Small Straws In A Stiff Wind

There are weeks when the Geek has regretted his lifelong interest in matters of war, diplomacy, and the shadow lands of covert/clandestine affairs.  The past month of so has been one of those periods.  It is not that the world has suddenly been infected by a fulminating virus of peace and love.  Quite the contrary.  Rather the intellectual languor has been promoted by the combination of events having unfolded in a drearily predictable factor and the lack of imagination exhibited by the Deep Thinkers and Bold Actors on all sides of all the many conflicts, armed and otherwise.

A useful example of both predictability and the lack of imagination is presented by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.  The energetic dismantlement of the New Mexican borne cleric is both welcome and long overdue.  The fact that he was accompanied on his trip to paradise by the one time resident of North Carolina, Samir Khan, rendered the event all the more pleasurable.

Anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the UAV campaign in the FATA and the building of a base convenient to Yemen from which Agency operated Predators might make their lethal flights well understood that Awlaki's days were numbered, and that the number was small.  The violent death of the genius of Internet (and personal) radicalization became as certain as sunrise when he was placed on the "kill or capture" list last year.  Despite the inevitable wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth by the ACLU and other advocates of human rights above the dictates of real life, and regardless of the equally certain condemnations of "extrajudicial execution" already resounding around the world, the Obama administration by it's listing of the imam let it be known that the governing considerations were those of war--a war in which Awlaki had voluntarily enlisted and waged with ever growing success.

With the failure a few months ago to capture Awlaki by a force of Yemeni personnel backed by USSOCOM assets, the only option was killing, and the only practical tool was provided by a Predator launched Hellfire.  The only time limits were imposed by the requirements for constructing an operational base and gaining from both Yemeni and national technical means sufficient actionable intelligence.  When fractured open source reports out of Yemen a couple of weeks ago indicated a diminishing of drone traffic over the area of Yemen in which Awlaki's tribe holds sway with a ramping up over territory to the country's north, it became evident that the endgame for the preacher was underway.

The removal of Awlaki and Khan from the board is good.  But, it is drearily predictable that it is not much more than that.  The strike in no way lessens the nature or effectiveness of the threat posed by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).  Had the reported inclusion of AQAP's chief bombmaker in the body count not been later retracted, the Hellfire would have well and truly hurt the group.  As it is, the most that can be said is the killing has had a marginal beneficial impact by reducing AQAP's capacity to use Internet radicalization with the same effect in the future that it has in the past.

Neither the killings nor the knee trembling on the part of human and civil rights lawyers and groups will change the nature of the ongoing war between advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states and people of the world.  The bad guys will keep on being bad actors.  The administration and any future one as well will use whatever means are necessary within the broad limits of proportionality to defend the country and its allies against attacks of whatsoever nature.

If there is any alteration in the future, it will be in the direction of placing increased reliance upon UAVs and other means of long range, low signature, low cost of commitment war fighting.  The use of special forces teams and UAVs has been both tested and proven in the harsh laboratory of the FATA as well as the one next door in Pakistan.  Both capabilities can be of great assistance in countering the potential threats resident in AQAP, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.)  Both may be required urgently against the latter threat if AQIM demonstrates greater capability as the result of having tapped into the arms stream flowing from the looted arsenals of Libya.

A greater use of UAVs will provoke an enormous consternation on the part of the usual suspects--the NGOs involved with human and legal rights as well as the apologists for countries which wish ill to the US but cannot match the American technological capacities.  There will be more and more political strange bedfellows both domestic and international as the US leans more heavily upon the impersonal, remotely controlled deliverers of death from above.  There will be demands beyond count for new conventions to bar such devices as Predator.  There will be calls for a moratorium on the use of these infernal machines until the law can catch up with the new technologies.

The only reply to those who believe the Predator and its tribe are inhuman and inhumane is,"Phooey!"  It is far better for a single Awlaki to die downrange than to see real war with its effects, unpredictable in detail but certain to include hundreds if not thousands of dead--most of whom will be civilians.

The Predators will continue to fly over Libya even long after NATO's warplanes have packed up and gone home.  They will be overhead to observe not only the intended targets of weapons being smuggled or saboteurs preparing but also the probable agony of protracted internal war as the joy of liberation turns into the pain of political disagreements of a very fundamental nature.

Libya (and its neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt) is also drearily predictable.  Much of the reason for this observation is found in a remark made by a Salifist Tunisian, 23 years old and holder of a degree in engineering who, when interviewed, opined, "We Salifists are the majority.  Democracy is rule of the majority.  Why should we allow the minority (secular oriented Tunisians as well as their non-Salifist fellow countrymen) dictate how we should live?"

By this question as well as similar content expressions by legions of Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, and their supporters in the West, the young man demonstrated just why the "Arab Spring" will turn into a Winter, a most harsh and bitter Winter.  The promoters of democracy show they well understand democracy in and of itself but fail to see the necessary corollary: Democracy is the tyranny of the majority.

Unless properly constrained within the firm dikes of a representational republic and held in check by dams formed by both division of powers and an independent judicial system, democracy is tyranny pure and simple in which the rights of the minorities are either non-existent or tenuous at best.  In the rush to embrace democracy without the time necessary to build the essential dikes and dams, no citizen is secure, no rights and liberties are permanent, nothing is safe from the fads and fantasies of public opinion and the winds generated by demagogues.

Libya, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, but quite like Yemen and Afghanistan or other Islamic states, has the additional burden of tribalism.  This is not to say tribalism is bad.  It isn't.  Tribal identity is predominant in several states to the point that they are not real, integrated nation-states but rather collections of tribes sharing a flag.

The attempt to force tribal based societies and polities to pretend they are Western nation-states is doomed to fail.  Don't believe?  Take a look at Somalia.  It is not a failed state because it never was a real state.  Rather it was an artifact created by Western diplomats who used the only model making sense to them--the nation-state.  The same is true of Afghanistan.  Much of the inherent instability there results from ignoring the tribal nature of the human terrain in order to pretend we can make it into a Western style state.

When looking at Libya or Yemen or, to a lesser extent, Syria, the same dynamic is present--tribes forced to act as if their members owed a higher loyalty to the state.  The example of Iraq is instructive here.  As long as we outsiders insist on democracy and the nation-state as the touchstone of legitimacy, we are helping to doom the targets to a long, harsh Winter.

Even if tribalism of the usual sort is absent as it is in Egypt and Tunisia, there is a functional equivalent at work. That is the existence of differing interpretations of Islam and thus the relation of the faith to the state.  The ground truth is Islam carries the seeds of its own failure as a foundation of state.  This actuality has been shown in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  People may think they want to live in a Shariah based system until they are actually in one.  The proponents of austere Islam have and will find that their vision of life is totally unattractive to most people.  Then, they must (as do the austere Islamists of Iran) rely upon naked force to oppress their way to continued power.

Put together, the two forms of tribalism, traditional and religious, along with unchecked democracy point to a long, bitter Winter of pronounced discontents.  This, in turn, implies a high possibility of protracted or episodic internal war in all its manifold and evil forms.  Such is the result of ill-advised exercises in "nation-building" or regime change or support of the "peoples' will.

Coming full circle, the several downsides of either intervention or unthinking support are circumvented completely by using Predators or even special forces units.  These approaches to defending against hostile intents and acts minimize the probability of unintended consequences.  Predators do not engage in "nation-building," neither do they change regimes.  They kill people in serious need of being killed.

To this end, the killing of Awlaki is one important small straw in the very stiff winds of the coming Arab Winter.

The Next Ten Years

The US (and a hell of a lot of other countries) is approaching the zero point marking the official start of "The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT.)"  To err on the side of accuracy, the US had already been in a war against advocates of violent political Islam for eight years when the hijacked passenger aircraft were turned into cruise missiles.

Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention.  Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED.  The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression.  The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort.  The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.

The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor.  It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched.  It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.

Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead.  At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states.  The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.

Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11.  Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader.  Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.

As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace.  Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country.  Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the  new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.

The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan.  The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations.  The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.

The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation.  Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.

Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow.  AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure.  Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.

In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance.  AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao,  "a paper tiger."

The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated.  There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.

The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population.  AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs.  Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor.  They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.

The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis.  In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures.  This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed.  Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.

The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen.  Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority.  They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power.  (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)

There is an important caveat to this.  Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly.  This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam.  They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.

Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted.  Neither should they be diminished.  The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces.  The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers.  In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants.  It is OK.  A fact of life.  But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.

When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US.  The winner would be AQAP.

The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen.  In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.

We did this once before.  In Vietnam.  The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.

Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated.  But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.

Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only.  The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP.  Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam.  Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.

Carrying Water And Doublethinking

Leon Panetta is an old Chicago pol.  He came of political age as a cog in the oldest, longest running, smoothest operating machine in the US--the Cook County Democratic Party.  As such, he knows well the primary duty of a machine man--loyalty to the Boss.  By definition the Boss is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Barack Obama.

Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach."  Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.

Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size.  And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well.  If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.

Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11.  In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.

Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated.  Al-Qaeda is not dead.  It is not on some sort of Islamic life support.  It is not even gravely ill.

The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed.  It has changed profoundly from its original form.  Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.

In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system.  It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser.  None of this obtains today.  Nor has it obtained for some time.  Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.

Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam.  Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.

The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises.  Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original.  "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group.  It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.

The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea.  This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.

In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea.  It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct.  The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam.  These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics.  Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West.  Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.

Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda.  Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies.  The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.

Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone.  In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles.  AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat.  AQIM is growing.  Rapidly.

The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe.  This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better.  In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death.  Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.

AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria.  Kidnapping Europeans.  This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy.  In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort.  Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago.  Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe.  There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.

Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say.  Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year.  Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US.  It is one more rapidly growing threat.

Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge.  He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground.  He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today.  Probably on a larger scale geographically.

Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American.  Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits.  When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.

Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI.  That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols.  It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there,  that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US.  If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.

Internal War--Neocons And The Tea Party

Like the shambling corpses in the classic black and white version of Night of the Living Dead, the neocon ninnies have been resurrected by the fragrant miasma surrounding the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions.  Eliot Abrams and Joshua Muravchik having been baying in the van, eager for a faster, harder intervention in Libya and chomping after the chance to depose Bashir Assad.

Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver.  The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.

Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants.  The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.

Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison.  Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms.  There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.

At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations.  It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."

As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya.  They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs.  They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.

The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering.  By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.

As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch!  This sketch is silly."

The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today.  At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.

This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right.  It is not.  It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.

There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.

The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power.  It is not simply first among equals.  It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities.  There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this.  The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night.  (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)

The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest.  True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.

This positive statement is accompanied by a negative.  The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology.  Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq.  This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure.  As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.

The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong.  The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress.  No Great Power has ever resigned its status.  The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs.  Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.

Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock?  A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?

Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam.  The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy.  Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.

If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish.  Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war.  Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.

Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war.  It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica.  This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations.  It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.

There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP.  In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group.  Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.

Then, of course, there is Iran.  There is always Iran.  The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb."  The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.  (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)

The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months.  The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction.  So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority.  Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides.  This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.

This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast.  The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.

John Bolton was right.  And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him.  Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage.  This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.

The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents.  We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go.  Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?

Unfortunately it is.  That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.

And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.

Woosh! There Goes Yemen Down The Potty

You know things must be bad when Somali refugees start leaving.  This is happening in Yemen, so there is little hope that the place will escape failed state status.  Of course you can't blame these hyper vigilant survivors of a war without fronts.  They learned up close and personal that he who hesitates is dead.

The Yemeni army is fractured.  Several units have "mutinied" with the result that former comrades-in-arms are now shooting each other.  The army is reflecting the other divisions which have occurred in Yemen subsequent to the quite ill-advised use of highly trained and skilled snipers to kill dozens assembled outside the University of San'a last Friday protesting the thirty-two year old dictatorship of Abdullah Saleh.  As Talleyrand once observed of a particularly stupid bit of political murder committed by his boss, Napoleon, "Sire that was worse than a crime.  It was a blunder."

How much of a blunder Saleh has been discovering the past forty-eight hours.  The chief tribe in this tribal assemblage, his tribe, has called for his ouster.  Several cabinet members--including fellow tribesmen--called it quits over the killings as did ambassador after ambassador.  Now the army has joined in with a senior officer, a commander of the northern district among others and a half-brother who has carried heavy internal security freight among others, leading the parade to opposition.

On the international scene, France continuing its leadership of the free and democratic countries, has become the first state to demand Saleh step down ASAP.  How long will it be before other countries in the West, for example the UK, join the chorus?

According to assorted "experts" the continued collapse of Yemen places the US in the space between a rock and a hard place.  After all, we are reminded, Yemen is a key ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.

Sure it is.

When evaluating the role of Saleh and Yemen in any contest with AQAP, it is critical to recall that Saleh took over South Yemen, the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, with the assistance of tribesmen who fought under the banner of violent political Islam.  Subsequently, these same folk have constituted the majority of the high command of the anti-terrorist units and a heavy percentage of the actual security force trigger pullers.  This ground truth along with Yemen's tribal nature may be the reason that Yemen has had a singular lack of success in suppressing AQAP.

It can be argued with some legitimacy that a failed Yemen right across the narrow straight from the long failed Somalia will exacerbate greatly the menace to navigation presented by the Merry Buccaneers Of Puntland.  A large grain of truth resides in that contention, but not a large enough one to make of it a pearl of wisdom.

The Yemeni coastguard rivals the Yemeni counter-terrorist forces for ineffectiveness.  This has not been remedied in the slightest by US aid.

Yemen is, has been and will be, whether or not Saleh stays in power, a source of jihadists and pirates alike.  The reason for that is the nature of the human terrain of Yemen.  The deep tribal nature of the place, the extreme poverty which besets the majority, the appeal of the most austere form of Islam, the cultural imperative of tribal solidarity against any outsider combine to assure Yemen is a fertile breeding place for jihad of all sorts.

Nor is the situation in Yemen going to be altered in any meaningful way by the introduction of democracy or any other form of exported "nation-building" including massive economic assistance.  It is critical, foundational, to remember that Yemen is not a nation in any recognizable sense of the word.  Rather it is a collection of rival tribes collected under a single flag which none recognize as being real.

Senior American decision makers headed by Defense Secretary Gates have warned that fragmentation of existing states will not contribute to stability.  While he made that warning with specific reference to the notion of a Libya partitioned into western and eastern components, his proposition is flatly wrong.  When a state, be it Libya, Yemen, or Somalia, is the artifact of well-intentioned Western diplomats, it is not an authentic affair.  Having never been a reality in the minds of most people living there, fragmentation along tribal or cultural lines is a viable option.

It can be argued on the basis of history, both European and non-Western, that nations and the states they create emerge slowly, painfully, and organically from internal imperatives and external pressures.  Only a nation and concomitant state so created can withstand stresses such as those seen in Libya or Yemen.

This suggests strongly that the collapse of Yemen into its component parts is not a bad idea even if the near-term consequences bear no resemblance to a stroll though paradise.  Only by falling apart will there be any hope of Yemen ever coming together in a stable way.

The best policy for France, the UK, or the US is to stay away.  Even if Saleh becomes a perfect imitation of Gaddafi, which is unlikely given the internal dynamics of Yemen, the West must restrain its impulses to impose peace, craft a settlement calculated to keep Yemen intact under some sort of imitation Western liberal government.

There is a lesson from Afghanistan which may be learned once more in Libya.  Outsiders cannot create a nation-state from a traditional, tribal society for which the entire notion of the nation and the state are literally unthinkable.  As was once said, "Don't try to teach a pig to sing.  It won't work.  It will annoy the pig."

Are They Really That Smart?

Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) has released a special issue of its Inspire online magazine.  This "Extra-Extra!-Read-All-About-It! release is dedicated to a single topic.  The only matter considered is the "failed" parcel bomb plot.

To AQAP's chief propagandist, the one time North Carolina resident turned full time "traitor to America," Samir Khan, the operation was not a failure.  In his typically breezy not to say cocky way, this self-proclaimed "traitor" points out that the job cost AQAP a bit over four thousand dollars but will result in "billions" of bucks in enhanced security costs to the American air cargo industry.  In terms of cost accounting, ole "Sammy" is bang on.

The jihadist publication promised a continuation of low cost, high economic damage attacks.  AQAP avers that it has hit on a new formula for successfully bringing about the collapse of the US and the West, a sort of death by a thousand paper cuts way of waging war.

The special issue also repeated the AQAP claim of responsibility for the crash of a UPS flight in Dubai which killed the two man crew.  This claim has been rejected by the officials in Dubai, but the results of a review of the crash investigation has not yet substantiated the local view that the incident resulted from causes other than a terrorist attack.  However, there has been no evidence of an on-board explosion, so the cause remains an open question.

Leaving aside the matter of the Dubai incident, the Inspire narrative does pose an interesting question for analysts.  There is no arguing against the contention that the parcel bombs have resulted in greater attention being paid to air cargo.  This attention will both cost extra money and introduce additional frictions into a critical component of the international logistics system.  Over the longer term the delays occasioned by enhanced security will bring substantial indirect costs, but not such as to cripple the industry let alone bring the US to its financial knees.

It has been known since the Pliocene epoch of terrorism that every increment in increased security brings both additional direct costs and a slew of frictions both economic and political in its wake.  By responding to terrorist incidents, the target automatically hands the terrorist a small victory.  The inevitable combination of increased costs, increased frictions, increased apprehensions, and decreased belief in the capacity of the target government to provide a satisfactory level of security exacts political and social as well as economic costs.  The current contretemps over "strip or grope" is excellent evidence of the overall consequence of security driven frictions.

Those adherents of violent political Islam who have lived in the US or elsewhere in the West such as Samir Khan and Anwar al-Awlaki would be well aware of the dynamic of terror-enhanced security-increased frictions.  Thus the question for analysts is this: Did AQAP intend and plan the parcel bomb attack in order to inflict economic damage or is the Inspire explanation one of an after-the-fact nature?

To put it more simply: Are the operatives of AQAP as smart as Khan alleges or did the talented propagandist invent his theory to meet the facts, including the irrefutable one of failure?  In support of the second interpretation is a critical fact absent in the glowing tribute to the brilliance of the Deep Thinkers and Master Strategists of AQAP.

The missing fact?

Well, bucko, how about the cause of the operation's failure?  The attack was betrayed to Saudi intelligence by a defector from AQAP.  Actually, the man was a multiple defector.  He had bounced from terror to Saudi "rehabilitation" and then back to AQAP and finally back to the waiting arms of the Saudis.  The unlikely series of bounces hints strongly that the informant had been targeted on AQAQ by the Saudis and he then performed his task with precision.  Since penetration of hostile entities is the first line of defense and the Saudis have more than one dog in the fight with AQAP, the use of an intentional penetration asset seems quite likely.

The fact that the operation, admittedly a very clever and cheap one, was compromised fatally by a Saudi penetration asset must be more than a tad galling to the heavyweights of AQAP.  The fertile imagination of Samir Khan provided a way of retrieving a measure of success from what is otherwise a failure tinted with the humiliation of betrayal from within.

Ole Sammy makes much of the insight and intelligence of his running buddies of AQAP.  That is the reason for the article detailing not only the infernal devices but also the security systems successfully evaded.  Of course, by giving these operational details the article would seem to be undercutting the value of its promises that the campaign would continue as it provides useful grist for the intelligence and security mills of the US and other countries.

Whether AQAP continues with a focus on parcel bombs or uses another approach one thing is sure--AQAP is not going to fade away, organizational bones bleaching in some sunwashed wadi deep in the mountains of Yemen.  A second unpleasant reality will remain as well: AQAP is aware of the greatest vulnerability in the US and most of the West.  That vulnerability is the demands for more security and the inevitable costs of providing such.

We the People--and the government--must carefully consider just how much security is enough.  We must keep in mind that every time the security wrench ratchets tighter, the costs and the frictions go up as well.  There is a crossover point where the negatives of security are such as to accomplish the goals of the terrorists without a single additional terrorist act.

How close are we right now to the crossover point?  That is the question the Inspire braggadocio demands we, all of us, answer.

The Yemeni Dilemma

The rapidly collapsing state of Yemen is on the verge of becoming a serious rival to Pakistan's FATA as a secure base for groups advocating and practicing violent political Islam.  Foreign fighters displaced from Afghanistan and elsewhere by successful security operations are coming to Yemen as a sort of evil twin to the Haj.  Along with genuine foreigners are sizable numbers of denizens of the Arabian Peninsula returning to familiar deserts and barren mountains from their travel-broadens-the-mind sojourns in combat zones ranging from Iraq to Afghanistan and other, even more exotic, climes.

These early birds of passage will be followed by others as the operations in Afghanistan and from the sky over the FATA become ever more lethal and thus discouraging to the Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith.  Yemen seems destined to become even more of a center of violent political Islam as more and more muscle is added by the returnees.

There is no doubt but Yemen and its Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) are the most attractive venue for those folk dedicated to the tenets of violent political Islam.  Yemen is an ungoverned and perhaps ungovernable place with a physical and human terrain seemingly ideal for the propagation and growth of AQAP.  The attractiveness of Yemen is in no way lessened by the talents of Anwar al-Awlaki as is hinted at by the flow of wannabe martyrdom seekers from Western Europe, the UK, and the US.  Thanks to the Internet, Yemen is only a click or two away from anywhere on Earth.

The Yemen dilemma is both real and pressing for American decision makers.  Individuals based in its so far very hospitable environment constitute a genuine threat to CONUS as events of the past year have brought home with appropriate drama.  At the same time the government of Yemen has demonstrated a pervasive lack of political will and competence in confronting the AQAP such as to make the government of Pakistan appear to be a frothing-to-fight bunch in comparison.

Yemen's internal problems ranging from exceptional poverty to the ongoing nature of two insurgencies to the ever increasing shortage of water to an unsupportable population growth assure the government lacks the resources and legitimacy necessary to take on AQAP even if it wanted to.  Further exacerbating the weakness, not to say impotence, of the government is the intensely tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture.  Of course, the government in no way helps its cause by exhibiting a level of corruption and nepotism which would make the old Dick Daley machine in Chicago drool with envy.

Since the Yemeni population is characterized by a degree of prickly nationalism which surpasses even that of the Mexicans, the capacity or the desirability of the US to enter the conflict directly is nil at best.  Realistically, any direct, evident American presence in Yemen would be counterproductive.  It is not, as Secretary of Defense Gates noted that the US does not "need" another war but rather that any attempt to wage war in Yemen would be to assure failure.

Even the relatively low footprint usage of Predators and other UAVs is not really safe.  Yemeni tribesmen are aware of the Predators overhead and resent their drone overhead even when no Hellfire missiles are forthcoming.  Perhaps the initial reaction to the arrival of the Predators would not have been so negative had the US not used Tomahawk cruise missiles in an ill-advised and failed attack to take out a high value personality about a year ago.  The attack may not have killed its intended victim but did manage to terminate with the utmost of prejudice a number of civilians including women and children and a well respected high ranking member of the local government.

About the only military activity the US can undertake without unacceptable risks of an unintended, counterproductive outcome is training selected Yemeni personnel and providing logistical, intelligence, and procurement support.  This level of assistance would be "safe" and might have some benefits for the local central government but will not defeat AQAP.  It will not abate nor measurably lessen the threat to the US resident in Yemen.

Even the capture or killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, desirable and emotionally satisfying as such might be, would not alter the state of play in Yemen in favor of the US.  Nor would a more robust Saudi presence in Yemen, even if the House of Sand could be persuaded that such might be in its interests.

The task of making the human terrain of Yemen unsuitable for the continued growth of violent political Islam is one of establishing effective governance in the place for the first time in modern history.  This in turn means assisting the government of Yemen in winning the crucial bones of perceived legitimacy.  Due to the tribal nature of Yemeni society and culture, the legitimacy must be functional as it can never be inherently existential, not until the primary loyalty of the individual Yemeni focuses on the state rather than the tribe.

The "soft" power instruments of the US are both available and appropriate for the task of enhancing the perceived functional legitimacy of the central government.  In considering this the Geek is reminded of the time in the early Seventies when he encountered Mideastern students, including those from Yemen (among whom was the father of Anwar al-Awlaki) who were attending New Mexico State University (NMSU.)  The majority of these men (and they were, unsurprisingly, all male) were taking courses in dry land agriculture, hydrology, and similar real world, severely practical matters.  All intended to go back home and apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills to the very real and pressing problems there.  Mr Awlaki senior was in no way different from the majority.

Forty years ago NMSU and other state schools had rather large programs supported by the State Department and USAID to find, recruit, and educate a new generation of technically competent leaders in most of the states of the Mideast and North Africa.  Schools such as NMSU had much experience in dealing with the sort of problems confronting countries with limited rainfall, extensive dry lands, periodic flooding, and the other disasters which limit agricultural development in places such as Yemen.

For various reasons including a desire by students to do work in areas ranging from political science to urban planning, the basic efforts pioneered with success in the Sixties and early Seventies fell increasingly by the wayside.  The situation in Yemen demands that the State Department, USAID, and relevant universities reinvigorate the old approach with haste.

Agricultural shortfalls coupled with water scarcity, population growth, and the economic displacement of current farmers represent a critical area in Yemen's present capacity for survival as well as its longer term prospects.  A crash program focusing on these considerations with an emphasis on eduction of locals would rebound to the credit of the US and the government of Yemen alike.  Insofar as the current deficiencies are addressed and future talent developed, the perceived functional legitimacy of the Yemeni government will be enhanced.  At the same time the demonization of the US would be lessened--perhaps even ended.

Beyond legitimacy enhancement and life improvement efforts, the US can assist the local government in properly exploiting the inherent provincialism and tribal loyalties of the several tribes against AQAP.  As the number of foreigners entering the tribal homelands increases, there will be more and more frictions with the locals.  Every time and ever place where foreign fighters have embedded themselves with local coreligionists, the consequent frictions have outweighed the ties of Islam.  To a Yemeni even a Saudi is an outsider, a person who may be entitled to hospitality and protection but also a person who can overstay his welcome or abrade the customs of hospitality by his arrogance or indifference.

An awareness of and exploitation of tribal sentiments, norms, and values can serve the coinciding interests of the US and the Yemeni central government.  The US has already shown its awareness of the intense xenophobia which characterizes many of the Yemeni tribals.  All that is needed now is an informed program conducted with and through the San'a regime to exploit these norms and values to the disadvantage of AQAP and even "homeboys" such as Anwar al-Awlaki.  (The least-worst solution to the problem of Anwar is for him to die at the hands of an insulted local tribesman.)

The really nifty thing about Yemen is that it provides an excellent venue to explore not only smaller footprint means of waging military counterinsurgency but ways of engaging soft power tools to promote the perceived legitimacy of the threatened host government.  To do this successfully all hands in Washington and San'a must understand that stability and peace alike rest on the twin pillars of properly employed coercion including lethal force and enhanced popular perceptions of governmental legitimacy.  The fact that Yemen is almost as bad off in the governance area as Somalia not only makes the challenge greater--it will make the success all the more compelling when (and if) it happens.

One More War We Don't Want To Fight--And Won't

Over ten years ago, around the time of the embassy bombings, the Geek identified Yemen as a primary venue of threats directed against the US and the West by the purveyors of violent political Islam.  He went so far as to predict to his audience that Yemen would rival or surpass Pakistan as the Mother of all Islamist Threats.  He was, not surprisingly, pooh-poohed by the field grades and their civilian counterparts in attendance.

Then, and, even more now, Yemen is the perfect petri dish for breeding the bacillus of armed political Islam.  The reason is not simply that the fractured, desolate countryside is the homeland of Osama bin Laden, although that is a signal of the evil potential resident in the wadis, barren mountains, and scorching desert which constitutes the physical geography of Yemen.

Far more important than the physical makeup of Yemen is its human terrain.  In that area, the single most important consideration when assessing or countering threats from jihadist inclined Muslims, Yemen equals or surpasses Afghanistan, the FATA of Pakistan, and most other Muslim majority locations in exhibiting the features central to the flourishing growth of violent political Islam.

The context is the commonalities found when examining the heartlands of the assorted advocates of violent political Islam.  First, the fundamental social organizing locus above the family is the tribe.  Afghanistan, the FATA, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan are all tribal societies in which the concept of central government is elusive, has no claim on primary loyalties, and is held with the same fondness as a Tea Party member would see a tax hike.

In all the heartland areas, the hold of a central government is light at best and absent in the majority of cases.  Any central government presence is not only fragile and transient, it is viewed with great suspicion by the locals.  The most universal explanation for the lack of confidence in the central government given by residents in the several heartland areas is corruption.  This reason has much to recommend it as the several governments involved are corrupt.  Period.

In addition to pervasive corruption, the several governments are brothers in another critical way.  All are inefficient.  The universal inefficiency assures the central government will not have the slightest shred of functional legitimacy in the estimate of the locals.

The combination of corruption and gross inefficiency assures that whatever existential legitimacy the central government might have possessed has long since been eroded by the corrosive impact of repeated and highly frustrating experiences on the part of locals when dealing with representatives of the central regime.  There is no tradition, no history of viewing the central government as worthy of respect, loyalty, or obedience.

In none of the cited countries is there any set of even slightly compelling reasons for individuals to forsake tribal affiliations for one with the central regime.  Other than coercion, the government has no means by which to engage the locals.  Having no carrots, the regimes are left with only the stick.

Since pressure consolidates long before it fractures and the assorted governments have a record of being just as inefficient in repression as in all other aspects of governmental life, the result is a strengthening of anti-governmental attitudes and loyalties.  Insofar as the government attempts to coerce its way to authority, the result is a solidifying of resistance to it and an increase in the perceptions of illegitimacy.

Finally, there is the political incorrect need to underscore the role of religion.  In all of the several states mentioned, Islam of the most severe, austere form is prevalent.  Local clerics emphasize those aspects of the Muslim portmanteau of beliefs which authorize and even demand violent action be taken by believers against apostate rulers and infidels who support the apostates.  Some, but not necessarily all, of the local clerics also preach the need of ongoing, offensive violent operations against the infidels wherever and whenever they are found.

These factors, all of which are present in Yemen, are enhanced significantly when wealth is maldistributed.  This has been the case in-country with respect to the (now diminishing) oil revenues.  The money has gone in the main to those who are well connected, those who haul heavy freight with the government.  Very little has gone to any use visible to the general public--particularly that part which lives in the most remote, most desolate, most hard scrabble of the country's hinterlands.

Way back when the Geek issued his prediction on Yemen as well as today there are several features unique to the place.  All of these exacerbate greatly the impossibility of the central government suppressing the emerging advocates of violent political Islam.

Yemen is a artificial country.  It is not the end product of a long, organic process of social and political evolution.  More important than the period of British "colonial" presence was the overthrow of the ancient Houthi emirate a half century ago.  The instability of this action was in no way lessened by the division of Yemen into two sovereign states.  Nor were matters improved by the war which ensued, a war which was prolonged and made more bloody by the efforts of outside actors, most importantly Egypt.

The formalities of peace treaties and national consolidation were relatively easily accomplished during the Nineties.  But formalities do not reality make.  The reality remained what it had been during the years of division and war.  The North and South did not make an amicable family.  The supporters and descendants of the old Houthi regime were alive, well, and itching for a comeback.

The "international community" (whatever that might mean in this context) apparently decided that its involvement was no longer needed once the photo-op treaty signing and political reunification had come to an end.  The matter of making peace and reconciliation genuine was dropped onto the laps of the locals with the assumed benevolent(?) assistance of the House of Saud.

For a short while the pretense could be continued.  Even after al-Qaeda issued its declaration of war against the US, even (briefly) after the bombing of the USS Cole, the US and other Western states could afford to take a detached, somewhat bemused attitude regarding Yemen.  Later the focus on Afghanistan and Iraq assured Yemen was cast into the outer darkness of policy making concern.

For a long while even Saudi Arabia could afford the luxury of overlooking Yemen even though it was the largest, most inviting target of the armed political Islamists lurking in the bleak mountains on the border.  The government of Yemen was uncooperative in the common task of defeating the jihadists.  Moments of collaboration--the famed Predator strike stands out--were exceeded by years of obstructionism.

The relocation of the New Mexico born, US educated, English speaking cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, to Yemen made an already grave situation downright deadly as demonstrated by the failed "Underwear Bomber" and the tragically successful Fort Hood Shooter.  Al-Awlaki taken in conjunction with the announced formation of Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) changed the game radically.

Now Yemen equals or, perhaps, surpasses the FATA as the most important locus of anti-American, anti-Western violent political Islam.  Given that the government of Yemen has no effective control over the majority of the country and lacks the political base of support to expand its sway, the situation will only get worse.

The worsening of the Yemen Dilemma has been made crystalline with the air cargo bomb effort.  The Saudis proved their worth by giving the warning which allowed the attack to be prevented.  The precision of the heads-up assured that British and UAE security personnel were able to identify and neutralize the very carefully made and concealed bombs before they exploded probably far over the desolate wastes of the North Atlantic.  With this one action the Saudis have earned much of the aid and assistance provided them by the US.

The ground truth remains.  The prevention of one attack does not equal the abating of the threat behind the attack.  AQAP remains alive and well.  So does Anwar al-Awlaki.

The government of Yemen is no stronger, no more possessed of legitimacy in the eyes of most Yemeni now than it was the day before yesterday.  It is no more able or willing to take serious action against AQAP now than it was the day before yesterday.  And, get a grip on it, the US is no more in a position today than it was the day before yesterday to provide the degree and kind of aid which would assure the government of Yemen can and will destroy AQAP.

The long war in Iraq with its less than convincing success as well as the even longer and so far even less successful war in Afghanistan would have sapped American political will to engage in yet another war with a resolute, resilient, and elusive enemy even in the absence of the Great Recession and the economic constraints it has imposed.  The same applies to a greater degree with respect to the West generally.

This implies that even in the highly unlikely event the government of Yemen requested direct on the ground American presence that Washington would provide it.  The unnecessary war in Iraq combined with the unnecessarily protracted one in Afghanistan has left the US without either the will or the means to fight one more war.

Nor is it likely that Saudi Arabia will step into the breech.  The House of Saud has more pressing problems ranging from its own homegrown jihadists to the looming nuclear threat of Iran.  The shrewd calculators of the Land of the Two Mosques will do very little in Yemen unless they are directly and very seriously attacked by AQAP.  Even then it is debatable that the Saudis can act decisively enough and over a long enough period of time to deal a mortal blow to AQAP.

The picture is as dismal as the landscape of Yemen itself.  Eventually AQAP will succeed.  We will get creamed one of these days unless the US and its partners have a run of intelligence good fortune never seen before in the real world.  Then we will respond even if the government of Yemen doesn't like the idea.

It would be far, far better if the US bites down on the cliched bullet and introduces itself into the conflict sooner rather than later.  It is still possible to do so in a reasonably low signature way and still have some good effect.  It will be necessary to program more UAVs and more Special Operations forces both civilian and military.

However, the situation is still such that organizational disruption is possible.  Any significant perturbation of AQAP's leadership--to say nothing of removing al-Awlaki from the board--would cripple AQAP severely.  At the least this would buy time for the Saana government to establish some shred of legitimacy among more of the population.  It would allow creative arm twisting on the Saudis to play a larger role in stabilizing the Peninsula.

If any action in the direction of preempting AQAP is to be made it will be up to the new Congress.  President Obama has shown himself far longer on words than effective deeds when facing "credible threats" to the US and its interests.

This implies the ball will come to rest in the Republican court--if current predictions prove out come Wednesday morning.  Then We the People will discover if today's Republican Party is more like Ronald Reagan--or Jimmy Carter.

And, Now, It's Yemen Again

Either or both CIA and the WaPo have determined Yemen is tomorrow's news. Baying along is Amnesty International, once more ever-so-concerned that somehow, someone may be killed by an American munition without benefit of arrest, trial, appeal, and the other features of justice.

American, particularly CIA, neutralization efforts have taken the fun out of being an al-Qaeda heavyweight either in Afghanistan or the FATA of Pakistan. The ever present Predators have proven spectacularly successful at what is politely referred to as "organizational disruption" in both venues. The result, as intended, has been the lowering of both the will and ability of al-Qaeda to mount offensive operations on its own.

One result has been the redirection of al-Qaeda personnel and efforts from direct leadership to behind the scenes training, planning, and advising. The small number of al-Qaeda (fifty to one hundred) remaining in Afghanistan still represent a significant but indirect threat as they use their experience to gin up the locals, to churn out more effective Taliban and Haqqani network tactical commanders, more competent bomb makers, more industrious and able recruiters. In this role al-Qaeda can hope to serve as a potent force multiplier.

Another, equally predictable result of the increased US pressure both on the ground in Afghanistan and in the air over the FATA has been horizontal escalation. The Geek has posted many times on the potentials for geographic spread by al-Qaeda. The most likely venues for such horizontal escalation have been North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. Of these alternatives, the one having the most threat enhancing potential is the last, the Arabian Peninsula.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been in existence for well over a decade. Osama bin Laden launched his war against the US and the West from the wide sands of the Peninsula. His motive was the perceived "infidel" occupation of the Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden's goal was and is the forced ejection of the American "infidels" and the local "apostates" from the Kingdom of the Two Mosques. His "declaration of war against the American people" of fifteen or so years ago made both motive and goal explicit.

Yemen has been a preferred center of operations for bin Laden and his organization from its earliest days. The country has been a collection of nations in contest for statehood. Tribal in nature, contentious in politics, feudal in loyalties, divided in all essential respects for the past half century, the barren, impoverished dry mountains and parched deserts of Yemen are inherently ungovernable.

The Yemeni are also given to deep religious enthusiasm, which is not surprising given the economic, social, cultural nature of the place. Insofar as there is a glue which might bind Yemenis together across the chasms of family, clan, tribe, region, relative poverty, or political affiliation, it is found in religion. The Yemeni have taken their Islam hot, black, and strong since the days of the Houthi overthrow.

The message of bin Laden as well as the ascetic personality of the messenger himself have struck a deep and resonate chord with many in Yemen, a chord which resounds all the stronger as Osama is a local boy who has made good, very good. This reality has made Osama bin Laden a very real actor in Yemeni politics since before the suicide bombing of the USS Cole linked Yemen, al-Qaeda, and terrorism at the shoulder and hip.

The government of president Ali Abdullah Saleh has played a very delicate, not to say duplicitous game over the past decade, balancing its precarious hold on what passes for central power domestically with the demands of the US or Saudi Arabia. This means the Saleh regime has tacked violently and unpredictably between apparent cooperation with the US and Saudi Arabia on one course and seeming agreement with the stance of al-Qaeda on the other.

The Yemeni government is not only fighting a recurrent defensive insurgency in the south (Always have to remember that Yemen was two countries for the best part of a half century, and the relation between North Yemen and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen was not peaceful.) but also a renewed offensive insurgency waged by the recrudescent Houthis in the mountains of the far north. In this setting AQAP has a measure of power far greater than might be expected given its current manpower is in the three to five hundred range.

It is not going too far to assert that AQAP can be the kingmaker, or, to err on the side of accuracy, the regicide if pushed too far by either the Sanaa government or the outsiders. If the Saleh regime were to fall, AQAP has both the will and ability to take over either directly (unlikely) or as the force in the backroom (likely) with the Houthi rebels as the stooges in front.

Not to put too fine a point on it, Yemen is a far better base for a violent political Islam advocacy group than is either Afghanistan or the FATA. Geographically, Yemen is in the center of things, well, the important things that is. It is coterminous with Saudi Arabia. It fronts the Gulf of Aden and the (very) narrow strait connecting the Gulf with the Red Sea and thus the southern approach to the Suez Canal. Right across the way is the failed state of Somalia and the less than stable Eritrea.

That's not a pretty picture.

Equally unpretty is the nature of the terrain of Yemen itself. Most of the place rather resembles a mating of the backside of the moon and the uplands of Hell. It makes the FATA and most of Afghanistan look like Iowa in comparison. This means it is a fine place for a small guerrilla force provided the troops and leaders are well motivated. Equally it makes the physical geography a counterinsurgent's worst nightmare.

The long (1,450 klicks) border with Saudi is unsealable. So is the border with Oman, a country with little credible military capacity. The road network makes that of Afghanistan look like it is covered by an Interstate highway system. (Only ten percent of the seventy thousand klicks of tracks is paved.) You get the picture.

The long and short of reality is simply this: Even if the US had the political will to take on yet one more ground conflict, the physical terrain of Yemen militates against the American way of war, even the "new" one of light, lean, and mean.

Nor is the human terrain any less unpromising. The Yemeni population is as experienced with unending war as that of Afghanistan. If anything, more Yemenis have a direct contact with the physical and psychological realities of protracted and asymmetrical conflict than the folks of Afghanistan. (It is hard to find twelve consecutive months of Yemeni history since 1960 when the bullets were not flying somewhere in the country.)

While Yemen has not had a Taliban of its own, there is a strong current of intense and severe Salifist Islam. Exacerbating the tendency for religiously based true belief is the very young population--the median age is not quite eighteen years. Strong religious identification plus youth equals "extremism."

Nor is the "extremist" propensity modified by the high level of illiteracy (fifty percent for the total population, thirty percent for men) and an equally high level of unemployment. The wealth of the country is highly maldistributed and employment opportunities at home nearly zilch.

Worsening the domestic economic situation is the rapid depletion of the minimal oil reserves of Yemen. The same applies to water. Water has always been scarce (the place is a desert after all), but population growth and urbanization have made the situation far worse. Water is lacking; economic diversification has been a flop; agricultural yields are slipping.

Really looking good, isn't it?

The central government is corrupt, inefficient, filled with cronies, timeservers, inept graduates of pathetic post-secondary educational institutions. The army is no better being poorly equipped, very poorly officered, lacking any real capacities in such features as logistics, transportation, intelligence, heavy weapons, and aviation. Neither army nor government is up to the task of defeating AQAP or the Houthis or the southern insurgents even if political will to do any of these existed in more than fits and starts.

The US has only recently restarted its defensive efforts in Yemen. The Agency's capabilities in country are minimal given the degree of threat. The Predators have been absent for years with the result that when it was necessary to attempt a hit on a senior AQAP command center late last year the only available option was a cruise missile strike. The result was negative to say the least.

The December strike killed forty-one people including a provincial official seeking to negotiate a cease fire and a passel of children. Worse, the raid had no plausible deniability as cluster bomb unit sub-munitions were found and easily identified as American in origin. Leaving aside the issue of covertness, cruise missiles have been proven repeatedly to be a bad choice for this type of mission. They arrive too late, are not subject to terminal maneuver, spread death over too wide an area, inflict too many collateral casualties, and cannot be called off at the last moment should new information make such desirable.

And, the footprint cruise missiles leave invite the rancorous attention of international do-gooder outfits such as Amnesty International . Amnesty International and similar organizations do not have an accurate understanding of the type of war fought by AQAP and others of the violent political Islamic sort. They simply don't get the fact that entities such as AQAP or the original al-Qaeda do not observe tidy geographically defined "war zones."

Nor does Amnesty International and the other high minded, lofty thinking folks of other NGOs or the UN really grok on the reality that the proponents of violent political Islam choose the place, methods, and means of waging their idea of war on the states and peoples who have been declared enemies of Islam. In this dynamic the US and other states who find themselves in the impact zone have no realistic option except to fight the attackers where they are. Responsible, reactive governments have no choice beyond that of using means and munitions which will kill or otherwise neutralize the attackers at the lowest cost in either collateral casualties or third government destabilization.

Predators, ground commands of special forces, covert and clandestine intelligence operators all constitute appropriate, low signature, low footprint means. All are effective in identifying, killing or otherwise removing bad actors from the board, perturbing hostile organizations. All are good ways to do the job at the lowest cost in unwanted and counterproductive "side effects."

The American born clerical advocate of violent political Islam, Anwar al-Awlaki is a declared enemy of the US. He has been directly, substantially, and materially connected to armed attacks on the US. He is an effective recruiter, motivator, trainer, and superintendent of armed attacks on US territory and citizens. He is in Yemen.

In a perfect world it would be possible to convince the Yemeni government to arrest al-Awlaki and extradite him to the US for trial. In this same world, a world where unicorns frolic and lions do recline with lambs, Awlaki could have a full, fair, transparent trial, file appeals endlessly, and finally, perhaps, reside in a not frightfully uncomfortable federal slammer.

In the imperfect world any and all of these are either impossible or very unlikely. Even if the Yemeni government could be motivated to find and arrest the radical cleric, the political realities of the place would demand that Awlaki be tried in Yemen and, if convicted, be jailed there until he either "escaped" or was given amnesty. He would be out of prison and back on the internet faster than a camel can spit.

This means that if the US government, (which is to say the Obama administration) desires to secure the US against further, future harm from Awlaki, it must either apprehend or kill the man. As the probability of quietly arresting Awlaki is slim to none, the option of killing him looms large.

Of course, dispatching ole Anwar with a Hellfire launched from a Predator does constitute, at least in the estimate of Amnesty International and other citizens of Unicorn Land, an "extra-judicial killing." As the Geek is not a lawyer, for which he thanks the mercies of the universe, he is not prepared to dispute the point. He is, however, prepared to assert that a dead Awlaki constitutes little threat to any American.

Coming from Apache ancestry, the Geek is aware of the dangers of a mentality such as that epitomized by the old cliche, "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." At the same time he is aware from both personal and vicarious experience that the decision to kill a specific, named enemy is not taken lightly even during a declared war. (Recall that the decision to kill Admiral Yamamoto during WW II as he flew between Japanese bases far from the frontline was made at the highest levels of government after a lengthy debate within the senior circle of the FDR administration.)

There is no reason to believe that the standards, the strictures, or the processes of review are any less stringent today. There is no reason to assume as Amnesty International apparently has that the US government, or its covert service, or its military has stooped to the level of the enemy or has adopted the arrogance without either rules or limits which characterize the way in which Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, Taliban, al-Qaeda, or AQAP wage war.

The realties of Yemen, the realities of American political will, the realities of violent political Islam demand that the US use covert or clandestine means to defend our country and its citizens, our allies, and our interests. This means we must do things, use means, employ weapons or methods which some of tender hearts and high minded sentiments find disturbing, even repugnant.

But, these easily offended sensitive souls have to get a firm grip on the situation in Yemen and elsewhere. We are under attack. We cannot fight back using either conventional or tidy, open, and transparent methods. But, we can and must fight effectively without compromising our basic values.

This is what we have been doing. And, must do more of.

ADMIN NOTE: Because Get a Grip has been victimized by spammers it is necessary to take defensive measures including moderation and the anti-spam verification. The Geek apologizes for the inevitable, unavoidable inconvenience.