The Islamist AKP has gained an apparent unassailable superiority over the armed forces of Turkey. The shocking simultaneous "early retirement" of the military chief of staff and three other service commanders over the weekend seemed to have put the final nail in the coffin of the military's role as the ultimate guarantor of Turkish secularism and the legacy of Ataturk.
The act came on the eve of the semi-annual meeting of the combined armed forces senior leadership with the head of the civilian government, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and has been seen by many observers, Turkish as well as foreign, as a welcome sign of Turkey having become a normal democracy where civilian supremacy over the military is a given. In the past, there has been a great deal of discomfort in the US and Western Europe over the periodic military excursions out of the barracks and into the presidential palace. The European Union (or at least France) demanded that the armed forces be defanged as a prerequisite for membership.
The recent mass resignation must be taken in conjunction with the ongoing trial of nearly three hundred past and present senior commanders (ten percent or so of the entire flag officer complement) on charges which are at best politically motivated and most likely fabricated in whole or major part. The massive series of arrests over the past year or so constituted the AKP's direct attack on the military, which was the only plausible obstacle to permanent Islamist domination of Turkish politics.
The armed forces and AKP have been at daggers drawn since the once-banned AKP won power in 2002. The military missed its chance to send the Islamists packing in the wake of the narrow electoral victory mainly out of regard for EU sentiments and a proper regard for the benefits of EU membership. As the years slipped by, the chances for a military coup slipped away until they were lost beyond any hope in the most recent election where AKP took no prisoners at the polls.
Erdogan had made much of his stated intent to pursue EU membership even though it was more than slightly obvious that France would spare no effort to block the application. The economic success of the AKP has been based not on trade with the EU but upon increased ties with the Mideast and the Turkish speaking Central Asian Republics. In the process, a new class of very rich middlemen and entrepreneurs drawn from urban migrants originating in the Anatolian highlands has become a key component of the AKP base. These new millionaires join with displaced peasants in the slums of Istanbul and Ankara and "conservative" clerics to provide the electoral majority.
The rivals to the AKP drive to the east have been the senior officers of the armed forces along with the "traditional" business and commercial elite of Istanbul. The military has at its upper ranks men who are far more Western in their outlook, far more liberal in their views as well as far more educated than the mass of the political class and the new moneyed class. Their instinctive perspective is Western. That of AKP and its base runs to the East, to the Muslim marches of Central and Northwest Asia--and the states of the old Ottoman Empire.
The seemingly decisive victory of AKP over the inheritors of Ataturk is not universally welcomed in Turkey. There are more than a few Turks who fear that without the army as a counterweight there will be no limits on Erdogan and AKP. There is an undercurrent of apprehension that now the Islamists will be free to pursue the goal of reestablishing the old caliphate with all that implies. Others, unsurprisingly, pooh-pooh that notion and welcome AKP confining the armed forces to a subordinate role and, thus, allowing a return to the values and norms of the pre-Ataturk era.
Very few Turks are aghast at the new diplomatic muscle enjoyed by Ankara in the Mideast and Central Asia. Likewise, very few resent the new economic options brought by the "Ost politik" practiced by Erdogan. Other than some trepidations over Turkey's ever closer ties to Shia Iran, there have been few complaints over the foreign policy of Erdogan and company. There is definitely majority support for the very hard line drawn by Erdogan over Israel, particularly the IDF takeover of the Mazi Marmora "humanitarian relief" ship over a year ago.
The net effect has been the tilting of the longstanding conflict between nationalist and Islamist, secularist and Islamist in favor of the latter. For the moment this is just jake with the majority of Turks. But, there is likely to be a quick withdrawal of support for AKP should there be heavy handed attempts to "purify" Turkish society of "infidel" aspects. So far, the party has been sensitive to this dynamic and has moved only slowly to "Islamify" Turkey.
Almost overlooked in the political discussions of the resignations has been another, critical subject: The impact of Turkey's Muslim oriented "Ost politik" on NATO. In as much as Turkey's membership in the alliance has been considered, it has been in the boilerplate terms of "NATO's second largest army." As if size matters.
Turkey's large army is also quite irrelevant to NATO in the post-cold war period. Not only is the army incapable of any effective action outside of Turkey, it has not shown any particular utility in the local "forever war" against the Kurdish defensive insurgency. Pace NATO public statements (or those of Admiral Mullen), the armed forces of Turkey are totally irrelevant to NATO today and into the future.
The armed forces of Turkey, while large, are also largely immobile, poorly trained, indifferently equipped, overly expensive, a drain on the Turkish fisc, and a political drag on the alliance. The new Erdogan ministry strongly opposed the US driven invasion of Iraq making much political hay from proclaiming the operation as a "war on Islam and Muslims." In addition, the Turks have been a major non-participant in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the AKP government bitterly opposed the no-fly zone and its follow-on in Libya.
There is no reason not to believe that Turkey has passed along critical NATO information to Iran as a part of its charm offensive with Tehran. The same may be true regarding the opposition in Afghanistan and, possibly, Libya. Having Turkey in NATO today is tantamount to having the Italy of Mussolini sitting in on the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff during World War II.
If it is true, as it appears to be, that the Islamists have won in Turkey, the time has come to restructure NATO without Ankara. The hoary alliance is at a difficult crossroads. There is looming, embarrassing failure in Libya joining with the rush for the exit in Afghanistan to undercut any lingering credibility accruing to it. Given further that most NATO members have shown an ability to hit the funding targets akin to the performance of a visually impaired sniper, the time is now to rethink the alliance. The time is now to contemplate the impossible: The dissolution of NATO.
It is questionable whether or not NATO has any utility or even relevance to the world of now and tomorrow where the major enemy of any and all civilized states are the advocates of violent political Islam. The best way for civilized states to counter the threat resides not with NATO or any other Cold War artifact but rather with "coalitions of the willing," ad hoc structures of states with coinciding national interests which perceive the threat from violent political Islam or the challenges presented by any particular failed, failing, or hollow state in similar ways.
As George H.W. Bush showed during the Gulf War, the ad hoc coalition can work well provided the necessary preliminary diplomatic work is done with care. Even George W. Bush's ham handed counterparts worked reasonably well. In comparison, the NATO effort in Libya has been an example of how not to go about the task. While this can (correctly) be blamed on the relative absence of the US from the shooting war, the real lesson to be learned is that the effort was not undertaken by a genuine coalition of the willing.
The AKP has taken Turkey away from the West. Its lurch to the lands of Islam is understandable and even forgivable. It is, after all, a choice made by the Turkish electorate--at least up to a point. We can have no beef about it.
Rather, we should embrace the Turkish policy. We should use the stimulus to take a long hard look at the role of NATO in our alliance system, and jettison it as currently constituted unless a very strong argument can be made for its continuation. The inclusion of Turkey was contextual to the cold war; it has no permanent root in the Atlantic community. This is the geographical, cultural, and political reality. We should admit it with at least as much honesty as have the Turks.
The ideological and political blocs of the world have reformed since the end of the bi-polar world. Turkey has recognized this. The AKP has acknowledged bluntly that religion and language ties trump the artifacts of global alliance politics. Erdogan and company have chosen their side.
The US and Western Europe can and should do no less.
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