Is The Islamist War Getting Wider--And Longer?

The prime difficulty with fighting a limited war in support of policy is that both sides have to agree to keep the show under control.

In the Korean War, which should be seen as the prototype of modern period limited war, that was the case. The US along with the USSR and the PRC wanted to keep the war limited in space and means.

None of the three saw any advantage in widening the war geographically. As a result, the US did not bomb north of the Yalu river even though airbases there were sanctuaries for North Korean and PRC fighters. In an often overlooked quid for the American quo, neither the PRC nor the North Koreans attempted to interfere with the lines of communication between Japan and South Korea.

The Soviet Union may have made a mistake when Joe Stalin gave the thumbs-up to the North Korean plan for a quick war in the South, but it did not worsen the error by seeking horizontal escalation at a place and time of its choosing. The US leadership fretted over the Soviet potential but finally came to the realization that it wasn't going to happen.

Another non-starter was the desire expressed by the American proconsul in Asia, Douglas MacArthur, to either "turn Chaing loose" or to go ahead on our own and dump atom bombs on Chinese targets. MacArthur's vision of both horizontal and vertical escalation across the nuclear threshold had a fair measure of support among some of the more stegosaurian types in Congress, the press, and the public.

The politically beleaguered Truman Administration kept on course. Korea was not a crusade of roll-back. It was a carefully limited war in support of one particular policy--containment.

The Korean War was seen symmetrically by the three major powers. By the tacit agreement of congruent national interests, the war was kept limited in scope, means, and goals.

The current administration has shown itself completely gripless concerning the nature of limited war. Or, if you prefer a more sinister interpretation of the past six years, it has shown itself to have no interest in limiting the wars which we are fighting.

The Geek admits that the second, the sinister, interpretation is implied by the grandiose and completely out-of-touch-with-reality phrase, "global war on terrorism." Even so, the Geek cannot pump up enough paranoia to make the charge.

The invasion of Afghanistan could, charitably, be characterised as a limited war in support of policy. At least the goal was limited: Eliminate the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The geographic scope was limited. The means were limited.

Arguably the goal and means were too limited...

"What's that!" You interrupt.

The Geek believes a case can be made for contending our goals and means were too limited in the beginning of our Afghan adventure. The interlocking, negative goals of eliminating Taliban and al-Qaeda were necessary but not sufficient.

The accomplishment of either or both of the negative goals required the setting and accomplishment of a complementary positive goal. Afghanistan would have to be (re)constituted as a functioning social-economic-political entity. As is so often the case in life, the positive goal would be far harder to accomplish than the negative.

The limitation of means, specifically the refusal of the current administration to deploy sufficient troops, assured that not even the negative goal could be accomplished. The replacement of men by technology, of boots on the ground by Tomahawks from submarines, made sure that both Taliban and al-Qaeda would be damaged but not destroyed.

Machiavelli wisely counseled the Prince not to leave any wounded enemies. The current administration developed and executed a plan of overly limited war on the cheap that created wounded enemies in wholesale lots.

Not only was the attack on Afghanistan too limited in goal and means, it was too limited in scope.

Before you squawk in outrage, let the Geek continue, please. As the desperately flawed endgame strategy of the Reagan Administration demonstrated, it is impossible to achieve anything in Afghanistan without considering Pakistan.

The current administration should have known this. All the information was right there. In the archives as well as in the living memories of individuals who had played key roles in the denouement of the American proxy war in Afghanistan during the Reagan-Bush years.

Taliban was the creation of Pakistan. The Islamists of the Zia al-Huq period in Pakistan made sure that this "Student" organization came into existence; that it was supported; that it gained military ascendancy over rivals in the Afghan internal wars.

There were two reasons for this "tilt to Taliban" approach within the government and military of Pakistan. One was ideological--Islamism to be precise. The other was the perceived need for "strategic depth" to the north and west against the threat to the east and south--India.

The second reason may seem idiotic from the perspective of the US, but it had (and has) power within the Pakistani government and military. This perceived strategic need links directly, even intimately, with the ideological cause.

India has a potent advantage over Pakistan in geographic area, population, and economic strength. In all the features of "hard" power, India has it all over Pakistan. The only possible counter to this advantage was the increase of Pakistan's resources in territory, population, and, most importantly, the social/cultural/political coherence of its human assets.

If Pakistan could extend its sway over not only Afghanistan but potentially beyond that region into the Islamic societies of at least some of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, it could off-set many of the Indian advantages. The off-set could be made even more potent if the Islamic population could be made coherent by ideology--Islamism.

This strain of thinking gave rise to the Pakistani support of Taliban as well as the efforts of A.Q. Khan. The combination of Islamism and nuclear proliferation would do much to assure that Pakistan would have superiority when the bell rang for the next round of Indian-Pakistani fighting. (It might even make war unnecessary as the Indians realized the shift in what the Soviets used to call the "correlation of forces.")

Instead of taking a long, hard, cold look at the realities of Pakistan and its international politics before sending Tomahawks to Kabul, the current administration simply assumed that the new military strongman in Islamabad, General Musharraf, would be a staunch ally in the effort. It kept on with the long standing, and not particularly well advised, policy of tilting toward Pakistan.

Gosh, the Geek knows that the Indian government to say nothing of particular personalities within that government can be extremely annoying. India has a long record of irritating US administrations going all the way back to that of Harry Truman. Just because the lads (and lassies) in New Delhi have been aggravating doesn't mean they are threatening to either the United States or Pakistan.

By overly limiting goals, means, and geographic scope to the war in Afghanistan, the US assured that the war could not remain limited. It would spill over into Pakistan whether we or the government of Pakistan wanted it to. Over time, the spill over would be of such magnitude as to threaten the continued existence of the Musharraf regime.

None of what is happening right now in Pakistan should have come as a surprise to anyone with even a cursory understanding of the region's history over the past fifty years. The way in which the current administration planned and executed its invasion of Afghanistan kicked the rock over the edge. Now we are seeing the avalanche.

Had the US not invaded Iraq it might have been able to retrieve the situation in Afghanistan by putting enough boots on the ground. The Geek believes this would have been unlikely. By the time the current administration would have realised that the "shock and awe" approach to limited, unconventional war didn't work, Taliban and al-Qaeda would have already gone to ground in the Tribal Agency areas of Pakistan.

The choice would have been between sending the new boots to Pakistan or depending on military assistance to the Pakistanis to boost their ability to fight the Islamist groups on their own territory. The highest probability is that the current administration would have taken the latter course.

In short, we would have done in Pakistan what we have been doing. With the same results. Inevitably the war would have widened. And lengthened.

As it was, the current administration opted for horizontal escalation by invading Iraq. Not surprisingly, the opposition, the Islamists, have sought horizontal escalation of their own.

There is no doubt that the war with the Islamists which was forced upon us on 9/11 will widen more. This will occur whether or not the current administration takes military action in Iran.

What's the lesson in all of this?

Simple. Define the political goals, both negative and positive which will bring about a better state of peace from at least the American perspective. Limit the geographic scope of the war by correctly understanding not only the dynamics in play within the target country but between it and other regional actors. Use means that will allow the accomplishment of the goals within the limited geographic scope of the war. Finally, it is necessary that goals and means combine to effectively deny the opposition the opportunity to seek horizontal escalation.

If a country (us in this case) can't define goals, scope, and means such as to assure a better state of peace is achieved rapidly enough to prevent horizontal escalation; if coinciding national interests cannot be at least tacitly enlisted to hinder horizontal escalation, then don't go to war. Find some other way to project national power so that the goal might be achieved.