Living With The (Mahdi's) Bomb

Ever since the overthrow of the Shah thirty-eight years ago Iran has been an omnipresent and ever obnoxious presence on the global stage. From taking diplomatic personnel hostage to supporting transnational terrorist groups all the way to its current hemi-demi-semi covert nuclear weapons program the mullahocracy in Tehran has been the worst sort of blot on the international landscape.

The essential question for the US is not that of rating the irritation quotient of Iran. The fundamental consideration for the US is not that of determining how much of a menace Iran might be to Israel.

No. The critical consideration for the US is whether or not a nuclear weapons equipped Iran represents a danger to the strategic interests and national security of the United States. Period.

It's safe to stipulate that Iran is hot after a nuclear capability. All the signs point in that direction. Certainly, as the Geek has noted previously, Iran has two major reasons to acquire the Big Bomb: having been the recipient of chemical attacks during the Iraq-Iran War and desiring to emerge as the unchallenged regional hegemonic power.

From the perspective of other (think Sunni) Persian Gulf countries a nuclear Iran might be an existential nightmare. Israel may see a nuclear Iran as an existential threat.

What about the American perspective?

To be realistic about it, the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran in our near future should cause not much more than a shoulder shrug and a (slightly) heightened vigilance.

"What's that!" You exclaim. "They're a bunch of Muslim loonie toons who think the Mahdi will come riding out of the clouds to end the bloody final clash of nations."

Yeah, and so what? The Geek remembers as a small child being assured by press, parents and politicians alike that the "godless commonists" had such disregard for human life that they'd nuke the world in an instant to bring about the defeat of America.

The Geek also remembers hearing, shortly after the Chicoms lit off their first nudet that deterrence would never work with them. After all, it was solemnly pontificated by seemingly responsible adults, "life is cheap in the Orient" and "what does a few million people mean to Mao? I mean, look how many of them there are!"

History proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that deterrence worked with the Soviets, be they godless or otherwise, as well as the Chinese, regardless of how many of them there might be.

We--and the Russians--viewed the Israeli development of nuclear weapons with equanimity. This was true even after the Israelis developed and deployed a nuclear capable missile with sufficient range to engage the southwestern section of the old Soviet Union.

Why were the Kremlin and Washington so unruffled by the Israeli bomb? Simple. Both governments (this was more important to the Soviets than to us) were certain that deterrence works.

While it is possible to hyperventilate over the Pakistani bomb by averring that it might fall into the hands of terrorists, we can live with the bomb in Pakistan as we can with that in India. Deterrence works. (It might even make for more cooperative neighbors, but the jury is still out on this.)

"Wait one, Geek!" You interrupt. "That's the point! Those mullahs are likely to hand over the bomb to their running buddies, like Hezbollah."

Well, partner, the Geek admits you have a point. It's conceivable. But, low in probability. The Iranians have to know that nudets leave isotope fingerprints and those show the identity of the maker of the fissionable material. The mullahs also have to know that with Iran's long standing reputation as Juvenile Delinquent of the World, suspicion would fix on Tehran beaucoup schnell after any nudet anywhere.

In short, should there be a 9/11 on nuclear steroids, it would not be enjoyable to live anywhere in Iran.

The coming of the Mahdi is of little consequence if you have become some radioactive ash in the jet stream. The men running Iran understand this.

Since it appears overwhelmingly likely that constructive engagement Russian style or sanctions American style will prove as ineffective in the future as they have in the past, the US is left with two choices regarding the Iranian bomb. Choice one: military action. Choice two: live with it.

Given the current American economic, political and military context which is too self-evident to deserve recapitulation, the military option carries more risks than it does benefits.

That narrows the choice.

We have learned to live with the bomb in Russian hands. In Chinese. Even in Pakistani. An Iranian add-on should cause no appreciable loss of American sleep.

Of course, the Mahdi bomb will cause sleepless nights in Israel. There lies the problem, the challenge for American policy makers. The Government of Israel (GOI) would like very much for us to carry their water for them this time as they did with respect to Iraq and Syria.

The (intentionally) skewed views of the GOI and its advocates in the US were in large part responsible for the bogus WMD argument propelling the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq. Similarly, these views and intelligence were responsible in large measure for the self-inflicted policy wound of turning Syria hostile to the US.

It can happen again with Iran if once more the Israeli tail wags the dog of American foreign policy decision making.

It is an election year after all.