The Israeli Bomb--And Iran's

Of late the Obama administration has started putting pressure on Israel to come clean on its nuclear arsenal, sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, implicitly at least, follow the lead of South Africa and abandon its nuclear capacity. There has been more than a little bloviation about a link between the Israeli bomb and the inability of the US and its partners to convince the mullahs of Tehran to give up their quest for a "Mahdi Bomb."

There has even been some degree of quacking over the High Minded concept of a regional pact making the Mideast an area free of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. This notion, which is much more a product of Fantasyland than an emigrant from the shores of Utopia, is of a piece with the Obama vision of a world without any nuclear weapons anywhere.

There is not much to say in favor of nuclear weapons. Except one small, but very relevant fact. They, and the much maligned doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, have made the world safe for war.

That's right. The shadow of the mushroom cloud hovering over the chancelries of the globe have made the place safe for the waging of controlled, more or less purposeful war.

One can never say that the Big Bomb has kept the peace per se, not in the face of the historical record covering the past sixty-four years. But, the wars have not involved widespread, high intensity operations of the massively destructive scale of, say, the two World Wars. And, that is no small accomplishment given the international dynamics of the period.

Without the Israeli nuclear capacity the wars of the Mideast, including that of 1967, would have been far greater, far more bloody and not necessarily any more decisive in outcome than the low scale conflict which has occurred during this period of "Nuclear Ambiguity." The unchallenged possession of the "Samson Option" by Israel, not the diplomatic support of the US nor the nanny like nattering of the UN has limited and prevented regional hectatombs from happening.

The documentary hints which have leaked out around the Great Wall of Secrecy make it clear that the US government has been fully aware not only of Israel's ultimately successful efforts to develop and refine its nuclear weapons capabilities but the existence and size of the resultant stockpile. There is also no doubt of our complicity in maintaining the thin and porous scrim of secrecy behind which lurk the missiles and bombs of Israel.

The policy of nuclear ambiguity was dictated to Israel by the forces of reality.

The first was particularly important early in the Israeli development and procurement effort: The ambiguous threat is always perceived as being larger than any reality would dictate. Ambiguity encourages the enemy to contemplate the worst conceivable case, not the worst realistic one.

The second justification--no, requirement--for the ambiguity policy is the US Congress. In one of its fits of High Mindedness, Congress legislated that no country which possesses either nuclear weapons or an active research and development program in that area can receive US military assistance including monetary aid. Israel may no longer be dependent upon US money for its defense needs, but what rational government is going to chuck gigabucks without a very, very good reason?

Even the achievement of that long sought, but always elusive Holy Grail of a comprehensive Mideast peace agreement in no way nullifies the cruciality of Israel's nuclear deterrent. The German diplomatic maestro, Bismarck was reputed to have said regarding treaties--they are "mere scraps of paper." So also might any emergent Mideast leader.

Given the record of diplomatic agreement longevity in the Mideast, any dropping of defenses and deterrents in the warm glow of the post-signing celebrations would be the height of folly. It would be folly as well for Israel to rely upon some external protecting power rather than itself when faced by an existential threat.

Offers to extend the American nuclear umbrella over Israel are well-intentioned, but ultimately meaningless gestures. Forty-five years ago the abrasive but quite insightful French president, Charles de Gaulle, made that point in a characteristically blunt fashion when he questioned the willingness of the US to expose New York to the possibility of nuclear obliteration in order to protect Paris.

His point was very well taken. Other European leaders whispered what De Gaulle shouted. It was only the presence of American troops in the potential killing fields of Europe which gave any credibility to the nuclear umbrella concept. Except for the anglophobic French president, most Europeans were willing to concede that the US would go nuclear if and when their troops were on the receiving end of a Soviet strike.

Even the political power of AIPAC and other components of the Israel Lobby lacks the potency necessary to turn any American nuclear pledge from the dross of rhetoric to the gold of action in a time of dire need. Would We the People really, truly, undoubtedly continence the placing of New York or any other city at risk in order to protect Tel Aviv?

The second guess doesn't count.

Absent the Israeli nuclear deterrent, even though the shield of ambiguity has been holed, most notably by Robert Gates during his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense, there is no means of inhibiting a Mideast leader, Islamist most likely, from abandoning any then extant treaty or agreement to mount total jihad against the "Zionist Entity." There would be nothing to inhibit the manufacture and use of chemical, biological or radiological munitions against Israel with results which would lethal on a grand scale.

Nuclear weapons may be icky-poo in the extreme. Their use may be revolting to civilized sensitivities. They do have one redeeming factor in comparison to their equally nasty relatives in the clan of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Compared to chemical, biological and radiological munitions, nuclear weapons are both expensive and difficult to produce and stockpile. Chemical munitions can be manufactured quickly, easily and cheaply from widely available industrial precursors. Biological threats can be conjured up in a modestly equipped laboratory from progenitors which are available globally. Radiological weapons require nothing more than access to high level radwaste, a little bit of explosives and operators who are willing to die.

None of the "Smaller Three" demand major investment in infrastructure facilities which are as visible as they are expensive. None require highly trained and skilled technicians in brigade lots. None require equipment which is readily identifiable as to purpose and thus easily interdicted before or during shipment.

While the "Small Three" of the WMD clan lack the diplomatic prestige of the nuclear option, they make up for this deficiency by their ease and invisibility of manufacture. They are also more suited to ambiguous signature operations, which is an advantage if the author has reason to apprehend a military response to an attack.

And, as the recent "swine flu" imbroglio amply demonstrated, biological munitions have a potential for terror effects far outweighing any actual damage inflicted. Fear without any concurrent high body count is the terrorist's ideal. It represents maximum damage with both limited investment and very low potential of a military response by the victim country(ies.)

Without its nuclear deterrent Israel would be wide open to chemical, biological or radiological attack. Only the deterrent and uncertainty as to the threshold level which would trigger an Israeli atomic reaction has any genuine likelihood of keeping the "Small Three" threat remote in probability.

The government of Israel has taken a dim view of the NPT's inherent efficacy. While Brazil and South Africa abandoned their pursuit of a nuclear capacity it is doubtful that the NPT had any role in the decision. Brazil, by its own admission, had no reason to acquire the bomb. It had nothing to gain and much to lose by going ahead with its program. South Africa made its move as part of the groundswell of internal governmental change. Again, any linkage with the NPT owes more to High Minded wishful thinking than political reality.

Adherence to the NPT did not inhibit North Korea. The NPT is, after all, another of those "mere scraps of paper" to be abandoned when reasons of state demand. The Hermit Kingdom of the North ditched the NPT officially three years before its first test.

Not too much should be made of Japan or South Korea not pursuing a nuclear procurement effort. Each has the base for very rapid breakout. It would take either country only months, not years, to put a deliverable weapon on the shelves. Each could (and would) resign from the NPT if it saw more to gain by the action than would hypothetically be lost.

Like all treaties the NPT is no stronger, no more effective than the political will and self-perceived, subjectively defined national interests of the states which are signatory to it. The Great Menace of that chimera, global public opinion, in a manner akin to the sanctions of the UN Security Council, are toothless in comparison with a reason of existential nature compelling abandonment of the NPT.

Even when no official abandonment of the NPT has happened, as in the case of Iran, reasons of state will both allow and compel the "illegal" pursuit of nuclear weapons. As the Iranians have shown to date, the risks of doing so are acceptably slight. The differences between the Permanent Members of the Security Council as well as the needs of important constituencies within industrialised countries assure that economic and diplomatic sanctions are less effective than would be a black powder muzzle loader on a modern battlefield.

The Australians estimated in a recent White Paper that as many as twenty countries will have joined the Nuclear Club within the next decade or two. This conclusion does not seem to be unwarrantably pessimistic. Nuclear technology is ever more broadly disseminated around the world as is the supporting hardware. The proliferation of "civilian" reactors both research and power producing will drag the potential of increased distribution of nuclear weapons in its wake. There is no way around that reality. Knowledge plus hardware plus fissile material equals a bomb--actual or potential.

The lesson is simple. And, to many, unpleasant. The NPT is a thin, greasy, slippery rope on which to take a grip. It is more delusion than reality. It will let us down, hard, unless we put it in the same category as the halcyon hallucination of a "nuclear free world."

Getting a grip on the alternative of a world in which more countries have nuclear weapons or the rapid capacity to acquire these weapons is hard. Not impossible. Only hard. Deterrence, particularly that which resides in the hands of a responsible country such as the US (or, history shows, Israel) has protected us from worst case wars for over a half century. There is no reason to anticipate any change in the future.

A world without nuclear weapons is pleasant to contemplate. A continuation, even an expansion of mutually assured destruction is not.

Now ask yourself, would a world without nuclear deterrence in which the threat of the "Small Three" reigned supreme, its use not susceptible to effective retaliation be any better? Perhaps, it would be even worse?

The President Misuses History One More Time

In common with most politicians (OK, most people) the current POTUS likes to select snippets of history which line up with whatever position he is arguing or justifying at the moment. At last night's prime-time news conference, Mr Obama took a historical leap to support his contention that outlawing "torture," even when effective in acquiring information was a good idea because it was moral.

The president averred that no less a statesman and nationalist than Winston Churchill refused to continence the use of torture against German prisoners of war or detainees during the height of the Blitz. Purportedly the reason for this stance was its immorality.

Let's go to the videotape.

If, indeed, the oft repeated but never properly documented Churchill tale is true, there is a very good reason for refusing to torture or otherwise "intensively interrogate" Luftwaffe prisoners--other than the fact there was no intelligence imperative to do so. The mistreatment of German PoWs would result in the similar mistreatment of British soldiers, seamen and airmen in Nazi hands. The fear of quid pro quo was an absolute deterrent--on both sides of the battleline.

Churchill's lack of concern over morality per se is readily demonstrated from the well-documented historical record.

The British PM had no problems with authorising the fire bomb raids against the civilian residential districts of German cities. The intent of the attacks was put forth bluntly in numerous internal memorandums. The intent was to kill as many civilians as possible. And, terrorise those who were not killed.

Unlike the Blitz where the German bombing of purely civilian targets (defined here to be limited to residential districts and excluding civilian facilities such as railroads, docks and warehouses which had military utility) was the result of technological deficiencies which precluded accurate bombing of war related factories, the British air effort as it matured in 1942 was deliberately aimed at killing and terrorising the civilian population of Germany. The British knew what they were doing. They knew so well that they lied to the American government and public.

The British government from the PM on down believed (correctly) that the Americans were too High Minded and otherworldly to understand and support the terror campaign. So, the British referred to it as "the worker de-housing program." Churchill and the others did this with a straight face.

In the interests of inter-Allied cooperation and harmony, the administration of FDR did not dissent from the British effort. However, when the Brits tried to convince the Americans to join with them in incinerating German men, women and children, the attempt failed. Our ostensible reason was the unsuitability of American aircraft and crew training to missions other than daylight precision bombing.

The real deal was different. The senior leadership of the Air Force as well as the civilians in charge of the government recoiled at the notion of intentionally targeting civilians. While none of these men were opposed to killing civilians, they did insist that such be an ancillary, a corollary to the bombing of factories or other infrastructure components directly useful to the war effort.

The reasons for rejecting a pure counter-civilian terror campaign were twofold. The first was the belief it would not work. The reasoned conclusion that far from undercutting morale or war production, a terror effort would strengthen both. The accuracy of this view was amply demonstrated by post-war analysis of production statistics that proved production went up along with the tonnage of bombs dropped and number of workers "de-housed."

The second reason was moral. There were men, both in uniform and in mufti, who would not continence direct attacks on civilians. This course of action, even if effective, would be morally wrong.

It is evident that Churchill did not buy the morality argument for a nanosecond. But, he needed the US and was unwilling to argue the morality issue with FDR, although there are hints that he wanted to.

If Winnie was annoyed at our moral sensibilities in the area of terror bombing, he would have thrown a hissy-fit over our reaction to his big idea for (a) revenging the Blitz and (b) making D-Day unnecessary. Winston Churchill, the alleged paragon of morality according to the president's understanding of history, wanted to bomb Germany's urban areas with anthrax.

That's right, bucko, anthrax. Its qualities and characteristics were well known to the British. The boffins of that "tight and sceptered isle" had experimented with it in the pre-war years. It had been successfully weaponized. An early production plant was churning the spores out in limited quantities at an old immigration inspection station in Canada.

The Americans, working from British specifications, were in the process of building an industrial production plant capable of making the bug in ton quantities when Churchill developed (Whether on his own or through the machinations of his science advisor, Lord Cherwell, is unclear.) his notion of using biological warfare to devastate the German population.

Even the architects of the "worker de-housing program" were shocked and horrified by this idea. Apparently morality is flexible. Burning civilians to death is OK. Germs are not OK.

The argument against the anthrax employment was based, however, not on matters of morality as it was well understood that such would cut no ice with Winston. Rather, the British opponents contended correctly that use of anthrax would render large parts of Germany uninhabitable for generations after the war. This effect would run counter to Churchill's post-war goal of stopping the plague of Bolshevism east of the Elbe.

At the same time the Americans, having caught word of Churchill's idea, dragged their feet in getting the Pine Bluff production facility on line. Without American industrial grade production, there simply would not be sufficient agent to undertake the scheme. This deliberate slow-down was undertaken with the tacit approval of FDR, whose moral sense would have been outraged by the concept.

Yes, bucko, FDR was a very moral man when it came to methods of fighting war. Don't believe this?

Come with the Geek to the island of Iwo Jima. The Navy and Marine Corps planners knew that this island would be an extremely tough place to take. It was very heavily fortified with miles of deep tunnels and hundreds of well sited bunkers. Further, the place was exceptionally well defended by over 22,000 troops who were quite willing to die in place. Thus, it would be very costly in American lives.

The planners suggested that the US stand off-shore and drench the place with mustard agent. They argued that the nature of the defenses and the utter absence of civilians as well as the prior use of chemical weapons by the Japanese in China combined to make Iwo Jima the perfect place for the US to resort to chemical means.

The capstone of the planners' argument was simply that the use of mustard gas would save American lives. Potentially, the landing would be unopposed.

FDR said, "No." He would not go down in history as the first American president to authorise the use of chemical weapons in a non-retaliatory context. His reasoning was strictly moral in its basis.

The moral sensibilities of FDR were responsible for 6,825 American combat deaths.

Whether that exchange was justified can be argued endlessly.

Fairness requires mentioning that FDR raised no moral objection to the use of mass firebomb raids against Japanese cities. These raids were far more destructive than their equivalents in Germany burning square mile after square mile of predominantly civilian residential districts. President Roosevelt accepted the argument that the Japanese scattered small factories throughout these residential areas. That was true, but it can be argued that the killing of more than 100,000 civilians in one raid on Tokyo was not morally justifiable.

Certainly, FDR's successor had no moral qualms regarding the use of nuclear bombs on Japanese targets in the hope that doing so would save the US from the enormous losses forecast to accompany an invasion of the home islands. The moral correctness of Truman's decision can be and has been debated without any resolution for the sixty-four years since the mushroom clouds grew over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

President Obama was poorly advised to cherry pick his history. Not only did he pick the wrong cherry, the internal contradiction of his position on the use of "torture" in the interrogation of captured terrorist suspects illustrates the the problem of using morality as a basis for policy.

Prohibiting the use of mustard agent against Iwo Jima cost American lives. Its use would have saved an unknowable number of these.

Similarly, the use of nuclear weapons against Japan saved an unknowable number of lives, both American and Japanese. The non-use of this option might have resulted in no additional loss of life given the collapsing nature of Japanese political will and economy under the twin pressures of the blockade and Soviet invasion of North China. We will never know. History's tape runs in one direction only with no rewind possible.

The president acknowledged that the use of waterboarding and other, similar methods did provide useful information. Information which may well have saved lives. At the same time Mr Obama implied that the use of "torture" lessened American security by eroding the firm moral foundation which separates us from our Islamist enemies.

This (to quote one MSM outlet) "nuanced" view of the torture controversy has not ended debate and doubt over whether the morality of means outweighs considerations of effectiveness. It is a question which is fundamentally unanswerable.

It is an ancient question, asked countless times over the centuries. Does the end justify the means or do evil means pollute even the most worthy of ends?

The president provided no answer. He didn't even ask the question correctly.

There Sure Hasn't Been Much Said About Bioterrorism

Berry Kellman, a professor of law and director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University College of Law wants to change that. He has written a decent treatment of the threat presented by bioterror. Take a look at it. (Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime)

Professor Kellman who has also been a consultant to Interpol on biological crime is bothered by all the attention paid by governments and the media to nuclear and radiological threats including atomic weapons deployed by rogue states. He is convinced that biological weapons present a greater clear and present danger.

For some time the Geek was paid to consider the possibilities and drawbacks in the use of biological weapons. As a result, while he shares some of Professor Kellman's concerns, the Geekmo isn't quite as willing to lose sleep over the problems of bioterror--or embrace the fixes proposed by the professor.

The professor views with great alarm several potential biological agents currently classified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as "Class A" pathogens. The CDC classification is predicated upon medical considerations of virulence, morbidity and difficulty of treatment. These are legitimate medical criteria. They are not necessarily relevant to the use of the pathogen as a weapon either of war or terror.

Nor do the CDC criteria consider the extensive field testing data available from often criticised US government research back in the Fifties and Sixties regarding difficulties of initial dissemination and the level of exposure needed to ignite a self-replicating plague. Even with improvements in dissemination technology made over the past forty or fifty years, there are still difficulties in establishing a "hot zone" where human-to-human transfer would provide for fast spreading infection.

Even the oft-cited scenario of spreading the infection in the "closed" environment of a transoceanic airliner has far more difficulties in practice than in principle. (For example, the supposedly closed airliner cabin has more changes of air per hour than the typical hospital room. The new filtration systems make it cleaner air than most hospitals as well.)

Since the professor deals with law and consults with law enforcement agencies, the Geek isn't surprised that he focuses on new laws, both domestic and international as the largest portion of the defense against bioterror. History hasn't given the Geek as much faith in the effectiveness of law as a defense against hostile action.

Controls over the manufacture, possession and transfer of potential pathogens is a nifty idea. The Geek has no problems with it.

But, there is a problem with the concept.

Get a grip on this.

Most of the most dangerous pathogens, the kind that make people really sick exist in nature. With the exception of smallpox, all the real Class A nasty critters can be easily cultured from natural hosts. No amount of international or domestic law can change that.

Professor Kellman's suggested remedies won't work. The only real defense against bioterror is a combination of good intelligence on organizations likely to use it, credible deterrence (which we don't have at the moment for non-state actors) and very good public health system responses.

Meanwhile, join the Geek in not losing too much sleep over the threat of bioterror. It's attractiveness is far more apparent than real.

Press TV Doesn't Know Diddly About US History

There they go again! The Iranian agency, Press TV, warps, distorts, and mutilates US history as it gins out propaganda under the guise of "objective reporting."

We're all used to the media distorting fact to meet the requirements of propensity, prejudice, and predilection. Nothing new about it. US media--both mainstream and alternative--have been known to commit felonious assault upon American history. It seems to come with the territory.

The Geek usually just shakes his head sadly as he reads or hears yet one more nauseating twisting of historical reality to fit present needs.

It's different this time. This time the Geek is flatly rankled. This time the self-proclaimed reclaimer of media purity from the icky, nasty liars of the Western media has sliced and diced the realities of American history to meet the propaganda needs of the mullahocracy.

Worse, Press TV has chosen a subject--biological and chemical warfare research--which is both highly emotional and has a history poorly understood by the vast majority of even well-educated people. Choosing this subject for propagandistic treatment is a cheap shot. A low blow.

The Geek, who is, after all, a military historian who has lived in more archives than he cares to remember, pouring over the most recently declassified documents, has some expertise in the area of biological and chemical warfare. He is equipped by virtue of his education and experience to comment on the warped account provided by Press TV.

The problem is that space prohibits taking on more than a few of the specifics of Press TV's fabrications through misrepresentation. But, first take a look at the Iranian bill of particulars. http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=24716&sectionid=3510303.

Now, The Geek Talks Back! Or, Truth In History Is A Good Thing.

The Tuskegee Syphilis Study really happened. You can read the whole, sad, sick story in Jones, Bad Blood. This book came out a quarter century ago. It was written by a professor of history at the University of Houston. Jones and his book had a brief moment in the celebrity spotlight. It contains the cliched "rest of the story" which eluded Press TV

The lads in Tehran have the problem of pellagra wrong. In 1935, as the result of a pioneering study conducted on both black and white citizens in the so-called Pellagra Belt in the American south, the cause of the metabolic disorder was determined and effective countermeasures through diet change were developed. The difficulty came in convincing people to change time honored dietary customs.

The malaria experiments of 1940 and many successive years conducted on convicts in a number of state and federal prisons were done with the individual's consent and for the valid reason of determining effective prophylactic measures other than quinine. The results spared many US personnel in the South Pacific and other theaters of war from the debilitating disease. As the war moved toward Japan, the local populations also benefited.

You bet we, like the British, experimented in protective measures to counter toxic weapons such as mustard gas. Military personnel, conscientious objectors, and convicts were all used. While the Geek has real problems with the concept "informed consent" in this work, it was critically necessary and certainly better than the German and Japanese practice of conducting experiments on concentration camp inmates.

To show how out-to-lunch the crew at Press TV are, get a grip on this. The British, Canadian, and American governments pressed ahead with research, development, testing, and production of biological weapons, such as anthrax during World War II. Churchill had to be actively resisted in his stated desire to use anthrax on German cities in early 1944. (The winning argument was the truth. Not enough had been produced yet. And, the target cities might be uninhabitable for fifty years.)

Had Press TV been aware of history, the merry bunch could have used this one fact instead of the reams of misinterpretation and falsification they did use.

Had enough? The Geek has.

One last howler though, if you would indulge the ole Geekmo. He isn't much of a techno-wonk, but even the Geek knows that there is a vast difference between uranium hexafluoride gas used in the gaseous diffusion method of enrichment and fluorine.

(BTW, Press TV dudes, fluoride is a specific compound including fluorine. It is not a chemical element,)

Fluorine gas is very nasty since it is a highly active oxidant. Because it is active, fluorine can be combined with a number of other substances. Some are quite toxic. Others are not. The devil is in the details. Fluoridation of drinking water may be controversial but it does not and never did involve the old Atomic Energy Commission.

The Geek is officially bored with beating down the evil little straw men put up by one component of the Iranian noise machine. If you want, go over the roster of Press TV claims. Pick one you like and pass it on to the Geek.

The we can play Truth In History again.