The Next Ten Years

The US (and a hell of a lot of other countries) is approaching the zero point marking the official start of "The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT.)"  To err on the side of accuracy, the US had already been in a war against advocates of violent political Islam for eight years when the hijacked passenger aircraft were turned into cruise missiles.

Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention.  Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED.  The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression.  The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort.  The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.

The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor.  It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched.  It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.

Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead.  At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states.  The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.

Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11.  Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader.  Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.

As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace.  Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country.  Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the  new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.

The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan.  The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations.  The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.

The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation.  Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.

Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow.  AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure.  Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.

In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance.  AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao,  "a paper tiger."

The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated.  There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.

The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population.  AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs.  Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor.  They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.

The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis.  In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures.  This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed.  Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.

The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen.  Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority.  They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power.  (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)

There is an important caveat to this.  Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly.  This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam.  They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.

Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted.  Neither should they be diminished.  The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces.  The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers.  In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants.  It is OK.  A fact of life.  But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.

When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US.  The winner would be AQAP.

The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen.  In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.

We did this once before.  In Vietnam.  The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.

Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated.  But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.

Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only.  The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP.  Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam.  Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.