The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad. The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered. It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.
Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.
Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity. The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.
The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date. The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice. The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.
There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan. That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil. Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally. The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine. Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.
Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray. Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making. As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues. More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.
Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime. There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause. But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite. Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."
Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point. His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint. However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.
The same dynamic applied in Iraq. The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural. The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate. The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.
As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border. Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities. In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.
As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance. This man is Muqtada al-Sadr. He is a Shia cleric. He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context. He runs a very large and rather competent private militia. And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.
The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing. Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price. For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.
The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran. The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.
A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon. Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government. The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level. The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.
The departure of the Americans will have two results. One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations. The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.
Isn't that a fascinating prospect?
The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real. The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad. Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.
President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not. They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik. Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.
Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box. Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France. The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.
Libya is in a profound state of flux. It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed. The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on. Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.
So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department. While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.
Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it. Doesn't it?
Monday, August 29, 2011
Tuesday, August 23, 2011
The "Fall" Of Tripoli And Other Polite Fictions
You will recall no doubt that NATO air forces have been operating under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution to "protect" civilians caught in the crossfire between rebels and troops loyal to noted humanitarian, African "King of Kings," and Brother Leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi. To some of the NATO countries such as Germany and Turkey, even this limited mission was unacceptably broad and all too fraught with the possibility that someone, somewhere, somehow might kill someone else. To other members, the US, the UK, and France come to mind, the only way to accomplish the prescribed action was through the removal of Gaddafi.
Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime. When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure. It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.
In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west. The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation. Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.
The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces. Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO." Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.
The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate. Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size. The associated body counts were equally small. In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.
As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties. That should have raised flags with all observers. There were darn few dots to connect. The rebels were suddenly more effective. "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target. There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.
Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control. In the past couple of days, due in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.
The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet. In a sense there is no real reason. After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains? Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans? Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?
Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya. A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth. The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.
The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable. The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary. The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.
The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel. Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli. In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.
The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies. Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it. On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush. But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.
A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People. That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan. Hooey! Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone. He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country. This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi. There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.
There is a final polite fiction. That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli. Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental. The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction. The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars. Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.
The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little. Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men." No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off. For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.
A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq. That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not. Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.
The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi. It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise. It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace. It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime. None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.
That challenge?
Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.
If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.
Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime. When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure. It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.
In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west. The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation. Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.
The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces. Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO." Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.
The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate. Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size. The associated body counts were equally small. In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.
As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties. That should have raised flags with all observers. There were darn few dots to connect. The rebels were suddenly more effective. "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target. There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.
Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control. In the past couple of days, due in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.
The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet. In a sense there is no real reason. After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains? Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans? Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?
Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya. A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth. The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.
The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable. The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary. The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.
The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel. Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli. In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.
The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies. Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it. On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush. But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.
A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People. That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan. Hooey! Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone. He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country. This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi. There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.
There is a final polite fiction. That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli. Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental. The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction. The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars. Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.
The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little. Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men." No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off. For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.
A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq. That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not. Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.
The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi. It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise. It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace. It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime. None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.
That challenge?
Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.
If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.
Friday, August 19, 2011
Smart(?) Power In Action
The other day Hilary Clinton and Leon Panetta were on stage at the National Defense University. In the course of the action Ms Clinton bragged on the use of "smart power" by her boss, The Nice Young Man From Chicago, with respect to the Syrian conundrum. She went on to imply strongly that the graduated escalation of economic and diplomatic sanctions in support of the anti-government demonstrators was both without precedent in American diplomatic history and (drum roll, please) constituted a paradigm for the future.
This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.
While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.
Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.
The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.
Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.
The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.
Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.
A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.
These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.
The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.
The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)
The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.
The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.
While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."
By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)
Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.
The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.
This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.
"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)
Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.
This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.
While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.
Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.
The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.
Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.
The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.
Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.
A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.
These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.
The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.
The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)
The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.
The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.
While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."
By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)
Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.
The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.
This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.
"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)
Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.
Sunday, August 14, 2011
Rick Perry And The Big, Bad World
As had been expected for several weeks, Rick Perry has entered the GOP contest. Of this the Geek is both glad and positive. Governor Perry appears to possess the stomach and head necessary for a down and dirty campaign against the Nice Young Man From Chicago which is singularly lacking with other Elephant hopefuls.
The Geek became a fan of Texas politics during the years necessity compelled him to live and work in the Lone Star Empire. The doings at that model of law making decorum called the "Lege" were and are as fascinating as the inner workings of the Cook County (Ill.) Democratic machine. The emergence of Perry showed him to be a man having a strong, visceral understanding of the political soul of most Texans. Over the past year Perry's performance has demonstrated that this gut level talent is not restricted to the denizens of the LSE but extends to many of We the People.
It is important to enter an important caveat here, a warning of relevance to international politics. Other significant leaders who have exhibited a strong, visceral understanding of their people's national politics such as Vladimir Putin have seen that understanding stop abruptly at the border. They have little if any understanding of the political mood or mode of other people in other countries.
Governor Perry stated strongly in Charleston that he was a strong believer in "American exceptionalism," which places him in very sharp contrast with the relativistic Mr Obama. This posture while laudable in itself demands yet another caveat in the arena of global affairs. The "exceptionalism" part of the phrase consists of characteristics, attributes, and values which are under a permanent export ban. American exceptionalism is not only made in America by dint of suffering, war, political struggles, and endless effort, it must forever stay in the land of its fabrication. It is unique to us for it is uniquely us and ours. No bayonet, no tank, no stealth fighter, no UAV, no aid program, no propaganda effort, no executive order or congressional enactment can force its export to other, foreign soils. As a transplant it must fail.
On his campaign website, Mr Perry avers that his service as a C-130 driver as well as his many foreign trips as governor give him insight into the needs of American diplomatic and national security policy. While it is true that the governor flew Herky birds with numerous RONs and TDYs, the result would be an intimate acquaintance with nocturnal resorts of entertainment and recreation but little contact with the dark doings of foreign chanceries or the gavottes in distant corridors of power. (To this truism any person with a peripatetic military experience can attest.) And, as governor Mr Perry's overseas jaunts were in the interest of the economic development of the LSE not the national interests of the US.
In his speech at Charleston, the Texan was more than kind when he characterized whatever passes as foreign policy within the Obama administration as a "muddle." It is, of course, far worse than that. It is even worse than a collection of blunders wrapped in empty, high sounding rhetoric. Rather, it is an ideologically driven exercise in ad hoc reaction coupled with a set of self-defeating visions of how the world ought to be if only it were designed in Left leaning academic salons located near the University of Chicago campus.
At least implicitly (if Rick "No One Crosses Me and Lives" Perry can ever be merely implicit) the Texas Cyclone of Prayer vowed to change this. He evidently intends to assure the US once again walks tall and proud on the international stage. This would be a welcome change after the years of "leading from behind" but carries with it yet another, larger caveat.
This caveat resides in the coterie Perry has assembled to date as his advisers on foreign and national security affairs. Without notable exception, it is comprised of neocon ninnies out of the years of the Bush/Cheney administration. At the head of the list is the execrable Doug Feith, the top architect of the debacle in Iraq. Other members have an equally illustrious record. From their post administration writings and speeches, it is apparent they have neither learned nor forgotten a single iota. None have seen the failings produced by their own ideologically predicated view of the world and the role of the US in that world.
Unless Governor Perry expands his advisory staff, there is a very grave danger that his understanding of the abilities and limits of American power will be as disastrously off the mark as were those of George W. Bush. Neither the US nor the world can live with yet another ideologically predicated misreading of what the US can and cannot do with respect to the internal workings of other countries.
It is important to note that not since George H.W. Bush left office has the US enjoyed the services of a president who was both internationally focused and relatively bereft of ideological blinders. The many years of Clinton, George W. Bush and His Hindmost, Barack Obama--each with either or both a disinterest in foreign affairs or ideological predicates of overwhelming power--have seen the steady decline of the US as a Great Power with influence and potency. Given that the next president will be laboring under serious budgetary constraints, the question of the relations of the US with the rest of the world as well as the American capacity and will to defend and advance its national interests will be under very severe challenge.
More than ever we will need a president who realistically assesses our national interests and tailors our diplomacy and military to protect and advance those interests regardless of extraneous considerations including ideological preferences and prejudices. The next president will face a world which remains what it always has been--a dangerous place replete with countries which oppose us and our interests and actors both state and non-state who wish to do us harm. The world will also contain countries which share values and norms with us and with which we have coinciding national interests.
The next president must do what the present incumbent has failed to do with striking obviousness--parse between the enemies and the allies. He must be able and willing to cozen and stroke the latter while drawing in a credible manner the necessary lines in the sand regarding the former.
As Perry lacks any significant foreign policy experience and whose direct experience with military affairs and war fighting is limited to the perspective offered from the cockpit of a C-130, he will depend heavily on his foreign policy and national security teams. Given his first picks as advisers, there is, unfortunately, little if any reason to be hopeful in this regard.
In the future national interest as well as his own personal political fortune, Governor Perry ought to fire the present advisory staff. It is the only smart and prudential thing to do. He has to put daylight between himself and George W. Bush, and listening to the old gang of neocon ninnies is not the way to offset the inevitable Obama camp attacks seeking to make Perry look like the much disliked (not to say hated) Bush, Jr.
(Full disclosure in blogging statement: The Geek is not angling for a job with the Perry camp as he is constitutionally incapable of working for anyone.)
The Geek became a fan of Texas politics during the years necessity compelled him to live and work in the Lone Star Empire. The doings at that model of law making decorum called the "Lege" were and are as fascinating as the inner workings of the Cook County (Ill.) Democratic machine. The emergence of Perry showed him to be a man having a strong, visceral understanding of the political soul of most Texans. Over the past year Perry's performance has demonstrated that this gut level talent is not restricted to the denizens of the LSE but extends to many of We the People.
It is important to enter an important caveat here, a warning of relevance to international politics. Other significant leaders who have exhibited a strong, visceral understanding of their people's national politics such as Vladimir Putin have seen that understanding stop abruptly at the border. They have little if any understanding of the political mood or mode of other people in other countries.
Governor Perry stated strongly in Charleston that he was a strong believer in "American exceptionalism," which places him in very sharp contrast with the relativistic Mr Obama. This posture while laudable in itself demands yet another caveat in the arena of global affairs. The "exceptionalism" part of the phrase consists of characteristics, attributes, and values which are under a permanent export ban. American exceptionalism is not only made in America by dint of suffering, war, political struggles, and endless effort, it must forever stay in the land of its fabrication. It is unique to us for it is uniquely us and ours. No bayonet, no tank, no stealth fighter, no UAV, no aid program, no propaganda effort, no executive order or congressional enactment can force its export to other, foreign soils. As a transplant it must fail.
On his campaign website, Mr Perry avers that his service as a C-130 driver as well as his many foreign trips as governor give him insight into the needs of American diplomatic and national security policy. While it is true that the governor flew Herky birds with numerous RONs and TDYs, the result would be an intimate acquaintance with nocturnal resorts of entertainment and recreation but little contact with the dark doings of foreign chanceries or the gavottes in distant corridors of power. (To this truism any person with a peripatetic military experience can attest.) And, as governor Mr Perry's overseas jaunts were in the interest of the economic development of the LSE not the national interests of the US.
In his speech at Charleston, the Texan was more than kind when he characterized whatever passes as foreign policy within the Obama administration as a "muddle." It is, of course, far worse than that. It is even worse than a collection of blunders wrapped in empty, high sounding rhetoric. Rather, it is an ideologically driven exercise in ad hoc reaction coupled with a set of self-defeating visions of how the world ought to be if only it were designed in Left leaning academic salons located near the University of Chicago campus.
At least implicitly (if Rick "No One Crosses Me and Lives" Perry can ever be merely implicit) the Texas Cyclone of Prayer vowed to change this. He evidently intends to assure the US once again walks tall and proud on the international stage. This would be a welcome change after the years of "leading from behind" but carries with it yet another, larger caveat.
This caveat resides in the coterie Perry has assembled to date as his advisers on foreign and national security affairs. Without notable exception, it is comprised of neocon ninnies out of the years of the Bush/Cheney administration. At the head of the list is the execrable Doug Feith, the top architect of the debacle in Iraq. Other members have an equally illustrious record. From their post administration writings and speeches, it is apparent they have neither learned nor forgotten a single iota. None have seen the failings produced by their own ideologically predicated view of the world and the role of the US in that world.
Unless Governor Perry expands his advisory staff, there is a very grave danger that his understanding of the abilities and limits of American power will be as disastrously off the mark as were those of George W. Bush. Neither the US nor the world can live with yet another ideologically predicated misreading of what the US can and cannot do with respect to the internal workings of other countries.
It is important to note that not since George H.W. Bush left office has the US enjoyed the services of a president who was both internationally focused and relatively bereft of ideological blinders. The many years of Clinton, George W. Bush and His Hindmost, Barack Obama--each with either or both a disinterest in foreign affairs or ideological predicates of overwhelming power--have seen the steady decline of the US as a Great Power with influence and potency. Given that the next president will be laboring under serious budgetary constraints, the question of the relations of the US with the rest of the world as well as the American capacity and will to defend and advance its national interests will be under very severe challenge.
More than ever we will need a president who realistically assesses our national interests and tailors our diplomacy and military to protect and advance those interests regardless of extraneous considerations including ideological preferences and prejudices. The next president will face a world which remains what it always has been--a dangerous place replete with countries which oppose us and our interests and actors both state and non-state who wish to do us harm. The world will also contain countries which share values and norms with us and with which we have coinciding national interests.
The next president must do what the present incumbent has failed to do with striking obviousness--parse between the enemies and the allies. He must be able and willing to cozen and stroke the latter while drawing in a credible manner the necessary lines in the sand regarding the former.
As Perry lacks any significant foreign policy experience and whose direct experience with military affairs and war fighting is limited to the perspective offered from the cockpit of a C-130, he will depend heavily on his foreign policy and national security teams. Given his first picks as advisers, there is, unfortunately, little if any reason to be hopeful in this regard.
In the future national interest as well as his own personal political fortune, Governor Perry ought to fire the present advisory staff. It is the only smart and prudential thing to do. He has to put daylight between himself and George W. Bush, and listening to the old gang of neocon ninnies is not the way to offset the inevitable Obama camp attacks seeking to make Perry look like the much disliked (not to say hated) Bush, Jr.
(Full disclosure in blogging statement: The Geek is not angling for a job with the Perry camp as he is constitutionally incapable of working for anyone.)
Saturday, August 13, 2011
Afghanistan Or Pashtunstan--A Back-to-the-Future Ending
Overshadowed by the Great Debt Ceiling Battle, the Great Downgrading, and the Miracle of the Job Free Recovery, the US has reached a very critical crossroad in Afghanistan. In truth we haven't just reached it, we have pushed for it, rushed to it, and sought it with the eagerness of a drowning man clawing for the sky.
The US wants out of Afghanistan in the worst sort of way. With the exception of some military people, most but not all of senior rank, the current political leadership of the US along with most of We the People want out, right now if possible, but tomorrow at the latest. This is the ground reality regardless of President Obama's patent bromide about pressing on regardless delivered in the wake of the Chinook shoot-down and the deaths of more than two dozen men from Boat Six.
Of course, We the People, the congress, and the Clueless Guy in the Oval would like it best if the US can get out of Afghanistan with a modicum of dignity and a sufficient simulacrum of success to offset the billions of bucks spent and the hundreds of lives sacrificed on the alter of "nation-building." Congressman Ron Paul was speaking for many besides himself at the Iowa debate when he denounced the American adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan while warning against any repeat in Iran. Heads no doubt nodded in agreement across the country as he delivered his neo-isolationist message for the umpteenth time.
One unnecessary and unjustifiable war is reaching its quite unsatisfying conclusion. As the Iraqi excuse for a parliament dithers over whether or not to invite American "trainers" to remain in country after the last day of this year, it has become brilliantly clear that only Saddam Hussein lost to a greater extent than did the US over the course of this long, bloody exercise in regime change.
Iran has emerged as the big winner in the contest as shown by Baghdad's alignment with Tehran over the question of Syria. This is simply the most recent, most dramatic example of the triumph of Shia faith over all other considerations in the deeply divided human terrain of Iraq. But, far outside of international politics, in the quotidian dealings of business, it is instructive that US companies have lost out repeatedly and consistently to competitors from China, Russia, and Europe for the lucrative opportunities available in the country which was--we were assured--going to pay for the costs of liberation, rejoice in new democratic freedoms, greet American troops as the French did after D-Day, and generally rally to the American flag.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the US lost in the Iraqi gambit. And, now, we face losing in Afghanistan as well. No, we will not be defeated in the field by Taliban, the Haqqani network, and their Pakistani backers. There are simply not enough lucky shots by RPGs to do that. Rather, we will conspire in our own defeat at the hands not of Taliban alone, nor by the combination of Taliban and Pakistan but rather by the joint efforts of "our man in Kabul," Hamid Karzai, the Pakistanis, and Taliban.
Karzai wants out of the war with a fervor which surpasses even that of the US and its partners in the ISAF. To this end he has been seeking a species of separate peace with Taliban for some time now. He has been seeking this goal not through the public means of the Supreme Peace Jurga, a large, unwieldy and totally implausible group, but through low key, private, and ever-so-discrete conversations in the presidential palace as well as out of country locations.
The glue which would hold any peace agreement together is simply that Karzai as well as the overwhelming majority of Taliban is Pashtu speaking. They are all good Pashtuns on the Secret Peace Bus. As the Pakistanis understand and support the Pashtun super-tribe due to its domination of the key border areas of the FATA, there is no doubt but Islamabad is well represented on the Peace Bus as well. This means their strategic political position in Afghanistan will be protected in full.
The ethnic Uzbeks, Tajjks, and Hazaras constituting the majority of the population in northern Afghanistan are not represented on the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pashtun Peace Express. These are the same people who suffered the most under the rule of the Taliban and whose Northern Alliance comprised the bulk of the indigenous fighters cooperating with the American invaders ten years ago.
It is not surprising that the old Northern Alliance is silently reforming. It is no surprise that the non-Pushtu population is rearming at a great rate of knots. Nor will it be surprising when renewed civil war greets the announcement of a peace brokered by Pushtuns for the benefit of Pushtuns. Last of all, there will be no surprise when the US greets the peace with loud applause and the ensuing internal war with a complete and utter silence.
It is not that the Deep Thinkers around the Oval are unaware of what is taking place in Kabul. Even if the totality of American intelligence assets was detained on matters of tactical and operational focus, the US is aware of both the ongoing Karzai effort and the probable outcome(s.) The former head of Afghanistan's premiere intelligence service, Amrolah Saleh, has been all but shouting it from the minarets since he was forced from office last year by Karzai.
Saleh is not only very highly respected by intelligence professionals from the US, the UK, and elsewhere, he is personally honest, not at all corrupt, and, most important, committed to the notion of an Afghanistan which includes all the several ethnic groups on a basis of equality before the law as well as in politics. He is post-tribal to a fault. And, in Afghanistan, being post-tribal in worldview is a grave fault.
Saleh's message is simple, easy to corroborate, and very well rooted historically. Should the Great All Pashtun Peace Express arrive at its destination, the result will be fatal for Afghanistan. In short, Afghanistan will return to what it was the day before the first American boot hit Afghan soil. A predominantly Pushtu, religiously predicated, and robustly violent Taliban will run the southern two thirds of the country to the advantage of Islamabad while the reconstituted Northern Alliance will fight a defensive insurgency based upon ethnic identity in the final third.
A decade or more of war, hundreds of American lives, billions of dollars to say nothing of the indescribable sufferings of the Afghans caught in the crossfire, will finally result in a back-to-the-future ending. Worst of all, there is virtually nothing the US can do about it.
We were doomed in our efforts the moment George W. Bush and his neocon ninny crew decided to engage in nation-building in Afghanistan in lieu of a simple, straight forward punitive expedition. In the rush to invade Iraq so as to teach the Arabs a lesson in how to elect good men which was not needed or indicated, the men of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld administration assured we were on a mission-impossible in Afghanistan.
Now we must reap the harvest of the seeds those intellectually challenged, ideologically driven men planted. We can see the crop now, a government which is a broken, rotten travesty, a people demoralized and victimized by a war in which none have a direct stake, an army and police force which exists more in name than in the field, and an "ally" in Pakistan which is an adversary in all but name. All that is needed to complete the harvest is the "success" of the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pushtun Peace Bus.
When that happens--and it is question of when not if, the US will be (including Vietnam) 0 for 3 in large scale interventionary operations. That record is not simply pathetic, it is one of self-inflicted defeats unrivaled by any other major country in recent history. (Even the French were only 0 for 2.)
Does this mean that Ron Paul is right? Does it mean the US would be best served by an isolationist posture? It does imply that the US is so preposterously pathetic in its efforts at muscular nation-building that we should abandon any future efforts in that direction. Of course, the world may not be willing to let us off so easy--and we may not be able to resist future temptations to do good.
The Geek has some thoughts on those questions. (No shock there.) Stay tuned. He will be back.
The US wants out of Afghanistan in the worst sort of way. With the exception of some military people, most but not all of senior rank, the current political leadership of the US along with most of We the People want out, right now if possible, but tomorrow at the latest. This is the ground reality regardless of President Obama's patent bromide about pressing on regardless delivered in the wake of the Chinook shoot-down and the deaths of more than two dozen men from Boat Six.
Of course, We the People, the congress, and the Clueless Guy in the Oval would like it best if the US can get out of Afghanistan with a modicum of dignity and a sufficient simulacrum of success to offset the billions of bucks spent and the hundreds of lives sacrificed on the alter of "nation-building." Congressman Ron Paul was speaking for many besides himself at the Iowa debate when he denounced the American adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan while warning against any repeat in Iran. Heads no doubt nodded in agreement across the country as he delivered his neo-isolationist message for the umpteenth time.
One unnecessary and unjustifiable war is reaching its quite unsatisfying conclusion. As the Iraqi excuse for a parliament dithers over whether or not to invite American "trainers" to remain in country after the last day of this year, it has become brilliantly clear that only Saddam Hussein lost to a greater extent than did the US over the course of this long, bloody exercise in regime change.
Iran has emerged as the big winner in the contest as shown by Baghdad's alignment with Tehran over the question of Syria. This is simply the most recent, most dramatic example of the triumph of Shia faith over all other considerations in the deeply divided human terrain of Iraq. But, far outside of international politics, in the quotidian dealings of business, it is instructive that US companies have lost out repeatedly and consistently to competitors from China, Russia, and Europe for the lucrative opportunities available in the country which was--we were assured--going to pay for the costs of liberation, rejoice in new democratic freedoms, greet American troops as the French did after D-Day, and generally rally to the American flag.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the US lost in the Iraqi gambit. And, now, we face losing in Afghanistan as well. No, we will not be defeated in the field by Taliban, the Haqqani network, and their Pakistani backers. There are simply not enough lucky shots by RPGs to do that. Rather, we will conspire in our own defeat at the hands not of Taliban alone, nor by the combination of Taliban and Pakistan but rather by the joint efforts of "our man in Kabul," Hamid Karzai, the Pakistanis, and Taliban.
Karzai wants out of the war with a fervor which surpasses even that of the US and its partners in the ISAF. To this end he has been seeking a species of separate peace with Taliban for some time now. He has been seeking this goal not through the public means of the Supreme Peace Jurga, a large, unwieldy and totally implausible group, but through low key, private, and ever-so-discrete conversations in the presidential palace as well as out of country locations.
The glue which would hold any peace agreement together is simply that Karzai as well as the overwhelming majority of Taliban is Pashtu speaking. They are all good Pashtuns on the Secret Peace Bus. As the Pakistanis understand and support the Pashtun super-tribe due to its domination of the key border areas of the FATA, there is no doubt but Islamabad is well represented on the Peace Bus as well. This means their strategic political position in Afghanistan will be protected in full.
The ethnic Uzbeks, Tajjks, and Hazaras constituting the majority of the population in northern Afghanistan are not represented on the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pashtun Peace Express. These are the same people who suffered the most under the rule of the Taliban and whose Northern Alliance comprised the bulk of the indigenous fighters cooperating with the American invaders ten years ago.
It is not surprising that the old Northern Alliance is silently reforming. It is no surprise that the non-Pushtu population is rearming at a great rate of knots. Nor will it be surprising when renewed civil war greets the announcement of a peace brokered by Pushtuns for the benefit of Pushtuns. Last of all, there will be no surprise when the US greets the peace with loud applause and the ensuing internal war with a complete and utter silence.
It is not that the Deep Thinkers around the Oval are unaware of what is taking place in Kabul. Even if the totality of American intelligence assets was detained on matters of tactical and operational focus, the US is aware of both the ongoing Karzai effort and the probable outcome(s.) The former head of Afghanistan's premiere intelligence service, Amrolah Saleh, has been all but shouting it from the minarets since he was forced from office last year by Karzai.
Saleh is not only very highly respected by intelligence professionals from the US, the UK, and elsewhere, he is personally honest, not at all corrupt, and, most important, committed to the notion of an Afghanistan which includes all the several ethnic groups on a basis of equality before the law as well as in politics. He is post-tribal to a fault. And, in Afghanistan, being post-tribal in worldview is a grave fault.
Saleh's message is simple, easy to corroborate, and very well rooted historically. Should the Great All Pashtun Peace Express arrive at its destination, the result will be fatal for Afghanistan. In short, Afghanistan will return to what it was the day before the first American boot hit Afghan soil. A predominantly Pushtu, religiously predicated, and robustly violent Taliban will run the southern two thirds of the country to the advantage of Islamabad while the reconstituted Northern Alliance will fight a defensive insurgency based upon ethnic identity in the final third.
A decade or more of war, hundreds of American lives, billions of dollars to say nothing of the indescribable sufferings of the Afghans caught in the crossfire, will finally result in a back-to-the-future ending. Worst of all, there is virtually nothing the US can do about it.
We were doomed in our efforts the moment George W. Bush and his neocon ninny crew decided to engage in nation-building in Afghanistan in lieu of a simple, straight forward punitive expedition. In the rush to invade Iraq so as to teach the Arabs a lesson in how to elect good men which was not needed or indicated, the men of the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld administration assured we were on a mission-impossible in Afghanistan.
Now we must reap the harvest of the seeds those intellectually challenged, ideologically driven men planted. We can see the crop now, a government which is a broken, rotten travesty, a people demoralized and victimized by a war in which none have a direct stake, an army and police force which exists more in name than in the field, and an "ally" in Pakistan which is an adversary in all but name. All that is needed to complete the harvest is the "success" of the Karzai-Taliban-Pakistan All Pushtun Peace Bus.
When that happens--and it is question of when not if, the US will be (including Vietnam) 0 for 3 in large scale interventionary operations. That record is not simply pathetic, it is one of self-inflicted defeats unrivaled by any other major country in recent history. (Even the French were only 0 for 2.)
Does this mean that Ron Paul is right? Does it mean the US would be best served by an isolationist posture? It does imply that the US is so preposterously pathetic in its efforts at muscular nation-building that we should abandon any future efforts in that direction. Of course, the world may not be willing to let us off so easy--and we may not be able to resist future temptations to do good.
The Geek has some thoughts on those questions. (No shock there.) Stay tuned. He will be back.
Tuesday, August 9, 2011
Time For The "Nuclear Option"
The US and assorted other civilized states have been making noises and ugly faces for some years now over the Iranian efforts to attain nuclear weapons. Diplomatic and economic sanctions have been employed. So have more robust measures ranging from the more or less covert such as computer viruses to the rather obvious, the shooting of nuclear researchers.
Th net result has been the continued and accelerating Iranian quest for the bomb.
Years ago, the notion of Iranian science or work in advanced technology would have been seen quite properly as an oxymoron. During the early days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, science and technology were downgraded severely as a matter of theologically predicated policy. It was only years later, years marked by the stalemated bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War, that the mullahs and ayatollahs changed their religious tune. Only after the near defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Iraq convinced the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution that the deity did, after all, will Iran to have sufficient and sufficiently advanced weapons to protect the revolution.
Science and technology came back to the front and center of Iranian governmental life in the late Eighties and beyond. Oil money poured into new and reinvigorated institutes and university departments. Chief among these were those entities which dealt with nuclear research and development as well as key support systems of nuclear weapons including but not limited to ballistic and guided missiles.
The Iranians deserve great credit for accomplishing much over the next two decades. In both nuclear and missile development, they were very much on their own. Only South Africa was as internationally isolated during its nuclear development period--and even then the Pretoria regime received some assistance from Israel including supplies of tritium necessary for boosted fission as well as fusion bombs. Other than some early model centrifuges from A.Q Khan's ring in Pakistan, the Iranians pulled themselves up by their own fission bootstraps.
The monolithic Western governmental opposition linked with the earlier conviction that only a nuclear capacity would assure Iranian survival in a future war to enhance greatly the firm belief that the possession of nuclear weapons was an existential matter. The existential foundation of the nuclear option was reinforced by Tehran's observation of how the US treated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Islamabad Bad Boys were handled with gentility and respect by Washington for one simple reason--Pakistan had the bomb.
This meant that should Iran match Pakistan's accomplishment, the result would be elevated status on both the global and regional stages. Not only would the "Mahdi Bomb" assure Iran's survival as an Islamic theocracy, it would propel the country to the status of regional hegemon and global actor of real potency. These were two very fine reasons to bear heavy burdens and make great sacrifices for the years it would take to develop a credible nuclear capacity.
There is no doubt but the many sanctions regimes imposed, particularly those of recent origin focusing on shipping and insurance, have place very heavy loads on the Iranian economy. There is no doubt but the sanctions taken in total have forced the Iranian government and people to make sacrifices over and above those required by the inefficient and repressive nature of the government.
Most importantly, there is no reason to conclude that the sanctions and diplomatic pressures have modified Iranian behavior--other than to make the mullahs and their frontmen more intransigent, more creative in sanction evasion, and more committed to acquiring the bomb no matter what the price.
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, in the battle of political wills between the US led West and Iran, it is the latter which is winning. In this context, the Iranians have introduced a form of game changer--a new generation of improved centrifuges which will reduce greatly the time needed to turn twenty percent enriched uranium into weapons grade stuff. Further, they have acted in a prudential manner, placing the new fast-spinners in deep dug bunkers.
Now ninety plus senators have urged the immediate introduction of a game changer from the American perspective. In a letter to the president, this overwhelming majority of the senate have demanded the imposition of sanctions against the Iranian central bank, the bank created some fifty years ago to act as the interface between the consumers of Iranian oil and the Tehran government. This move, described as the "nuclear option," would, if enforced, prevent the clearing of payments to Iran from all purchasers of oil.
For its part, the government of Iran has stated this move would constitute "an act of war."
While not being an armed action, the isolation of the Iranian Bank Markazi would be the equivalent in effect of the US freezing of all Japanese assets in the summer of 1941. That action, the culmination of a long campaign of escalating economic pressures, prevented Japan from acquiring oil and other strategic materials from the US. This gave the government of Imperial Japan the choice of a humiliating surrender to American political dictates or war.
As you know, the Japanese chose the second alternative. The decision makers believed that the fortunes of war might favor Japan given other constraints operating on the US including the ongoing Great Depression and a preoccupation with Nazi Germany.
It would not be irrational for Tehran to make the same choice today or into the near future. The US is in the throes of a severe economic challenge including possibly the second of a double dip recession. It is still engaged in an unpopular and seemingly inconclusive war in Afghanistan. The current administration is perceived as both irresolute and feckless.
The senators hint at the possibility of legislation compelling the imposition of the ultimate sanction should the president decide not to use the authority he already has to make the move. This make the challenge both direct and definitely non-trivial. As the choice is both clear and stark, it will be difficult for Mr Obama to "lead from behind" or equivocate. And, it is debatable whether or not he has the political capital necessary to stare the senators down.
Were the Iranians to choose war, now is the least-worst time for us to fight it. Looking ahead, there is no doubt but the American military will be significantly weaker a year or two hence. The budget battles assure the Pentagon will take a heavy hit. In this context is is important to recall that people close to the Oval have intimated the president would be happy to see the military budget at or below fifteen percent of total expenditures. This would be a funding level not seen since the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.
We forget how unready the US was for World War II. We forget how difficult it was to mobilize our industrial resources and manpower for that war. Perhaps most important, we overlook the fact that playing the sort of catch-up now that we did so well seventy years ago is quite impossible. It is no longer feasible or even possible to undertake the kind of forced draft military build-up today which we did between 1941 and 1944. The radical changes in military technology have been responsible for this ground truth as they are for the companion reality that a draftee based armed force is not possible.
Right now or in the next few months, the US is quite capable of decisively defeating Iran should the latter be so ill-advised as to treat our imposition of the "nuclear option" as a literal act of war. Further, it is a war which would be widely supported by We the People--provided only that it was fought as a retaliatory and punitive action without any follow-on occupation and rebuilding of the place.
President Obama is long overdue in making a defecate or get off the pot decision about Iran and its search for the bomb. We have played the escalating sanction game long enough and have had more than sufficient opportunity to have observed the counterproductive results. Diplomacy of the talk sort has also run its course without beneficial results.
The senatorial letter is forcing a final decision. Either we have to admit that we can live and the world can live with a nuclear capable Iran and all that implies or we have to take the final, decisive act. The president would be best off acting on his current authority so he will look as if he were actually a "decider guy" as George W. used to put it. Better to look as if you are acting of your own volition than to be seen as being frog marched by the senate.
Should Iran respond with war-like acts either directly or through surrogates, by overt military actions or through terrorism, let it be. As George W. memorably put the matter, "Bring it on!"
Th net result has been the continued and accelerating Iranian quest for the bomb.
Years ago, the notion of Iranian science or work in advanced technology would have been seen quite properly as an oxymoron. During the early days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, science and technology were downgraded severely as a matter of theologically predicated policy. It was only years later, years marked by the stalemated bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War, that the mullahs and ayatollahs changed their religious tune. Only after the near defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Iraq convinced the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution that the deity did, after all, will Iran to have sufficient and sufficiently advanced weapons to protect the revolution.
Science and technology came back to the front and center of Iranian governmental life in the late Eighties and beyond. Oil money poured into new and reinvigorated institutes and university departments. Chief among these were those entities which dealt with nuclear research and development as well as key support systems of nuclear weapons including but not limited to ballistic and guided missiles.
The Iranians deserve great credit for accomplishing much over the next two decades. In both nuclear and missile development, they were very much on their own. Only South Africa was as internationally isolated during its nuclear development period--and even then the Pretoria regime received some assistance from Israel including supplies of tritium necessary for boosted fission as well as fusion bombs. Other than some early model centrifuges from A.Q Khan's ring in Pakistan, the Iranians pulled themselves up by their own fission bootstraps.
The monolithic Western governmental opposition linked with the earlier conviction that only a nuclear capacity would assure Iranian survival in a future war to enhance greatly the firm belief that the possession of nuclear weapons was an existential matter. The existential foundation of the nuclear option was reinforced by Tehran's observation of how the US treated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Islamabad Bad Boys were handled with gentility and respect by Washington for one simple reason--Pakistan had the bomb.
This meant that should Iran match Pakistan's accomplishment, the result would be elevated status on both the global and regional stages. Not only would the "Mahdi Bomb" assure Iran's survival as an Islamic theocracy, it would propel the country to the status of regional hegemon and global actor of real potency. These were two very fine reasons to bear heavy burdens and make great sacrifices for the years it would take to develop a credible nuclear capacity.
There is no doubt but the many sanctions regimes imposed, particularly those of recent origin focusing on shipping and insurance, have place very heavy loads on the Iranian economy. There is no doubt but the sanctions taken in total have forced the Iranian government and people to make sacrifices over and above those required by the inefficient and repressive nature of the government.
Most importantly, there is no reason to conclude that the sanctions and diplomatic pressures have modified Iranian behavior--other than to make the mullahs and their frontmen more intransigent, more creative in sanction evasion, and more committed to acquiring the bomb no matter what the price.
Not to put too fine a point on the matter, in the battle of political wills between the US led West and Iran, it is the latter which is winning. In this context, the Iranians have introduced a form of game changer--a new generation of improved centrifuges which will reduce greatly the time needed to turn twenty percent enriched uranium into weapons grade stuff. Further, they have acted in a prudential manner, placing the new fast-spinners in deep dug bunkers.
Now ninety plus senators have urged the immediate introduction of a game changer from the American perspective. In a letter to the president, this overwhelming majority of the senate have demanded the imposition of sanctions against the Iranian central bank, the bank created some fifty years ago to act as the interface between the consumers of Iranian oil and the Tehran government. This move, described as the "nuclear option," would, if enforced, prevent the clearing of payments to Iran from all purchasers of oil.
For its part, the government of Iran has stated this move would constitute "an act of war."
While not being an armed action, the isolation of the Iranian Bank Markazi would be the equivalent in effect of the US freezing of all Japanese assets in the summer of 1941. That action, the culmination of a long campaign of escalating economic pressures, prevented Japan from acquiring oil and other strategic materials from the US. This gave the government of Imperial Japan the choice of a humiliating surrender to American political dictates or war.
As you know, the Japanese chose the second alternative. The decision makers believed that the fortunes of war might favor Japan given other constraints operating on the US including the ongoing Great Depression and a preoccupation with Nazi Germany.
It would not be irrational for Tehran to make the same choice today or into the near future. The US is in the throes of a severe economic challenge including possibly the second of a double dip recession. It is still engaged in an unpopular and seemingly inconclusive war in Afghanistan. The current administration is perceived as both irresolute and feckless.
The senators hint at the possibility of legislation compelling the imposition of the ultimate sanction should the president decide not to use the authority he already has to make the move. This make the challenge both direct and definitely non-trivial. As the choice is both clear and stark, it will be difficult for Mr Obama to "lead from behind" or equivocate. And, it is debatable whether or not he has the political capital necessary to stare the senators down.
Were the Iranians to choose war, now is the least-worst time for us to fight it. Looking ahead, there is no doubt but the American military will be significantly weaker a year or two hence. The budget battles assure the Pentagon will take a heavy hit. In this context is is important to recall that people close to the Oval have intimated the president would be happy to see the military budget at or below fifteen percent of total expenditures. This would be a funding level not seen since the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.
We forget how unready the US was for World War II. We forget how difficult it was to mobilize our industrial resources and manpower for that war. Perhaps most important, we overlook the fact that playing the sort of catch-up now that we did so well seventy years ago is quite impossible. It is no longer feasible or even possible to undertake the kind of forced draft military build-up today which we did between 1941 and 1944. The radical changes in military technology have been responsible for this ground truth as they are for the companion reality that a draftee based armed force is not possible.
Right now or in the next few months, the US is quite capable of decisively defeating Iran should the latter be so ill-advised as to treat our imposition of the "nuclear option" as a literal act of war. Further, it is a war which would be widely supported by We the People--provided only that it was fought as a retaliatory and punitive action without any follow-on occupation and rebuilding of the place.
President Obama is long overdue in making a defecate or get off the pot decision about Iran and its search for the bomb. We have played the escalating sanction game long enough and have had more than sufficient opportunity to have observed the counterproductive results. Diplomacy of the talk sort has also run its course without beneficial results.
The senatorial letter is forcing a final decision. Either we have to admit that we can live and the world can live with a nuclear capable Iran and all that implies or we have to take the final, decisive act. The president would be best off acting on his current authority so he will look as if he were actually a "decider guy" as George W. used to put it. Better to look as if you are acting of your own volition than to be seen as being frog marched by the senate.
Should Iran respond with war-like acts either directly or through surrogates, by overt military actions or through terrorism, let it be. As George W. memorably put the matter, "Bring it on!"
Sunday, August 7, 2011
The Bugs Bunny "What A Maroon!" Award Returns
It has been some time since the Geek last bestowed the highly coveted "What A Maroon! Award." This has not been due to a dearth of candidates. Quite the contrary, the past several months have been awash to the scuppers with moronic policies and the severely intellectually challenged folks behind them. Simply, there have been entirely too many possibilities to single out just one each and every week.
Fortunately, a person has emerged from the fog of merely inept, incompetent, brain dead wonks and pols inside the Beltway. Finally there has been an act of such unmitigated idiocy that the Award must be bestowed.
The envelop, please. Riiippp. Raise the slip of paper inside. Read the distinguished name of the winner.
"And, the winner is.....(drum roll.) Lick lips in anticipations. "The winner is Hillary Clinton!" Applause.
That's right, bucko. The recipient is our most distinguished Secretary of State. Ms Clinton gets the Award not for her efforts to push back on the eviscerated foreign aid budget. Nor for her opposition to the cuts to the Foreign Service appropriation. No. Those were not moronic.
Well, what then? Is this belated recognition for Hilary's hard work to bring about the Libyan policy morass? No, although a strong case can be made for her receiving at least an honorable mention in this area.
SecState Clinton deserves the "What A Maroon!" Award for her recent collaboration with the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC,) the Turkish proponent of political Islam and historian manque, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in the area of preventing religious defamation. In an announcement datelined Jeddah, Ms Clinton and Dr Ihsanoglu declared the US would host a series of meetings to focus on the implementation of a UN Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.
This measure passed by the discredited Human Rights Council last March is intended to combat in an "urgent" fashion the growth of something called "Islamophobia." While carefully avoiding the use of either the word "Islam" or "Muslim," the intent of the resolution to single out the faith of the Prophet for special protection is clear. The fifty plus Muslim majority states of the OIC have long pushed for the criminalization of any written, spoken, or graphic consideration of any aspect of Islam in any manner other than the adulatory. After many failures, the OIC and its supporters such as Russia and China succeeded in getting 16/18 passed by a minority of the HRC members.
It is always essential to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of the OIC membership is well known for limiting free expression and inquiry. The same is true of states which have sided with the OIC in its efforts to stifle open expression and the equally free inquiry which accompanies expression. Some OIC states, such as Pakistan, whose delegation introduced 16/18 as well as its numerous predecessors, has blasphemy laws of the most draconian sort enshrined in law.
It is equally necessary to recall that OIC states such as Egypt are (in)famous for the easy availability of antisemitic billingsgate such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Throughout the Muslim states, Judaism is defamed in the worst imaginable ways and in all media. Christianity is no better treated. Nor is Hinduism. Or Buddhism. Or minority groups within Islam such as the Alawites of Syria. All religions other than the most mainstream versions of Islam are fair targets for "defamation." Even the two largest subgroups of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia are willing, even eager, to "defame" the other.
Of course this "defamation" is not seen as such by the Muslims. To a good Muslim, the other faiths are either bastions of the infidel or expressions of apostasy. Thus, it is impossible by definition to "defame" them. Having not submitted to the unique Muslim view of the deity, adherents to all other faiths are fair game for whatever vitriol any Muslim cares to spill forth.
Logically, as the only "true" faith, only Islam merits protection as only Islam can be "defamed" by the vile slanders of the infidels and apostates. It is not extreme to assert that even the most objective, fact based, well documented assessment of Islam is automatically "defamatory" if it comes from the tongue or pen of an infidel or apostate. Considered from a Muslim perspective, the HRC resolution and all national policies or actions which arise from its application can serve to protect only Islam as only Islam resides in the realm of true faith.
As a dedicated adherent of political Islam, the OIC Secretary General is willing to do whatever is necessary to advance and protect the interests and position of Islam. Thus, it is not surprising that he seized upon the Norwegian tragedy to argue that now more than ever the states of the West must move quickly and effectively to turn the theory of resolution 16/18 into legal practice. The unfortunate reaction of so many in the Western and American elites to the berserker act of Brevik gave added power to Ishanoglu's argument.
The elites in the post-Brevik days continued and amplified their assertion that any criticism of Islam or any linkage of Muslims with terror serves the end of alleged "rightwing extremists" with the results such as those in Norway. This exercise in absurdity and political correctness automatically plays into the censorious hands of the OIC. Somehow, even the most objective and well-documented negative interpretations of Islam or the relation between the tenets of the faith and violent political actions are seen by the left leaning elites as being responsible for the action of Brevik. Without any documentation, the same people argue that a myriad of potential Breviks are lurking all through Western and American societies waiting to be triggered into violence by some less than hosanna laden treatment of Islam or Muslims.
Showing her elite credentials and leftward bent, Ms Clinton signed onto the OIC's gag-the-infidels gambit. No matter what her intentions are and no matter what the outcome may be, the secretary's agreement to a series of meetings oriented to putting 16/18 into practice gives the Muslim "speechophobic" move a legitimacy it does not deserve. Her action provides an imprimatur to a resolution which strikes at the heart of the most basic and critical right resident in Western societies.
Free inquiry and expression is a protean right. It is also a right from which many others emerge. It is so basic to Western liberties and Western economic, social, political, and cultural development that it is simply impossible to separate free speech from the West as it exists today. The utter absence of any real free inquiry and expression in the countries of the OIC goes far to explain why these states are comparatively backwards in all respects.
The irrelevance of rights, including that of free expression and inquiry, in Muslim majority states is not surprising. Islam, unlike other major faiths, has no inherent concept of rights. Islam is all about duty. Believers have duties to the deity and to other believers, but, as good slaves, they have no inherent rights. In sharp contrast, other faiths, particularly those preeminent in the West, not only acknowledge the existence of rights, rights which are inherent to the human condition, but exalt those rights by stating clearly and repeatedly that the exercise of rights requires the concomitant acceptance of duties.
To the faithful Muslim, the Western emphasis on rights constitutes a world through the looking glass. It is not comprehensible to the good and faithful Muslim with his focus on knowing his duties and executing them with willing joy. The Muslim has a duty to protect his religion against the words of the infidels and apostates. His duty goes so far as to seek to prevent the infidel and apostate from sullying the faith by even an honest and objective narrative treatment. The Muslim has a duty to exalt his faith above all others, which means he is allowed to attack the "false" beliefs. His double standard is not hypocritical but rather is an honest expression of duties and beliefs.
Ms Clinton is not a Muslim as far as is publicly known. She is, however, an American. As a holder of an office of trust and confidence under the Constitution, she has taken an oath of office swearing to protect and defend the Constitution to the best of her ability. She is a lawyer by education. Putting the two aspects of Ms Clinton's life together, it must be concluded that she understands the OIC backed resolution is repugnant to the Bill of Rights.
She became a "maroon" of the highest order when she did not meet the demand that the US support 16/18 with any reaction other than gales of derisive laughter.
Fortunately, a person has emerged from the fog of merely inept, incompetent, brain dead wonks and pols inside the Beltway. Finally there has been an act of such unmitigated idiocy that the Award must be bestowed.
The envelop, please. Riiippp. Raise the slip of paper inside. Read the distinguished name of the winner.
"And, the winner is.....(drum roll.) Lick lips in anticipations. "The winner is Hillary Clinton!" Applause.
That's right, bucko. The recipient is our most distinguished Secretary of State. Ms Clinton gets the Award not for her efforts to push back on the eviscerated foreign aid budget. Nor for her opposition to the cuts to the Foreign Service appropriation. No. Those were not moronic.
Well, what then? Is this belated recognition for Hilary's hard work to bring about the Libyan policy morass? No, although a strong case can be made for her receiving at least an honorable mention in this area.
SecState Clinton deserves the "What A Maroon!" Award for her recent collaboration with the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC,) the Turkish proponent of political Islam and historian manque, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, in the area of preventing religious defamation. In an announcement datelined Jeddah, Ms Clinton and Dr Ihsanoglu declared the US would host a series of meetings to focus on the implementation of a UN Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.
This measure passed by the discredited Human Rights Council last March is intended to combat in an "urgent" fashion the growth of something called "Islamophobia." While carefully avoiding the use of either the word "Islam" or "Muslim," the intent of the resolution to single out the faith of the Prophet for special protection is clear. The fifty plus Muslim majority states of the OIC have long pushed for the criminalization of any written, spoken, or graphic consideration of any aspect of Islam in any manner other than the adulatory. After many failures, the OIC and its supporters such as Russia and China succeeded in getting 16/18 passed by a minority of the HRC members.
It is always essential to keep in mind that the overwhelming majority of the OIC membership is well known for limiting free expression and inquiry. The same is true of states which have sided with the OIC in its efforts to stifle open expression and the equally free inquiry which accompanies expression. Some OIC states, such as Pakistan, whose delegation introduced 16/18 as well as its numerous predecessors, has blasphemy laws of the most draconian sort enshrined in law.
It is equally necessary to recall that OIC states such as Egypt are (in)famous for the easy availability of antisemitic billingsgate such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Throughout the Muslim states, Judaism is defamed in the worst imaginable ways and in all media. Christianity is no better treated. Nor is Hinduism. Or Buddhism. Or minority groups within Islam such as the Alawites of Syria. All religions other than the most mainstream versions of Islam are fair targets for "defamation." Even the two largest subgroups of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia are willing, even eager, to "defame" the other.
Of course this "defamation" is not seen as such by the Muslims. To a good Muslim, the other faiths are either bastions of the infidel or expressions of apostasy. Thus, it is impossible by definition to "defame" them. Having not submitted to the unique Muslim view of the deity, adherents to all other faiths are fair game for whatever vitriol any Muslim cares to spill forth.
Logically, as the only "true" faith, only Islam merits protection as only Islam can be "defamed" by the vile slanders of the infidels and apostates. It is not extreme to assert that even the most objective, fact based, well documented assessment of Islam is automatically "defamatory" if it comes from the tongue or pen of an infidel or apostate. Considered from a Muslim perspective, the HRC resolution and all national policies or actions which arise from its application can serve to protect only Islam as only Islam resides in the realm of true faith.
As a dedicated adherent of political Islam, the OIC Secretary General is willing to do whatever is necessary to advance and protect the interests and position of Islam. Thus, it is not surprising that he seized upon the Norwegian tragedy to argue that now more than ever the states of the West must move quickly and effectively to turn the theory of resolution 16/18 into legal practice. The unfortunate reaction of so many in the Western and American elites to the berserker act of Brevik gave added power to Ishanoglu's argument.
The elites in the post-Brevik days continued and amplified their assertion that any criticism of Islam or any linkage of Muslims with terror serves the end of alleged "rightwing extremists" with the results such as those in Norway. This exercise in absurdity and political correctness automatically plays into the censorious hands of the OIC. Somehow, even the most objective and well-documented negative interpretations of Islam or the relation between the tenets of the faith and violent political actions are seen by the left leaning elites as being responsible for the action of Brevik. Without any documentation, the same people argue that a myriad of potential Breviks are lurking all through Western and American societies waiting to be triggered into violence by some less than hosanna laden treatment of Islam or Muslims.
Showing her elite credentials and leftward bent, Ms Clinton signed onto the OIC's gag-the-infidels gambit. No matter what her intentions are and no matter what the outcome may be, the secretary's agreement to a series of meetings oriented to putting 16/18 into practice gives the Muslim "speechophobic" move a legitimacy it does not deserve. Her action provides an imprimatur to a resolution which strikes at the heart of the most basic and critical right resident in Western societies.
Free inquiry and expression is a protean right. It is also a right from which many others emerge. It is so basic to Western liberties and Western economic, social, political, and cultural development that it is simply impossible to separate free speech from the West as it exists today. The utter absence of any real free inquiry and expression in the countries of the OIC goes far to explain why these states are comparatively backwards in all respects.
The irrelevance of rights, including that of free expression and inquiry, in Muslim majority states is not surprising. Islam, unlike other major faiths, has no inherent concept of rights. Islam is all about duty. Believers have duties to the deity and to other believers, but, as good slaves, they have no inherent rights. In sharp contrast, other faiths, particularly those preeminent in the West, not only acknowledge the existence of rights, rights which are inherent to the human condition, but exalt those rights by stating clearly and repeatedly that the exercise of rights requires the concomitant acceptance of duties.
To the faithful Muslim, the Western emphasis on rights constitutes a world through the looking glass. It is not comprehensible to the good and faithful Muslim with his focus on knowing his duties and executing them with willing joy. The Muslim has a duty to protect his religion against the words of the infidels and apostates. His duty goes so far as to seek to prevent the infidel and apostate from sullying the faith by even an honest and objective narrative treatment. The Muslim has a duty to exalt his faith above all others, which means he is allowed to attack the "false" beliefs. His double standard is not hypocritical but rather is an honest expression of duties and beliefs.
Ms Clinton is not a Muslim as far as is publicly known. She is, however, an American. As a holder of an office of trust and confidence under the Constitution, she has taken an oath of office swearing to protect and defend the Constitution to the best of her ability. She is a lawyer by education. Putting the two aspects of Ms Clinton's life together, it must be concluded that she understands the OIC backed resolution is repugnant to the Bill of Rights.
She became a "maroon" of the highest order when she did not meet the demand that the US support 16/18 with any reaction other than gales of derisive laughter.
Saturday, August 6, 2011
Carrying Water And Doublethinking
Leon Panetta is an old Chicago pol. He came of political age as a cog in the oldest, longest running, smoothest operating machine in the US--the Cook County Democratic Party. As such, he knows well the primary duty of a machine man--loyalty to the Boss. By definition the Boss is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Barack Obama.
Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach." Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.
Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size. And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well. If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.
Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11. In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.
Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated. Al-Qaeda is not dead. It is not on some sort of Islamic life support. It is not even gravely ill.
The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed. It has changed profoundly from its original form. Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.
In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system. It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser. None of this obtains today. Nor has it obtained for some time. Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.
Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam. Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.
The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises. Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original. "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group. It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.
The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea. This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.
In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea. It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct. The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam. These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics. Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West. Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.
Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda. Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies. The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.
Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone. In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles. AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat. AQIM is growing. Rapidly.
The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe. This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better. In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death. Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.
AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria. Kidnapping Europeans. This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy. In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort. Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago. Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe. There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.
Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say. Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year. Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US. It is one more rapidly growing threat.
Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge. He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground. He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today. Probably on a larger scale geographically.
Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American. Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits. When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.
Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI. That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols. It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there, that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US. If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.
Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach." Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.
Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size. And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well. If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.
Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11. In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.
Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated. Al-Qaeda is not dead. It is not on some sort of Islamic life support. It is not even gravely ill.
The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed. It has changed profoundly from its original form. Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.
In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system. It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser. None of this obtains today. Nor has it obtained for some time. Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.
Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam. Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.
The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises. Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original. "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group. It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.
The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea. This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.
In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea. It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct. The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam. These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics. Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West. Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.
Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda. Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies. The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.
Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone. In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles. AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat. AQIM is growing. Rapidly.
The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe. This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better. In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death. Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.
AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria. Kidnapping Europeans. This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy. In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort. Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago. Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe. There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.
Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say. Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year. Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US. It is one more rapidly growing threat.
Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge. He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground. He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today. Probably on a larger scale geographically.
Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American. Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits. When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.
Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI. That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols. It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there, that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US. If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Butchering A Sacred Cow
The Pentagon is already scheduled to take a big hit in the money department. In addition, the landmine laden wording of the debt ceiling increase bill assures that should the "super committee" not come up with the requisite 1.2 trillion bucks in additional cuts over the next decade, the "national security" portion of federal expenditures will take another, larger whack. Potentially, the "national security" community could lose over a trillion bucks during the next ten years.
The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security. There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing. On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear. Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.
As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations. As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year. The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.
As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier. The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board. (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.) The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War. And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.
By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron. Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago. It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.
As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released. Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities. The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.
A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted. The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.
The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions. The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack. The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.
The reality was far different. As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support. The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.
Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home. In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.
Will is one thing. Ability is quite another. Political will is perishable. It can flourish. Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight. Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11. But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices. And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.
Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness. The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US. Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer. After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised. It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies. Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).
This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm. The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it. Dollars must be considered. Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things. But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.
The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values. We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power. It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.
The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity. We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical. As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.
The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies. Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia. Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam. The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum. This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.
None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped. But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.
Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner." There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities. It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.
Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US. His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities. And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.
Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget. In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast. By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place. We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming. Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.
Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.
The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security. There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing. On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear. Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.
As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations. As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year. The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.
As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier. The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board. (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.) The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War. And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.
By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron. Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago. It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.
As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released. Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities. The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.
A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted. The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.
The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions. The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack. The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.
The reality was far different. As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support. The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.
Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home. In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.
Will is one thing. Ability is quite another. Political will is perishable. It can flourish. Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight. Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11. But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices. And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.
Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness. The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US. Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer. After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised. It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies. Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).
This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm. The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it. Dollars must be considered. Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things. But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.
The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values. We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power. It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.
The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity. We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical. As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.
The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies. Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia. Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam. The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum. This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.
None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped. But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.
Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner." There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities. It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.
Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US. His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities. And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.
Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget. In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast. By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place. We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming. Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.
Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
A Slick Trip Down The Islamist Tubes?
The Islamist AKP has gained an apparent unassailable superiority over the armed forces of Turkey. The shocking simultaneous "early retirement" of the military chief of staff and three other service commanders over the weekend seemed to have put the final nail in the coffin of the military's role as the ultimate guarantor of Turkish secularism and the legacy of Ataturk.
The act came on the eve of the semi-annual meeting of the combined armed forces senior leadership with the head of the civilian government, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and has been seen by many observers, Turkish as well as foreign, as a welcome sign of Turkey having become a normal democracy where civilian supremacy over the military is a given. In the past, there has been a great deal of discomfort in the US and Western Europe over the periodic military excursions out of the barracks and into the presidential palace. The European Union (or at least France) demanded that the armed forces be defanged as a prerequisite for membership.
The recent mass resignation must be taken in conjunction with the ongoing trial of nearly three hundred past and present senior commanders (ten percent or so of the entire flag officer complement) on charges which are at best politically motivated and most likely fabricated in whole or major part. The massive series of arrests over the past year or so constituted the AKP's direct attack on the military, which was the only plausible obstacle to permanent Islamist domination of Turkish politics.
The armed forces and AKP have been at daggers drawn since the once-banned AKP won power in 2002. The military missed its chance to send the Islamists packing in the wake of the narrow electoral victory mainly out of regard for EU sentiments and a proper regard for the benefits of EU membership. As the years slipped by, the chances for a military coup slipped away until they were lost beyond any hope in the most recent election where AKP took no prisoners at the polls.
Erdogan had made much of his stated intent to pursue EU membership even though it was more than slightly obvious that France would spare no effort to block the application. The economic success of the AKP has been based not on trade with the EU but upon increased ties with the Mideast and the Turkish speaking Central Asian Republics. In the process, a new class of very rich middlemen and entrepreneurs drawn from urban migrants originating in the Anatolian highlands has become a key component of the AKP base. These new millionaires join with displaced peasants in the slums of Istanbul and Ankara and "conservative" clerics to provide the electoral majority.
The rivals to the AKP drive to the east have been the senior officers of the armed forces along with the "traditional" business and commercial elite of Istanbul. The military has at its upper ranks men who are far more Western in their outlook, far more liberal in their views as well as far more educated than the mass of the political class and the new moneyed class. Their instinctive perspective is Western. That of AKP and its base runs to the East, to the Muslim marches of Central and Northwest Asia--and the states of the old Ottoman Empire.
The seemingly decisive victory of AKP over the inheritors of Ataturk is not universally welcomed in Turkey. There are more than a few Turks who fear that without the army as a counterweight there will be no limits on Erdogan and AKP. There is an undercurrent of apprehension that now the Islamists will be free to pursue the goal of reestablishing the old caliphate with all that implies. Others, unsurprisingly, pooh-pooh that notion and welcome AKP confining the armed forces to a subordinate role and, thus, allowing a return to the values and norms of the pre-Ataturk era.
Very few Turks are aghast at the new diplomatic muscle enjoyed by Ankara in the Mideast and Central Asia. Likewise, very few resent the new economic options brought by the "Ost politik" practiced by Erdogan. Other than some trepidations over Turkey's ever closer ties to Shia Iran, there have been few complaints over the foreign policy of Erdogan and company. There is definitely majority support for the very hard line drawn by Erdogan over Israel, particularly the IDF takeover of the Mazi Marmora "humanitarian relief" ship over a year ago.
The net effect has been the tilting of the longstanding conflict between nationalist and Islamist, secularist and Islamist in favor of the latter. For the moment this is just jake with the majority of Turks. But, there is likely to be a quick withdrawal of support for AKP should there be heavy handed attempts to "purify" Turkish society of "infidel" aspects. So far, the party has been sensitive to this dynamic and has moved only slowly to "Islamify" Turkey.
Almost overlooked in the political discussions of the resignations has been another, critical subject: The impact of Turkey's Muslim oriented "Ost politik" on NATO. In as much as Turkey's membership in the alliance has been considered, it has been in the boilerplate terms of "NATO's second largest army." As if size matters.
Turkey's large army is also quite irrelevant to NATO in the post-cold war period. Not only is the army incapable of any effective action outside of Turkey, it has not shown any particular utility in the local "forever war" against the Kurdish defensive insurgency. Pace NATO public statements (or those of Admiral Mullen), the armed forces of Turkey are totally irrelevant to NATO today and into the future.
The armed forces of Turkey, while large, are also largely immobile, poorly trained, indifferently equipped, overly expensive, a drain on the Turkish fisc, and a political drag on the alliance. The new Erdogan ministry strongly opposed the US driven invasion of Iraq making much political hay from proclaiming the operation as a "war on Islam and Muslims." In addition, the Turks have been a major non-participant in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the AKP government bitterly opposed the no-fly zone and its follow-on in Libya.
There is no reason not to believe that Turkey has passed along critical NATO information to Iran as a part of its charm offensive with Tehran. The same may be true regarding the opposition in Afghanistan and, possibly, Libya. Having Turkey in NATO today is tantamount to having the Italy of Mussolini sitting in on the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff during World War II.
If it is true, as it appears to be, that the Islamists have won in Turkey, the time has come to restructure NATO without Ankara. The hoary alliance is at a difficult crossroads. There is looming, embarrassing failure in Libya joining with the rush for the exit in Afghanistan to undercut any lingering credibility accruing to it. Given further that most NATO members have shown an ability to hit the funding targets akin to the performance of a visually impaired sniper, the time is now to rethink the alliance. The time is now to contemplate the impossible: The dissolution of NATO.
It is questionable whether or not NATO has any utility or even relevance to the world of now and tomorrow where the major enemy of any and all civilized states are the advocates of violent political Islam. The best way for civilized states to counter the threat resides not with NATO or any other Cold War artifact but rather with "coalitions of the willing," ad hoc structures of states with coinciding national interests which perceive the threat from violent political Islam or the challenges presented by any particular failed, failing, or hollow state in similar ways.
As George H.W. Bush showed during the Gulf War, the ad hoc coalition can work well provided the necessary preliminary diplomatic work is done with care. Even George W. Bush's ham handed counterparts worked reasonably well. In comparison, the NATO effort in Libya has been an example of how not to go about the task. While this can (correctly) be blamed on the relative absence of the US from the shooting war, the real lesson to be learned is that the effort was not undertaken by a genuine coalition of the willing.
The AKP has taken Turkey away from the West. Its lurch to the lands of Islam is understandable and even forgivable. It is, after all, a choice made by the Turkish electorate--at least up to a point. We can have no beef about it.
Rather, we should embrace the Turkish policy. We should use the stimulus to take a long hard look at the role of NATO in our alliance system, and jettison it as currently constituted unless a very strong argument can be made for its continuation. The inclusion of Turkey was contextual to the cold war; it has no permanent root in the Atlantic community. This is the geographical, cultural, and political reality. We should admit it with at least as much honesty as have the Turks.
The ideological and political blocs of the world have reformed since the end of the bi-polar world. Turkey has recognized this. The AKP has acknowledged bluntly that religion and language ties trump the artifacts of global alliance politics. Erdogan and company have chosen their side.
The US and Western Europe can and should do no less.
The act came on the eve of the semi-annual meeting of the combined armed forces senior leadership with the head of the civilian government, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and has been seen by many observers, Turkish as well as foreign, as a welcome sign of Turkey having become a normal democracy where civilian supremacy over the military is a given. In the past, there has been a great deal of discomfort in the US and Western Europe over the periodic military excursions out of the barracks and into the presidential palace. The European Union (or at least France) demanded that the armed forces be defanged as a prerequisite for membership.
The recent mass resignation must be taken in conjunction with the ongoing trial of nearly three hundred past and present senior commanders (ten percent or so of the entire flag officer complement) on charges which are at best politically motivated and most likely fabricated in whole or major part. The massive series of arrests over the past year or so constituted the AKP's direct attack on the military, which was the only plausible obstacle to permanent Islamist domination of Turkish politics.
The armed forces and AKP have been at daggers drawn since the once-banned AKP won power in 2002. The military missed its chance to send the Islamists packing in the wake of the narrow electoral victory mainly out of regard for EU sentiments and a proper regard for the benefits of EU membership. As the years slipped by, the chances for a military coup slipped away until they were lost beyond any hope in the most recent election where AKP took no prisoners at the polls.
Erdogan had made much of his stated intent to pursue EU membership even though it was more than slightly obvious that France would spare no effort to block the application. The economic success of the AKP has been based not on trade with the EU but upon increased ties with the Mideast and the Turkish speaking Central Asian Republics. In the process, a new class of very rich middlemen and entrepreneurs drawn from urban migrants originating in the Anatolian highlands has become a key component of the AKP base. These new millionaires join with displaced peasants in the slums of Istanbul and Ankara and "conservative" clerics to provide the electoral majority.
The rivals to the AKP drive to the east have been the senior officers of the armed forces along with the "traditional" business and commercial elite of Istanbul. The military has at its upper ranks men who are far more Western in their outlook, far more liberal in their views as well as far more educated than the mass of the political class and the new moneyed class. Their instinctive perspective is Western. That of AKP and its base runs to the East, to the Muslim marches of Central and Northwest Asia--and the states of the old Ottoman Empire.
The seemingly decisive victory of AKP over the inheritors of Ataturk is not universally welcomed in Turkey. There are more than a few Turks who fear that without the army as a counterweight there will be no limits on Erdogan and AKP. There is an undercurrent of apprehension that now the Islamists will be free to pursue the goal of reestablishing the old caliphate with all that implies. Others, unsurprisingly, pooh-pooh that notion and welcome AKP confining the armed forces to a subordinate role and, thus, allowing a return to the values and norms of the pre-Ataturk era.
Very few Turks are aghast at the new diplomatic muscle enjoyed by Ankara in the Mideast and Central Asia. Likewise, very few resent the new economic options brought by the "Ost politik" practiced by Erdogan. Other than some trepidations over Turkey's ever closer ties to Shia Iran, there have been few complaints over the foreign policy of Erdogan and company. There is definitely majority support for the very hard line drawn by Erdogan over Israel, particularly the IDF takeover of the Mazi Marmora "humanitarian relief" ship over a year ago.
The net effect has been the tilting of the longstanding conflict between nationalist and Islamist, secularist and Islamist in favor of the latter. For the moment this is just jake with the majority of Turks. But, there is likely to be a quick withdrawal of support for AKP should there be heavy handed attempts to "purify" Turkish society of "infidel" aspects. So far, the party has been sensitive to this dynamic and has moved only slowly to "Islamify" Turkey.
Almost overlooked in the political discussions of the resignations has been another, critical subject: The impact of Turkey's Muslim oriented "Ost politik" on NATO. In as much as Turkey's membership in the alliance has been considered, it has been in the boilerplate terms of "NATO's second largest army." As if size matters.
Turkey's large army is also quite irrelevant to NATO in the post-cold war period. Not only is the army incapable of any effective action outside of Turkey, it has not shown any particular utility in the local "forever war" against the Kurdish defensive insurgency. Pace NATO public statements (or those of Admiral Mullen), the armed forces of Turkey are totally irrelevant to NATO today and into the future.
The armed forces of Turkey, while large, are also largely immobile, poorly trained, indifferently equipped, overly expensive, a drain on the Turkish fisc, and a political drag on the alliance. The new Erdogan ministry strongly opposed the US driven invasion of Iraq making much political hay from proclaiming the operation as a "war on Islam and Muslims." In addition, the Turks have been a major non-participant in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. And, the AKP government bitterly opposed the no-fly zone and its follow-on in Libya.
There is no reason not to believe that Turkey has passed along critical NATO information to Iran as a part of its charm offensive with Tehran. The same may be true regarding the opposition in Afghanistan and, possibly, Libya. Having Turkey in NATO today is tantamount to having the Italy of Mussolini sitting in on the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff during World War II.
If it is true, as it appears to be, that the Islamists have won in Turkey, the time has come to restructure NATO without Ankara. The hoary alliance is at a difficult crossroads. There is looming, embarrassing failure in Libya joining with the rush for the exit in Afghanistan to undercut any lingering credibility accruing to it. Given further that most NATO members have shown an ability to hit the funding targets akin to the performance of a visually impaired sniper, the time is now to rethink the alliance. The time is now to contemplate the impossible: The dissolution of NATO.
It is questionable whether or not NATO has any utility or even relevance to the world of now and tomorrow where the major enemy of any and all civilized states are the advocates of violent political Islam. The best way for civilized states to counter the threat resides not with NATO or any other Cold War artifact but rather with "coalitions of the willing," ad hoc structures of states with coinciding national interests which perceive the threat from violent political Islam or the challenges presented by any particular failed, failing, or hollow state in similar ways.
As George H.W. Bush showed during the Gulf War, the ad hoc coalition can work well provided the necessary preliminary diplomatic work is done with care. Even George W. Bush's ham handed counterparts worked reasonably well. In comparison, the NATO effort in Libya has been an example of how not to go about the task. While this can (correctly) be blamed on the relative absence of the US from the shooting war, the real lesson to be learned is that the effort was not undertaken by a genuine coalition of the willing.
The AKP has taken Turkey away from the West. Its lurch to the lands of Islam is understandable and even forgivable. It is, after all, a choice made by the Turkish electorate--at least up to a point. We can have no beef about it.
Rather, we should embrace the Turkish policy. We should use the stimulus to take a long hard look at the role of NATO in our alliance system, and jettison it as currently constituted unless a very strong argument can be made for its continuation. The inclusion of Turkey was contextual to the cold war; it has no permanent root in the Atlantic community. This is the geographical, cultural, and political reality. We should admit it with at least as much honesty as have the Turks.
The ideological and political blocs of the world have reformed since the end of the bi-polar world. Turkey has recognized this. The AKP has acknowledged bluntly that religion and language ties trump the artifacts of global alliance politics. Erdogan and company have chosen their side.
The US and Western Europe can and should do no less.
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