Another (Nuclear) War Waiting To Start?

For an aficionado of impeding crises, there are plenty locations from which to choose.  As the events of the past couple of weeks demonstrated, one of the most probable spots is Kashmir.  The MSM spent a fair amount of time and attention on the civil unrest on the Indian side of the dividing line but didn't bother to place the strife in the context where it belongs.  Kashmir today is the contemporary version of Sarajevo in the summer of 1914.

The conflict over Kashmir holds the world record for longest running Cold and Hot War.  The shooting over the 92,000 square miles started with the independence of India and Pakistan sixty-two years ago.  The killing and dying have not stopped yet with the most recent additions to the body count being a hundred or so locals felled by the guns of Indian paramilitary police.

When the wars of partition ended, India was in possession of two thirds of Kashmir.  Pakistan got the rump, the less densely populated mountain region in the west.  The population divided in about the same proportion so that roughly eight million Kashmiri live on the Indian side of the Line of Control.  Three million reside on Pakistani territory.  It is important to note that over three quarters of the Kashmiri population is Muslim.  Twenty percent are Hindu with the rest scattered between Christians, Sikhs, and Buddhists.  It is almost unnecessary to point out that religion is not a trivial consideration in the region.

The wars since partition have been short, bloody, inconclusive, and have usually ended to Indian advantage.  In 1999 the two powers came perilously close to yet another war.  By this time both possessed nuclear weapons.  Considering the ranges and travel times involved, both India and Pakistan would have had no choice but launch-under-warning.

The launch-under-warning necessity continues today.  Considering the most recent changes in both country's delivery systems there is good reason to posit that each is skidding toward a launch-under-threat doctrine.  That reality is sufficient to make even the most limited, most ambiguous direct contact between Pakistani and Indian forces along the Line of Control a very scary thing.

China has played and continues to play the role of the dual sided sword in the Kashmir conflict.  On the one hand Beijing has served as a destabilizing presence.  An example: Back in the days of Mao, the Fifties to be precise, the Chinese occupied and annexed a portion of Kashmir, a stretch along the Aksai Chin mountains, to allow the building of a military road between Tibet and the Xinjang province in China.  The close relationship between the Indian government under Nehru with both Moscow and Beijing assured this event went by with little noise and international interest.

Perhaps emboldened by the quick, quiet success of this action, Beijing went on to claim the Ladakh region of Indian Kashmir.  The rapid and decisive slap down administered to the Indian army by the PLA was not uncoupled from this claim.  Nor is the ongoing face off high in the mountains between Indian troops and their PLA rivals.

Through the Seventies and even more in the Eighties, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) armed, trained, and directed the activities of Kashmiri jhadi.  In 1989 the long simmering but low level ISI managed partisan war escalated to a level rivaling or surpassing the Palestinian intifadas.  The Indian security forces suppressed the uprising in a welter of blood--at least forty thousand were killed.

Neither the anti-Indian sentiments of the Kashmiri nor the ambitions of ISI were extinguished by the suppression as the rapidly blooming crisis of 1999 made clear.  The Pakistanis did not even pretend to ratchet down the partisan war until the administration of George W. Bush used a combination of bribery and diplomatic pressure in the days following 9/11 to convince Islamabad to make genuflections before the alter of peace.

Even if someone were so delusional as to believe that the results of the Bush effort would be either genuinely effective or long lasting must have been disabused of this belief when the US showed a willingness to open new avenues of cooperation with the Indian government.  These steps, most importantly the move to facilitate Indian civil nuclear power development, gave the Pakistanis pause.

Islamabad used this pause to reconsider their relations with China.  It was not a Dulles style "agonizing reappraisal" but rather a quick but well-considered demarch to Beijing.  The Trolls of Beijing were more than a tad interested in a new axis of interest between China and Pakistan.  India was seen increasingly through the prism of the Forbidden City as an emerging rival for regional preeminence as well as an economic competitor in the making.

Given this and the profound anti-American sentiment in the Pakistani government and public, it has not been surprising to see Beijing successfully seek opportunities for investment and influence alike.  Chinese money is developing port facilities in natural gas rich Baluchistan.  China stands ready, willing, and eager to supplant the US as chief armorer of the Pakistani armed forces.  Beijing's aid in the wake of the flood has been quick and generous.  And, China is standing by to aid Pakistan in developing its nuclear power needs.

The Indio-Pakistani conflict in Kashmir has spilled over into Afghanistan.  India has developed a major presence in Kabul.  Indian money has been spread generously around the Karzai government, a dynamic which is aided greatly by the Indian government's open minded attitudes regarding bribery and corruption.  The Indians have been successful to an outstanding extent in both countering Pakistan's paramount place in the Kabul government and expanding its own interests there.

This, in turn, has alarmed Islamabad.  The vision of strategic depth in Afghanistan has driven Pakistani policy there since the last days of the Soviet occupation.  In ongoing pursuit of this dream, Islamabad, particularly the ISI, has provided support and assistance to the anti-Karzai insurgents.  The training camps and other necessary facilities strewing the remoter portions of Pakistan are there because Taliban and the Haqqani network are seen as keys to eventual Pakistani dominance of Kabul.

Kashmir and the groups advocating violent political Islam are joined head and hip.  There is a set of very real problems for both India and Pakistan involved in this intimate relation between Kashmir and groups such as but not limited to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT.) It will be recalled that LeT was the executive agent of the 2008 attack on Mumbai.

As the ISI and others in Islamabad have found out repeatedly, LeT like Taliban and the Haqqani network are monsters which easily escape the leash of their creator.  LeT and the others will and do pursue what each determines to be in its "national" interest.  If that coincides with Islamabad's needs or desires, well, fine.  If it doesn't, well, that is just too bad.

Terrorists need tensions to provide the necessary context for their operations.  The combination of terrorism, violent political Islam, and tensions between states or within the population of a country is as natural as coffee and a doughnut.  However, the combination of religiously predicated terrorism and inter-state tensions turns very ugly when operations are conducted in an environment with a launch-under-threat component.

The presence of Chinese troops in northern Pakistan in a place coterminous with Kashmir can be either stabilizing or it opposite.  The troops are there ostensibly to repair the Kharakorum  highway which is the only direct land route between China and the Pakistani region of Gilgit.  The tipping point where the Chinese presence can shift from one of a potentially stabilizing one to its opposite comes with the unpleasant recent complication of an independent Kashmir.

About a million Kashmiri live in Gilgit which is historically a part of greater Kashmir.  Within this million there are those (number unknown) who, like compatriots on both sides of the Line of Control, take the view that only an independent Kashmir can find peace and prosperity.  Nationalism has been growing well under the radar scopes of the West, including the US.  This is a very dangerous fact and one which augments the analogy between Kashmir today and Bosnia in 1914.

As yet another generation comes of age in divided and bloody Kashmir, the appeals of nationalism are being reinforced.  The (to the outside world) invisible Chinese presence even though small and low profile is one more bit of kindling on the nationalistic fire.  A growing but unquantifiable number of Kashmiri are seeing themselves as "occupied" pawns in an inscrutable Game of Nations.

In this context the force of armed political Islam should not, cannot, be overstated.  A new generation of terrorist Frankenstein monsters is under construction.  Soon this new force will be far beyond the control or even influence of Islamabad or Delhi.

As the world learned nearly a century ago, the effects of a small act of nationalistic terror can be totally non-linear in its ultimate effects.  If this was true in an era of six shooters, where the machinegun was a world beater and the fighter aircraft not yet invented, think how true it might be in a day of nuclear tipped missiles and a launch-under-warning imperative.

ADMIN NOTE: The Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments.  To defeat spam comment attacks he has been forced to employ frustrating defense measures.  He apologizes.

From The Sky-Is-Blue Department

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has finally gone public on an elephant in the john which has been present but unacknowledged all too long. On the road in India the SecDef made a long overdue reference to the strategy of al-Qaeda. Quite specifically he commented to the reporters present that al-Qaeda is working with Taliban of Afghanistan, Taliban of Pakistan, and the gang behind last year's Mumbai attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), to provoke war between Pakistan and India.

This option is both too obvious and too attractive not to have captured the attention of the leadership echelon of al-Qaeda. Not only have India and Pakistan gone to war several times before, both countries (Pakistan far more than India under its present government) are willing to stage another rematch. All that is needed is a proper inciting incident or maybe two if the Indians are in a particularly cautious mood.

Had it not been for India's "restraint" and "statesmanlike" behavior, as Gates correctly characterized matters, the attack on Mumbai would have been sufficient. The lack of a robust response by India undoubtedly perturbed both the heavyweights of Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaeda. Even the foot dragging and irresolute response on the part of Pakistan's government to the Indian demands that Islamabad haul its freight in both investigating and prosecuting the LeT leaders down home in Pakistan did not end India's policy of restraint.

A year ago some outside observers (including the Geek) expected an Islamist "second strike." It was unimportant just which group of the many available undertook the second attack as long as one occurred. No Indian government could have survived politically had it not taken strong retaliatory measures.

Gates observed that Indian patience and restraint was not unlimited in the face of future attacks on a scale rivaling the one on Mumbai. The Secretary's words were both diplomatic and quite blunt.

Their bluntness implies that the Indian government had made it abundantly clear that the next attack would not pass by unanswered. A further implication is that the Indians would be unwilling (or politically unable) to accept any US counsel to the effect that they be patient, that they show restraint, that they turn the other cheek in the event of another outrage committed by Islamist jihadists with a documented or even probable connection to Pakistan.

The Indian military has a wide range of retaliatory capabilities at its disposal. In highest probability the use of the most circumspect method would recommend itself. The most probable response would be carried out by Indian domestic manufacture cruise missiles against known terrorist training centers in Pakistan. This approach would limit collateral damage while allowing for an escalation should such prove necessary for either legitimate security reasons or compelling domestic political requirements.

Any Indian response even one as low profile as a single cruise missile strike on remotely located camps would carry risks. Additionally, it would have to be very carefully calibrated. The Indians would need to consider--and to avoid if at all possible--stimulating either of two probable Pakistani reactions. There is no desire in India for Pakistan's population to rally monolithically behind its government let alone the Islamists of LeT and Taliban. Neither would the Indian government (or the US) hope to see a Pakistan further weakened internally so as to assure an Islamist victory in that country.

Whether the Indian government and military are capable of so perfectly calibrating any hypothetical retaliatory strike is questionable at best. What Gates said hints strongly at the reality that the Indians are less concerned about that aspect of life than they are about motivating the Pakistani government to get off the dime and work far more sedulously at the task of eradicating both Taliban in Pakistan and the leader of the "syndicate of terror," al-Qaeda.

The US is just as interested in motivating Pakistan to do more in the war for its government's survival. Gates correctly called the conflict with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan "existential" in nature. Regardless of the hopes and delusions of those Islamists in the government, military, and Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, the contest between Taliban et al and the current regime is a zero sum game. There is only room at the top for one winner be it the status quo or the Islamist jihadists.

For just over two decades now the Pakistani military and ISI have fostered, nurtured, supported, guided, and protected both Taliban and al-Qaeda. Throughout this long period and process it has been the hope of ISI and others in the power elite that someday in someway the Islamist jihadists would provide the winning element in the future war with India. Whether through the provision of strategic depth in Afghanistan or the means of creating a fifth column in Kashmir and elsewhere in India, the Pakistanis have seen Islamist jihadists as a key weapon for future success against the hated Hindu rival.

In a set of very real ways India has already won the future war. Not only is the Indian military far more competent than its Pakistani rival, the Indian decision to invest heavily in human capital has given the country a vast advantage economically and in terms of social coherence. In addition the landmass of India compared to that of Pakistan implies strongly that the former country can survive a limited nuclear attack far better than the latter.

The great equalizer of nuclear weapons does not exist as regards the Indian-Pakistani calculus. The population and economic infrastructure of Pakistan is simply too concentrated to survive even a very limited (one to five weapons of twenty kilotons yield) nuclear attack. Sheer geographic propinquity assures that even a conscientiously counter-force strike would be a major counter-value attack.

The same situation does not apply to nearly the same extent in India. The country could survive a mid-sized attack (twenty to fifty weapons of up to fifty kiloton yield) without being existentially impaired.

In short, reality behooves Islamabad even more than it does New Delhi to take firm, effective, and rapid action to end the "syndicate of terror" before the syndicate can bring its strategic vision into effect. Should the syndicate succeed, the results will be far more disastrous for Pakistan than India.

And that, bucko, was the crucial sub-text of Secretary Gates' remarks to the press. One can only hope they read the papers in Islamabad.

Time For A Change--Pakistan

The US has coddled the hell out of the military and intelligence service of Pakistan for the past eight years. The billions of dollars spent there have bought no noticeable improvement in the counter-terrorist or counterinsurgency capacities of the military. The effort has been without success.

The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continues to be a fortress of Islamism/jihadism. The military is not much better. These two unpleasant ground truths are the reason that most, if not all, terrorist roads end in Pakistan.

The time has come to get a grip on this reality. It is really long past time to drop the pretense that Pakistan is an ally in the effort against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Lashkar e-Taiba.

It is time to publicly acknowledge that Pakistan provides ready sanctuary, easy cover, and competent training and support to the people fighting the US, killing Americans, and seeking the goal of ejecting the US and the West from the sub-continent.

Unless and until Pakistan ceases being the recruiting, training, financing, and general purpose rest and recreation center for the jihadists of the world, the world has no hope of being rid of their noxious presence. The instruments of American national power, along with those of other countries which have a realistic appraisal of the threat presented by jihadism and the critical role played by Pakistan in facilitating jihadism, must be employed to alter Pakistan's behavior--radically.

This does not mean another great adventure in regime change. There is no need (and even less possibility of success) for a Iraq type invasion.

What is needed is the application of economic and diplomatic pressure on the government of Pakistan to take two specific actions. Get a grip on them. It isn't hard even though the current administration couldn't (or wouldn't) do it.

The ISI must be disbanded. Period. Reform of the ISI so as to remove the Islamists/jihadists is as impossible as reforming the Mafia to remove the Tony Soprano types.

The Pakistani military has to be reoriented from wishing for yet another losing war with India. The job for the armed forces of Pakistan is twofold. Secure the borders between Pakistan and India as well as between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mount a sustained counterinsurgency and pacification campaign not only in the FATA but Swat and other jihadist heartlands.

In short, the armed forces of Pakistan should take on the greatest challenge and perform the most important mission any military can--insure the structural integrity of the government. Make sure the government of Pakistan and only the government of Pakistan has authority over the population of Pakistan.

Given the parlous economic conditions of Pakistan, conditions that can only be worsened by the current global recession, the US and its partners (we assume the US will have partners globally after next January 20th.) can put the squeeze on Pakistan with a high probability of success. Yes, the government of Pakistan will squawk like the cliched stuck pig about foreign dictates and the beauties of national sovereignty. That is only to be expected. Let them scream all they want--as long as they also do what is required.

Cut off all military and economic assistance until the required twin efforts have been undertaken, at least to the extent that results are visible. Then and only then reprogram the aid. This time emplace sufficient oversight that the money is spent only for purposes consistent with stamping out the terrorist groups and their supporters.

"But, wait a minute, Geek! The Paks have nukes. They have plutonium. We can't take the risk."

The Pakistani bomb is one of the reasons we have to go the "tough love" route. Their assembled, deliverable nuclear arsenal represents a threat to India and--potentially--Iran. One of these countries already has a nuclear deterrent and the other one seems hellbent to do the same. In any event, the Government of Pakistan is well aware of what might (will) happen if some of its nuclear material ends up as a mushroom cloud somewhere. The bomb is not a reason to cease pressure on Islamabad. It is a reason to increase it.

The administration of George W. Bush swived the pooch with respect to Pakistan. The reasons for this severe failure are still unclear. In so far as the past is prologue, in this case it is the cause of a very dark future. Coddling Pakistan, its military, its ISI, has not only brought the Taliban resurgence, it has brought the world Mumbai.

To have a better chance of a future without more Mumbais there must be a change. To have a better chance of a future without one, two, many Talibans, there must be a change.

The change must happen in Pakistan. The change must be started in Washington.