Once More, Adrift At The Policy Level

"Somebody will have to pay!" So said a high level Saudi royal (is there any other sort of royal?) regarding the Iranian plot to ace the Saudi ambassador to the US.  Secretary of State Clinton as well as Vice President Biden made the customary formulaic statements about somebody, somewhere, somehow being "held accountable," in connection with the same bit of outrageous but normal Iranian diplomatic conduct.

Throughout the rarefied levels of the American government, there has been much bloviating and bleating about just how terribly Iran has violated international law and custom about the corporeal sanctity of diplomatic persons.  This predicate was followed by earnest statements about the need to forge international solidarity against the rapscallions of the Iranian Islamic Republic.  To this end, special missions have been dispatched to brief and enlist the full support of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC), and the Arab League.

By golly, this will sure show the ayatollahs, mullahs, and imams, won't it?

Of course, the Iranians have not only denied the existence of the plot, they have engaged in the expected counter accusations.  At home a number of Iranians interviewed by the AP indicated there was no way anyone in Iran could have been either so ill-advised or so creative as to have developed the plot, let alone put it into initial operation.

It is easy for a skeptic to doubt the plot, it is too redolent of Hollywood thriller elements to be totally plausible.  The only problem is that it is a very competent covert/clandestine operation completely in line with other previous Tehran initiated assassinations.

The al-Quds component of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is quite experienced, highly motivated, has excellent operational mechanisms, and is well acquainted with the drug trafficking organizations (DTO) of Central and South America.  Given this last consideration, it is to be expected that the IRGC would turn to the drug smugglers of Mexico to actually conduct the mission.  While it is a tad surprising that the men in Tehran turned to an American citizen rather than use one of their agents already resident in Mexico, the use of the dual national did provide some potential advantages.

It was fortunate (almost too convenient) that the DEA had a credible and reliable informant asset on tap to play the role of a Los Zetas member, but that may be clarified as to dynamics and timing as the legal processes unfold.  Manssor Arbabsiar, the dual US/Iranian national, lives in Corpus Christi, so he would have been quite familiar with the Zetas and their extensive record of highly competent killings carried out with the flair and skill of an experienced special operations force.

The hiring of a group with the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct a bombing at a Washington, DC restaurant for a mere 1.5 million dollars is a feat of excellent bargaining.  If the hit on the Saudi ambassador was carried out in conjunction with a set of simultaneous bombings on other, unrelated targets, the net result would have been to decouple any hint of Iranian sponsorship or involvement.

The combination of several, simultaneous bombings with the use of readily available explosives (which category includes military grade munitions such as C4) and equally common electronic components would have complicated the investigation further, reducing the probability of discovering the Tehran connection.  A further fog would have resulted from the inevitable claims of responsibility which would have flooded the ether, an eventuality which would have grown with the size of the body count.  Every group espousing violent political Islam, including those which are totally notional, would have jumped in with an appropriately worded media release.

As the investigation floundered about in the many leveled swamp of false flags, inconclusive forensics and competing claims of authorship, the ayatollahs and their operational tools could have sat back, smiling with grins wider than the Cheshire Cat, knowing the truth, a truth they would keep to themselves.  Of course, the Saudis would have had their suspicions (as would the Americans), but without a case meeting legal standards, neither arrests nor military retaliation would have been politically feasible.

In short, the plot in outline is highly credible in all respects.  Assuming the puppet masters in Iran and the operational assets in Mexico and the US observed standard operational security measures, the probability of detection either before or after the event would have been low.  The probability of attaching the tail to the Iranian donkey would have been even lower.

It was either a matter of awesomely good luck or an intelligence coup of the first water which allowed the plot to have been penetrated so early and so successfully.  The fact that the US did penetrate and did arrest a key conspirator in no way undercuts the brilliance of the concept--nor provide a firm basis for assuming the whole deal was an American confection.

The question which confronts the US (or at least the administration) is what to do now.  Not to go into hyperventilation mode, the Iranian plot does constitute, or did once constitute a cause of war.  The plot was not simply a crime.  It was much more.  It was an act of war.  Asymmetrical war is still war.  And that is what the Iranians intended.  The killing of a third party national of diplomatic status, thus a protected person under international convention, along with a significant but unknowable number of Americans by an infernal machine is every bit as much an act of war as the attacks of 9/11.

It is no less an act of war by virtue of having been detected and thwarted before culmination.

The US would be fully justified by undertaking a military response.  Such a response is equally justifiable under international norms and law if conducted by covert/clandestine means or by open use of force.  There is, of course, no real possibility of the current administration exercising this latter option.  The American public to say nothing of the federal budget would not sit still for an open act of war.  The possibility of failure would inhibit any low visibility, light footprint response against either the IRGC or its masters.

Inhibition is not the same as prohibition.  The US has engaged in covert/clandestine actions intended to impair the Iranian march to nuclear threshold status.  These serve as a paradigm for a suitable response to the plot.

It is to be hoped that behind the wall of indignant oratory spewing forth in Spindletop fashion from the highest circles inside the District there is some quiet and sober consideration of who might be a suitable candidate for being "held accountable."  Targeted killings of high ranking military or paramilitary figures might be distasteful in some quarters, but there is something far worse.

That something is allowing the senior decision makers of the al-Quds force or the IRGC to be reinforced in their view that the US is nothing more than a "paper tiger."  Unless the US does show its displeasure in a quiet but robust way, we will continue to be seen as week, indecisive, on the decline--and a suitable venue to wage a nasty little war.

The Empire Wants To Strike Back

This time around the "empire" is not the US, pace Comrades Hugo and Fidel.  The empire in question does not yet exist in its desired, reincarnated form.  But, given the ambitions of Turkish prime minister Erdogan and the almost done deal between his country and the mullahs next door in Iran, it is not unfair.

The jefe grande of the Ottoman Empire 2.0 is, like his predecessors, terribly upset by the Kurds.  Again in imitation of his non-Islamist forebearers, Erdogan is dreadfully keen on wiping the several groups fighting for Kurdish independence out of existence for once and all.  The Supreme Guardian of the Revolution, just like the Shah during the days of the ancien regime, shares the sentiment heart and soul.

The US as well as the (presumably) US backed regime in Iraq are caught somewhere in the middle.  Baghdad has a much larger dog in the fight to be sure.  Iraqi Kurdistan, which is legally semi-autonomous, is the most stable and prosperous place in the partially rebuilt country.  It is not simply Kurdistan's wealth and security that has raised hackles not only in Baghdad but through much of Iraq.  No.  Rather the deep distaste for Kurds and their region is about the only thing upon which the minority Sunnis and majority Shia can and do agree.

Way back in the mists of history (that is before World War I resulted in a massive exercise in creative cartography), Kurdistan was a territorial whole.  It had so existed for a mort of centuries both before and after the Ottoman Turks came to supremacy in Stamboli (or Istanbul, if that is your preference.)  The carving up of the old Empire was accomplished courtesy of the machinations of mid-level bureaucrats serving their masters in France and Great Britain.  In what was one of the greatest sins committed against the self-determination of nations principle dear to the heart of Woodrow Wilson, the Kurds found their tight little nascent state divided between French run Syria and English operated Iraq with small amounts allocated to the Turkey of Ataturk and the Shah of Persia.

Had this violation of American policy not been allowed to take place, Kurdistan would have long ago been recognized as the independent sovereign state its people wanted (and want) it to be.  But, as was so often the case, Wilson believed that the League of Nations (his centerpiece ideologically) would solve the injustice--an injustice he himself acknowledged.

For many decades, the issue rested silently in the mountains which constitute most of "Kurdistan."  But that came to an end when the respective "occupying" governments came to realize what resources resided in them thar hills.  Oil and hydroelectric resources to be precise.  Iraq battened fat off the oil while Turkey saw the rivers as the source of both agricultural and industrial riches.  The Iranians and Syrians saw potential in the fast running waters if not the oil and vowed to get their share.

With every passing year, the resources of "Kurdistan" have become more and more critical to Turkey and Iraq.  While the other two states have not profited so much, both Tehran and Damascus see the danger resident in a successful separatist movement.  The Syrian government both before and after the Baathist came to power sought to suppress the language, culture, and political identity of the Kurdish population.  The same has been the case in Iran under both secularist shah and Islamist grand ayatollahs.

Right down to the present day, the central government of Iraq has used all methods fair and foul alike to limit the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan.  The only thing keeping Baghdad from emulating the muscular methods of Saddam Hussein in the region has been the military capacity of the Kurdish peshmerga, which could fight the national army to a bloody standstill.

Over the past quarter century, the Kurds have been waging a low level defensive insurgency against both Iran and Turkey.  The PKK (shooting Turks) and PJAK (doing the same with Iranians down range) have been a thorn in the side of their target states.  Because Turkey is a NATO "partner," the US determined that the PKK is a terrorist organization.  Since Iran is a hostile state, the US has not yet made the same determination regarding the other group, the PJAK (aka "good terrorists.)

Comes now Recip Erdogan to announce an impending agreement with Iran to mount a joint effort presumably involving ground as well as air forces against those pesky Kurds and the heavily fortified base camps high in the mountains.  The reason to presume a ground effort is the abject failure of air assaults conducted by the Turkish air force to do more than move a few rocks around as well as kill a small number of civilians who did not find shelter in time but who in their deaths provided excellent propaganda material for the Kurds.

So far there has been no reported word from the Iraqi government regarding this proposed violation of sovereignty.  Perhaps the Iraqis are more easy going about such matters then are, say, the Pakistanis.  Or, the central government might be hoping for a good excuse to move large forces into Iraqi Kurdistan, forces which once there will not be quick to leave.

Nor has the Obama administration made comment on the proposed joint action--except implicitly.  For some while the US has been providing intelligence information to Ankara concerning the PKK.  This shared catch includes imagery and ELINT obtained by Predators.  Now, the word has leaked out that the Obama crew is contemplating basing Predators in Turkey.

Not one to be asleep at the switch, Erdogan has responded by offering to purchase or lease a few Predators so as to cut out the middleman.  Considering that the Paks have wanted to do this for a long while now, it would be quite a diplomatic and political coup for Erdogan to achieve the goal.

Not to put too fine a point on the Kurdish Question, there is ample evidence to the effect that the Kurds and their proposed state meet the tests provided in the UN Charter as well as subsidiary conventions.  With Iraqi Kurdistan as the linchpin, there is no doubt but the hypothetical Kurdistan would meet the requirements of the Montevideo Convention.  Considering this inconvenient context, US policy regarding the Kurds is flatly wrong.

The finding that PKK is a terrorist entity was based simply on the role Turkey theoretically plays in NATO while the similar act by the European Union dates back to the days when Turkey was knocking on the EU door.  In short, these actions had little if anything to do with "terrorism" per se and much to do with extraneous political considerations.

Silence in the Oval regarding the odd couple military plans must fall in the same category.  Arguably, the decision to share catch with Ankara and the basing of Predators in Turkey constitute another bribe to Erdogan for allowing the installation of the US X-band radar.  The decision to allow this anti-Iran move has resulted in severe blowback from Tehran, so the Turkish prime minister probably wants additional compensation.

There is only one open question.  No, that question is not will the US switch its policy regarding the Kurds and their right to and desire for a state of their own.  Nor does this question involve the notion of granting the government of Iraqi Kurdistan its request of redeploying US forces within its borders.  The present administration lacks both the depth of regional understanding and the political will to do either--even if each would be in American national interest.

The only remaining question is whether or not Obama and his "team" will cave and sell-lease a few spare Predators to Erdogan, and through him, the Iranians.

Wanna make a bet?

They Just Have The Wrong Enemy

Back in 1918, the Great Powers, victors over Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire did a bit of practical work, redrawing the maps of Europe and the Mideast.  Supposedly high on the list of priorities for this exercise in practical cartography was the uniquely American proposition called, "self-determination of peoples."  This noble bit of High Mindedness was honored more or less with respect to the splitting up of the old Hapsburg domains, but was it observed only in the breech when it came to dismembering the Ottoman lands.

When the hyper-idealistic Woodrow Wilson confronted the real world of secret deals and the fruits of wartime exigencies, he discovered that his notions of self-determination had been preempted by an assortment of understandings both formal and otherwise between Great Britain and France.  One of these rather under the table deals dealt with the area called Palestine.  This area along with the coterminous Trans-Jordan had been divided according to two contradictory undertakings.  One, the Balfour Declaration, promised Jews a "national homeland."  The other, an agreement between two bureaucrats, Sykes and Picot, created two protectorates, one under British rule and the other under French.

This exercise in international can kicking is still with us today in the form of the seemingly endless conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.  (By the way a body of American experts on the region advised President Wilson to fight this one to the death as the result would be a century of bloodshed.  Rarely have experts been so right.)

Almost overlooked was the simultaneous division of Iraq and Syria into British (Iraq) and French (Syria along with its appendage, Lebanon) protectorates.  Embedded in both Iraq and Syria as well as in the rump state of Turkey and the country then called Persia was a people long separated from their neighbors by language, customs, and culture but not religion.  This nation now split among four states was the Kurds.

The Kurds were not at all happy with this division.  Nor should they have been.  According to the principle of self-determination, the Kurds merited their own state, the state of Kurdistan.  But, these unfortunate folk lacked any representative in Versailles.  Unlike the Arabs way down south, the Kurds had provided no service to the Allied cause.  Unlike the Arabs, the Kurds had no access to powerful British political figures.  Neither did they gain the attention of imperial minded bureaucrats.  As a result, they were casually and cruelly consigned to minority status within four states.

Almost immediately, the Kurds commenced a defensive insurgency in each and every of the four countries to which they had been so cavalierly assigned.  The insurgency has not ended to this day.  Like the conflict between Arab Palestinian and Israeli Jew, the conflict gives no hint of ending soon, or ever.

The Kurdish people are an ancient hill folk.  Like hill dwellers almost everywhere, they are excellent warriors.  It deserves mention that the great Muslim fighter who kicked Crusader butt with great effect, Saladin, was a Kurd.  While today's Kurdish fighters may not have either the military genius or bent to chivalry which marked the legendary Saladin, they are not slouches in the craft of guerrilla war as may be attested to by the marked lack of success enjoyed to date by Turks and Iranians alike.

Other than in Iraq where the Kurds have a semi-autonomous province under sole Kurdish control, it is accurate to say the Kurds live under occupation by a foreign force.  In Turkey, in Syria, and in Iran, the majority Kurdish areas are under direct military control.  Indeed, in at least two of these countries, the degree of military control equals or exceeds that exercised by Israel over the Palestinians of the West Bank and far outstrips that of Gaza.

The Kurds are denied equal treatment in all three states to a degree never reached in the West Bank or Gaza.  They are denied the use of their own language.  They are not allowed to conduct their own education.  They are not provided with the same level of governmental services including access to economic development as the majority populations in all three states.  In short, the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iran have been pushed to the margins, had their culture and language robustly attacked as a matter of policy, and are subject to an array of legal disabilities as well as informal discrimination.

From any perspective, the Kurds have suffered far more deprivation of status, rights, and opportunities at the hands of the governments and majority populations of Turkey, Syria, and Iran than the Palestinians ever were during the years since June 1967.  At the same time, the Kurds have a claim on statehood which equals or exceeds that made by the Palestinians.

In sharp contrast with the Palestinians, the Kurds have waged their multi-generation insurgency with remarkable humanity.  Unlike the Palestinians down to the present day, the Kurdish fighters sharply limit their attacks to military and constabulary targets.  The intentional attack of civilians is almost unheard of.  Compared to the Palestinian way of war, the Kurds take care to reduce collateral damage to a minimum.  In the usually dirty business of insurgent warfare, the Kurds are relative good guys.  The Palestinians are very much of the opposite hue.

These ground truths demand a question or two.  Where are the liberal groups in the West?  Where are the groups espousing boycotts, divestiture, or deligitimatization of Iran, Syria, and Turkey?  Where are the UN resolutions condemning the suppression of the legitimate rights of the Kurds by Ankara, Damascus, Tehran?  Where is the UN Human Rights Council with resolutions, special rapporteurs, and other displays of condemnation or concern?

In the last few years, advocates of Palestinian statehood have proliferated with a speed which boggles the imagination.  Campaigns of boycotts, divestiture, and sanctions have spilled forth in mighty torrents.  The UN and its lesser creatures have shown a tender concern for the Palestinians without precedent.  The High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West have taken the Palestinians--rockets, suicide vests, and AK-47s  included--into a warm embrace.

All blame for whatever happens in the Mideast between Israel and the Palestinians is quickly, automatically, ascribed to the evil doing, racist, Zionist occupiers.  Even when a Jewish infant dies, throat slit as it slept near the dead parents and elder siblings, it is seen as the direct result of the Zionist occupier.

Meanwhile, the Turkish air force bombs civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan while Iranian artillery does the same without even the mildest whimper coming from the assorted advocates of self-determination around the world who are so quick to condemn the Zionist occupiers.  Even Syria is exempt from criticism as it denies the most basic rights to Kurds resident in its borders.

Why?

Why two "victims" (one, the Kurds, arguably more deserving of the term) with two such wildly disparate responses from the "international community," the human rights congeries, and politicians around the world?

The answer is as simple as it is ugly.  The Kurds are predominantly Muslim.  So also are the oppressive majority populations in each and every of the four states.  The Palestinians are mainly Muslim.  Their putative oppressors are Jewish.

And, now the really nasty part, antisemitism is as rife in the West as it is endemic to the Muslim states.  In the West, this ancient, evil mindset hides behind the currently respectable facade of being "anti-Zionist" or, even better, as a euphemism, "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy."

It is OK in the West to look at Muslim oppression of Muslims with total indifference.  In the Muslim majority states, the same is true to an even greater extent because to condemn the Muslim majority for oppressing a Muslim minority is to commit that great Islamic sin of fitna, of introducing fission in the great Islamic ummah.  The single towering fiction in Islam is that of holding the community of believers to be one huge, happy family.  So, no hand is raised, no voice either, to stop the oppression of Kurds by Muslim Turks, Muslim Iranians, or Muslim Arabs.

The fiction of Islamic unity is nothing compared to the larger concoction in the West.  The concealing of antisemitism behind the thin and torn scrim of "anti-Zionism" or "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy" is not simply hypocritical, it is a moral delict of the highest order.

Any way you cut it, the groups and individuals in the West who brandish the cudgels on behalf of the Palestinians while maintaining a discrete silence with respect to the Kurds are examples of moral decay without equal.  It is a very severe indictment of the High Minded in the West who by their careful selection of who deserves support show themselves to be both dishonest and antisemitic to the core.

The people and groups so staunchly supporting the Palestinians (including the UN, the UN Human Rights Council, the assorted NGOs, and the individuals who espouse sanctions, boycotts, and divestiture) will deserve respectful attention when and only when they exhibit the same level of concern for the Kurds as they do the Palestinians.  Unless and until these worthies are as willing to condemn and seek to delegitimatize the Turks, the Iranians, and the Syrians, they merit no hearing.

Rather, these groups and individuals should themselves be blackguarded as the antisemites they are.  Any less is to endorse their wicked position.

Turkey's Foreign Policy--Clever Calculation Or Flat Out Stupid

Until very recently, the announced foreign policy of Turkey under the Islamist leaning AKP has been one of "zero problems" with its regional neighbors.  This exercise in fantasy started to crumble under the bitter winds of the "Arab Spring."

Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi.  The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain.  The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.

After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters.  Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels.  In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.

Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad.  The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran.  Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.

The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom.  Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."

The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days.  At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen.  By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.

The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance.  Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.

The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident.  Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer."  The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship.  Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora.  Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.

The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so.  The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.

As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan.  The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.

It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan.  So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians.  It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.

Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq.  While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders.  This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.

One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.

It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want.  The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed.  They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.

The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border.  This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing.  The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any.  In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.

Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge.  They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible.  They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible.  They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan.  Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.

The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy.  The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside.  True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp.  Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.

Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey.  But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support.  As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders.  Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.

Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.

One More Victory?

The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad.  The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered.  It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.

Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.

Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity.  The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.

The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date.  The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice.  The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.

There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan.  That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil.  Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally.  The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine.  Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.

Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray.  Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making.  As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues.  More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.

Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime.  There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause.  But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite.  Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."

Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point.  His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men."  The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint.  However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.

The same dynamic applied in Iraq.  The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion.  Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural.  The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was  to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate.  The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.

As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border.  Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities.  In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.

As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance.  This man is Muqtada al-Sadr.  He is a Shia cleric.  He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context.  He runs a very large and rather competent private militia.  And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.

The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing.  Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price.  For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran.  Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.

The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran.  The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.

A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon.  Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government.  The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level.  The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.

The departure of the Americans will have two results.  One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations.  The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.

Isn't that a fascinating prospect?

The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real.  The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad.  Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.

President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not.  They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik.  Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.

Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box.  Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France.  The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.

Libya is in a profound state of flux.  It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed.  The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on.  Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.

So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department.  While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.

Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it.  Doesn't it?

Time For The "Nuclear Option"

The US and assorted other civilized states have been making noises and ugly faces for some years now over the Iranian efforts to attain nuclear weapons.  Diplomatic and economic sanctions have been employed.  So have more robust measures ranging from the more or less covert such as computer viruses to the rather obvious, the shooting of nuclear researchers.

Th net result has been the continued and accelerating Iranian quest for the bomb.

Years ago, the notion of Iranian science or work in advanced technology would have been seen quite properly as an oxymoron.  During the early days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, science and technology were downgraded severely as a matter of theologically predicated policy.  It was only years later, years marked by the stalemated bloodletting of the Iran-Iraq War, that the mullahs and ayatollahs changed their religious tune.  Only after the near defeat at the hands of the technologically superior Iraq convinced the Supreme Guardian of the Revolution that the deity did, after all, will Iran to have sufficient and sufficiently advanced weapons to protect the revolution.

Science and technology came back to the front and center of Iranian governmental life in the late Eighties and beyond.  Oil money poured into new and reinvigorated institutes and university departments.  Chief among these were those entities which dealt with nuclear research and development as well as key support systems of nuclear weapons including but not limited to ballistic and guided missiles.

The Iranians deserve great credit for accomplishing much over the next two decades.  In both nuclear and missile development, they were very much on their own.  Only South Africa was as internationally isolated during its nuclear development period--and even then the Pretoria regime received some assistance from Israel including supplies of tritium necessary for boosted fission as well as fusion bombs.  Other than some early model centrifuges from A.Q Khan's ring in Pakistan, the Iranians pulled themselves up by their own fission bootstraps.

The monolithic Western governmental opposition linked with the earlier conviction that only a nuclear capacity would assure Iranian survival in a future war to enhance greatly the firm belief that the possession of nuclear weapons was an existential matter.  The existential foundation of the nuclear option was reinforced by Tehran's observation of how the US treated the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  The Islamabad Bad Boys were  handled with gentility and respect by Washington for one simple reason--Pakistan had the bomb.

This meant that should Iran match Pakistan's accomplishment, the result would be elevated status on both the global and regional stages.  Not only would the "Mahdi Bomb" assure Iran's survival as an Islamic theocracy, it would propel the country to the status of regional hegemon and global actor of real potency.  These were two very fine reasons to bear heavy burdens and make great sacrifices for the years it would take to develop a credible nuclear capacity.

There is no doubt but the many sanctions regimes imposed, particularly those of recent origin focusing on shipping and insurance, have place very heavy loads on the Iranian economy.  There is no doubt but the sanctions taken in total have forced the Iranian government and people to make sacrifices over and above those required by the inefficient and repressive nature of the government.

Most importantly, there is no reason to conclude that the sanctions and diplomatic pressures have modified Iranian behavior--other than to make the mullahs and their frontmen more intransigent, more creative in sanction evasion, and more committed to acquiring the bomb no matter what the price.

Not to put too fine a point on the matter, in the battle of political wills between the US led West and Iran, it is the latter which is winning.  In this context, the Iranians have introduced a form of game changer--a new generation of improved centrifuges which will reduce greatly the time needed to turn twenty percent enriched uranium into weapons grade stuff.  Further, they have acted in a prudential manner, placing the new fast-spinners in deep dug bunkers.

Now ninety plus senators have urged the immediate introduction of a game changer from the American perspective.  In a letter to the president, this overwhelming majority of the senate have demanded the imposition of sanctions against the Iranian central bank, the bank created some fifty years ago to act as the interface between the consumers of Iranian oil and the Tehran government.  This move, described as the "nuclear option," would, if enforced, prevent the clearing of payments to Iran from all purchasers of oil.

For its part, the government of Iran has stated this move would constitute "an act of war."

While not being an armed action, the isolation of the Iranian Bank Markazi would be the equivalent in effect of the US freezing of all Japanese assets in the summer of 1941.  That action, the culmination of a long campaign of escalating economic pressures, prevented Japan from acquiring oil and other strategic materials from the US.  This gave the government of Imperial Japan the choice of a humiliating surrender to American political dictates or war.

As you know, the Japanese chose the second alternative.  The decision makers believed that the fortunes of war might favor Japan given other constraints operating on the US including the ongoing Great Depression and a preoccupation with Nazi Germany.

It would not be irrational for Tehran to make the same choice today or into the near future.  The US is in the throes of a severe economic challenge including possibly the second of a double dip recession.  It is still engaged in an unpopular and seemingly inconclusive war in Afghanistan.  The current administration is perceived as both irresolute and feckless.

The senators hint at the possibility of legislation compelling the imposition of the ultimate sanction should the president decide not to use the authority he already has to make the move.  This make the challenge both direct and definitely non-trivial.  As the choice is both clear and stark, it will be difficult for Mr Obama to "lead from behind" or equivocate.  And, it is debatable whether or not he has the political capital necessary to stare the senators down.

Were the Iranians to choose war, now is the least-worst time for us to fight it.  Looking ahead, there is no doubt but the American military will be significantly weaker a year or two hence.  The budget battles assure the Pentagon will take a heavy hit.  In this context is is important to recall that people close to the Oval have intimated the president would be happy to see the military budget at or below fifteen percent of total expenditures.  This would be a funding level not seen since the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

We forget how unready the US was for World War II.  We forget how difficult it was to mobilize our industrial resources and manpower for that war. Perhaps most important, we overlook the fact that playing the sort of catch-up now that we did so well seventy years ago is quite impossible.  It is no longer feasible or even possible to undertake the kind of forced draft military build-up today which we did between 1941 and 1944.  The radical changes in military technology have been responsible for this ground truth as they are for the companion reality that a draftee based armed force is not possible.

Right now or in the next few months, the US is quite capable of decisively defeating Iran should the latter be so ill-advised as to treat our imposition of the "nuclear option" as a literal act of war.  Further, it is a war which would be widely supported by We the People--provided only that it was fought as a retaliatory and punitive action without any follow-on occupation and rebuilding of the place.

President Obama is long overdue in making a defecate or get off the pot decision about Iran and its search for the bomb.  We have played the escalating sanction game long enough and have had more than sufficient opportunity to have observed the counterproductive results.  Diplomacy of the talk sort has also run its course without beneficial results.

The senatorial letter is forcing a final decision.  Either we have to admit that we can live and the world can live with a nuclear capable Iran and all that implies or we have to take the final, decisive act.  The president would be best off acting on his current authority so he will look as if he were actually a "decider guy" as George W. used to put it.  Better to look as if you are acting of your own volition than to be seen as being frog marched by the senate.

Should Iran respond with war-like acts either directly or through surrogates, by overt military actions or through terrorism, let it be.  As George W. memorably put the matter, "Bring it on!"

More "Followership" From The Hindmost

Coming late and out of breath from the unusual bout of exertion, the US today decided that the rebels, The Transitional Government" is the only legitimate game in Libya.  The US has extended full diplomatic recognition to the far less than coherent bunch in Benghazi.  The practical effect of this move is the freeing of the billions of Gaddafi bucks languishing in American custody, impounded under UN sanctions.

The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition.  The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.

Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government.  Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid.  It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists.  There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.

There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi.  The US has no direct stake in the country.  Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play.  That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company.  It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.

There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya.  It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.

The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy.  The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy.  While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.

One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions.  An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia.  The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.

The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft.  In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US.  Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.

If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests?  Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.

No, bucko, not oil.  The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran.  It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq.  These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure.  But there is a far more important audience.

That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran.  In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program.  The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges.  More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.

Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort.  It is focused on getting the bomb.  Period.  There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.

Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US.  In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so.  As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.

"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat.  A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved.  The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.

Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge.  This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour.  We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy.  In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.

Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force.  They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant.  The mullahs are right in this.  Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.

The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation.  The Israeli government shares it.  Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat.  They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world.  A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.

The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant.  There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in.  If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.

Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational.  It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US.  Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.

The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure.  The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset.  As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.

A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event.  But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well.  This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.

To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer.  To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut.  However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader.  In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.

The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!"  The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."

As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact.  By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu.  That is not a failure of policy.  It is not even a simple error of judgement.  It is a world class blunder.

Of Course Iran Is Behind The New "Surge" In Iraq

Admiral Mike Mullen made a blunt and truthful statement which has not been well received in Tehran.  The only thing at all wrong with the admiral's remarks was their tardy nature.  It is not inaccurate to characterize the chairman's accusation of Iranian complicity in the uptick of attacks on Americans in Iraq as yesterday's news.

With or without the active participation (or even the presence in country) of Moqtada al-Sadr, the famed anti-American Shiite paramilitary leader and part-time student of Islam, the ayatollahs and their goons of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have pursued national interest in Iraq.  The view from Tehran is simply that religion trumps national identity or, if that isn't enough motivation, the Iraqi Shiites have decades of scores to settle against the minority Sunnis who ran the place from the time of the British Mandate through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The ready presence of the Shiite fighters of the Sadrists seemed to underscore the accuracy of the Iranian calculations.  The enigmatic and illusive figure of Moqtada al-Sadr confused the picture to some extent--in the estimates of both American and Iranian decision makers.  Sadr played two cards with equal skill: Confessional loyalty and nationalism.  As he switched between the two, his eyes remained firmly on the prize he sought.  Not surprisingly, the prize was and remains power.

Sadr has no desire to sit on the throne.  He knows all too well that not only is the head which wears the crown likely to sleep uneasily but in Iraq for some time to come crown wearers are quite likely to lose both crown and the head under it.  Sadr wanted and wants to be the ultimate power behind the throne.  In pursuit of this end, the crafty cleric is willing to use Iranian assistance--if it is low profile enough.

He has been careful, very careful to keep daylight between himself and the theocrats of Tehran as well as the current crop of Shiite terrorists.  He understands quite well that the old Iraqi proverb holding that no fruit tastes as good as the product of one's own orchard applies today among Iraqis of all stripes.  To be seen as a tool or proxy of the Ayatollahs would be fatal to Sadr's ambitions.  All the more since he has achieved the long coveted status of Grey Eminence following his agreement to support al-Maliki--a promise of support which has become increasingly important as Maliki has lost popularity generally.

Sadr's hand will be strengthened by the completion of the American withdrawal.  His highest public priority has been that of seeing the last American posterior hitting the Kuwaiti border at year's end.  Ironically, accomplishment of this much desired result is being compromised by the Iranian uptick of direct support for the Shiite insurgents who have been attacking Americans as well as Iraqis.

The Deep Thinkers of Tehran apparently have convinced themselves that the infliction of fatalities on US personnel is the best way of assuring the American withdrawal.  The take in Tehran is simple:  Neither the American president nor the American people have the stomach for more death.

In this assessment the Deep Thinkers in Tehran may be correct.  We the People want no more of our own killed in Iraq.  The current administration and congress would like very much to see an end to our Great Adventure in Regime Change.  But, the view inside Baghdad is different.  So is the perspective from the Pentagon.

The Pentagon is afraid, very afraid that any final American withdrawal would now be seen by not only the Iranians but promoters of violent political Islam everywhere as having been forced upon us by the efforts of the jihadists.  Such a conclusion might be totally wrong, but it will be drawn nonetheless.  A previous generation of advocates of violent political Islam including Osama bin Laden wrongly concluded that it was the efforts of the "Arab fighters," the "martyrdom seekers," who defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan.  This work of fiction would be emulated next January if the US withdraws according to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.

It is to preclude this possibility and the evils which would flow from it (among other reasons) which has propelled the Defense Department to seek a modification of the SOFA.  Even a small (10,000) man package of combat capable personnel would prevent the false claim of military victory on the part of the Islamists.

The politicians of Baghdad along with many in the Iraqi military establishment favor a continued, low footprint American presence.  The leaders of the Kurds strongly support the idea.  Within the beleaguered Sunni areas of Anbar province, the support is both wide and deep.  Only Sadr is opposed.

Despite his opposition, there is very little probability that Sadr would seek to veto the idea should it be strongly and evidently favored by the other elements of Iraqi politics.  To do so would be to put himself  publicly in league with the Iranians.  This would undercut his power in Iraq.  Not a good idea from the Sadr perspective.

It would be best for Sadr if he could convince his Iranian comrades to call off their private war.  By doing so, the American desire to stay lest they appear to have been defeated would be eroded.  By lowering the climate of fear, the badly divided Iraqi political structure would be fragmented so that no unified support for a modification in the SOFA would develop.  And, it would make Sadr even more of a critical broker of power.

It is highly unlikely that Tehran would listen to Sadr even should he make the outlined argument.  Considering the dynamic in Syria there is real anxiety that Tehran is about to lose their only Arab state ally.  This implies that Iraq looms larger today than in the past as an Iranian Shiite outpost in the Arab world.  Tehran knows perfectly well that any American presence reduces greatly their hopes of turning Baghdad into a replacement for Damascus.

The strongest probability is that Tehran will not only continue but increase its support for the Shiite groups which have been carrying out the attacks.  This is a calculated risk.  The ayatollahs must believe that when push comes to shove, Sadr will carry Tehran's water within the circles of the Maliki government.  Or, even better, Sadr will whistle up the supposedly disarmed Sadrist militias.  Whether the Deep Thinkers of Tehran are right or not depends on Sadr's commitment to his faith: does his identity as a Shiite outweigh or not his identity as an Iraqi?

Sadr probably does not even know his own mind here.  His actions and words over the past nine years have been those of a man quite confused about his identity much as he knows his priorities.  Often he has tried to ride the horse of religion and that of nationalism simultaneously.  Inevitably, he has fallen one way or the other. His recurrent prolonged trips to "study" in Qom show the crisis of conscious which results each time he falls to the side of nationalism at the expense of Shia.

Perhaps his thinking would be clarified if someone were to whisper in his ear, "Iraqis are more likely to trust a fellow Iraqi with power than an Iranian in Iraqi costume."  That is a sentiment one can take to the bank in Iraq.

It Looks As If Assad Has Made A Decision

The Baathist regime has sent the tanks to Daraa, the place where it all started.  It would appear that Assad and company have decided to end the protests where they began a few short and bloody weeks ago.  A cell phone image of the hulking mass of a top of the line Soviet era MBT lurking in a city street gives a particular air of menace--a air which is undoubtedly true.

One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago.  Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence.  The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down.  If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.

Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case.  The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate.  The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations.  The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.

It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change.  While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival.  The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities.  Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.

This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists.  The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support.  However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.

With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back.  And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks.  If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression.  The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.

Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives.  More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions.  And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.

Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow.  The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces.  The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement.  This will lengthen the fighting.  Lengthening means more killing.  More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.

Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy.  Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression.  This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists.  By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.

The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel.  The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.

Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list.  However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job.  If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.

Israel loses as well.  The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat.  Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war.  If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.

Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria.  He was right.  Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on.  Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace.  The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.

The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer.  Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter.  One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace.  The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple.  No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.

If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region.  For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement.  Syria gets the Golan Heights back.  That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.

This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria.  It is a time sensitive matter.  If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.

Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria.  Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down.  The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert.  Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people.  Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."

And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region.  With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt.  The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.

There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement.  Sanctions will not deter Assad.  Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest.  The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.

It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration.  But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.

The Egyptian Foreign Policy "Reset" Button

One upon a time Egypt was a power to be reckoned with, even to be feared.  No, kiddies, not in the time of Ramses or one of the other big time pharaohs but fifty years ago when Gamal Abdel Nasser was running the show.

Nasser built much of his personal power on projecting Egypt very large on the international scene.  The fertile mind and great energy of the one time colonel turned dictator was responsible for the phenomenon of pan-Arabism.  In addition, he was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement.  Nasser rapidly became the bete noir of John Foster Dulles to say nothing of so alienating both the British and French governments that these two allies linked up with Israel in a conspiracy to commit aggressive war against Nasser's Egypt.

Throughout it all, through all the defeats in war, the ups and downs of regional and global diplomacy, all the twists and turns of playing the Cold War game, the Egyptian public felt very, very good about themselves, their country, and their leader.  Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, also played the foreign policy game well.  And, better yet for the Egyptians, he played the Great Game of War far better than had Nasser with the  result that the Egyptian army and people reclaimed their long lost testicles in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War.  Sadat followed that with the best diplomatic volte face in years when he switched sides from the Soviets to the Americans.

Egyptians walked tall and talked loud, punching well above their weight in the global arena.  They continued to do so right on to and past the signing of the Camp David Accords.  But, not long after Mubarak replaced the assassinated Sadat, the Egyptian diplomatic power house faded to black.

True, Egypt helped this process when signing the Camp David Accords resulted in Cairo being shunned by the other "frontline" states of the Arab League.  However, far more important than this brief episode was the decision made incrementally by Hosni Mubarak to link Egypt's domestic political tranquility and economic well being to the US policy interest of maintaining Mideast peace.  Egypt withdrew from the diplomatic arena in all save a few, carefully selected, peace enhancing ways.

As long as Mubarak followed this approach of quiescence, the US overlooked the lack of democracy and the abundance of repression in Egypt.  Additionally, the US provided huge amounts of money desperately needed by Egypt to keep consumer prices on basic commodities low.  It was a decent bargain for both sides.

The bargain gave rise to a persistent belief among Egyptians that Mubarak was nothing more than an American lapdog.  This belief was and is emblematic of a proud people's reaction to their country and government having gone from the top ranks of diplomatic players to the silent majority of states that don't matter.

While subsidiary in importance to purely domestic issues, the shrinking of Egypt's global status was not absent in the overthrow of Mubarak.  The chant, "Stand tall, you are Egyptian!" speaks to that issue bluntly and clearly.

The tossing over of Mubarak assured that Egypt would shortly embark upon a new course of diplomacy.  It was a given that this new course would be one which kept the US at least at an arm's length.  It was a given that Egypt would edge closer to Iran.  It was a given that Egypt would be far more solicitous of the Palestinian cause.

Implied in these givens was the high probability that Egypt's new course would be one which did not meet with the approbation of the Saudis.  A further implication running in tandem with the first is that insofar as Egypt moved closer to Iran, the more it would find itself caught in the crossfire of the Saudi-Iranian cold war.

While there are some experts on the Mideast who think that the triangular dynamic of thirty years ago--Egypt, Iran and Turkey--exists unchanged today the reality is different, far different.  Even thirty years ago, the triangle was morphing into a quadrilateral with Iraq.  Today it is again a four cornered array with Saudi Arabia as the fourth.  The degree to which Iran influences Turkish policy is debatable, but there is sufficient community of interest between Ankara and Tehran to wonder if any meaningful daylight exists between the two.

From the vantage point of Riyadh, the prospect of Egypt, reinvigorated with the new politics of a post-Mubarak epoch, linking at all with Iran would be both threatening and totally unacceptable.  This raises the stakes for the US.

Were it not for the upticking Saudi-Iranian cold war, the US could view any changes in Egypt's diplomatic posture with a high degree of equanimity.  The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is not in danger.  Not even a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood would rip up that particular piece of paper.  To do so would be quite unacceptable to both the US and the European Union, the two money bags upon which Egypt's basic fiscal health and thus political stability depends.

The prospect of an Egypt given to greater denunciation of the US and Israel is not amusing but neither is it a challenge to the good order of the region.  Even a greater degree of support for Hamas on the part of Cairo is not a game changer--except for the possibility for levering Hamas away from sole dependence upon Iran by way of Syria.  The US, Europe, and Israel could all deal with this level of change on the part of Egypt.

It is the Saudi-Iranian cold war which alters the dynamic in a fundamental way.  Right now the Saudis are counting the house, seeing who is potentially with them--and against them.  Affairs are looking a bit bleak from the Saudi point of view.  Syria is still in Tehran's hip pocket.  Iraq is run by the Shiites--and the last of the US forces is scheduled to be out in mere months.  And, Egypt is moving slowly but surely into the gravitational field of Iran.  Jordan is an embattled semi-nonentity.  Yemen is close to collapse--or, in a best case, suitable as a hollow state under direct Saudi control.

To the Saudis nothing is secure beyond their fellow feudal rulers of Sunni belief in the Gulf states.  For this reason if no other the Kingdom will be looking to the Obama administration to put some muscle on the Egyptians not to wander too far off the old reservation.  This will bring Washington into direct confrontation with the needs of the transitional government as well as whatever and whoever succeeds it to establish its bona fides as an independent actor with potency on the global and regional stages.

The resulting balancing act will be both difficult and demanding for the current administration.  It has shown itself remarkably tone deaf to the nuances of regional politics as well as the internal affairs of the several key countries.  It has also compiled a record of being indecisive and slow to act.  When the preoccupations of an active campaign for reelection and the domestic politics of divided government facing monumental difficulties are factored in, the probability of the administration or the president acting in a timely and effective fashion is low to say the least.

When the full weight of what is in process hits home it is likely that both Mr Obama and Ms Clinton will wish they were safely back in the senate voting "present" on pieces of controversial legislation.

And Still The Blood Flows---

Yesterday the Syrian security forces killed more than one hundred anti-government protesters.  Today it was more of the same as snipers in civilian clothes were reported to be engaging funeral processions in suburbs of Damascus.  It is looking more and more like Bashir al-Assad is losing control of the situation as the old truism of the dead dictating policy is once again operative among the long repressed and fearful folks of Syria.

While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression.  His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple.  It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.

As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them.  The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge.  Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game.  As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)

It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen.  This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept.  How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?

In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway.  The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.

No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be.  The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime.  An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government.  It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support.  To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.

Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically.  Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance.  Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial.  Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region.  However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq.  That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs.  So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.

This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation.  The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions.  This is possible but meaningless in effect.  As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming.  Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.

In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company.  The imperatives to do the same now exist.  The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy.  Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.

Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea.  The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups.  As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.

As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements.  The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan.  The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.

The House Of Saud Is Getting Very, Very Worried

Perhaps the best sign of growing Saudi anxiety over the near future is the recall of the legendary Prince Bandar from the diplomatic/political purgatory he has inhabited for the past several years.  Bandar's record in the many jobs he has held including a lengthy and very productive stint as the Kingdom's ambassador to the US shows him to be a man of unusual boldness, resourcefulness, and determination.  Given the way in which regional affairs have been going rapidly and steadily south from the perspective of Riyadh, it was a certainty that Bandar would be brought back, the Kingdom's diplomatic cavalry in action.

The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf.  The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom.  Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam.  This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques.  In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.

That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."

In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring."  Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.

According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.

Enter Prince Bandar.  The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia.  Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief.  But it was not the only part.

Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US.  The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout.  Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.

The same is true with respect to Russia.  The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production.  And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US.  Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."

Now for Pakistan.  It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia.  Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.  Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."

While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.

An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran.  The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan.  And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques.  Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.

As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US.  The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.

Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions.  They make a person feel good just considering them.  But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy.  The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.

Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf.  The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point.  An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach.  Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.

Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria.  The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary.  There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.

The outlines of a deal are hinted here.  Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain.  From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.

Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.