A Couple Of Good Personnel Choices

President Obama--or, to err on the side of accuracy--Secretary of Defense Robert Gates deserve a strong thumbs-up for two specific decisions on personnel.  One is the move of Leon Panetta from CIA to SecDef.  The other is tabbing Marine LtGen John Allen to take over the supreme command in Afghanistan.

Panetta, like Gates, has a long and distinguished record in Washington.  More to the point, Panetta has spent the last two years immersed in the realities of the threats confronting the US now or in the near to mid-term.  It is this latter consideration which makes Panetta the only real contender to follow Gates to the Pentagon.  With his knowledge of the dark sides of the world, Panetta is best equipped to argue budget cuts which will leave the US in the best possible position to honor commitments and defend its national and strategic interests.  Panetta is prepared in all essential respects to hold an open debate on American priorities and absolute requirements as the budgetary considerations demand a shrinkage of the Pentagon's budget by at least four hundred billion dollars over the next decade.

The great fear of Gates and all other reasonably knowledgeable observers has been an across the board cut which would result in all defense capacities being hollowed out equally.  This would leave the US without sufficient capabilities in any area either to honor obligations to treaty partners or to deter and defeat threats to national interests.  It would leave the US without the muscle necessary to support diplomacy in all its myriad forms.

Gates has been in favor of an open debate, a far reaching one by necessity over the stance of American military forces.  Such a debate will be messy, unpleasant, ideological in all too many ways, and, unless undertaken with a leadership both well informed and willing to lead, inconclusive.  Panetta should be able to perform the function of debate facilitator quite well.  Given that he can combine the expertise of having run a large, complex, and sensitive agency with knowledge of the world and previous experience with both the Office of Management and Budget and the Appropriations Committee, it is hard to see any other person so well equipped to handle the delicate and highly important matter of guiding the Pentagon budget to a soft landing.

While unknown outside the Marine Corps and the small number of mavens of small wars, LtGen Allen is an excellent choice to run operations in Afghanistan during what will prove to be the make or break end stage of the war.  When the Geek encountered Allen in the context of an advanced service school many years before the man got his first star let alone his third, the Geek was quite impressed by the officer's quick and probing mind.  That the mind was far more than merely quick or probing was demonstrated by Allen's success in recruiting critical tribal leaders so as to shift Sunni tribes from leaning to the insurgents in Iraq to siding with the US.  This act was central to the development of the Awakening Councils and the Sons of Iraq, both of which proved to be very important components of the victory over the various insurgent combines.

While the tribal politics of Afghanistan are not so regimented or predictable as was the case in Iraq, there is very good reason to believe that LtGen Allen's skills in this area will serve the cause of defeating the insurgents with high efficiency.  It is also probable that General Allen will be able to establish a relationship with Hamid Karzai which more closely resembles that which existed between Stanley McChrystal than the current troubled one with David Petraeus.

It rather appears that LtGen Allen combines much of the warfighting nature of McChrystal with many of the political skills possessed by General Petraeus.  This will do much to assure the US and its allies including Afghanistan are more rather than less likely to come out on top in the war.  Potentiating this is the fact that the war in Afghanistan is now an all Marine operation at the highest levels with a Marine as CENTCOMCINC and another running the shop in Afghanistan.  This will do much to smooth any of the frictions which normally exist between major commands and theater commands.

Robert Gates has performed many outstanding services to We the People over his long career.  However, few equal let alone surpass this last day effort--choosing two perfect candidates for two very tough jobs.  The outgoing Secretary of Defense deserves more than the usual gratitude for the care with which he has prepared for his leaving office with wars in progress and a budget which must be cut without damage to the core interests of the US.

Happy Talk--But, There Is Bad News Coming

The Pentagon spin machine has released its latest Congressionally required semi-annual appraisal of the state of play in Afghanistan.  By and large it is 108 pages of happy talk, soothing mood music, a sort of happy-days-will-be-coming-soon-(maybe.)  The same tone, very upbeat, but with a slight note of caution obtains in the news release issued as a cover letter on the report.

The report spends fifty-three pages in consideration of the security situation in-country.  Much of the good news is contained in this section.  It is clear that operations over the past several months have shifted the initiative to the the ISAF/US/ANF coalition.  The insurgents despite their capacity to undertake high visibility attacks, plant IEDs, and generally give the appearance of still being in the fight have lost the initiative and seem to have lost some of their will to combat.

The Local Security Program which dates back to General McChrystal and is the descendant of the Vietnam War Combined Action Platoon Program as well as the much deprecated Regional Forces-Popular Forces ("Ruff-Puffs") has been developing with a fair degree of success even given the opposition of the Karzai government and the inherent corruption and inefficiency of the Afghan Interior Ministry.  Should this trend continue over the next six months, it bodes well for long term stability as only a credible locally based force with primary loyalty to the area it is protecting can assure Taliban and the other insurgent groups cannot and will not return after the foreigners leave.  It is clear that more external support for the development of the local forces is required.  It is equally evident that more pressure must be placed on Kabul to allow the local forces to develop and deploy.

The same applies to the Afghan Local Police.  This organization (to use the term generically and loosely only) is not only a necessary complement to the Local Security Program's Village Stability Operations, it provides the only governmental presence which is directly observable by and accountable to the local folks.  Thus it is a critical instrument of government which, if operating correctly, will go toward countering the impression of the Afghan National Police and Army as corrupt, distant, and non-responsive.  Again, Kabul has dragged its feet in allowing and encouraging the development of the Afghan Local Police due to its customary fear of losing control of the population--as if it actually ever had any such control.

The report way understates both the importance of these locally oriented efforts and the resistance to them which is presented by the central government.  This is unfortunate and raises doubts about the future ability of the Pentagon (and considering the impending change of management) the Agency to evaluate progress or lack thereof in Afghanistan.  The low balling of the local initiatives also erodes the ability of Congress to assure American dollars and manpower is put to the best possible use.

The thirty-five pages covering the development and deployment of the Afghan National Army and Police is optimistic but not overly so.  The report does note the severe problem presented by the very, very low level of basic literacy among the recruits.  It pays some attention to the chronic willingness of ANF&P personnel to desert, change sides, or "go rogue."  Overall, the attrition affecting the ANF&P represents a major challenge in meeting the ambitious goals for force size.  It may be necessary for Kabul to institute a draft of some sort which would open a very large can of very vicious political and tribal worms.

The subtext of the pages considering the procurement process for the ANF&P hints at but, unfortunately, does not state the difficulties presented by pervasive corruption.  The problem is that the corrupt actions are not simply those of locals but involve representatives of foreign firms offering both equipment and materiel.  It is easy to see the political/diplomatic considerations which demanded a heavy foot on the soft pedal.  Even if justifiable, this absence of accuracy misleads the reader, congressional, media, or private citizen.

Because of the mis-definition of the mission in Afghanistan as one of "nation-building" rather than one of punishment and deterrence, the report wanders at some length into the areas of governance and "reconstruction and development" as well as counternarcotics.  All of these areas may be of very real relevance to the Afghan population, but they are tangential at best to the US and its foreign allies.  The goal of assuring that Afghanistan does not and will never again provide a safe haven to groups practicing violent political Islam does not require the construction of a faux Western nation-state from the tribal warp and woof of the local population.

Unfortunately, the military does not question the importance of these civilian goals any more in this report than it has in previous efforts or in the decision making process regarding the nature and character of the military efforts in-country.  The underlying assumption that nation-building is central to effective counterinsurgency rides along in splendor, unquestioned, undoubted in this report.  A close reading of the sections regarding nation-building shows a surplus of fine sounding mood music, lofty words, and even loftier ambitions coupled with barely whispered lyrics concerning the sorry record of nearly unmitigated failure in all areas.

One lack is noteworthy due to its sheer obviousness.  There is not a word about religion or the role of religion in facilitating instability within the country.  Nor is there any consideration of the centrality of tribal affiliation and loyalties to the challenges of facilitating the construction of a unitary national identity and state in Afghanistan.  The leaving aside of the two most important features of individual and group self-identification so as to not consider their impact on the goals of nation-building is an inexcusable flaw in the report as it was in predecessors.  The complete absence of such key features skews the ability of any reader to accurately appreciate what can and cannot be done in-country along with what has and has not been accomplished.

A total of three, that's right, three pages was spent considering Afghanistan in its regional engagement context.  Considering that the Taliban and Haqqani network as well as the survivors of al-Qaeda would have been sent to Paradise years ago had Pakistan not been such a close and inviting ally, the failure to accurately and comprehensively consider the regional engagement aspect of the conflict is a fine example of moral and intellectual bankruptcy.

All and all this semi-annual exercise in shading reality resembles the everything-is-perfect-and-getting-better approach of the Pentagon during the Vietnam War.  One can only wonder if the denizens both in the Five Sided Wigwam and Afghanistan are deluding themselves or simply hoping to delude the rest of us--particularly the money givers on the Hill.

As if to prove the cautionary notes of impending problems and setbacks contained in the report are not only accurate but in their accuracy buttress the marginal credibility of the entire exercise, there are now two shop mutterings of Taliban major attacks coming in the next few days.  No details of course, just the vague words about casualties and ultimate Taliban failure.  It is a fine example of salvation through good timing or, to use the invisible motto over the entrance at Langley, "Thank God for coincidence."

Well, In Afghanistan, It's That Time Of Year--Again

Traditionally, the campaigning season in Afghanistan starts around Mayday.  The snows in the high passes have melted; travel across the FATA/Afghanistan border is easier.  The high country cold has retreated and so the armies can advance.

While the winter break this time around has not been as pronounced as in previous years and wars, the tempo of enemy driven operations is expected to increase over the next few weeks.  As that happens, as the number of Taliban or Haqqani network suicide bombers grows, as the density of IEDs ticks up, so also will the number of friendly forces killed and wounded.  Equally important, as the tempo of operations accelerates, the number of incidents involving collateral non-combatant casualties will ramp up as well.

As the bodies of maimed or dead non-combatants are piled higher and higher, Afghan outrage at the actions of the Americans and other infidel foreigners will escalate as well.  It will not matter if the dead die as a result of insurgent actions or those of the US/ISAF/Afghan National Forces, the result will be the same--demands that the Americans stop whatever it is that they are doing.  One can be sure that both the Karzai government and Muslim clerics supportive of political Islam will be in full-throated anger over the purported massacres of Afghan women and children.

The combination of religious and political imperatives admits of nothing else.  To Muslims, the notion that Muslims kill Muslims is infinitely less unacceptable than is the killing of Muslims by infidels.  Even the indiscriminate slaughter by IED is seen by Afghans as less worthy of condemnation than a misguided airstrike or a stray artillery round, or even the nocturnal raid of an insurgent occupied compound by infidel forces.

The single largest advantage enjoyed by the insurgents is the simple fact that they are Muslims and as such are not subject to condemnation under the guiding Islamic stricture of avoiding any appearance of division, of disagreement within the community of believers.  The power this particular and very fundamental requirement holds on most Muslims precludes any opposition to even the worst excesses of the tactics of murder practiced by Taliban or any other insurgent group.

At the same time the demands of solidarity within Islam as well as the division of all humanity into the opposing camps of "the House of Peace" (Islam) and the "House of War" (infidels, that is everyone who is not a proper Muslim) assures that all culpability for all casualties within the former is assigned unthinkingly to the latter.  As a consequence, the infidels are to blame when one Muslim kills another--particularly when the killing is technically unintentional as is always the case with an IED and is plausibly claimed with respect to suicide bombers hitting soft, civilian targets.

As Taliban et al escalate their efforts this Spring, it is to be expected that Afghan support for a compromise peace will grow with every non-combatant casualty.  The Karzai government will be found baying in the van of the "peace now" movement in Afghanistan.  Insofar as it can escape its ISI minders so also will much of Taliban.  This group has taken very heavy hits at its mid-level ranks as well as among its footsoldiers from the US/NATO/ISAF moves into their former heartlands.  The leadership echelon has also been the victim of attrition courtesy of the UAV attacks in the FATA.

The Haqqani network is unlikely to join in any peace oriented conversations as it is joined shoulders and hip with ISI.  Frantic to secure its fiction of strategic depth against the Indians, there is no way that either ISI or the Pakistani military will surrender any control over either the Haqqani network or any factions within the badly riven Taliban.  Nothing scares the Pakistani military more than the prospect they will lose a seat at the head of the table as Afghanistan enters its endgame phase.

No mistake should be made about this: The Afghanistan war is entering its endgame this spring.  Regardless of protestations to the contrary by, for example, NATO foreign ministers, the US and its "partners" will start an accelerating process of disengagement this summer.  The political realities within the various countries dictate an exit sooner rather than later and at any cost less than a frank admission of military failure or defeat.

No less an expert on covering the political posterior than Harry Reid in the course of an interview filled with internal inconsistencies has acknowledged the pull-out will be coming with greater certainty than Nancy Pelosi's next injection of Botox.  In short compass, the Nevada senator stated that he had "no confidence" in the war coming to a satisfactory conclusion, averred great respect and confidence in the optimistic predictions of General Petraeus, and blamed the upcoming debacle on the American public's "short attention span."  To cut to the chase, the Democratic leader expects the minority support for the war to erode further and for the war to be an issue of note in next year's elections which can be addressed successfully only by a withdrawal.

The situation is the same in all the other Western participants.  The war has no support among the various electorates.  Given the totality of economic and political circumstances, there is no real stomach for continuing the effort anywhere.  Even the several combatant forces are not enthralled with going on with a war which is fundamentally one which cannot be won for circumstances far removed from the sphere of military competence.

As night falls in the next few months, the best which can be expected is the infliction of sufficient damage on Taliban and the Haqqani network to force a compromise peace which does not favor the advocates of violent political Islam.  Afghanistan will remain a semi-hollow state with much of the real power accruing to Islamabad at the expense of Kabul.  The country will remain a cesspool of Shariah in all its reprehensible manifestations.  It will exist as an area ripe for exploitation by outsiders including both Russia and China, both of which have an eye on the vast mineral resources proved out by American experts.  Once again the biggest losers will be as was the case the last time the US disengaged from Afghanistan the people of the place who desire to live without the oppression of a Ninth Century regime.

The tragedy of it all is that the debacle was a 'preventable accident.'  Had the Bush/Cheney administration focused on executing a punitive expedition without any thought of either appeasing Pakistan or playing at nation-building in Afghanistan, the outcome would have been vastly different.  Had the military used a more relevant doctrine in the opening months of the war, the outcome would have been vastly different.  Had President Obama not given into a momentary snit and fired the only man, General McChrystal, capable of going mano a mano with Karzai--and winning, the outcome would have been vastly different.  If General Petraeus could be as good at fighting a war as he is at practicing military (and Congressional) politics, the outcome would have been vastly different.  If President Obama had the guts and realism so sadly lacking with President George W. Bush and not given in to the extortion efforts of the Pakistanis, the outcome would have been vastly different.

But, what has happened, happened.  The war will soon start fading away to an endstate which will not be fully satisfactory and an accompaniment of whimpers and recriminations.  However, if the US and its partners can inflict sufficient losses on the insurgents and keep on with the decapitation strikes in the FATA while coddling Karzai to the fullest extent necessary, it is not too late to retrieve enough of an imitation of victory to make the sacrifices of life, limb, and money almost justifiable.