What Victory(ies)?

Today The Clueless Guy In The Oval announced (as expected) that all US troops other than the embassy guard will be out of Iraq by the end of the year.  Instantly if not sooner, the political flacks which surround the Oval sprang into action averring with straight faces that this was the desired result as well as the fulfillment of a major campaign promise.

What a crock!

As American military and diplomatic officials including both the past and current Secretaries of Defense have maintained with a fair degree of passion, the continuation of a US military presence was essential for assuring that the past nine years, something on the order of a trillion dollars, and, most importantly, over 4,000 lives had not been wasted.  Iraq's internal stability is very fragile on the best of days--and there are damn few of those.  In addition, the Iranians present a clear and present threat against which Iraq has no credible means of either deterrence or defense.  Beyond that, the Iraqi forces need much more training in their new weapons systems as well as in the areas of intelligence, logistics, air support, and communication.

Over the past year, the Obama administration had and threw away numerous opportunities to keep a suitable number of training, combat support, special operations, and combat forces in Iraq.  The alleged block was the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to grant immunity from Iraqi judicial processes to the US personnel.

This, too, is a crock.

The administration--the president--insisted that legal immunity be granted by specific action on the part of the Iraqi Council of Representatives.  This would have been politically impossible as the Obama foreign policy "team" must have known.  There were other means of obtaining the requisite immunity which would have sidestepped the field of mines which constitutes the Council of Representatives as well the total Iraqi parliament.  The simplest means would have been to list the names of each and every spook, special operator, trainer, and trigger puller on the embassy personnel roster, which would have made diplomatic immunity automatic.  The Iraqi ForMin was wide open to this gambit as were other senior members of the Iraqi executive branch.

While it is true that Allawi--the head of the opposition bloc which was narrowly and questionably defeated by Maliki's bloc--complicated the matter, the US had and has sufficient juice with Allawi to end the stall he introduced.  In short, there were no insurmountable obstacles in Baghdad to continuing the American presence even at the level of 20,000 troops.

The real deal was the Nice Young Man From Chicago was and is hoping that by bringing the last troops home against the rhetorical backdrop of declaring victory he will gain political mileage for the upcoming reelection bid.  He has been purposefully willing to toss aside the last nine years, the trillion dollars, and the lives of more than 4,000 Americans for personal, partisan reasons.

The same applies to the specious claims of victory in Libya following the killing of Gaddifi yesterday.  It was not a victory for the US.  Nor was it one for NATO.  While it is true that without the US/UK/French/NATO air campaign, on the ground advisers, weapons and equipment supplies, intelligence support, and diplomatic game playing, "Brother Leader" would still be oppressing the Libyans and haunting the international scene.  But, the only "victors" were the assorted militias who did the fighting and dying--and who will now claim the rewards.

It will be up to these sundry groups of trigger pullers as well as the myriad of tribal and religious leaders who more or less control the men with the AKs to decide which reward will go to who.  The probability of continued and escalating violence is somewhere between high and extremely high.  Rewards will be claimed and fought over.  Payback will be the word of the day for months to come.  The body count, already high, will increase.  The NTC is losing support, in large measure because its actions and decision making are as transparent as a sandstorm.  Regional, tribal, and religious loyalties far exceed any attachment to something called "Libya" or the "Libyan nation."

The death of the "King of Kings of Africa" removed whatever thin and tenuous glue held the competing factions and their guns together.  Now it is a matter of every region, every tribe, every city, every clan, even every individual for him or itself.  Every man raises his AK or RPG or MANPAD against every other.

There is no "victory" here for the US or France or the UK.  There is and will be only more challenges to regional stability, regional peace, to international efforts on behalf of these worthy end states.  There is utterly and absolutely nothing for the US--or Mr Obama--to crow about or see as a good lesson for tomorrow.

There is only the hope on the part of the president and his advisers that the Libyan adventure in "leading from behind" will bolster his fading reelection chances.  (Note the recent Gallup poll placing his approval rating at the new low of 41%.)

Iraq is frail.  Libya is even worse.  The risks and sacrifices taken and made in both have been in vain by any rational calculus.  One can only hope that the Obama campaign will not be aided by these false "victories."

Small Straws In A Stiff Wind

There are weeks when the Geek has regretted his lifelong interest in matters of war, diplomacy, and the shadow lands of covert/clandestine affairs.  The past month of so has been one of those periods.  It is not that the world has suddenly been infected by a fulminating virus of peace and love.  Quite the contrary.  Rather the intellectual languor has been promoted by the combination of events having unfolded in a drearily predictable factor and the lack of imagination exhibited by the Deep Thinkers and Bold Actors on all sides of all the many conflicts, armed and otherwise.

A useful example of both predictability and the lack of imagination is presented by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.  The energetic dismantlement of the New Mexican borne cleric is both welcome and long overdue.  The fact that he was accompanied on his trip to paradise by the one time resident of North Carolina, Samir Khan, rendered the event all the more pleasurable.

Anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the UAV campaign in the FATA and the building of a base convenient to Yemen from which Agency operated Predators might make their lethal flights well understood that Awlaki's days were numbered, and that the number was small.  The violent death of the genius of Internet (and personal) radicalization became as certain as sunrise when he was placed on the "kill or capture" list last year.  Despite the inevitable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the ACLU and other advocates of human rights above the dictates of real life, and regardless of the equally certain condemnations of "extrajudicial execution" already resounding around the world, the Obama administration by it's listing of the imam let it be known that the governing considerations were those of war--a war in which Awlaki had voluntarily enlisted and waged with ever growing success.

With the failure a few months ago to capture Awlaki by a force of Yemeni personnel backed by USSOCOM assets, the only option was killing, and the only practical tool was provided by a Predator launched Hellfire.  The only time limits were imposed by the requirements for constructing an operational base and gaining from both Yemeni and national technical means sufficient actionable intelligence.  When fractured open source reports out of Yemen a couple of weeks ago indicated a diminishing of drone traffic over the area of Yemen in which Awlaki's tribe holds sway with a ramping up over territory to the country's north, it became evident that the endgame for the preacher was underway.

The removal of Awlaki and Khan from the board is good.  But, it is drearily predictable that it is not much more than that.  The strike in no way lessens the nature or effectiveness of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).  Had the reported inclusion of AQAP's chief bombmaker in the body count not been later retracted, the Hellfire would have well and truly hurt the group.  As it is, the most that can be said is the killing has had a marginal beneficial impact by reducing AQAP's capacity to use Internet radicalization with the same effect in the future that it has in the past.

Neither the killings nor the knee trembling on the part of human and civil rights lawyers and groups will change the nature of the ongoing war between advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states and people of the world.  The bad guys will keep on being bad actors.  The administration and any future one as well will use whatever means are necessary within the broad limits of proportionality to defend the country and its allies against attacks of whatsoever nature.

If there is any alteration in the future, it will be in the direction of placing increased reliance upon UAVs and other means of long range, low signature, low cost of commitment war fighting.  The use of special forces teams and UAVs has been both tested and proven in the harsh laboratory of the FATA as well as the one next door in Pakistan.  Both capabilities can be of great assistance in countering the potential threats resident in AQAP, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.)  Both may be required urgently against the latter threat if AQIM demonstrates greater capability as the result of having tapped into the arms stream flowing from the looted arsenals of Libya.

A greater use of UAVs will provoke an enormous consternation on the part of the usual suspects--the NGOs involved with human and legal rights as well as the apologists for countries which wish ill to the US but cannot match the American technological capacities.  There will be more and more political strange bedfellows both domestic and international as the US leans more heavily upon the impersonal, remotely controlled deliverers of death from above.  There will be demands beyond count for new conventions to bar such devices as Predator.  There will be calls for a moratorium on the use of these infernal machines until the law can catch up with the new technologies.

The only reply to those who believe the Predator and its tribe are inhuman and inhumane is,"Phooey!"  It is far better for a single Awlaki to die downrange than to see real war with its effects, unpredictable in detail but certain to include hundreds if not thousands of dead--most of whom will be civilians.

The Predators will continue to fly over Libya even long after NATO's warplanes have packed up and gone home.  They will be overhead to observe not only the intended targets of weapons being smuggled or saboteurs preparing but also the probable agony of protracted internal war as the joy of liberation turns into the pain of political disagreements of a very fundamental nature.

Libya (and its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt) is also drearily predictable.  Much of the reason for this observation is found in a remark made by a Salifist Tunisian, 23 years old and holder of a degree in engineering who, when interviewed, opined, "We Salifists are the majority.  Democracy is rule of the majority.  Why should we allow the minority (secular oriented Tunisians as well as their non-Salifist fellow countrymen) dictate how we should live?"

By this question as well as similar content expressions by legions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, and their supporters in the West, the young man demonstrated just why the "Arab Spring" will turn into a Winter, a most harsh and bitter Winter.  The promoters of democracy show they well understand democracy in and of itself but fail to see the necessary corollary: Democracy is the tyranny of the majority.

Unless properly constrained within the firm dikes of a representational republic and held in check by dams formed by both division of powers and an independent judicial system, democracy is tyranny pure and simple in which the rights of the minorities are either non-existent or tenuous at best.  In the rush to embrace democracy without the time necessary to build the essential dikes and dams, no citizen is secure, no rights and liberties are permanent, nothing is safe from the fads and fantasies of public opinion and the winds generated by demagogues.

Libya, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, but quite like Yemen and Afghanistan or other Islamic states, has the additional burden of tribalism.  This is not to say tribalism is bad.  It isn't.  Tribal identity is predominant in several states to the point that they are not real, integrated nation-states but rather collections of tribes sharing a flag.

The attempt to force tribal based societies and polities to pretend they are Western nation-states is doomed to fail.  Don't believe?  Take a look at Somalia.  It is not a failed state because it never was a real state.  Rather it was an artifact created by Western diplomats who used the only model making sense to them--the nation-state.  The same is true of Afghanistan.  Much of the inherent instability there results from ignoring the tribal nature of the human terrain in order to pretend we can make it into a Western style state.

When looking at Libya or Yemen or, to a lesser extent, Syria, the same dynamic is present--tribes forced to act as if their members owed a higher loyalty to the state.  The example of Iraq is instructive here.  As long as we outsiders insist on democracy and the nation-state as the touchstone of legitimacy, we are helping to doom the targets to a long, harsh Winter.

Even if tribalism of the usual sort is absent as it is in Egypt and Tunisia, there is a functional equivalent at work. That is the existence of differing interpretations of Islam and thus the relation of the faith to the state.  The ground truth is Islam carries the seeds of its own failure as a foundation of state.  This actuality has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  People may think they want to live in a Shariah based system until they are actually in one.  The proponents of austere Islam have and will find that their vision of life is totally unattractive to most people.  Then, they must (as do the austere Islamists of Iran) rely upon naked force to oppress their way to continued power.

Put together, the two forms of tribalism, traditional and religious, along with unchecked democracy point to a long, bitter Winter of pronounced discontents.  This, in turn, implies a high possibility of protracted or episodic internal war in all its manifold and evil forms.  Such is the result of ill-advised exercises in "nation-building" or regime change or support of the "peoples' will.

Coming full circle, the several downsides of either intervention or unthinking support are circumvented completely by using Predators or even special forces units.  These approaches to defending against hostile intents and acts minimize the probability of unintended consequences.  Predators do not engage in "nation-building," neither do they change regimes.  They kill people in serious need of being killed.

To this end, the killing of Awlaki is one important small straw in the very stiff winds of the coming Arab Winter.

The Empire Wants To Strike Back

This time around the "empire" is not the US, pace Comrades Hugo and Fidel.  The empire in question does not yet exist in its desired, reincarnated form.  But, given the ambitions of Turkish prime minister Erdogan and the almost done deal between his country and the mullahs next door in Iran, it is not unfair.

The jefe grande of the Ottoman Empire 2.0 is, like his predecessors, terribly upset by the Kurds.  Again in imitation of his non-Islamist forebearers, Erdogan is dreadfully keen on wiping the several groups fighting for Kurdish independence out of existence for once and all.  The Supreme Guardian of the Revolution, just like the Shah during the days of the ancien regime, shares the sentiment heart and soul.

The US as well as the (presumably) US backed regime in Iraq are caught somewhere in the middle.  Baghdad has a much larger dog in the fight to be sure.  Iraqi Kurdistan, which is legally semi-autonomous, is the most stable and prosperous place in the partially rebuilt country.  It is not simply Kurdistan's wealth and security that has raised hackles not only in Baghdad but through much of Iraq.  No.  Rather the deep distaste for Kurds and their region is about the only thing upon which the minority Sunnis and majority Shia can and do agree.

Way back in the mists of history (that is before World War I resulted in a massive exercise in creative cartography), Kurdistan was a territorial whole.  It had so existed for a mort of centuries both before and after the Ottoman Turks came to supremacy in Stamboli (or Istanbul, if that is your preference.)  The carving up of the old Empire was accomplished courtesy of the machinations of mid-level bureaucrats serving their masters in France and Great Britain.  In what was one of the greatest sins committed against the self-determination of nations principle dear to the heart of Woodrow Wilson, the Kurds found their tight little nascent state divided between French run Syria and English operated Iraq with small amounts allocated to the Turkey of Ataturk and the Shah of Persia.

Had this violation of American policy not been allowed to take place, Kurdistan would have long ago been recognized as the independent sovereign state its people wanted (and want) it to be.  But, as was so often the case, Wilson believed that the League of Nations (his centerpiece ideologically) would solve the injustice--an injustice he himself acknowledged.

For many decades, the issue rested silently in the mountains which constitute most of "Kurdistan."  But that came to an end when the respective "occupying" governments came to realize what resources resided in them thar hills.  Oil and hydroelectric resources to be precise.  Iraq battened fat off the oil while Turkey saw the rivers as the source of both agricultural and industrial riches.  The Iranians and Syrians saw potential in the fast running waters if not the oil and vowed to get their share.

With every passing year, the resources of "Kurdistan" have become more and more critical to Turkey and Iraq.  While the other two states have not profited so much, both Tehran and Damascus see the danger resident in a successful separatist movement.  The Syrian government both before and after the Baathist came to power sought to suppress the language, culture, and political identity of the Kurdish population.  The same has been the case in Iran under both secularist shah and Islamist grand ayatollahs.

Right down to the present day, the central government of Iraq has used all methods fair and foul alike to limit the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan.  The only thing keeping Baghdad from emulating the muscular methods of Saddam Hussein in the region has been the military capacity of the Kurdish peshmerga, which could fight the national army to a bloody standstill.

Over the past quarter century, the Kurds have been waging a low level defensive insurgency against both Iran and Turkey.  The PKK (shooting Turks) and PJAK (doing the same with Iranians down range) have been a thorn in the side of their target states.  Because Turkey is a NATO "partner," the US determined that the PKK is a terrorist organization.  Since Iran is a hostile state, the US has not yet made the same determination regarding the other group, the PJAK (aka "good terrorists.)

Comes now Recip Erdogan to announce an impending agreement with Iran to mount a joint effort presumably involving ground as well as air forces against those pesky Kurds and the heavily fortified base camps high in the mountains.  The reason to presume a ground effort is the abject failure of air assaults conducted by the Turkish air force to do more than move a few rocks around as well as kill a small number of civilians who did not find shelter in time but who in their deaths provided excellent propaganda material for the Kurds.

So far there has been no reported word from the Iraqi government regarding this proposed violation of sovereignty.  Perhaps the Iraqis are more easy going about such matters then are, say, the Pakistanis.  Or, the central government might be hoping for a good excuse to move large forces into Iraqi Kurdistan, forces which once there will not be quick to leave.

Nor has the Obama administration made comment on the proposed joint action--except implicitly.  For some while the US has been providing intelligence information to Ankara concerning the PKK.  This shared catch includes imagery and ELINT obtained by Predators.  Now, the word has leaked out that the Obama crew is contemplating basing Predators in Turkey.

Not one to be asleep at the switch, Erdogan has responded by offering to purchase or lease a few Predators so as to cut out the middleman.  Considering that the Paks have wanted to do this for a long while now, it would be quite a diplomatic and political coup for Erdogan to achieve the goal.

Not to put too fine a point on the Kurdish Question, there is ample evidence to the effect that the Kurds and their proposed state meet the tests provided in the UN Charter as well as subsidiary conventions.  With Iraqi Kurdistan as the linchpin, there is no doubt but the hypothetical Kurdistan would meet the requirements of the Montevideo Convention.  Considering this inconvenient context, US policy regarding the Kurds is flatly wrong.

The finding that PKK is a terrorist entity was based simply on the role Turkey theoretically plays in NATO while the similar act by the European Union dates back to the days when Turkey was knocking on the EU door.  In short, these actions had little if anything to do with "terrorism" per se and much to do with extraneous political considerations.

Silence in the Oval regarding the odd couple military plans must fall in the same category.  Arguably, the decision to share catch with Ankara and the basing of Predators in Turkey constitute another bribe to Erdogan for allowing the installation of the US X-band radar.  The decision to allow this anti-Iran move has resulted in severe blowback from Tehran, so the Turkish prime minister probably wants additional compensation.

There is only one open question.  No, that question is not will the US switch its policy regarding the Kurds and their right to and desire for a state of their own.  Nor does this question involve the notion of granting the government of Iraqi Kurdistan its request of redeploying US forces within its borders.  The present administration lacks both the depth of regional understanding and the political will to do either--even if each would be in American national interest.

The only remaining question is whether or not Obama and his "team" will cave and sell-lease a few spare Predators to Erdogan, and through him, the Iranians.

Wanna make a bet?

Turkey's Foreign Policy--Clever Calculation Or Flat Out Stupid

Until very recently, the announced foreign policy of Turkey under the Islamist leaning AKP has been one of "zero problems" with its regional neighbors.  This exercise in fantasy started to crumble under the bitter winds of the "Arab Spring."

Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi.  The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain.  The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.

After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters.  Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels.  In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.

Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad.  The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran.  Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.

The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom.  Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."

The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days.  At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen.  By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.

The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance.  Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.

The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident.  Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer."  The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship.  Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora.  Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.

The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so.  The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.

As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan.  The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.

It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan.  So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians.  It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.

Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq.  While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders.  This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.

One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.

It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want.  The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed.  They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.

The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border.  This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing.  The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any.  In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.

Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge.  They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible.  They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible.  They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan.  Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.

The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy.  The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside.  True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp.  Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.

Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey.  But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support.  As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders.  Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.

Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.

One More Victory?

The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad.  The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered.  It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.

Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.

Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity.  The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.

The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date.  The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice.  The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.

There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan.  That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil.  Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally.  The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine.  Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.

Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray.  Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making.  As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues.  More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.

Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime.  There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause.  But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite.  Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."

Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point.  His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men."  The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint.  However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.

The same dynamic applied in Iraq.  The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion.  Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural.  The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was  to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate.  The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.

As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border.  Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities.  In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.

As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance.  This man is Muqtada al-Sadr.  He is a Shia cleric.  He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context.  He runs a very large and rather competent private militia.  And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.  When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.

The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing.  Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price.  For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran.  Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.

The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran.  The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.

A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon.  Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government.  The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level.  The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.

The departure of the Americans will have two results.  One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations.  The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.

Isn't that a fascinating prospect?

The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real.  The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad.  Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.

President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not.  They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik.  Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.

Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box.  Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France.  The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.

Libya is in a profound state of flux.  It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed.  The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on.  Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.

So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department.  While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.

Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it.  Doesn't it?

Smart(?) Power In Action

The other day Hilary Clinton and Leon Panetta were on stage at the National Defense University.  In the course of the action Ms Clinton bragged on the use of "smart power" by her boss, The Nice Young Man From Chicago, with respect to the Syrian conundrum.  She went on to imply strongly that the graduated escalation of economic and diplomatic sanctions in support of the anti-government demonstrators was both without precedent in American diplomatic history and (drum roll, please) constituted a paradigm for the future.

This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible.  Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.

While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy.  "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.

Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency.  In principle, her understanding is correct.  It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.

The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power."  All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.

Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US.  Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf.  It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia.  It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy.  Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests.  And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.

The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make.  Far more demanding was the process of doing so.  Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union.  The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union.  Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict.  These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.

Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action.  The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone.  Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure.  Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government.  It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons.  However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction.  Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.

A ground war would be necessary.  To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties.  A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home.  To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary.  In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.

These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time.  And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people.  Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.

The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary.  Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically.  The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.

The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it.  The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made.  (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)

The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power."  The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower.  The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.

The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself.  This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all.  The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper.  The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war.  A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces.  Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.

While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable.  It was an exercise in "smart power."

By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power."  First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy.  Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance.  Syria is an adversary of consequence.  As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West.  (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)

Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date.  More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria.  The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility.  It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.

The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought.  The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought.  The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.

This, bucko, would have been "smart power."  Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base.  And, political courage is not this administration's long suit.  It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition.  Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.

"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated.  It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)

Madam Secretary, get it right.  Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.

Of Course Iran Is Behind The New "Surge" In Iraq

Admiral Mike Mullen made a blunt and truthful statement which has not been well received in Tehran.  The only thing at all wrong with the admiral's remarks was their tardy nature.  It is not inaccurate to characterize the chairman's accusation of Iranian complicity in the uptick of attacks on Americans in Iraq as yesterday's news.

With or without the active participation (or even the presence in country) of Moqtada al-Sadr, the famed anti-American Shiite paramilitary leader and part-time student of Islam, the ayatollahs and their goons of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have pursued national interest in Iraq.  The view from Tehran is simply that religion trumps national identity or, if that isn't enough motivation, the Iraqi Shiites have decades of scores to settle against the minority Sunnis who ran the place from the time of the British Mandate through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

The ready presence of the Shiite fighters of the Sadrists seemed to underscore the accuracy of the Iranian calculations.  The enigmatic and illusive figure of Moqtada al-Sadr confused the picture to some extent--in the estimates of both American and Iranian decision makers.  Sadr played two cards with equal skill: Confessional loyalty and nationalism.  As he switched between the two, his eyes remained firmly on the prize he sought.  Not surprisingly, the prize was and remains power.

Sadr has no desire to sit on the throne.  He knows all too well that not only is the head which wears the crown likely to sleep uneasily but in Iraq for some time to come crown wearers are quite likely to lose both crown and the head under it.  Sadr wanted and wants to be the ultimate power behind the throne.  In pursuit of this end, the crafty cleric is willing to use Iranian assistance--if it is low profile enough.

He has been careful, very careful to keep daylight between himself and the theocrats of Tehran as well as the current crop of Shiite terrorists.  He understands quite well that the old Iraqi proverb holding that no fruit tastes as good as the product of one's own orchard applies today among Iraqis of all stripes.  To be seen as a tool or proxy of the Ayatollahs would be fatal to Sadr's ambitions.  All the more since he has achieved the long coveted status of Grey Eminence following his agreement to support al-Maliki--a promise of support which has become increasingly important as Maliki has lost popularity generally.

Sadr's hand will be strengthened by the completion of the American withdrawal.  His highest public priority has been that of seeing the last American posterior hitting the Kuwaiti border at year's end.  Ironically, accomplishment of this much desired result is being compromised by the Iranian uptick of direct support for the Shiite insurgents who have been attacking Americans as well as Iraqis.

The Deep Thinkers of Tehran apparently have convinced themselves that the infliction of fatalities on US personnel is the best way of assuring the American withdrawal.  The take in Tehran is simple:  Neither the American president nor the American people have the stomach for more death.

In this assessment the Deep Thinkers in Tehran may be correct.  We the People want no more of our own killed in Iraq.  The current administration and congress would like very much to see an end to our Great Adventure in Regime Change.  But, the view inside Baghdad is different.  So is the perspective from the Pentagon.

The Pentagon is afraid, very afraid that any final American withdrawal would now be seen by not only the Iranians but promoters of violent political Islam everywhere as having been forced upon us by the efforts of the jihadists.  Such a conclusion might be totally wrong, but it will be drawn nonetheless.  A previous generation of advocates of violent political Islam including Osama bin Laden wrongly concluded that it was the efforts of the "Arab fighters," the "martyrdom seekers," who defeated the Red Army in Afghanistan.  This work of fiction would be emulated next January if the US withdraws according to the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq.

It is to preclude this possibility and the evils which would flow from it (among other reasons) which has propelled the Defense Department to seek a modification of the SOFA.  Even a small (10,000) man package of combat capable personnel would prevent the false claim of military victory on the part of the Islamists.

The politicians of Baghdad along with many in the Iraqi military establishment favor a continued, low footprint American presence.  The leaders of the Kurds strongly support the idea.  Within the beleaguered Sunni areas of Anbar province, the support is both wide and deep.  Only Sadr is opposed.

Despite his opposition, there is very little probability that Sadr would seek to veto the idea should it be strongly and evidently favored by the other elements of Iraqi politics.  To do so would be to put himself  publicly in league with the Iranians.  This would undercut his power in Iraq.  Not a good idea from the Sadr perspective.

It would be best for Sadr if he could convince his Iranian comrades to call off their private war.  By doing so, the American desire to stay lest they appear to have been defeated would be eroded.  By lowering the climate of fear, the badly divided Iraqi political structure would be fragmented so that no unified support for a modification in the SOFA would develop.  And, it would make Sadr even more of a critical broker of power.

It is highly unlikely that Tehran would listen to Sadr even should he make the outlined argument.  Considering the dynamic in Syria there is real anxiety that Tehran is about to lose their only Arab state ally.  This implies that Iraq looms larger today than in the past as an Iranian Shiite outpost in the Arab world.  Tehran knows perfectly well that any American presence reduces greatly their hopes of turning Baghdad into a replacement for Damascus.

The strongest probability is that Tehran will not only continue but increase its support for the Shiite groups which have been carrying out the attacks.  This is a calculated risk.  The ayatollahs must believe that when push comes to shove, Sadr will carry Tehran's water within the circles of the Maliki government.  Or, even better, Sadr will whistle up the supposedly disarmed Sadrist militias.  Whether the Deep Thinkers of Tehran are right or not depends on Sadr's commitment to his faith: does his identity as a Shiite outweigh or not his identity as an Iraqi?

Sadr probably does not even know his own mind here.  His actions and words over the past nine years have been those of a man quite confused about his identity much as he knows his priorities.  Often he has tried to ride the horse of religion and that of nationalism simultaneously.  Inevitably, he has fallen one way or the other. His recurrent prolonged trips to "study" in Qom show the crisis of conscious which results each time he falls to the side of nationalism at the expense of Shia.

Perhaps his thinking would be clarified if someone were to whisper in his ear, "Iraqis are more likely to trust a fellow Iraqi with power than an Iranian in Iraqi costume."  That is a sentiment one can take to the bank in Iraq.

Maybe If We Pretend Hard Enough---

Political scientists call it, "let us define our dependent variables," but little kids are more honest.  Politicians call it "nation-building," but little kids are more honest.  The UN calls it "responsibility to protect," but little kids are more honest.

Little kids call it, "Let's pretend."

And here we are today playing let's pretend under all the upscale rubrics mentioned.  We are playing it in the Ivory Coast.  We are playing it in Yemen.  We are playing it in Libya.

In each case our opponent in this great game is called a "strongman," or a "dictator," or, more politely, an "authoritarian ruler."  In each case the venue of this great game is called a "state," or a "nation," or a "country."  In each case we maintain with the straightest of faces that our goal is to "support the people," or "to promote the rights of the citizens," or, most simply, to gain "democracy," or, even simpler and hazier, to seek "reform."

All the terms, all the fine sounding words, all the lofty thoughts behind the words constitute a lie.  Perhaps not an intentional lie, but an untruth nonetheless.  Tergiversation by volitional ignorance covers the situation.

Each of the venues mentioned as well as others such as Sudan or Somalia are not by any realistic understanding "nations," let alone "nation-states."  All are geographical expressions inhabited by assorted tribal peoples of differing, even antipodal, customs, values, norms, and, most important, senses of identification.  Each of the "dictators" is actually nothing more than the accepted leader of one tribe.  None are national leaders for none has a unified nation to lead.

In the Ivory Coast the ousted former president is actually the leader by tacit acceptance if not more active support of the Southern, non-Muslim tribal confederation while the new guy is the tacitly accepted leader of the Northern, Muslim tribal groupings.  In Yemen, the embattled Saleh emerged from the base of support of one tribe and maintained his power by playing off the other tribes against each other.  And, in Libya, Brother Leader is likewise a tribal chieftain whose rivals are from another, far larger tribal assembly located in the far east of the country.

Tribal leaders are not and never will be national politicians as the term is understood in the West.  Nor are the agglutinations of tribes under their authority "nations" as the word is applied in the West.  The absence of national identity means that by definition there can be no nation-state, no truly national polity controlling the instruments of government.

Tribal leaders including the die hard "dictators" of Yemen, Libya, and the Ivory Coast are motivated by deep and powerful considerations such as personal and group honor which have been moribund for many, many generations in the US and the rest of the West.  The tribal leader incarnates in himself not only his personal honor, his personal power, but that of his family, clan, and tribe.  This is at a far cry from the motivators of contemporary Western politicos.  It is even at some distance from the motivators of more typical dictators of the ideological sort, for these may have an inflated sense of self but rarely believe the entire honor, potency, and status of a social group is embodied in their person.

When Gaddafi cried, "I am history!  I am the revolution!  I am Libya!," he was not simply exhibiting what in the West would be considered a psychopathology but stating a ground truth that would have been (and was) understood by tribal leaders around the world.  Gbagbo in his upmarket bunker understood.  So also did Saleh as the vipers on whose heads he danced squirmed and twisted.  Karzai all the way off in Afghanistan understood, despite his status as an "elected" leader.  So also did Maliki in Iraq, again regardless of the special cachet of a Western approved "election."

Tribal leaders, all of whom have "death before dishonor" in an invisible tattoo inscribed across their chests, do not think like Western politicians.  Their calculus of political rationality is completely different.  It would require the resurrection of an American politician such as Andrew Jackson to have an effective translator.  Andy Jackson, like the majority of domestic politicos of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries was a tribal leader in transition.  While focused on developing a nation, these men were emerging from sectional identities equivalent to those of a tribe.

Other countries throughout the West had their own transitional figures,  men part way between the tribal, regional past and the nation-state future.  History demonstrates that the process of congealing a true national identity is one of equal parts time and blood.  War as well as the passage of decades of shared experience and defining mythology is needed to overcome the inertia of the tribal/regional past.  The West has had the time--and more to the point--the spilled blood necessary to forge national identities and politics, to become full fledged nations and nation-states.

Libya and the Ivory Coast had any organic centripetal movement put in stasis by periods of colonization.  And Yemen never emerged from a tribal, feudal dynamic.  (Neither did Afghanistan despite the existence of a monarchy other than brief periods when under external threat.)  The attempt by the well intended statesmen of the West and the diplomats and the bureaucrats of the UN to create actual functioning nation-states from the tribal cloth of the Ivory Coast or Yemen or Libya will be unsuccessful.

It is not a matter of money.  Consider that the EU and France have offered 840 million bucks to the Ivory Coast; that is not mere chump change.  Neither is the vast quantity of American and other peoples' money spent on civilian development and governance programs in Afghanistan.  The sands of Libya will ultimately soak up as much international aid as the wealth of its oil fields produced to date.  None will matter.

Money does not create a state.  Neither do good intentions.  Nor do military interventions.  American and other governments had best realize that in none of these cases as well as others yet to occur will the end product be other than confederations of tribes riven with animosities old and new.  No matter what is done by outsiders, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, or even Iraq will not become genuine nation-states in the near- or mid-term future.

In a very real sense the less that is done by the outsiders under any of the noble terms referenced above, the better the results for the locals.  The less done for the suffering locals, the faster they will have to weld together their own nation by their own blood and sweat.  They will have to do what all of us in the West have done--bring about a national identity and a national polity by passion and suffering over time.

There is no faster way to do it.  And, history shows, no better method.  It seems to be written in our DNA, to suffer is to progress.

The Wonders Of Democracy In Iraq Or Have We A New Saddam Here?

Observers of Iraq since the end of American combat operations have focused correctly on the state of play in the new "democratic" government which is the legacy of the Great Adventure In Regime Change.  What has been evolving in Iraq shows all the dangers resident in celebrating "democracy" without proper regard to all the contextual factors which can allow democracy to be other than a portal to authoritarianism.

The most visible sign of something awry in Iraq was the seemingly never ending failure of the Maliki apparatus to form a functioning government following parliamentary elections.  The inability of the government to organize itself was illustrative of the deep fractures which characterize politics in post-Saddam Iraq.  Even leaving aside the many questions regarding the fairness and accuracy of the parliamentary vote, the deep ruptures running across Iraqi society and polity virtually make effective and responsive government impossible.

Maliki has already shown a propensity toward the authoritarian which far transcends his main rival.  Even though Mr Maliki has ambitions to near dictatorship, his government has proven itself inefficient and corrupt to a degree which has excited "days of rage" in many Iraqi cities.  The protests resulted in deaths as security forces opened fire with small arms.  As the deaths mounted so also have the protests.

The security forces have rounded up Baghdad intellectuals--lawyers, journalists, and academics--subjecting those arrested to beatings and intimidating interrogations before finally releasing them.  While this scarcely amounts to the sort of activity routinely engaged in by Saddam's internal security personnel, the arrests like the use of deadly force against peaceful albeit noisy demonstrators points in an alarming direction.

Even more alarming has been the steady accretion of power by Maliki.  In a move without equal in any parliamentary government elsewhere in the world, Maliki and his cabinet have been given unique authority by the Iraqi equivalent of the Supreme Court.  In a ruling which was stunning in both its breadth and lack of constitutional basis, the high court ruled that only Maliki and his cabinet could propose legislation to the parliament.  The legislators could not propose any legislation on their own initiative.  In effect this makes the Iraqi parliament something less than relevant.

The obliging court also gave Maliki control over the previously independent central bank.  It also made the formerly independent agencies responsible for investigating corruption and conducting elections mere tools in Maliki's ever grasping hands.

Additionally, human rights groups in Iraq have alleged credibly that Maliki's security forces have created secret detention centers in which dissidents are immured.  If this is not a symptom of creeping authoritarianism it would be hard to say what might be.

The record of Maliki's government is dismal at best.  As Iraqi citizens have complained in the street and elsewhere, the basic infrastructure is still a mess.  Electricity is still off nearly as much as it is on.  The economy is still in a shambles despite the ocean of oil a few thousand feet down.  Unemployment remains high.  And, inflation particularly in basics is on the up ramp.

Then, of course, the tensions between Shiite and Sunni remain.  So also do those between Arab and Kurd.  The purportedly secularist regime of Maliki;s State of Law party has shown a tilt toward the Shiite majority and most definitely against the Sunni minority.  This tendency emerged dramatically with the refusal of the Maliki government to honor commitments made to the Sons of Iraq and Awakening Councils which are Sunni and were key to the success of the American counterinsurgency effort.  Since then the government has marginalized the Sunni population even more.

The security situation has gone south over the entire period since the American combat forces withdrew.  The bombings have been directed against Shiites much of the time but there has been no evidence, not even credible rumors, pointing the finger at Sunnis.  The cynical killing of Shiites by Shiites is not unprecedented in Iraq and would fit the agenda of both Iran and its agents in Iraq.  It would also meet the agenda of a wannabe dictator, particularly one who happens to be a Shiite.  Maliki has control of specialist security units capable of undertaking spectacular operations whether the targets are government facilities, Shiite pilgrims, or Christian churches and homes.

It is more than simply interesting that persons suspected of involvement in bombings and assassinations are arrested in a blare of publicity but then simply fade away.  No trials.  No convictions.  No executions.  Nothing.  Considering that one of the fastest roads to total authority is creating a climate of disorder and lack of safety, that there is a loud demand for law'n'order, it is not implausible that Maliki and his cohorts have orchestrated at least some of the prevailing insecurity.

The schism between the Arabs of Baghdad and the Kurds in their semi-autonomous region has grown of late again at the behest of the central government.  The Kurds may be obstreperous but they have shown themselves to be rational negotiators.  The current talks over the status of Kirkuk and the oil fields surrounding it could come to a satisfactory conclusion, but the Maliki government keeps upping the ante as if looking for an excuse to turn the army loose in the region.

As the clock ticks down to the date certain when the last American forces withdraw, the influence of the US declines apace.  The loss of American influence is exacerbated by the Obama's administration which appears flatly indifferent to what is happening in Iraq in the wake of our unilaterally declared victory.  Unlike Vietnam the Obama administration has not even sought a "decent interval" before Iraq's "democracy" collapses into an authoritarian regime.

It is more than slightly ironic that as pro-democracy movements have spread across many Arab majority states, the tide is running in the opposite direction in Iraq.  Increasing the irony is the crowing of unreconstructed neo-cons over the flood of protests ranging from Tunisia to Yemen as having proved just how right, how prescient was George W. Bush when he ordered the invasion of Iraq.  It certainly looks like the American monument to democracy built with the blood of so many Americans and so much American money is at great risk of imploding into an imitation of the dictatorship it was intended to replace.

The lesson here is simple and brutal.  It is far easier to talk about nation-building than it is to do it.  It is easier to envision the creation of a Western style democracy than it is to realize the vision.  Or, most simply: Democracies can not be created; they can only create themselves.

Gates And The Future Of The American Army

Robert Gates has a long and distinguished record of saying unpleasant things which need to be said.  He did it again today in remarks at West Point delivered to the Corps of Cadets.  Among his ruminations on the future of the US army were his view that the US should not again fight a ground force heavy intervention of the Iraq or Afghan sort anywhere in Asia, Africa, or the Mideast.  He also and correctly noted the army will have to change its culture regarding career development or run the risk of losing its best junior and mid-rank officers to the tedium of clerical and budgetary work.

His view of our misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan merit close study  While he refrained from offering any direct criticism of the decisions leading to either war, his cautionary not to say pessimistic thought about any future repetition give a strong hint as to how he would have done the job had he been in the Pentagon back in 2001-3.

It is important to understand that Dr Gates did not retreat behind an update of the preposterous refrain of so many decades, "No more Vietnams!"  Rather he implied that the US may find it necessary to intervene in failed or failing states, or states which offer cover and comfort to hostile non-state actors, but any such future operations must not be massive exercises in regime change and nation building.  In his understanding, interventions must be of (to use an archaic but respectable term,) "punitive."  These would be conducted primarily by air and naval assets but of necessity would include specialist ground formations tasked with the neutralization or capture of designated personnel or facilities.

Interventionary operations, if the Geek is understanding the tenor of Gates' position correctly, would be short, sharp, well-defined as to goals but would leave the larger political questions up to some entity other than the US military.  Certainly, this is how it should have been in Afghanistan.  The military should have been focused simply on destroying al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime.  Much of this could have been undertaken successfully by air assets, but the use of ground formations would still have been necessary.  With the evolution of remotely operated aerial vehicles, this sort of operation could be conducted more efficiently now or in the future than it could have been a decade ago, but even so specialist ground troops will remain essential in the years to come.

The prime concept governing interventionary operations must be a combination of economy of force and economy of time.  The job must be done swiftly and with the lowest possible investment in the "men-at-risk" category.  Since political, social, and economic reconstruction and reform are both lengthy in duration and intensive in human capital requirements, this area of task must remain beyond the competence of the military.

It is legitimate to infer from Dr Gates' words that the best adventure in regime change is the one which is undertaken using indirect means.  This implies little if any role for the military particularly the ground forces.  The Gates view is historically justified.  The only sort of regime change which will work is one which is conducted by the locals, one which arises organically from legitimate political disaffiliation on the part of a segment of the population.  Indeed, that is an operational definition of insurgency.  The outsider may play indirect roles in applying pressure to the status quo regime and support to the dissidents, but must not go any further.

Dr Gates stated categorically that the army will have its hands full justifying the expense of maintaining its heavy formations.  With this proposition, the Geek disagrees.  The threats confronting American national interests are not confined to those of failed, failing, hollow, or captive states or the non-state actors which flourish in those soils.  The threats also include large, complexly organized, technologically advanced states with ambitions which will run counter to the interests of the US, its allies, and clients.  The two top candidates on this list are China and Russia.

Again, the primary tools of deterrence and the war fighting on which deterrence is based are air and naval in nature.  But the utility of heavy ground formations in this area where diplomacy and war intersect cannot and must not be minimized.  The hoary question attributed to Joe Stalin when told the Pope was opposed to some Soviet initiative, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" applies to the Men in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing today and into the foreseeable future.

The credible capacity to coerce which includes the credible capacity to deter is based on the perception that a country possesses both the means and the will to wage war effectively.  As the nuclear deterrent slides down in direct relevance, the metric of war fighting will rest increasingly on conventional air, naval, and ground forces.  In the latter category the primary index will be the size, number, and perceived competence of heavy formations.

The essential task confronting both the Army and Marine Corps in the era of the Incredible Shrinking Budget will be that of maintaining a credible capacity to fight both interventionary and conventional inter-state wars.  This may require some very creative out-of-the-box thinking on the part of both services with the final result being some sort of division of tasks with the heavy, conventional conflict duty accruing primarily if not exclusively to the Army.  Admittedly, the notion of preparing for the least likely of wars is frustrating to those who spend entire careers doing so, but boredom is the price of deterrence.

The fundamental nature of war is essentially unchanged and unchangeable, but the devil now and into the future resides in the details.  The world is not on the verge of universal peace and long term stability.  Governments such as those in Iran, Pakistan, Venezuela show this as do events in the Mideast.  Russia has announced an enormous military redevelopment program which will see a quantum level improvement in the materiel basis of the Russian military forces over the next decade.  The Chinese show no indication of abandoning their drive for a military second to none across the board: air, sea, ground, cyber, and space.

Nor is there any use appealing to the fiction on the banks of the Hudson river.  The UN has unlimited ambitions but no real capacity in its primary, arguably only, reason for existence--keeping and enforcing the international peace.  Similarly, there is no joy in the position so often adopted by the self-appointed academic, media, and political elites in Western Europe and the US, the notion that nationalism and the nation-state are dead or rapidly dying.

The reality remains that the US will continue to have national and strategic interests which will need to be defended against the hostility of other states.  Another reality will continue: There are states and non-state actors who are hostile to the US--regardless of who is occupying the Oval this year.  So will a third reality: the US must look first and foremost to itself in pursuing and defending its national and strategic interests.  Then, of course, there is the inconvenient fact that the US remains a Great Power, not as great a Great Power as just a very few years ago but a Great Power nonetheless.  This is a status that cannot be surrendered; it can only be lost or taken away by the acts of others.

This means the US will have to fight more interventionary conflicts.  It means the US must be able to show each and every day for years to come that it has both the means and will to fight a high intensity war against a peer.  This means that the US Army and other services will still have a job and We the People must be both able and willing to pay the associated costs.

The alternative remains what it always has been: A curtailment of American freedom to act on the global stage, and, when night falls, surrender to the forces of fear and hate.

The Saudis Are Hitting Their Worry Beads

The House of Sand--oops!  Bad Geek!  It's the House of Saud--is having a serious Xanax moment all because of what is going on in Egypt.  No, it's not because the feudal regime is all that worried about being the next domino falling in the Arab world.

The Saudis have their burnooses in a twist because Egypt has been a very critical ally in the ongoing conflict between the reactionary Sunni regimes and the flatly paleolithic Shiite theocracy in Iran.  The fear is that a new Egyptian government may ooze closer to the stream of Islam best called political.  Should that happen, the Saudis will find themselves more isolated in the contest with Iran.

Saudi Arabia has been more keen than even the US in pursuing a strategy of isolating Iran.  Egypt has been a very important associate in this endeavor.  The support of Cairo has been key in offsetting the efforts of other Muslim majority states such as Qatar and Turkey to lessen the impact of sanctions and other isolation enhancing mechanisms.  Should Egypt under a new government slack off on these efforts, the result would be not only a lessening of Saudi influence but a collateral increase in that of Turkey.  The net outcome would be a species of defeat for the House of Sand.

While not having received any great play in American MSM, the cold war between Riyadh and Tehran has been the highest priority within the Saudi government.  The fear felt in Saudi Arabia concerning the ambitions and reach of the mullahs has been high and continues to grow.  The Saudis fear not only the military capacities of Iran, including the impending nuclear one, but also the growth of its direct and indirect influence within the smaller states of the region.

The growth of Iranian influence was behind the frantic efforts made by Saudi diplomats--and the Saudi king--to come to an understanding with Syria regarding the political arrangements within Lebanon.  The failure of these efforts not only indicated that Damascus had fallen deeper into the Iranian gravity well, but that Lebanon was being dragged in as well.  This meant simply that as of two weeks ago only Egypt was a solid backer of the Saudi play.

Should, as seems quite likely, the next Egyptian government will include the Muslim Brotherhood under some guise, it is almost inevitable that Egypt will back down from its solid pro-Saudi stance.  This, in turn, will enhance the ability of Qatar to wean at least some of the other, lesser Gulf States away from the Saudi line with a corresponding increase in the numbers and power of the soft-line-on-Iran bloc.

Because the centuries old split between Sunni and Shiite Islam is at the center of the current Saudi-Iran cold war, the Saudis have injured their own cause with the position taken by the Kingdom with respect to Iraq.  The Iraqis have as much if not more to worry about when looking at Tehran than the Saudis--and the Saudi government undoubtedly knows this.  But, because Iraq is majority Shiite in its demographics, the Kingdom has stiff armed the requests and importuning of Baghdad repeatedly.

It does not seem to matter to the Wahhibists of the Kingdom that the Iraqis are Arab.  Nor does it seem to count for much that more that a third or more of all Iraqis are Sunni.  It doesn't appear important to the strategists of Riyadh that the national interests of the Kingdom and Iraq coincide at several key points.  None of these considerations have offset the big one: Iraq is majority Shiite.

The chance of losing Egypt as an anchor ally may prompt some more realistic thinking in the Kingdom.  That is to be hoped for as an alliance between these two oil giants would be a force for political stability in the region.

Nice as such a development might be, it does not address the key problem for the Saudi regime as it contemplates an Egypt without Hosni Mubarak.  The dilemma for Riyadh is how to find and cultivate more allies.  It is no help for the Kingdom that it is autocratic even by the standards of the Mideast.  This means that insofar as the disaffiliated citizens of any state see their own less than legitimate authoritarian regime embracing the Saudis, it weakens the local structure.

Consider Jordan.  On the one hand Jordan seems a very obvious and attractive state for the Saudis to cultivate and support.  Jordan needs money.  Massive infusions of Saudi cash would assist greatly in meeting the needs for subsidization of consumer prices, the creation of jobs through public employment projects, even direct subventions to students and their families.  The list of potentials for order enhancing bribery are legion.

And, now for the on-the-other-hand department.  The current king of Jordan, Abdullah II, has none of the popularity of his father.  That is important given how much depends on personal relations between monarch and tribal chiefs.  And, at root, order in Jordan depends upon the strong support of the Bedouin tribes against the Palestinians.  Complicating the personal factors at work in Jordan is the severe unpopularity of the queen, Riana, whose let-them-eat-cake attitude came into harsh relief during her birthday bash a while back.  Going beyond the personal, the government has a record of exceptional inefficiency.  Finally, there is the intense friction between the traditional tribesmen: the "old" Palestinians and the "new" Palestinians.

The upshot is that a too obvious, too open, too close relation between Abdullah II and the House of Saud would rebound to the disadvantage of the monarchy.  It is not going too far to assert that moving too fast and far in the direction of Saudi Arabia would produce significant disorder in Amman.  As both the King of Saudi Arabia and the King of Jordan are under the pressure of fear complicated by a perception that time is running out, the probability of a too rapid, too open movement is high.

The other alternatives are no more attractive.  The more or less constitutional monarchy of Morocco is both too distant geographically and too fragile to be of much use to Saudi Arabia.  Algeria has its own problems with violent political Islam which may--or, more probably, may not--be helped by a more open and comprehensive alliance with Saudi Arabia.

The takeaway is the House of Sand has few options when it comes to replacing Egypt as an ally against Iran.  By any realistic assessment, the least-worst approach if for Riyadh to mend its relations with Iraq.  This would fry off the clerical establishment of the Kingdom.  The elderly, ailing King Abdullah and his almost as old, nearly as frail successor(s) have already taken actions which have annoyed the religious hardliners, so this should be an acceptable cost of maintaining the House in power.

As a companion move the House would not be out of line to push a "reset" button in its relations with Turkey. The Ottoman Empire has been gone long enough to forget about the bad old days.  The AKP is religiously conservative enough.  Turkey's diplomatic trajectory is oriented to the Turkic speaking regions of Central Asia.  And, Turkey would benefit from the one product other than oil which Saudi Arabia exports--cash.

Diplomatically, which is to say, in the creation of areas of strategic interest, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are complementary.  At the same time Turkey and Iran are rivals in that both see room for the expansion of influence in the same geographic region.  Thus, there are real limits to the degree to which Iran and Turkey can work in alliance.

If Saudi Arabia is actually as worried about Iran as seems to be the case, it should be possible for the government to reexamine its stance with respect to Syria.  As the abortive effort in Lebanon shows, it is possible for the Kingdom to push the Wahhibists to the side in pursing national interest.  Syria, of course, looks to be the model of authoritarian order but as recent events have made clear, appearances can differ markedly from substance.  The embrace of Iran by Assad's government is not universally supported by the public or even the elite.  The Syria-Iran hook-up is one of convenience from the perspective of Damascus and is far less certain than the oft repeated protestations of undying love made by the Syrian government would seem to indicate.

This means the House of Saud has maneuvering room regarding Syria.  Saudi Arabia has two very important commodities it can bring to the table: money and its relation with the US.  Both of these could have high value in Damascus.  In comparison, Tehran has very little to offer.  Its money is not as unlimited as that of Saudi Arabia and it has no relation with the US.  One not need to be the most sophisticated diplomat since Bismark to see the opportunities or how to play them.

There is no question that the elderly bunch running Saudi Arabia are worried.  Nor is there any doubt about the genuine nature of the worries.  The only question is whether or not the fugitives from the moribund ward in Riyadh have the wit and will to address the anxieties with speed and effect.

Not Much Of A Merry Christmas In Muslim Majority Countries

There can be little doubt but the advocates of violent political Islam have determined that no Christian shall remain above ground anywhere in Muslim majority countries.  From Morocco to the Philippines, from Egypt to Nigeria, it is a very risky business to be a practicing Christian.  It is nearly as lethal to be a practicing Christian in the Muslim dominated states today as it was to have been a Jew in Nazi Germany.

Having purged Jews from their midst to a degree which would have warmed the hearts of Hitler, Himmler and Co., the Muslims now have set their very deadly sights on the Christian communities.  As events of recent vintage in Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, and other, nearby locations have made plain, there is a slow motion sort of holocaust underway.

And, the reactions of Christians generally?  The response of major American denominations?  The US government?

With the notable exception of a few articles of protest and a handful of Congressional Resolutions, the word best characterizing the push back by Christians in the US as well as the US government is "none."

Nor is the lack of outrage, of protest, of sharp rebuttal limited to American denominations and officials.  The Pope in his Christmas address to the faithful made a low key reference to the plight of Iraqi Christians while reserving his big rhetorical guns to support the Catholics in China who resist the official, government approved pseudo-hierarchy   The Archbishop of Canterbury, who is the head of the world wide Anglican communion, took his Christmas opportunity to demand that the rich share in the sacrifices of governmental austerity.

Perhaps so few religious and political leaders care much because the Christians under attack generally are not members of well established, well-known denominations either in the US or Western Europe.  Copts and Syriac Christians are not long standing communities of faith in the US or Western Europe.  Few who occupy the pews of American churches are aware of the long history of these groups, how they trace their roots back to the days shortly after Paul and the other Apostles shook the dust of so many towns across the Middle East, leaving behind the seeds of a potent view of life and God which would give rise ultimately to these denominations now under terminal threat.

In dogma and doctrine, the Christians of Iraq, Syria, Egypt and elsewhere may differ markedly from Western denominations, but in their basic confession of faith they share identity with all the myriad Protestant churches as well as both the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox communities.  They are Christians as have been their ancestors in the region for the past two thousand years.  Only Jews have been constantly present in the Mideast for longer than these Christian confessions.

And, like the Jews, these Christians have been the target of Muslim hostility since the all conquering scimitar first cut through the clear air of the region spreading the words of the Prophet not by force of reason but by sheer force of arms.  In recent times, resurgent political Islam has taken up the scimitar with even deadlier intent and consequence.

The ancient approach of "convert or die" has been replaced by the simpler, "die, Christian."  And as the blood flows and fear grows, the West watches in silence.  The Christians of the West as well as the governments of the purportedly Christian majority Western states watch, wring their hands, and neither do nor even say anything in protest, in opposition, or in support of their badly beleaguered Brothers and Sisters in Christ.

What a far and shameful distance this behavior is from the days of the Cold War when all Christian denominations as well as the governments took sharp issue with the treatment of Christians meted out by the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.  Those of a certain age can remember well the days of prayer, the petitions of protest, the resolutions of condemnation focusing on the Christian martyrs to their faith and the persecution they suffered from the atheistic governments of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact states.

The American Congress was so motivated by the atheistic nature of Communism and the concomitant persecution of Christians that it inserted the words, "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.  Public schools, not simply those of a parochial nature, invited speakers whose subject was the relentless oppression of Christianity and Judaism by the Communists.

All together the subject of Christian persecution by Communists was a constant theme of American culture through the Fifties and most of the Sixties.  It was a very big deal, a sort of social and political definer, a way of expressing the superiority of Western (particularly American) ideals and values.

None of that exists today.  Nor, given the triumph of faux-sensitivity and its operational handmaiden, political correctness, can it be expected to exist.  Not without intense, focused effort on the part of Christians of genuine commitment to their faith.

The simple fact that President Obama condemned violence in Iraq following the savage attack on the Baghdad church without once using the words "Christian" or "church" is telling.  It bespeaks the utter failure of commitment or even sensitivity to the rights and dignity of a group--Christians--which is subject to lethal attack simply because it is Christian.

Once before American leaders and Christian congregations were silent in the face of evil predicated upon religious belief.  That time was the Thirties when the first intimations of the foul antisemitism which would produce the extermination camps of the Holocaust were printed in American papers.  In the face of mounting evidence that the Jews of Germany and Europe generally were at risk of being wiped out, most American denominations kept silent.  The same was true of the US government.

It was because of the silence in the run up to the Nazi slaughter that American churches and government alike became so vocal in the denunciation of Communist persecution of Christians and, later, Jews.  We had learned the dangers of silence, of business as usual, of fearing to make a bad situation even worse.

Now, we Americans apparently have forgotten the truth of the Thirties and are somehow embarrassed by our collective behavior of the anti-Communist days of the Fifties and Sixties.  It is telling that today's leaders both in pulpit and politics were young in the worst days of the Cold War, were exposed unceasingly to the rhetorical overkill of those days.  We learned, falsely it seems, that speaking out is somehow ill-mannered and insensitive, somehow boorish and unsophisticated, in some mysterious way damaging to the self-esteem of the haters, the persecutors, the killers.

In the instant case, the Muslims, or at least those who are either exponents of political Islam or by their silence tacit supporters of those who preach hate, demand "death to Christians."  The situation today is far closer to that which prevailed in Germany during the Thirties and that makes silence by us in the West either personally or through leaders who fear to take a stand complicit in the crimes committed in Muslim majority states.

It is long past time for American denominations to stand up and demand an end to the butchery being done in the name of Islam.  At the very least American churches should insist that our government take a principled position against the slow motion holocaust underway in so much of the Muslim world.  American Christians should be insisting that our government use all the instruments at its disposal to stop the persecution, end the killings, succor the hurt, give refuge to those who must flee literally for their lives.

Anything less is not only anti-Christian it is most assuredly un-American.

(Full disclosure: The Geek is not a member of any denomination or community of faith.)