This time around the "empire" is not the US, pace Comrades Hugo and Fidel. The empire in question does not yet exist in its desired, reincarnated form. But, given the ambitions of Turkish prime minister Erdogan and the almost done deal between his country and the mullahs next door in Iran, it is not unfair.
The jefe grande of the Ottoman Empire 2.0 is, like his predecessors, terribly upset by the Kurds. Again in imitation of his non-Islamist forebearers, Erdogan is dreadfully keen on wiping the several groups fighting for Kurdish independence out of existence for once and all. The Supreme Guardian of the Revolution, just like the Shah during the days of the ancien regime, shares the sentiment heart and soul.
The US as well as the (presumably) US backed regime in Iraq are caught somewhere in the middle. Baghdad has a much larger dog in the fight to be sure. Iraqi Kurdistan, which is legally semi-autonomous, is the most stable and prosperous place in the partially rebuilt country. It is not simply Kurdistan's wealth and security that has raised hackles not only in Baghdad but through much of Iraq. No. Rather the deep distaste for Kurds and their region is about the only thing upon which the minority Sunnis and majority Shia can and do agree.
Way back in the mists of history (that is before World War I resulted in a massive exercise in creative cartography), Kurdistan was a territorial whole. It had so existed for a mort of centuries both before and after the Ottoman Turks came to supremacy in Stamboli (or Istanbul, if that is your preference.) The carving up of the old Empire was accomplished courtesy of the machinations of mid-level bureaucrats serving their masters in France and Great Britain. In what was one of the greatest sins committed against the self-determination of nations principle dear to the heart of Woodrow Wilson, the Kurds found their tight little nascent state divided between French run Syria and English operated Iraq with small amounts allocated to the Turkey of Ataturk and the Shah of Persia.
Had this violation of American policy not been allowed to take place, Kurdistan would have long ago been recognized as the independent sovereign state its people wanted (and want) it to be. But, as was so often the case, Wilson believed that the League of Nations (his centerpiece ideologically) would solve the injustice--an injustice he himself acknowledged.
For many decades, the issue rested silently in the mountains which constitute most of "Kurdistan." But that came to an end when the respective "occupying" governments came to realize what resources resided in them thar hills. Oil and hydroelectric resources to be precise. Iraq battened fat off the oil while Turkey saw the rivers as the source of both agricultural and industrial riches. The Iranians and Syrians saw potential in the fast running waters if not the oil and vowed to get their share.
With every passing year, the resources of "Kurdistan" have become more and more critical to Turkey and Iraq. While the other two states have not profited so much, both Tehran and Damascus see the danger resident in a successful separatist movement. The Syrian government both before and after the Baathist came to power sought to suppress the language, culture, and political identity of the Kurdish population. The same has been the case in Iran under both secularist shah and Islamist grand ayatollahs.
Right down to the present day, the central government of Iraq has used all methods fair and foul alike to limit the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan. The only thing keeping Baghdad from emulating the muscular methods of Saddam Hussein in the region has been the military capacity of the Kurdish peshmerga, which could fight the national army to a bloody standstill.
Over the past quarter century, the Kurds have been waging a low level defensive insurgency against both Iran and Turkey. The PKK (shooting Turks) and PJAK (doing the same with Iranians down range) have been a thorn in the side of their target states. Because Turkey is a NATO "partner," the US determined that the PKK is a terrorist organization. Since Iran is a hostile state, the US has not yet made the same determination regarding the other group, the PJAK (aka "good terrorists.)
Comes now Recip Erdogan to announce an impending agreement with Iran to mount a joint effort presumably involving ground as well as air forces against those pesky Kurds and the heavily fortified base camps high in the mountains. The reason to presume a ground effort is the abject failure of air assaults conducted by the Turkish air force to do more than move a few rocks around as well as kill a small number of civilians who did not find shelter in time but who in their deaths provided excellent propaganda material for the Kurds.
So far there has been no reported word from the Iraqi government regarding this proposed violation of sovereignty. Perhaps the Iraqis are more easy going about such matters then are, say, the Pakistanis. Or, the central government might be hoping for a good excuse to move large forces into Iraqi Kurdistan, forces which once there will not be quick to leave.
Nor has the Obama administration made comment on the proposed joint action--except implicitly. For some while the US has been providing intelligence information to Ankara concerning the PKK. This shared catch includes imagery and ELINT obtained by Predators. Now, the word has leaked out that the Obama crew is contemplating basing Predators in Turkey.
Not one to be asleep at the switch, Erdogan has responded by offering to purchase or lease a few Predators so as to cut out the middleman. Considering that the Paks have wanted to do this for a long while now, it would be quite a diplomatic and political coup for Erdogan to achieve the goal.
Not to put too fine a point on the Kurdish Question, there is ample evidence to the effect that the Kurds and their proposed state meet the tests provided in the UN Charter as well as subsidiary conventions. With Iraqi Kurdistan as the linchpin, there is no doubt but the hypothetical Kurdistan would meet the requirements of the Montevideo Convention. Considering this inconvenient context, US policy regarding the Kurds is flatly wrong.
The finding that PKK is a terrorist entity was based simply on the role Turkey theoretically plays in NATO while the similar act by the European Union dates back to the days when Turkey was knocking on the EU door. In short, these actions had little if anything to do with "terrorism" per se and much to do with extraneous political considerations.
Silence in the Oval regarding the odd couple military plans must fall in the same category. Arguably, the decision to share catch with Ankara and the basing of Predators in Turkey constitute another bribe to Erdogan for allowing the installation of the US X-band radar. The decision to allow this anti-Iran move has resulted in severe blowback from Tehran, so the Turkish prime minister probably wants additional compensation.
There is only one open question. No, that question is not will the US switch its policy regarding the Kurds and their right to and desire for a state of their own. Nor does this question involve the notion of granting the government of Iraqi Kurdistan its request of redeploying US forces within its borders. The present administration lacks both the depth of regional understanding and the political will to do either--even if each would be in American national interest.
The only remaining question is whether or not Obama and his "team" will cave and sell-lease a few spare Predators to Erdogan, and through him, the Iranians.
Wanna make a bet?
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Monday, September 26, 2011
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
They Just Have The Wrong Enemy
Back in 1918, the Great Powers, victors over Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire did a bit of practical work, redrawing the maps of Europe and the Mideast. Supposedly high on the list of priorities for this exercise in practical cartography was the uniquely American proposition called, "self-determination of peoples." This noble bit of High Mindedness was honored more or less with respect to the splitting up of the old Hapsburg domains, but was it observed only in the breech when it came to dismembering the Ottoman lands.
When the hyper-idealistic Woodrow Wilson confronted the real world of secret deals and the fruits of wartime exigencies, he discovered that his notions of self-determination had been preempted by an assortment of understandings both formal and otherwise between Great Britain and France. One of these rather under the table deals dealt with the area called Palestine. This area along with the coterminous Trans-Jordan had been divided according to two contradictory undertakings. One, the Balfour Declaration, promised Jews a "national homeland." The other, an agreement between two bureaucrats, Sykes and Picot, created two protectorates, one under British rule and the other under French.
This exercise in international can kicking is still with us today in the form of the seemingly endless conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. (By the way a body of American experts on the region advised President Wilson to fight this one to the death as the result would be a century of bloodshed. Rarely have experts been so right.)
Almost overlooked was the simultaneous division of Iraq and Syria into British (Iraq) and French (Syria along with its appendage, Lebanon) protectorates. Embedded in both Iraq and Syria as well as in the rump state of Turkey and the country then called Persia was a people long separated from their neighbors by language, customs, and culture but not religion. This nation now split among four states was the Kurds.
The Kurds were not at all happy with this division. Nor should they have been. According to the principle of self-determination, the Kurds merited their own state, the state of Kurdistan. But, these unfortunate folk lacked any representative in Versailles. Unlike the Arabs way down south, the Kurds had provided no service to the Allied cause. Unlike the Arabs, the Kurds had no access to powerful British political figures. Neither did they gain the attention of imperial minded bureaucrats. As a result, they were casually and cruelly consigned to minority status within four states.
Almost immediately, the Kurds commenced a defensive insurgency in each and every of the four countries to which they had been so cavalierly assigned. The insurgency has not ended to this day. Like the conflict between Arab Palestinian and Israeli Jew, the conflict gives no hint of ending soon, or ever.
The Kurdish people are an ancient hill folk. Like hill dwellers almost everywhere, they are excellent warriors. It deserves mention that the great Muslim fighter who kicked Crusader butt with great effect, Saladin, was a Kurd. While today's Kurdish fighters may not have either the military genius or bent to chivalry which marked the legendary Saladin, they are not slouches in the craft of guerrilla war as may be attested to by the marked lack of success enjoyed to date by Turks and Iranians alike.
Other than in Iraq where the Kurds have a semi-autonomous province under sole Kurdish control, it is accurate to say the Kurds live under occupation by a foreign force. In Turkey, in Syria, and in Iran, the majority Kurdish areas are under direct military control. Indeed, in at least two of these countries, the degree of military control equals or exceeds that exercised by Israel over the Palestinians of the West Bank and far outstrips that of Gaza.
The Kurds are denied equal treatment in all three states to a degree never reached in the West Bank or Gaza. They are denied the use of their own language. They are not allowed to conduct their own education. They are not provided with the same level of governmental services including access to economic development as the majority populations in all three states. In short, the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iran have been pushed to the margins, had their culture and language robustly attacked as a matter of policy, and are subject to an array of legal disabilities as well as informal discrimination.
From any perspective, the Kurds have suffered far more deprivation of status, rights, and opportunities at the hands of the governments and majority populations of Turkey, Syria, and Iran than the Palestinians ever were during the years since June 1967. At the same time, the Kurds have a claim on statehood which equals or exceeds that made by the Palestinians.
In sharp contrast with the Palestinians, the Kurds have waged their multi-generation insurgency with remarkable humanity. Unlike the Palestinians down to the present day, the Kurdish fighters sharply limit their attacks to military and constabulary targets. The intentional attack of civilians is almost unheard of. Compared to the Palestinian way of war, the Kurds take care to reduce collateral damage to a minimum. In the usually dirty business of insurgent warfare, the Kurds are relative good guys. The Palestinians are very much of the opposite hue.
These ground truths demand a question or two. Where are the liberal groups in the West? Where are the groups espousing boycotts, divestiture, or deligitimatization of Iran, Syria, and Turkey? Where are the UN resolutions condemning the suppression of the legitimate rights of the Kurds by Ankara, Damascus, Tehran? Where is the UN Human Rights Council with resolutions, special rapporteurs, and other displays of condemnation or concern?
In the last few years, advocates of Palestinian statehood have proliferated with a speed which boggles the imagination. Campaigns of boycotts, divestiture, and sanctions have spilled forth in mighty torrents. The UN and its lesser creatures have shown a tender concern for the Palestinians without precedent. The High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West have taken the Palestinians--rockets, suicide vests, and AK-47s included--into a warm embrace.
All blame for whatever happens in the Mideast between Israel and the Palestinians is quickly, automatically, ascribed to the evil doing, racist, Zionist occupiers. Even when a Jewish infant dies, throat slit as it slept near the dead parents and elder siblings, it is seen as the direct result of the Zionist occupier.
Meanwhile, the Turkish air force bombs civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan while Iranian artillery does the same without even the mildest whimper coming from the assorted advocates of self-determination around the world who are so quick to condemn the Zionist occupiers. Even Syria is exempt from criticism as it denies the most basic rights to Kurds resident in its borders.
Why?
Why two "victims" (one, the Kurds, arguably more deserving of the term) with two such wildly disparate responses from the "international community," the human rights congeries, and politicians around the world?
The answer is as simple as it is ugly. The Kurds are predominantly Muslim. So also are the oppressive majority populations in each and every of the four states. The Palestinians are mainly Muslim. Their putative oppressors are Jewish.
And, now the really nasty part, antisemitism is as rife in the West as it is endemic to the Muslim states. In the West, this ancient, evil mindset hides behind the currently respectable facade of being "anti-Zionist" or, even better, as a euphemism, "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy."
It is OK in the West to look at Muslim oppression of Muslims with total indifference. In the Muslim majority states, the same is true to an even greater extent because to condemn the Muslim majority for oppressing a Muslim minority is to commit that great Islamic sin of fitna, of introducing fission in the great Islamic ummah. The single towering fiction in Islam is that of holding the community of believers to be one huge, happy family. So, no hand is raised, no voice either, to stop the oppression of Kurds by Muslim Turks, Muslim Iranians, or Muslim Arabs.
The fiction of Islamic unity is nothing compared to the larger concoction in the West. The concealing of antisemitism behind the thin and torn scrim of "anti-Zionism" or "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy" is not simply hypocritical, it is a moral delict of the highest order.
Any way you cut it, the groups and individuals in the West who brandish the cudgels on behalf of the Palestinians while maintaining a discrete silence with respect to the Kurds are examples of moral decay without equal. It is a very severe indictment of the High Minded in the West who by their careful selection of who deserves support show themselves to be both dishonest and antisemitic to the core.
The people and groups so staunchly supporting the Palestinians (including the UN, the UN Human Rights Council, the assorted NGOs, and the individuals who espouse sanctions, boycotts, and divestiture) will deserve respectful attention when and only when they exhibit the same level of concern for the Kurds as they do the Palestinians. Unless and until these worthies are as willing to condemn and seek to delegitimatize the Turks, the Iranians, and the Syrians, they merit no hearing.
Rather, these groups and individuals should themselves be blackguarded as the antisemites they are. Any less is to endorse their wicked position.
When the hyper-idealistic Woodrow Wilson confronted the real world of secret deals and the fruits of wartime exigencies, he discovered that his notions of self-determination had been preempted by an assortment of understandings both formal and otherwise between Great Britain and France. One of these rather under the table deals dealt with the area called Palestine. This area along with the coterminous Trans-Jordan had been divided according to two contradictory undertakings. One, the Balfour Declaration, promised Jews a "national homeland." The other, an agreement between two bureaucrats, Sykes and Picot, created two protectorates, one under British rule and the other under French.
This exercise in international can kicking is still with us today in the form of the seemingly endless conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. (By the way a body of American experts on the region advised President Wilson to fight this one to the death as the result would be a century of bloodshed. Rarely have experts been so right.)
Almost overlooked was the simultaneous division of Iraq and Syria into British (Iraq) and French (Syria along with its appendage, Lebanon) protectorates. Embedded in both Iraq and Syria as well as in the rump state of Turkey and the country then called Persia was a people long separated from their neighbors by language, customs, and culture but not religion. This nation now split among four states was the Kurds.
The Kurds were not at all happy with this division. Nor should they have been. According to the principle of self-determination, the Kurds merited their own state, the state of Kurdistan. But, these unfortunate folk lacked any representative in Versailles. Unlike the Arabs way down south, the Kurds had provided no service to the Allied cause. Unlike the Arabs, the Kurds had no access to powerful British political figures. Neither did they gain the attention of imperial minded bureaucrats. As a result, they were casually and cruelly consigned to minority status within four states.
Almost immediately, the Kurds commenced a defensive insurgency in each and every of the four countries to which they had been so cavalierly assigned. The insurgency has not ended to this day. Like the conflict between Arab Palestinian and Israeli Jew, the conflict gives no hint of ending soon, or ever.
The Kurdish people are an ancient hill folk. Like hill dwellers almost everywhere, they are excellent warriors. It deserves mention that the great Muslim fighter who kicked Crusader butt with great effect, Saladin, was a Kurd. While today's Kurdish fighters may not have either the military genius or bent to chivalry which marked the legendary Saladin, they are not slouches in the craft of guerrilla war as may be attested to by the marked lack of success enjoyed to date by Turks and Iranians alike.
Other than in Iraq where the Kurds have a semi-autonomous province under sole Kurdish control, it is accurate to say the Kurds live under occupation by a foreign force. In Turkey, in Syria, and in Iran, the majority Kurdish areas are under direct military control. Indeed, in at least two of these countries, the degree of military control equals or exceeds that exercised by Israel over the Palestinians of the West Bank and far outstrips that of Gaza.
The Kurds are denied equal treatment in all three states to a degree never reached in the West Bank or Gaza. They are denied the use of their own language. They are not allowed to conduct their own education. They are not provided with the same level of governmental services including access to economic development as the majority populations in all three states. In short, the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iran have been pushed to the margins, had their culture and language robustly attacked as a matter of policy, and are subject to an array of legal disabilities as well as informal discrimination.
From any perspective, the Kurds have suffered far more deprivation of status, rights, and opportunities at the hands of the governments and majority populations of Turkey, Syria, and Iran than the Palestinians ever were during the years since June 1967. At the same time, the Kurds have a claim on statehood which equals or exceeds that made by the Palestinians.
In sharp contrast with the Palestinians, the Kurds have waged their multi-generation insurgency with remarkable humanity. Unlike the Palestinians down to the present day, the Kurdish fighters sharply limit their attacks to military and constabulary targets. The intentional attack of civilians is almost unheard of. Compared to the Palestinian way of war, the Kurds take care to reduce collateral damage to a minimum. In the usually dirty business of insurgent warfare, the Kurds are relative good guys. The Palestinians are very much of the opposite hue.
These ground truths demand a question or two. Where are the liberal groups in the West? Where are the groups espousing boycotts, divestiture, or deligitimatization of Iran, Syria, and Turkey? Where are the UN resolutions condemning the suppression of the legitimate rights of the Kurds by Ankara, Damascus, Tehran? Where is the UN Human Rights Council with resolutions, special rapporteurs, and other displays of condemnation or concern?
In the last few years, advocates of Palestinian statehood have proliferated with a speed which boggles the imagination. Campaigns of boycotts, divestiture, and sanctions have spilled forth in mighty torrents. The UN and its lesser creatures have shown a tender concern for the Palestinians without precedent. The High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West have taken the Palestinians--rockets, suicide vests, and AK-47s included--into a warm embrace.
All blame for whatever happens in the Mideast between Israel and the Palestinians is quickly, automatically, ascribed to the evil doing, racist, Zionist occupiers. Even when a Jewish infant dies, throat slit as it slept near the dead parents and elder siblings, it is seen as the direct result of the Zionist occupier.
Meanwhile, the Turkish air force bombs civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan while Iranian artillery does the same without even the mildest whimper coming from the assorted advocates of self-determination around the world who are so quick to condemn the Zionist occupiers. Even Syria is exempt from criticism as it denies the most basic rights to Kurds resident in its borders.
Why?
Why two "victims" (one, the Kurds, arguably more deserving of the term) with two such wildly disparate responses from the "international community," the human rights congeries, and politicians around the world?
The answer is as simple as it is ugly. The Kurds are predominantly Muslim. So also are the oppressive majority populations in each and every of the four states. The Palestinians are mainly Muslim. Their putative oppressors are Jewish.
And, now the really nasty part, antisemitism is as rife in the West as it is endemic to the Muslim states. In the West, this ancient, evil mindset hides behind the currently respectable facade of being "anti-Zionist" or, even better, as a euphemism, "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy."
It is OK in the West to look at Muslim oppression of Muslims with total indifference. In the Muslim majority states, the same is true to an even greater extent because to condemn the Muslim majority for oppressing a Muslim minority is to commit that great Islamic sin of fitna, of introducing fission in the great Islamic ummah. The single towering fiction in Islam is that of holding the community of believers to be one huge, happy family. So, no hand is raised, no voice either, to stop the oppression of Kurds by Muslim Turks, Muslim Iranians, or Muslim Arabs.
The fiction of Islamic unity is nothing compared to the larger concoction in the West. The concealing of antisemitism behind the thin and torn scrim of "anti-Zionism" or "opposition to aspects of Israeli policy" is not simply hypocritical, it is a moral delict of the highest order.
Any way you cut it, the groups and individuals in the West who brandish the cudgels on behalf of the Palestinians while maintaining a discrete silence with respect to the Kurds are examples of moral decay without equal. It is a very severe indictment of the High Minded in the West who by their careful selection of who deserves support show themselves to be both dishonest and antisemitic to the core.
The people and groups so staunchly supporting the Palestinians (including the UN, the UN Human Rights Council, the assorted NGOs, and the individuals who espouse sanctions, boycotts, and divestiture) will deserve respectful attention when and only when they exhibit the same level of concern for the Kurds as they do the Palestinians. Unless and until these worthies are as willing to condemn and seek to delegitimatize the Turks, the Iranians, and the Syrians, they merit no hearing.
Rather, these groups and individuals should themselves be blackguarded as the antisemites they are. Any less is to endorse their wicked position.
Monday, September 5, 2011
Turkey's Foreign Policy--Clever Calculation Or Flat Out Stupid
Until very recently, the announced foreign policy of Turkey under the Islamist leaning AKP has been one of "zero problems" with its regional neighbors. This exercise in fantasy started to crumble under the bitter winds of the "Arab Spring."
Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi. The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain. The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.
After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters. Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels. In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.
Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad. The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran. Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.
The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom. Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."
The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days. At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen. By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.
The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance. Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.
The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident. Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer." The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship. Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora. Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.
The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so. The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.
As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.
It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan. So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians. It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.
Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq. While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders. This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.
One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.
It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want. The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed. They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.
The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border. This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing. The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any. In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.
Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge. They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible. They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible. They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan. Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.
The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy. The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside. True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp. Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.
Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey. But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support. As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders. Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.
Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.
Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi. The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain. The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.
After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters. Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels. In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.
Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad. The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran. Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.
The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom. Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."
The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days. At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen. By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.
The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance. Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.
The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident. Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer." The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship. Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora. Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.
The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so. The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.
As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.
It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan. So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians. It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.
Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq. While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders. This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.
One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.
It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want. The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed. They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.
The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border. This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing. The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any. In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.
Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge. They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible. They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible. They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan. Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.
The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy. The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside. True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp. Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.
Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey. But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support. As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders. Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.
Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.
Monday, August 29, 2011
One More Victory?
The huzzahs over the capture of Tripoli have been almost as loud as those which greeted the entrance of American troops into Baghdad. The cheers and applause for President Obama's "leading from behind" have been greater than the response with which the dislodging of Mullah Omar and his odious Taliban government engendered. It has been, from all appearances, one more victory for the democrats of an oppressed people and those high minded foreign governments which supported them.
Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.
Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity. The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.
The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date. The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice. The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.
There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan. That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil. Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally. The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine. Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.
Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray. Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making. As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues. More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.
Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime. There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause. But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite. Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."
Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point. His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint. However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.
The same dynamic applied in Iraq. The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural. The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate. The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.
As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border. Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities. In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.
As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance. This man is Muqtada al-Sadr. He is a Shia cleric. He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context. He runs a very large and rather competent private militia. And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.
The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing. Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price. For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.
The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran. The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.
A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon. Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government. The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level. The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.
The departure of the Americans will have two results. One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations. The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.
Isn't that a fascinating prospect?
The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real. The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad. Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.
President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not. They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik. Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.
Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box. Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France. The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.
Libya is in a profound state of flux. It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed. The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on. Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.
So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department. While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.
Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it. Doesn't it?
Anyone having a cursory acquaintanceship with military history knows there is nothing more misleading than a victory improperly appreciated--unless it is a defeat which passes without examination. When considering Iraq or Afghanistan or, now, Libya, it is rather important to determine whether or not the locals and their outside supporters actually achieved a victory or suffered a defeat not yet properly recognized.
Of the three wars, one--that against Taliban--was a war of necessity. The other two, Iraq and Libya, were clearly optional wars, "wars of choice," to use a newly coined formulation.
The invasion of Afghanistan in its opening phase was self-evidently one which was both justified (as retaliation against an act of unparalleled aggression) and necessary as a punitive measure intended to assure that Afghanistan would not be a source of attack at some future date. The decision made by the Bush/Cheney administration to engage in an exercise in nation-building transmogrified the war into one of choice. The expansion of the war from one of limited and achievable goals to one which was inherently both open ended and unwinnable in any meaningful sense turned a narrow victory into a wide defeat.
There is not and will not be any genuine victory in Afghanistan. That chance was unthinkingly flung into the ditch within weeks of the first American boot hitting Afghan soil. Ideology trumped national interest with results most baleful to the US, Afghanistan, and the world generally. The negative effects of ideologically driven decisions could not be reversed even after the US dedicated more assets to the war and employed those assets according to a superior operational and tactical doctrine. Sometimes (and Afghanistan is one of those) the courage and dedication of the troops at the sharp point even when backed by excellent warfighting doctrine and outstanding technology cannot and will not redeem a failed policy.
Iraq presents a more interesting case of presumed victory gone astray. Even more than the "mission leap" in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq represents the disastrous impact of ideology upon decision making. As has been clear since before the first American bombs and missiles plowed up Iraqi targets, the exercise in fostering democracy by armed means was the product of ideologues. More, it was the product of ideologues so blinded by the light of their beliefs that they warped intelligence, failed to consider the nature and character of the Iraqi human terrain, and perverted history.
Few would dissent from the proposition that Saddam Hussein was a most odious man running an equally odious regime. There is no argument that in a perfect world he not only deserved to be displaced but would have been to universal applause. But, this world is far closer to imperfection than its utopian opposite. Even if the American viceroy had refrained from the spectacular blunders such as that of disbanding the armed and police forces or the one of insisting on removing all Baathists from positions of authority, the results would not have been subsumed by the phrase "mission accomplished."
Woodrow Wilson discovered nearly a century ago at low cost in both money and lives, it is impossible to impose democracy--American style--at bayonet point. His lofty goal was to provide a civics lesson--to, in his words, "teach the Mexicans to elect good men." The lesson was taught by US Marines with due diligence and remarkable restraint. However the lesson was lost upon the Mexican population for the simple reason that the lesson were not "made in Mexico" but rather in the US.
The same dynamic applied in Iraq. The same dynamic to be sure but one which was fueled not only by nationalism but also by religion. Well, to err on the side of accuracy, the second fuel was religions, plural, while the first was nationalisms, again plural. The singular failure of the Bush/Cheney administration as well as their assorted minions in country was to understand that not only were there two religious communities sharing the same generic title--Islam, but that each considered the other to be apostate. The Deep Thinkers also apparently overlooked the fact that the concept "majority rules" would result in a zero sum game for the minority.
As if not seeing that particular T. rex in the bedroom was not sufficient, the same ideologically propelled Deep Thinkers managed to ignore the practical effect of three nations uneasily coexisting within a common international border. Among the impacts would be a search for external support on the part of at least one of the three nationalities. In this case, nationality was reinforced by religious confession.
As a result of these blind spots, a man emerged to undue importance. This man is Muqtada al-Sadr. He is a Shia cleric. He is an outstanding politician in the Iraqi context. He runs a very large and rather competent private militia. And, he is an exponent of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. When these factors are combined and taken in conjunction with the utterly dysfunctional Iraqi government, al-Sadr becomes the most powerful personality in the country.
The Maliki government exists because al-Sadr gave it his personal blessing. Al-Sadr blessings are rather like Catholic indulgences in the years before Martin Luther--they come only for a price. For Nouri al-Maliki the price was that of taking warm and tender regard for the policy desires of the ayatollahs in Tehran. Chew on that one for a moment, bucko.
The obvious implication is that the real winner of the American orchestrated invasion of Iraq has--or shortly will be--Iran. The US expended thousands of American lives and who really knows how many hundreds of billions of dollars to secure a political victory for the ultimate bad boys of the region--the dictatorial theocrats of Tehran.
A test of the Tehran wins hypothesis is coming soon. Al-Sadr has called upon his followers to engage in massive demonstrations against the Maliki government. The ostensible reason is the failure of the current regime to restore basic services to their pre-2003 level. The substantial reason is to demonstrate in an unmistakable way what will confront the government should it agree to a continued substantial American presence after 31 December 11.
The departure of the Americans will have two results. One will be a reignition of the violence which marked the mid-period of the US combat operations. The second will be an invitation to Tehran for assistance in providing domestic security.
Isn't that a fascinating prospect?
The possibility of Iraq becoming a "hollow state" where all the real power resides with Tehran and its Iraqi proxies is very real. The reality is underscored by the recent signs of Tehran retreating from unqualified support for the embattled regime of Bashar al-Assad. Losing one outpost in the Arab states is acceptable if the loss of Syria can be offset by the gaining of a larger, far more oil rich and Shia majority Iraq.
President Ahmedinejad and his boss, the Guardian of the Revolution, may sound like utter fools or delusional maniacs to many in the West, but they are not. They, particularly the Grand Ayatollah, are careful and dedicated practitioners of regional realpolitik. Iraq is the better "ally," the better "hollow state" in all respects as compared with Syria.
Now, in looking at the latest "victory" for democracy, please recall that the governments of both Iran and Iraq came to power via the ballot box. Simply having elections does not guarantee an outcome compatible with the interests of the US, or the UK, or France. The many critics of the "NATO" campaign in Libya who focused on the many unknowns resident within the rebel forces and their Transitional National Council were well justified in their cautionary notes.
Libya is in a profound state of flux. It will remain that way even if Gaddafi and his sons are caught or killed. The many factions, the multitude of conflicting priorities and agendas, the rivalries which constitute the most important hallmark of the TNC alone assures the flux will go on, and on, and on. Also contributing to the ongoing lack of stability will be the simple fact that there currently exist in Libya a large number of very well armed young men who have discovered that it is not all that hard to push the cancel button on another human being and who have their own agendas as motivators.
So far the US is 0 for 2 in the victory department. While the final bell has not yet rung in Libya, there are few reasons to conclude the record will not soon be 0 for 3.
Makes you kind of wonder if Ron Paul and his message of neo-isolationism might not have something going for it. Doesn't it?
Friday, August 19, 2011
Smart(?) Power In Action
The other day Hilary Clinton and Leon Panetta were on stage at the National Defense University. In the course of the action Ms Clinton bragged on the use of "smart power" by her boss, The Nice Young Man From Chicago, with respect to the Syrian conundrum. She went on to imply strongly that the graduated escalation of economic and diplomatic sanctions in support of the anti-government demonstrators was both without precedent in American diplomatic history and (drum roll, please) constituted a paradigm for the future.
This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.
While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.
Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.
The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.
Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.
The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.
Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.
A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.
These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.
The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.
The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)
The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.
The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.
While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."
By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)
Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.
The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.
This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.
"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)
Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.
This multi-tier exercise in pure idiocy would normally provide grounds for a Bugs Bunny Memorial "What a Maroon!" Award but as the Secretary of State just received one of these highly coveted tributes only a week or so ago, she was (temporarily) ineligible. Instead Ms Clinton will be given an Honorable Mention in the Rampant Distortions of History and Reality For Base Political Purposes.
While the term "smart power" must mean something else in the Clinton lexicon, to the disinterested observer it can only signify an exercise in simulated policy covering hesitation, irresolution, hemming and hawing to say nothing of the lack of a clear focus on American national interest and an inability to understand the limits of coercive diplomacy. "Smart power" also serves to obscure if not hide completely the utter failure of the Obama administration to properly calibrate the relation between policy and the mechanisms by which policy might be implemented effectively.
Years ago, way back when the current president was blathering on constitutional law and plotting radical change in the parlors of such as Bernadine Dohrn and her co-revolutionist, Bill Ayers, and Ms Clinton was in Little Rock, President George H.W. Bush showed just how "smart power" is supposed to work in the real world of enemies, partial enemies, allies, pseudo-allies, and the usually uncommitted states-in-the-middle as he patiently assembled an ad hoc coalition under US leadership to eject the Iraq of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
In the past, Ms Clinton has characterized "smart power" as the process of coalition building with the goal of meshing diplomatic, economic, and military assets into an effective package to counter a given threat or meet an unexpected contingency. In principle, her understanding is correct. It should be--it was taken directly from the record of the H.W. Bush administration.
The response of the H.W. Bush administration to the unexpected Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is the practical expression of "smart power." All any successor administration has had to do is read the book that Dad Bush wrote and follow its guidance.
Leaving aside one very embarrassing factor basic to the Iraqi invasion--the US diplomatic misstep which seemed to Saddam to have given him a clear signal of any lack of American interest in the readjustment of the Iraqi border--the Iraqi attack and occupation of Kuwait came as both a surprise and a major challenge to the US. Long standing American policy opposed any single state gaining hegemony over the oil states of the Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that the Nixon administration provided military assistance to the Iran of the Shah as well as to Saudi Arabia. It was for this reason that the US established and expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would have violated this policy. Certainly the notion of Saddam Hussein controlling so much of the oil reserves in the region was against American interests. And, worst of all, the prospect of Iraq either pushing on into Saudi Arabia or exercising an oppressive influence upon the Kingdom was both destabilizing for the region and against American strategic interests.
The decision to roll back the Iraqis was not difficult to make. Far more demanding was the process of doing so. Unilateral action would have been unacceptable given the political dynamics not only of the region but also in the rapidly changing international political environment following the collapse of the old Soviet Union. The status and sensitivity of the Kremlin was a major consideration as the new Confederation of Independent States tried to assemble itself out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Also exercising great influence on the problem of rolling the Iraqis back was the tenuous nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict. These major factors along with a host of lesser issues meant the US could not act hastily or without the broadest possible base of international political support.
Military considerations were also an important limiter on the rapidity of American action. The rolling back of the Iraqis from Kuwait could not be accomplished by air and naval power alone. Sure, the US could obliterate the Kuwaiti (and Iraqi) oil fields and their supporting infrastructure. Certainly, the US could inflict great devastation on the Iraqi military and government. It could even 'bomb Iraq back to the stone age' without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, none of these alternatives would be effective in that each would cause counterproductive levels of destruction. Winning a rubble field covered by a pall of smoke from ever burning oil wells is not a good definition of victory.
A ground war would be necessary. To be successful, a ground war would of necessity have to be of short duration and very limited casualties. A long war or an inconclusive one or one which resulted in too many Americans coming home in body bags would be politically insupportable at home. To assure the war came to a speedy conclusion with an absolute minimum number of fatalities, a very large force would be necessary. In order to assure a maximum degree of international support, the US would have to assemble a vast coalition of military contingents from countries lacking any real history of warlike cooperation.
These two foundation truths along with the diplomatic requisites took time. And they took great effort, personal effort from the president and his most senior people. Adding to the time requirements was the decision to refrain from using any established multilateral institution other than the UN in the assembling of both the diplomatic and military coalitions.
The use of the UN Security Council was a necessary preliminary. Not only was gaining the proper authorization from the Security Council a proper preliminary to coalition building, it was essential for securing universal political support domestically. The Americans like the use of the UN baby blue flag as a figleaf covering the policy genitalia of the US.
The long months of the Fall and Winter of 1990 were well spent in assembling the coalition, transporting the very, very massive American military forces to the theater of operations, and integrating contingents from traditional American allies as well as assorted countries better known for opposing the US than cooperating with it. The diplomatic and military preparations were highly visible thus giving Saddam ample time to reconsider his position and repent the error made. (This period of reflection was, in and of itself, an important factor often overlooked at the time by critics and equally ignored by post-conflict writers.)
The war itself was conducted in a manner which well meets the requirements of "smart power." The early, overly muscular, and unsubtle operational plans of the theater commander were rejected and replaced by a much better thought out use of American mobility and firepower. The president ignored his critics who bayed for a quicker commencement of hostilities and who chaffed under the seemingly unnecessary delay of a very long preparatory period of aerial bombardment.
The final plan focused on the necessary--the ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait--and a limited incursion into Iraq itself. This perturbed critics greatly as there were many who wanted the US to go all the way and eliminate Saddam for once and all. The decision of the H.W. Bush administration not to go all the way, to resist the pernicious virus of the "victory disease' was proper. The realities of both the domestic and international political scene militated against a total war. A drive to Baghdad would have resulted in ever stiffening Iraqi resistance and a commensurate body count among friendly forces. Further, the removal of Saddam would have saddled the US with the problems of post-conflict occupation and the specters of a crumbling coalition and a dissolving Iraqi society.
While there are grounds to criticize the post-truce American policy, on balance the end of the war was as good as could be expected at costs which were politically and economically acceptable. It was an exercise in "smart power."
By comparison the Obama administration approach to the problems of Libya and Syria were demonstrations of "dumb power." First and foremost, the administration did not choose the right battle against the right enemy. Libya and Gadaffi were, at best, a nuisance, an annoyance. Syria is an adversary of consequence. As the US has not been able to influence Israel in the direction of returning the Golan Heights to Damascus which, of course, had the potential of prying Syria loose from the embrace of Tehran and ending Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the alternative is the removal of Bashir al-Assad with the hope that the new regime would be less threatening to both Israel and the West. (Admittedly a weak hope given the potency of the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups espousing violent political Islam.)
Had the US opposed the delusions in London and Paris, there would have been some bloodletting in Libya but less than has accrued to date. More importantly, the administration could have focused on the very difficult task of gaining support for strong action against Syria. The difficulty of the task given the long standing relationship between Russia and Syria would have been extreme but not beyond the realm of plausibility. It is not unthinkable that Moscow could have been persuaded to abstain in the Security Council and as a result Beijing would have done the same rather than be seen as the sole protector of a very unpleasant regime.
The months of diplomacy along with the necessary and highly visible redeployment of US and other forces would have given Assad pause and time for thought. The lengthy preparations would have provided impetus for the Baathists to have found a face saving way out of the dilemma which came about more by accident and miscalculation than malicious aforethought. The diplomatic ramp up to war could have made the war itself unnecessary.
This, bucko, would have been "smart power." Sure, it would have required a level of political courage to prepare for yet one more war with a well armed, well prepared adversary in the face of opposition from the Obama political base. And, political courage is not this administration's long suit. It would have taken a high degree of diplomatic finesse along with patient persuasion to build a coalition. Both of these have been qualities conspicuously absent of late.
"Smart power" ain't easy as the Gulf War demonstrated. It is, however, far preferable to the hopeless, feckless series of spastic blunders which have scarred our diplomacy in the Mideast in recent months (and years.)
Madam Secretary, get it right. Saying that something is "smart" doesn't make it so.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Big Question--Which Way For The Syrian Army?
Dictators fall when the army stands by with folded arms. That has been the one big lesson of the so-called "Arab Spring." Where the army or at least a significant portion of it has stood firm with the challenged jefe grande, the Mr Big of the place has retained at least a fair semblance of power.
This difference is the distinction between Egypt and Tunisia on the one hand and Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain on the other. This, in turn, makes the stance of the Syrian army key to the course developments will take in that dissent torn state.
Optimists (those who favor the speedy end of the Baathist regime) point out that while the majority of the armed services command structure like that of the multi-member intelligence community is comprised of Alawites or individuals from another minority religious community, the overwhelming majority of the rank and file are Sunnis. Thus, the optimists conclude, when push comes to shove the army will divide against itself with the numerical majority siding with the Sunni dissidents.
In support of this interpretation the optimists note that most of the killings to date have been executed either by members of the Baathist militia groups or one of the several intelligence services, most often that nominally belonging to the air force. The army has been in place but has not done much if any of the actual trigger pulling. The optimists also point to information flowing from Syria regarding the lethal purges of low ranking officers who refuse to participate in the suppression as well as reports of incidents of collective disobedience on the part of several different army formations.
The pessimists (those who are not particularly in sympathy with a rapid regime change in Syria) interpret matters somewhat differently. They underscore the existence of selected elite units with a higher percentage of loyalist personnel in all ranks as well as superior equipment and training. They also point to the array of privileges enjoyed by many members of the armed forces--and not simply senior officers. Most tellingly, the pessimists highlight the role played by the army in Syria and the indoctrination to this role practiced every day in all armed forces units.
Of the several arguments offered by the pessimists, it is the last which has the greatest force. It is also the basis for concluding that there is little, if anything, the US can do to foster a climate of indifference to the fate of the Baathist regime within the armed forces generally.
Like all national forces, the prime roles of the Syrian defense establishment is protecting the territorial integrity of the state as well as the sovereignty of the government. The Syrian armed forces are primarily focused on Israel but have demonstrated secondary foci on Jordan and Iraq. These lesser interests have faded even more in recent years.
In addition, the Syrian armed forces are conceived as being instruments of power projection. Importantly, the services see this role as critical. The venue for power projection is Lebanon. Syria has a deep and defining belief that Lebanon is part of Greater Syria. a part ruthlessly ripped away from the larger part by the colonial powers of France and England. The "lost province" of Lebanon has remained lost due to the sinister and exploitative manipulations of Israel and its key sponsor, the US.
It is critical that the Syrian armed forces remain constantly on the alert so as to reclaim Lebanon should the slightest opportunity present itself. The role of power projection even more than the defensive mission warding off or defeating an aggressive Israeli move is key to the extra benefits received by the armed forces and their personnel.
The unique combination of traditional territorial defense and power projection seeking the return of lost territory makes the Syrian army unique. The closest analogy would be the army of France between 1872 and 1918. The redemption of "lost provinces" in each case makes the army not only more loyal to the regime and meriting extra rewards but also assures that the army is less likely to take actions which might weaken the state and make the return of the lost land less probable.
The Syrian armed forces, particularly the army, have shown greater competence in combat than other Arab states during both the 1967 and 1973 wars. In the latter, the Syrians despite having been set up by the Egyptians for failure came within one defensive line of breaking through the IDF positions and overrunning northern Israel. The last second arrival of IAF fighter-bombers made possible by US intelligence regarding the Egyptian force distribution and positions, stopped the aggressive and well managed Syrian armored thrust at what was literally the last possible moment.
All ranks of the Syrian forces are robustly indoctrinated with the "glorious" record and equally "glorious" mission of reclaiming the lost province of Lebanon. This indoctrination includes the Sunni draftees. As a result it is pushing the envelop to see the army splitting on sectarian lines at the expense of its own identity and future relevance.
It is not as if the Baathist regime relies on indoctrination alone. Serious internal security operations are conducted only by those elite units with unquestioned loyalty predicated upon the existential concerns of their members. Other units, units with large undigested chunks of Sunni draftees are kept disarmed in their camps. The least reliable units are also fully penetrated by agents of the several military counterintelligence formations.
The Syrian high command is quite literally death on any sign of disloyalty or disobedience. This brutal reality is well known and understood within the military. This knowledge is quite an inhibition in and of itself.
The correlation of forces militates against any army action resembling those of the Egyptian and Tunisian armies. It also makes the probability of wholesale revolt within the army far from likely. This makes a copy of the Libyan dynamic the next thing to impossible.
The same correlation of forces limits the influence of the US upon the armed forces of Syria. Not only does the US lack the sort of direct connection it had with the Egyptian army, it has no plausible inducements to offer the army should that body cooperate with the anti-regime movement. There is literally nothing Washington can offer to match let alone replace the self-defined role of the Syrian army as both guarantor of the state and liberator of the lost province. No amount of new equipment, no amount of money or advice can begin to equal the intrinsic force of the role the armed forces see for themselves.
Nothing less than an armor plated guarantee of (1) a return of the Golan Heights and (2) a Syrian "free hand" in Lebanon could sway the armed forces from loyalty to the current regime. These are both beyond the capacity of the US to offer.
Even if the Baathists are compelled to rely upon the three brigade equivalents of absolutely loyal minority manned units as well as the air force for suppression of the dissidents, these would prove sufficient to the task of drowning the anti-regime movement in blood. Thus the only question is whether or not the Baathists have the political will to use all necessary force to stay in power regardless of the views of the "international community."
So far the answer is simple and blunt. The regime does have the will.
This difference is the distinction between Egypt and Tunisia on the one hand and Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain on the other. This, in turn, makes the stance of the Syrian army key to the course developments will take in that dissent torn state.
Optimists (those who favor the speedy end of the Baathist regime) point out that while the majority of the armed services command structure like that of the multi-member intelligence community is comprised of Alawites or individuals from another minority religious community, the overwhelming majority of the rank and file are Sunnis. Thus, the optimists conclude, when push comes to shove the army will divide against itself with the numerical majority siding with the Sunni dissidents.
In support of this interpretation the optimists note that most of the killings to date have been executed either by members of the Baathist militia groups or one of the several intelligence services, most often that nominally belonging to the air force. The army has been in place but has not done much if any of the actual trigger pulling. The optimists also point to information flowing from Syria regarding the lethal purges of low ranking officers who refuse to participate in the suppression as well as reports of incidents of collective disobedience on the part of several different army formations.
The pessimists (those who are not particularly in sympathy with a rapid regime change in Syria) interpret matters somewhat differently. They underscore the existence of selected elite units with a higher percentage of loyalist personnel in all ranks as well as superior equipment and training. They also point to the array of privileges enjoyed by many members of the armed forces--and not simply senior officers. Most tellingly, the pessimists highlight the role played by the army in Syria and the indoctrination to this role practiced every day in all armed forces units.
Of the several arguments offered by the pessimists, it is the last which has the greatest force. It is also the basis for concluding that there is little, if anything, the US can do to foster a climate of indifference to the fate of the Baathist regime within the armed forces generally.
Like all national forces, the prime roles of the Syrian defense establishment is protecting the territorial integrity of the state as well as the sovereignty of the government. The Syrian armed forces are primarily focused on Israel but have demonstrated secondary foci on Jordan and Iraq. These lesser interests have faded even more in recent years.
In addition, the Syrian armed forces are conceived as being instruments of power projection. Importantly, the services see this role as critical. The venue for power projection is Lebanon. Syria has a deep and defining belief that Lebanon is part of Greater Syria. a part ruthlessly ripped away from the larger part by the colonial powers of France and England. The "lost province" of Lebanon has remained lost due to the sinister and exploitative manipulations of Israel and its key sponsor, the US.
It is critical that the Syrian armed forces remain constantly on the alert so as to reclaim Lebanon should the slightest opportunity present itself. The role of power projection even more than the defensive mission warding off or defeating an aggressive Israeli move is key to the extra benefits received by the armed forces and their personnel.
The unique combination of traditional territorial defense and power projection seeking the return of lost territory makes the Syrian army unique. The closest analogy would be the army of France between 1872 and 1918. The redemption of "lost provinces" in each case makes the army not only more loyal to the regime and meriting extra rewards but also assures that the army is less likely to take actions which might weaken the state and make the return of the lost land less probable.
The Syrian armed forces, particularly the army, have shown greater competence in combat than other Arab states during both the 1967 and 1973 wars. In the latter, the Syrians despite having been set up by the Egyptians for failure came within one defensive line of breaking through the IDF positions and overrunning northern Israel. The last second arrival of IAF fighter-bombers made possible by US intelligence regarding the Egyptian force distribution and positions, stopped the aggressive and well managed Syrian armored thrust at what was literally the last possible moment.
All ranks of the Syrian forces are robustly indoctrinated with the "glorious" record and equally "glorious" mission of reclaiming the lost province of Lebanon. This indoctrination includes the Sunni draftees. As a result it is pushing the envelop to see the army splitting on sectarian lines at the expense of its own identity and future relevance.
It is not as if the Baathist regime relies on indoctrination alone. Serious internal security operations are conducted only by those elite units with unquestioned loyalty predicated upon the existential concerns of their members. Other units, units with large undigested chunks of Sunni draftees are kept disarmed in their camps. The least reliable units are also fully penetrated by agents of the several military counterintelligence formations.
The Syrian high command is quite literally death on any sign of disloyalty or disobedience. This brutal reality is well known and understood within the military. This knowledge is quite an inhibition in and of itself.
The correlation of forces militates against any army action resembling those of the Egyptian and Tunisian armies. It also makes the probability of wholesale revolt within the army far from likely. This makes a copy of the Libyan dynamic the next thing to impossible.
The same correlation of forces limits the influence of the US upon the armed forces of Syria. Not only does the US lack the sort of direct connection it had with the Egyptian army, it has no plausible inducements to offer the army should that body cooperate with the anti-regime movement. There is literally nothing Washington can offer to match let alone replace the self-defined role of the Syrian army as both guarantor of the state and liberator of the lost province. No amount of new equipment, no amount of money or advice can begin to equal the intrinsic force of the role the armed forces see for themselves.
Nothing less than an armor plated guarantee of (1) a return of the Golan Heights and (2) a Syrian "free hand" in Lebanon could sway the armed forces from loyalty to the current regime. These are both beyond the capacity of the US to offer.
Even if the Baathists are compelled to rely upon the three brigade equivalents of absolutely loyal minority manned units as well as the air force for suppression of the dissidents, these would prove sufficient to the task of drowning the anti-regime movement in blood. Thus the only question is whether or not the Baathists have the political will to use all necessary force to stay in power regardless of the views of the "international community."
So far the answer is simple and blunt. The regime does have the will.
Monday, April 25, 2011
It Looks As If Assad Has Made A Decision
The Baathist regime has sent the tanks to Daraa, the place where it all started. It would appear that Assad and company have decided to end the protests where they began a few short and bloody weeks ago. A cell phone image of the hulking mass of a top of the line Soviet era MBT lurking in a city street gives a particular air of menace--a air which is undoubtedly true.
One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago. Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence. The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down. If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.
Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case. The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate. The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations. The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.
It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change. While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival. The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities. Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.
This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists. The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support. However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.
With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back. And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks. If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression. The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.
Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives. More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions. And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.
Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow. The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces. The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement. This will lengthen the fighting. Lengthening means more killing. More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.
Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy. Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression. This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists. By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.
The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel. The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.
Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list. However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job. If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.
Israel loses as well. The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war. If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.
Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria. He was right. Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on. Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace. The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.
The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer. Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter. One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace. The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple. No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.
If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region. For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement. Syria gets the Golan Heights back. That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.
This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria. It is a time sensitive matter. If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria. Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down. The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert. Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people. Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."
And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region. With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt. The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.
There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement. Sanctions will not deter Assad. Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest. The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.
It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration. But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.
One is tempted to compare the Syrian government's response to the anti-regime movement with that of the Trolls of Beijing regarding the pro-democracy demonstrators twenty two years ago. Assad's regime, like the Masters of the Forbidden City, gave warnings, blunt and unmistakable warnings, offered (carefully limited) reforms, and, finally, cracked down with sledgehammer violence. The protesters have been given ample time--and inducements--to back down. If nothing else, they had the memory of what Assad the Father did to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Homa thirty years ago.
Arguably, the single greatest mistake made by Assad the Son was not stomping the initial demonstrators in Daraa harder and faster than was the case. The first response was just brutal enough to outrage, but not brutal enough to intimidate. The same can be said of the later responses to demonstrations. The less than truly scarifying moves by the security forces coupled with the offers of reform sent mixed messages to the large body of inchoate anti-regime opinion festering throughout the Syrian population.
It is easy to see how the anti-government figures--particularly the large, influential expat community who possessed the bravery of being out of range--interpreted the mixed messages to mean the regime lacked the political will to suppress the forces of change. While easy to understand the process of misinterpretation, it must be pointed out that those who did the misinterpretation were overlooking the most important part of the regime's motivations--physical survival. The vast majority of the power elite from Assad down to the mid and lower ranks of the military officer corps, the civil service, and, most importantly, the security forces is comprised of religious minorities. Alawites, Christians, Druze, and others of minority persuasions would be at a very real risk of being killed should religiously enthusiastic Sunni take over.
This is not to say there is any real danger of the Muslim Brotherhood or akin groups rising to the top in Syria even if the protesters are successful in ousting the Baathists. The decades of very effective repression directed against the Brotherhood ever since the abortive uprising assure the organization is weak, divided, few in members, and lacking broad support. However, religious enthusiasm is percolating through the anti-regime ranks with sufficient vigor to make credible the fears resident throughout the elite regarding what would happen to them should the status quo end.
With motivation of such a fundamental nature in play, it is not shocking that the regime has struck back. And, struck back with a ferocity which is not likely to lessen in future days and weeks. If anything, threats such as that levied over the weekend of prosecution by the International Criminal Court will amp up the brutality and lethality of the repression. The necessary inference to be drawn from the ICC gambit is simply that the Assad family and the Baathist regime generally will have no place to run, nowhere to hide if and when the mobs break down the palace gates.
Quite literally the Baathists are fighting for their lives. More even than Gaddafi, Bashir al-Assad, his fellows, and underlings have nothing to lose by fighting as fiercely as they can regardless of casualties to civilians, heedless of international condemnation, indifferent to expressions of disapprobation such as sanctions, travel bans, or UN resolutions. And, they have nothing to gain by giving in to the demands of the anti-regime movement and its foreign supporters.
Indeed, the more foreign governments offer indirect support to the anti-regime movement, the more the body count will grow. The chimera of foreign support has the effect of enhancing the political will of the anti-regime forces. The size, sophistication, and orientation of the Syrian expat communities in Western Europe and the US will magnify both the reality and the appearance of Western sympathy to and support of the Oust Bashir movement. This will lengthen the fighting. Lengthening means more killing. More killing means the political will of both sides is strengthened as increasingly the dead dictate policy.
Another factor that needs consideration is the relation between a more robust response by the regime and Iranian government policy. Tehran will be pleased to see the Syrians finally following the Iranian model of regime maintenance by harsh repression. This course of action has undoubtedly been the major message from the mullahs to the Baathists. By letting the tanks roll in Deraa and authorizing more snipers to pull more triggers, Assad has tied his regime closer to Tehran which means Tehran will invest more in enhancing the security of Assad's government.
The losers in the new escalation of violence are Saudi Arabia and Israel. The House of Saud certainly has been in a clandestine conflict for influence in Damascus with the mullahs.
Regardless of King Abdullah's intense distaste for Assad and his view that the ophthalmologist turned dictator is a viper in the Arab tent, the goal of prying Syria loose from Iran is high on the Kingdom's to-do list. However, not even the redoubtable Prince Bandar has been able to do the job. If that had been the case, it is far more likely that Assad would have restrained the snipers and left the tanks in the garage, preferring instead to use bribery and more promises of more reforms to undercut the appeal of the anti-regime agenda.
Israel loses as well. The spreading unrest in Syria may result in undesired spill overs including a ratcheting up of the Hezbollah threat. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that any successor regime to that of the Baathists will be any more kindly disposed to the Jewish state and many reasons to conclude the hypothetical successor will not be able to assure the peace is kept regardless of such events as the 2006 Lebanon war. If a successor comes to power over the corpses of Assad and company with the assistance of Iran (not an impossibility should the mullahs conclude Assad is losing anyway), the successor will be far less amenable to any sort of comprehensive peace settlement.
Henry Kissinger once famously quipped that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt--and can't make peace without Syria. He was right. Thirty and more years later his observation is still bang on. Syria--not Egypt, not the Palestinians, not the Saudis, not the Iranians--is the major player in bringing about a genuine and comprehensive Mideast peace. The anti-regime movement and, even more, the regime's increasingly blunt and bloody response puts severe constraints on both the will and ability of Syria to play its linchpin roll in securing a lasting regional peace.
The endless intransigence of the Israeli government on the Golan Heights Question boggles the mind of an objective observer. Even more logic defying is the American position in the matter. One American administration after another has kept a myopic focus on the Palestinian Question and the Two State Solution to that question as if this was the only or best way to achieve a comprehensive peace. The reality--a reality so simple that even a Deep Thinker inside the Beltway should be able to get a grip on it--is simple. No matter what the Palestinians do, no matter if there is a Two State or a Three State Solution, unless Syria signs off on the deal, there is no comprehensive regional peace.
If and when Syria signs a deal, there will be a genuine comprehensive peace in the region. For Syria to do this, there is but one requirement. Syria gets the Golan Heights back. That's it, folks, Golan or no peace.
This ground truth argues powerfully for one approach to Syria. It is a time sensitive matter. If the US, if the EU, if the UN actually care about the body count in Syria, there must be a tough single minded effort to convince Israel that the time is now for returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Word of the return of the "lost provinces" (to use a phrase redolent of meaning for the French) would have immediate and very positive effects on the current situation in Syria. Assured of the speedy return of the Golan Heights, Assad would order the tanks back to the garage, the snipers to stand down. The anti-regime protests would fade away faster than a rain shower in the desert. Assad would be the hero of the Syrian people. Additionally, Damascus would dump its "eternal" and "strategic" alliance with Iran with a haste worthy of the phrase, "a New York second."
And, to the benefit of all--Israel, the new regime in Egypt, the embattled Saudis, everyone except Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and a few other malcontents--peace would be a reality in the region. With Syria on board, it would be possible to bring the Palestinian Authority to the table with a realistic attitude regarding the "settlements," Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley security belt. The Palestinians would not be in a position to resist the pressures and inducements which could and would be brought by a united Arab front now including Syria as well as Saudi Arabia.
There is the near-term alternative to what otherwise must be a welter of blood as the Baathists wage an existential battle against the anti-regime movement. Sanctions will not deter Assad. Not even if the EU joins with the US in a campaign of economic punishment will the pain outweigh the perils of losing in an existential contest. The way to peace in Syria is identical with the way to peace in the Mideast: Give the Golan Heights back to its rightful sovereign.
It must be so simple as to fly below the elevated thoughts of the Deep Thinkers of the administration. But, at least they can go home at night without dodging snipers' bullets or fearing the tanks' treads.
Saturday, April 23, 2011
And Still The Blood Flows---
Yesterday the Syrian security forces killed more than one hundred anti-government protesters. Today it was more of the same as snipers in civilian clothes were reported to be engaging funeral processions in suburbs of Damascus. It is looking more and more like Bashir al-Assad is losing control of the situation as the old truism of the dead dictating policy is once again operative among the long repressed and fearful folks of Syria.
While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression. His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple. It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.
As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them. The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge. Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game. As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)
It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen. This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept. How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?
In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway. The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.
No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be. The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime. An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government. It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support. To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.
Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically. Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance. Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial. Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region. However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.
The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq. That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs. So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.
This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation. The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions. This is possible but meaningless in effect. As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming. Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.
In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company. The imperatives to do the same now exist. The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy. Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.
Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea. The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups. As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.
As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements. The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan. The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.
While still too early to start an inquest on the Fall of the Baathists, it does seem that Bashir miscalculated in his mix of pseudo-reforms and blunt repression. His father, Hafez, skipped the reform gambit, relying on repression pure and simple. It is self-evident that Bashir is not a chip off the old block, but is actually inclined to being a reformer as he has so often proclaimed.
As Bashir's allies and mentors in Tehran could (and undoubtedly have) advised, forget about gestures of reform when faced by mobs in the streets, just go ahead and kill them. The mixed messages from the top of the tree in Damascus which started in the immediate wake of the very first protests have given the impression of a weak will being in charge. Having wrong footed it from the get-go, the Syrian regime must now play catch up in the break-their-will-by-killing-enough-of-them game. As events in Yemen have made crystalline, this is not the way to go. Unless you are willing to toss in the towel and get the next stage out of Dodge (hopefully with immunity from prosecution.)
It may still be possible for the Baathists to kill their way to remaining in office, but it will take a very great deal of killing for that to happen. This opens the question of how much killing will other states accept. How many bodies must be piled up in how short a time to force some sort of international collective action perhaps even of the Libyan sort?
In a way the Syrian government is quite fortunate that the Libyan adventure in humanitarian protection is underway. The difficulties which have been encountered in what too many civilian leaders in the West incorrectly assumed would be a quick, cheap, and easy operation against the opinion of military commanders, particularly those of the US, have put a deep chill on any notion of imposing a peaceful regime change on Bashir et al.
No one well oriented in time and place would consider Syria to be the easy nut to crack that Libya appeared to be. The Syrian defense capacities are orders of magnitude greater than those possessed by Libya, and the army, although conscript in nature, has not yet turned on the regime. An attack by outsiders would be certain to keep the armed forces loyal to the government. It would even turn back some civilians from the path of opposition to that of support. To belabor the obvious, the military option is a non-starter--even if the Security Council could be cozened into one more R2P predicated resolution.
Nor is Syria all that easy to isolate either diplomatically or economically. Unless and until Iran concludes that Bashir cannot survive, Syria will have its support and assistance. Given the success shown by Iran in avoiding and evading sanctions, this support is not trivial. Iran is not likely to give up on Syria quickly or easily considering the importance of Syria to Iranian diplomatic and paramilitary ambitions in the region. However, if the mullahs see the end is near--or even merely probable--it can be expected they will open contact with the opposition so as to protect their investment in Syria and ongoing access to the proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.
The clandestine war between Iran and Saudi Arabia has a new front in Syria along with the older one in Iraq. The majority of the Syrian population is Sunni which gives Saudi Arabia a form of home court advantage which it lacks in Iraq. That plus the money the House of Saud can pass around gives the Kingdom quite a leg up over the mullahs. So, it is probable that Iran will stick with Bashir until the bitter end with the Saudis doing all they can to encourage the anti-government forces.
This implies more pressure will be put on the US to at least go full throated in its rhetoric of condemnation. The Saudis would expect the US to go beyond words into the realm of sanctions. This is possible but meaningless in effect. As events have shown elsewhere and repeatedly, sanctions of all sorts are very weak weapons whose effects, if any, are long in coming. Still, the US will have to go through the motions not only to placate the Saudis but also to sooth the bruised sensitivities of various components of the Obama base.
In the past the Baathists have shown a willingness to kill on levels undreamed of by Gaddafi and company. The imperatives to do the same now exist. The government, the higher ranks of the military, the security services, the elites aligned with these are all comprised of minorities including the Alawites and Christians who would be at great risk should Muslims given to violent political Islam gain the ascendancy. Considering that the long outlawed Muslim Brotherhood still exists with the organizational competence necessary to gain political dominance, the fear of losing one's life felt by many in the regime's higher and mid-ranks is realistic.
Not even the Israelis are sure that removing Bashir and the Baathists would be a good idea. The current regime may be highly anti-Israeli and almost as stridently anti-American, but the Syrian government is predictable, does keep the peace, can keep out of Hezbollah initiated wars, and does restrain more than a few terrorist groups. As the Geek has argued in previous posts, it is still possible to wean the Syrians away from the Iranian orbit and even onto the first faint path of true reform--but it takes Israel recognizing the reality that it can't keep the Golan Heights any longer.
As coercion is not a viable option in Syria, perhaps the time has come for the administration to focus on inducements. The only inducement which matters so much to Bashir and the Baathists that they would be willing to drop the Iranian connection and consider real reforms is the return of the Golan. The problem is simply that time is the most important commodity right now and this means the administration and Israel must do something both are loath to do--work fast for a dramatic solution to a real and bloody problem.
The House Of Saud Is Getting Very, Very Worried
Perhaps the best sign of growing Saudi anxiety over the near future is the recall of the legendary Prince Bandar from the diplomatic/political purgatory he has inhabited for the past several years. Bandar's record in the many jobs he has held including a lengthy and very productive stint as the Kingdom's ambassador to the US shows him to be a man of unusual boldness, resourcefulness, and determination. Given the way in which regional affairs have been going rapidly and steadily south from the perspective of Riyadh, it was a certainty that Bandar would be brought back, the Kingdom's diplomatic cavalry in action.
The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom. Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam. This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques. In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.
That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."
In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring." Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.
According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.
Enter Prince Bandar. The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia. Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief. But it was not the only part.
Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US. The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout. Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.
The same is true with respect to Russia. The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production. And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US. Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."
Now for Pakistan. It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia. Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."
While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.
An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran. The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan. And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques. Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.
As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US. The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.
Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions. They make a person feel good just considering them. But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy. The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.
Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point. An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach. Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.
Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria. The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary. There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.
The outlines of a deal are hinted here. Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain. From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.
Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.
The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom. Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam. This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques. In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.
That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."
In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring." Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.
According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.
Enter Prince Bandar. The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia. Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief. But it was not the only part.
Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US. The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout. Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.
The same is true with respect to Russia. The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production. And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US. Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."
Now for Pakistan. It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia. Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."
While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.
An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran. The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan. And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques. Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.
As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US. The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.
Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions. They make a person feel good just considering them. But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy. The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.
Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point. An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach. Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.
Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria. The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary. There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.
The outlines of a deal are hinted here. Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain. From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.
Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.
Monday, March 28, 2011
Internal War--Neocons And The Tea Party
Like the shambling corpses in the classic black and white version of Night of the Living Dead, the neocon ninnies have been resurrected by the fragrant miasma surrounding the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions. Eliot Abrams and Joshua Muravchik having been baying in the van, eager for a faster, harder intervention in Libya and chomping after the chance to depose Bashir Assad.
Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver. The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.
Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants. The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.
Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison. Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms. There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.
At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations. It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."
As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya. They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs. They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.
The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering. By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.
As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch! This sketch is silly."
The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today. At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.
This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right. It is not. It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.
There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.
The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power. It is not simply first among equals. It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities. There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this. The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)
The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest. True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.
This positive statement is accompanied by a negative. The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology. Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq. This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure. As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.
The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong. The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress. No Great Power has ever resigned its status. The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs. Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.
Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock? A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?
Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam. The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy. Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.
If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish. Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war. Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.
Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war. It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica. This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations. It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.
There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP. In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group. Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.
Then, of course, there is Iran. There is always Iran. The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb." The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)
The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months. The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction. So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority. Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides. This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.
This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast. The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.
John Bolton was right. And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him. Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage. This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.
The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents. We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go. Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?
Unfortunately it is. That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.
And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.
Back east (from the Geek's perspective) in the soon-to-be-wilds of caucus Iowa, the redoubtable neocon hawk John Bolton, in the context of a conservative Republican cattle call, not only lambasted the Obama view of foreign policy, he advised the GOP to add foreign policy to its current two arrow quiver. The nonpareil unilateralist and one time UN ambassador is obviously of the view that foreign affairs will be an ever larger component of the domestic political scene--and all the Republican front runners were monumentally deficient in this aspect of the presidential job description.
Bolton's understanding both of the increasing importance of American foreign relations and the lack of both experience and talent in this area represented within the Republican front bench may be accurate, but it is far from unchallenged within the ranks of the elephants. The Tea Party movement, or at least its favorites which gained election this past November, does not constitute a cheering section for US engagement with the rest of the world.
Senator Rand Paul has staked out an isolationist position which makes the (in)famous isolationists of the Thirties seem almost like globalists in comparison. Other Republicans--not just Senator Paul's dad, Ron--are all for slicing and dicing foreign aid in all its myriad forms. There seems to be a near universal consensus among those on the right of the aisle to stop paying dues or other assessments to the UN.
At the same time the standard issue defense conservatives of the GOP seek to keep as much money as possible flowing to the Pentagon, regardless of all other considerations. It does not seem to be "more bang for the buck" so much as "more bucks for more bangs."
As if all these different and contradictory currents were not confusing enough, Republicans in Congress are simultaneously for and against the Obama intervention in Libya. They are for it in the sense of feeling good because Made in the USA bombs and missiles are macerating goodly numbers of Gaddafi thugs. They are against it because (a) Obama treated Congress like a collection of mushrooms, (2) the US isn't running the show, (3) the administration dithered too much, too long, (4) because it looks as if the US is dancing to a French tune.
The picture of Republican foreign policy is more disjointed and disjarring than one of Jackson Pollock's exercises in random splattering. By comparison the Obama understanding of how to conduct the nation's international business appears almost rational, well considered, and tightly braided.
As the line on Monty Python ran, "Stop this sketch! This sketch is silly."
The Republicans had best get a grip on a very inconvenient truth: The Man With The Moustache is probably right--foreign affairs will be far more central to American presidential (and congressional) politics a year hence than it is today. At the same time both the neocons and the isolationist tilted members of the GOP and Tea Party movement are as wrong as a soup sandwich.
This set of contentions does not mean nor imply that the Obama hyper-multilateralist, apologetic, deferential way of dealing with the world is right. It is not. It is as wrong as grilled watermelon.
There are a couple of ground truths involved which render Obama as well as the neocons and the neo-isolationists wrong.
The first of these is simply that the US is a Great Power. It is not simply first among equals. It stands alone in its mixture of hard and soft power capacities. There is an implicit but quite evident corollary to this. The rest of the world is not only comfortable with this but expects the concomitant American leadership when unpleasant bumps occur in the global night. (OK, to err on the side of accuracy, there are some states which are quite unhappy with the status quo, examples include Iran, Venezuela, and the two rivals, China and Russia.)
The second and equally critical foundational truth is this: The only sure guide to a state's foreign policy and diplomatic relations is national interest. True, principles, that is, national norms, values, ideals, and aspirations as well as the inducements and constraints of domestic politics are an important component of the process by which national interest is defined, but they are not the sole determinants of this interest.
This positive statement is accompanied by a negative. The worst, the absolutely worst basis for determining either national interest or foreign policy is ideology. Ideologically driven approaches lead to blunders as in Iraq. This is why the neocon approach is doomed to counterproductive failure. As history has demonstrated times beyond counting, institutions cannot be transplanted to new and strange environments by force of arms.
The inapposite nature of ideologically predicated foreign policy is also why the unquestioningly multilateralist stance of the Obama administration is wrong. The same can be applied to the neo-isolationist understanding of the Pauls and their soulmates in and out of Congress. No Great Power has ever resigned its status. The other countries just won't allow it without imposing very large and quite unacceptable costs. Unless, of course, one considers the cost in lives and treasure extracted by World War II to have been just fine.
Looking ahead, it is necessary to ask a question: Have the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" been an earthquake or simply a foreshock? A year from now will the world be shaking to aftershocks or will the real earthquake, a temblor of ten on the global political Richter scale?
Consider what might plausibly occur over the next six to twelve months in the Mideast alone.
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood may gain political dominance through the much celebrated "democratic process" and, having done so, drop its secular cover and revert to its base: violent political Islam. The MB has the advantage of tight organization, a well established hierarchy, a long developed agenda, and a large amount of perceived legitimacy. Also, there is no reason to conclude that it has abandoned its core definer of commitment to political Islam including,where necessary, that of the violent sort.
If the Assad regime is overthrown, the most likely outcome will be a Sunni regime dominated by advocates of violent political Islam with any number of domestic and regional scores to settle and goals to accomplish. Or, if hard pressed, the Assad government might choose to unite its restive population with the time honored technique of an external war. Or, as a wrinkle to this, Hezbollah may be turned loose by its two sponsors, Syria and Iran, with predictable consequences for the region.
Libya may well turn out as a stalemate, a divided entity caught in a slow motion semi-internal war. It is equally possible that the post-Gaddafi country will be one in which the Sufi inclined majority falls under the control of the Salifist derived advocates of violent political Islam who are quite thick on the ground of Eastern Libya, Cyrenaica. This would give AQIM a secure and wealthy base of operations. It would also mean for the majority of Libyans that they have simply exchanged a secular authoritarian regime for one of a Koran waving nature.
There is a better than excellent chance Yemen will collapse into a welter of feuding regions and tribes in which the single greatest "winner" will be AQAP. In this regard it is well to recall that Secretary Gates this past weekend termed AQAP the largest threat confronting the West from all the assorted franchises of bin Laden's group. Saudi Arabia would be put square in the crosshairs of AQAP should it emerge as the most potent faction in the riven remnants of Yemen.
Then, of course, there is Iran. There is always Iran. The mullahs will be a year closer to the goal of the "Mahdi Bomb." The Iranian government will have had more months to cultivate and spread influence among the Shia of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Recall that the Eastern Province is majority Shia as well as the most prolific producer of oil in the kingdom.)
The Israeli-Palestinian Question will not be answered in the next few months. The resumption of rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza points in a dangerous direction. So does the restart of IED attacks mounted in all probability from the West Bank of the Palestinian Authority. Once again the dead and the fearful will direct policy on both sides. This implies the cycle of strike and counterstrike will escalate slowly but inexorably over the next year--unless a more dramatic war intervenes on the Northern Front of Israel.
This set of seismic shocks yet to come has been restricted to the Mideast. The rest of the world has been ignored intentionally but this in no way should be taken to imply the rest of the globe--North Korea, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, even Latin America will be monuments to peace, love, and flower power, sections of the globe where overage diplomats and military officers can be safely put out to pasture, free to rusticate without unpleasant demands placed upon them.
John Bolton was right. And, it would be good for the Herd of Elephants to pay attention to him. Foreign matters will come closer and closer to center stage. This will be the case to an even greater degree if We the People become more optimistic about the economy over the next year and if, (unlikely as this may be) Congress addresses the deficit to more than a symbolic degree.
The US has suffered through eighteen years of ideologically driven, situationally naive presidents. We have at least two more years of this enervating situation yet to go. Is it too much to hope that the days of True Belief will come to an end--along with the decline of American influence and status in the world--in 2012?
Unfortunately it is. That is unless either Obama bows out or the Republicans come up with a person capable of being a president who is not out of his depth when he must play his role on the world stage.
And, make no mistake about it, the next president will have to play a great role--for the earthquake is yet to come.
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Ripples And Fallout
No event exists or can exist in a vacuum. Certainly no event punctuated by the noise of bombs, missiles, and gunfire can be considered to have no implications, no ramifications, no ripples and fallout. So it is with the Western Answer to the Libyan Question.
If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now. The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target. The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct. When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.
This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost. The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US. The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein. His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.
The big QED is self-evident. As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe. Lose that capacity and all is over. The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program. Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.
Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay. The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.
So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe. One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.
The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria. Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya. The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.
Leiberman did not mention Hama. He should have. It would have made his case more convincing. Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion. At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire. The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater. In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent. More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.
A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent. The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years. The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now. This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.
For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo. They can neither expect nor give quarter. Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.
With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern. That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria. Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power. If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.
Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria. She averred that every country in the Mideast is different. Duh? Gosh, you don't say?
Syria certainly isn't Libya. Syria is far from isolated. While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia. This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.
Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states. It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West. It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics. This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself. This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.
Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA. The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob. This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.
Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya. It has a far more up to date air defense system. In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer. And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel. Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.
Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought. One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.
Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria. If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done. And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions. Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.
There are other ripples sloshing around. None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular. One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US. Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration. Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.
Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison. The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What this means is simple. We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.
In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.
If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now. The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target. The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct. When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.
This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost. The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US. The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein. His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.
The big QED is self-evident. As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe. Lose that capacity and all is over. The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program. Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.
Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay. The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.
So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe. One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.
The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria. Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya. The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.
Leiberman did not mention Hama. He should have. It would have made his case more convincing. Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion. At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire. The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater. In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent. More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.
A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent. The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years. The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now. This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.
For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo. They can neither expect nor give quarter. Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.
With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern. That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria. Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power. If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.
Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria. She averred that every country in the Mideast is different. Duh? Gosh, you don't say?
Syria certainly isn't Libya. Syria is far from isolated. While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia. This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.
Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states. It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West. It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics. This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself. This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.
Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA. The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob. This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.
Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya. It has a far more up to date air defense system. In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer. And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel. Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.
Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought. One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.
Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria. If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done. And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions. Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.
There are other ripples sloshing around. None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular. One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US. Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration. Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.
Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison. The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What this means is simple. We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.
In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.
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