Yemen Kicks Sand In Uncle Sam's Face

The current administration clearly can't get a grip on the difference between feces and shoe polish. This unpleasant fact is singularly true regarding what countries are allies in the current fight with Islamists/Jihadists.

Yemen is the current poster child for the current administration's lost-in-space view of what constitutes an ally.

Two days ago, the Commander Guy was reported in the Yemen Times to have sent a message via his Special Assistant for Internal Security and Combating Terrorism, Francis Townsend. The message was purported to congratulate the Yemeni government for "it's success in combating terrorism." See, http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1097&p=front&a=1.

The message also contained promises to continue US aid for Yemeni projects in economic development, education, security and military assistance, and "fighting against terrorism." This hearty expression of praise and aid came in the context of a meeting between Yemeni and American counter-terrorism wallahs.

At the meeting one Mohammed Salah, who is the capo-in-chief of the Central Security Forces, said Yemen stood ready (and, maybe, perhaps, kind of willing and able) to "provide assistance and expertise" in the area of counter-terrorism.

Yeah. Right. And, just what sort of "expertise?" What kind of "assistance?"

Jamal al-Badawi, the man convicted in a Yemeni court for having been the chief planner of the bombing of the USS Cole, had turned himself in to Yemeni authorities a week before this love fest of mutual assistance. He had apparently become tired and bored with life as a fugitive after his second successful jail break.

There is no doubt but al-Badawi is a genuine, bottled-in-bond, triple x, super-refined, Grade A Jihadist. He is a serious blackhat. Always has been. In all probability, he always will be.

The "expert" Yemenis cut him loose only two days after Special Assistant Townsend delivered the Commander Guy's kissy-kissy communication.

The experienced and expert Yemeni government isn't saying why they cut the man loose from the horrors of life in the slam. They aren't really confirming or denying whether al-Badawi is under some sort of house arrest. The most this trusted ally in the counter-terrorism arena will say is that al-Badawi has renounced terrorism and really, really promised to be a very, very nice guy in the future.

Al-Badawi himself isn't talking in public. He is reported to be entertaining guests in his house in Aden. Probably regaling them with tales of his exciting life in the desert living with the Tribal types who kept him safe until working out a deal with the expert counter-terrorists in the Yemeni government. (Of course, he might be working on his next little bomb-in-the-boat caper.)

If the Yemenis aren't saying much, their silence is more than compensated for by the screeches from the campaign trail and the howls from the Justice Department.

There is a five megabuck price on Jamal al-Badawi's head. He's on the Feeb's Ten Most Wanted List. There is a lengthy indictment waiting for him in the US. With this as a backdrop, Rudi Giuliani demanded a halt to all aid to Yemen until al-Badawi is rearrested.

Wow! That's telling 'em, Rudy.

What is the US going to do if the Yemeni regime does not respond appropriately to either the statement of "extreme displeasure" delivered by our Ambassador or even an aid cut off?

You gotta remember that the Yemenis are great believers in hospitality, just like the Afghans back in 2002. You also have to remember that al-Badawi has reportedly sworn loyalty to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Loyalty can be--and usually is in tribally based Islamic societies--a two way street.

Now, get a grip on this.

Yemen, no more than Saudi Arabia, is an ally of the US in the confrontation between Islamism and the West. That was obvious in the aftermath of the attack on the USS Cole. Yemeni officials, those experienced and expert on regional counter-terrorism, were notably uncooperative with the FBI and other American investigative or intelligence agencies. Nothing substantial has changed since then.

"How come?" You ask.

Yemen, not unlike Afghanistan, is not really a nation-state as that is understood in the West, or most of the world. It is a geographic expression, which came into its present incarnation back in 1990 when the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen stopped its festering multi-decade war with North Yemen. Its current boundary with Saudi Arabia was fixed only seven years ago.

Its population is young (median age is slightly less than seventeen). Its land is mostly barren, short on water. Yemen is one of the poorest, if not the poorest country in the Arab world, with a per person GDP of roughly $1,000 last year. Wahhabism is the predominant brand of Islam practiced.

In short, the government lacks stability. The population can and has turned restive (to put it politely) when its all too easily perturbed emotional balance is tipped in the slightest.

Al-Badawi is a popular hero to many of the young Yemeni dudes without a real hope of a genuine future and a past deeply rooted in tribalism, Wahhabism, and violence.

Making sense now, isn't it?

Even if the Yemeni government wanted for reasons of its own to cooperate fully with the US not only with regard to al-Badawi's future but the whole spectrum of counter-terrorism issues, it could not. Not without slitting its own throat.

The Commander Guy should have known all of the above (and probably did) before sending the unrealistically fulsome message to the Yemeni government. Not unlike the ambiguous message delivered to Saddam Hussein by our new Ambassador in 1990, the recipient probably concluded that it had a free hand in dealing with al-Badawi. With (unseemly) haste, the Yemeni leadership honored its agreement with the tribal elders and cut the convicted terrorist loose.

To repeat the key question: Now what are we Americans going to do if the Saana regime doesn't rearrest al-Badawi and deliver him to our justice system?

The last time the US faced this type of problem we resolved it by invading. More than five years later the object of that combination of SWAT raid and regime change is still free, making audio tapes by the bushel, and we are still slogging up hill trying to create a nation-state in Afghanistan.

Is this an option now? The Commander Guy and his neocon ninny brigade better scratch their heads long and hard.

No. It's Tough Treatment But Is It Torture?

The current hyperventilation over whether or not the current administration authorised torture is a difficult matter to parse correctly. To do so with any hope of accuracy requires differentiating between arduous treatment and actual torture. This is not the kind of issue the Geek likes to deal with because it ultimately depends upon purely subjective considerations.

Assuming that the documents quoted in the New York Times and other mainstream media are accurate, the treatment described as having been employed by CIA personnel in the secret prisons seems to have been lifted bodily from the survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training long used to prepare US military and similar personnel for unpleasant eventualities. The combination of psychological and physical techniques approved by the current administration including exposure to cold temperatures, prolonged sleep deprivation, head slapping, even "waterboarding" are customary components of SERE training.

The SERE course is no fun. Ask anyone who has been through it. Even though the person will not be able to provide details (classification and all that, don't you know), he will probably agree with the Geek's characterization. The Geek calls it, "Rugged."

Rugged beyond a doubt. Unpleasant to be sure. An out and out gut check. But, not torture.

It's not torture if the definition of torture is limited to the administration of unbearable pain, potentially damaging physical mis-treatment such as was commonplace in the dungeons of the Middle Ages or the cellars of the Soviet secret police. SERE and SERE derived techniques do not inflict pain beyond the capacity of the normal, healthy, motivated person to tolerate--not enjoy--but tolerate. Neither do these techniques carry the risk of genuine physical damage or the impairment of health.

Even though the techniques employed with the authorization of the current administration are in and of themselves not torture in the Geek's estimate and experience, their effects would have been potentiated by contextual factors. Chief amongst these is the reality that the people subject to the techniques were being held in an unknown location for an unknowable period of time. They were cut off completely and no doubt knew that they could be killed at any time and that their death would not be known outside the walls of the prison.

Isolation. Prolonged, hopeless isolation. Prolonged, hopeless isolation with the possibility of a lonely, unmourned death hanging in the air could (and perhaps did) elevate the package of psychological and physical pressures to the level of torture.

The worst torture is not the physical but the mental. As a result of this consideration, which is well documented in the debriefings of torture victims and psychological literature alike, the Geek is willing to argue that the combination of unpleasant techniques and isolation constitutes torture.

The Geek opposes torture.

Not because it offends his ethical schemata. The Geek opposes torture in all its forms including the potentiation of relatively innocuous techniques by isolation because it doesn't work as well as other forms of interrogation.

The most effective form of interrogation as the history of intelligence operations shows is the use of patient, empathic questioning by an individual who is highly knowledgeable about the person being interrogated. The classic example of this approach is Jim Skardon's slow, careful, ever-so-friendly interview of the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs. In less than three days of effort, Skardon elicited a detailed confession from Fuchs, a highly motivated, well disciplined Soviet agent who had been working in the bowels of the Manhattan Project. Without that confession, Fuchs would have walked.

There are other approaches that work well without the potentially distorting effects of torture or overly harsh treatment which borders on torture. Cops. intelligence officers, and others who have to gain reliable, time sensitive information from people not overly eager to divulge it are aware of them. There is no need to take space rehashing them.

All that is necessary is to rehearse the obvious. People who are isolated from customary environments, dislocated from the usual anchors and reference points of life, look for a way to lower the fear that normally accompanies such disruption. The combination of offering a way of lessening fear with a knowledge of the psychology of the interrogatee and taking full advantage of the reality that most people have a compulsion to talk will open the door to information.

Now for the ultimate hypothetical, the one posed to candidates and people in the field alike. The ticking atomic bomb scenario.

The Geek admits this is the toughest call of all. It is difficult because it places deontological ethics in direct conflict with teleological. That is to say it opposes the notion of absolute standards with absolute limits against the idea of a good end being achieved by bad means.

On this the Geek takes the Utilitarian position: the greater good for the greater number. As a last resort and under severe time constraints, the use of non-damaging physical coercion would be allowable. With a caveat. After the fact, those who authorized and administered the torture must be held accountable.

This means quite simply that the people involved with the decision to use physical torment must admit potential violation of relevant law and submit their conduct to judicial scrutiny. Not pleasant.

But the alternative would be worse.

The creation of a slippery slope leading to the unconstrained use of torment and torture would not be in the best interests of any of us.

How Do You Win Against People Who Love To Die?

Jeffery Imm asks an important question in his post today on Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org/.) Stripped to its essentials, Imm's question is how does one win aganst an enemy who "embraces death" in tactics such as suicide bombing?

He makes two correct assertions. One is that conventional military tactics seek victory through, as General George S. Patton actually said, "making the other poor son of a bitch die for his country." The other point is that the war with Islamists and Jihadists is primarily an ideological conflict.

While these assessments are correct, they do not in and of themselves answer the basic question.

Neither does Mr Imm's apparent reliance upon security mechanisms ranging from strategic intelligence to the efforts of local law enforcement agencies.

To reach the answer, a firm grip must be taken on a governing reality. It is not possible to stop all suicide attacks. That is true in the US. It is true in Europe. Even the most technologically sophisticated, most comprehensive security systems imaginable will not be leakproof.

It is the same problem which exists with air and missile defense systems. The initiative lies with the attacker. He chooses the time, place, and weight of attack. Complicating the situation is the parallel fact that it is always cheaper to increase the weight of the attack than the strength of the defense.

In defending against terror attacks by individuals quite willing to die in the attempt, the increased layering of defensive measures has the effect of introducing friction in economic, social, and political systems. Systemic frictions are additive.

A little friction, a small amount of extra delay, the marginal increase in cost, the slight uptick in suspicions, uncertainty, fear might be acceptable. Over time, individuals and institutions can adjust to the minor inconveniences, delays, costs, and paranoia.

We've seen that in operation since 9/11.

No one would allege that the post-9/11 measures are one hundred percent effective. No one would assert the current system is foolproof. That's because it isn't.

Worse, as layers of sought security are added, frictions increase. These compounded frictions can do as much or more economic, social and political damage than the terror they were intended to prevent.

Worse yet, even at a level far surpassing what would be tolerable to Americans, security measures do not guarantee safety.

Even Israel, which is far more of a garrison state than the US or any country in Europe, does not have an absolute defense against a resolute terrorist.

Step into countries such as Pakistan, let alone Afghanistan or Iraq, and the anti-terrorist situation is much worse than in the previously mentioned countries. In these war or nearly-war venues, the use of terror requires no particular competence. All that is necessary is to strap on the bomb, get behind the wheel of the explosive loaded vehicle and, at what is hoped to be the right time and place, push the button.

If the button-pusher has reached the right place at the right time, a bus filled with off-duty soldiers is blown to small fragments of plastic, metal, and body parts. If the man with the button is wrong, then a couple of children are atomized.

Paradoxically, perhaps the situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq points to the ultimate answer to Mr Imm's question.

Let's walk through it.

Remember, the purpose of terror is to terrorise. The goal of the terrorist is to directly, materially, and substantially influence the behavior and policies of the target government by creating a pervasive climate of fear among the citizens. The terrorist depends upon the civilian targets, through a process of willing self-identification with the actual victims, to act as a force multiplier.

In short, the terrorist hopes that the effects of his (necessarily) limited actions will be magnified by the fear driven demands of the civilian population among which his targets exist. The terrorists' killing actions don't directly influence the government. No. The killing drives the larger population to force the government in the desired direction.

Now, we have to remember the critical limiting factor to the potential political power of terror as a tactic. Each member of the target population must allow himself to be terrorised for terror to have any effect.

Terrorists of all ideological colors (including the commander of the British Bomber Command during WW II) have operated on the assumption that terror attacks carried on long enough and in sufficient weight will have the desired effect on the target population. Even though the historical record shows clearly that this has rarely, if ever, occurred, today's employers of terror hold the same belief.

If a close examination is made of the relationship between terror attacks directed against soft civilian targets in Afghanistan and Iraq and the consequences of these attacks within the populations, the result is surprising. It also gives the answer to Mr Imm's question.

The Geek doesn't propose to fire a barrage of numbers. Just the results of examining all the relevant, open source indicators from both countries over the past eight months.

Get a grip on this.

As Taliban shifted to terror attacks against civilian targets, the focus of resentment shifted increasingly from the US/NATO/Afghan National Army operations with their (inadvertent) civilian deaths to the insurgent attacks with their (intentional) civilian deaths.

The same dynamic operated in Iraq. As al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups bombed and shot civilians, the more-or-less uncommitted population shifted visibly from either a pro-insurgent posture or one of strict neutrality to one favoring the Multi-National Forces.

To make it simple: killing civilians is counterproductive. This truism applies whether the killing is done by an American fighter-bomber or a terrorist suicide bomber. It applies regardless of the reason(s) behind the killing. It applies regardless of who does the killing: insurgent, member of a national army, or Blackwater security guards.

Now the counter-intuitive response to Mr Imm's question. First, recognise that no absolute defense against suicidal terrorists is possible at any frictionally acceptable level of effort. Second, recognise that some deaths from terrorist operations are inevitable. Finally, while not foregoing reasonable defensive methods, when the inevitable happens, use it to consolidate political will to continue the ideological struggle.

This answer require some proactive efforts. The most important of these is educating the American (and European) publics to the reality of the current conflict--that it is a long duration ideologically based Second Cold War. Equally important is the necessity of acknowledging the reality that leakproof defense is impossible.

The next requirement is the hardest to implement. It is critical for Americans and others to recognise that there is no terror unless each and every individual in a target population makes the decision to be terrorised.

This is a gut check that few wish to be called upon to undergo.

We may not wish it. We may not want it. But, sometime in the not-too-distant future, the action of some terrorist group will demand that we undergo it.

The Geek, drawing on history as always, is willing to bet hair that we Americans have the guts to take the attack, pull together, and press on.

That is the ultimate answer to Mr Imm's question. That is how we win against people who love to die.