Nuclear weapons have been prepared and justified in two roles.
One is that of the area targeted "counter-value" mission of city-busting. Whether the area down range was an enemy city containing (perhaps only peripherally)legitimate military facilities as was the case in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki or hordes of advancing troops and armor (the classic vision of the "crimson tide" cresting the "Trace" in Germany), the weapons of choice were thwacking great yield atomic or (later) hydrogen bombs. One (to use the old Soviet term) nuclear charge of beaucoup kilotons or a few megatons and, well, no more city or onrushing horde. Of course, there would be quite a bit of "collateral" damage--particularly downwind. It was the "collateral" damage projected to result from a major exchange which caused the nightmares of "nuclear winter" or even the "On-The-Beach" end-of-the-world outcome.
The other seemingly legitimate usage for nukes was engaging small, hardened point targets such as the opponent's residual nuclear forces or his command and control centers. The question of second, third, and so on strikes focused on two questions. The first was that of survivability, of riding out a first strike with a credible capacity for retaliation. The second revolved around constructing systems with sufficient accuracy and potency to destroy the point targets. The name of this game was "counter-force."
The problems of assuring the destruction of hardened point targets tested guidance systems to the max. These were complicated by the difficulty of delivering sufficient force on the target to overcome the passive defenses of hyper-hardening. Nukes, particularly those carried on maneuverable re-entry vehicles or endoatmospheric systems such as cruise missiles or precision guided gravity bombs, alone had sufficient bang to obliterate the target.
The limits of reliance upon nuclear munitions became more than a tad obvious to American planners and decision makers in the runup to the Persian Gulf War in 1990. The Saddam Hussein regime had constructed an impressive array of super-hardened command bunkers which were immune to any non-nuclear American weapon.
The same situation obtained years later when the Bush/Cheney administration contemplated their adventure in regime change in Iraq. Even the (usually but not always) highly accurate cruise missiles were of no value in taking on highly hardened point targets. Beyond that the slow flight of the cruise missiles provided them with no utility in hitting a moving target such as Saddam was with his constant movement between alternative command centers.
The difficulty of the cruise missile's leisurely pace had already complicated American efforts to take out Osama bin Laden. When the Clinton administration in 1998 received hard, actionable intelligence regarding bin Laden's location, the combination of decision cycle time and slow flight gave more than sufficient opportunity for a person in the Pakistani government or Inter-Services Intelligence to get on the phone and call his good buddy, Osama. The latter beat feet so the missiles finally hit only empty mud and stone huts.
The lack of a fast reaction, short transit time, highly accurate and bang-heavy munition has seriously complicated, arguably even frustrated, any reasonable American plan to neutralize North Korean or Iranian nuclear facilities without the highly negative consequences which would ensue inevitably upon the use of a nuclear munition. The same applies to some extent with regard to removing high value personnel such as Osama from the playing field.
The advent of hardware having the potential to provide ultra-fast, accurate delivery of a whole bunch of bang downrange is a game changer, the importance of which cannot be overstated, and must not be underestimated. Not surprisingly, the possibility of fielding this class of weapons systems comes with problems both technological and diplomatic in nature.
The fastest, cheapest way of putting the GPS on line is the reposturing of current generation land and sea based ICBMs to GPS delivery. Work on reconfiguring current missiles has been underway long enough and with good enough results that a one-for-one replacement feature has been incorporated in the new START.
This little commented upon aspect of START indicates the Russians are not absolutely against this American option. (Hmm, perhaps they hope their espionage boys are up to the task of swiping the technology?) The depressed trajectory of a GPS equipped ICBM should be, in and of itself, sufficient indication that the US was not trying to sneak in a Dr Strangelove attack. If not, there are simple ways to reassure the Kremlin that we really, really are taking out a point in Iran, or North Korea and not, say, Gorky.
The Chinese are another problem. Beijing is not so easily put off its anxieties that the US might want to, say, welch on its debts by obliterating the debt holders. Still, it is not a problem which should exceed the capacity of the State Department to handle. (Well, in principle at least.)
Other, more exotic, more expensive, and longer lead-time systems are in the pipeline or on the drawing board. One of these might be inferred to exist in the recently test launched X-37B. While not the Finger of Death per se, the vehicle could deploy hypersonic, precision guided munitions anywhere along its orbit trace. The X-37B has been under development first by NASA and then by the Air Force for more than a decade and should be viewed as a platform with a range of potential applications as well as the one furthest along in its maturation.
The hypersonic cruise missile is also well along in its development. The Falcon 2 was launched from Vandenberg AFB aboard a Minotaur IV last week. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has been close-mouthed about the Falcon, but has disclosed enough about this unpowered hypersonic vehicle to show that its potentials as a GPS mainstay are significant.
Even further down the way is the X-51 "WaveRider." The X-51 is conceptualized as a hypersonic endoatmospheric cruise missile powered by a scramjet engine. It gets its nickname from the designed intent that the vehicle ride its own sonic shockwave, an approach which provides a number of advantages--if it can be made to work. Air launched, the mach-five plus system is intended to provide the capacity to hit anywhere on the Earth within sixty minutes of a "go" decision.
Diplomatic conundrums exist with respect to both the X-37B and X-51 alternatives as with the conversion of current ICBMs to the GPS role. It is easy to argue that the hypersonic endoatmospheric vehicles including a paper proposal advanced by the Army present greater diplomatic difficulties than does the re-configured ICBM approach. Hypersonic missiles whether powered or not present very tough challenges for the defender. And, any hypersonic missile can carry either city busting nukes or point target appropriate conventional munitions.
As has been shown by the diplomatic storms surrounding the decision to deploy a very limited anti-ballistic missile capacity near Russia, it is utterly essential that diplomatic moves proceed in tandem with the research, development, and evaluation of the hardware. There is no doubt but squeals of (feigned) outrage will emanate eventually from both Moscow and Beijing. This is to be expected; it is the default position regarding any proposed technologically driven change in the Great Power status quo which seems to confer some sort of advantage to the US.
This implies that the ultimate test, the real challenge for the US, resides not in the realm of technology but in the area of political will. The question is not will the US develop a workable GPS system or systems in the near- to mid-term, but whether or not the administration can withstand the gales of pretended fury originating from one or more Great Powers which lack a similar, and, presumably, countervailing capacity.
That question in turn hinges on two other factors: Will the new GPS come online before or after 2012 and will the current president be re-elected?
It sure would be nice to have an accurate crystal ball. Or, a forward running time machine.
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