In both the US and Western Europe a class war in the making. No. It's not the old Marxist thing lurching out of the tomb.
The Geek sees it as conflict between the social/economic/political elite and the hoi polloi, those of lesser income, lesser political potency, lesser social status, lesser inherent organization. A lot of lessers balanced by one "greater." Greater numbers.
A while back the hoi polloi in Ireland outraged the European elites by voting "no" on a proposed new constitution for the European Union. The chattering members of the European elite damned the Irish majority as unenlightened, xenophobic and not knowing what was in its own best interests.
The Euro-litists have gone exoatmospheric now because twenty-nine percent of the vote in this past weekend's Austrian election went to a pair of "far-right, anti-immigration, anti-foreigner" political parties. The Freedom Party took eighteen percent and the younger Movement for Austria's Future won eleven.
The Freedom Party's thirty-nine year old leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, has been deprecatingly characterised throughout the media as a "former dental technician." Presumably this occupational background as opposed to one of "lawyer" makes a person unfit to be taken seriously as a political figure.
Strache is on record as saying, "Vienna must not become Istanbul." The Geek must point out that a few hundred years ago Vienna withstood a prolonged siege and stopped the Ottoman Empire's thrust into Central Europe. The Ottoman Empire, it must be recalled, had its capitol in Istanbul.
The Freedom Party head is also notorious among the Euro-litists for favoring a Ministry of Deportation and a constitutional ban on minarets and for a fondness for wearing cammies whilst toting a firearm in the forests of the Land of Gemutlichkeit. Finally he has been described as a "neo-Nazi, a Holocaust Denier and the new poster boy for Europe's extreme Right."
The Austrian election results in some respects echo the experience in Italy where the Northern League has been successful with the common folk while being damned as xenophobic, Islamophobic and anti-foreigner.
One time rivals Austria and Italy are not alone in the apparent drift to the right among the European states. Much to the dismay of the Euro-litists from the UK to the shores of the Baltic, the hoi polloi are rejecting in ever increasing numbers the elite-approved, politically correct themes of unlimited tolerance and acceptance for immigrants, non-European cultural and social norms and alternative lifestyles.
Looking beyond the usual reasons adduced by the elites for the contrariness of the hoi polloi what might be motivating the new, strong wind from the Right?
There are several historical trajectories in play, aligning in the rejectionist focus.
The first is simply the Nanny State orientation of the Euro-litists. There is (and has been for some while now) a we-know-best attitude arising as an individualist obliterating cloud from both the national governments and the EU establishment in Brussels. As one Irish lady put it when explaining her "no" vote, "We have too much government now. Why should we want more?"
The Nanny State aims at restricting individual choices in the presumed interest of some sort of ill-defined greater good such as reducing health care costs. Or eliminating prejudice. Or assuring that the sensibilities of whatsoever nature of any more-or-less definable sub-culture within the larger society will not under any circumstances be abraded.
Not surprisingly the hoi polloi who are the unconsulted objects of these restrictions has begun to chafe (loudly) under the erosion of individual exercise of individual selected options by the individual.
A second trajectory is the rejection by the Euro-elitists of the notion of a specific national or even regional cultural identity and history worthy of both celebration and protection against erosion. This attitude was famously expressed recently by a Swedish Minister, "Tell me what is Swedish culture?"
People, or at least the hoi polloi, want a sense of belonging, a feeling of familiarity. They want to identify with and be members of a unique culture backed and produced by a specific national history. This reality has been openly cast aside by the elite in its embrace of something called "multi-culturalism" and the siren song of "globalism."
Obviously the people of the hoi polloi reject this contention. They do not see themselves as part of the multi-billion crew members of "spaceship Earth." No. They understand their individual identities as part of a specific linguistic/cultural/ethnic/religious community inhabiting a specific geographical entity bound together by a specific set of historically rooted myths.
There are other trajectories at work but those are the major actors.
The same forces are at work here in the United States. They are pushing and pushing hard to create the same elite-hoi polloi dichotomy here as is being seen in Europe. Perhaps they are pushing even harder here than there.
Why?
The US population has wrestled with a recurrent identity crisis throughout its history. This is the inevitable consequence of being a nation of folks from other places. It is the necessary result of being citizens of an artificial nation.
"Artificial!" You interrupt.
Yes. Artificial. The US and its citizens did not arise organically out of a native soil, melded in its identity over centuries. We are as is so often said, "A nation of immigrants." Our national identity revolves around an intellectual construct: The Constitution.
Being the People of an Artifact, it is not surprising that we have had and continue to have doubts about just who we are. An identity crisis.
Part of the current identity crisis revolves around the conflict between the mythology of the individual and the seemingly reality based requirements of the community, of the nation, of the State. The conflict between the rights and risks of the individual and the costs which exercising those rights and taking those risks might impose upon the rest of society.
"Hey, Geek! Aren't you getting way off your foreign policy and national security message?"
No. Until and unless we here in the US can settle, abort if you will, the growing split between our elites and our hoi polloi, there is no way that we can effectively address the foreign policy and national security challenges that are looming in our immediate future. From the need for energy independence to the costs of global capital movement, from the threat of rogue states and terrorism to the question of "stealth jihad," We the People must decide and know if we speak as one people or two.
One American voice or two competing voices, that of the elite and that of everybody else.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Monday, September 29, 2008
Fantasyland By The Hudson Gets More Fantastic
Once upon a time Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann was a Roman Catholic priest. He was smitten by a very seductive idea--liberation theology. So, the priest became a Left Socialist. Well, actually he became a Castro-leaning Communist. Fr (perhaps Sr would be more appropriate) Brockmann joined the Sandinistas of Nicaragua.
Along with the Ortega brothers Sr Brockmann was a noted adversary of the US during the years of the Reagan presidency. From the perspective of Washington the priest turned Sandinista was a bete noir of the darkest sort. We wanted him dead.
The Reagan Administration did not get its wish. Sr Brockman survived the years of the Contras. He weathered the period of political isolation which followed the end of the nasty little Contra War and the election of an anti-Sandinista government
Proving once again that the Lord works in mysterious ways, the Sandinistas came to power finally in an election that met the usual criteria of seeming to be open, fair and free. Sr Brockmann became Foreign Minister. As such he pursued policies which were not closely aligned with those of the US.
Be that as it may, US administrations had changed. The Soviet Union was of interest only to historians. Communism (and history, but not historians for which the Geek is thankful) was declared dead by American academics and others of the chattering class. Sr Brockmann was neither hated nor desired dead by the denizens living inside the Beltway. Even the neocons had bigger fish to catch and fry in the Mideast.
Now the whims and winds of democratic process have made Sr Brockmann the new President of the UN General Assembly. The priest turned Foreign Minister offered his maiden speech the other day. He proved two things.
You can take the man out of the cassock, but you can't remove the priestly from the man.
Communism may be officially dead, but lambasting capitalist Western pigs (and Israel) is alive, well and a crowd pleaser. Lest you think the Geek gets it wrong, the transcript is available at the UN site. (http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/statements/160908opening63.shtml)
Sr Brockmann makes his sentiments clear and unmistakable. Compared to the new GA President, Senator Obama frankly hates the poor and wretched of the earth.
When Fr/Sr Brockmann gets on a roll he rolls ever faster. Here is one specific case. Food.
Not convinced that the new GA president mouths the same slogans of long dead Kremlin Commissars? Try this. Brockmann's view of two critical internatinal institutions.
Brockman lets go with one barrage of Marxist or quasi-Marxist rhetoric after another. Climate change. Fresh water. Making the UN more "democratic." Assure that the will of "We the Peoples" cannot be ignored by sovereign states. Ya da. Ya da. Ya da.
Then the one time guerrilla fighter cuts to the chase. Terrorism. He has a take on the subject that would have warmed the heart of the Soviets and Castro back in the good ole days.
Just in case the assembled Assembly didn't get his point, the priestly ex-guerrilla spelled it out.
Brockmann decompresses with some of the usual dabba-dabba-do about disarmament and the horrors of the nuclear arsenals now in existence. He neglects to say a word concerning the nuclear weapons being sought but as yet still unmade. Such as the Mahdi Bomb.
After genuflecting before the totems of gender equality and saving the children of the world, Miguel ends on a note that must seem reassuringly familiar to at least some Americans: "Change — real, credible change — is the watchword of the day."
No session of the UN General Assembly has been pleasant for Americans unless they are remarkably masochistic in their high mindedness for a mort of years. This one promises to be not only more of the same but a further descent into the recycled muck of the Cold War, the America-as-Evil-Empire rhetoric of the Sixties, Seventies and Eighties.
Come to think of it, those were Sr Brockmann's years of glory and ambition.
A further thought just struck the Geek. The sentiment of a realpoliker from the Italian Renaissance who wrote, "leave behind no wounded enemy."
It seems like the Reagan Administration did.
Along with the Ortega brothers Sr Brockmann was a noted adversary of the US during the years of the Reagan presidency. From the perspective of Washington the priest turned Sandinista was a bete noir of the darkest sort. We wanted him dead.
The Reagan Administration did not get its wish. Sr Brockman survived the years of the Contras. He weathered the period of political isolation which followed the end of the nasty little Contra War and the election of an anti-Sandinista government
Proving once again that the Lord works in mysterious ways, the Sandinistas came to power finally in an election that met the usual criteria of seeming to be open, fair and free. Sr Brockmann became Foreign Minister. As such he pursued policies which were not closely aligned with those of the US.
Be that as it may, US administrations had changed. The Soviet Union was of interest only to historians. Communism (and history, but not historians for which the Geek is thankful) was declared dead by American academics and others of the chattering class. Sr Brockmann was neither hated nor desired dead by the denizens living inside the Beltway. Even the neocons had bigger fish to catch and fry in the Mideast.
Now the whims and winds of democratic process have made Sr Brockmann the new President of the UN General Assembly. The priest turned Foreign Minister offered his maiden speech the other day. He proved two things.
You can take the man out of the cassock, but you can't remove the priestly from the man.
Communism may be officially dead, but lambasting capitalist Western pigs (and Israel) is alive, well and a crowd pleaser. Lest you think the Geek gets it wrong, the transcript is available at the UN site. (http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/statements/160908opening63.shtml)
Sr Brockmann makes his sentiments clear and unmistakable. Compared to the new GA President, Senator Obama frankly hates the poor and wretched of the earth.
I am aware of the great expectations which the vast majority of the dispossessed inhabitants of our threatened planet have placed in the United Nations to bring them peace, security and to defend their right to life and to full development. We must not fail them. It was most of all for the dispossessed of the world that I took up the challenge of presiding over this sixty-third session of the General Assembly. It is to them — to all our sisters and brothers on this Earth — that I dedicate my presidency. We must unite our efforts, with all the seriousness that the task requires, to meet their expectations. I trust that I can count on all of you to give me your most generous cooperation. On behalf of Nicaragua and the entire Latin American and Caribbean region, my extended homeland, I thank you for your confidence.When you hear words like this the time has come to hang on to your wallet--with both hands.
When Fr/Sr Brockmann gets on a roll he rolls ever faster. Here is one specific case. Food.
At the root of the problem of world hunger is the unequal distribution of purchasing power within and between countries. Rather than concentrate on increasing food production as the single solution, the central focus of our efforts should be on the reduction of the inequalities in our world’s food production system.Apparently Brockmann has a an old-school Marxist conspiracy theory view of global economics or at least the farming part of it.
Not convinced that the new GA president mouths the same slogans of long dead Kremlin Commissars? Try this. Brockmann's view of two critical internatinal institutions.
Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are basically controlled by the United States and Europe. Both institutions have been and continue to be used as instruments of domination. The world resents this and this situation must change. The necessary democratization of these international financial institutions requires a change in the share system and the system for electing the respective Boards of Directors.You bet. Let's see now. Hmm. (Snap fingers.) Why not let the recipient nations control the Boards. That way those greedy donor nations won't be able to be so damn controlling.
Brockman lets go with one barrage of Marxist or quasi-Marxist rhetoric after another. Climate change. Fresh water. Making the UN more "democratic." Assure that the will of "We the Peoples" cannot be ignored by sovereign states. Ya da. Ya da. Ya da.
Then the one time guerrilla fighter cuts to the chase. Terrorism. He has a take on the subject that would have warmed the heart of the Soviets and Castro back in the good ole days.
Terrorism and human rights. Any act of terrorism, whether or not it is committed by a Government, engenders more terrorism. Initiatives to stop this vicious cycle must begin at the level of State terrorism. Otherwise, the official struggle against terrorism perpetrated by individuals or organizations will lack moral authority and will never succeed in curbing what some see as nothing more than a defensive, albeit equally reprehensible, form of terrorism on the part of civil society. The question is how to overcome this vicious cycle of violence; towards that end, terrorism by powerful States against relatively weak States must stop.There it is. The US, the West, Israel are the true terrorists. Unless and until these evil actors stop whatever it is they do that the Brockmanns of the world disapprove of there can be no effective "official struggle" against non-state actors.
Just in case the assembled Assembly didn't get his point, the priestly ex-guerrilla spelled it out.
No State should appropriate the right to decide on its own which States are terrorists, or sponsors of terrorism, and which are not. Less still should States that are guilty of wars of aggression, the worst form of terrorism imaginable, presume to arrogate that right unto themselves, and further, to unilaterally take action against those it has stigmatized.All together now: Spell U-S-A.
Brockmann decompresses with some of the usual dabba-dabba-do about disarmament and the horrors of the nuclear arsenals now in existence. He neglects to say a word concerning the nuclear weapons being sought but as yet still unmade. Such as the Mahdi Bomb.
After genuflecting before the totems of gender equality and saving the children of the world, Miguel ends on a note that must seem reassuringly familiar to at least some Americans: "Change — real, credible change — is the watchword of the day."
No session of the UN General Assembly has been pleasant for Americans unless they are remarkably masochistic in their high mindedness for a mort of years. This one promises to be not only more of the same but a further descent into the recycled muck of the Cold War, the America-as-Evil-Empire rhetoric of the Sixties, Seventies and Eighties.
Come to think of it, those were Sr Brockmann's years of glory and ambition.
A further thought just struck the Geek. The sentiment of a realpoliker from the Italian Renaissance who wrote, "leave behind no wounded enemy."
It seems like the Reagan Administration did.
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Yo, Ho, Ho! It's A Pirate's Life For Me!
The only real difference between coastal fishing and piracy is that being a pirate is a lot less work. At least in the waters off Somalia.
Well, come to think of it there might be a second difference. Being a pirate is a lot safer than fishing. At least in the waters off Somalia.
OK, there's a third difference. Piracy makes a guy a lot more money than fishing. At least in the waters off Somalia.
Really now, you can't beat the pirate's life. Speedboats, automatic weapons, the rush of climbing over the target's rails with a RPG in your mouth. The thrill of victory as you bring the captive ship and hostages back home to Puntland. The flush of cash in your hand as the shipowners pay the ransom.
Oh, yeah, the pirate's life is a grand one. At least in the waters off Somalia.
The Geek can just imagine all the testicle grabbing fun on board the weapons and tank laden ship today. It's got to be jolly time. Just standing there watching the USS Howard cruise impotently a mile or so away. Just a grabbing and a grinning as the small planes fly overhead and the warships stay a respectful distance away.
It's no wonder that piracy is a growth industry in Somalia (and a few other places as well.) It's no surprise that snatching ships on the high seas has been growing at ten percent or more per year.
Heck, piracy is dead easy, immensely profitable and, best of all, absolutely safe.
If the Geek didn't live a thousand miles from the nearest ocean, he'd be off to fly the Jolly Roger himself. It sure beats working for a living.
Of course piracy hasn't always been so safe. At one time not only did merchant ships carry both the means of self-defense but crews who were ready, willing and able to repel borders. At one time the naval forces of the Great Powers swept up any pirate vessels they encountered. At one time apprehended pirates could expect a choking end on a gallows erected at the high tide line.
There are international conventions which both make illegal and provide for enforcement and judicial measures against piracy for gain on the high seas. US law is not at all kind to those committing piracy. (See, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 81, Section 1651, Piracy under law of nations.)
In fact, if you think back far enough, say the early 19th Century, the US waged a quasi-war with pirates in the Western Mediterranean. People died in this undeclared war. Merchant seamen. Naval personnel. Pirates. At the end the pirates were suppressed.
So what's happening today?
There's been a lot of talk. And, the US along with such major naval powers as Denmark formed a naval coalition against piracy in the waters off Somalia.
And, in a really, really pirate scaring move, Yemen announced the formation of a special anti-piracy patrol of 1,600 "specially trained" men using sixteen bought-in-Australia speedboats to curb piracy in the Red Sea and adjacent waters. (http://yemenonline.info/news-918.html)
With the exception of the French who have engaged in two special forces operations to liberate captured French registry recreational vessels and those on board, the Western navies and their civilian masters have been amazingly reluctant to authorize any action against the simple fisherfolk turned maritime muggers.
Perhaps this strange lethargy has been produced by the simple reality that the vast majority of the ships and yachts seized have been flying Third World flags of convenience. Many have been owned by firms willing and able to pay ransom for ships and crews. Third, but not least, most of the hostages have been from Third World states.
Considering that the US is a maritime nation (even if our national flag registry is puny) and considering that the Bush Administration has harped ad nauseum about the need for and desirability of international law and order, why is it that our naval assets in the area are limiting their activities to "monitoring the situation?" Oh, yes, and advising ship owners and operators to hire private security forces. (Perhaps Blackwater needs the business.)
Perhaps the US and other Western maritime powers are inhibited by the fear of actually killing some of these poor, scrawny Somalians who are simply seeking to make their way in a harsh world. Then there is the corollary: apprehension of crew members being caught in the crossfire.
One way to discourage piracy is to make the occupation inherently risky. That implies proactive measures. Stop the speedboats or the mother ships and arrest those on board. If they resist, shoot back--with lethal intent. The US Code makes it clear. Those suspected of piracy and brought before a US Federal Court can be tried and convicted.
As a less lethal alternative, the US and other countries can establish convoy rendezvous points and routes. This might slow maritime trade marginally and increase some costs a tad, but it would reduce piracy as an attractive alternative to fishing.
These options and others like them should be considered--quickly.
Why, you ask?
Because the Russians are coming. The Kremlin has indicated that their on route destroyer will operate independently. And, the Russians have always shown a willingness and ability to act robustly in defense of their own national interests, however loosely defined.
Remember that Ukrainian ship on which pirates are grabbing their balls and sticking out their tongues at the USS Howard has three Russians on board. Also, remember that Russia has interests in play regarding the Ukraine.
It could prove interesting for the Pirates of Puntland.
Well, come to think of it there might be a second difference. Being a pirate is a lot safer than fishing. At least in the waters off Somalia.
OK, there's a third difference. Piracy makes a guy a lot more money than fishing. At least in the waters off Somalia.
Really now, you can't beat the pirate's life. Speedboats, automatic weapons, the rush of climbing over the target's rails with a RPG in your mouth. The thrill of victory as you bring the captive ship and hostages back home to Puntland. The flush of cash in your hand as the shipowners pay the ransom.
Oh, yeah, the pirate's life is a grand one. At least in the waters off Somalia.
The Geek can just imagine all the testicle grabbing fun on board the weapons and tank laden ship today. It's got to be jolly time. Just standing there watching the USS Howard cruise impotently a mile or so away. Just a grabbing and a grinning as the small planes fly overhead and the warships stay a respectful distance away.
It's no wonder that piracy is a growth industry in Somalia (and a few other places as well.) It's no surprise that snatching ships on the high seas has been growing at ten percent or more per year.
Heck, piracy is dead easy, immensely profitable and, best of all, absolutely safe.
If the Geek didn't live a thousand miles from the nearest ocean, he'd be off to fly the Jolly Roger himself. It sure beats working for a living.
Of course piracy hasn't always been so safe. At one time not only did merchant ships carry both the means of self-defense but crews who were ready, willing and able to repel borders. At one time the naval forces of the Great Powers swept up any pirate vessels they encountered. At one time apprehended pirates could expect a choking end on a gallows erected at the high tide line.
There are international conventions which both make illegal and provide for enforcement and judicial measures against piracy for gain on the high seas. US law is not at all kind to those committing piracy. (See, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 81, Section 1651, Piracy under law of nations.)
It may not be hanging in chains on Execution Dock, but it isn't a nice prospect either. In years gone by, the US Navy along with the Coast Guard had a leading role in suppressing piracy.Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.
In fact, if you think back far enough, say the early 19th Century, the US waged a quasi-war with pirates in the Western Mediterranean. People died in this undeclared war. Merchant seamen. Naval personnel. Pirates. At the end the pirates were suppressed.
So what's happening today?
There's been a lot of talk. And, the US along with such major naval powers as Denmark formed a naval coalition against piracy in the waters off Somalia.
And, in a really, really pirate scaring move, Yemen announced the formation of a special anti-piracy patrol of 1,600 "specially trained" men using sixteen bought-in-Australia speedboats to curb piracy in the Red Sea and adjacent waters. (http://yemenonline.info/news-918.html)
With the exception of the French who have engaged in two special forces operations to liberate captured French registry recreational vessels and those on board, the Western navies and their civilian masters have been amazingly reluctant to authorize any action against the simple fisherfolk turned maritime muggers.
Perhaps this strange lethargy has been produced by the simple reality that the vast majority of the ships and yachts seized have been flying Third World flags of convenience. Many have been owned by firms willing and able to pay ransom for ships and crews. Third, but not least, most of the hostages have been from Third World states.
Considering that the US is a maritime nation (even if our national flag registry is puny) and considering that the Bush Administration has harped ad nauseum about the need for and desirability of international law and order, why is it that our naval assets in the area are limiting their activities to "monitoring the situation?" Oh, yes, and advising ship owners and operators to hire private security forces. (Perhaps Blackwater needs the business.)
Perhaps the US and other Western maritime powers are inhibited by the fear of actually killing some of these poor, scrawny Somalians who are simply seeking to make their way in a harsh world. Then there is the corollary: apprehension of crew members being caught in the crossfire.
One way to discourage piracy is to make the occupation inherently risky. That implies proactive measures. Stop the speedboats or the mother ships and arrest those on board. If they resist, shoot back--with lethal intent. The US Code makes it clear. Those suspected of piracy and brought before a US Federal Court can be tried and convicted.
As a less lethal alternative, the US and other countries can establish convoy rendezvous points and routes. This might slow maritime trade marginally and increase some costs a tad, but it would reduce piracy as an attractive alternative to fishing.
These options and others like them should be considered--quickly.
Why, you ask?
Because the Russians are coming. The Kremlin has indicated that their on route destroyer will operate independently. And, the Russians have always shown a willingness and ability to act robustly in defense of their own national interests, however loosely defined.
Remember that Ukrainian ship on which pirates are grabbing their balls and sticking out their tongues at the USS Howard has three Russians on board. Also, remember that Russia has interests in play regarding the Ukraine.
It could prove interesting for the Pirates of Puntland.
Saturday, September 27, 2008
McCain's Right (Sort Of) Obama's Right (Sort Of)
The Geek is normally not of a mind to watch candidates' debates. They tend to be pre-scripted posture sessions of little substance. He made an exception this time. Guess there was some eagerness to see if either man had a good grip on the upcoming foreign policy presidency. Or would both guys be so wrapped up in the current financial sector "emergency" that foreign affairs would be covered with brief campaign boiler plate.
There was substance. Interestingly, both men were equally right and wrong on the challenges of Iran and trans-national terrorism. Of course each man was right in a different way The same is true with how each was wrong.
Spell it out, Geek. You're losing me.
OK, bunky, here's the way the Geek saw it.
Obama got it right when he said that Afghanistan and Pakistan constituted the "central front" of the anti-terrorism war.
McCain was wrong as a cat barking when he dissented, averring that Iraq deserved pride of place.
Obama saw the Iraq invasion as a dangerous and counterproductive diversion of US resources and political will. (The Geek's summary of what he believes Obama was trying to articulate.)
McCain is gripless when he avers, as he did last night, that the Iraq invasion constituted the critical component of the "war on terror." He was as out to lunch as the neocon ninnies of the Bush Administration when he said five and more years ago that the war in Iraq would be short, sweet and low cost.
Obama was wrong on the "surge" in Iraq and McCain was right. That is irrelevant. What is relevant is that there would have been no need for a "surge" if we hadn't invaded Iraq.
Neither man squarely acknowledged that the US and its allies were on the verge of losing the war with Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. If anything the military situation in Afghanistan today is worse from our perspective than the way the war in Iraq was going just before the "surge " commenced.
There are several reasons for this unpleasant reality, none of which were even indirectly referenced by McCain or Obama. The first was the dilatory way in which the US and its allies initially prosecuted operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda. The second was the failure to properly consider the actual relationship between elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services with Taliban and al-Qaeda. The third was the failure to take proper account of the ethno-linguistic and religious nature of the human terrain straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In the what-we-should-do-next department, Obama was dead perfect wrong. The initiation of more "clandestine" cross-border operations by the US would be utterly counterproductive. The time for that option expired months--if not years--ago.
Unilateral actions now would both further alienate and destabilize the Government of Pakistan (GOP)to say nothing of strengthen the hand of the indigenous Pakistani Islamists. It would also undercut the position of the various tribal khans within the FATA whose lives and hold on power are increasingly threatened by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
As these khans increasingly recognise the danger they and their tribes are in they will be more willing to mobilize the tribal forces and take the war to the Islamists. These khans and the trigger-pullers they can muster are the FATA-land equivalent of the Concerned Local Citizens and Awakening Councils of Anbar and other provinces in Iraq. Unilateral US action whether by ground or air will erode--perhaps fatally--this indigenous option.
While it would be emotionally satisfying for US commandos to winkle Osama bin Ladin out of his presumed FATA-land cave, it is a highly unlikely eventuality. To make the attempt (presumably repeatedly until success was obtained) as Senator Obama stated would be to undertake a fools mission, a forlorn hope.
On the Pakistan issue, Senator McCain got it right. We must work with the Pakistanis, frustrating and irritating as that may be. The Geek agrees that we wasted the ten or so gigabucks funneled to Pakistan over the past seven years as a result of the Bush Administration's constitutional unwillingness to accept that the money would be diverted from its intended counterinsurgency and counterterror usages to big ticket items directed at India.
But conditions in Pakistan have changed in recent months. This includes the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. The civilian government of Pakistan must have seen it as a wake up call of unmistakable nature. Not only are their (to quote a line from Blazing Saddles) "phony-baloney jobs" in danger, so also were their lives.
While the GOP is undoubtedly overstating the body count resulting from the recent military operations in FATA , there is no denying that the war is being carried to the border sanctuaries at long last. American cooperation, understanding and discretion can not but assist this long overdue process.
On Iran there is no doubt that Senator McCain had it all over Senator Obama in the who-has-a-firmer-grip department. The Geek can write this even though admitting that it rankled him when McCain overly emphasized the Iranian "existential" threat to Israel. The Geek had a great desire to scream at the screen, "You're running for POTUS not Prime Minister of Israel.
The position of Senator Obama (oft restated) of negotiations without preconditions is, as Senator McCain made clear, "naive" and "dangerous." However, Senator McCain's position is not without dangers as well.
Unless Senator McCain can put a lot of blue sky between his view of US-Russian relations and the isolate-the-bastards position espoused by Dick Cheney and other neocons, there is no hope of making the current (or projected) sanctions effective.
Even far more biting sanctions will, in the Geek's estimate, prove unlikely to modify Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Tehran has invested too much of its political capital as well as Iran's resources in the project.
The world (including Israel) may well have to learn to live with a nuclear weapons equipped Iran. Here again close collaborative efforts between the US and Russia are essential. If Iran's mullahs were to be presented by both the US and Russia extending its nuclear umbrella over the Mideast and Persian Gulf states, the probability of deterrence being effective would be increased by orders of magnitude.
Unfortunately Senator McCain gave no evidence last night of seeking to distance himself from those in the Bush Administration. He made no mention of how he would seek collaboration with the Kremlin. That was a major malfunction by the Senator.
The Geek was surprised that neither candidate (nor the moderator for that matter) mentioned the other nuclear elephant in the room. North Korea.
The Hermit Kingdom of the North is a far more clear and present danger to US national and strategic interests than is Iran. The regime there is even more resistant to sanctions and other niceties of diplomacy than is the mullahocracy in Tehran. The North Koreans have shown that they have mastered the implosion bomb. They have thirty of more kilos of Pu239 on hand with more en route from the spent fuel rods extracted earlier from their Yongbyon reactor.
The North Korean reality is an elephant that can be ignored only at great risk. The Senators should have at least genuflected before that fact.
The night showed that We the People have a hair raising choice. Ignorance and inexperience. Or knowledge, experience and a neocon predilection.
Lord help us.
There was substance. Interestingly, both men were equally right and wrong on the challenges of Iran and trans-national terrorism. Of course each man was right in a different way The same is true with how each was wrong.
Spell it out, Geek. You're losing me.
OK, bunky, here's the way the Geek saw it.
Obama got it right when he said that Afghanistan and Pakistan constituted the "central front" of the anti-terrorism war.
McCain was wrong as a cat barking when he dissented, averring that Iraq deserved pride of place.
Obama saw the Iraq invasion as a dangerous and counterproductive diversion of US resources and political will. (The Geek's summary of what he believes Obama was trying to articulate.)
McCain is gripless when he avers, as he did last night, that the Iraq invasion constituted the critical component of the "war on terror." He was as out to lunch as the neocon ninnies of the Bush Administration when he said five and more years ago that the war in Iraq would be short, sweet and low cost.
Obama was wrong on the "surge" in Iraq and McCain was right. That is irrelevant. What is relevant is that there would have been no need for a "surge" if we hadn't invaded Iraq.
Neither man squarely acknowledged that the US and its allies were on the verge of losing the war with Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. If anything the military situation in Afghanistan today is worse from our perspective than the way the war in Iraq was going just before the "surge " commenced.
There are several reasons for this unpleasant reality, none of which were even indirectly referenced by McCain or Obama. The first was the dilatory way in which the US and its allies initially prosecuted operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda. The second was the failure to properly consider the actual relationship between elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services with Taliban and al-Qaeda. The third was the failure to take proper account of the ethno-linguistic and religious nature of the human terrain straddling the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
In the what-we-should-do-next department, Obama was dead perfect wrong. The initiation of more "clandestine" cross-border operations by the US would be utterly counterproductive. The time for that option expired months--if not years--ago.
Unilateral actions now would both further alienate and destabilize the Government of Pakistan (GOP)to say nothing of strengthen the hand of the indigenous Pakistani Islamists. It would also undercut the position of the various tribal khans within the FATA whose lives and hold on power are increasingly threatened by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
As these khans increasingly recognise the danger they and their tribes are in they will be more willing to mobilize the tribal forces and take the war to the Islamists. These khans and the trigger-pullers they can muster are the FATA-land equivalent of the Concerned Local Citizens and Awakening Councils of Anbar and other provinces in Iraq. Unilateral US action whether by ground or air will erode--perhaps fatally--this indigenous option.
While it would be emotionally satisfying for US commandos to winkle Osama bin Ladin out of his presumed FATA-land cave, it is a highly unlikely eventuality. To make the attempt (presumably repeatedly until success was obtained) as Senator Obama stated would be to undertake a fools mission, a forlorn hope.
On the Pakistan issue, Senator McCain got it right. We must work with the Pakistanis, frustrating and irritating as that may be. The Geek agrees that we wasted the ten or so gigabucks funneled to Pakistan over the past seven years as a result of the Bush Administration's constitutional unwillingness to accept that the money would be diverted from its intended counterinsurgency and counterterror usages to big ticket items directed at India.
But conditions in Pakistan have changed in recent months. This includes the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. The civilian government of Pakistan must have seen it as a wake up call of unmistakable nature. Not only are their (to quote a line from Blazing Saddles) "phony-baloney jobs" in danger, so also were their lives.
While the GOP is undoubtedly overstating the body count resulting from the recent military operations in FATA , there is no denying that the war is being carried to the border sanctuaries at long last. American cooperation, understanding and discretion can not but assist this long overdue process.
On Iran there is no doubt that Senator McCain had it all over Senator Obama in the who-has-a-firmer-grip department. The Geek can write this even though admitting that it rankled him when McCain overly emphasized the Iranian "existential" threat to Israel. The Geek had a great desire to scream at the screen, "You're running for POTUS not Prime Minister of Israel.
The position of Senator Obama (oft restated) of negotiations without preconditions is, as Senator McCain made clear, "naive" and "dangerous." However, Senator McCain's position is not without dangers as well.
Unless Senator McCain can put a lot of blue sky between his view of US-Russian relations and the isolate-the-bastards position espoused by Dick Cheney and other neocons, there is no hope of making the current (or projected) sanctions effective.
Even far more biting sanctions will, in the Geek's estimate, prove unlikely to modify Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Tehran has invested too much of its political capital as well as Iran's resources in the project.
The world (including Israel) may well have to learn to live with a nuclear weapons equipped Iran. Here again close collaborative efforts between the US and Russia are essential. If Iran's mullahs were to be presented by both the US and Russia extending its nuclear umbrella over the Mideast and Persian Gulf states, the probability of deterrence being effective would be increased by orders of magnitude.
Unfortunately Senator McCain gave no evidence last night of seeking to distance himself from those in the Bush Administration. He made no mention of how he would seek collaboration with the Kremlin. That was a major malfunction by the Senator.
The Geek was surprised that neither candidate (nor the moderator for that matter) mentioned the other nuclear elephant in the room. North Korea.
The Hermit Kingdom of the North is a far more clear and present danger to US national and strategic interests than is Iran. The regime there is even more resistant to sanctions and other niceties of diplomacy than is the mullahocracy in Tehran. The North Koreans have shown that they have mastered the implosion bomb. They have thirty of more kilos of Pu239 on hand with more en route from the spent fuel rods extracted earlier from their Yongbyon reactor.
The North Korean reality is an elephant that can be ignored only at great risk. The Senators should have at least genuflected before that fact.
The night showed that We the People have a hair raising choice. Ignorance and inexperience. Or knowledge, experience and a neocon predilection.
Lord help us.
Friday, September 26, 2008
Whatever Happened To The Punitive Expedition?
What a great old term--punitive expedition. Kind of makes you think of Queen Victoria's pith helmeted boys heading up some African river or Northwest Frontier canyon to teach some uppity indige types a lesson in proper manners. Or, perhaps the US cavalry riding on out to slap some pesky redskins back onto the reservation.
Of course punitive expeditions, even if not under that quaintly accurate name, are still alive and well today. They have to be. Reality demands that,
What does a nation do when the sanctions don't work? When diplomacy fails? When patience runs out? When the nuisance refuses to abate itself?
Americans shy away from punitive expeditions under any name. Even if the neocon ninnies were not calling the play during the post-9/11 months We the People wouldn't have felt at all comfortable with simply going into Afghanistan on the ground and in the air with the goal of killing as many al-Qaeda leaders and adherents as possible, and, along the way, doing the same to the maximum number of Taliban.
We could have administered what used to be called "condign punishment" to both the al-Qaeda mass murderers and their Taliban protectors. The outrage of 9/11 assured both political will and popular support for a punitive expedition--even one which would have perforce resulted in significant civilian casualties.
Absent the neocons and their strange delusion that fully functioning, pluralistic democracy and free enterprise can be installed via "shock and awe," American sensibilities would have demanded that we do more than simply vanquish the sinner. Our unique view of the world would have required that we raise the prostrate sinner to his feet, dust him off, offer him new clothes and abjure him to go and sin no more.
We the People would have required nation building as the ultimate goal no matter how unrealistic that might be. And, no matter how inappropriate a role for our military it might be.
Thus the neocon ninnies were aided and abetted in their flights of fancy by the moral sensitivities of the American public with the result that we are still in Afghanistan more than six years later. Still in Afghanistan and currently facing defeat. High price to pay for ignoring the plausibility and realism of a purely punitive expedition.
If the crime is great enough as it was on 9/11, a country may prosecute a punitive operation with support by both its domestic population and that of the political elites abroad. If the crime is small--a misdemeanor by international standards--then a country pursues punitive action at great peril to its global reputation and standing.
Israel discovered the reality that the crime must merit the punishment during its ill-considered expedition into Lebanon in summer 2006. The crime was the kidnapping of two IDF members by Hezbollah. Aggravating circumstances were provided by occasional rockets incoming from southern Lebanon.
The Israeli punitive expedition which included massive air strikes on infrastructure targets (what nuclear strategists called "counter-value targeting") meshed with both air and ground operations purportedly directed against Hezbollah arms dumps and personnel but actually rather indiscriminately applied to anyone and everyone in southern Lebanon. With the noteworthy exception of the United States, the global response to the disproportionate Israeli action was condemnation.
The crime did not merit the punishment.
Ultimately Israel suffered the greatest military and diplomatic defeat in its history. Hezbollah emerged as the clear winner by any measure which might be applied. Also winning in the contest were the mullahocracy in Tehran and the hardest hardliners within the Palestinian community and the Arab population generally.
(It should be mentioned that the US was listed, not among the "winners" but along with Israel in the "loser" category.)
We have to get a grip on the concept of punitive expeditions now more than ever since high on the list of foreign policy challenges faceing us is the matter of nuclear proliferation. Not only is Iran on the "path" (to quote Dr ElBaradei) but North Korea is apparently getting back in the plutonium production business.
While the New Hermit Kingdom of the North may further impoverish its citizens by extracting more plutonium from the several thousand fuel rods taken from its (perhaps only temporarily) decommissioned reactor, it can add several more kilos to its store of Pu239. In the mind of Kim jong Il or the minds of North Korea's very hardline military commanders, the risks are far outweighed by the potential benefits.
Six or eight Nagasaki size and type bombs when coupled with North Korea's 1.2 million man army represents a very large diplomatic blackmail potential. Cowing South Korea into compliance with the North's policy dictates might move from the thinkable to the doable.
If anything, a North Korean nuclear threat represents far more of a clear and present danger to US strategic interests than does the potential (within as few as six to twelve months) Iranian Mahidi bomb.
Given the low likelihood of sanctions and diplomatic palaver stimulating a sudden, genuine desire on the part of the Hermit Kingdom of the North to surrender its plutonium to some other, more responsible custodian, what should the US do next? (The Geek recommends that as a question to be posed at the foreign policy debate between Senators McCain and Obama.)
One option is a air delivered punitive expedition. Leaving aside the very real question, "Will it work?" the nature of the crime needs to be explored.
Has Pyongyang's intransigence reached a level such that either world or US domestic opinion would accept a series of strikes which, if successful, carry the risk of liberating a large amount of radioactivity to the environment?
(While considering that question, keep in mind that the jet stream blows from west to east. Then look at a world map.)
Rogue states and trans-national terrorist groups are not going to evaporate simply because we would find that convenient. As a result, the punitive expedition (however one might like to cosmetically cover the harsh term) must and will remain an option for the US and other states. This means we must have a serious conversation about both "crime" and "punishment."
This means in turn that the often criticised Bush Doctrine must be revisited as it was not so much inherently incorrect or unjustified as it was poorly thought through and presented. We must have not only the right of self-defense but also a properly grounded right to abate threats and punish those who threaten.
Of course punitive expeditions, even if not under that quaintly accurate name, are still alive and well today. They have to be. Reality demands that,
What does a nation do when the sanctions don't work? When diplomacy fails? When patience runs out? When the nuisance refuses to abate itself?
Americans shy away from punitive expeditions under any name. Even if the neocon ninnies were not calling the play during the post-9/11 months We the People wouldn't have felt at all comfortable with simply going into Afghanistan on the ground and in the air with the goal of killing as many al-Qaeda leaders and adherents as possible, and, along the way, doing the same to the maximum number of Taliban.
We could have administered what used to be called "condign punishment" to both the al-Qaeda mass murderers and their Taliban protectors. The outrage of 9/11 assured both political will and popular support for a punitive expedition--even one which would have perforce resulted in significant civilian casualties.
Absent the neocons and their strange delusion that fully functioning, pluralistic democracy and free enterprise can be installed via "shock and awe," American sensibilities would have demanded that we do more than simply vanquish the sinner. Our unique view of the world would have required that we raise the prostrate sinner to his feet, dust him off, offer him new clothes and abjure him to go and sin no more.
We the People would have required nation building as the ultimate goal no matter how unrealistic that might be. And, no matter how inappropriate a role for our military it might be.
Thus the neocon ninnies were aided and abetted in their flights of fancy by the moral sensitivities of the American public with the result that we are still in Afghanistan more than six years later. Still in Afghanistan and currently facing defeat. High price to pay for ignoring the plausibility and realism of a purely punitive expedition.
If the crime is great enough as it was on 9/11, a country may prosecute a punitive operation with support by both its domestic population and that of the political elites abroad. If the crime is small--a misdemeanor by international standards--then a country pursues punitive action at great peril to its global reputation and standing.
Israel discovered the reality that the crime must merit the punishment during its ill-considered expedition into Lebanon in summer 2006. The crime was the kidnapping of two IDF members by Hezbollah. Aggravating circumstances were provided by occasional rockets incoming from southern Lebanon.
The Israeli punitive expedition which included massive air strikes on infrastructure targets (what nuclear strategists called "counter-value targeting") meshed with both air and ground operations purportedly directed against Hezbollah arms dumps and personnel but actually rather indiscriminately applied to anyone and everyone in southern Lebanon. With the noteworthy exception of the United States, the global response to the disproportionate Israeli action was condemnation.
The crime did not merit the punishment.
Ultimately Israel suffered the greatest military and diplomatic defeat in its history. Hezbollah emerged as the clear winner by any measure which might be applied. Also winning in the contest were the mullahocracy in Tehran and the hardest hardliners within the Palestinian community and the Arab population generally.
(It should be mentioned that the US was listed, not among the "winners" but along with Israel in the "loser" category.)
We have to get a grip on the concept of punitive expeditions now more than ever since high on the list of foreign policy challenges faceing us is the matter of nuclear proliferation. Not only is Iran on the "path" (to quote Dr ElBaradei) but North Korea is apparently getting back in the plutonium production business.
While the New Hermit Kingdom of the North may further impoverish its citizens by extracting more plutonium from the several thousand fuel rods taken from its (perhaps only temporarily) decommissioned reactor, it can add several more kilos to its store of Pu239. In the mind of Kim jong Il or the minds of North Korea's very hardline military commanders, the risks are far outweighed by the potential benefits.
Six or eight Nagasaki size and type bombs when coupled with North Korea's 1.2 million man army represents a very large diplomatic blackmail potential. Cowing South Korea into compliance with the North's policy dictates might move from the thinkable to the doable.
If anything, a North Korean nuclear threat represents far more of a clear and present danger to US strategic interests than does the potential (within as few as six to twelve months) Iranian Mahidi bomb.
Given the low likelihood of sanctions and diplomatic palaver stimulating a sudden, genuine desire on the part of the Hermit Kingdom of the North to surrender its plutonium to some other, more responsible custodian, what should the US do next? (The Geek recommends that as a question to be posed at the foreign policy debate between Senators McCain and Obama.)
One option is a air delivered punitive expedition. Leaving aside the very real question, "Will it work?" the nature of the crime needs to be explored.
Has Pyongyang's intransigence reached a level such that either world or US domestic opinion would accept a series of strikes which, if successful, carry the risk of liberating a large amount of radioactivity to the environment?
(While considering that question, keep in mind that the jet stream blows from west to east. Then look at a world map.)
Rogue states and trans-national terrorist groups are not going to evaporate simply because we would find that convenient. As a result, the punitive expedition (however one might like to cosmetically cover the harsh term) must and will remain an option for the US and other states. This means we must have a serious conversation about both "crime" and "punishment."
This means in turn that the often criticised Bush Doctrine must be revisited as it was not so much inherently incorrect or unjustified as it was poorly thought through and presented. We must have not only the right of self-defense but also a properly grounded right to abate threats and punish those who threaten.
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Join The Navy!
Since the Monster Debate on Foreign Policy may be postponed so that the candidates may posture appealingly next to the Wall Street Emergency Rescue and CEO Reduced Compensation Act of 2008, there is a little time for one or both contenders to reconsider his stance on US policy in the Mideast. In the (remote) hope that reevaluation might take place, the Geek has a modest proposal or two.
The United States is and always has been a maritime power. Maritime powers have an enormous advantage over continental powers such as Germany or Russia. Control and use of the sea allows for timely force projection without overseas bases.
This means that a maritime power can practice balance of power politics. The British played that game with great effect during the 19th Century. The US dabbled with the idea off and on during some of the 20th. The time has come for us to play the game with cold calculation.
What has been the historic US interest in the Mideast and Persian Gulf?
No. Not the oil. Or at least not the oil in and of itself.
Our interest since the middle of World War II has been assuring that no single nation controls all or most of the region's oil. For nearly sixty years the US employed economic, military assistance, diplomacy and covert actions to achieve the policy goal.
The Rapid Deployment Force was conceptualised in the wake of the Iranian Revolution as a way of continuing to assure the oil region did not fall under a single country's hegemony. That same reason underscored the (in)famous "tilt to Iraq" during the Iraq-Iran War.
The policy requirement of preventing a regional hegemon from emerging prompted the massive deployment of US and other forces to Saudi Arabia in the run up to the Kuwait War.
Had the foreign forces left the Arabian Peninsula in the wake of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, a major motive for Osama bin Ladin's 1996 "Declaration of War" against the US would have been undercut. Unfortunately that didn't happen. Although the massive American presence in Saudi Arabia was removed, the relocation of our bases to the UAE was a classic case of "too little, too late."
A strong argument may be made that the No Fly Zone in southern Iraq could have been adequately enforced by aircraft from naval carriers operating over the horizon in international waters. There was no crying military need for a large US presence anywhere in the Peninsula. Even the highly unlikely possibility of a resurgent and aggressive Saddam would have been detected in time for sea based, invisible force to be brought to bear.
With that as background, it's time to get a grip on the options now available.
The first option is to get out of Iraq. The US might take the Iraqi government and its delusions of adequacy seriously. The Iraqi politically articulate elite doesn't want our forces in its country now that the noise level has been reduced to an acceptable level.
Fine. It is no longer possible for the US to "not lose" militarily in Iraq. It is most assuredly not our responsibility to make certain that the Iraqis can do a passable job of running their own country.
We have accomplished our minimum necessary policy goal. We have not lost. The black turbans could not and did not defeat us either militarily or by enervation of our political will to continue the fight. Now it is up to the autocthones. The Iraqis in all their varied sectarian and linguistic stripes have to decide how the show is going to be run.
As long as we follow a balance of power approach, our basic policy of assuring open access to the only thing in the region that matters--oil--is preserved. We can do that best by remembering that we are a maritime power.
A second requirement of a new, balance of power oriented policy is to constructively engage Iran. The Iranian regime(s) have shown a willingness to do this, most recently in 2003. It wouldn't have been easy to arrange an all-inclusive bargain then and it will be immensely more difficult now, but that is no reason not to go ahead with the effort.
This approach does not imply an Obama-esque "negotiations without preconditions." Rather it relies on old style diplomacy with the only wrinkle that the US will have to eat some crow to jump start the process. For those who argue that we can't deal with Tehran while the mullahocracy supports Hezbollah, aids black turbans in Iraq, and slips assistance to Taliban, the Geek replies that history is the guide.
Remember that the US talked openly and repeatedly with the Soviet Union--to include a Summit Meeting in 1967--even though the Soviets were sending weapons by the shipload to North Vietnam and these weapons did in fact kill and wound Americans. (The Geek has a personal involvement in the latter part of this reality and carries fragments of Russian origin metal in his body to this day.)
Sure, an effort at constructive engagement might not pay off now after years of sanctions and saber waving, but the risks are far smaller and much more easily controlled than those attendant upon the military option. And, the benefits are far greater.
Beyond that, should force be necessary, the US possesses the over-the-horizon platforms to assure the rubble formerly called Tehran to bounce past the tropopause. Still, tough talk, tough bargaining is to be preferred over tough action.
Then there is Israel.
The seemingly eternal problem of Israel.
The time is long past for the US to treat Israel with the same respect, dignity and self-interested basis as it treats all other countries.
Yes, the US should be every bit as concerned with the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Israel as it that of France, Germany, Canada or Georgia.
Yes, the US should have all the normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel that it does with other countries.
All the normal features of relations the US has with other democratic, more or less pluralistic regimes should and must exist with respect to Israel.
But no more than that.
No more excessive military aid. No more excessive diplomatic and political support. No more foreign aid. (Israel is by all normal criteria a developed nation and needs foreign aid no more than does Canada or Sweden.)
For our own national interest we must give the Government of Israel (GOI) a choice regarding the West Bank and Gaza. Choice one: negotiate a two state solution immediately and in good faith with our support. Choice two: continue as an oppressive colonial power in the West Bank and Gaza without our support.
Again, the US has the over-the-horizon capacity to assure Israel's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. By giving the GOI the stark choice outlined above, we are not withdrawing from effective overwatch and protection.
Will this, any of the foregoing realpolitik approaches be embraced by either of the two major candidates?
No.
John McCain has openly embraced the neocon perspective and his campaign advisers include people such as Max Boot who have learned nothing from the greatest US foreign policy debacle in history and are eager to have the Israeli tail wag the dog of US policy. Senator Obama is a neophyte in foreign policy which makes him captive of the same Democratic movers and shakers who have followed the Israel uber alles view for more than forty years.
Also, the Geek is well aware of the Israel Lobby which, like the China Lobby of sixty and more years ago, has shown itself both willing and able to inflict massive damage on the interests of the United States in order to further the interests of another country.
Lord, help us.
The United States is and always has been a maritime power. Maritime powers have an enormous advantage over continental powers such as Germany or Russia. Control and use of the sea allows for timely force projection without overseas bases.
This means that a maritime power can practice balance of power politics. The British played that game with great effect during the 19th Century. The US dabbled with the idea off and on during some of the 20th. The time has come for us to play the game with cold calculation.
What has been the historic US interest in the Mideast and Persian Gulf?
No. Not the oil. Or at least not the oil in and of itself.
Our interest since the middle of World War II has been assuring that no single nation controls all or most of the region's oil. For nearly sixty years the US employed economic, military assistance, diplomacy and covert actions to achieve the policy goal.
The Rapid Deployment Force was conceptualised in the wake of the Iranian Revolution as a way of continuing to assure the oil region did not fall under a single country's hegemony. That same reason underscored the (in)famous "tilt to Iraq" during the Iraq-Iran War.
The policy requirement of preventing a regional hegemon from emerging prompted the massive deployment of US and other forces to Saudi Arabia in the run up to the Kuwait War.
Had the foreign forces left the Arabian Peninsula in the wake of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, a major motive for Osama bin Ladin's 1996 "Declaration of War" against the US would have been undercut. Unfortunately that didn't happen. Although the massive American presence in Saudi Arabia was removed, the relocation of our bases to the UAE was a classic case of "too little, too late."
A strong argument may be made that the No Fly Zone in southern Iraq could have been adequately enforced by aircraft from naval carriers operating over the horizon in international waters. There was no crying military need for a large US presence anywhere in the Peninsula. Even the highly unlikely possibility of a resurgent and aggressive Saddam would have been detected in time for sea based, invisible force to be brought to bear.
With that as background, it's time to get a grip on the options now available.
The first option is to get out of Iraq. The US might take the Iraqi government and its delusions of adequacy seriously. The Iraqi politically articulate elite doesn't want our forces in its country now that the noise level has been reduced to an acceptable level.
Fine. It is no longer possible for the US to "not lose" militarily in Iraq. It is most assuredly not our responsibility to make certain that the Iraqis can do a passable job of running their own country.
We have accomplished our minimum necessary policy goal. We have not lost. The black turbans could not and did not defeat us either militarily or by enervation of our political will to continue the fight. Now it is up to the autocthones. The Iraqis in all their varied sectarian and linguistic stripes have to decide how the show is going to be run.
As long as we follow a balance of power approach, our basic policy of assuring open access to the only thing in the region that matters--oil--is preserved. We can do that best by remembering that we are a maritime power.
A second requirement of a new, balance of power oriented policy is to constructively engage Iran. The Iranian regime(s) have shown a willingness to do this, most recently in 2003. It wouldn't have been easy to arrange an all-inclusive bargain then and it will be immensely more difficult now, but that is no reason not to go ahead with the effort.
This approach does not imply an Obama-esque "negotiations without preconditions." Rather it relies on old style diplomacy with the only wrinkle that the US will have to eat some crow to jump start the process. For those who argue that we can't deal with Tehran while the mullahocracy supports Hezbollah, aids black turbans in Iraq, and slips assistance to Taliban, the Geek replies that history is the guide.
Remember that the US talked openly and repeatedly with the Soviet Union--to include a Summit Meeting in 1967--even though the Soviets were sending weapons by the shipload to North Vietnam and these weapons did in fact kill and wound Americans. (The Geek has a personal involvement in the latter part of this reality and carries fragments of Russian origin metal in his body to this day.)
Sure, an effort at constructive engagement might not pay off now after years of sanctions and saber waving, but the risks are far smaller and much more easily controlled than those attendant upon the military option. And, the benefits are far greater.
Beyond that, should force be necessary, the US possesses the over-the-horizon platforms to assure the rubble formerly called Tehran to bounce past the tropopause. Still, tough talk, tough bargaining is to be preferred over tough action.
Then there is Israel.
The seemingly eternal problem of Israel.
The time is long past for the US to treat Israel with the same respect, dignity and self-interested basis as it treats all other countries.
Yes, the US should be every bit as concerned with the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Israel as it that of France, Germany, Canada or Georgia.
Yes, the US should have all the normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel that it does with other countries.
All the normal features of relations the US has with other democratic, more or less pluralistic regimes should and must exist with respect to Israel.
But no more than that.
No more excessive military aid. No more excessive diplomatic and political support. No more foreign aid. (Israel is by all normal criteria a developed nation and needs foreign aid no more than does Canada or Sweden.)
For our own national interest we must give the Government of Israel (GOI) a choice regarding the West Bank and Gaza. Choice one: negotiate a two state solution immediately and in good faith with our support. Choice two: continue as an oppressive colonial power in the West Bank and Gaza without our support.
Again, the US has the over-the-horizon capacity to assure Israel's territorial integrity and national sovereignty. By giving the GOI the stark choice outlined above, we are not withdrawing from effective overwatch and protection.
Will this, any of the foregoing realpolitik approaches be embraced by either of the two major candidates?
No.
John McCain has openly embraced the neocon perspective and his campaign advisers include people such as Max Boot who have learned nothing from the greatest US foreign policy debacle in history and are eager to have the Israeli tail wag the dog of US policy. Senator Obama is a neophyte in foreign policy which makes him captive of the same Democratic movers and shakers who have followed the Israel uber alles view for more than forty years.
Also, the Geek is well aware of the Israel Lobby which, like the China Lobby of sixty and more years ago, has shown itself both willing and able to inflict massive damage on the interests of the United States in order to further the interests of another country.
Lord, help us.
Tuesday, September 23, 2008
Compared With Israel Chicken Little Was Optimistic
Israel is a sovereign state. The Government of Israel (GOI) pursues the self-defined strategic and national interests of the state. No surprises. That's all business as usual.
GOI as well as its advocates and apologists in the United States do all in their collective power to convince the government and people of the US to support without qualification the strategic and national interests of Israel--regardless of American national interests. No surprises. That's all business as usual.
GOI in a manner identical to countries such as the United Kingdom has employed any and all means necessary to gain American support and assistance. GOI, again in a manner identical with that used by, say, the UK during World War I and the opening years of World War II, has employed deceptive intelligence, exaggerated threats and repeated warnings of dire consequences to influence the American public and its government. Influence the government to take actions which it would otherwise not take as being against long term American national and strategic interests.
The difficulty for us comes when our politicians and our public opinion molders accept without question GOI policy positions. It comes when our political leaders and opinion molders act upon the bogus intelligence, the exaggerated threats and the mournful predictions of catastrophe.
The process of co-opting the US through the use of bogus intelligence started before there was a state of Israel. During World War II James Jesus Angleton then at the London Controlling Section of the OSS established contacts with the intelligence office of Haganah.
After the war Angleton combined his functions as head of CIA's counterintelligence shop with that of privately running liaison with the Mossad. During the 1950s Angleton was fed--and accepted uncritically--a combination of chickenfeed and falsity from his Israeli interlocutors. The Mossad derived disinformation emphasized the rapid growth of Soviet aerospace technology and nuclear capacities.
Not until the U2 overflights was the Mossad exposed as a papermill and the usefulness of the liaison called into question. The doubts about Israeli military and political intelligence continued even though on occasion, such as the "Secret Speech" exposing Stalin's excesses, the Israeli catch proved bang-on accurate.
The purpose of the "intelligence" sharing was twofold. Show how useful GOI and its components were to the US and thus drop markers for later collection. Establish a basis of reliability so that Israeli warnings of immediate threat would be believed by Washington.
While the Israeli military intelligence product has proven both accurate and of limited utility, the political and strategic products were far less so. In the run-up to the Six Day War all hands from CIA, the Pentagon, State and even the Executive Office Building didn't know whether to laugh or cry over the grossly exaggerated threat intel streaming out of the Mossad.
Israel played the we-are-doomed-we-are-going-to-die tune so long and hard and with such little real world basis that contempt dripped (privately) throughout the US national security community. (Recall that CIA, the Pentagon and State predicted up to a year before the outbreak of war that the Israeli military would need not more than seven days to obliterate the enemy forces.)
LBJ and his administration had no options given the political context of 1967. They had to applaud the war, ignore the unjustifiable attack on the USNS Liberty, and overlook the intransigence of GOI regarding the occupied territories. Similar constraints operated on LBJ when it came to the matter of GOI's nuclear weapons program.
We had known (or suspected) that Israel was hot after the bomb since Ike putted on the West Lawn. Various attempts to "inspect" the Israeli facilities were turned aside by GOI. By the time LBJ was pulling the ears of his beagles and getting our feet stuck in the muck of Vietnam, the denizen of the Oval Office made it clear that he didn't want to know about any yarmulke wearing atom bombs.
The Israeli bomb coupled with exaggerations of threat combined to convince the Nixon Administration to provide real-time intelligence (which allowed redeployment of IDF and IAF assets to blunt the nearly successful Syrian attack) and airlifted resupply (which provoked the first OPEC oil embargo.) It should be noted that the Egyptian Army had no intention of going deep into the Sinai let alone chug on to Israel proper.
With this historical background it should have come as no surprise that GOI provided false and misleading "intelligence" regarding Saddam and the Iraqi WMD. This set of Israeli fabrications came as biblical manna to the neocon ninnies who litter the landscape of the current US administration. Had George W. Bush possessed the mental horsepower necessary to parse between responsible realpolitikers such as James Baker and Robert Gates and the posse of neocons led by Dick (Nobody Has A Need To Know Anything) Cheney and Donald (Shock And Awe 'Em Into Democracy and Shopping Malls) Rumsfeld, the output of the Mossad papermill would have been pulped without a second thought.
Of course the neocon ninnies lapped it up and the rest, as they say, is history.
Now history threatens to repeat itself.
Even eight and more years ago GOI and Company wanted the US to abate the Iranian nuisance. Indeed, in the months preceding the invasion of Iraq there was great fear within GOI that we would lose sight of the Iranian peril while pursuing the lesser menace of Saddam's Iraq.
Five years into what is arguably the greatest foreign policy debacle in US history, GOI and Company is leaning hard on the button marked "War." The neocons of the Bush regime are doing the same.
As posted yesterday, the potential "Mahdi bomb" represents no clear and present danger to the US. It constitutes, at worst, an irritation that the US can learn to live with given that deterrence works and the American nuclear umbrella has historically sheltered many allied or other states important to the US national and strategic interests.
True, the Mahdi bomb is much more of a threat to GOI and the Israeli public. But, Israel has a substantial nuclear arsenal of more than two hundred devices. These include not only the old standby of pure fission but, almost certainly, boosted fission weapons and quite probably genuine two stage fission-fusion gadgets as well.
In short, Israel has the capacity to green glass the totality of Iran. The mullahs know this. They also know that the US nuclear threat stands behind Israel. And, as previously mentioned, it matters not if the Twelfth Imam returns and you are a loose assembly of radioactive fly ash in the stratosphere.
So why can't We the People emulate the "What? Me Worry?" attitude of yesterday's Mad Magazine? Why can't we say to the mullahocracy, "Go ahead, make your bomb and pray for peace?"
Because we are deep in an election campaign.
On the one hand is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Senator Obama. He is an empty suit and a teleprompter mouth who hails from a machine politics background. His party has its own neocon ninnies. His party has a long and rich history of conflating Israeli national interests with American. With respect to US-Israel relations his definition of "change" is more than likely to be "more of the same."
Then there is John McCain. He used to be a realpolitiker. Under the whip of the campaign he is morphing into a neocon. (See, http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/article/2008092220080922bootdanzig.html.)
The history of the past few years shows what that means.
Lord help us.
GOI as well as its advocates and apologists in the United States do all in their collective power to convince the government and people of the US to support without qualification the strategic and national interests of Israel--regardless of American national interests. No surprises. That's all business as usual.
GOI in a manner identical to countries such as the United Kingdom has employed any and all means necessary to gain American support and assistance. GOI, again in a manner identical with that used by, say, the UK during World War I and the opening years of World War II, has employed deceptive intelligence, exaggerated threats and repeated warnings of dire consequences to influence the American public and its government. Influence the government to take actions which it would otherwise not take as being against long term American national and strategic interests.
The difficulty for us comes when our politicians and our public opinion molders accept without question GOI policy positions. It comes when our political leaders and opinion molders act upon the bogus intelligence, the exaggerated threats and the mournful predictions of catastrophe.
The process of co-opting the US through the use of bogus intelligence started before there was a state of Israel. During World War II James Jesus Angleton then at the London Controlling Section of the OSS established contacts with the intelligence office of Haganah.
After the war Angleton combined his functions as head of CIA's counterintelligence shop with that of privately running liaison with the Mossad. During the 1950s Angleton was fed--and accepted uncritically--a combination of chickenfeed and falsity from his Israeli interlocutors. The Mossad derived disinformation emphasized the rapid growth of Soviet aerospace technology and nuclear capacities.
Not until the U2 overflights was the Mossad exposed as a papermill and the usefulness of the liaison called into question. The doubts about Israeli military and political intelligence continued even though on occasion, such as the "Secret Speech" exposing Stalin's excesses, the Israeli catch proved bang-on accurate.
The purpose of the "intelligence" sharing was twofold. Show how useful GOI and its components were to the US and thus drop markers for later collection. Establish a basis of reliability so that Israeli warnings of immediate threat would be believed by Washington.
While the Israeli military intelligence product has proven both accurate and of limited utility, the political and strategic products were far less so. In the run-up to the Six Day War all hands from CIA, the Pentagon, State and even the Executive Office Building didn't know whether to laugh or cry over the grossly exaggerated threat intel streaming out of the Mossad.
Israel played the we-are-doomed-we-are-going-to-die tune so long and hard and with such little real world basis that contempt dripped (privately) throughout the US national security community. (Recall that CIA, the Pentagon and State predicted up to a year before the outbreak of war that the Israeli military would need not more than seven days to obliterate the enemy forces.)
LBJ and his administration had no options given the political context of 1967. They had to applaud the war, ignore the unjustifiable attack on the USNS Liberty, and overlook the intransigence of GOI regarding the occupied territories. Similar constraints operated on LBJ when it came to the matter of GOI's nuclear weapons program.
We had known (or suspected) that Israel was hot after the bomb since Ike putted on the West Lawn. Various attempts to "inspect" the Israeli facilities were turned aside by GOI. By the time LBJ was pulling the ears of his beagles and getting our feet stuck in the muck of Vietnam, the denizen of the Oval Office made it clear that he didn't want to know about any yarmulke wearing atom bombs.
The Israeli bomb coupled with exaggerations of threat combined to convince the Nixon Administration to provide real-time intelligence (which allowed redeployment of IDF and IAF assets to blunt the nearly successful Syrian attack) and airlifted resupply (which provoked the first OPEC oil embargo.) It should be noted that the Egyptian Army had no intention of going deep into the Sinai let alone chug on to Israel proper.
With this historical background it should have come as no surprise that GOI provided false and misleading "intelligence" regarding Saddam and the Iraqi WMD. This set of Israeli fabrications came as biblical manna to the neocon ninnies who litter the landscape of the current US administration. Had George W. Bush possessed the mental horsepower necessary to parse between responsible realpolitikers such as James Baker and Robert Gates and the posse of neocons led by Dick (Nobody Has A Need To Know Anything) Cheney and Donald (Shock And Awe 'Em Into Democracy and Shopping Malls) Rumsfeld, the output of the Mossad papermill would have been pulped without a second thought.
Of course the neocon ninnies lapped it up and the rest, as they say, is history.
Now history threatens to repeat itself.
Even eight and more years ago GOI and Company wanted the US to abate the Iranian nuisance. Indeed, in the months preceding the invasion of Iraq there was great fear within GOI that we would lose sight of the Iranian peril while pursuing the lesser menace of Saddam's Iraq.
Five years into what is arguably the greatest foreign policy debacle in US history, GOI and Company is leaning hard on the button marked "War." The neocons of the Bush regime are doing the same.
As posted yesterday, the potential "Mahdi bomb" represents no clear and present danger to the US. It constitutes, at worst, an irritation that the US can learn to live with given that deterrence works and the American nuclear umbrella has historically sheltered many allied or other states important to the US national and strategic interests.
True, the Mahdi bomb is much more of a threat to GOI and the Israeli public. But, Israel has a substantial nuclear arsenal of more than two hundred devices. These include not only the old standby of pure fission but, almost certainly, boosted fission weapons and quite probably genuine two stage fission-fusion gadgets as well.
In short, Israel has the capacity to green glass the totality of Iran. The mullahs know this. They also know that the US nuclear threat stands behind Israel. And, as previously mentioned, it matters not if the Twelfth Imam returns and you are a loose assembly of radioactive fly ash in the stratosphere.
So why can't We the People emulate the "What? Me Worry?" attitude of yesterday's Mad Magazine? Why can't we say to the mullahocracy, "Go ahead, make your bomb and pray for peace?"
Because we are deep in an election campaign.
On the one hand is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Senator Obama. He is an empty suit and a teleprompter mouth who hails from a machine politics background. His party has its own neocon ninnies. His party has a long and rich history of conflating Israeli national interests with American. With respect to US-Israel relations his definition of "change" is more than likely to be "more of the same."
Then there is John McCain. He used to be a realpolitiker. Under the whip of the campaign he is morphing into a neocon. (See, http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/article/2008092220080922bootdanzig.html.)
The history of the past few years shows what that means.
Lord help us.
Monday, September 22, 2008
Living With The (Mahdi's) Bomb
Ever since the overthrow of the Shah thirty-eight years ago Iran has been an omnipresent and ever obnoxious presence on the global stage. From taking diplomatic personnel hostage to supporting transnational terrorist groups all the way to its current hemi-demi-semi covert nuclear weapons program the mullahocracy in Tehran has been the worst sort of blot on the international landscape.
The essential question for the US is not that of rating the irritation quotient of Iran. The fundamental consideration for the US is not that of determining how much of a menace Iran might be to Israel.
No. The critical consideration for the US is whether or not a nuclear weapons equipped Iran represents a danger to the strategic interests and national security of the United States. Period.
It's safe to stipulate that Iran is hot after a nuclear capability. All the signs point in that direction. Certainly, as the Geek has noted previously, Iran has two major reasons to acquire the Big Bomb: having been the recipient of chemical attacks during the Iraq-Iran War and desiring to emerge as the unchallenged regional hegemonic power.
From the perspective of other (think Sunni) Persian Gulf countries a nuclear Iran might be an existential nightmare. Israel may see a nuclear Iran as an existential threat.
What about the American perspective?
To be realistic about it, the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran in our near future should cause not much more than a shoulder shrug and a (slightly) heightened vigilance.
"What's that!" You exclaim. "They're a bunch of Muslim loonie toons who think the Mahdi will come riding out of the clouds to end the bloody final clash of nations."
Yeah, and so what? The Geek remembers as a small child being assured by press, parents and politicians alike that the "godless commonists" had such disregard for human life that they'd nuke the world in an instant to bring about the defeat of America.
The Geek also remembers hearing, shortly after the Chicoms lit off their first nudet that deterrence would never work with them. After all, it was solemnly pontificated by seemingly responsible adults, "life is cheap in the Orient" and "what does a few million people mean to Mao? I mean, look how many of them there are!"
History proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that deterrence worked with the Soviets, be they godless or otherwise, as well as the Chinese, regardless of how many of them there might be.
We--and the Russians--viewed the Israeli development of nuclear weapons with equanimity. This was true even after the Israelis developed and deployed a nuclear capable missile with sufficient range to engage the southwestern section of the old Soviet Union.
Why were the Kremlin and Washington so unruffled by the Israeli bomb? Simple. Both governments (this was more important to the Soviets than to us) were certain that deterrence works.
While it is possible to hyperventilate over the Pakistani bomb by averring that it might fall into the hands of terrorists, we can live with the bomb in Pakistan as we can with that in India. Deterrence works. (It might even make for more cooperative neighbors, but the jury is still out on this.)
"Wait one, Geek!" You interrupt. "That's the point! Those mullahs are likely to hand over the bomb to their running buddies, like Hezbollah."
Well, partner, the Geek admits you have a point. It's conceivable. But, low in probability. The Iranians have to know that nudets leave isotope fingerprints and those show the identity of the maker of the fissionable material. The mullahs also have to know that with Iran's long standing reputation as Juvenile Delinquent of the World, suspicion would fix on Tehran beaucoup schnell after any nudet anywhere.
In short, should there be a 9/11 on nuclear steroids, it would not be enjoyable to live anywhere in Iran.
The coming of the Mahdi is of little consequence if you have become some radioactive ash in the jet stream. The men running Iran understand this.
Since it appears overwhelmingly likely that constructive engagement Russian style or sanctions American style will prove as ineffective in the future as they have in the past, the US is left with two choices regarding the Iranian bomb. Choice one: military action. Choice two: live with it.
Given the current American economic, political and military context which is too self-evident to deserve recapitulation, the military option carries more risks than it does benefits.
That narrows the choice.
We have learned to live with the bomb in Russian hands. In Chinese. Even in Pakistani. An Iranian add-on should cause no appreciable loss of American sleep.
Of course, the Mahdi bomb will cause sleepless nights in Israel. There lies the problem, the challenge for American policy makers. The Government of Israel (GOI) would like very much for us to carry their water for them this time as they did with respect to Iraq and Syria.
The (intentionally) skewed views of the GOI and its advocates in the US were in large part responsible for the bogus WMD argument propelling the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq. Similarly, these views and intelligence were responsible in large measure for the self-inflicted policy wound of turning Syria hostile to the US.
It can happen again with Iran if once more the Israeli tail wags the dog of American foreign policy decision making.
It is an election year after all.
The essential question for the US is not that of rating the irritation quotient of Iran. The fundamental consideration for the US is not that of determining how much of a menace Iran might be to Israel.
No. The critical consideration for the US is whether or not a nuclear weapons equipped Iran represents a danger to the strategic interests and national security of the United States. Period.
It's safe to stipulate that Iran is hot after a nuclear capability. All the signs point in that direction. Certainly, as the Geek has noted previously, Iran has two major reasons to acquire the Big Bomb: having been the recipient of chemical attacks during the Iraq-Iran War and desiring to emerge as the unchallenged regional hegemonic power.
From the perspective of other (think Sunni) Persian Gulf countries a nuclear Iran might be an existential nightmare. Israel may see a nuclear Iran as an existential threat.
What about the American perspective?
To be realistic about it, the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran in our near future should cause not much more than a shoulder shrug and a (slightly) heightened vigilance.
"What's that!" You exclaim. "They're a bunch of Muslim loonie toons who think the Mahdi will come riding out of the clouds to end the bloody final clash of nations."
Yeah, and so what? The Geek remembers as a small child being assured by press, parents and politicians alike that the "godless commonists" had such disregard for human life that they'd nuke the world in an instant to bring about the defeat of America.
The Geek also remembers hearing, shortly after the Chicoms lit off their first nudet that deterrence would never work with them. After all, it was solemnly pontificated by seemingly responsible adults, "life is cheap in the Orient" and "what does a few million people mean to Mao? I mean, look how many of them there are!"
History proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that deterrence worked with the Soviets, be they godless or otherwise, as well as the Chinese, regardless of how many of them there might be.
We--and the Russians--viewed the Israeli development of nuclear weapons with equanimity. This was true even after the Israelis developed and deployed a nuclear capable missile with sufficient range to engage the southwestern section of the old Soviet Union.
Why were the Kremlin and Washington so unruffled by the Israeli bomb? Simple. Both governments (this was more important to the Soviets than to us) were certain that deterrence works.
While it is possible to hyperventilate over the Pakistani bomb by averring that it might fall into the hands of terrorists, we can live with the bomb in Pakistan as we can with that in India. Deterrence works. (It might even make for more cooperative neighbors, but the jury is still out on this.)
"Wait one, Geek!" You interrupt. "That's the point! Those mullahs are likely to hand over the bomb to their running buddies, like Hezbollah."
Well, partner, the Geek admits you have a point. It's conceivable. But, low in probability. The Iranians have to know that nudets leave isotope fingerprints and those show the identity of the maker of the fissionable material. The mullahs also have to know that with Iran's long standing reputation as Juvenile Delinquent of the World, suspicion would fix on Tehran beaucoup schnell after any nudet anywhere.
In short, should there be a 9/11 on nuclear steroids, it would not be enjoyable to live anywhere in Iran.
The coming of the Mahdi is of little consequence if you have become some radioactive ash in the jet stream. The men running Iran understand this.
Since it appears overwhelmingly likely that constructive engagement Russian style or sanctions American style will prove as ineffective in the future as they have in the past, the US is left with two choices regarding the Iranian bomb. Choice one: military action. Choice two: live with it.
Given the current American economic, political and military context which is too self-evident to deserve recapitulation, the military option carries more risks than it does benefits.
That narrows the choice.
We have learned to live with the bomb in Russian hands. In Chinese. Even in Pakistani. An Iranian add-on should cause no appreciable loss of American sleep.
Of course, the Mahdi bomb will cause sleepless nights in Israel. There lies the problem, the challenge for American policy makers. The Government of Israel (GOI) would like very much for us to carry their water for them this time as they did with respect to Iraq and Syria.
The (intentionally) skewed views of the GOI and its advocates in the US were in large part responsible for the bogus WMD argument propelling the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq. Similarly, these views and intelligence were responsible in large measure for the self-inflicted policy wound of turning Syria hostile to the US.
It can happen again with Iran if once more the Israeli tail wags the dog of American foreign policy decision making.
It is an election year after all.
The Past Is The Future--In Russia
Since August seventh when Russia went on a rampage in Georgia (proving a good, really big guy can beat a small, not-so-good one), the hawks in the current US administration headed by Dick (let's-kick-the Russkies-again) Cheney have been in the ascendant. With the same single-minded, to-hell-with-reality! determination which was previously exhibited with regard to our Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq, the bring-on-the-apocalypse-now! crowd has been successfully restoring the Cold War, at least in miniature.
The handful of realpolitikers such as SecDef Robert (PhD in Russian studies) Gates have been on the defensive as they seek to retain necessary channels of communication open. Caught in the middle is SecState Condy (PhD in Soviet studies) Rice.
Time to go to the videotape of history. This is important--no, central--to understanding the source of contemporary Russian behavior and the challenges for American policy makers.
Why? You ask.
Because history may be a simple case of the dead past for Americans but it is a living hand at the back of every educated Russian (and even those who are not so educated.)
In Russia as in so many other countries the past is never really past, never actually dead, buried and of interest only to narrow specialists in history. Events of nearly a thousand years ago (think Mongol conquest and occupation) as well as of the past century (think German invasion in 1941 or the international respect accorded Russia during the Cold War) are alive and well in the minds of Russians.
In simple but not oversimplified terms, the collective mind of Russia is colored by both a sense of inferiority compared to the West and paranoia regarding Russian susceptibility to invasion from both West and East. This combination is assured to make Russian leaders feel both threatened and insecure, as getting no respect from the political elites of other major powers.
One result of this insecurity over the centuries has been a Russian fixation on gaining a protective territorial belt surrounding and buffering the Russian heartland against the ambitions of foreign powers be they European, Asian or in recent decades, American. Originally this protective belt, this buffer area on which future battles would be waged, consisted of those territories coterminous with Russia. The territories of the "Near Abroad" in Russian terminology such as the Ukraine, Georgia, the Central Asian Republics, the Baltic states.
As the Big Three (Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt) met at Yalta in the closing days of World War II in Europe, the Russian jefe made it clear that the Kremlin's definition of a necessary protective belt had expanded. Churchill, being a fine example of the 19th Century British statesman, understood the concept "sphere of influence" and accepted that wherever Red Army tanks sat at war's end would be the Russian sphere of influence.
While Roosevelt may not have accepted the concept of a Russian sphere of influence with equanimity, he both understood the idea and recognised the limits of American military power in April 1945 with half a war yet to be won. He bowed to the power of realism and accepted the facts on the ground (much to the dismay and future political advantage of numerous Republicans.)
A sphere of influence in which Russian interests receive the utmost of regard is one which warms the innermost chambers of the insecure Russian heart. The sphere assures that security is enhanced. The sphere provides a basis for international respect.
For the long decades of the Cold War the sphere formally known as the Warsaw Pact together with the Near Abroad gave the Kremlin material and psychic comfort. The Soviet semi-empire provided a balm for both inferiority feelings and barely suppressed fears of imminent attack.
The empire also made for caution. The Russians had something to lose. The primary goal of all Russian diplomatic and military effort during the Soviet period generally and the Cold War years in particular was conservative. The conduct of the denizens of the Kremlin was as cautious as their rhetoric was bellicose and radical.
The Kremlin kept the tightest of holds on the national Communist parties throughout the world lest they forget their purpose in life--protecting Russia. The assorted Communist parties did not have the purpose of spreading worldwide workers' revolutions. They did not have the goal of establishing global communism. Both of those ideas died along with Trotsky.
The purpose, the goal of Communism throughout the world, was profoundly conservative--protect and guard Russia. Period.
On the rare occasion when the Kremlin was incautious, adventurist as in seeking to base nuclear capable missiles in Cuba, it backed down quickly in the face of a resolute response. Even after the debacle in Vietnam caused the crisis of American confidence, the Kremlin moved with the utmost of caution as in Africa. The Russians tested the waters. When there was no American response they went ahead. But, even so they remained circumspect, using proxy forces from Cuba and other clients rather than their own.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the concomitant loss of both the WarPact and Near Abroad buffer, the Russian insecurity reemerged. For a decade or so the insecurity and conviction of inferiority were submerged in public perception by the extreme economic and social turbulence brought about by the Communist collapse.
The US provided, as correctly noted by Secretary Rice in her speech last week at the German Marshall Society, both material and political aid during the years of privation and upheaval. But, it must be noted that this assistance was provided with a hefty dose of condescension, paternalism and well-intended hectoring.
Members of the Russian political elite remember all too well the attitudes which accompanied the aid more than the aid itself. The feelings of inferiority and insecurity were stoked.
As the Russian economic and social house came more and more to order and a measure of prosperity under the regime of Vladimir Putin, the need to address the feelings of inferiority and insecurity grew. It was up to the US to both take cognizance of these feelings and effectively meet the underlying needs.
We didn't.
We repeatedly refused to acknowledge that the Russians saw Russia as a Great Power. We brushed aside their concerns in Kosovo. We blew off their ill-founded objections regarding the deployment of a small ABM capability in the Czech Republic and Poland. We bashed the Kremlin for opposing our Iraq adventure. In short, we treated the Russians in a way which communicated to the Kremlin that we saw Russia as a lesser power regardless of how we talked.
Objectively our role in the run-up to the Georgian border war was unconstructive. We gave too much public support to the current Georgian government as though it constituted the greatest monument to democracy since the Federalist Papers. We pushed too hard for Georgian (and Ukrainian) membership in NATO, ignoring that the one time Cold War alliance would thereby gain a presence in the Near Abroad.
From the Kremlin's perspective, colored by Russian history as it must be, our actions were both disrespectful and hostile. Far from mitigating Russian inferiority and insecurity, we enhanced them. There can be no surprise that the Russians pulled the several-months-in-preparation plan for war in South Ossetia out of the drawer and implemented it.
That action is every bit as unsurprising as the earlier Russian dusting off of long obsolete bombers and sending them on patrol over US naval forces and near US territory just like in the old days of the Cold War.
We have to get a grip on a simple fact. We need the Russians. We need their cooperation on a wide range of international interests. We need their cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. We need their cooperation in counter terrorism.
This means we have to take the Russians on their own, historically determined terms. We have to treat them like the Great Power they believe themselves to be. We have to honestly consult with the Kremlin, not have meetings where we talk past each other. We need, horrors on the right, to bow to their interests from time to time.
Or we can go the Dick Cheney way. We can ignore them. Refuse to have high level meetings. Restore some of the more obnoxious features of the Cold War.
None of that will alter Russian behavior. They can take isolation. It makes for inventiveness of diplomacy and political operations.
Let's see, muses the Geek thinking himself in the Kremlin, we are a major oil exporting country. What is the name of that bunch, you know the one our new best friend in the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela belongs to? Oh, yeah, Organization of Patroleum Exporting Countries. Maybe I should give those boys a ring.
The handful of realpolitikers such as SecDef Robert (PhD in Russian studies) Gates have been on the defensive as they seek to retain necessary channels of communication open. Caught in the middle is SecState Condy (PhD in Soviet studies) Rice.
Time to go to the videotape of history. This is important--no, central--to understanding the source of contemporary Russian behavior and the challenges for American policy makers.
Why? You ask.
Because history may be a simple case of the dead past for Americans but it is a living hand at the back of every educated Russian (and even those who are not so educated.)
In Russia as in so many other countries the past is never really past, never actually dead, buried and of interest only to narrow specialists in history. Events of nearly a thousand years ago (think Mongol conquest and occupation) as well as of the past century (think German invasion in 1941 or the international respect accorded Russia during the Cold War) are alive and well in the minds of Russians.
In simple but not oversimplified terms, the collective mind of Russia is colored by both a sense of inferiority compared to the West and paranoia regarding Russian susceptibility to invasion from both West and East. This combination is assured to make Russian leaders feel both threatened and insecure, as getting no respect from the political elites of other major powers.
One result of this insecurity over the centuries has been a Russian fixation on gaining a protective territorial belt surrounding and buffering the Russian heartland against the ambitions of foreign powers be they European, Asian or in recent decades, American. Originally this protective belt, this buffer area on which future battles would be waged, consisted of those territories coterminous with Russia. The territories of the "Near Abroad" in Russian terminology such as the Ukraine, Georgia, the Central Asian Republics, the Baltic states.
As the Big Three (Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt) met at Yalta in the closing days of World War II in Europe, the Russian jefe made it clear that the Kremlin's definition of a necessary protective belt had expanded. Churchill, being a fine example of the 19th Century British statesman, understood the concept "sphere of influence" and accepted that wherever Red Army tanks sat at war's end would be the Russian sphere of influence.
While Roosevelt may not have accepted the concept of a Russian sphere of influence with equanimity, he both understood the idea and recognised the limits of American military power in April 1945 with half a war yet to be won. He bowed to the power of realism and accepted the facts on the ground (much to the dismay and future political advantage of numerous Republicans.)
A sphere of influence in which Russian interests receive the utmost of regard is one which warms the innermost chambers of the insecure Russian heart. The sphere assures that security is enhanced. The sphere provides a basis for international respect.
For the long decades of the Cold War the sphere formally known as the Warsaw Pact together with the Near Abroad gave the Kremlin material and psychic comfort. The Soviet semi-empire provided a balm for both inferiority feelings and barely suppressed fears of imminent attack.
The empire also made for caution. The Russians had something to lose. The primary goal of all Russian diplomatic and military effort during the Soviet period generally and the Cold War years in particular was conservative. The conduct of the denizens of the Kremlin was as cautious as their rhetoric was bellicose and radical.
The Kremlin kept the tightest of holds on the national Communist parties throughout the world lest they forget their purpose in life--protecting Russia. The assorted Communist parties did not have the purpose of spreading worldwide workers' revolutions. They did not have the goal of establishing global communism. Both of those ideas died along with Trotsky.
The purpose, the goal of Communism throughout the world, was profoundly conservative--protect and guard Russia. Period.
On the rare occasion when the Kremlin was incautious, adventurist as in seeking to base nuclear capable missiles in Cuba, it backed down quickly in the face of a resolute response. Even after the debacle in Vietnam caused the crisis of American confidence, the Kremlin moved with the utmost of caution as in Africa. The Russians tested the waters. When there was no American response they went ahead. But, even so they remained circumspect, using proxy forces from Cuba and other clients rather than their own.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the concomitant loss of both the WarPact and Near Abroad buffer, the Russian insecurity reemerged. For a decade or so the insecurity and conviction of inferiority were submerged in public perception by the extreme economic and social turbulence brought about by the Communist collapse.
The US provided, as correctly noted by Secretary Rice in her speech last week at the German Marshall Society, both material and political aid during the years of privation and upheaval. But, it must be noted that this assistance was provided with a hefty dose of condescension, paternalism and well-intended hectoring.
Members of the Russian political elite remember all too well the attitudes which accompanied the aid more than the aid itself. The feelings of inferiority and insecurity were stoked.
As the Russian economic and social house came more and more to order and a measure of prosperity under the regime of Vladimir Putin, the need to address the feelings of inferiority and insecurity grew. It was up to the US to both take cognizance of these feelings and effectively meet the underlying needs.
We didn't.
We repeatedly refused to acknowledge that the Russians saw Russia as a Great Power. We brushed aside their concerns in Kosovo. We blew off their ill-founded objections regarding the deployment of a small ABM capability in the Czech Republic and Poland. We bashed the Kremlin for opposing our Iraq adventure. In short, we treated the Russians in a way which communicated to the Kremlin that we saw Russia as a lesser power regardless of how we talked.
Objectively our role in the run-up to the Georgian border war was unconstructive. We gave too much public support to the current Georgian government as though it constituted the greatest monument to democracy since the Federalist Papers. We pushed too hard for Georgian (and Ukrainian) membership in NATO, ignoring that the one time Cold War alliance would thereby gain a presence in the Near Abroad.
From the Kremlin's perspective, colored by Russian history as it must be, our actions were both disrespectful and hostile. Far from mitigating Russian inferiority and insecurity, we enhanced them. There can be no surprise that the Russians pulled the several-months-in-preparation plan for war in South Ossetia out of the drawer and implemented it.
That action is every bit as unsurprising as the earlier Russian dusting off of long obsolete bombers and sending them on patrol over US naval forces and near US territory just like in the old days of the Cold War.
We have to get a grip on a simple fact. We need the Russians. We need their cooperation on a wide range of international interests. We need their cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. We need their cooperation in counter terrorism.
This means we have to take the Russians on their own, historically determined terms. We have to treat them like the Great Power they believe themselves to be. We have to honestly consult with the Kremlin, not have meetings where we talk past each other. We need, horrors on the right, to bow to their interests from time to time.
Or we can go the Dick Cheney way. We can ignore them. Refuse to have high level meetings. Restore some of the more obnoxious features of the Cold War.
None of that will alter Russian behavior. They can take isolation. It makes for inventiveness of diplomacy and political operations.
Let's see, muses the Geek thinking himself in the Kremlin, we are a major oil exporting country. What is the name of that bunch, you know the one our new best friend in the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela belongs to? Oh, yeah, Organization of Patroleum Exporting Countries. Maybe I should give those boys a ring.
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