagandist's tendentiousness.

It is important to keep in mind that there was no tradition of democracy in the historical experience of the Jewish people either before or after the savage Roman repression of the second uprising. Only insofar as Jews participated in democratic processes as such developed fitfully and painfully in the several European states or in the US was there any direct experience with the complex nature of democracy. In a very real sense, the pioneering Zionists and the Jews who answered the call of freedom implicit in the creation of the Jewish state brought democracy in all its manifold ways and complexities with them, political freight carried in their knapsacks as they got off the boat on the sandy shore of the land which would become Israel.

It is also critical to recall that the Jews of Western and Central Europe were not the only Jews involved in the project called Israel. Arrivals from the autocracies of the Mideast constituted a great and growing part of the citizenry. Later, vast numbers of Jews arrived from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. The latter like their coreligionists from the Mideast had no direct experience with democracy. They had no basis on which to predicate an understanding of the mix of processes of trade offs, of compromises, of partial successes which jointly make up the intricate interior of democracy.

For many years, Israel against all odds remained a vibrant democracy. Not even the addition of refugees from the autocratic antisemitic states of the Mideast threatened the effectiveness and buoyancy of democracy, Israeli style. The robust nature of Israeli democracy was demonstrated repeatedly under extreme stress. Neither a surprising initial defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War nor unending terror attacks undercut or distorted the democratic processes.

Democracy it appears could survive and prosper no matter what until Israelis themselves turned against the concept and its instrumental effects. While a portion of the Israeli sellout of their own democracy can be assigned to the impact on the polity of the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union, that was only a minor factor. The major cause of the erosion of democracy has been the combination of an increasingly fundamentalist form of the Jewish faith with an evermore strident sense of nationalism.

In this dynamic, quite evident after 1990, the Israelis have echoed the Muslim states surrounding them. From the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the contemporaneous "Holy War" against the Red Army in Afghanistan, the force of the more austere and fundamentalist schools of Islam have combined with growing nationalism to produce the plethora of groups espousing political Islam. This includes those groups and leaders embracing violence as an acceptable tool of politics. The Israeli responses have included the growth of a similar, even identical, mix of religion and nationalism to the disadvantage of real democracy.

This process can be tracked easily by looking at the ever lessening status of the political Left in Israel. Looking back at the salad days of Israel, one sees the Left as ever triumphant at the polls. The Right was marginal at best and irrelevant most of the time. Only since the First Intifada has the Right emerged to power.

In recent years, the nature of Israeli politics has become one of the Right versus the Further Right. In the current Israel, the Left has become instrumentally a mere ghost, a marginal figure with less substance than a desert mirage. Electoral contests are between the "Moderate" Right and the Further Right. All too often it has been and is the Further Right which wins. In the recent past, the biggest loser has been not the Left per se or the "Moderate" Right but the nature and character of democracy itself.

During the current administration of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Knesset has lurched evermore to the farthest shores of the Right. The Nakba Law, the loyalty oaths, the overkill reaction to the "flotillas," and, most recently and disturbingly, the anti-boycott law are all demonstrations of the way in which the Further Right is willing to lethally distort the appearance of democratic processes and structures to enervate democracy and imperil the future of the state. While some manifestations of religion linked nationalism run amok such as the demand that Israeli universities sing the national anthem at all conceivable occasions are bizarre but not harmful, others such as the recently passed full fledged assault on freedom of speech--the anti-boycott law--are fatally injurious to any meaningful exercise of democracy.

There is no fundamental difference between the abridgement of free political speech contained in the law prohibiting any Israeli from speaking or writing in support of the boycott on products originating in the "settlements" constructed on land seized during the Six Day War and the continued attempts by the renamed Organization of Islamic Cooperation to prevent something called "defamation" of religions and religious figures. Both are misguided efforts to protect something "sacred" from any criticism or opposition by limiting rights of expression.

The status of the "settlements" is contentious to say the least. There are many activists in many countries, including Israel, who consider the new cities built on land occupied by the IDF forty-four years ago to be illegal at worst and illegitimate at best. As a result, there is and has been an effort to boycott products originating in these areas. Since the government of Israel does not identify those goods or products originating in the settlements, the only course of action available to those who wish to boycott settlement products is that of boycotting all goods made or grown in Israel. This is true even for Israelis who have no desire to see their country de-legitimized or otherwise harmed.

Urging boycotts on the settlements including denial of services by Israelis to the settlements is a legitimate political tactic for those Israelis who see their government's hanging on to the settlements as inherently wrongheaded. The goal of the new law--which is probably, almost certainly, violative of the several basic laws held by the Israeli Supreme Court to be equivalent to a constitution--seeks to deny this tool of political speech to Israelis and others in Israel who oppose current government policy.

The Israeli Further Right is like Muslim political advocates in that it refuses to compromise. The Further Right goes to the mat on everything. It is dedicated to an all-or-nothing approach to politics which is anathema to democracy. Under the sway of the Further Right, Israel bodes well to become just one more standard issue Mideastern state lacking the will and ability to practice genuine democracy with all its messy deal making, horse trading, and compromises which leave no one completely happy.

Absent a genuine democracy, Israel loses a powerful claim on American understanding and support. Actions such as the anti-boycott law are repugnant to American norms and values. Even the powerful efforts of the Israel Lobby will not be able to hide this reality from politically articulate Americans and their congressional representatives. Not even the best efforts of AIPAC can convince Americans that Israel deserves support when its governmental actions show the country to be one more semi-autocracy with some democratic trappings.

Israel must rediscover its roots. Not the ones in the Hebrew Bible, but the ones carried ashore by the early Zionists and the refugees from the hectatombs of Europe. For its future, Israel must get back to its past, to the past containing genuine democracy and all the risks which accompany democracy. Artificial, monolithic consensus, the consensus of enforced silence, serves Israel very poorly. To secure its future, Israel and the Israelis must channel their past, the noisy, vibrant democracy which characterized the place for decades. Only then will they have a genuine claim on American sympathy and support.

More "Followership" From The Hindmost

2011-07-15T15:27:00.000-07:00

Coming late and out of breath from the unusual bout of exertion, the US today decided that the rebels, The Transitional Government" is the only legitimate game in Libya. The US has extended full diplomatic recognition to the far less than coherent bunch in Benghazi. The practical effect of this move is the freeing of the billions of Gaddafi bucks languishing in American custody, impounded under UN sanctions.

The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.

Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government. Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid. It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists. There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.

There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi. The US has no direct stake in the country. Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play. That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company. It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.

There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya. It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.

The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy. The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy. While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.

One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions. An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia. The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.

The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft. In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US. Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.

If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests? Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.

No, bucko, not oil. The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran. It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq. These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure. But there is a far more important audience.

That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran. In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges. More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.

Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort. It is focused on getting the bomb. Period. There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.

Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US. In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so. As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.

"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat. A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved. The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.

Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge. This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour. We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy. In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.

Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force. They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant. The mullahs are right in this. Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.

The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation. The Israeli government shares it. Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat. They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world. A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.

The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant. There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in. If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.

Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational. It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US. Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.

The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure. The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset. As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.

A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event. But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well. This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.

To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer. To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut. However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader. In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.

The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!" The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."

As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact. By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu. That is not a failure of policy. It is not even a simple error of judgement. It is a world class blunder.

Cheers And Tears For South Sudan

2011-07-10T13:18:00.000-07:00

Yesterday South Sudan became the 196th independent sovereign state on Earth. The raising of the new national flag was the result of intensive diplomatic efforts on the part of the US and UK to end a twenty year long defensive insurgency which pitted the primarily African, Christian south against the overwhelmingly Arab, Muslim north. The post war road to independence has been long--six years--and filled with still unresolved difficulties such as the division of oil revenues and the status of disputed territory.

The most interesting aspect of the MSM coverage of the independence celebration in Juba, the capital, has been the recitation of a seemingly unending litany of problems confronting the place. Mention is made of the poverty, the lack of education, the feuds which separate the leaders of the new government, the lack of infrastructure, lack of jobs, lack of medical care, lack of almost everything other than oil and fertile land. Learned tongues cluck over the inexperience of the governmental personnel at all levels. There is head shaking over the hostility still resident in Khartoum along with dire hints that the matter is not yet permanently settled.

Of course much mention is made of the international assistance which will be coming. The British foreign minister has promised much. The US is not far behind. China, with an eye firmly on the source of the oil of Sudan, has indicated it will be inclined to be generous. Then, of course, the NGO industry has already cranked up its not inconsiderable resources--most importantly its public relations and lobbying capabilities. One gets the impression that donors almost beyond count are lining up hoping to toss some money in the general direction of Juba.

Looking at the mixture of hand-wringing and calls for as well as assurance of aid in abundance, one cannot help but think of the US at the time of its foundation. It matters not which date is selected--that of the Declaration of Independence, the surrender of the British at Yorktown, the signing of the final treaty, or the adoption of the Constitution--the picture was much the same. The birth of the US, the period from the first shootout at Lexington to the adoption of the Constitution, was a prolonged and painful process lasting the best part of two decades. At no time would the smart money placed a bet on the success of the Americans.

The US was massively underdeveloped. It had no industry. Its only exports were agricultural products and naval stores. And, the export market for these had been constricted by British action after independence had been gained. The Americans were riven with internal divisions, not least of which was the split between states where slavery was commonplace and those where it was nonexistent. The US was broke. The circulating media were so worthless and specie (gold and silver) so lacking that barter was normal.

The American government was composed in the main of former insurgent fighters with little if any actual governmental experience. The many strong personalities often clashed in contests of ego and ideology. Corruption was rampant as is illustrated by the traffic by speculators in the land warrants used by states and Congress in lieu of pay for the men of the Continental Army.

The British had only partially and grudgingly acknowledged defeat when they signed the treaty ending the war. In the aftermath London did not live up to its obligations under the treaty particularly as regarded the evacuation of military posts on the upper Great Lakes. Together with their trade policy, this failure to abide by the requirements of the treaty indicated the British expected American independence to be transitory. As if that hostility was insufficient, the French occupied the Mississippi Valley and showed no sign of leaving. The Spanish from their colonial outpost in Florida schemed with Americans of doubtful loyalty to the new country to pry loose the territories of the old southwest and attach it to Madrid.

The American population was small in comparison to the land. Medical care was absent outside the handful of major cities (more like large villages than true cities) and often inept even where it existed. While Americans were notably literate by the standards of the day, the overall rate of literacy was not much better than the twenty-five percent reported for South Sudan. And, despite the agrarian nature of most of the US, hunger was far from absent given the lack of a circulating medium of constant value as well as problems with transportation stemming from the very limited and rudimentary infrastructure of the period.

There were no international donors lining up to toss money at the US. No NGO took up the American plight as the poster cause of the moment. No UN, no WHO, no WFP stood by eager to provide whatever humanitarian assistance might be needed. At best, the world was massively indifferent to whether or not the US survived and prospered. More than a few European states rather hoped that this radical experiment in democracy would sputter and die--the sooner the better.

The US and We the People were very much on our own. For the Americans of the independence period it was, to use a phrase of the day, a matter of "root, hog, or die." We would have to solve our internal frictions. We would have to pay our debts. We would have to create a government. Create a currency. Create an economy and the jobs which would come with it. We, and only we, would have the duty and privilege of creating a country with a future--or not.

Arguably, the root of our success is not to be found in some sort of unique ability on the part of the leaders of the period. Nor, it can be shown, was the success attributable to an act of divine providence. The American success in all its fits, starts, blind alleys, and failures was simply the consequence of having no choice other than national extinction.

As the prospect of being hung in two weeks reputedly has the effect of concentrating the mind most wonderfully so also does the ever-present prospect of national death concentrate the efforts and will of many, many people. The Americans chose to root rather than die.

The first two generations of independent existence were neither easy nor, in retrospect, pretty. The challenges were many and great. The failures of were plentiful. Many individuals in positions of power acted in the most petty and self-serving ways imaginable. It was a magnificent muddle with no light at the end of the tunnel until after the second war of independence ended in 1815. After that, while much remained to do if the American experiment were to prosper, its survival was almost certain.

Perhaps it is most unfortunate that South Sudan will be denied the chance to make it on its own merits. It may be regrettable that the South Sudanese will not be faced with the stark choice of "root or die." Arguably, the laudable humanitarian impulses which motivate at least some of the offers of aid and assistance will be the cause of a moral dry rot which will sap the political will and energies of the South Sudanese to make a genuine go of it as a sovereign state with a unique national identity.

As the current situation in South Sudan is considered, it is worth remembering that every rich, powerful, and successful state in the world today was once no better off than is South Sudan. Every last member of the G-8 or even the G-20 was as internally riven, as poor, as lacking in infrastructure, education, jobs as is South Sudan. It is worth considering how each made it from that sort of dire beginning to their status today. One commonality is the absence of external assistance. Another is that success came only with time, difficulty, and the painful development of internal consensus on what to do and how to do it as well as putting that consensus into practice with genuine structures created organically and not in response to some outside "experts" opinion and advice.

Parents in their understandable desire to save children from pain and mistakes often forget how much they learned by failing, by making bad choices, by having to decide in microcosm to "root" rather than "die." The same is true in spades when developed, successful states contemplate a new arrival in the international community.

Helicopter moms and dads often discover too late that their constant hovering has done more harm than good to the capacity of their children to fly free and alone in a hostile or at least indifferent world. Perhaps it is time that helicopter states and NGOs including international organizations learn the same. Whether hogs or states, not all root successfully. Some die.

The Land Of Pinocchio Is At It Again

2011-07-09T14:29:00.000-07:00

No one oriented in time and place expects governments to be open, honest, and ever truthful in their public (or most private) statements. Diplomacy is often a contest of careful mendacity on a par with the sort practiced by lawyers working in an adversarial system. That is, blatant duplicity of the easily exposed sort is eschewed in favor of the well-crafted framing of a statement, an issue, a position. The good diplomat like the good advocate in court depends on what is not said even more than that which is said to mask the truth--particularly when the truth is uncomfortable from one's perspective.

The heavyweights of the Pakistani military and intelligence service (ISI) fail to meet the standard of proper diplomatic lying. This is unfortunate as the armed forces and ISI are the government of Pakistan far eclipsing in both power and public esteem the elected civilian political structure. As such, they are far more a part of the problem and in no way a contributor to the solution as regards the threat posed to civilized states by the damaged but not yet defeated advocates of violent political Islam which stalk Afghanistan, the FATA, and Pakistan proper.

The power elite of the armed forces and ISI is back at it. As has so often been the case, they are lying in a fashion which boggles the mind in its breathtaking absurdity. In the most recent ejaculations of denial and counter accusation, the spokesman for the Pakistani general staff insults the intelligence of all who read or hear his thundering denunciation of a recent spate of articles and editorials linking the ISI and armed forces with groups dedicated to violent political Islam and the recent murder of a well known and respected Pakistani journalist.

The immediate reaction of any half-way intelligent and well-informed person to the preposterous posturing of Major General Athar Abbas' remarks is to quote Ronald Reagan's comment during one of the 1980 debates, "There he goes again." The line delivered with a slow, sad shake of the head. The modern major general was announcing that the shoe put upon the collective foot of the Pakistani military and ISI fit tightly--it pinched and he was yelling, "Ouch!"

As unbelievable fables go, the Abbas Denial was on a par with the outpouring of outraged dignity following the Great Abbotabad Raid. The credibility of the Pakistanis, never high, was stretched far beyond its Young's Modulus with the earnest protestations of innocence with which the Pakistani heavies met the news that the Americans had found and liquidated Osama bin Laden within pistol shot of their very own military academy.

While the US government for reasons of state (the justification of all ill-advised and ultimately less than productive actions) has downplayed the possibility that the senior ranks of our "ally" in the "joint" war with al-Qaeda, the various Talibans, and all similar groups could possibly have known that bin Laden resided close at hand in comfortable isolation, this reticence should not be interpreted as accepting the Pakistanis as being pure and lofty of motives and intentions. Indeed, it is hard to see how anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the long standing relationship between ISI and the army on the one hand and the several terror merchant groups on the other could keep a straight face while stating they had seen "no smoking gun."

Back in the Oligocene--the days of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush--one did not have to be a member of the American intelligence community to know that ISI and the Pakistani armed forces were connected hip and shoulder with various Islamist groups, including the one which would come to power in Afghanistan as the Taliban. Minority opinion in both administrations warned against turning over responsibility for the endgame in the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis as the latter would take advantage of the opportunity to install entities hostile to the interests of the US in the region and globally. As is usually the case, the minority was shoved to the margins so they could watch their gloomy prognostications come to pass with the fullness of time.

Way back in the regime of Zia it was obvious that the Pakistani military would eagerly embrace the ideas of the dictator which focused on importing Wahhibism so as to promote Islam of the most austere and demanding sort as a mechanism of social and political cohesion. The implications of this were high profile: The Islamification program would drive a move to the more and more extreme. The program would facilitate the growth of violent political Islam oriented groups. And, ultimately it would assure that Pakistan would become an evermore Islamist state.

American decision makers were immune to the negative counsel, seeing instead an easy way to slip out of the continued burden of doing something in a small, inconvenient, and out of the way state with a history of being ungovernable. Anyway, the boys of Islamabad were big on reassuring Washington's rarefied levels about the pacifistic nature of Islam and the need of the Pakistani people for a stronger national identity in the face of Indian aggression.

In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war put the problem of Pakistan and its operations in Afghanistan very much on the far back burner. The Clinton administration was so disinterested in Pakistan that its Deep Thinkers would have had a hard time finding the place on a map--until the Pakistanis demonstrated their nuclear capacity. By then, of course, it was too late. Too late to stop the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. Far too late to undo the damage done by the Pakistani backed installation of Taliban in Kabul.

Of course, the ending of the cold war reduced Pakistan's importance in American eyes. For decades Islamabad had depended upon the Left-leaning policies of India to turn on the spigot of US military aid along with the occasional civilian project.

The best thing that happened to Pakistan was the attack on 9/11. After a nearly proforma demonstration of reluctance, Islamabad signed on to the Global War on Terror in exchange for massive amounts of American money. It was interesting to say the least that the goodies demanded by the armed forces of Pakistan were those useful for high intensity conventional war with India rather than the more pedestrian items having utility in counterinsurgent or counter terrorist operations.

To keep the goodies flowing, the Pakistanis had to rely on their capacity to lie convincingly and in a well-timed manner. They played a transparently double game from the very outset of the so called "joint" effort. Given that the US already knew that the only reason Osama bin Laden had escaped a cruise missile strike years before 9/11 was a phone call from Islamabad, yet we went on catering to the Pinocchio of the Sub-continent. There was no intention of even closing the borders to Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel escaping the American invasion and its aftermath let alone actually fighting the Mighty Men of the Koran.

But the Pakistanis talked a good game. And, because they had a nuclear arsenal, we had to pretend they were telling us the truth. All we could do was hope that the bribes we paid bought us sufficient influence on their decision making that the armed forces and ISI might stop their training, supporting, harboring, and strategic planning efforts.

The hope was illusory at best. However, the US had compounded its errors by invading Iraq and so mishandling the day after "victory" that it became the main event and Afghanistan a mere sideshow. As a result, we had to continue believing the palpably false assurances of cooperation issuing from Islamabad on a daily basis. The reality was far different. The Pakistanis provided sanctuary in the FATA in return for a promise, since broken, that the Great Warriors of the One True Faith would limit themselves to killing Americans and apostate Afghans.

During the long interim from 2004-2010 the Taliban(s) and the Haqqani network as well as al-Qaeda rested, retrained, refitted, and grew safe from harm in the cities and hillsides of Pakistan and the FATA. As a result, the Americans were losing more and more in country and the Pakistani military and ISI felt more and more confident in their ability to lead Uncle Sam around by the nose using a string of lies.

The pity of it all was the lies worked. They worked because there seemed no viable alternative available to American decision makers. We became co-conspirators in our own defeat. Our role was limited to a continued refusal to blow the whistle on the easily demonstrated prevarications of the Pakistanis. One of the services provided by Private Bradley Manning and his publicists at WikiLeaks has been to expose many (but not all) of the lies peddled by Islamabad as well as the reality that American diplomats knew them to be untruths. In short we were not stupid, merely adrift at the policy level.

The Pakistani string of successful lying came to an end dramatically in May. There was no way the lies of the Pakistanis could be accepted, even as a pretense, after the raid. It is regrettable that the Obama administration has not taken advantage of the sea change initiated by Boat Six to force the Pakistanis to choose sides finally and definitely.

The biggest advantage which will accrue to the US from the decision to draw down our forces in Afghanistan and adopt more of a counter terrorist posture is our logistics dependence upon Pakistan will be decreased. This means we will be in a much better position to link any continued assistance to Islamabad on demonstrated performance rather than nice sounding words. It is much harder to lie by actions than it is with mere words. So, Pakistan will be deprived of its advantage, an advantage it has used against us for a decade now.

While it may not be approved diplomatic form, it would be good politics both domestic and international to call the liars of Islamabad to account. Diplomacy is usually conducted by vague words and ambiguous phrases so everyone walks away claiming success, but the Pakistanis need to be handled with a direct and blunt approach.

The time is now to say to Islamabad, to the armed forces, to ISI, to Major General Abbas, "Cut the crap! You're busted!"

Of Course Iran Is Behind The New "Surge" In Iraq

2011-07-08T15:49:00.000-07:00

Admiral Mike Mullen made a blunt and truthful statement which has not been well received in Tehran. The only thing at all wrong with the admiral's remarks was their tardy nature. It is not inaccurate to characterize the chairman's accusation of Iranian complicity in the uptick of attacks on Americans in Iraq as yesterday's news.

With or without the active participation (or even the presence in country) of Moqtada al-Sadr, the famed anti-American Shiite paramilitary leader and part-time student of Islam, the ayatollahs and their goons of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have pursued national interest in Iraq. The view from Tehran is simply that religion trumps national identity or, if that isn't enough motivation, the Iraqi Shiites have decades of scores to settle against the minority Sunnis who ran the place from the time of the British Mandate through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The ready presence of the Shiite fighters of the Sadrists seemed to underscore the accuracy of the Iranian calculations. The enigmatic and illusive figure of Moqtada al-Sadr confused the picture to some extent--in the estimates of both American and Iranian decision makers. Sadr played two cards with equal skill: Confessional loyalty and nationalism. As he switched between the two, his eyes remained firmly on the prize he sought. Not surprisingly, the prize was and remains power.

Sadr has no desire to sit on the throne. He knows all too well that not only is the head which wears the crown likely to sleep uneasily but in Iraq for some time to come crown wearers are quite likely to lose both crown and the head under it. Sadr wanted and wants to be the ultimate power behind the throne. In pursuit of this end, the crafty cleric is willing to use Iranian assistance--if it is low profile enough.

He has been careful, very careful to keep daylight between himself and the theocrats of Tehran as well as the current crop of Shiite terrorists. He understands quite well that the old Iraqi proverb holding that no fruit tastes as good as the product of one's own orchard applies today among Iraqis of all stripes. To be seen as a tool or proxy of the Ayatollahs would be fatal to Sadr's ambitions. All the more since he has achieved the long coveted status of Grey Eminence following his agreement to support al-Maliki--a promise of support which has become increasingly important as Maliki has lost popularity generally.

Sadr's hand will be strengthened by the completion of the American withdrawal. His highest public priority has been that of seeing the last American posterior hitting the Kuwaiti border at year's end. Ironically, accomplishment of this much desired result is being compromised by the Iranian uptick of direct support for the Shiite insurgents who have been attacking Americans as well as Iraqis.

The Deep Thinkers of Tehran apparently have convinced themselves that the infliction of fatalities on US personnel is the best way of assuring the American withdrawal. The take in Tehran is simple: Neither the American president nor the American people have the stomach for more death.

In this assessment the Deep Thinkers in Tehran may be correct. We the People want no more of our own killed in Iraq. The current administration and congress would like very much to see an end to our Great Adventure in Regime Change. But, the view inside Baghdad is different. So is the perspective from the Pentagon.

The Pentagon is afraid, very afraid that any final American withdrawal would now be seen by not only the Iranians but promoters of violent political Islam everywhere as having been forced upon us by the efforts of the jihadists. Such a conclusion might be totally wrong, but it will be drawn nonetheless. A previous generation of advocates of violent political Islam including Osama bin Laden wrongly concluded that it was the efforts of the "Arab fighters," the "martyrdom seekers," who defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan. This work of fiction would be emulated next January if the US withdraws according to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.

It is to preclude this possibility and the evils which would flow from it (among other reasons) which has propelled the Defense Department to seek a modification of the SOFA. Even a small (10,000) man package of combat capable personnel would prevent the false claim of military victory on the part of the Islamists.

The politicians of Baghdad along with many in the Iraqi military establishment favor a continued, low footprint American presence. The leaders of the Kurds strongly support the idea. Within the beleaguered Sunni areas of Anbar province, the support is both wide and deep. Only Sadr is opposed.

Despite his opposition, there is very little probability that Sadr would seek to veto the idea should it be strongly and evidently favored by the other elements of Iraqi politics. To do so would be to put himself publicly in league with the Iranians. This would undercut his power in Iraq. Not a good idea from the Sadr perspective.

It would be best for Sadr if he could convince his Iranian comrades to call off their private war. By doing so, the American desire to stay lest they appear to have been defeated would be eroded. By lowering the climate of fear, the badly divided Iraqi political structure would be fragmented so that no unified support for a modification in the SOFA would develop. And, it would make Sadr even more of a critical broker of power.

It is highly unlikely that Tehran would listen to Sadr even should he make the outlined argument. Considering the dynamic in Syria there is real anxiety that Tehran is about to lose their only Arab state ally. This implies that Iraq looms larger today than in the past as an Iranian Shiite outpost in the Arab world. Tehran knows perfectly well that any American presence reduces greatly their hopes of turning Baghdad into a replacement for Damascus.

The strongest probability is that Tehran will not only continue but increase its support for the Shiite groups which have been carrying out the attacks. This is a calculated risk. The ayatollahs must believe that when push comes to shove, Sadr will carry Tehran's water within the circles of the Maliki government. Or, even better, Sadr will whistle up the supposedly disarmed Sadrist militias. Whether the Deep Thinkers of Tehran are right or not depends on Sadr's commitment to his faith: does his identity as a Shiite outweigh or not his identity as an Iraqi?

Sadr probably does not even know his own mind here. His actions and words over the past nine years have been those of a man quite confused about his identity much as he knows his priorities. Often he has tried to ride the horse of religion and that of nationalism simultaneously. Inevitably, he has fallen one way or the other. His recurrent prolonged trips to "study" in Qom show the crisis of conscious which results each time he falls to the side of nationalism at the expense of Shia.

Perhaps his thinking would be clarified if someone were to whisper in his ear, "Iraqis are more likely to trust a fellow Iraqi with power than an Iranian in Iraqi costume." That is a sentiment one can take to the bank in Iraq.

Think Globally, Act Locally

2011-07-07T16:04:00.000-07:00

This old bumper sticker phrase much loved by the tree hugging crowd some twenty years ago has become the new, de facto slogan of al-Qaeda under the direction of its new capo d' tutti capi, Ayman al-Zawahiri. This, in itself, is not surprising as the good doctor has long been known for his possessing a far greater interest in making Egypt a model of shariah in action than in establishing a global caliphate.

What makes the latest expression of the world according to Zawahiri (it has a catchy title: The Message of Good Hope and Tidings For Our People In Egypt. OK, maybe it loses something in translation.) is the way in which he combines the ideas of making Egypt safe for a Salifist view of Islam with the further disestablishment of the US as a force in the region. The six parts of "The Message" are themselves a riff on Zawahiri's earlier and vastly important philosophical book best known by its short title Exoneration. In both he argues that the successful jihad mounted to date by al-Qaeda and its franchises forced the Obama administration to abandon Mubarak and prepare the way for the success of violent political Islam in Egypt.

In both "The Message" and "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri contends that the moment has come to shift the focus of jihad on the internal revolutions in Egypt and other countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia and Syria so as to put more pressure not only on the local apostate rulers but on the US. In essence he is calling for al-Qaeda to act not as a global non-state player but rather as the facilitator and coordinator of local efforts such as those being waged by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP,) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM,) and al-Shabaab. It is clear that he believes that the US will be overstretched by simultaneous challenges mounted by these groups as well as smaller entities and lone wolves preying on soft targets throughout the Mideast and North Africa.

Even in this context it is self-evident that al-Zawahiri's focus in on Egypt. His view of the Ummah is through the prism of Egyptian nationalism. He sees the (in his eyes) necessary victory of the most austere form of Islam in Egypt will vault the country to primacy in the emerging caliphate. As a good Egyptian nationalist, one who rivals the quite secular Nasser as a hyper-nationalist, al-Zawahiri sees Cairo as the fulcrum of the new Islam, the next Caliphate.

To this end "The Message" calls upon Egyptian Muslims to act as one, to act quickly and decisively so as to assert Egypt's pride of place among the Muslim majority states of the world. This appeal will not fall on deaf ears. Overlooked in all the hoopla over the yearning for genuine democracy expressed during the overthrow of Mubarak is a very basic and potent ground truth: Egyptians have felt diminished as a people, a nation over the past thirty years. After the national high point of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the road has been strictly downhill.

Egyptians have increasingly seen themselves as citizens of a diminished country. More and more they have come to see themselves as having lost status, position, even dignity. The thought that Egypt had become nothing more than a dependency of the US rankled--deeply. As is the case in Russia, the notion of having lost national status not only rankled, it motivated. Mubarak was deeply hated not simply because he presided over a country neck deep in corruption, nepotism, inequity, but because he had not only acquiesced in but actively fostered the decline of Egypt in the region and in the world. On Mubarak's watch, many believed and continue to believe, Egypt was no longer a country worthy of respect but rather the object of derision.

Al-Zawahiri's skilled blending of religion and nationalism serves to counter this pervasive sense of Egyptian degradation. By seizing the present moment, al-Zawahiri argues, Egyptians can reclaim their dignity, their status, their pride, their place in the sun. Merging the Egyptian national identity with the true belief of basic and uncompromising Islam will bring salvation, or, if not salvation, at least pull Egypt and its people out of the slough of the marginalized, the trivialized, the ignored, the bowed head beggers.

Al-Zawahiri promises that an Egypt powered by Islam of ninety proof purity will once more be what it seemed to be many, many years ago during the heyday of Nasser--a force in the world, a country that could call the tune danced to by supposed superpowers. All that is required, the one time medic alleges, is for Egyptians not to fall prey to American blandishments or secret plots made in the USA and hold true to the calls of the faith and the needs of political Islam--including the use of violence should such be either necessary or desirable.

In "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri extends his argument to include countries such as Yemen, Syria and the states of North Africa. His position is both simple and inherently attractive, particularly to younger members of the over-educated and underemployed middle class.

In short he says, "All of you, Syrians, Yemeni, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans are members of societies which were once great. You are all citizens of states which were once respected, even feared by the infidels. You are people of nations which were once great but are now small."

He then asks the essential question, "Why? Why were you who were once so great are now so small?"

And, unsurprisingly, he gives the correct answer. "Because you abandoned the path of pure and true Islam. Because you surrendered to government by apostates, by turncoats who say they are Muslims but act and govern as if they are kaffir."

Then comes the expected call to arms. "You will be great once more, respected and feared once again, feel the dignity you deserve only when you join the jihad. Only when you throw out the apostates and restore genuine Islamic rulers will you regain your greatness."

Shrewdly al-Zawahiri backs his argument by emphasizing Islam's stance on social justice, economic equity, and political openness. He contrasts the nature of the Islamic posture in all these critical and highly emotional issues with the stance of the US and Uncle Sam's local clients. He wraps all the ills of the Islamic Mideast and North African states in an American flag. He demands locals act for local goals while doing so in the global context of putting increased pressure on the US--pressure to withdraw.

It is worth considering that the thinking of al-Zawahiri has been picked up, reflected and even amplified by other high profile advocates of violent political Islam. Anwar al-Awalacki in Yemen has done this in recent weeks. Indeed much of the theoretical writing in the several issues of Inspire might have come from the keyboard of the American born and educated cleric, but the ideas and arguments, the logic and goals, are those of al-Zawahiri.

Even in the geographic expression, Somalia, where one is surprised to discover a level of literacy which would allow the reading of al-Zawahiri's rather dense prose, the locals have been extolling the ideas of the medic turned mass murderer. The same applies to recent musings by spokesmen for AQIM. Clearly, al-Zawahiri has a message that many are both reading and amplifying.

The US has been playing the role assigned to it in The World According to Ayman. Our aid to the Ugandan forces in Somalia has been increased as has been the assistance provided to the fictitious government of Somalia. Shortly we can expect more Predator strikes in Somalia along with a significant ramp-up of the remote controlled death from above operations in Yemen. Carefully targeted special operations will not be long in the offing.

The regional impact of the ongoing mess in Libya is growing. There will be a requirement in the not-too-distant future for the US to make some choices as to what we should or must do to help the local forces and governments in their struggle with AQIM. While we have no bulls in the herd, particularly as compared with European countries, the small but rapidly growing AQIM will reach the level of potential threat to US interests long before the next election here.

Think Globally, Act Locally! Al-Zawahiri has it right. So right that we may soon be wishing for the good old days of Osama bin Laden. The legion of experts assured us that al-Zawahiri would be a nebbish as the Lord High Poobah of al-Qaeda because he had the charisma of a nematode.

What a crock! Brains beat charisma every time--particularly in war.

The "Improbable" Artificial State Has One More Anniversary

2011-07-02T15:31:00.000-07:00

The United States is unique--exceptional, if you will--in a number of ways. Among these arguably the most important is the fundamental reality that it is a totally artificial state. A second unique feature, arguably almost on a par with the first, is that the US is that rare bird, a state which has created a nation.

As a nation and as a polity, We the People, each and every one of us, is part of a purely artificial state. We are defined not by borders per se nor by language. We are not defined by religious confession, pace the large number of Christians who would wish it otherwise.

What defines us as a state and thus as a nation is a set of ideas. That basement truth is what makes us both artificial and exceptional. We are the product of that most ineffable and powerful entity--the intellect. Founded on ideas, the ideas became our foundation. Over time the memes by which Americans see and understand themselves have both remained fixed and highly mutable, evolving with changes in our size, our complexity, the shifting sands of science and technology, the alterations of our demographics, the creative destruction of our economy while staying unaltered in all the essentials, the cornerstones of thinking so often expressed in simple, almost buzzword terms: democracy, transparency, rule of law, separation of church and state, equality of opportunity, free enterprise, and so on.

The fact that we are citizens of a set of ideas made manifest in human structures and institutions usually flies below our personal and political radar. Having been born and raised in this crowd sourced set of ideas, we are as unaware of its central and crucial nature as is the fish of the water in which it swims. It takes the perspective of either the immigrant or of having returned to the US after a long absence abroad to awaken the consciousness, to become aware of just how faint and fragile the foundations of our collective enterprise actually are--and how powerful a force they effect upon us.

The existence, let alone the flourishing of the US has been termed "improbable" as far back as the end of the Nineteenth Century as the US emerged on the global stage for the first time. Foreign observers, men of rank, power and learning saw the reality of the American experience with a clarity which eluded most Americans. They saw the artificial nature of the US as both a great strength and an awesome source of potential weakness.

The strengths were self-evident. The artificial nature of the US, its foundations being ideas, provided a haven for all, a safe harbor for all those ideas and individuals seen as too dangerous to be tolerated in the states of Europe founded on language, customs, borders, the verdicts of ancient wars. The US was by its nature imbued with a degree of flexibility, a willingness to experiment, to take a chance far beyond any European country. As the US and its people were defined by ideas and not by the accidents of precedent or ancestry there were more rewards for trying something new, for striking out in a new direction, for doing things differently. At the same time the citizens of this artificial state and nation held onto the basics, the foundational principles with a rigor and a zeal almost beyond European comprehension.

The weaknesses were not so apparent, but were equally real. One very important weakness which arose directly from our foundation as an intellectual artifact was uncertainty as to what it took to be a "real" American.

The US was caught in a never ending crisis of identity. Being founded on ideas and having a population representing virtually every nation on Earth, We the People always wondered "who are we?" At the core, what did it mean to be an American? The endemic identity crisis peaked in epidemic outbreaks from time to time over the course of our history. Recurrent waves of anti-immigrant sentiment represented a manifestation of this. So also did the episodic outbreaks of religious frenzy. Hyper-patriotism thrived periodically as we sought to reassure ourselves regarding our identity.

Another, closely related weakness was our uncertainty as to how and when we should have relations with other countries. It had always been a given that the US would seek cordial commercial relations with all other states. In this orientation we Americans showed ourselves to be the citizens of a maritime power, a state which sought the broadest possible networks of trade. Beyond that one element there has never been a long lasting consensus on the role of the US in the world. Isolationist or interventionist represent just two poles in the America foreign policy dilemma. Idealism or realism are the verbal flags marking two other extremes in the foreign relations conundrum which grows from the artificial nature of the US.

The never ending swings between idealism and realism in our foreign policy as well as the equally drastic swings between withdrawal and engagement with the world both come from the unique, artificial nature of the US. In a real sense our history shows that the US lacks permanent friends and enemies. In this way we are not exceptional. But, our history also shows that the US does not have many permanent interests. Indeed, beyond free trade there is no present day national interest which can be traced back much beyond the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

Lasting interests are the necessary products of states which do not have identity crises. Lasting interests are defined as are the states which have them--by experience, usually that of ancient wars. A sharp reminder of this dynamic and its difference from the forces at work in the US can be seen in the opposing ways in which many Mexicans and the majority of Americans see the war between their two countries. To the Americans the affray of more than a century and a half ago is a null referent. To the Mexicans it was a defining experience, a national humiliation the stain of which lingers on to the present moment. The demand by so many Mexican apologists for a more "liberal" immigration policy on the part of the US is really an attempt to rewrite the verdict of a war most Americans are unaware of having taken place.

Because we are a state and a nation defined by ideas, ideas which are both unchanging and ever mutating we Americans fail to see just how long and complex the task of "nation-building" actually is. We can blithely assume that since our defining ideas and the institutions which grow from them are and have been so successful, other people in other countries will want to adopt them wholesale just as soon as they are informed. It was this simple assumption that propelled George W. Bush and his fellow neocons into the misguided and wrongheaded effort to transform Afghanistan and remake Iraq, not some perverse and evil impulse. It might be noted that most of We the People thought the same until enough time and American corpses showed the error of the underlying assumption.

When the interventionary impulse leads to failure as it so often has, the reaction is withdrawal. The American isolationist sentiment is predicated just as is our interventionary equivalent upon the defining ideas of the US. Both are expressions of moral sentiments which reside deeply in our collective understanding of both our past and our present nature. Moral sentiments ranging from being the shining city on the hill to its opposite, the cavalry riding to the rescue of the innocents threatened by external, violent evil are part, a central part, of our self-understanding, our collective self-definition. We are doomed to continue to repeat the cycle of engage and disengage as we are that of being "realistic" only to turn "idealistic."

But our greatest weakness as an artifact of the minds of men is the potential to lose faith in our collective self, our shared institutions and structures, our capacity to shape our future. The American identity is subject to seismic shocks. Should one or a combination of those shocks result in a loss of faith in ourselves and our collective capacities, the result would be fatal to the American experiment.

The blame-America-first crowd along with those who celebrate cultural relativism threaten the American faith. The constant refrain chanted by the tireless throats of these two groups which has pervaded so much of our collective consciousness for the past three decades is like water dripping on rock, slowly eroding, gradually corroding the solid and indestructible boulder to a handful of sand and mud. Taken in the present context of war weariness, frustration with an implacable enemy addicted to terror, and the fear provoked by economic catastrophe looming, the soul sapping effects of the naysayers in our midst represent a very real challenge to the nature of the US and We the People.

We often give credit to ideas, particularly the ideas on which we are founded; we call them "powerful" and "eternal." And so they can be. It is also true that there is nothing more fragile and quick to flee than an idea. Or a state and a nation founded simply and solely on ideas.

Pragmatism Or More Obama-esque Truckling?

2011-06-30T16:34:00.000-07:00

Secretary of State Clinton has admitted that the US not only has been engaged in "limited" contacts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood but intends to continue doing so, perhaps on a significantly expanded basis. These contacts have been described as "official" by some unnamed sources but are more accurately seen as "informal" or "unofficial" so as to avoid both political and legal embarrassment.

In any event and under whatsoever term, the contacts with the MB will prove controversial. Whether they will turn out as useful remains to be seen.

Not surprisingly, assorted bloggers on the Right have picked up cudgels to pound the current administration into so much jelly. Individuals such as the redoubtable defender of Israel, Barry Rubin, have alleged the Obama administration is once again demonstrating its typical, ill-informed, and counterproductive genuflection before the political totems of the Islamists. Certainly, this US policy lends itself to this interpretation given the context of Obama's apparent hostility to the government of Israel, at least as presently constituted.

It is possible to see the continued and perhaps expanding dialogue between the US and the MB as a pragmatic ploy given the political dynamics within Egypt today and into the near future. The MB in the land of its origin is a very real, very potent political player. Even with self-imposed limitations on the number of parliamentary seats and seeking the presidency, the MB is and will remain the most critical political force in Egypt--the power behind the throne even if a secular rump fills the exalted seat itself. Beyond that consideration, which is non-trivial to say the least, a constructive relation with the MB would assist the US in gaining a degree of rapprochement with other groups in the region which espouse political Islam.

The inducements for the US to have contact with the present senior leadership of the MB is not reduced by the very evident generational split within the Brotherhood. The "Young Turks" of the Egyptian Brotherhood may be quite annoyed with their elders, particularly with the ukase tossing any Brother out of the hood should he break the ban on running for the presidency or join a party other than the official MB organ. The split is real, but its effects are easy to exaggerate.

Also easy to exaggerate is the purported differences between those Brothers who emphasize practical programs aimed at solving the numerous and almost overwhelming social and economic problems currently besetting Egypt and those Brothers for whom the establishment of an Islamic state based on all Shariah all the time is the goal. There is a difference not so much in basic views and understandings separating these two wings of the MB as there is a disparity of tactics, of priorities, and of means.

Neither the "Young Turks" nor the "Old Guard" of the Brotherhood, neither the "practicalists" nor the "idealists" differ on a single basic and highly critical point. Even if this one point is all that binds together the assorted sub-groups within the Brotherhood it would be sufficient to make the MB a potent threat looming over the future of Egypt and the region. Here is the point: No member of the Brotherhood has any more regard for the nature of democracy as understood in the West than Ron Paul has for the Federal Reserve System.

Of course there are a plethora of points upon which all Brothers agree. Israel must go is one. Another is that the sway of Islam must be extended over the House of War. Still another is the debased, evil, and threatening nature of the US. There are others, but you get the drift from this very short list.

The mere fact that the Muslim Brotherhood not only in Egypt but around the world would like to see Israel expunged as the deity laughed with delight or the population of the US boiled in the pit for all eternity as the blessed of the faith watched from the gallery thoughtfully provided in Paradise for the amusement of the Muslim saint is no bar to talking with the Brothers. In past years the various administrations and their diplomats have talked both officially and otherwise with any number of people who sought our defeat. Talking with those who oppose you is one of the most, arguably the most, important aspects of diplomatic work.

Given that the MB in Egypt is a very real fact on the political ground and will remain such for some time to come, it is critical that we convey to them the limits of acceptable conduct. It is even more critical that the Brotherhood's leaders come to understand not only the limits but become convinced that the US will exact a price for any violation of these limits. In this context "contacts" does not imply a dialogue between equals but rather the transmission of facts to an auditor.

If the contacts are limited to the task of delivering a clear understanding of the limits of acceptable conduct as well as the range of possible penalties, the exercise is worth the effort. It is important that the contacts do not fall prey to mission creep. Whenever conversations, particularly those of an allegedly "informal" or "unofficial" nature, take place, the temptation to expand, make official, or otherwise raise the importance and status of the talks exists. This temptation must be resisted. Regardless of any impressions to the contrary, there is no more chance that the Brotherhood or any significant sub-group within the MB will accept American views of proper governance, proper social and political equality, proper policy regarding Israel than there is the Tea Party embracing Obamacare.

The folks on the Right and other reflexive defenders of all things Israeli ought to get a grip and stand down from their ramparts of indignation. The time to man those ramparts will come when and if the Obama administration and its diplomatic personnel get off the track of squaring away the MB on what US policy will allow and what it will not, wandering instead into the bottomless morass of palaver about democracy, transparency, the rule of law and similar (to the mind of a Brother) fables.

After all, Mr Rubin and all you others, it is not possible to draw a line in the sand without talking to the opposition. For the benefit of the Egyptians, the Americans, and, yes, the Israelis, it is rather important that the US draw a line and tell the Brothers of all stripes where the line is and what will happen should they be so ill-advised as to cross it.