Small Straws In A Stiff Wind

There are weeks when the Geek has regretted his lifelong interest in matters of war, diplomacy, and the shadow lands of covert/clandestine affairs.  The past month of so has been one of those periods.  It is not that the world has suddenly been infected by a fulminating virus of peace and love.  Quite the contrary.  Rather the intellectual languor has been promoted by the combination of events having unfolded in a drearily predictable factor and the lack of imagination exhibited by the Deep Thinkers and Bold Actors on all sides of all the many conflicts, armed and otherwise.

A useful example of both predictability and the lack of imagination is presented by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.  The energetic dismantlement of the New Mexican borne cleric is both welcome and long overdue.  The fact that he was accompanied on his trip to paradise by the one time resident of North Carolina, Samir Khan, rendered the event all the more pleasurable.

Anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the UAV campaign in the FATA and the building of a base convenient to Yemen from which Agency operated Predators might make their lethal flights well understood that Awlaki's days were numbered, and that the number was small.  The violent death of the genius of Internet (and personal) radicalization became as certain as sunrise when he was placed on the "kill or capture" list last year.  Despite the inevitable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the ACLU and other advocates of human rights above the dictates of real life, and regardless of the equally certain condemnations of "extrajudicial execution" already resounding around the world, the Obama administration by it's listing of the imam let it be known that the governing considerations were those of war--a war in which Awlaki had voluntarily enlisted and waged with ever growing success.

With the failure a few months ago to capture Awlaki by a force of Yemeni personnel backed by USSOCOM assets, the only option was killing, and the only practical tool was provided by a Predator launched Hellfire.  The only time limits were imposed by the requirements for constructing an operational base and gaining from both Yemeni and national technical means sufficient actionable intelligence.  When fractured open source reports out of Yemen a couple of weeks ago indicated a diminishing of drone traffic over the area of Yemen in which Awlaki's tribe holds sway with a ramping up over territory to the country's north, it became evident that the endgame for the preacher was underway.

The removal of Awlaki and Khan from the board is good.  But, it is drearily predictable that it is not much more than that.  The strike in no way lessens the nature or effectiveness of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).  Had the reported inclusion of AQAP's chief bombmaker in the body count not been later retracted, the Hellfire would have well and truly hurt the group.  As it is, the most that can be said is the killing has had a marginal beneficial impact by reducing AQAP's capacity to use Internet radicalization with the same effect in the future that it has in the past.

Neither the killings nor the knee trembling on the part of human and civil rights lawyers and groups will change the nature of the ongoing war between advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states and people of the world.  The bad guys will keep on being bad actors.  The administration and any future one as well will use whatever means are necessary within the broad limits of proportionality to defend the country and its allies against attacks of whatsoever nature.

If there is any alteration in the future, it will be in the direction of placing increased reliance upon UAVs and other means of long range, low signature, low cost of commitment war fighting.  The use of special forces teams and UAVs has been both tested and proven in the harsh laboratory of the FATA as well as the one next door in Pakistan.  Both capabilities can be of great assistance in countering the potential threats resident in AQAP, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.)  Both may be required urgently against the latter threat if AQIM demonstrates greater capability as the result of having tapped into the arms stream flowing from the looted arsenals of Libya.

A greater use of UAVs will provoke an enormous consternation on the part of the usual suspects--the NGOs involved with human and legal rights as well as the apologists for countries which wish ill to the US but cannot match the American technological capacities.  There will be more and more political strange bedfellows both domestic and international as the US leans more heavily upon the impersonal, remotely controlled deliverers of death from above.  There will be demands beyond count for new conventions to bar such devices as Predator.  There will be calls for a moratorium on the use of these infernal machines until the law can catch up with the new technologies.

The only reply to those who believe the Predator and its tribe are inhuman and inhumane is,"Phooey!"  It is far better for a single Awlaki to die downrange than to see real war with its effects, unpredictable in detail but certain to include hundreds if not thousands of dead--most of whom will be civilians.

The Predators will continue to fly over Libya even long after NATO's warplanes have packed up and gone home.  They will be overhead to observe not only the intended targets of weapons being smuggled or saboteurs preparing but also the probable agony of protracted internal war as the joy of liberation turns into the pain of political disagreements of a very fundamental nature.

Libya (and its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt) is also drearily predictable.  Much of the reason for this observation is found in a remark made by a Salifist Tunisian, 23 years old and holder of a degree in engineering who, when interviewed, opined, "We Salifists are the majority.  Democracy is rule of the majority.  Why should we allow the minority (secular oriented Tunisians as well as their non-Salifist fellow countrymen) dictate how we should live?"

By this question as well as similar content expressions by legions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, and their supporters in the West, the young man demonstrated just why the "Arab Spring" will turn into a Winter, a most harsh and bitter Winter.  The promoters of democracy show they well understand democracy in and of itself but fail to see the necessary corollary: Democracy is the tyranny of the majority.

Unless properly constrained within the firm dikes of a representational republic and held in check by dams formed by both division of powers and an independent judicial system, democracy is tyranny pure and simple in which the rights of the minorities are either non-existent or tenuous at best.  In the rush to embrace democracy without the time necessary to build the essential dikes and dams, no citizen is secure, no rights and liberties are permanent, nothing is safe from the fads and fantasies of public opinion and the winds generated by demagogues.

Libya, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, but quite like Yemen and Afghanistan or other Islamic states, has the additional burden of tribalism.  This is not to say tribalism is bad.  It isn't.  Tribal identity is predominant in several states to the point that they are not real, integrated nation-states but rather collections of tribes sharing a flag.

The attempt to force tribal based societies and polities to pretend they are Western nation-states is doomed to fail.  Don't believe?  Take a look at Somalia.  It is not a failed state because it never was a real state.  Rather it was an artifact created by Western diplomats who used the only model making sense to them--the nation-state.  The same is true of Afghanistan.  Much of the inherent instability there results from ignoring the tribal nature of the human terrain in order to pretend we can make it into a Western style state.

When looking at Libya or Yemen or, to a lesser extent, Syria, the same dynamic is present--tribes forced to act as if their members owed a higher loyalty to the state.  The example of Iraq is instructive here.  As long as we outsiders insist on democracy and the nation-state as the touchstone of legitimacy, we are helping to doom the targets to a long, harsh Winter.

Even if tribalism of the usual sort is absent as it is in Egypt and Tunisia, there is a functional equivalent at work. That is the existence of differing interpretations of Islam and thus the relation of the faith to the state.  The ground truth is Islam carries the seeds of its own failure as a foundation of state.  This actuality has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  People may think they want to live in a Shariah based system until they are actually in one.  The proponents of austere Islam have and will find that their vision of life is totally unattractive to most people.  Then, they must (as do the austere Islamists of Iran) rely upon naked force to oppress their way to continued power.

Put together, the two forms of tribalism, traditional and religious, along with unchecked democracy point to a long, bitter Winter of pronounced discontents.  This, in turn, implies a high possibility of protracted or episodic internal war in all its manifold and evil forms.  Such is the result of ill-advised exercises in "nation-building" or regime change or support of the "peoples' will.

Coming full circle, the several downsides of either intervention or unthinking support are circumvented completely by using Predators or even special forces units.  These approaches to defending against hostile intents and acts minimize the probability of unintended consequences.  Predators do not engage in "nation-building," neither do they change regimes.  They kill people in serious need of being killed.

To this end, the killing of Awlaki is one important small straw in the very stiff winds of the coming Arab Winter.

Are They Really That Smart?

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has released a special issue of its Inspire online magazine.  This "Extra-Extra!-Read-All-About-It! release is dedicated to a single topic.  The only matter considered is the "failed" parcel bomb plot.

To AQAP's chief propagandist, the one time North Carolina resident turned full time "traitor to America," Samir Khan, the operation was not a failure.  In his typically breezy not to say cocky way, this self-proclaimed "traitor" points out that the job cost AQAP a bit over four thousand dollars but will result in "billions" of bucks in enhanced security costs to the American air cargo industry.  In terms of cost accounting, ole "Sammy" is bang on.

The jihadist publication promised a continuation of low cost, high economic damage attacks.  AQAP avers that it has hit on a new formula for successfully bringing about the collapse of the US and the West, a sort of death by a thousand paper cuts way of waging war.

The special issue also repeated the AQAP claim of responsibility for the crash of a UPS flight in Dubai which killed the two man crew.  This claim has been rejected by the officials in Dubai, but the results of a review of the crash investigation has not yet substantiated the local view that the incident resulted from causes other than a terrorist attack.  However, there has been no evidence of an on-board explosion, so the cause remains an open question.

Leaving aside the matter of the Dubai incident, the Inspire narrative does pose an interesting question for analysts.  There is no arguing against the contention that the parcel bombs have resulted in greater attention being paid to air cargo.  This attention will both cost extra money and introduce additional frictions into a critical component of the international logistics system.  Over the longer term the delays occasioned by enhanced security will bring substantial indirect costs, but not such as to cripple the industry let alone bring the US to its financial knees.

It has been known since the Pliocene epoch of terrorism that every increment in increased security brings both additional direct costs and a slew of frictions both economic and political in its wake.  By responding to terrorist incidents, the target automatically hands the terrorist a small victory.  The inevitable combination of increased costs, increased frictions, increased apprehensions, and decreased belief in the capacity of the target government to provide a satisfactory level of security exacts political and social as well as economic costs.  The current contretemps over "strip or grope" is excellent evidence of the overall consequence of security driven frictions.

Those adherents of violent political Islam who have lived in the US or elsewhere in the West such as Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki would be well aware of the dynamic of terror-enhanced security-increased frictions.  Thus the question for analysts is this: Did AQAP intend and plan the parcel bomb attack in order to inflict economic damage or is the Inspire explanation one of an after-the-fact nature?

To put it more simply: Are the operatives of AQAP as smart as Khan alleges or did the talented propagandist invent his theory to meet the facts, including the irrefutable one of failure?  In support of the second interpretation is a critical fact absent in the glowing tribute to the brilliance of the Deep Thinkers and Master Strategists of AQAP.

The missing fact?

Well, bucko, how about the cause of the operation's failure?  The attack was betrayed to Saudi intelligence by a defector from AQAP.  Actually, the man was a multiple defector.  He had bounced from terror to Saudi "rehabilitation" and then back to AQAP and finally back to the waiting arms of the Saudis.  The unlikely series of bounces hints strongly that the informant had been targeted on AQAQ by the Saudis and he then performed his task with precision.  Since penetration of hostile entities is the first line of defense and the Saudis have more than one dog in the fight with AQAP, the use of an intentional penetration asset seems quite likely.

The fact that the operation, admittedly a very clever and cheap one, was compromised fatally by a Saudi penetration asset must be more than a tad galling to the heavyweights of AQAP.  The fertile imagination of Samir Khan provided a way of retrieving a measure of success from what is otherwise a failure tinted with the humiliation of betrayal from within.

Ole Sammy makes much of the insight and intelligence of his running buddies of AQAP.  That is the reason for the article detailing not only the infernal devices but also the security systems successfully evaded.  Of course, by giving these operational details the article would seem to be undercutting the value of its promises that the campaign would continue as it provides useful grist for the intelligence and security mills of the US and other countries.

Whether AQAP continues with a focus on parcel bombs or uses another approach one thing is sure--AQAP is not going to fade away, organizational bones bleaching in some sunwashed wadi deep in the mountains of Yemen.  A second unpleasant reality will remain as well: AQAP is aware of the greatest vulnerability in the US and most of the West.  That vulnerability is the demands for more security and the inevitable costs of providing such.

We the People--and the government--must carefully consider just how much security is enough.  We must keep in mind that every time the security wrench ratchets tighter, the costs and the frictions go up as well.  There is a crossover point where the negatives of security are such as to accomplish the goals of the terrorists without a single additional terrorist act.

How close are we right now to the crossover point?  That is the question the Inspire braggadocio demands we, all of us, answer.

The Yemeni Dilemma

The rapidly collapsing state of Yemen is on the verge of becoming a serious rival to Pakistan's FATA as a secure base for groups advocating and practicing violent political Islam.  Foreign fighters displaced from Afghanistan and elsewhere by successful security operations are coming to Yemen as a sort of evil twin to the Haj.  Along with genuine foreigners are sizable numbers of denizens of the Arabian Peninsula returning to familiar deserts and barren mountains from their travel-broadens-the-mind sojourns in combat zones ranging from Iraq to Afghanistan and other, even more exotic, climes.

These early birds of passage will be followed by others as the operations in Afghanistan and from the sky over the FATA become ever more lethal and thus discouraging to the Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith.  Yemen seems destined to become even more of a center of violent political Islam as more and more muscle is added by the returnees.

There is no doubt but Yemen and its Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) are the most attractive venue for those folk dedicated to the tenets of violent political Islam.  Yemen is an ungoverned and perhaps ungovernable place with a physical and human terrain seemingly ideal for the propagation and growth of AQAP.  The attractiveness of Yemen is in no way lessened by the talents of Anwar al-Awlaki as is hinted at by the flow of wannabe martyrdom seekers from Western Europe, the UK, and the US.  Thanks to the Internet, Yemen is only a click or two away from anywhere on Earth.

The Yemen dilemma is both real and pressing for American decision makers.  Individuals based in its so far very hospitable environment constitute a genuine threat to CONUS as events of the past year have brought home with appropriate drama.  At the same time the government of Yemen has demonstrated a pervasive lack of political will and competence in confronting the AQAP such as to make the government of Pakistan appear to be a frothing-to-fight bunch in comparison.

Yemen's internal problems ranging from exceptional poverty to the ongoing nature of two insurgencies to the ever increasing shortage of water to an unsupportable population growth assure the government lacks the resources and legitimacy necessary to take on AQAP even if it wanted to.  Further exacerbating the weakness, not to say impotence, of the government is the intensely tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture.  Of course, the government in no way helps its cause by exhibiting a level of corruption and nepotism which would make the old Dick Daley machine in Chicago drool with envy.

Since the Yemeni population is characterized by a degree of prickly nationalism which surpasses even that of the Mexicans, the capacity or the desirability of the US to enter the conflict directly is nil at best.  Realistically, any direct, evident American presence in Yemen would be counterproductive.  It is not, as Secretary of Defense Gates noted that the US does not "need" another war but rather that any attempt to wage war in Yemen would be to assure failure.

Even the relatively low footprint usage of Predators and other UAVs is not really safe.  Yemeni tribesmen are aware of the Predators overhead and resent their drone overhead even when no Hellfire missiles are forthcoming.  Perhaps the initial reaction to the arrival of the Predators would not have been so negative had the US not used Tomahawk cruise missiles in an ill-advised and failed attack to take out a high value personality about a year ago.  The attack may not have killed its intended victim but did manage to terminate with the utmost of prejudice a number of civilians including women and children and a well respected high ranking member of the local government.

About the only military activity the US can undertake without unacceptable risks of an unintended, counterproductive outcome is training selected Yemeni personnel and providing logistical, intelligence, and procurement support.  This level of assistance would be "safe" and might have some benefits for the local central government but will not defeat AQAP.  It will not abate nor measurably lessen the threat to the US resident in Yemen.

Even the capture or killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, desirable and emotionally satisfying as such might be, would not alter the state of play in Yemen in favor of the US.  Nor would a more robust Saudi presence in Yemen, even if the House of Sand could be persuaded that such might be in its interests.

The task of making the human terrain of Yemen unsuitable for the continued growth of violent political Islam is one of establishing effective governance in the place for the first time in modern history.  This in turn means assisting the government of Yemen in winning the crucial bones of perceived legitimacy.  Due to the tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture, the legitimacy must be functional as it can never be inherently existential, not until the primary loyalty of the individual Yemeni focuses on the state rather than the tribe.

The "soft" power instruments of the US are both available and appropriate for the task of enhancing the perceived functional legitimacy of the central government.  In considering this the Geek is reminded of the time in the early Seventies when he encountered Mideastern students, including those from Yemen (among whom was the father of Anwar al-Awlaki) who were attending New Mexico State University (NMSU.)  The majority of these men (and they were, unsurprisingly, all male) were taking courses in dry land agriculture, hydrology, and similar real world, severely practical matters.  All intended to go back home and apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills to the very real and pressing problems there.  Mr Awlaki senior was in no way different from the majority.

Forty years ago NMSU and other state schools had rather large programs supported by the State Department and USAID to find, recruit, and educate a new generation of technically competent leaders in most of the states of the Mideast and North Africa.  Schools such as NMSU had much experience in dealing with the sort of problems confronting countries with limited rainfall, extensive dry lands, periodic flooding, and the other disasters which limit agricultural development in places such as Yemen.

For various reasons including a desire by students to do work in areas ranging from political science to urban planning, the basic efforts pioneered with success in the Sixties and early Seventies fell increasingly by the wayside.  The situation in Yemen demands that the State Department, USAID, and relevant universities reinvigorate the old approach with haste.

Agricultural shortfalls coupled with water scarcity, population growth, and the economic displacement of current farmers represent a critical area in Yemen's present capacity for survival as well as its longer term prospects.  A crash program focusing on these considerations with an emphasis on eduction of locals would rebound to the credit of the US and the government of Yemen alike.  Insofar as the current deficiencies are addressed and future talent developed, the perceived functional legitimacy of the Yemeni government will be enhanced.  At the same time the demonization of the US would be lessened--perhaps even ended.

Beyond legitimacy enhancement and life improvement efforts, the US can assist the local government in properly exploiting the inherent provincialism and tribal loyalties of the several tribes against AQAP.  As the number of foreigners entering the tribal homelands increases, there will be more and more frictions with the locals.  Every time and ever place where foreign fighters have embedded themselves with local coreligionists, the consequent frictions have outweighed the ties of Islam.  To a Yemeni even a Saudi is an outsider, a person who may be entitled to hospitality and protection but also a person who can overstay his welcome or abrade the customs of hospitality by his arrogance or indifference.

An awareness of and exploitation of tribal sentiments, norms, and values can serve the coinciding interests of the US and the Yemeni central government.  The US has already shown its awareness of the intense xenophobia which characterizes many of the Yemeni tribals.  All that is needed now is an informed program conducted with and through the San'a regime to exploit these norms and values to the disadvantage of AQAP and even "homeboys" such as Anwar al-Awlaki.  (The least-worst solution to the problem of Anwar is for him to die at the hands of an insulted local tribesman.)

The really nifty thing about Yemen is that it provides an excellent venue to explore not only smaller footprint means of waging military counterinsurgency but ways of engaging soft power tools to promote the perceived legitimacy of the threatened host government.  To do this successfully all hands in Washington and San'a must understand that stability and peace alike rest on the twin pillars of properly employed coercion including lethal force and enhanced popular perceptions of governmental legitimacy.  The fact that Yemen is almost as bad off in the governance area as Somalia not only makes the challenge greater--it will make the success all the more compelling when (and if) it happens.

One More War We Don't Want To Fight--And Won't

Over ten years ago, around the time of the embassy bombings, the Geek identified Yemen as a primary venue of threats directed against the US and the West by the purveyors of violent political Islam.  He went so far as to predict to his audience that Yemen would rival or surpass Pakistan as the Mother of all Islamist Threats.  He was, not surprisingly, pooh-poohed by the field grades and their civilian counterparts in attendance.

Then, and, even more now, Yemen is the perfect petri dish for breeding the bacillus of armed political Islam.  The reason is not simply that the fractured, desolate countryside is the homeland of Osama bin Laden, although that is a signal of the evil potential resident in the wadis, barren mountains, and scorching desert which constitutes the physical geography of Yemen.

Far more important than the physical makeup of Yemen is its human terrain.  In that area, the single most important consideration when assessing or countering threats from jihadist inclined Muslims, Yemen equals or surpasses Afghanistan, the FATA of Pakistan, and most other Muslim majority locations in exhibiting the features central to the flourishing growth of violent political Islam.

The context is the commonalities found when examining the heartlands of the assorted advocates of violent political Islam.  First, the fundamental social organizing locus above the family is the tribe.  Afghanistan, the FATA, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan are all tribal societies in which the concept of central government is elusive, has no claim on primary loyalties, and is held with the same fondness as a Tea Party member would see a tax hike.

In all the heartland areas, the hold of a central government is light at best and absent in the majority of cases.  Any central government presence is not only fragile and transient, it is viewed with great suspicion by the locals.  The most universal explanation for the lack of confidence in the central government given by residents in the several heartland areas is corruption.  This reason has much to recommend it as the several governments involved are corrupt.  Period.

In addition to pervasive corruption, the several governments are brothers in another critical way.  All are inefficient.  The universal inefficiency assures the central government will not have the slightest shred of functional legitimacy in the estimate of the locals.

The combination of corruption and gross inefficiency assures that whatever existential legitimacy the central government might have possessed has long since been eroded by the corrosive impact of repeated and highly frustrating experiences on the part of locals when dealing with representatives of the central regime.  There is no tradition, no history of viewing the central government as worthy of respect, loyalty, or obedience.

In none of the cited countries is there any set of even slightly compelling reasons for individuals to forsake tribal affiliations for one with the central regime.  Other than coercion, the government has no means by which to engage the locals.  Having no carrots, the regimes are left with only the stick.

Since pressure consolidates long before it fractures and the assorted governments have a record of being just as inefficient in repression as in all other aspects of governmental life, the result is a strengthening of anti-governmental attitudes and loyalties.  Insofar as the government attempts to coerce its way to authority, the result is a solidifying of resistance to it and an increase in the perceptions of illegitimacy.

Finally, there is the political incorrect need to underscore the role of religion.  In all of the several states mentioned, Islam of the most severe, austere form is prevalent.  Local clerics emphasize those aspects of the Muslim portmanteau of beliefs which authorize and even demand violent action be taken by believers against apostate rulers and infidels who support the apostates.  Some, but not necessarily all, of the local clerics also preach the need of ongoing, offensive violent operations against the infidels wherever and whenever they are found.

These factors, all of which are present in Yemen, are enhanced significantly when wealth is maldistributed.  This has been the case in-country with respect to the (now diminishing) oil revenues.  The money has gone in the main to those who are well connected, those who haul heavy freight with the government.  Very little has gone to any use visible to the general public--particularly that part which lives in the most remote, most desolate, most hard scrabble of the country's hinterlands.

Way back when the Geek issued his prediction on Yemen as well as today there are several features unique to the place.  All of these exacerbate greatly the impossibility of the central government suppressing the emerging advocates of violent political Islam.

Yemen is a artificial country.  It is not the end product of a long, organic process of social and political evolution.  More important than the period of British "colonial" presence was the overthrow of the ancient Houthi emirate a half century ago.  The instability of this action was in no way lessened by the division of Yemen into two sovereign states.  Nor were matters improved by the war which ensued, a war which was prolonged and made more bloody by the efforts of outside actors, most importantly Egypt.

The formalities of peace treaties and national consolidation were relatively easily accomplished during the Nineties.  But formalities do not reality make.  The reality remained what it had been during the years of division and war.  The North and South did not make an amicable family.  The supporters and descendants of the old Houthi regime were alive, well, and itching for a comeback.

The "international community" (whatever that might mean in this context) apparently decided that its involvement was no longer needed once the photo-op treaty signing and political reunification had come to an end.  The matter of making peace and reconciliation genuine was dropped onto the laps of the locals with the assumed benevolent(?) assistance of the House of Saud.

For a short while the pretense could be continued.  Even after al-Qaeda issued its declaration of war against the US, even (briefly) after the bombing of the USS Cole, the US and other Western states could afford to take a detached, somewhat bemused attitude regarding Yemen.  Later the focus on Afghanistan and Iraq assured Yemen was cast into the outer darkness of policy making concern.

For a long while even Saudi Arabia could afford the luxury of overlooking Yemen even though it was the largest, most inviting target of the armed political Islamists lurking in the bleak mountains on the border.  The government of Yemen was uncooperative in the common task of defeating the jihadists.  Moments of collaboration--the famed Predator strike stands out--were exceeded by years of obstructionism.

The relocation of the New Mexico born, US educated, English speaking cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, to Yemen made an already grave situation downright deadly as demonstrated by the failed "Underwear Bomber" and the tragically successful Fort Hood Shooter.  Al-Awlaki taken in conjunction with the announced formation of Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) changed the game radically.

Now Yemen equals or, perhaps, surpasses the FATA as the most important locus of anti-American, anti-Western violent political Islam.  Given that the government of Yemen has no effective control over the majority of the country and lacks the political base of support to expand its sway, the situation will only get worse.

The worsening of the Yemen Dilemma has been made crystalline with the air cargo bomb effort.  The Saudis proved their worth by giving the warning which allowed the attack to be prevented.  The precision of the heads-up assured that British and UAE security personnel were able to identify and neutralize the very carefully made and concealed bombs before they exploded probably far over the desolate wastes of the North Atlantic.  With this one action the Saudis have earned much of the aid and assistance provided them by the US.

The ground truth remains.  The prevention of one attack does not equal the abating of the threat behind the attack.  AQAP remains alive and well.  So does Anwar al-Awlaki.

The government of Yemen is no stronger, no more possessed of legitimacy in the eyes of most Yemeni now than it was the day before yesterday.  It is no more able or willing to take serious action against AQAP now than it was the day before yesterday.  And, get a grip on it, the US is no more in a position today than it was the day before yesterday to provide the degree and kind of aid which would assure the government of Yemen can and will destroy AQAP.

The long war in Iraq with its less than convincing success as well as the even longer and so far even less successful war in Afghanistan would have sapped American political will to engage in yet another war with a resolute, resilient, and elusive enemy even in the absence of the Great Recession and the economic constraints it has imposed.  The same applies to a greater degree with respect to the West generally.

This implies that even in the highly unlikely event the government of Yemen requested direct on the ground American presence that Washington would provide it.  The unnecessary war in Iraq combined with the unnecessarily protracted one in Afghanistan has left the US without either the will or the means to fight one more war.

Nor is it likely that Saudi Arabia will step into the breech.  The House of Saud has more pressing problems ranging from its own homegrown jihadists to the looming nuclear threat of Iran.  The shrewd calculators of the Land of the Two Mosques will do very little in Yemen unless they are directly and very seriously attacked by AQAP.  Even then it is debatable that the Saudis can act decisively enough and over a long enough period of time to deal a mortal blow to AQAP.

The picture is as dismal as the landscape of Yemen itself.  Eventually AQAP will succeed.  We will get creamed one of these days unless the US and its partners have a run of intelligence good fortune never seen before in the real world.  Then we will respond even if the government of Yemen doesn't like the idea.

It would be far, far better if the US bites down on the cliched bullet and introduces itself into the conflict sooner rather than later.  It is still possible to do so in a reasonably low signature way and still have some good effect.  It will be necessary to program more UAVs and more Special Operations forces both civilian and military.

However, the situation is still such that organizational disruption is possible.  Any significant perturbation of AQAP's leadership--to say nothing of removing al-Awlaki from the board--would cripple AQAP severely.  At the least this would buy time for the Saana government to establish some shred of legitimacy among more of the population.  It would allow creative arm twisting on the Saudis to play a larger role in stabilizing the Peninsula.

If any action in the direction of preempting AQAP is to be made it will be up to the new Congress.  President Obama has shown himself far longer on words than effective deeds when facing "credible threats" to the US and its interests.

This implies the ball will come to rest in the Republican court--if current predictions prove out come Wednesday morning.  Then We the People will discover if today's Republican Party is more like Ronald Reagan--or Jimmy Carter.

The Alternative Universe Of (Some) Lawyers

Anwar al-Awlaki was born in Albuquerque, NM. That was an accident in which his father's educational aspirations connected with geography to confer Mr Awlaki with the benefit of US citizenship. Later, Anwar grew up to become an Islamic cleric. That was a matter of choice. It would prove to be a matter of choice which ultimately put the young Awlaki on a collision course with the government of the US.

For Awlaki the choice not only to become a Muslim cleric but to march steadily along the road of violent political Islam has become a matter of life or death. The Obama administration came to accept that Awlaki was more, much more, than an exponent of a very expansive view of Islam in the world. He had become a recruiter of, facilitator of, and operational leader of men who sought martyrdom while killing American civilians.

The well documented connections between the Yemen based, American born advocate of global jihad directed at establishing a new global Caliphate on the one hand and such Agents Of Allah as the Fort Hood Shooter, the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Dud Maker convinced the Obama administration to call Awlaki what he is--a terrorist. He was placed on the official roster of such people by the Treasury Department. And, a kill-or-capture authorization was signed at the highest levels.

A bullseye was placed on Awlaki's back. If we could find him, we could kill him without any further ado.

That is until Awlaki's dad entered the picture. Seeking to maximize the benefits so accidentally and providentially conferred upon his son by virtue of his birth in the Duke City, the senior Awlaki sought the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Constitutional Rights in an effort to take the target off sonny boy's posterior.

The ACLU and its partner in law would like nothing better than the chance to convince the federal courts to end the Bush started and Obama augmented policy of "targeted killings." The lawyers have decided that there is something deucedly wrong with the notion of killing people who sponsor, support, or command lethal efforts against Americans unless those evil doers are either (1) located in a precisely defined and geographically limited "zone of combat operations," or (2) are provided with the full panoply of protection extent under the constitution for any and all accused of crimes great or small.

To the ACLU and its kin the Awlaki case is simply a means to an end. The end is that of severely limiting the ability of the US to strike effectively against major terrorist figures wherever they are hiding or, more importantly, regardless of the protection they are receiving from local officials. Awlaki is hiding far from the current war zones--or at least the "official" ones--in Iraq, and Afghanistan. He is operating with the tacit protection at least of Yemeni officials.

The only practical way to remove Awlaki's odious presence is through either the risk-ridden means of a commando operation or the low risk one of hitting him from on high. Presumably the ACLU has no problem with the first option as that would assure in principle that Awlaki would be the recipient of all precautions and protections available under the current American system. All other considerations such as risks, diplomatic complications, undue glorification of an evil man, pale into insignificance in the estimate of the High Minded lawyers.

It would be refreshing if the worthies of the ACLU would admit that their motives were not as pure in this case as they have been in past skirmishes between government power and citizen's rights. This time the goal of the lawyers is not the protection of Awlaki's rights as an individual lucky enough to have become a born-in-America hater of all things American. Their interest is simply putting a crippling spanner in the works of a key American effort to fight a war against a global girdling opponent who knows no constraints--legal or otherwise--on their methods and venues.

It would be even more refreshing if the lawyers of ACLU involved in this attempt to castrate critical war fighting means would admit that they share one value with Mr Awlaki. They hate America as much as he does.

It Wasn't Santa, But Still It's A Nice Present

Reports from the latest venue of combat between Islamist jihadists and the more-or-less civilized people of the world, Yemen, are of an airstrike on an al-Qaeda conflab in the caves. One of those present may or may not have been the New Mexico born Islamist cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki.

According to the reports al-Awlaki, who is best known for having been the on-the-Internet spiritual advisor of Major Hasan, may or may not have been killed by the Yemeni jets. If al-Awlaki has gone to his reward there is reason to be jolly this Christmas season given that the cleric joyously confirmed on al-Jazzera that the Fort Hood shootist had contacted him to find out if it was legal under Shariah to go ahead and kill his fellow countrymen and service members. Al-Awliki, drawing on his years of profound study of the intricate holdings of Islamic jurisprudence, apparently advised the Major that killing other Americans was just jake with the religion of peace and tolerance.

As al-Awlaki sagely observed to his interlocutor from al-Jazzera, loyalty to Islam by a Muslim trumps any minor consideration such as loyalty to one's fellow nationals or those who wear the same uniform and salute the same flag. Well, as the assorted multi-cultural mavins of the post modern chattering and academic classes have assured one and all for years now, nationalism and its cognates such as loyalty to one's country are both anachronistic and the raw materials for international adventurers such as W. Bush and Dick Cheney.

It is presumed that members of the aforementioned groups will hold memorial services for such a fine exemplar of the post-modernist sensibilities as al-Awliki. While they are at it perhaps they might find a kind word to say for the (perhaps or perhaps not) deceased leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula who may or may not have been at the troglodyte conference. After all these men were simply pursuing the goal of establishing an international comity of Muslims at the sole expense of national governments such as those in Yemen (which is not legitimate in the estimate of most Yemenis) and Saudi Arabia (which is feudalistic at best and paleolithic at worst.)

For those of us who are not members in good standing with either the chattering or academic classes or other self-defined elite congeries, the news out of Yemen, if confirmed, is all to the good. The last thing the US or the rest of the world needs is yet one more sanctuary for Islamist jihadists. Given the flawed nature of the Yemeni government, the influx of foreign jihadis from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as well as Yemen's geographic position, the notion of the place becoming the next stronghold for the Bold and Courageous Warriors of the Prophet is not to be tolerated.

Backing the Yemeni regime in its long overdue efforts to squash the Houthi and abate the growing jihadi presence is the least worst course of action available to the US. Providing intelligence, logistic support, and even the occasional sea-launched cruise missile attack is a much lower risk operational concept than waiting for affairs in that particular global armpit reaching such a dangerous pass that direct on-the-ground intervention is required.

Airstrikes alone will not do the entire job of repressing the Houthi insurgency. Nor will airstrikes, cruise missiles, and limited Saudi Arabian ground incursions end the attraction of Yemen for jihadis displaced from earlier venues in the "clash of civilizations." The Yemeni government will have to use both political and military means to continue the campaign.

The government shows no particular political will for either the task of ground combat or the far more important and demanding one of enhancing its perceived legitimacy among a badly disaffiliated population. Frankly, the historical forces in Yemen, whether one cares to use the overthow of the emirate in 1961 or go back further to the foundations of the post-World War I Yemeni and Saudi states, are far more centripetal than centrifugal in nature.

The manufacture of Yemen was as artificial as the making of saccharine. The country has no organic reason to exist. The regime has no existential claim on either the loyalty or the affections of most Yemenis. These foundation conditions are exacerbated by the chronic poverty of the country which has seen its very limited oil and other natural resources exploited for the benefit of foreigners or a handful of the very well connected.

Yemen, like Somalia across the Gulf of Aden, is a creation of foreign diplomats working with the limited input of a very small number of locals who spoke an appropriate language, wore suits, and could make the right noises at the correct time. To call this process "self determination" is to commit a felony against language and common sense alike. To expect these artifacts of foreign manufacture to evolve into stable nation-states is to be terminally out-to-lunch.

In Yemen the interest of the US, as is the case in Somalia, Afghanistan, and a few other places, is limited to precluding its exploitation by Islamist jihadists. We (and other Western states) have no need to engage in the futile exercise of "nation-building" as such is beyond the capacity of mere humans. There is no need to provide Yemenis with a fully functioning, modern, pluralistic, democratic, secular state (as if such would be possible.) The only requirement is to end the appeal of Yemen to jihadis and those such as al-Awlaki who give them comfort and encouragement.

Al-Awlaki's father is quoted as condemning the US and President Obama for having murdered his son. The father holds that if his son had committed some crime he should be brought before the bar of justice. The retort to the father's accusation is simple: If his son is dead, he, according to his own beliefs, has been judged by the Highest Court of Islam.

As to the verdict of that Court (or as to its existence) the Geek offers no assessment.