There Sure Hasn't Been Much Said About Bioterrorism

Berry Kellman, a professor of law and director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University College of Law wants to change that. He has written a decent treatment of the threat presented by bioterror. Take a look at it. (Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime)

Professor Kellman who has also been a consultant to Interpol on biological crime is bothered by all the attention paid by governments and the media to nuclear and radiological threats including atomic weapons deployed by rogue states. He is convinced that biological weapons present a greater clear and present danger.

For some time the Geek was paid to consider the possibilities and drawbacks in the use of biological weapons. As a result, while he shares some of Professor Kellman's concerns, the Geekmo isn't quite as willing to lose sleep over the problems of bioterror--or embrace the fixes proposed by the professor.

The professor views with great alarm several potential biological agents currently classified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as "Class A" pathogens. The CDC classification is predicated upon medical considerations of virulence, morbidity and difficulty of treatment. These are legitimate medical criteria. They are not necessarily relevant to the use of the pathogen as a weapon either of war or terror.

Nor do the CDC criteria consider the extensive field testing data available from often criticised US government research back in the Fifties and Sixties regarding difficulties of initial dissemination and the level of exposure needed to ignite a self-replicating plague. Even with improvements in dissemination technology made over the past forty or fifty years, there are still difficulties in establishing a "hot zone" where human-to-human transfer would provide for fast spreading infection.

Even the oft-cited scenario of spreading the infection in the "closed" environment of a transoceanic airliner has far more difficulties in practice than in principle. (For example, the supposedly closed airliner cabin has more changes of air per hour than the typical hospital room. The new filtration systems make it cleaner air than most hospitals as well.)

Since the professor deals with law and consults with law enforcement agencies, the Geek isn't surprised that he focuses on new laws, both domestic and international as the largest portion of the defense against bioterror. History hasn't given the Geek as much faith in the effectiveness of law as a defense against hostile action.

Controls over the manufacture, possession and transfer of potential pathogens is a nifty idea. The Geek has no problems with it.

But, there is a problem with the concept.

Get a grip on this.

Most of the most dangerous pathogens, the kind that make people really sick exist in nature. With the exception of smallpox, all the real Class A nasty critters can be easily cultured from natural hosts. No amount of international or domestic law can change that.

Professor Kellman's suggested remedies won't work. The only real defense against bioterror is a combination of good intelligence on organizations likely to use it, credible deterrence (which we don't have at the moment for non-state actors) and very good public health system responses.

Meanwhile, join the Geek in not losing too much sleep over the threat of bioterror. It's attractiveness is far more apparent than real.