The (Fast) Flying Finger Of Death

The most interesting development in the area of more-or-less conventional weapons to come down the pike is embodied in the several alternative platforms collectively called, alternatively "Prompt Global Strike" (PGS) or "Global Prompt Strike" (GPS.) Not only is the GPS concept--and the hardware which can turn it from theory to practice--interesting, it is the only way in which the new Obama approved Nuclear Posture Review can be rendered truly viable.

Nuclear weapons have been prepared and justified in two roles.

One is that of the area targeted "counter-value" mission of city-busting. Whether the area down range was an enemy city containing (perhaps only peripherally)legitimate military facilities as was the case in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki or hordes of advancing troops and armor (the classic vision of the "crimson tide" cresting the "Trace" in Germany), the weapons of choice were thwacking great yield atomic or (later) hydrogen bombs. One (to use the old Soviet term) nuclear charge of beaucoup kilotons or a few megatons and, well, no more city or onrushing horde. Of course, there would be quite a bit of "collateral" damage--particularly downwind. It was the "collateral" damage projected to result from a major exchange which caused the nightmares of "nuclear winter" or even the "On-The-Beach" end-of-the-world outcome.

The other seemingly legitimate usage for nukes was engaging small, hardened point targets such as the opponent's residual nuclear forces or his command and control centers. The question of second, third, and so on strikes focused on two questions. The first was that of survivability, of riding out a first strike with a credible capacity for retaliation. The second revolved around constructing systems with sufficient accuracy and potency to destroy the point targets. The name of this game was "counter-force."

The problems of assuring the destruction of hardened point targets tested guidance systems to the max. These were complicated by the difficulty of delivering sufficient force on the target to overcome the passive defenses of hyper-hardening. Nukes, particularly those carried on maneuverable re-entry vehicles or endoatmospheric systems such as cruise missiles or precision guided gravity bombs, alone had sufficient bang to obliterate the target.

The limits of reliance upon nuclear munitions became more than a tad obvious to American planners and decision makers in the runup to the Persian Gulf War in 1990. The Saddam Hussein regime had constructed an impressive array of super-hardened command bunkers which were immune to any non-nuclear American weapon.

The same situation obtained years later when the Bush/Cheney administration contemplated their adventure in regime change in Iraq. Even the (usually but not always) highly accurate cruise missiles were of no value in taking on highly hardened point targets. Beyond that the slow flight of the cruise missiles provided them with no utility in hitting a moving target such as Saddam was with his constant movement between alternative command centers.

The difficulty of the cruise missile's leisurely pace had already complicated American efforts to take out Osama bin Laden. When the Clinton administration in 1998 received hard, actionable intelligence regarding bin Laden's location, the combination of decision cycle time and slow flight gave more than sufficient opportunity for a person in the Pakistani government or Inter-Services Intelligence to get on the phone and call his good buddy, Osama. The latter beat feet so the missiles finally hit only empty mud and stone huts.

The lack of a fast reaction, short transit time, highly accurate and bang-heavy munition has seriously complicated, arguably even frustrated, any reasonable American plan to neutralize North Korean or Iranian nuclear facilities without the highly negative consequences which would ensue inevitably upon the use of a nuclear munition. The same applies to some extent with regard to removing high value personnel such as Osama from the playing field.

The advent of hardware having the potential to provide ultra-fast, accurate delivery of a whole bunch of bang downrange is a game changer, the importance of which cannot be overstated, and must not be underestimated. Not surprisingly, the possibility of fielding this class of weapons systems comes with problems both technological and diplomatic in nature.

The fastest, cheapest way of putting the GPS on line is the reposturing of current generation land and sea based ICBMs to GPS delivery. Work on reconfiguring current missiles has been underway long enough and with good enough results that a one-for-one replacement feature has been incorporated in the new START.

This little commented upon aspect of START indicates the Russians are not absolutely against this American option. (Hmm, perhaps they hope their espionage boys are up to the task of swiping the technology?) The depressed trajectory of a GPS equipped ICBM should be, in and of itself, sufficient indication that the US was not trying to sneak in a Dr Strangelove attack. If not, there are simple ways to reassure the Kremlin that we really, really are taking out a point in Iran, or North Korea and not, say, Gorky.

The Chinese are another problem. Beijing is not so easily put off its anxieties that the US might want to, say, welch on its debts by obliterating the debt holders. Still, it is not a problem which should exceed the capacity of the State Department to handle. (Well, in principle at least.)

Other, more exotic, more expensive, and longer lead-time systems are in the pipeline or on the drawing board. One of these might be inferred to exist in the recently test launched X-37B. While not the Finger of Death per se, the vehicle could deploy hypersonic, precision guided munitions anywhere along its orbit trace. The X-37B has been under development first by NASA and then by the Air Force for more than a decade and should be viewed as a platform with a range of potential applications as well as the one furthest along in its maturation.

The hypersonic cruise missile is also well along in its development. The Falcon 2 was launched from Vandenberg AFB aboard a Minotaur IV last week. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been close-mouthed about the Falcon, but has disclosed enough about this unpowered hypersonic vehicle to show that its potentials as a GPS mainstay are significant.

Even further down the way is the X-51 "WaveRider." The X-51 is conceptualized as a hypersonic endoatmospheric cruise missile powered by a scramjet engine. It gets its nickname from the designed intent that the vehicle ride its own sonic shockwave, an approach which provides a number of advantages--if it can be made to work. Air launched, the mach-five plus system is intended to provide the capacity to hit anywhere on the Earth within sixty minutes of a "go" decision.

Diplomatic conundrums exist with respect to both the X-37B and X-51 alternatives as with the conversion of current ICBMs to the GPS role. It is easy to argue that the hypersonic endoatmospheric vehicles including a paper proposal advanced by the Army present greater diplomatic difficulties than does the re-configured ICBM approach. Hypersonic missiles whether powered or not present very tough challenges for the defender. And, any hypersonic missile can carry either city busting nukes or point target appropriate conventional munitions.

As has been shown by the diplomatic storms surrounding the decision to deploy a very limited anti-ballistic missile capacity near Russia, it is utterly essential that diplomatic moves proceed in tandem with the research, development, and evaluation of the hardware. There is no doubt but squeals of (feigned) outrage will emanate eventually from both Moscow and Beijing. This is to be expected; it is the default position regarding any proposed technologically driven change in the Great Power status quo which seems to confer some sort of advantage to the US.

This implies that the ultimate test, the real challenge for the US, resides not in the realm of technology but in the area of political will. The question is not will the US develop a workable GPS system or systems in the near- to mid-term, but whether or not the administration can withstand the gales of pretended fury originating from one or more Great Powers which lack a similar, and, presumably, countervailing capacity.

That question in turn hinges on two other factors: Will the new GPS come online before or after 2012 and will the current president be re-elected?

It sure would be nice to have an accurate crystal ball. Or, a forward running time machine.

Is Uncle Sam Now A Nuclear Wimp?

The Obama administration released the long discussed, long speculated upon Nuclear Posture Review in a blare of public relations speechifying suitable for a political campaign rally. Not only did the president hail his accomplishment in approving a revision of the intentionally ambiguous and thus controversial product of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld years, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of State Clinton, and assorted other heavies broke their collective arms in an orgy of back patting.

Almost before the press releases hit in-boxes around the virtual world, the voices of criticism bayed long and loud. From the Right came the expectable viewing-with-alarm. On the Left heads wagged over one-more-opportunity-missed.

Both Left and Right practiced the fine art of reductionism with exuberance, which assured that each reduced matters to the point of absurdity. The Right was apparently of the view that by not promising the possibility of nuclear retaliation for any attack on the US employing a weapon more deadly than a .18 caliber airgun, Obama has opened us to any number of vile assaults by any number of evil actors. The Left evidently convinced itself that by not renouncing any first use--or perhaps, any use--of nuclear weapons the president has not only abandoned his quest for the unicorn inhabited world-without-nuclear-arms but has left the door to proliferation wide open.

The Earth shaking imaginings of both Left and Right are not borne out by the text of the NPR. A more or less close reading of this document along with its predecessor shows that little of substance has been altered. Arguably those features which constitute a change from the Bush era Review represent a change for the better.

Perhaps more importantly the changes show an understanding of the potency of the latest generation of conventional munitions along with their delivery systems. It also demonstrates a conservative estimate as to the direction and magnitude of projected future improvements in this genera of weapons.

The new NPR also reflects a realistic appreciation of the limits of nuclear utility. It is refreshing to see an explicit recognition that the nuclear arsenal has a very narrowly circumscribed area of efficacy. Other than mutual deterrence among nuclear opponents these very expensive devices and their means of delivery are fundamentally useless.

This is not to say nukes can't kill people and break things in horridly large lots but rather to acknowledge that this quality represents the basis of their uselessness. There is a point where retaliation has effects far worse than those of the initial attack. This point can be marked by a nuclear strike in response to a limited impact attack by, say, chemical or radiological means.

While nuclear munitions have been made in relatively small yields and the delivery systems tweaked greatly in their accuracy, the collateral damage from even a very small, very carefully targeted retaliatory strike would cause such massive deaths and destruction downrange as to cause diplomatic and political consequences of major dimension and nearly infinite duration.

The ruling out of a nuclear usage against a non-nuclear state which was in full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations even if that state launched or facilitated a chemical, radiological, or cybersystem attack is, to use one of George H.W. Bush's favorite words, "prudent." It is equally prudent to give ourselves an exception should the attack be of a biological nature.

BW may be a "weapon of mass destruction" by legal definition but this category of munitions has not yet reached a level of development likely to produce casualties on a scale equivalent to those inflicted by a nuclear weapon. The future of BW is impossible to predict with detailed accuracy, but it is safe to assume the field is open to development, probably rapid development. A declaratory policy which did not explicitly recognize the duty of the US government to evaluate the non-use of nuclear retaliation would be unconscionably vapid.

The new NPR gives the Obama administration at least some of the moral authority it needs coming into the Monster Rally For Non-Proliferation which goes down in a few weeks. In this context it is important to note that the NPR does put an emphasis upon the dangers of proliferation and the necessity for stronger measures to buck up proliferation inhibiting policies and systems as well as better control of all fissionable materials.

When the four dozen or so heads of state or government meet in Washington, the new NPR particularly when linked to the ReSTART with Russia, will position the US well to achieve real agreement on specific, real-world methods to enhance the physical security of nuclear materials and buff up the still too weak systems controlling the movement of dual use technology, particularly to rogue or failing states. The presence of more robust systems monitoring and, when necessary, interdicting the sale of sensitive nuclear related technology a few years ago would have gone a very long way to strangling the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs in the cradle.

These two rogue states have not been given a Get Out Of Jail Free card by the new NPR as has been made abundantly clear by SecDef Gates. While not specifically referenced by Gates, the same applies to India, Pakistan--and Israel. This is a wrinkle of the NPR which deserves close attention as to its implications, particularly as applied to a hypothetical future, Islamist Pakistani government.

No NPR is perfect. This one is most assuredly imperfect in its apparent rejection of any improvement in the aging American nuclear stockpile. Any explicit or implicit renouncing of upgrading nuclear weapons particularly as regards yield, explosive effect focusing, or reliability and security does not serve our national and strategic interests. This is all the more true when both China and Russia are expending significant efforts to improve and modernize their weapons. While the risk of nuclear exchange with either country is and is likely to remain small, the erosion of our capacities which would result necessarily from not seeking improvements in our own serves to weaken the deterrent effect of both our policy and the systems on which it depends.

To answer the question which topped this post: Uncle Sam is not a nuclear wimp--yet. But, any refraining from continued questing for small, more focused, more survivable, more accurate, better secured, enhanced reliability weapons will make sure that the old guy in practice will become just that in a very few years.