Parting Company With Secretary Gates And Admiral Mullen

Robert Gates is well known as a "realist" in the areas of foreign policy and national security.  His nearly thirty years in the intelligence racket and serving as Secretary of Defense have convinced him that the realities of international politics require the US to continue its difficult relationship with Pakistan.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, concurred with this view as the two men testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on defense today.

The subcommittee pushed both Gates and Mullen hard on the question of Pakistan.  The senators were exercised not only by the general attitude of Islamabad to the purportedly joint effort against advocates of violent political Islam but more particularly with recent, dramatic actions such as the arrest of Pakistani citizens who provided information to CIA in the run-up to the killing of Osama bin Laden.  Those arrested reportedly included an army major who furnished license plate numbers among other items.

When asked about the propriety of providing cooperation and sizable aid to an "ally" who engaged in such actions while conducting a non-stop campaign of tergiversation and mendacity, Secretary Gates dismissed the question in a way which was simultaneously both quite accurate--and significantly misleading.  The secretary responded by noting that governments routinely lie to each other, that doing so allowed work to be accomplished.  He also pointed out, once more accurately but in a way which is not germane to the Pakistani Question, that even friendly governments spy on one another.

Spying and lying are normal government activities.  Only hopeless idealists or those who inhabit the lotus lands of Julian Assange and Anonymous might think (or desire) otherwise.  But as generalizing from the particular is an intellectual error so also is particularizing from the general.

And, particularizing from the general is precisely what Dr Gates and Adm Mullen were doing.  They did it well but that does not make the effort either useful or honest.

Pakistan is a particular case.  It has a unique relation with the US defined by the current context of the war in Afghanistan and the larger conflict between the civilized states and the forces of violent political Islam.  This means that Pakistan's relation with the US differs not only from American relations with other countries which do not harbor, protect, and assist some groups motivated by violent political Islam while attacking others.  It also means that Pakistan's relation with the US today and in recent years is qualitatively different from the relation between the two countries during the cold war.

Simply put, the relationship between Pakistan and the US is utterly unique.  It is one of a kind.  Further, it is a relationship without precise historical counterpart.  To put that in focus, imagine a situation during World War II where the US provided massive aid and support to a country which simultaneously harbored the Nazi party, supported its actions in third countries, protected it against any US attacks, and mounted half-hearted actions against a Fascist organization within its borders.  The mind boggles at the concept.

Yet, that is precisely what is happening in Pakistan today.  It has been precisely what has gone on month after month from the day American bombs and boots hit the ground in Afghanistan.  The government, army, and intelligence service of Pakistan have aided and protected "good" jihadists while on occasion and with great reluctance attacked the "bad" jihadists.

Throughout the charade, the government, army, and intelligence service have benefited from vast amounts of US aid, most of which has been both military and useful not for counterinsurgent campaigns but rather for conventional operations of the sort which would be required when Pakistan gets its wish for one more rematch with India.  To ensure the benefits keep pouring in while maintaining its "strategic" asset of terror, the Pakistanis have lied non-stop.  They have lied with creativity.  They have lied consistently (while being quite unperturbed when the internal inconsistencies of the lies come to light.)  They have lied loudly.  They have even lied about their lies.

An alliance, any alliance, no matter how limited in nature, scope, and goals cannot be maintained when one of the allies relies upon a dedication to untruth.  The US government has been remarkably patient with the Pakistanis and their addiction to prevarication.  However, the raid at Abbottabad made the continuation of this policy of patience politically impossible.  No person reasonably well oriented in time and place can possibly accept the proposition that the Pakistani regime at its highest levels was clueless as to where Osama might have been for the past half decade or so.

Nor can any person even cursorily aware of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan accept Pakistani protestations that they have made great efforts, suffered mighty sacrifices in the joint cause.  The expeditions mounted by the army against the advocates of violent political Islam in Swat and other parts of the FATA were conducted not by the regular army in the main but rather by the poorly trained, poorly equipped, and very poorly officered Frontier Corps.  The three thousand fatalities so often pointed to by the Pakistani government and army as proof positive of their efforts are the result not of hard fought combat but the consequence of using second and third rank troops against a far better adversary.

As the Pakistani regular army and air force showed the bravery of being out of range, the unfortunates of the Frontier Corps were murdered by inept commanders and a self-serving bunch topside in order to provide a basis for the ongoing lies.  A close look at the several "campaigns" shows the troop movements were carefully choreographed to allow the majority of the jihadists to withdraw in perfect safety to havens in South Waziristan.  It needs to be recalled that the Pakistanis continue to refuse to operate in South Waziristan regardless of US requests and pressure.

The Geek has laid out in detail the strategic and political thinking which motivates the government, army, and intelligence service to continue their support of the several groups advocating violent political Islam which Islamabad considers to be "good," that is useful strategic assets in the war with India.  In these and other posts the Geek has provided a detailed history of the poor US decision making which facilitated the Pakistani efforts to create and maintain terrorist entities as a strategic weapon as well as the critical role played by Zia and Saudi Arabia in the overall Islamazation of the Pakistani people.  It is not necessary to recapitulate all that now.

The past, however, is prologue for the situation today.  And, today's bad situation will become only worse unless the US pulls the plug on the current relationship with Pakistan.

Dr Gates, as might be expected, raised the nuclear bogeyman.  The prospect of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and production facilities falling into the possession of advocates of violent political Islam is worrying indeed, but does not on its own constitute good and sufficient reason to continue the toxic relation with Islamabad.  If necessary there can be no doubt that the US has the capacity to eliminate the nuisance provided it is willing to accept the diplomatic consequences of collateral damage.  The ultimate fate of the Pakistani nuclear program is a grave issue to be sure but not an insurmountable problem as Dr Gates and Adm Mullen know from the contingency plans already on the shelf.

As the US draws down in Afghanistan--a question not of "if"or even "when" but rather of "how fast" and "how many," the need for Pakistani cooperation drops apace.  Reduction of the American footprint in Afghanistan is liberating as it allows Washington to focus more on the real heartland of terror threats to the US and other civilized states--the FATA.  This reality in turn puts a very real pressure on Islamabad.  Who is going to abate the jihadist menace in the area, Washington or Islamabad?

The reduction of the US and other foreign presence in Afghanistan shifts the burden for dealing with advocates of violent political Islam on Kabul and Islamabad.  The governments of these two counties will have to determine the degree to which they will exist independent of the threats and domination of the extremists.  The question for both Afghanistan and Pakistan is ultimately existential.  That should provide a real motivation for both political and military solutions to be developed and implemented.  The presence of the US and its foreign allies has given both Pakistan and Afghanistan a free pass to ignore the existential threat represented by the advocates of violent political Islam.

Now, with a withdrawal and a shift in policy toward Pakistan, the free pass will be revoked.  If the US also takes the position that it is indifferent to what happens within the borders of either country but is concerned only with the exportation of violent political Islam, the two regimes will have no real option beyond dealing effectively with the various Talibans and related groups.

In an ideal world the US would also tilt more and more toward India including supporting that country's efforts in Afghanistan.  India has a real strategic need to establish an effective presence in Kabul and has worked diligently in this direction for the past several years.  Considering the number of coinciding interests which exist between the US and India including a well-founded apprehension of Chinese ambitions in the region, the US would be well advised to shift its focus from Afghanistan and Pakistan to India so as to assist and support India in its policy gambits in the region.

The fundamental reality of policy in the subcontinent is simply that no government can do business with a regime based solely on lying.  Pakistan's behavior is over the edge when it comes to the way in which governments routinely mislead each other.  Dr Gates must be very well aware of this.  It is most unfortunate that in his last appearance before this subcommittee he felt obliged to shade the truth to a degree which constitutes an insult to American national interest--and the intelligence of many who heard or read his comments.

As there are limits in permissible lying between governments, there are limits to "realism" in foreign and national security policy.  In his assessment of Pakistan, Dr Gates regrettably transcended these limits.  It is a very sad note on which to end a most distinguished career.

Gates Doubles Down On NATO

NATO--the US has a hard time living with it but believes it cannot live without it.  For better than sixty years now we have been in a relationship with a tedious bunch which was not sought by us.  The treaty which ties the US to a couple of dozen other states was and remains a form of shotgun marriage--compelled by force of circumstance and, presumably, preferable to the alternative.

Nearly every secretary of defense has been frustrated by the pervasive unwillingness or inability of the member states to carry their fair share of the alliance's water.  Yesterday, Robert Gates, feeling free with his impending departure from the Pentagon, let it all hang out as he reamed the group for its collective failures of political will and military capacity.

His words were not particularly harsh.  Neither were they the petulant complaints.  His assessments were not even new.  Each and every one of the criticisms mentioned in his speech have been said before.  Often.  What made the Gates Warning substantially different was that it came in public.  The words were not murmured behind closed doors, minister to minister.  No.  These came in public for all to hear.  And, that sort of thing is just not done, don't you know.

Stripped to the essentials, the Gates Warning was simple and blunt.  As the cold war faded as even a memory, the American people and their representatives were decreasingly willing to spend ever more scarce resources underwriting the defense needs of countries unwilling to shoulder their own responsibilities.  Pointedly, Gates noted, the US carried roughly half the aggregate NATO military budget just before the Berlin Wall crumbled soon to followed by the Soviet Union.  He added the kicker: Currently the US staggers under three quarters of the total NATO military budget.

This one metric suggests strongly that something is amiss in NATO.  In case anyone missed the point, Gates commented that only four countries (the UK, France, Greece and Albania[!]) joined the US in spending more than the target two percent of GDP on defense.  The target figure of two percent was not established by some sort of fiat out of Washington but rather by consensus of all NATO members.  Nor is it some fossil of the cold war having been established long after the collapse of the Vanguard of the Proletariat.

More than a few of the assembled Dignitaries and Deep Thinkers must have squirmed when Gates not only acknowledged an awareness and appreciation of the budget crises enveloping most of the NATO members but went on to demonstrate how some (very) small countries were "punching well above their weight" by having used their defense money in an intelligent, forward looking, and combat focused way.  He singled out the Libyan efforts of Norway and Denmark in this regard.  By so doing Gates obviated the cringing and whining response offered by such European apologists as Daniel Korski, a senior fellow at the European Council of Foreign Relations.  Or, for that matter, the spokesman for the German Foreign Ministry who protested that Germany was pulling an awesome amount of freight in Afghanistan.

The reality of NATO is as it has been for many, many years.  That reality is simply the belief on the part of chancelleries throughout Europe that the US would always be there to pick up whatever burdens were necessary to guarantee European security.  The view has been the US has no alternative but to do so as Europe was the frontline of American defense.  As a consequence for three generations now the several old members of the alliance have shirked in defense so as to underwrite the extensive programs of social benefits and security which have long been the distinguishing characteristic of post-World War II Europe.

The majority of the old members of NATO have ridden in great comfort on the alliance's gravy train while the made-in-America locomotive pulled the freight.  The new, post-cold war members, the former Warsaw Pact states which have joined the alliance, have been quite willing to do the same--while complaining that the US is not doing enough to deter and inhibit the Russians in their efforts to reestablish some form of suzerainty over the Eastern European glacis.

NATO was challenged with the end of the cold war.  The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the reason for the alliance's existence.  More than ever it became obvious that the organization was an ill-assorted array of bed fellows who had little, if anything, in common beyond apprehension regarding Soviet ambitions in the West.  Not even geography tied the group together given that it spread from Turkey to Canada, Norway to Italy and Spain.  The very term, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization" had no rigorous meaning.  Arguably only one word, "treaty," was factual.  All the rest was well-intended diplomatic fiction.

The big question of 1991-2 which was never really asked let alone answered was, "What is NATO's justification now?"  The pseudo-answer focused on some critter called "out-of-theater operations."  That term is one of those phrases which is every bit as portentous rolling off a diplomat's lips as it is empty of actual substance.

The first "out-of-theater" NATO mission was not particularly "out-of-theater" if one defines NATO's area of responsibility to be Europe.  Specifically, it was the confused peace imposition operation in Kosovo.  That meant it was an R2P campaign without the term.  The US as always carried the majority of the burden despite the very compelling fact that no salient American interest was in play in the ruins of Yugoslavia.  Insofar as any state or states had interests in play, those states were all European.  NATO was invoked simply because the directly effected states (can we say, "Germany?") were unwilling to act.

The next "out-of-theater" operation was the ongoing mess in Afghanistan.  NATO with a rush and a flourish invoked its famous an-attack-on-one-is-an-attack-on-all article for the very first time while the smoke still hung heavy in the air over lower Manhattan.  What came out of this demonstration of one for all, all for one solidarity was the unfortunate applicability of the alternative meaning for the abbreviation ISAF.  To many Americans who have fought in the place the abbreviation does not mean International Security Assistance Force but I Saw Americans Fighting.

While some NATO contingents such as those from the UK, Canada and, shockingly, France have actually taken the war to the bad guys, others, (can we say, "Germany?") have done everything possible to avoid, evade, and ignore even the most remote chance of actually encountering the enemy.  Leaving aside the responsibility which must be assigned to the Bush/Cheney administration in the conduct of the war in Afghanistan and the alienation of allies attendant upon the invasion of Iraq, the residual actuality on the ground in Afghanistan is simply that NATO as an organization has done all too little relative to its capacities.

Now NATO is engaged in yet one more "out-of-theater" operation.  This time, unlike the previous efforts, the US has been a major non-participant.  Indeed, we would be even less involved if NATO had sufficient assets in critical areas such as overhead surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, mid-air refueling, and electronic warfare.  Secretary Gates as much as said this as he detailed the glaring deficiencies in the NATO effort.  He also underscored that the engaged NATO contingents had already run short of critical munitions thus requiring urgent American restocking.  This, he stated, was the foreseeable consequence of not properly spending even limited defense money.

In its post-cold war missions, NATO has shown itself to be a coalition of the unwilling and unready.  This reality is not mitigated by the excellent performance of some national contingents in each and every of the three "out-of-theater" endeavors.  Nor can it be lessened by pointing to budgetary matters.  Neither can the situation be expected to improve any.  In his optimism, limited as it was, Dr Gates is being entirely too kind, too considerate of ruffled diplomatic and political feathers within the alliance's membership.

(In connection with this it is of more than passing interest that the Obama White House attempted mightily to put blue sky between Secretary Gates' position and its own.  An unidentified White House "official" took the stance that the Secretary was either speaking solely for the Pentagon or was expressing his personal frustration with some NATO states.  The most the white-feathered crew at the White House was willing to grant was that Gates had raised "legitimate issues."  A fine bunch of courageous statesmen and women in and near the Oval, don't you think?)

Dr Gates warned NATO that the day would soon come when post-cold war Americans would cease funding Europe's defense needs.  That day may be far closer than the secretary indicated.  The dismal record compiled by NATO in its post-cold war actions shows rather conclusively that it has no reason to keep on keeping on.

The concept of "out-of-theater" operations is intellectually bankrupt, ethically suspect, and diplomatically useless.  Beyond that, it is a military nullity marked with asymmetry of effort, confusion of command, vagueness and contradiction politically.  NATO is a broken tool without any real purpose other than inhibiting Russian ambitions should such exist with respect to Central and Eastern Europe.

The US would be far better served by assembling an ad hoc coalition of states with coinciding national interests when interventions of whatsoever nature might be required.  The diplomacy of George H. W. Bush in the run-up to the First Gulf War is paradigmatic in this regard.  Ad hoc coalitions might be a bit difficult to put together, but no more so than achieving consensus within the councils of NATO.  Should it be necessary for the US to carry the overwhelming majority of the water in a coalition, there is at least the advantage that such groups are short duration (provided the war is fought with an appropriate doctrine and force package.)

The time has come to say to NATO, "Thanks for the memories."

Defense, Diplomacy, And Development

Those three words constitute a sort of mantra which issues from the mouth of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton at every opportunity.  They also define much of the debate soon to be entered into by the congress as the US makes another of its fitful attempts to come to grips with the deficit and the government's chronic inability to live within its means.

When congress in its collective excuse for wisdom makes the attempt to limit American expenditures, it will be traveling a road already passed over by the British Parliament.  The Coalition government of Cameron and Clegg  inherited a financial debacle from the Labor predecessor which has necessitated deep and painful cuts in all areas of the British budget.  High on the list of those cut was the Ministry of Defense.

The British military, naval, and air services were not simply cut, they were mangled.  The Royal Air Force now possesses the fewest aircraft since before the first shots of World War I.  The Royal Navy in its entirety would not be adequate to provide anti-air and anti-submarine screening for a single US aircraft carrier.  The Royal Army has shrunk to a level which would preclude a successful replay of either the Falklands War or even the intervention in Sierra Leone.

Bad is this seems, there are more cuts in the pipeline.  Dr Liam Fox, the Minister of Defense, has promised more whacks will be taken as soon as the British wrap up their ground presence in Afghanistan.  While Dr Fox specifically mentioned "redundant" vehicles, it is generally understood that the draw down in forces will go beyond vehicles and to the troops who ride them, drive them, and fire their guns.  At least another brigade equivalent in the general purpose forces will permanently case its colors.

Given that Prime Minister Cameron is chomping at his bit to hit the Afghan exit, the next ramp down of British military capacity will come sooner rather than later.  Even though the prime minister and his defense colleague assure the British public (and the US government) that the UK will remain capable of "broad spectrum" operations and will retain its "superb" special operations forces and will acquire more of the new generation of submarines, doubt as to British capacities to join with allied forces in combined and joint operations must linger.

It is clear that the British expect the US to retain its military capacities unscathed by the same budgetary and financial forces which have buffeted the UK.  The same thinking seems to apply generally across Western Europe.

How this wishful thinking can be maintained in the face of accelerating American force withdrawal from Europe boggles the imagination.  There are currently 42, 000 US personnel in Europe.  By 2015 the figure will drop to 37,000.  In comparison there were 213,000 stationed in Europe as the Berlin Wall fell.  And, that number was down from the high point in 1962 of nearly 277,000.

The American justification for the continued retreat from Europe is purely financial.  The aggregate GDP of the European Union is ten percent greater than that of the US.  At the same time the combined defense budgets of the EU states is a mere fraction of that imposed on the US.

It is worth noting that the logic of withdrawal has a momentum of its own.  Force strengths like rocks tend to roll down hill.  And, the imperatives of finance can far outstrip the power of gravity.

The US will lose some significant tactical flexibility and rapidity of response by pulling out of Europe.  It will take measurably longer to move force across an ocean.  More importantly, the interposition of an ocean between the US and the likely conflict areas of the Mideast and Africa provide an important political distance between any future flareup and the decision makers inside the Beltway.  Political and psychological distance is far more critical in slowing or preventing a response than the mere add-on of a few thousand miles.

It may be that this consideration will be moot by the time 2015 rolls around.  There is no way that the American defense department is going to be spared the budget trimming meat ax.  President Obama has made that clear.  Outgoing SecDef Gates has concurred, wholeheartedly.  At least four hundred billion dollars will go over the next decade.  Probably more.  Perhaps even a lot more depending upon the electoral fortunes of the defense conservatives of the Republican Party.

Implicit in the mantra of Secretary Clinton is the hope that insofar as the "defense" leg of the triad is shortened, the legs of "diplomacy" and "development" will be elongated in compensation.  This hope is both false and misplaced.  There is no powerful base of support for either diplomacy or development.

For many of We the People, even among those who are most aware of global politics and the Game of Nations, "diplomacy" is seen as a quasi-mysterious process involving gobs of talk, rounds of dinners, and photo ops.  Whatever it is that diplomats do and with whatever results, there is no belief that it should cost much money.  "Diplomacy" is something like a wand which is waved at vexing problems rather than a useful tool of state in the estimate of many outside of that dismal profession.  So, why does it need money?

"Development" is in even worse shape in the mind of many of us.  Foreign aid is tantamount to an obscenity in the estimate of many conservatives both in and out of congress.  At best it is seen as a form of bribery, a form of rent-a-friend which all too often does not pay off.  At worst it is conceived of as a way of furthering corruption in the recipient country while fostering tumor-like growth in the bureaucracy which doles it out.

Again the recent experience in the UK points at the limits of both debate and understanding when it comes to diplomacy and development.  Critics of the Coalition have pointed with disdain to the Cameron proposal to increase the development budget of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by more than a third at the same time that the British military is undergoing enforced, unilateral disarmament.

Advocates of the British move argue that by fostering education, good governance, and economic development in unstable or collapsing states, the need for military intervention or active defense against terror attacks originating in such places will be obviated.  The same points have been advanced here not only by Secretary Clinton and others in Foggy Bottom but also by Secretary Gates.  If anything Mr Gates has been a more robust proponent of foreign aid as a means of precluding later military action than have the denizens of State and USAID.

In principle it is hard to dissent from the perspective that prevention through foreign development assistance is far preferable to sending in the Marines at some future date.  In principle a strong case can be made for the effective use of foreign aid as a means of helping to create political and social tranquility within a recipient country such as to preclude it becoming a failing state.  In practice, though, it is far easier to identify the examples where foreign aid has not brought about either internal political and social harmony and progress or bribed the recipient government into accepting American policy leadership.

The Cold War landscape is carpeted with the corpses of failed foreign aid programs.  Africa is littered with the results of foreign aid driven corruption, inefficiencies, and betrayed expectations of a better life.  The same is true in large swaths of Asia and Latin America.  The aid has not been simply from the US.  Americans are not the only people to have failed in the development through aid game.  All who have played it have experienced more failures than successes.

Nor did the situation change with the end of the Cold War.  One need look no further than Pakistan than to see that truism at work.  But, if more convincing is necessary, all that is needed is to take a peek at the totality of those receiving development assistance at the government-to-government level to see that lack of success trumps success by a huge margin.

The palpable lack of success in the government-to-government development efforts will go a very long way to assure that budget cutters will find the funding for these programs a politically attractive target even though very few real dollars will be saved even if the totality of US foreign aid in all categories were to be zeroed out.  Slashing here is one of those look-good, feel-good votes that are so attractive to politicians unwilling and unable to make tough decisions.

While diplomacy is no magic wand to be waved at international problems and development no anodyne for internal debacles, both are necessary, even valuable, complements to defense.  The "vanilla" diplomacy of building upon coinciding national interests as well as carefully targeted development aid focusing on projects which are modest in scale, immediate in visible effects, and sustainable over time by local resources alone can go along way to limiting the need for more robust measures--and cost a lot less.

At the same time it must be recognized that "vanilla" diplomacy and targeted development have very real limits.  There are states which require a coercive approach.  There are states which will collapse and fail or have governments come to power which are not only adverse to the interests of the US and its allies but are willing to use asymmetrical means to demonstrate this.

In these contexts it must be remembered that all forms of coercive diplomacy rest finally upon the material ability and political will of the US to employ force in support of its policies.  Likewise the hostile state must be defanged.  The collapsed or collapsing state might well require outsiders come and impose peace.  In all these eventualities, eventualities which will become more rather than less likely over the next decade or two, credible and relevant military force is necessary if a positive outcome from the perspective of the US is desired.

Schoolrooms in Pakistan will not necessarily prevent violent political Islam from taking firm and continuing root there.  Nor will clinics in Yemen assure the place does not collapse into a welter of internal warfare.  Sudan will not become a thriving multi-ethnic, multi-religious, democratic state simply because some donor or another pumps in buckets of cash.  The same caveats may be made with respect to many other psuedo-states.

These unpleasant ground truths imply strongly that planners, both those dealing with budgets and those whose game is international strategy, must put defense first.  This does not mean the US is condemned to be an impoverished bunker, but it does mean that the existence of a full-spectrum and flexible military capacity cannot be sacrificed on the alters of diplomacy and development.

Nor does it mean the cost of budgetary sanity is surrender to hostile forces.

It does mean, however, that the congress and administration must be intelligent and realistic in their world view.  That, unfortunately, is probably too much to expect.

Internal War--Neocons And The Tea Party

Like the shambling corpses in the classic black and white version of Night of the Living Dead, the neocon ninnies have been resurrected by the fragrant miasma surrounding the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions.  Eliot Abrams and Joshua Muravchik having been baying in the van, eager for a faster, harder intervention in Libya and chomping after the chance to depose Bashir Assad.

Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver.  The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.

Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants.  The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.

Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison.  Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms.  There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.

At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations.  It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."

As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya.  They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs.  They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.

The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering.  By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.

As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch!  This sketch is silly."

The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today.  At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.

This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right.  It is not.  It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.

There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.

The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power.  It is not simply first among equals.  It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities.  There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this.  The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night.  (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)

The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest.  True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.

This positive statement is accompanied by a negative.  The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology.  Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq.  This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure.  As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.

The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong.  The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress.  No Great Power has ever resigned its status.  The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs.  Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.

Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock?  A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?

Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam.  The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy.  Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.

If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish.  Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war.  Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.

Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war.  It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica.  This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations.  It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.

There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP.  In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group.  Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.

Then, of course, there is Iran.  There is always Iran.  The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb."  The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.  (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)

The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months.  The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction.  So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority.  Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides.  This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.

This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast.  The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.

John Bolton was right.  And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him.  Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage.  This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.

The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents.  We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go.  Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?

Unfortunately it is.  That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.

And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.

Some More Reasons China Will Defeat The US

There are two contests currently underway in global affairs.  In each the stakes of the game are nothing less than planetary preeminence.  One of the two "games" is between adherents of political Islam, particularly violent political Islam, and the civilized states both great and small.  The other is between the US and the Peoples Republic of China.

Both are dangerous.  Both directly threaten the US and We the People.  Without going unacceptably far out on the limb of doom laden speculation, each--and particularly the second--are existential in the sense that should the US be on the losing side, life will change for Americans, and not for the better.

As was the case in World War II when the US was faced by war on two fronts, war conducted by two qualitatively different enemies, a choice must be made as to which enemy deserves priority.  In 1941 the leadership of the US and UK correctly estimated that Nazi Germany constituted the greater threat and thus merited the greater effort by the Western Allies.  Now, the leadership of the US must make a similar decision.  It must evaluate which threat--violent political Islam or expansionist China--is greater and, thus, must take pride of place in American efforts.

It is not an easy choice to make.  There is no doubt but violent political Islam constitutes a clear and present danger.  There is no arguing against the proposition that should the adherents of this objectionable religion based political philosophy gain greater influence around the world, the consequences for the US and other civilized states would be unpleasant and all too often lethal.  However, the potentials of violent political Islam pale when compared to the threat contained in Chinese expansionism.

Unlike the majority of those who advocate the triumph of political Islam (which are actors of the non-state sort), China is a fully functioning state with all the appurtenances of statehood.  Not only is China a nation-state, it is an authoritarian one, which means it has automatic advantages in long term planning and execution of policy.  China is not only a nation-state with an authoritarian political system, it is a country with both a long history and an equally long record of being quite historically conscious.  Historical consciousness implies that policy is more often than not based on trajectories and world views of very long standing, backed as it were by the power of time.

Given its advantages of organization, economic and technological predicates, population size and cohesiveness, unitary political will, and the very real force of time, China possesses a number of advantages in the Great Game of Nations which are denied to the adherents of political Islam.  In short, China is today's equivalent of Nazi Germany in 1941 while the practitioners of political Islam are the contemporary version of Imperial Japan in 1941--a major annoyance, an enemy which must be defeated in the fullness of time but not a true existential menace.

When considering the match up between China and the US, it is clear that China has a number of very potent advantages.  Some of these have been examined in earlier posts such as Beijing's severely narrow focus on Chinese national and strategic interests, its capacity to assure monolithic political will, or the Trolls' well demonstrated ability to plan and execute foreign policy with an emphasis on the long term.

There are other factors which amp up China's tactical capacities which merit close consideration since without effective tactics even the best strategy will fail.  A second justification for scrutinizing certain tactical matters is that the differing approaches taken by the US and China are illustrative of larger factors which militate against American success in the current contest.

Consider for the moment the notion of "doing good."  The notion of "doing good" is inherent in the concept of "nation-building."  And, as has been demonstrated by our interventionary operations in the post-World War II decades, the slippery critter called "nation-building" has been a centrality.  Actually, the roots of nation-building go back nearly a century when Woodrow Wilson sent the Marines ashore in Mexico in order "to teach the Mexicans to elect good men."

Nation-building is one of those ideas which reads well in academic conferences or policy discussions by ad hoc inter-agency working groups sitting around highly polished fine wood tables in some chancery somewhere.  In the real world, particularly among those benighted folk upon whose backs a nation will be built, the idea is not so well received.

The idea is even less well received when it is presented--as it always is--with overtones of condescension, of the well intentioned expert parachuting in with salvation for the heathen contained in his briefcase or on his flash drive.  The wannabe nation-builder does nothing to enhance the favor with which his efforts at uplift are received when--as inevitably it must be--hectoring replaces mere condescension.

No one likes to be told he is somehow lacking, somehow inferior, somehow in need of guidance, moral uplift, political transformation.  No member of a traditional society and culture enjoys hearing how it is deficient and what he must do to "build" his nation.  The universal crustiness of the human critter assures that the most well intended nation-building will fail unless the "builders" limit their role to that of provider of money and other goodies.

The Americans (and other Westerners as well) have never gotten the message no matter how often it has been delivered by different recipients of our nation-building efforts.  In Afghanistan today as in South Vietnam fifty years ago or Mexico a half century before that, Americans are committed to nation-building complete with the ribbons and bows of hectoring and implicit superiority.  The result is simple: No matter how much "good" we do, the efforts are invariably resented and rejected by the objects of our succor and assistance.

The Chinese are not so high minded.  Perhaps because China was the target of nation-building in bygone days, the Trolls and their agents are willing to simply pass out money and urge that Chinese companies be hired for infrastructure projects.  China does not seek to build nations but rather to secure influence within existing governments and the states these rule.  To this end the Trolls will distribute money, seek to recoup as much of the dole as possible through the awarding of contracts, and in the process gain and retain influence within both the government of the target state and its associated elite(s.)

This is a coldly realistic process of pursuing Chinese national and strategic interests.  The Trolls have no lofty aspirations of uplifting the heathens, of changing the local culture, society, or polity for the "better" or otherwise doing "good" for the local "masses."  Chinese national and strategic interests in no way require the transformation of the recipient country into a simulacrum of China.

This diplomatic philosophy is in sharp opposition with that of the US (and some other Western states.)  It doesn't matter if neocon ninnies or High Minded Progressives are running the White House or congress, the US always demands the recipient become some sort of Western style democratic polity with a society marked by the full panoply of "rights" enjoyed by Americans today and an economy having all the features of a well regulated, "rule of law" approach.

The implications of this sharp set of distinctions are too self-evident to require elucidation.  Or, at least, they should be.

For the Deep Thinking Denizens Inside the Beltway, the distinctions and their impact do not seem so self-evident.  This dynamic comes into sharper focus in another area of difference between the methods of the Trolls and those favored by the US government and its fellow travelers within our domestic elites.

The second illustration of the differences between the Chinese and American ways of 'nation-building" is the role of corruption.  To Americans at the policy level corruption is anathema.  To the Trolls it just another way of acquiring and keeping influence.  To us it is a sin.  To the Chinese it is a fact of life to be used in the pursuit of interest.

In many places around the world graft, corruption, nepotism, and a lack of transparency are a normal and expectable part of life.  When these features of quotidian existence become a problem for the local elite or the citizenry generally, it is usually because the fruits of corruption are not distributed equitably.  It is not the corruption per se but rather its lack of breadth which cause outrage.

The American answer to corruption is to stamp it out with the moral fervor of a health Nazi facing a McDonald's warehouse.  The Chinese response is to build corruption in as a normal cost and try to make sure it is spread around appropriately.  The more spreading the better as such assures more people will be tied in effectively to the Chinese program.

Our approach is more--more laws, more regulations, more courts, more commissions, more oversight, more investigators, more cops.  The Chinese approach is also more--more money and more widespread distribution.

Pop quiz:  Which approach is more likely to produce more positive results with more people in the recipient traditional society?

This brief consideration of two tactical advantages enjoyed by China over the US today illustrates why it is critical for us to stop and take a hard look at the two threats facing the Americans today.  It also helps in understanding why China is the larger, more important threat as well as why the US is not likely to prevail in the contest underway today.

To put it all quite simply, when the deck is stacked against you is it is with respect to the Trolls time is not on your side.  The US does not have the luxury of sitting back and wondering what we should do--if anything.  The real deal is the Obama administration has no viable option other than to remove its collective head from the sand and realize that the Chinese are cruising on by us on the fast track to global preeminence.

Really, Mr Obama is that why you received the Nobel Peace Prize?

A Tribute To Honesty

Most of We the People like to think honesty is a good thing.  Heck, we may even try to be honest and open in our interpersonal dealings.  Sure, we are jaundiced--with good reason--with respect to the honesty of politicians, advertisers, journalists, and preachers of the frothing mouth persuasion.  In some areas we are even given to joking about the amount of honesty on the part of practitioners.

There is an old saw regarding diplomacy, "A diplomat is an honest person sent to a foreign country to lie on behalf of his own."  This mordant bit of semi-wit is undeserved.  More it is flat out wrong.

Two aspects of a country's foreign relations establishment depend upon blunt candor and utter honesty.  These are diplomacy and intelligence.  While it may be necessary to lie to outsiders in pursuit of the diplomat's or intelligence officer's mission, both must be fully and candidly frank and honest in their reporting from the field.  There is no room for fudging.  No tolerance for heaping sweeteners on underlying sour realities.  The diplomat must tell it like it is regardless of the hopes or fears of the denizens topside.  Any shading, no matter how slight, in deference to what the folks upchannel might want to read is a sin against the national interest.

The WikiLeaks cables demonstrate that our representatives are doing their job correctly.  The reports and accompanying assessments are bluntly honest.  We the People are, therefore, being well served.  The honesty, candor, and quality of the assessments are a very far cry from the sort of diplomatic traffic which passed from overseas to Foggy Bottom thirty and more years ago.  And, that is a very good thing for our country.

Because journalists and even the academic experts quoted in the MSM are apparently unacquainted with history, there has been an unfortunate silence regarding just how superior the leaked documents are in honesty, bluntness, and incisive analysis when compared with the tripe and pablum passing for diplomatic cables during the long dark years following the Republican attacks on the State Department and its personnel during the waning days of the Truman administration.

The shrill cries of "Communist!  Fellow traveler!  Commie dupe!" which echoed in the halls of Congress and through the media of the day served to totally emasculate American diplomats.  Diplomats high and low, accredited to countries great and small, were afraid to put the words of their interlocutors down on paper unless those words were precisely what the most ardent anti-communist in Congress or the press wanted to read.  Likewise, our Foreign Service personnel were scared to death to write an assessment which would not pass muster with the most rabid anti-communist crusaders.

The fear of being hailed before some Senate committee and accused of being the person who "lost" some country or another to the Global Communist Menace assured that the decision makers inside the Beltway--even in the Oval--flew blind, deprived of the necessary eyes on the ground and the counsel of situationally aware professionals.

As a result, American foreign policy for thirty years consisted of aligning the US with each and every authoritarian regime which delivered short term order.  As long as the local heavy promised to oppose Communism in all its many guises and kept a sufficiently strong lid on local discontent, one administration after another regardless of party pretended our "ally" was a staunch bastion of long term stability as well as free enterprise and, well, maybe, some sort of democratic appearances.

This approach--and all the many blunders which came with it--was not so much a policy as it was the default forced upon presidents and secretaries of state by sheer ignorance.  That ignorance resulted from the unwillingness of Foreign Service personnel to be honest, blunt, and candid.  The unwillingness of diplomats to be honest was the direct and completely predictable consequence of the unjustified and quite lethal attacks levied against their predecessors by totally irresponsible and self-seeking politicians riding the great wave of fear--fear of Communism.

The tree of ignorance bore us many poisoned fruits.  In some cases--think Iran--the toxin of these fruit continues to infect the world.  The Iranian object lesson by itself is proof positive of the crucial nature of honest reporting and frank assessments even when such is not welcomed in the rarefied air inside the Beltway.

Fortunately for our country and its interests, the professionals at State left the doldrums of cowardice some years ago as is illustrated convincingly in the WikiLeaks revelations.  Our people abroad are telling it like it is and offering assessments which are trenchant, well founded, and highly useful.  When Secretary of State Clinton argued the cables showed "diplomats doing the work of diplomacy," she spoke a truth of the highest order.

The worst impact of the data dump by Mr Assange's outfit is in its probable chilling effect upon both American diplomats and their foreign interlocutors.  For good and sufficient reason--the fear of future leaks--neither will be as willing to speak or write forthrightly.  While the impact may not be as devastating or long lasting as after the Republican scorched earth campaign of the McCarthy Era of Great Fear, any lowering of the candor quotient will harm our national interests.

The real work of diplomats is no more glitzy or glamorous than is the quotidian tasks of spooks.  It consists of talking to people and reading things.  It requires thinking.  Analysis.  Finally, it demands an ability to write and speak with cogency and effect.  Most of all, the work of diplomats needs intellectual and moral courage.

That is, the diplomat in all times and places must be able to see things as they actually are and not as they might be hoped or feared to be.  Then, the diplomat has to relay the results up the chain of command without any thought as to its impact on one's personal career let alone the opinions of those in Congress or the views of those who constitute the vast beast, the media.

Julian Assange as well as his media enablers at the NYT and other outlets and his source(s) such as the emotional and moral cripple Bradley Manning have conspired to impair the willingness and ability of our diplomatic personnel to do the job we pay them to do.  A job, the cables show clearly, that all hands have been doing with great skill and dedication.

This Time The Leaks Really Hurt

As a historian dealing with national security affairs the Geek has been long frustrated and angered by the degree of secrecy surrounding diplomatic and military communications and other documents, even those dealing with the most mundane tactical matters.  He has fought many skirmishes with the Minions of Secrecy in order to gain access to materials forty and more years old.

Many, many times when the documents have been released (usually with more than their fair share of thick black lines scattered throughout), the Geek has been surprised that the materials had ever been classified given their content.  Many seem to have been stamped "Burn Before Reading" in order to protect egos, cover over errors of judgement, and otherwise maintain what one White House wallah called, "the mystique of government."

With that as background, the release today of a quarter million documents by the media organs favored by WikiLeaks, to say nothing of the actual WikiLeaks posting, does constitute real damage to the ability of American diplomats to carry out their most basic function.  That task, the foundation of all embassy work, is to speak candidly with representatives of the host government and report back to Foggy Bottom in full, accurate, and blunt candor.  While a degree of public prevarication is a requirement for diplomats, the need for internal honesty of fact and assessment is even more vital.

Diplomats who can not report honestly and frankly are a waste of public money.  Likewise, a host government which cannot speak bluntly with American representatives constitutes a net liability for American interests.  All hands everywhere in the world play the game the same way.  All expect blunt honesty in all internal communications.  All speak with forked tongues--a friendly, bland one for public consumption and an acidic sharp one in private.  And, most importantly, all anticipate that the bluntness will stay all in the family so to speak.

Thanks to the treacherous actions of a weasel named Brandly Manning aided and abetted by a computer system which grants automatic access to any low level person with a Secret clearance, the honesty and frankness without which diplomacy in its many, many forms has been compromised.  Over and above Private Manning is the shadowy Australian Julian Assange whose motives are declared to be pure beyond the ken of mere humans but who may well be a meretricious servant of men deeper in the dark for whom the United States and its actions are anathema.

The duo of Manning and Assange as well as their media facilitators such as the NYT have conspired and acted to cripple severely the capacity of the US to engage effectively in the normal tasks of diplomacy.  They may even have damaged the American ability to formulate and execute foreign policy for years to come.

The only upside in the current affair is that none of the documents carried the highest category of classification.  Bad as the damage done by the glimpse at the real deal of diplomatic doings has been, it would have been orders of magnitude worse had the Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information category been breeched as well.

The way in which damage has been done to US interests does not reside so much in what was actually disclosed, although some of that, such as the Yemeni president saying he has no problem with smuggled whiskey provided it is "good," will have immediate negative ramifications.  The real damage will come when foreign policy makers find some item in the revelations which provides plausible public cover in rejecting an American demarche or an American request for cooperation on a matter of what can be seen as a coinciding national interest.

Most political leaders--and all who deal hands-on with foreign policy--understand how the game is played and will be disinclined to take offense at the contents of the released documents.  Most will take a thank-God-it-didn't-happen-to-us attitude.  But there will be exceptions, some genuine and others artificial.  The exceptions may well hurt.

Also likely to hurt will be the effects of released materials upon the domestic opposition to some foreign governments discussed in the documents.  Opposition groups will go over the trove with an eye for anything, any tiny tidbit which can be exploited to the disadvantage of the man or party in power.  Foreign leaders friendly to the US are the most likely victims of this data mining process.  That will hurt, particularly if they are either forced from office or compelled by the opposition to change pro-US policies.

Another way in which the release will hurt is that it will inhibit honesty both on the part of American diplomatic personnel and foreign interlocutors both inside and outside government.  If secret materials are likely to become a matter of global knowledge, the only rational response is not to talk--at least not honestly and not to write--again or at least not honestly.

This release is no victory for the public's right to know.  Most of the materials are properly classified and awaiting declassification is no unacceptable burden on Americans or foreign nationals.  No genuine need has been served by the dreadful duo of Manning and Assange--except the needs of enemies of the United States and other civilized countries.

Big Surprise--China Counsels "Diplomacy" In Korean Affray

Diplomacy, what a marvelous word!  To many folks it is a term redolent of witchcraft, a magical fetish which, if waved properly and invoked with the correct ritualistic words, will neutralize threats, assure peace, and generally improve the lot of the human race.  To others the term brings to mind nothing more substantial than the optics of serious looking people hustling up and down impressive stairways, shaking hands while smiling in a uniquely Botox way, or, signing impressively bound documents.

In the real world diplomacy consists of either (1) a sincere exercise in (hard) bargaining based on identifiable, coinciding national interest with the intent of achieving a way of expanding or protecting these interests or (2) a creative way to expend much time in the hopes the underlying problem will go away or at least lose its initial force.  With respect to the Chinese call that the US and each of the two Koreas rely upon "diplomacy" in the wake of the latest bit of blatant provocation by Pyongyang, the latter interpretation is applicable.

The call for time wasting diplomacy is in China's interest.  This move along with the ever repeated urgings from the Trolls that both Pyongyang and Seoul show "calm" gives the appearance of an active Chinese interest in the affairs of the peninsula.  Imploring all parties to "talk," to "exercise restraint" and, above all, use "diplomacy" pumps the sweet fragrance of a Chinese love of rationality and peace.  The constant use of "diplomacy" also raises Chinese credit in the estimate of all those nice, well meaning folks who believe in the power of international institutions and meetings conducted by grimly smiling people around highly polished tables. This then is the magical power of "diplomacy."

By comparison any more realistic appraisal by a foreign leader to the effect that nothing will change in North Korean behavior unless and until there is a change in the North Korean regime is easily seen as some sort of primitive monger of war.  The less pleasant, but far more grounded in reality position holding that there is no call for diplomatic talks under whatsoever name until there is a firm reason to believe that some substantial end will emerge from the blue smoke and mirrors laden process is eclipsed by the higher moral position claimed by and granted to the Trolls for having used the words "diplomacy" and "calm" first and most.

The Trolls of Beijing long have been aware of the potency of invoking the diplomatic fetish, how it provides an appearance of high mindedness, of how it captures the debate by making more accurate and realistic approaches look almost barbaric in their bluntness.  The Trolls also realize that by moving quickly to wave the fetish, they can appear to be serious of purpose, mature global citizens, and world leaders for peace without having to do something in actuality.  It is a win-win for the Trolls.

It is also their only option given that Beijing has no intent of pulling in the leash on Pyongyang.  They have no desire to do anything which might perturb the succession of Kim Jong-un to the top spot in Pyongyang.  And, they well understand the processes at work to give the Number Three Son the street cred he needs to be even a nominal headman.  The occasional provocation, the deaths of a few or even a few dozen South Korean military personnel or civilians represent to the Trolls only the normal, expectable costs of an orderly change in government in Pyongyang.

The Chinese have far more to gain by their current course of support for Pyongyang than they have to lose.  Not only has the status quo in the Korean peninsula worked well from the perspective of Beijing, it is a object lesson to other states increasingly reliant upon Chinese support in the wacky world of diplomacy.

Consider Iran.  Iran and China have a web of interconnections ranging from the economic to the diplomatic.  These are equally vital to the national interests of both states.  Beijing desires to see the ties grow thicker and stronger as such will add much to China's benefit.

Iran and North Korea have a long history of close relations and mutual support.  The ties between the missile and nuclear weapons programs of both are quite strong and effective.  The Iranians have spent and will spend considerable sums to acquire devices and technology of North Korean origin in both areas.  The two countries have combined efforts on a number of fronts, most recently on the design of a re-entry vehicle suitable for the Nodong/Shihab missile.  The re-entry vehicle would, of course, be designed to hold a nuclear warhead.

More important than specific weapons or any given technology, the North Koreans have provided the example of how a country goes about the task of evading sanctions, ignoring diplomatic opprobrium, and generally cocking a snoot at the US and most of the other countries of the world.  Tehran has learned the most important lesson of all from its observations of North Korea versus the civilized states of the world.

That lesson is simple, even brutally so.  With China anything and everything is possible.

As long as the mullahs accommodate Chinese interests and desires, they can rely upon China's assistance and support.  China wants cheap oil, it gets it.  China wants lucrative contracts in Iran, these go to the Chinese.  For its part China gets oil, money, and further boosts for its domestic economy.  For Beijing and for Tehran it is a win-win game.

This is the model provided over the years by the infinitely less lucrative arrangements between Beijing and Pyongyang.  You might see the agreements between the Trolls and the Hermits as a sort of loss leader since it has led to the very profitable linkage between the Trolls and the Mullahs.

As long as China plays the right sort of mood music, the tunes of "diplomacy" and "calm," it has the necessary cover behind which it can do nothing.  As long as the Trolls go through the motions, mouth the correct mantras, Beijing can ignore the pleading of President Obama and others such as Australian ForMin Rudd to "exercise its influence" on Pyongyang.

One can be forgiven for believing that with the resources of the Agency and State Department at his disposal, the Guy in the Oval would have understood long ago that Beijing is a remorseless pursuer of its national and strategic interests.  Period.  Appeals to the mythical obligation to the "international community" are as bootless as would be depending upon the prognostications found in a Chinese fortune cookie.  Why the Nice Young Man From Chicago or members of his foreign policy "team" make these appeals boggles the mind.  Such a demonstration of pure out-to-lunchness is hard to understand--and impossible to forgive.

The real deal requires dropping the pretense that "diplomacy" can or will play any meaningful role unless and until the Hermits make necessary concessions on their nuclear and missile programs without any agreed upon in advance reciprocal actions.  The real deal requires accepting the high probability of more provocations in the future with the codicil of understanding that war is unlikely save by extreme miscalculation.

The realities of the situation also demand accepting the fact that the North has both an unlimited capacity for provocation and is inherently less prudent than the South.  This implies the US (and for its own reasons and in its own way, China) must be acutely situationally aware and fast to exercise a braking influence on precipitant actions by its junior partner.

This, in turn, is dependent upon a good eye and ear for nuance.  Understanding nuance, particularly during the inherently less stable and predictable period of regime change, is a foundational reality.  Whether the overly large, overly complicated, overly tardy American intelligence and foreign policy apparatus is up to the task of reading fine grain nuances of North Korean and Chinese behavior is questionable.

Even more questionable is the ability and willingness of President Obama and his closest senior advisors to both understand and act effectively upon the demands of nuance.  So far the record of the president and his administration gives no cause for optimism.

Gee, Mr Obama, wouldn't it be a lot more fun to be back in the Senate with nothing more important to do than to rail away at those obstructionist and reactionary people across the aisle?  It sure would be better for the world if that were the case.

The Fatal Appeal Of Negotiations

Currently the US is doing the same old, same old.  As it has been for a mort of frustrating years, the incumbant administration along with its counterparts present and past have been plugging away, singing the same tired song: Negotiations conquer all.  There are three critical sets of negotiations either sort of underway,  hoped to be underway soon, or prayed to be commenced sometime, anytime.

The first of these, the one which is more or less underway, is the US sponsored direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the stated goal of a comprehensive peace agreement within the next year (or so.)  The hoped to be started soon, say on 6 December, is the next round of talking at each other with the contestants being the P5+1 group on one side of the table and the Iranians on the other.  The third, the one policy makers hope and pray may take sometime soon is the Six Power Talks involving North Korea.

Three categories of similarity link the three totems to the appeal of negotiation.  All have been and are being pushed by the US.  In all three cases strong sets of pressure and inducements have been employed--or, in the case of inducements, promised--over an extended period of time.  Finally, all are replays of earlier failures.

What makes it any different this time around?  Why should any rational person argue that one more diplomatic engagement will accomplish what all the previous ones have failed to do?

The conventional wisdom offered by proponents of give-diplomacy-a-chance has two main parts.  The first is some variant of the contention that talking is better than fighting.  The second is this time,  unlike all the previous ventures, the context has changed: The sanctions have bit hard or the Israelis recognize the time is right and the PA knows it must produce peace or face Hamas sponsored regime change.

A number of high ranking members of the trust-us-we-are-statesmen crowd have assured the American public that the latest round of sanctions which include far more restrictive measures imposed by the US and the European Union have severely undercut the Iranian economy while the pro-democracy forces have refused to knuckle under to the repressive capacities of the Tehran regime.  Objective evidence including that from official Iranian sources does indicate the sanctions, particularly those affecting Western private investment in the oil sector, have made the already bad economic situation worse.  And, there is no doubt but the pro-democracy, Green movement continues to annoy the regime.

Both amount to a "so what?" in the the actions of the Iranian government.  The Iranians well understand that the contest between itself and the P5+1 generally and the US in particular is one of political wills.  They are betting that they possess the greater political will just as they have demonstrated in all the past diplomatic soirees.  If the Iranians and the P5+1 actually sit down somewhere (the venue has not yet been agreed upon) on 6 December, the Iranians will be willing to talk about Iran's role in matters of global import, about the need for revision of the UN Security Council, about the solving of mythic global warming, about almost any and everything other than the ongoing enrichment of uranium.  The US and the others of the P5+1 want to talk about fissioning atoms only.

The Iranians have already demonstrated their ability to teach Andre Gromyko and others of the legendary Iron Pants Brigade of Soviet negotiators a thing or two about how to stall, bob, and weave, and otherwise buy time and wear out the other side's political will.  Also, as the government and its supporters are members in good standing of the Shia sect of Islam, they take great pride in the capacity of the Iranian nation to suffer, to absorb pain in the service of belief.

The net effect of the sanctions has been to engage effectively the Shia commitment of pain for belief while simultaneously boosting the Iranian sense of nationalism.  That is a powerful combination, a combination guaranteed to promote political will.

In comparison the P5+1 lacks any genuine semblance of a coherent political will.  Two of the group have shown both will and ability at skirting or flatly avoiding the imposition of the most biting of the sanctions.  Two others have excellent records until very, very recently of looking the other way as private concerns violate the sanction regime.  And, at least four of the countries have a much higher priority in solving domestic economic concerns.  Overall this means the firmness of will on one side of the table is far less than on the other.

Takeaway: The results of any upcoming "negotiations" can be summarized by a line in a Herman's Hermits tune from the Sixties, "Second verse, same as the first."

The Israeli-Palestinian talks are still on hiatus.  What else can be expected?  The PA has been relying on the Obama administration to do the heavy lifting for them.  Despite its best efforts in pressure, inducements, and hortatory talk, Team Obama has not and will never be able to produce what the PA wants and thinks it must have.

The PA wants a lot.  It wants Israel back to the 1948 Green Line.  It wants East Jerusalem.  It wants either a
"right of return" or financial compensation for those who fled the land which became Israel during the wars of independence.  Most of all it wants a two state solution as an intermediary stop on the road to a one state solution which sees the end of Israel as constituted currently.

The Israeli government is not unaware of the PA's goals both short and long term.  No Israeli government will grant the PA a free pass to those goals.  No conceivable--which is to say, politically acceptable to the American electorate--amount of American pressures and inducements will work to get the PA what it wants.

This is not to imply the government of Israel is much more flexible than its PA interlocutor.  The Israelis may be willing to exchange some undeveloped semi-desert real estate on an acre for acre basis for the land on which the "settlements" exist, but they are not about to relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem which has been incorporated legally into the State of Israel regardless of any UN or US position to the contrary.

Nor is the Israeli government (this one or any other) willing to see a hostile state come into existence on its borders, even the more expansive ones defined by the line of settlements.  Thus the insistence of an Israeli armed presence in a security zone in the Jordan Valley.  It is doubtful that the government of Israel would accept a UN force there, given the record of that organization.

It is a certainty that the Israelis will not agree to any Arab "right of return."  Financial compensation might be possible--particularly if the US pays it.

The political will of the Israelis regarding a peace agreement is made explicit in a law pending before the Knesset.  This law, which is expected to pass easily, requires a super-majority (80 out of 120 members) in the Knesset to approve any agreement containing a territorial transfer.  The alternative to the super-majority will be a national referendum.  (Can we say, "Ice cube in a blast furnace?")

In short, it is hard to see what might exist to justify any continuation of the "peace talks."  Perhaps the US should abandon the effort and cut its political and diplomatic losses.

"But, wait, Geek," you protest.  "What about the Arab League/Saudi Arabian promise of diplomatic recognition and other goodies, like overflight rights?"

Yeah, right.  And, Hitler's Germany diplomatically recognized Poland even as the panzers crossed the common border.  What a concept, twenty or so Arab League members open embassies in Tel Aviv or wherever.  That will be a new challenge for Israeli security: Keeping tabs on legions of subversives and espionage agents.  And, overflights?  EL Al has done quite well without them--and imagine the restrictions for national security and air safety as well as protecting Mecca from "Jewish pollution" which would come as a part of the deal.

Finally there is the negotiation round we keep hoping for.  The one with North Korea.  In a fine exhibit of just how much the sanction regime has hurt the country the Hermits have not only started construction of a one megawatt, thermal, light water reactor equally useful for producing either electricity or plutonium but invited an American expert to tour their new uranium enrichment plant.  Built in a mere eighteen months the new plant definitely impressed the visiting American.

The North Koreans understand political will.  The twin nuclear developments show this.  So does history.  The seemingly endless talks which finally (due to Soviet action and Ike's nuclear threat) yielded the armistice were nothing but a joint Chinese-North Korean effort at outlasting the Americans in the interlocking processes of talking about peace while fighting a war.

The North Koreans are not going to abandon their nuclear effort without gaining something very, very important in return.  Promises of fuel, food, or even "safe" nuclear reactors will not cut it with the Hermits of Pyongyang.  We already know that from the events following the 1994 quasi-agreement brokered by the Clinton administration.

As long as Pyongyang has the tacit backing of Beijing (which will  be a day or two longer than forever), the Hermits see no percentage in settling for less than reunification of the two Koreas.  The reunification must be under terms and conditions of Pyongyang's liking if not dictation.  Acceptance of such by Seoul of a Pyongyang dictate is less likely than Nancy Pelosi showing a wrinkle.

So, reality asks the trenchant question, "What is there to negotiate about?"

The answer to that question is self-evident.

Perhaps the unwillingness of Americans to accept the self-evident and highly negative answers to this and similar questions demonstrates just why we are so addicted to diplomatic negotiations even when there is very little or no chance of such resulting in a good outcome.  We really are that strange and seemingly mythical creature--a peaceloving people.  Indeed we love peace so much we will keep on talking until the moment the first bullet (or missile) is fired at us.

A great strength, a great national value is also the major weakness our enemies can and do use against us.  Just comes with the territory, the territory of the unique American mind.

The Elephant In The House (And Senate)

The Constitution may give pride of place in the conduct of foreign relations and military affairs to the president, but Congress is anything but a nullity when the messy details of policy implementation are involved.  The predicted Republican ascendancy will change the way in which foreign and military policies are executed and will have many, perhaps indirect, effects on their formulation as well.

The prospects for change are already bothering many in the European elite, which group seems to be convinced that the results of Tuesday's vote will be a form of Cheney on steroids.  There is a notion over there to the effect that the new, Tea Party powered Republicans will constitute a triumph of the paleologues with all that implies in the area of looking for countries to invade and individuals to kidnap preparatory to waterboarding.

While these overblown flights of nightmarish fancy will not come to pass for reasons too self-evident to deserve comment, the shifts in emphasis and goals will be real--and not necessarily negative.  They will, however, be discomfiting not only to European elites but to President Obama as well.

The Republicans, with very few exceptions, are far from sold on the basic tenets of anthropogenic climate change.  They are even less given to believing in the necessity of heroic measures such as "cap-and-trade" or other economy distorting mandated reductions in carbon output.  This reality means that the upcoming Great Festival Of Alarm in Cancun is likely to be less productive of the sort of results favored by Al Gore and company than was last year's Festival of Urgent Anxiety in Copenhagen.

The inevitable consequence will be a eagerness on the part of countries great and small to blame the US for the lack of results to say nothing of any unusual weather event anywhere in the world in the months and years to come.  China in particular will seek (with high probability of success) to enhance its position with both the advocates of putting the US economy in a straitjacket and the legion of states which want a handout from Uncle Sam to offset the horrid impact of global warming upon their citizens.

Absent comprehensive legislation, the Obama administration will seek to use administrative measures and regulation to reach the same outcome.  The resultant brouhaha will be both unedifying and without use in the diplomatic conflicts sure to come on the heels of "failure" in Cancun.

The enlarged Republican minority in the Senate will prove to be resistant to the apparent appeal of the new START signed by Obama and Medvedev.  While the new agreement does not spell the end of American national security as has been alleged by some on the farther shore of rationality, it can be portrayed with some legitimacy as favoring the Russians over the US.  Well founded questions regarding the ability of the US to modernize its nuclear arsenal exist.  There are questions as well regarding any wink-and-nod deals between the American team and its Russian counterpart regarding the further development and deployment of American anti-ballistic missile systems.  These two areas alone give a good basis for those Republicans who oppose the treaty.

The consequence of delay not to mention a failure to ratify the agreement will be a Russian finger on the (in)famous "reset" button.  The dynamic duo in the Kremlin, particularly Vladimir The Horseman, have set Russia firmly on course to reestablish its existence as a Great Power.  It is to be expected that the two would take full advantage of a seeming rebuff by the Senate as a cause for greater assertiveness on the global stage.  This would not make the conduct of US foreign policy any easier.

Republicans have long shown a particular distaste for foreign aid.  Provided this distaste can be shown without damaging the interests of Israel, many from the Tribe of the Elephant would take cheerful advantage of the current budget constrained environment to cut foreign assistance, or, more probably, tie such assistance very tightly to specific US interests and oversight.  The current minority whip has already promised to take aid to Israel out of the State Department budget and put it into that of Defense.  Need one know more?

The Geek takes a jaundiced view of foreign aid generally as history has shown few successes and many failures.  The capacity of well intended but poorly advised or supervised aid to wreak unintended harm on the recipient state is well established.  So is the record of corruption, graft, and akin shenanigans.  Still, there is a place and need for foreign aid provided it is tied to definable US interests, properly monitored, and its success or failure accurately measured.

Even in the most constrained environment, the cost of foreign aid is minor but the results can be maximal.  In addition, the provision of humanitarian relief aid is a mitzvah, an obligation imposed by a decent regard for the ethical basis of life.  Realism and idealism alike require foreign aid; a tight fisted Republican hand on the money valve might go a good way to assuring the money is spent wisely and well.

The Republicans may not be so easy going on the Iranian Question as Mr Obama has been.  Come to think of it, that is a foregone conclusion.  Even though there is powerful evidence for the proposition that Iran's nuclear program has so many internal, inherent problems that its still a couple of years at the least from achieving a break out capacity, there are more than a few Republicans who not so secretly share the John McCain idea seen during the 2008 campaign, "Bomb, bomb, bomb Iran."

Should the more or less upcoming next round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 turn out to be one more go around of the same old, same old, there will be great sentiment among the Elephants to be far more robust--particularly in pressuring companies located in allied states to cease all truck with the mullahs.  That would be useful as the sanctions are far from complete in their application.  The Republicans would also be less hesitant than Mr Obama in the matter of supporting the "Greens" in Iran.  This also has the potential to be useful in seeking modification of Iranian behavior but is no magic bullet.

Republicans will complicate Mr Obama's announced intent of starting the draw down in American combat forces in Afghanistan in mid-2011.  There is a high likelihood that the president (or some of those near the Oval) have realized the deadline was a very poor idea and the Republican opposition in the next Congress would provide welcome political cover for the reality of war.  Advantage can be taken from a strong Republican posture on the withdrawal issue as it would undercut any belief on the part of either Taliban or the Men In The Shadows Of Islamabad that all that need be done to achieve ultimate victory is keeping on keeping on until the Americans start leaving in less than a year.

If Anwar al-Awlaki and other Americans who have shifted allegiances from the US to the cause of violent political Islam are as smart as so many think them to be or as knowledgeable of US politics as claimed, they will call off the terror campaign as it targets the US.  The Republican presence in Congress is more likely to promote a very robust response to any outrage traceable to Yemen.

The corrupt and indecisive cabal purportedly the government of Yemen had best realize this as well.  Unless the Yemenis can show themselves not only rhetorically ready but physically capable of squashing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, they will be facing a level of US involvement far transcending fifty or so Special Forces members and a drone or two.

The government of Pakistan should also wake up and smell not the coffee but the Tea.  Many of the Republican "young guns" are not cut from the same cloth as previous generations of Republicans.  They will be far more suspicious of Pakistan as a "valued ally" in the "joint" war on Taliban and similar groups.  If the new Chairs of the relevant committees are true to their protestations, the money valve may go to "off" very fast regardless of Mr Obama's promises.

On the matter of the Defense budget, the Republicans will lose their juice rapidly if they seek to exempt the Pentagon from necessary austerity.  The new leadership would be well advised to back Secretary Gates in his efforts to hold down military expenses, particularly in the big ticket area of procurement.  Lots of gee whiz new gadgets will have to be left to wither on the vine if the war fighting capabilities of the US forces is to be maintained along with the commitment to lower the deficit and not raise taxes.

The Republicans would also be well advised not to to on an orgy of investigations into foreign and national security policy.  This sort of activity may be emotionally satisfying given the closed nature of the administration and may generate some politically useful headlines, but will not help in the cause of forcing the administration to drop its more obnoxious addictions to ideologically driven love affairs with hostile governments or ineffective and anti-American international bodies.  Searching for concealed dead bodies as events of the Nineties showed do not result in necessary changes in policy direction.

Equally unproductive, equally damaging to US national and strategic interests would be some sort of retreat into neo-neo isolationism.  Some of the Tea Party movement supported Republican candidates seem to have flirted with this sort of retrenching.  They are wrong as a cat barking.  The world will not let the US retire to the sidelines without invoking costs of a damaging nature to We the People and our descendants.

In short, while foreign and military affairs have played no measurable role in the campaign, the reality is simply that for Congress as for President the next two years will be years of foreign policy and national security challenge.  And, it does no good to restore jobs, to bring the economy back from the brink of deflation if the loudest noises heard are not cheers of thanksgiving but the explosion of Muslim detonated bombs--or the orders of the Trolls of Beijing.