Perhaps the best sign of growing Saudi anxiety over the near future is the recall of the legendary Prince Bandar from the diplomatic/political purgatory he has inhabited for the past several years. Bandar's record in the many jobs he has held including a lengthy and very productive stint as the Kingdom's ambassador to the US shows him to be a man of unusual boldness, resourcefulness, and determination. Given the way in which regional affairs have been going rapidly and steadily south from the perspective of Riyadh, it was a certainty that Bandar would be brought back, the Kingdom's diplomatic cavalry in action.
The single greatest reason for the return of Bandar and the incipient panic in the House of Saud reflected in his recall is the firm belief that the US is currently run by a crew of notably inept, incompetent, unrealistic, naive folks who have no clue regarding the merciless nature of the environment of the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The Saudi elite have reached the conclusion that more than ever they are on their own, that the US has abandoned its relationship with the Kingdom. Even if that is not completely true, the behavior of the Obama administration and the president personally have demonstrated that there is no accurate understanding of the existential contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Rightly or wrongly (and the former is far more likely than the latter), the Saudi government is convinced that Iran is playing for keeps, that the mullahs have the near- to mid-term goal of becoming the regional hegemon and the long-term ambition of seeing Shia replace Sunni as the dominant form of Islam. This would include the Shiites (takfir, the lot of them) taking control of the Land of the Two Mosques. In the estimate of the Saudis this would mean not only the end of the Kingdom, but the end of Wahhibism, indeed the end of Islam as the world currently knows it.
That, bucko, adds up to existential with a capital "E."
In the eyes of the House of Saud, the Obama administration has been tried in the balance and found wanting during the episodes constituting the "Arab Spring." Not even personal massaging (and messaging) by Secretary Gates or the National Security Advisor can change the reality that the US eased the exit of Hosni Mubarak, that the US has been far less than resolute in seeking the removal of Saudi bete noir Gaddafi, that the US has been confining its disapproval of Syria (seen by the Saudis as an Iranian viper in the Arab house) to boilerplate platitudes, or that the US has been irresolute to say the least in its support of Saudi client Bahrain.
According to the Saudi scorecard, the US is 0 for 4--0 for 5 if Yemen is included.
Enter Prince Bandar. The first mission the prince undertook was a series of quick trips to Pakistan, China, and Russia. Ostensibly these were for the purpose of shoring up diplomatic support for the Kingdom, and, indeed, that was no doubt part of the Bandar brief. But it was not the only part.
Years ago Prince Bandar covertly arranged the sale by China of medium range missiles without the knowledge let alone the consent of the US. The resulting storm with Israel was settled by the US, and the Saudis won a significant increase in both their arsenal and diplomatic clout. Considering the Saudis have been buying weapons by the freighter load from countries as diverse as the US and Spain, there is no reason to believe the prince was not exploring what hardware the Chinese might have to offer.
The same is true with respect to Russia. The Russian arms industry is no slouch in the quality department--at least in some areas of production. And, they deliver a lot more potential bang for the buck--without any nasty diplomatic or political diversions as is so often the case with the US. Nor would Russian weapons and munitions be confined necessarily to what might be delicately termed "conventional."
Now for Pakistan. It is very well known that Saudi Arabia funded the extensive Wahhibist "outreach" program at the behest of Zia. Not as well known but equally critical to the state of play today is that Saudi petrodollars underwrote much of the cost of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Now a "quid" of that magnitude does not come without a suitable "pro quo."
While the prince might have been jawing with the lads in Islamabad only to assure diplomatic understanding or to arrange the importation of good Sunni security personnel to crack Shiite heads in Bahrain or the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that anyone would be surprised if there was some talk about when and under what conditions a portion of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would be "forward deployed" in the Kingdom as a counter to Iranian ambitions.
An understanding of this sort would confer benefits on both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both are concerned about an emergent, nuclear armed Iran. The posting of some nuclear weapons on Saudi soil would complicate the task of forcible nuclear disarmament of Pakistan. And, Pakistan would gain diplomatic leverage by being seen as co-guarantor with the Saudis of the continued Sunni possession of the Two Mosques. Mutual needs and mutual ambitions could be met with one grand bargain.
As a further benefit, the mere threat of a Saudi "forward basing" of Pakistani nukes would send a very firm and unmistakable warning message to the US. The message boils down to: There are very grave dangers in a world where the US sits passive on the sidelines.
Peace, love, flower power, and the UN are all nice, warm, fuzzy notions. They make a person feel good just considering them. But, they are darn poor predicates for foreign and national security policy. The Obama love affair with a "humble" US and an assertive UN may sit well with touchy-feely segments of the American and Western European elites, but they are totally irrelevant in the very tough neighborhood inhabited by Saudi Arabia.
Prince Bandar is the right man to take bold, even over-the-edge actions calculated to shock the US into a more realistic course of action in the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The most likely actions for Bandar to pursue are those which are "fail-safe" from the Saudi vantage point. An understanding on nuclear weapons--or even the grey market procurement of such--represents a proper "fail-safe" approach. Either the US wakes up and smells the coffee or, at the worst, Riyadh has the mechanisms necessary to counter the potential Iranian nuclear capacity--and the diplomatic implications of this.
Bandar's arrival back in the center of Saudi decision making assures there will be additional pressures brought to bear on the Obama "team" to get off the dime in both Libya and Syria. The will and ability of the US to do something about these two Saudi adversaries speaks volumes concerning the American capacity and willingness to do something about Iran when such proves absolutely necessary. There will also be additional pressure on the Nice Young Man From Chicago to come down on the right side in Bahrain.
The outlines of a deal are hinted here. Obama moves hard against both Gaddafi and Assad so he has the political freedom to overlook the repression in Bahrain. From the perspective of a man with the balls and brains of Bandar this is a perfect deal.
Of course it will look quite different from the point of view held by the Guy in the Oval who is notably deficient in the very areas where Prince Bandar is arguably overendowed.
Showing posts with label Bahrain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bahrain. Show all posts
Saturday, April 23, 2011
Friday, March 18, 2011
A No-Resolution Resolution--And The Game Goes On
As the Geek has posted previously, no one ought to underestimate Gaddafi (or Khadafi, or whichever alternative you prefer.) The man is a very clever person--and never more clever than when his survival is threatened. His response to the UN Security Council "all necessary means" vote demonstrates that--in spades.
His tone turned from flaming defiance--all air and maritime traffic in the Mediterranean will become a target--to one of pure peace and transparency--all military operations will be stopped and, why don't you all come by and see the situation for yourselves--in a matter of hours. The change was so fast and hard that observers may have gotten whiplash as a result.
Gaddafi will do whatever is necessary to keep himself in power. Even if his power is limited effectively to those towns where his troops are in unquestioned control, it is Gaddafi power. Even if his tenure in office seems to be limited by the ongoing sanctions, he has, at the very least, bought some of that most precious commodity--time. He is of the view that time must be on his side.
Time gives opportunity. In Gaddafi's case the opportunity being sought for exploitation is the split between the major powers of the European Union as well as the chasm separating the stance of the most bellicose governments from the support of the majority of their populations. There is already a yawning gulf between France and the UK on the one hand and Germany on the other. There is already a palpable lack of enthusiasm within the French (and other people) for any more war within a Muslim state. Even in the UK, which has hung longest and toughest in the Afghanistan effort, one sees a notable dearth of let's-get-the-bastard-out sentiment among the Brits generally.
Time also provides an opportunity to develop mechanisms to evade the sanctions so far imposed. Time provides Gaddafi with the opportunity to explore inviting Russian and Chinese interests to take over the oilfield operations from the European companies whose governments have "betrayed" Gaddafi's faith.
Time allows for the erosion of support for the insurgent forces. It allows for divisions within the insurgents to emerge, to weaken political will in that quarter. The passage of days, weeks, and, ultimately, months, will allow Gaddafi to use indirect means to foster discontent within rebel ranks, to bend the uncommitted increasingly in his direction. And, time's slow passage provides for the opportunity for Gaddafi to strengthen his own forces and gain more support from regimes hostile to the West.
The hands of time also strangle any real commitment on the part of President Obama to the insurgents to fade. The same applies to any American indignation or revulsion over the acts of Gaddafi's killers. He is betting that We the People will lose interest in Libya and wander off--with the American president at the head of the parade. Gaddafi knows that the shelf life of even the toughest of Obama tough talk is short.
Gaddafi's act of apparent preemptive surrender will go a long way to assuring that the world is stuck with his noxious presence for some time to come. Should he be successful in consolidating his territory and even in extending his sway deeper into the insurgent heartland around Benghazi, the probability of the reemergence of Gaddafi 1.0 grows high. A slow, incremental victory, even a victory so gradual in coming as to be insensible, is nonetheless a victory. With victory comes the aftermath--the scores to be settled. And, it scarcely needs mentioning, Gaddafi believes he has a number of scores to settle.
So, the game in Libya will go on.
So also will the game in Bahrain.
The situation in Bahrain is looking more and more dismal by the day. Underneath the cosmetic changes, the most dramatic of which was the demolition of the Pearl Roundabout's iconic image, the reality of the violent cleavage between the Shiite majority and the ruling Sunni minority continues. Also continuing is the direct presence of Saudi Arabian armed forces and the indirect involvement of Iranian agents of influence.
The great Saudi-Iranian cold war has taken on a definitely warmish aspect. The Iranian press has been loudly playing the ancient claim that Bahrain is a former province of Iran in a manner which reminds one of the mood music played by Saddam Hussein regarding Kuwait as Iraq's thirteenth province. The Saudis are becoming increasingly anxious over the role played by Iranian agents in fomenting unrest not only among Bahrain's Shiite population but that five percent of Saudi Arabia's which is both Shiite and living in the oil rich Eastern Province.
While always couched in religious terms the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran is purely secular in both its motivation and goal. Each sees itself in the role of regional hegemon. Each defines its role as regional hegemon in terms of nationalism. This conflict has as little to do with theology, with the doctrinal split separating Shia from Wahhibist Sunni as earlier contests for regional hegemonic status. Religion is invoked as a justification or as a weapon of psychological warfare, but is not at the center of the contest.
The US is caught between the two regional millstones. Saudi Arabia is obviously the better candidate for regional hegemonic status from our perspective. Bahrain is not simply a client of Saudi Arabia, it hosts an important (albeit not critical) base of US naval operations. Further, the future of Bahrain has strong implications for other Gulf states, all of which are important to either US economic or strategic interests.
There are a couple of ground rules in the Game of Bahrain which are evident already. The first is simply that there is no way the Sunni rulers of either Bahrain or Saudi Arabia will allow more than token, symbolic power sharing with the Shiite majority. There is too much fear of Tehran inspired or facilitated subversion to permit any genuine sharing of political authority, at least in the short- to mid-term. The second is that neither the Saudi nor the Bahraini king will be satisfied with anything less than total and high profile American support. Our influence is directly proportionate to the openness of administration support.
In contrast, the opposition in Bahrain takes us at our pro-reform, pro-democracy word. Any evident slackening in either area or any lessening of pressure on the government to end its suppression will serve to enhance the credibility of Tehran's agents. A misstep in dealing with the opponents of the current regime in Bahrain would give great advantage to Iran.
Obama's let-Europe-take-the-point approach worked in Libya--up to a point. A similar dilatory course of action will fail miserably in Bahrain.
That is a fact to keep in mind as the game goes on.
His tone turned from flaming defiance--all air and maritime traffic in the Mediterranean will become a target--to one of pure peace and transparency--all military operations will be stopped and, why don't you all come by and see the situation for yourselves--in a matter of hours. The change was so fast and hard that observers may have gotten whiplash as a result.
Gaddafi will do whatever is necessary to keep himself in power. Even if his power is limited effectively to those towns where his troops are in unquestioned control, it is Gaddafi power. Even if his tenure in office seems to be limited by the ongoing sanctions, he has, at the very least, bought some of that most precious commodity--time. He is of the view that time must be on his side.
Time gives opportunity. In Gaddafi's case the opportunity being sought for exploitation is the split between the major powers of the European Union as well as the chasm separating the stance of the most bellicose governments from the support of the majority of their populations. There is already a yawning gulf between France and the UK on the one hand and Germany on the other. There is already a palpable lack of enthusiasm within the French (and other people) for any more war within a Muslim state. Even in the UK, which has hung longest and toughest in the Afghanistan effort, one sees a notable dearth of let's-get-the-bastard-out sentiment among the Brits generally.
Time also provides an opportunity to develop mechanisms to evade the sanctions so far imposed. Time provides Gaddafi with the opportunity to explore inviting Russian and Chinese interests to take over the oilfield operations from the European companies whose governments have "betrayed" Gaddafi's faith.
Time allows for the erosion of support for the insurgent forces. It allows for divisions within the insurgents to emerge, to weaken political will in that quarter. The passage of days, weeks, and, ultimately, months, will allow Gaddafi to use indirect means to foster discontent within rebel ranks, to bend the uncommitted increasingly in his direction. And, time's slow passage provides for the opportunity for Gaddafi to strengthen his own forces and gain more support from regimes hostile to the West.
The hands of time also strangle any real commitment on the part of President Obama to the insurgents to fade. The same applies to any American indignation or revulsion over the acts of Gaddafi's killers. He is betting that We the People will lose interest in Libya and wander off--with the American president at the head of the parade. Gaddafi knows that the shelf life of even the toughest of Obama tough talk is short.
Gaddafi's act of apparent preemptive surrender will go a long way to assuring that the world is stuck with his noxious presence for some time to come. Should he be successful in consolidating his territory and even in extending his sway deeper into the insurgent heartland around Benghazi, the probability of the reemergence of Gaddafi 1.0 grows high. A slow, incremental victory, even a victory so gradual in coming as to be insensible, is nonetheless a victory. With victory comes the aftermath--the scores to be settled. And, it scarcely needs mentioning, Gaddafi believes he has a number of scores to settle.
So, the game in Libya will go on.
So also will the game in Bahrain.
The situation in Bahrain is looking more and more dismal by the day. Underneath the cosmetic changes, the most dramatic of which was the demolition of the Pearl Roundabout's iconic image, the reality of the violent cleavage between the Shiite majority and the ruling Sunni minority continues. Also continuing is the direct presence of Saudi Arabian armed forces and the indirect involvement of Iranian agents of influence.
The great Saudi-Iranian cold war has taken on a definitely warmish aspect. The Iranian press has been loudly playing the ancient claim that Bahrain is a former province of Iran in a manner which reminds one of the mood music played by Saddam Hussein regarding Kuwait as Iraq's thirteenth province. The Saudis are becoming increasingly anxious over the role played by Iranian agents in fomenting unrest not only among Bahrain's Shiite population but that five percent of Saudi Arabia's which is both Shiite and living in the oil rich Eastern Province.
While always couched in religious terms the contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran is purely secular in both its motivation and goal. Each sees itself in the role of regional hegemon. Each defines its role as regional hegemon in terms of nationalism. This conflict has as little to do with theology, with the doctrinal split separating Shia from Wahhibist Sunni as earlier contests for regional hegemonic status. Religion is invoked as a justification or as a weapon of psychological warfare, but is not at the center of the contest.
The US is caught between the two regional millstones. Saudi Arabia is obviously the better candidate for regional hegemonic status from our perspective. Bahrain is not simply a client of Saudi Arabia, it hosts an important (albeit not critical) base of US naval operations. Further, the future of Bahrain has strong implications for other Gulf states, all of which are important to either US economic or strategic interests.
There are a couple of ground rules in the Game of Bahrain which are evident already. The first is simply that there is no way the Sunni rulers of either Bahrain or Saudi Arabia will allow more than token, symbolic power sharing with the Shiite majority. There is too much fear of Tehran inspired or facilitated subversion to permit any genuine sharing of political authority, at least in the short- to mid-term. The second is that neither the Saudi nor the Bahraini king will be satisfied with anything less than total and high profile American support. Our influence is directly proportionate to the openness of administration support.
In contrast, the opposition in Bahrain takes us at our pro-reform, pro-democracy word. Any evident slackening in either area or any lessening of pressure on the government to end its suppression will serve to enhance the credibility of Tehran's agents. A misstep in dealing with the opponents of the current regime in Bahrain would give great advantage to Iran.
Obama's let-Europe-take-the-point approach worked in Libya--up to a point. A similar dilatory course of action will fail miserably in Bahrain.
That is a fact to keep in mind as the game goes on.
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Once Again It's Escalation Time In Bahrain
When the Saudi troops and armor moved down the causeway to Bahrain, any observer well oriented in time and place would have concluded that the countdown to a crackdown had commenced. The observer might also have mused that the number of hours on the clock was not great.
The troops have moved. The protest encampment in Pearl Square has been cleared. People have been wounded. Some have been killed. The ante in this particular game of bluff has been raised. So have the stakes for all players: the royal family and its Sunni minority supporters, the Shiite majority protesters, the backroom crowd from Tehran and, not least, the US for whom Bahrain is an important strategic outpost.
The Obama folks responded to the most recent clearing operation as they did the previous one. All the right boilerplate phrases have been pulled out of the word processors, "urge restraint," "deplore violence," "need for dialogue" and all the other routine yabba, yabba, dabba, dabba, yadda, yadda.
On the other side of the hill, the side occupied by the royal family of Bahrain, matters are seen differently. The Bahraini royals and their supporters see a strong probability that Obama is going to pull the plug on them as they believe was the case with Hosni Mubarak. There is a strong perception not only in Bahrain but also in Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Coordination Council to the effect that President Obama either though inertia and indifference or under the pressure of personal ideology allowed the overthrow of Mubarak and is likely to do the same with the assorted royals of the Gulf states.
The same perception, or one so close as to be operationally identical, must run through the minds of the Mullahs and their frontmen in Iran, Syria, and within Hezbollah. The vacillating stances of Obama and his secretary of state during the "Lotus Revolution" were seen not only in Egypt but elsewhere as the product of a weak person with no political will. This would embolden the adversaries of the status quo (including Iran) and force the current governments under threat to take more robust actions more rapidly than might otherwise be necessary, let alone desirable.
This analytical stance must lead to the conclusion that the Obama administration and the president himself bear a direct responsibility for the deaths in Bahrain. It also means the same applies with respect to the inevitable deterioration of political stability in Bahrain.
It doesn't matter that the authoritarian regimes have lasted so long in the region in largest measure due to American support. The reasons for that support matter even less. The reality that the US policy of supporting dictators and semi-dictators regardless of the rhetoric favoring democracy was fully justified considering American national and strategic interests as well as the threats presented to them matters least of all.
In Bahrain currently as in Egypt a couple of weeks ago, the US was caught between the two primary pillars of its foreign policy: the idealistic long term commitment to democracy and other political, social, and cultural values and norms on the one hand and the pragmatically sanctioned realistic need to defend and advance certain short term national and strategic interests against clear threats. This dynamic of contradictory policy imperatives both hamstrings and brands as hypocritical whatever the US seeks to do when confronted by a sudden political change as rapid and devastating of the old order as a tsunami.
Worsening the situation has been the chronic administration focus upon splitting the difference and postponing decision making under the transparent cover of appearing to be deliberate and prudent. A nice show which may play in Peoria, but one which falls on its flabby rear end in the streets and squares where the political battles are fought.
As a result no ruler in the Mideast can be sure the US will support him when doing such might require actions running contrary to the myth of constant American upholding of truth, democracy, and the American Way. King Hamid cannot trust Obama to remain a consistent supporter even if the current regime does enter into legitimate negotiations with the dissident Shiites. The same applies to King Abdullah next door in Saudi Arabia. Ditto for all the other feudal rulers of the GCC states.
Can you blame them for concluding they are on their own? Can they be blamed for taking robust action in the hope (perhaps forlorn) that by doing such enough order to allow minimal concessions might be achieved? And, can anyone blame these endangered rulers facing not only domestic threats but the machinations of Iran for ignoring the fine words of the Obama folks?
The answer to each and all these questions is simple: Of course not.
The sorry record of the Obama administration compels the local rulers to ignore Washington completely. The indecisive nature of the administration, its reliance on speeches and verbal lines in the sand never backed by actions which might be effective in the short term, the inability of Mr Obama and his "team" even to come to terms with the realities in Libya, all of these combine to reduce American influence in the region to zero. Even if the local kings and sheiks had been so tone deaf as to miss the significance of Obama reversing decades of US policy toward Israel, they could scarcely overlook the lack of resolute or even visible policy in Egypt.
The King of Bahrain and his peers throughout the Gulf region have no one to look to except each other and themselves. The US is worse than a mere nonentity. It has become a distrusted player, a potential enemy who claims to be a friend. So they act reflexively, violently, coercively in the hopes it might bring a time out during which some sort of internal deal might be brokered.
The reliance on coercion may well be misplaced, fatally so. But in that event at the least the current governments will have been stabbed in the chest. That, the rulers must believe, is better by far than waiting for Mr Obama to plunge the deadly knife into their backs.
Mr Obama and his adherents may convince themselves that the President is a perfect model of statesmanship: cool, deliberative, refusing to act precipitously. This is an illusion. In sharpest point of fact, the Obama "team" is assuring more unrest, longer unrest, and an ever growing mound of corpses. In the final analysis the blood must be seen as staining the hands of the Deep Thinkers of Washington far more than it does the hands of the locals.
The troops have moved. The protest encampment in Pearl Square has been cleared. People have been wounded. Some have been killed. The ante in this particular game of bluff has been raised. So have the stakes for all players: the royal family and its Sunni minority supporters, the Shiite majority protesters, the backroom crowd from Tehran and, not least, the US for whom Bahrain is an important strategic outpost.
The Obama folks responded to the most recent clearing operation as they did the previous one. All the right boilerplate phrases have been pulled out of the word processors, "urge restraint," "deplore violence," "need for dialogue" and all the other routine yabba, yabba, dabba, dabba, yadda, yadda.
On the other side of the hill, the side occupied by the royal family of Bahrain, matters are seen differently. The Bahraini royals and their supporters see a strong probability that Obama is going to pull the plug on them as they believe was the case with Hosni Mubarak. There is a strong perception not only in Bahrain but also in Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Coordination Council to the effect that President Obama either though inertia and indifference or under the pressure of personal ideology allowed the overthrow of Mubarak and is likely to do the same with the assorted royals of the Gulf states.
The same perception, or one so close as to be operationally identical, must run through the minds of the Mullahs and their frontmen in Iran, Syria, and within Hezbollah. The vacillating stances of Obama and his secretary of state during the "Lotus Revolution" were seen not only in Egypt but elsewhere as the product of a weak person with no political will. This would embolden the adversaries of the status quo (including Iran) and force the current governments under threat to take more robust actions more rapidly than might otherwise be necessary, let alone desirable.
This analytical stance must lead to the conclusion that the Obama administration and the president himself bear a direct responsibility for the deaths in Bahrain. It also means the same applies with respect to the inevitable deterioration of political stability in Bahrain.
It doesn't matter that the authoritarian regimes have lasted so long in the region in largest measure due to American support. The reasons for that support matter even less. The reality that the US policy of supporting dictators and semi-dictators regardless of the rhetoric favoring democracy was fully justified considering American national and strategic interests as well as the threats presented to them matters least of all.
In Bahrain currently as in Egypt a couple of weeks ago, the US was caught between the two primary pillars of its foreign policy: the idealistic long term commitment to democracy and other political, social, and cultural values and norms on the one hand and the pragmatically sanctioned realistic need to defend and advance certain short term national and strategic interests against clear threats. This dynamic of contradictory policy imperatives both hamstrings and brands as hypocritical whatever the US seeks to do when confronted by a sudden political change as rapid and devastating of the old order as a tsunami.
Worsening the situation has been the chronic administration focus upon splitting the difference and postponing decision making under the transparent cover of appearing to be deliberate and prudent. A nice show which may play in Peoria, but one which falls on its flabby rear end in the streets and squares where the political battles are fought.
As a result no ruler in the Mideast can be sure the US will support him when doing such might require actions running contrary to the myth of constant American upholding of truth, democracy, and the American Way. King Hamid cannot trust Obama to remain a consistent supporter even if the current regime does enter into legitimate negotiations with the dissident Shiites. The same applies to King Abdullah next door in Saudi Arabia. Ditto for all the other feudal rulers of the GCC states.
Can you blame them for concluding they are on their own? Can they be blamed for taking robust action in the hope (perhaps forlorn) that by doing such enough order to allow minimal concessions might be achieved? And, can anyone blame these endangered rulers facing not only domestic threats but the machinations of Iran for ignoring the fine words of the Obama folks?
The answer to each and all these questions is simple: Of course not.
The sorry record of the Obama administration compels the local rulers to ignore Washington completely. The indecisive nature of the administration, its reliance on speeches and verbal lines in the sand never backed by actions which might be effective in the short term, the inability of Mr Obama and his "team" even to come to terms with the realities in Libya, all of these combine to reduce American influence in the region to zero. Even if the local kings and sheiks had been so tone deaf as to miss the significance of Obama reversing decades of US policy toward Israel, they could scarcely overlook the lack of resolute or even visible policy in Egypt.
The King of Bahrain and his peers throughout the Gulf region have no one to look to except each other and themselves. The US is worse than a mere nonentity. It has become a distrusted player, a potential enemy who claims to be a friend. So they act reflexively, violently, coercively in the hopes it might bring a time out during which some sort of internal deal might be brokered.
The reliance on coercion may well be misplaced, fatally so. But in that event at the least the current governments will have been stabbed in the chest. That, the rulers must believe, is better by far than waiting for Mr Obama to plunge the deadly knife into their backs.
Mr Obama and his adherents may convince themselves that the President is a perfect model of statesmanship: cool, deliberative, refusing to act precipitously. This is an illusion. In sharpest point of fact, the Obama "team" is assuring more unrest, longer unrest, and an ever growing mound of corpses. In the final analysis the blood must be seen as staining the hands of the Deep Thinkers of Washington far more than it does the hands of the locals.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Pucker Factor Has To Be On The Rise In Saudi Arabia
Now that the government of Bahrain has reversed course on its treatment of the anti-government protests there, the House of Sand must be more worried than before. There are two reasons for the probable uptick in uptightness in the Kingdom.
First, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is right across the narrow waterway from Bahrain. The Eastern Province, like Bahrain, is majority Shiite in makeup. Further, the Shiites of the EP echo their coreligionists in charges of discrimination at the hands of the Wahhibist regime and larger population.
Second, the House of Saud does not trust the current US administration. The belief in Saudi Arabia is the Obama administration has gone wobbly with respect to the status quo in the Mideast. The government at its highest levels is particularly torqued off over the administration having abandoned Hosni Mubarak with unseemly haste and without any eye on the future. Of course, the future which Saudi Arabia worries about centers on any extension of Iranian influence in the region.
For several years now the primary concern of the House of Saud has been Iran not Israel. The Saudis would be willing to sell out every Palestinian extant if that would help secure a future safe from Iranian ambitions. The Saudis, as the WikiLeaks cables make clear, has lost no opportunity in conveying this position to the Obama administration as it did the Bush/Cheney team. Any sign by Washington of decreasing interest in maintaining the status quo pushes the worry beads into hyperdrive all over the Kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has always been worried about being encircled. In the old days of Pan-Arabism and the Soviet Union, the fear was the combination would create a Soviet controlled bloc running from Egypt to Iraq as well as from Egypt to Yemen. Now the anxiety is that Iran will do something similar using proxies ranging from Hamas and Hezbollah to the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its "official" state ally, Syria. The Saudi regime is now of the firm view that the US is not sensitive to this potential.
The House of Saud is not willing to believe its own propaganda. The fear is the combination of gobs of money, Wahhibism, and a more or less popular royal house will not prove to be enough to defeat some full throated, Iranian assisted exercise in local "people power." The first expression of this belief can be seen in the probable role being played by Saudi officials in the response by Bahrain to the pro-change demonstrators.
There is strong reason to believe (although no direct proof) that the very muscular response of the Bahraini security forces was orchestrated in Saudi Arabia. The unexpected overnight shift to "dialogue" including the withdrawal of the army from Pearl Roundabout constituted a Bahraini act of regret. Should the new, velvet glove approach not payoff and quickly, the fifteen mile causeway built by the Saudis exists for a reason far more military then providing a quick weekend getaway for Saudis in search of a drink.
The situation in Bahrain is far from settled. The (perhaps temporary) back down by the government will probably prove insufficient to end the demonstrations permanently. The blood of the martyrs will not allow such an easy out. At the same time the House of Saud is not going to allow any move which smacks of regime change to occur. While the Saudi army is probably not combat capable against the Iranians or any other real armed force, it is up to the task of squashing unarmed demonstrators.
The Obama administration will have to factor Saudi fears as well as probable Saudi actions into whatever passes as policy regarding Bahrain. The Saudis will insist on order, the order of the status quo, being maintained against all comers and all American desires. The Deep Thinkers of Team Obama will have to keep in mind the reality that the word "change" is an obscenity in the minds of the Saudi regime.
Recalling the rumors of Saudi campaign cash flowing into Obama coffers, one cannot help but wonder if the House of Saud believes now that it got value for its money.
First, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia is right across the narrow waterway from Bahrain. The Eastern Province, like Bahrain, is majority Shiite in makeup. Further, the Shiites of the EP echo their coreligionists in charges of discrimination at the hands of the Wahhibist regime and larger population.
Second, the House of Saud does not trust the current US administration. The belief in Saudi Arabia is the Obama administration has gone wobbly with respect to the status quo in the Mideast. The government at its highest levels is particularly torqued off over the administration having abandoned Hosni Mubarak with unseemly haste and without any eye on the future. Of course, the future which Saudi Arabia worries about centers on any extension of Iranian influence in the region.
For several years now the primary concern of the House of Saud has been Iran not Israel. The Saudis would be willing to sell out every Palestinian extant if that would help secure a future safe from Iranian ambitions. The Saudis, as the WikiLeaks cables make clear, has lost no opportunity in conveying this position to the Obama administration as it did the Bush/Cheney team. Any sign by Washington of decreasing interest in maintaining the status quo pushes the worry beads into hyperdrive all over the Kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has always been worried about being encircled. In the old days of Pan-Arabism and the Soviet Union, the fear was the combination would create a Soviet controlled bloc running from Egypt to Iraq as well as from Egypt to Yemen. Now the anxiety is that Iran will do something similar using proxies ranging from Hamas and Hezbollah to the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its "official" state ally, Syria. The Saudi regime is now of the firm view that the US is not sensitive to this potential.
The House of Saud is not willing to believe its own propaganda. The fear is the combination of gobs of money, Wahhibism, and a more or less popular royal house will not prove to be enough to defeat some full throated, Iranian assisted exercise in local "people power." The first expression of this belief can be seen in the probable role being played by Saudi officials in the response by Bahrain to the pro-change demonstrators.
There is strong reason to believe (although no direct proof) that the very muscular response of the Bahraini security forces was orchestrated in Saudi Arabia. The unexpected overnight shift to "dialogue" including the withdrawal of the army from Pearl Roundabout constituted a Bahraini act of regret. Should the new, velvet glove approach not payoff and quickly, the fifteen mile causeway built by the Saudis exists for a reason far more military then providing a quick weekend getaway for Saudis in search of a drink.
The situation in Bahrain is far from settled. The (perhaps temporary) back down by the government will probably prove insufficient to end the demonstrations permanently. The blood of the martyrs will not allow such an easy out. At the same time the House of Saud is not going to allow any move which smacks of regime change to occur. While the Saudi army is probably not combat capable against the Iranians or any other real armed force, it is up to the task of squashing unarmed demonstrators.
The Obama administration will have to factor Saudi fears as well as probable Saudi actions into whatever passes as policy regarding Bahrain. The Saudis will insist on order, the order of the status quo, being maintained against all comers and all American desires. The Deep Thinkers of Team Obama will have to keep in mind the reality that the word "change" is an obscenity in the minds of the Saudi regime.
Recalling the rumors of Saudi campaign cash flowing into Obama coffers, one cannot help but wonder if the House of Saud believes now that it got value for its money.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Head Busting Time In Bahrain
The demos in Bahrain not only are different in thrust and goals from those in other Arab states, they present the Obama administration with a degree of diplomatic difficulty surpassing that contained in the Egyptian conundrum. The situation in Bahrain, both demographic and political as well as the diplomatic context, constitutes a genuine one-off problem which only superficially resembles what has or will happen in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, or Iran.
The fundamental dynamic in Bahrain is sectarian. The overwhelming majority of the native population of the micro-state is Shiite. The ruling elite (and the individuals imported from other countries including those in Asia to act as security personnel) are Sunni. The Shiite majority claims with a high degree of documentable accuracy to have suffered discrimination both political and economic.
The government--a monarchy with some very limited features of constitutionality--not only denies the charges of discrimination but counters with accusations of Iranian influence at work within the Shiite community. There is no doubt but Tehran's agents have been beavering away seeking to broaden and focus the latent political disaffiliation extant in the population. This is not to imply the mullahs have created the disaffiliation and its outgrowth de novo but rather to argue the Iranian influence has accelerated the pace of development along the insurgent continuum. The past few years have demonstrated a continued and escalating progress from latent and inchoate political disaffiliation to the beginnings of genuine organization.
The government in Manama has given too much emphasis to the not-so-hidden hand of Tehran in justifying the excessive use of force in its overnight security operation clearing the Pearl Park. There was some, probably not overly important, Iranian guidance, but the real impetus to the demonstrations came from their essential nature as self-organizing.
It is unfortunate but expectable that the local government as well as the Deep Thinkers in the US have underestimated the rapidly growing potency of non-linear, self-organizing systems. The notion of "leaderless" political movements was strictly fictional until the advent of widespread horizontal communications methods. Now that these are a normal part of quotidian life nearly everywhere, the "leaderless" political movement, even the "leaderless" political organization (an apparent oxymoron) have become not only possible but annoyingly commonplace.
Whichever side first and best comprehends the potency of the self-organizing, non-linear political movement will gain an undeniable advantage in the great game of insurgency and its close cousin, political revolution. The existence of the self-organizing movement allows the heavy lifting of direct confrontation with the status quo to occur without risk to agenda driven men in the back room. For example, the real work of deposing Hosni Mubarak was done by the self-organizing folk of Tahiri Square not the Muslim Brotherhood or any other opposition group. Now, with the decks of the ancien regime having been cleared, the second stage of political change can be accomplished by whichever group can offer the most tightly organized, well focused agenda as well as co-opt the energy and frustrations of the folks who did the earlier work.
The same dynamic can be seen as having been at work in Tunisia. The deck clearing was done in fine "leaderless" style, but the construction of a new political/social/economic structure will be done by those who run the old, well organized primarily Muslim oriented groups.
The situation in Bahrain shows the self-organizing phenomenon at work. The protests were not directed, let alone ordered by Tehran. But, should the government continue to bobble its task of keeping short term order with the hope that long term stability might emerge, Tehran is in the wings, plans and agents at the ready. With the bloody suppression of the nearly peaceful demonstrations, the king and his men have made the challenge offered by the demonstrators truly existential.
The demonstrators, after all, are Shiite. What makes this label important is not simply the identity with the majority of Iran's population but the cultural traditions and definers of the Shia branch of Islam. Shiites have a long history and deep tradition of martyrdom. Martyrdom is the single greatest definer of a "Partisan of Ali." Shia was born in martyrdom. It is nourished by the blood of martyrs. The transcendent ecstasy of pain felt and blood spilled in truth to the faith is evident at all major Shiite rituals, ceremonies, and high holy days.
In a very real sense when the (primarily imported) police forces cut loose last night with concussion and tear gas grenades, truncheons, and shotguns, they gave the Shiites what was not only expected, but desired: martyrdom. Martyrdom for the faith. Blood and pain shed and suffered on behalf of Ali. As a result, a result which is as inevitable as predictable, the demonstrations will become even more of an auto de fe--an act of faith.
Both the self-organizing demonstrators and the agents of Tehran will use this to their (mutual, whether intended as such or not) advantage. There is no way around that dreary reality. Even if the demonstrations are suspended, they will not end. Even if the protesters go underground, they will not go away. Even if the Pearl Roundabout is empty, the nights will be full--full of preparations for and execution of violent episodes.
King Hamad made a momentous decision when he decided (as presumably he must have) to turn the security forces loose on the sleeping occupants of the Pearl. He bet on the impossible--that he could drown the protests of Shiites in a wave of martyrs' blood. In essence he bet the ranch on the impossible with the result that violence will not only continue, it will take an upward trajectory. Realistically there is very little chance his regime will remain unchanged. It may take weeks--or years--but the clock is running.
From the perspective of the US the King could not have made a worse choice. We are in Bahrain as we have been for years. The kingdom exists thanks to our military protection. It provides a useful but not utterly critical homeport for the Fifth Fleet. It has even proven open to our suggestions about opening government at the local level to a measure of democracy. And, our stance with regard to Bahrain is crucial to the Saudis and Kuwait.
As a consequence of last night's action, the options available to the Obama administration are limited. Of course, the administration must "deplore" violence. Of course, it must counsel "restraint." Beyond that, there is little if anything which can be accomplished by the US.
We can, and should, advise King Hamad to offload responsibility onto the interior minister and others further down the food chain. There is some slight chance that the King can retrieve some legitimacy by demanding his underlings to fall on their swords. There is some slight chance he can assist this by passing out huge lumps of cash to the survivors and wounded. There is some slight chance he can improve his position in the eyes of the population by surrendering some power gracefully, by opening parliamentary elections more, by inviting the opposition party into effective governance.
None of these taken individually will be sufficient, but taken in aggregate may purchase time, time during which the passions of and for martyrdom might diminish. Whether the King likes the idea or not, the only path to continuation on the throne requires he rule less and merely reign more. This means he must bow to the necessity of genuine power sharing. It means an end to importing security personnel from far afield using the promise of citizenship as a potent lure.
Bahrain was down through most of the Nineteenth Century a province of Persia. In the short span of time which has elapsed since then there has been no creation of a concept of nationalism in the minds of most in Bahrain. Appeals to this nonexistent concept as has been attempted by the Foreign Minister are of no use. But, if one looks at the creation of a genuine constitutional monarchy one can see the instrument by which a genuine national identity can be generated.
The King needs to understand that only by opening a new era of constitutional government can a legitimate Bahrain be created. This has to be the main message given to Manama by the US. Only by so doing can we assist in achieving a mutual national interest with Bahrain. We need to tell the King and his intimates that they stand on one of those few, genuine cusps of history. By their actions and words in the near future, they and only they can determine what emerges from the fog of gas and welter of pain in the Pearl Roundabout--an ongoing sectarian driven insurgency from which only Iran can benefit or the creation of a new, authentic state named Bahrain with a legitimate constitutional government.
It is a simple, stark choice. It is not even a tough choice to put into action. Even our Community-Organizer-in-Chief should be able to understand that.
The fundamental dynamic in Bahrain is sectarian. The overwhelming majority of the native population of the micro-state is Shiite. The ruling elite (and the individuals imported from other countries including those in Asia to act as security personnel) are Sunni. The Shiite majority claims with a high degree of documentable accuracy to have suffered discrimination both political and economic.
The government--a monarchy with some very limited features of constitutionality--not only denies the charges of discrimination but counters with accusations of Iranian influence at work within the Shiite community. There is no doubt but Tehran's agents have been beavering away seeking to broaden and focus the latent political disaffiliation extant in the population. This is not to imply the mullahs have created the disaffiliation and its outgrowth de novo but rather to argue the Iranian influence has accelerated the pace of development along the insurgent continuum. The past few years have demonstrated a continued and escalating progress from latent and inchoate political disaffiliation to the beginnings of genuine organization.
The government in Manama has given too much emphasis to the not-so-hidden hand of Tehran in justifying the excessive use of force in its overnight security operation clearing the Pearl Park. There was some, probably not overly important, Iranian guidance, but the real impetus to the demonstrations came from their essential nature as self-organizing.
It is unfortunate but expectable that the local government as well as the Deep Thinkers in the US have underestimated the rapidly growing potency of non-linear, self-organizing systems. The notion of "leaderless" political movements was strictly fictional until the advent of widespread horizontal communications methods. Now that these are a normal part of quotidian life nearly everywhere, the "leaderless" political movement, even the "leaderless" political organization (an apparent oxymoron) have become not only possible but annoyingly commonplace.
Whichever side first and best comprehends the potency of the self-organizing, non-linear political movement will gain an undeniable advantage in the great game of insurgency and its close cousin, political revolution. The existence of the self-organizing movement allows the heavy lifting of direct confrontation with the status quo to occur without risk to agenda driven men in the back room. For example, the real work of deposing Hosni Mubarak was done by the self-organizing folk of Tahiri Square not the Muslim Brotherhood or any other opposition group. Now, with the decks of the ancien regime having been cleared, the second stage of political change can be accomplished by whichever group can offer the most tightly organized, well focused agenda as well as co-opt the energy and frustrations of the folks who did the earlier work.
The same dynamic can be seen as having been at work in Tunisia. The deck clearing was done in fine "leaderless" style, but the construction of a new political/social/economic structure will be done by those who run the old, well organized primarily Muslim oriented groups.
The situation in Bahrain shows the self-organizing phenomenon at work. The protests were not directed, let alone ordered by Tehran. But, should the government continue to bobble its task of keeping short term order with the hope that long term stability might emerge, Tehran is in the wings, plans and agents at the ready. With the bloody suppression of the nearly peaceful demonstrations, the king and his men have made the challenge offered by the demonstrators truly existential.
The demonstrators, after all, are Shiite. What makes this label important is not simply the identity with the majority of Iran's population but the cultural traditions and definers of the Shia branch of Islam. Shiites have a long history and deep tradition of martyrdom. Martyrdom is the single greatest definer of a "Partisan of Ali." Shia was born in martyrdom. It is nourished by the blood of martyrs. The transcendent ecstasy of pain felt and blood spilled in truth to the faith is evident at all major Shiite rituals, ceremonies, and high holy days.
In a very real sense when the (primarily imported) police forces cut loose last night with concussion and tear gas grenades, truncheons, and shotguns, they gave the Shiites what was not only expected, but desired: martyrdom. Martyrdom for the faith. Blood and pain shed and suffered on behalf of Ali. As a result, a result which is as inevitable as predictable, the demonstrations will become even more of an auto de fe--an act of faith.
Both the self-organizing demonstrators and the agents of Tehran will use this to their (mutual, whether intended as such or not) advantage. There is no way around that dreary reality. Even if the demonstrations are suspended, they will not end. Even if the protesters go underground, they will not go away. Even if the Pearl Roundabout is empty, the nights will be full--full of preparations for and execution of violent episodes.
King Hamad made a momentous decision when he decided (as presumably he must have) to turn the security forces loose on the sleeping occupants of the Pearl. He bet on the impossible--that he could drown the protests of Shiites in a wave of martyrs' blood. In essence he bet the ranch on the impossible with the result that violence will not only continue, it will take an upward trajectory. Realistically there is very little chance his regime will remain unchanged. It may take weeks--or years--but the clock is running.
From the perspective of the US the King could not have made a worse choice. We are in Bahrain as we have been for years. The kingdom exists thanks to our military protection. It provides a useful but not utterly critical homeport for the Fifth Fleet. It has even proven open to our suggestions about opening government at the local level to a measure of democracy. And, our stance with regard to Bahrain is crucial to the Saudis and Kuwait.
As a consequence of last night's action, the options available to the Obama administration are limited. Of course, the administration must "deplore" violence. Of course, it must counsel "restraint." Beyond that, there is little if anything which can be accomplished by the US.
We can, and should, advise King Hamad to offload responsibility onto the interior minister and others further down the food chain. There is some slight chance that the King can retrieve some legitimacy by demanding his underlings to fall on their swords. There is some slight chance he can assist this by passing out huge lumps of cash to the survivors and wounded. There is some slight chance he can improve his position in the eyes of the population by surrendering some power gracefully, by opening parliamentary elections more, by inviting the opposition party into effective governance.
None of these taken individually will be sufficient, but taken in aggregate may purchase time, time during which the passions of and for martyrdom might diminish. Whether the King likes the idea or not, the only path to continuation on the throne requires he rule less and merely reign more. This means he must bow to the necessity of genuine power sharing. It means an end to importing security personnel from far afield using the promise of citizenship as a potent lure.
Bahrain was down through most of the Nineteenth Century a province of Persia. In the short span of time which has elapsed since then there has been no creation of a concept of nationalism in the minds of most in Bahrain. Appeals to this nonexistent concept as has been attempted by the Foreign Minister are of no use. But, if one looks at the creation of a genuine constitutional monarchy one can see the instrument by which a genuine national identity can be generated.
The King needs to understand that only by opening a new era of constitutional government can a legitimate Bahrain be created. This has to be the main message given to Manama by the US. Only by so doing can we assist in achieving a mutual national interest with Bahrain. We need to tell the King and his intimates that they stand on one of those few, genuine cusps of history. By their actions and words in the near future, they and only they can determine what emerges from the fog of gas and welter of pain in the Pearl Roundabout--an ongoing sectarian driven insurgency from which only Iran can benefit or the creation of a new, authentic state named Bahrain with a legitimate constitutional government.
It is a simple, stark choice. It is not even a tough choice to put into action. Even our Community-Organizer-in-Chief should be able to understand that.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Identity Politics--It's All The Rage
Usually when the term "identity politics" is invoked one thinks of the US political tableau. For years now much of the American political dynamic has rested upon the rolicking gavotte of assorted victim groups and their competing claims for redress, protection and compensation.
Identity politics is playing an increasingly large role on the international stage. Nowhere is this more evident than on the shores of the Persian (or is Arab) Gulf. Here national affiliation either intertwines with religious and linguistic identity or wars against it.
The relation between identity politics and regional stability came into very sharp focus just over a month ago when an Iranian official, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri , who is an advisor to Supreme Ayatollah Khamenei blandly asserted that Bahrain was not a sovereign state but rather Iran's long lost fourteenth province. Well, on one level this was no big deal. Nateq Nouri was right, sort of.
Way back when Iran was still Persia between 1602 and 1783, Bahrain was a province of the country. Later it bounced in the vacuum at the margin of the Ottoman Empire, finally enjoying (if that is the right word) the sloppy, haphazard suzerainty of the British Empire until 1970. Following a UN sponsored referendum in which the locals voted for independence rather than a return to Iranian authority, Bahrain came into sovereign existence.
Since 1971 the Tehran regime both under the Shah and the mullahs has huffed and puffed asserting its "historic" claim to the strategic outpost island. Even as recently as 2007 when the Iranians made the assertion of proprietorship the the world, the region (but not the Bahraini royal house) greeted the pronunciamiento with a yawn.
This time was different. The Arab states generally went exoatmospheric in fast-burn mode. The yowls of outrage and keening of animus culminated with Morocco severing relations with Iran.
So, why the immense escalation in reaction? Why the quick change from indifference in 2007 to the screams of Arab solidarity in the face of Persian provocation last month?
Some features of the Bahraini reality certainly have not changed. The population in the island-state is roughly two-thirds native born and one-third outlander. That percentage has not shifted appreciably in the past two decades. The majority of the population is Muslim. Again no change. The majority of the Muslims is Shia. That also isn't a new development.
The royal house and elite generally are Sunni. Once more, no change. Iranian supported subversive and terror oriented groups litter the Shia landscape. Say it again, with feeling, "No change here."
"So, what the heck has changed?" You ask.
To which question the Geek replies, "The context. Or at least a couple of essential factors in the context."
The first factor to have shifted in recent years is, to put it bluntly, Iran is getting ever more uppity. Some of this is pure talk as when President and Orator-in-Chief Ahmedinejad announced in February that Iran was now a super-power and no country in the world would consider threatening it.
But, as the Arab Gulf states well realise there is an unpleasant amount of reality beyond the Orator-in-Chief's grandiose pronouncement. The Iranians have developed an impressive military capacity which was displayed at sea in December 2008 with a series of naval exercises which demonstrated capabilities and threat potential far surpassing the Arab ability to equal, let alone counter.
Perhaps more to the point, Iran has fought a war within living memory. The war was a long, bloody stalemate yet the Iranian military demonstrated a capacity to learn as it fought. No Arab force has fought an opponent to a stand still since the Arab Legion back in the days of Glubb Pasha did so. (Not even the short-lived, even if surprising, success of the Egyptian Army in 1973 equals what the Jordanian unit did in 1948.)
Reinforcing the demonstration of Iranian military potential is the clear success of the Iranian proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. Not only did Hezbollah inflict unacceptable losses on the IDF in the course of a poorly planned and pathetically executed Israeli incursion, the group has been politically successful beyond expectations becoming the de facto controlling force in Lebanon's government.
Even more recently the defiant attitude and policies of Hamas have added luster to the Iranian threat. Put simply the Arab states correctly see the Iranians, Shia the lot of them, have a demonstrated capacity to penetrate Sunni populations with vigorous success. As subversives, the Iranians have shown a rare talent.
The second contextual factor to have changed is an Arab loss of confidence. There are a number of contributory considerations at work here. One is the continued inability of the Arab states working in concert or individually to do anything effective in the perpetual Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Militarily the Arab states have been a nullity. They have been scarcely more effective in their application of diplomacy. Even the use of the "oil weapon" has been bootless.
The collapse of last year's oil bull market is a second fact which the Arab Gulf states must consider. Far from being immune to the economic web which entangles the globe, the oil producers can be the first to feel the baleful effects of contraction in the western economies. Members of the Arab elite blessed with a memory might recall that after the oil embargoes of the 1970s, western countries, particularly the US, embarked upon successful conservation programs which cut demand for the only revenue generator the Arabs possess.
The rhetoric in the US concerning alternative sources of energy or the moves to open off-shore fields to development represent a long-term threat to Arab financial underpinnings even as demands for increased social spending to buy regimes' peace grow apace. Making the picture bleaker is the emergence of new rivals such as Brazil's off-shore deposits and the expansion of long standing competitors such as the development of Mexico's seabeds.
The oil consideration loops into another consideration. How long will the US continue to have a national and strategic interest in the Gulf region? Since the US has more than sufficient sand to meet its requirements indefinitely, the only remaining reason for our interest in this unpleasant area has to be oil.
The day will come when the US has a sufficient alternative to Gulf oil. When that day will come is imponderable at the moment. But, (here it comes, the big "but") the hoary and somewhat irrelevant They-Put-A-Man-On-The-Moon based apprehension of the enormous potential of American technological invention and innovation is going to come sooner rather than later.
Making this apprehension teeter on the border of genuine fear is the fact that the US has a president (or at least its own Orator-in-Chief) that seems to be firmly committed to the development of alternatives to Mideast oil. And, a Congress willing to spend gigabucks in that direction.
So, how long can the feudal kingdoms of the Gulf expect the American military (including nuclear) umbrella to extend one millimeter beyond the borders of Israel? That thought can be (and apparently has become) a real stomach clencher around the Gulf littoral.
Then there is the matter of religious identity. Sunni Muslims have been comfortable for centuries looking down their collective clerical noses at the apostate Shia. Shias have always been the despised minority. They were consigned to the furthest marches of Islam, the outland of Persia, the margin of the Arab world in Iraq. Shias? Piffile!
Shia roared back with a vengeance in the Iranian Revolution. It has been roaring ever since. Fighting successfully against Iraq--even though Iraq received US support. Standing off the Great Powers led by the US and UK as Shia Iran developed its military, missile, and nuclear capacity.
Shia whispered as well. Extending its subversive tentacles throughout the Muslim states. Even reaching to the Western Hemisphere, the bailiwick of the Great Satan.
It is small wonder that Shia is seen as the superman version of Islam to so many among the youth of Islamic countries--particularly Arab states. Shia kicks butt! Youth admires butt-kickers. Youth (defined as those under 25) represents the absolute majority of the Arab population. Many, how many is one of those famed Rumsfeld "unknowable unknowns," youth are gravitating to the Shia camp.
Wahhabist and Salafist clerics as well as the states which give them homes and support are faced with a genuine challenge. From the perspective of the government either the option of confrontation or that of accommodation pose grave, possibly unacceptable risks. A choice will have to be made. The clerical tiger on which the feudal states ride will demand it.
Sunni versus Shia joins with Arab versus Iranian as the sharp and threatening dividing line within the heartland of oil and Islam. The Chimera of Arab solidarity shimmers more and more like a desert mirage.
The mullahocracy will do nothing in the near or mid-term to perfect their claim to Bahrain. The lesson of Iraqi ambitions in Kuwait is too recent. Besides that, there is no need. The need is simply to perturb the Arab states of the Gulf. That need has been filled.
By simply kicking the Arab anthill, the weaknesses, the uncertainties, the failures of Arab solidarity have been both exposed and exacerbated. The paradox is that the seeming single voice of outrage greeting the February announcement failed to disguise the weakness of both the Arab states and the Arab identity.
At the same time the boldness of the announcement, taken in context, reinforced the Shia-as-superman image which Iran has been projecting for decades. This means the appeal of Iranian branded Shiaism has been boosted in the critical target population--Arab youth.
Not bad for a single television clip, eh? But, the founder of the Revolution was the most underrated practitioner of absolutist politics in recent generations. The old Ayatollah Khomeini would be proud of his successors.
Identity politics is playing an increasingly large role on the international stage. Nowhere is this more evident than on the shores of the Persian (or is Arab) Gulf. Here national affiliation either intertwines with religious and linguistic identity or wars against it.
The relation between identity politics and regional stability came into very sharp focus just over a month ago when an Iranian official, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri , who is an advisor to Supreme Ayatollah Khamenei blandly asserted that Bahrain was not a sovereign state but rather Iran's long lost fourteenth province. Well, on one level this was no big deal. Nateq Nouri was right, sort of.
Way back when Iran was still Persia between 1602 and 1783, Bahrain was a province of the country. Later it bounced in the vacuum at the margin of the Ottoman Empire, finally enjoying (if that is the right word) the sloppy, haphazard suzerainty of the British Empire until 1970. Following a UN sponsored referendum in which the locals voted for independence rather than a return to Iranian authority, Bahrain came into sovereign existence.
Since 1971 the Tehran regime both under the Shah and the mullahs has huffed and puffed asserting its "historic" claim to the strategic outpost island. Even as recently as 2007 when the Iranians made the assertion of proprietorship the the world, the region (but not the Bahraini royal house) greeted the pronunciamiento with a yawn.
This time was different. The Arab states generally went exoatmospheric in fast-burn mode. The yowls of outrage and keening of animus culminated with Morocco severing relations with Iran.
So, why the immense escalation in reaction? Why the quick change from indifference in 2007 to the screams of Arab solidarity in the face of Persian provocation last month?
Some features of the Bahraini reality certainly have not changed. The population in the island-state is roughly two-thirds native born and one-third outlander. That percentage has not shifted appreciably in the past two decades. The majority of the population is Muslim. Again no change. The majority of the Muslims is Shia. That also isn't a new development.
The royal house and elite generally are Sunni. Once more, no change. Iranian supported subversive and terror oriented groups litter the Shia landscape. Say it again, with feeling, "No change here."
"So, what the heck has changed?" You ask.
To which question the Geek replies, "The context. Or at least a couple of essential factors in the context."
The first factor to have shifted in recent years is, to put it bluntly, Iran is getting ever more uppity. Some of this is pure talk as when President and Orator-in-Chief Ahmedinejad announced in February that Iran was now a super-power and no country in the world would consider threatening it.
But, as the Arab Gulf states well realise there is an unpleasant amount of reality beyond the Orator-in-Chief's grandiose pronouncement. The Iranians have developed an impressive military capacity which was displayed at sea in December 2008 with a series of naval exercises which demonstrated capabilities and threat potential far surpassing the Arab ability to equal, let alone counter.
Perhaps more to the point, Iran has fought a war within living memory. The war was a long, bloody stalemate yet the Iranian military demonstrated a capacity to learn as it fought. No Arab force has fought an opponent to a stand still since the Arab Legion back in the days of Glubb Pasha did so. (Not even the short-lived, even if surprising, success of the Egyptian Army in 1973 equals what the Jordanian unit did in 1948.)
Reinforcing the demonstration of Iranian military potential is the clear success of the Iranian proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. Not only did Hezbollah inflict unacceptable losses on the IDF in the course of a poorly planned and pathetically executed Israeli incursion, the group has been politically successful beyond expectations becoming the de facto controlling force in Lebanon's government.
Even more recently the defiant attitude and policies of Hamas have added luster to the Iranian threat. Put simply the Arab states correctly see the Iranians, Shia the lot of them, have a demonstrated capacity to penetrate Sunni populations with vigorous success. As subversives, the Iranians have shown a rare talent.
The second contextual factor to have changed is an Arab loss of confidence. There are a number of contributory considerations at work here. One is the continued inability of the Arab states working in concert or individually to do anything effective in the perpetual Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Militarily the Arab states have been a nullity. They have been scarcely more effective in their application of diplomacy. Even the use of the "oil weapon" has been bootless.
The collapse of last year's oil bull market is a second fact which the Arab Gulf states must consider. Far from being immune to the economic web which entangles the globe, the oil producers can be the first to feel the baleful effects of contraction in the western economies. Members of the Arab elite blessed with a memory might recall that after the oil embargoes of the 1970s, western countries, particularly the US, embarked upon successful conservation programs which cut demand for the only revenue generator the Arabs possess.
The rhetoric in the US concerning alternative sources of energy or the moves to open off-shore fields to development represent a long-term threat to Arab financial underpinnings even as demands for increased social spending to buy regimes' peace grow apace. Making the picture bleaker is the emergence of new rivals such as Brazil's off-shore deposits and the expansion of long standing competitors such as the development of Mexico's seabeds.
The oil consideration loops into another consideration. How long will the US continue to have a national and strategic interest in the Gulf region? Since the US has more than sufficient sand to meet its requirements indefinitely, the only remaining reason for our interest in this unpleasant area has to be oil.
The day will come when the US has a sufficient alternative to Gulf oil. When that day will come is imponderable at the moment. But, (here it comes, the big "but") the hoary and somewhat irrelevant They-Put-A-Man-On-The-Moon based apprehension of the enormous potential of American technological invention and innovation is going to come sooner rather than later.
Making this apprehension teeter on the border of genuine fear is the fact that the US has a president (or at least its own Orator-in-Chief) that seems to be firmly committed to the development of alternatives to Mideast oil. And, a Congress willing to spend gigabucks in that direction.
So, how long can the feudal kingdoms of the Gulf expect the American military (including nuclear) umbrella to extend one millimeter beyond the borders of Israel? That thought can be (and apparently has become) a real stomach clencher around the Gulf littoral.
Then there is the matter of religious identity. Sunni Muslims have been comfortable for centuries looking down their collective clerical noses at the apostate Shia. Shias have always been the despised minority. They were consigned to the furthest marches of Islam, the outland of Persia, the margin of the Arab world in Iraq. Shias? Piffile!
Shia roared back with a vengeance in the Iranian Revolution. It has been roaring ever since. Fighting successfully against Iraq--even though Iraq received US support. Standing off the Great Powers led by the US and UK as Shia Iran developed its military, missile, and nuclear capacity.
Shia whispered as well. Extending its subversive tentacles throughout the Muslim states. Even reaching to the Western Hemisphere, the bailiwick of the Great Satan.
It is small wonder that Shia is seen as the superman version of Islam to so many among the youth of Islamic countries--particularly Arab states. Shia kicks butt! Youth admires butt-kickers. Youth (defined as those under 25) represents the absolute majority of the Arab population. Many, how many is one of those famed Rumsfeld "unknowable unknowns," youth are gravitating to the Shia camp.
Wahhabist and Salafist clerics as well as the states which give them homes and support are faced with a genuine challenge. From the perspective of the government either the option of confrontation or that of accommodation pose grave, possibly unacceptable risks. A choice will have to be made. The clerical tiger on which the feudal states ride will demand it.
Sunni versus Shia joins with Arab versus Iranian as the sharp and threatening dividing line within the heartland of oil and Islam. The Chimera of Arab solidarity shimmers more and more like a desert mirage.
The mullahocracy will do nothing in the near or mid-term to perfect their claim to Bahrain. The lesson of Iraqi ambitions in Kuwait is too recent. Besides that, there is no need. The need is simply to perturb the Arab states of the Gulf. That need has been filled.
By simply kicking the Arab anthill, the weaknesses, the uncertainties, the failures of Arab solidarity have been both exposed and exacerbated. The paradox is that the seeming single voice of outrage greeting the February announcement failed to disguise the weakness of both the Arab states and the Arab identity.
At the same time the boldness of the announcement, taken in context, reinforced the Shia-as-superman image which Iran has been projecting for decades. This means the appeal of Iranian branded Shiaism has been boosted in the critical target population--Arab youth.
Not bad for a single television clip, eh? But, the founder of the Revolution was the most underrated practitioner of absolutist politics in recent generations. The old Ayatollah Khomeini would be proud of his successors.
Friday, February 20, 2009
May You Live In Interesting Times--And We Do
The ancient Chinese toast (and curse) is sure alive and well today. It seems that wherever a person looks on the international scene, feces and air impeller are colliding with typically unpredictable but nasty effect.
Consider the oil price game. Benchmark crude oil prices on the spot market have dipped as low as thirty-seven bucks the barrel. Great news, right?
Sure. For Americans it is better than the assorted economic stimulus packages presented by pork merchants and ideologues in Washington. For those who produce oil the news sure ain't as one color good.
Even Saudi Arabia and others in the Gulf Coordination Council need a steady base price in the sixty to seventy dollar range to maintain their expansive budgets. Iran, Venezuela and even Russia need higher prices given their ambitions in the military hardware department.
While the difficulties present for these later three countries may bring smiles of relief to Americans, the situation is not so simple. As economic pinching becomes more acute, governments historically have had a difficult time resisting the impulse to direct attention elsewhere. Say, at a "threat" to national survival or ambition.
While it is possible that Russia has matured sufficiently that the Putin Crew can resist tossing threats at the "Imperialist Camp," the lads in the Kremlin will nonetheless prove more rather than less difficult in diplomatic dealings over the short- to mid-term. The situation with respect to the other two bad boys of the oil producing world is not so straightforward given that neither regime has been noted for responsible, adult conduct of a consistent nature.
Iran is the much larger problem child. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has apparently known for three months that the figures it had regarding the Iranian production of low enrichment uranium (LEU) were based on "miscalculations." These Iranian miscalculations were cleared up back in November, but the IAEA only very recently released the new figures.
While many diplomats, nuclear observers and the like professed shock, there was no reason for these protestations of surprise. The information available from open sources demonstrated clearly that the Iranians would reach "breakout" level of LEU production early this year. The IAEA has confirmed this conclusion, reporting that the spinning centrifuges of the mullahocracy have manufactured a metric ton of LEU.
Reaching the minimum "breakout" level of LEU means that the Iranians could now, in principle, switch to the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU.) The mullahs now have the feedstock necessary to produce the twenty-five kilograms nominally necessary for a Mahdi Bomb.
Sure, to do this the Iranian government would have to toss the IAEA inspectors out, set more centrifuges a-spinning and generally make it evident to the world what they were doing. A rational actor might not be expected to take such a risk considering just how many nation-states are arrayed in potential (robust) opposition to this move.
Before we comfort ourselves with that view, we best get a grip on the number of times Revolutionary Iran has taken risks which have paid off. We also best get a grip on the unpleasant ground truth that the men who run the mullahocracy are possessed of an eschatological view which is frankly apocalyptic in nature.
Iran is also making some interesting noises regarding the view from Tehran regarding Bahrain. In language which is eerily reminiscent of that used by Saddam Hussein in the run-up to his invasion of Kuwait, the mullahocracy (or at least its designated spokesmen) have been describing the small country as Iran's "Fourteenth Province."
Bahrain has a microscopic population (roughly 750,000 a third of which is non-native.) The majority of the Bahrainis are Shia. Iran has successfully sponsored two pro-Iranian political associations in the country. Against this the Bahrain government's two thousand man police force has stopped a number of Tehran-backed terrorist actions and may have penetrated the hostile political groups effectively. Beyond this the government has moved to include Shias in the government and meet some--but not all by a long way--of the impoverished Shia majority's economic needs.
Saudi Arabia has, at least rhetorically, extended its protection over Bahrain, but that is a very thin deterrent shield given the House of Sand's past record, as in the Gulf War. The US Fifth Fleet operates out of Bahrain so the American umbrella is present, but not necessarily, given the gestalt of reality today, credible enough.
All on its lonely own Iran is a sufficiently unpredictable and occasionally irrational actor to assure the times today would be more than merely interesting. Of course, Iran has company--and plenty of it.
There is North Korea. The Hermit Kingdom of the North seems to be locked in a perpetual case of the "terrible twos," tossing one international temper tantrum after another. The latest one is ostensibly the result of South Korea's conservative Lee Administration having cast a chill on relations between North and South.
More likely there is a form of regime change occurring in the Hermit Kingdom of the North. Even if the Dear Leader (who has never been a monument to stable, responsible behavior) is alive and more-or-less well, there is sufficient reason to posit that more robust, hard-line types are calling many, if not all, the shots.
The country is broke, many of its people literally famished. North Korea needs massive amounts of foreign aid. But, the aid must come without attached conditions or foreign monitors of any sort or nationality. The aid must be provided not as a matter of humanitarian charity but as a "free-will offering" between equals.
In short, the leadership cadre intends to coerce what the country needs. The temper tantrums involving the far-from-settled nuclear problem or the perspective launch of the made in North Korea ICBM constitute a form of international protection racket. Like the two year old in the grocery store, the North Koreans will stop their tantrum if they get enough candy from the rack.
Of course, as any parent knows, giving in to the tantrum simply encourages a sequel. As between people so it is with nations, peace can be bought but only at an ever increasing price.
Ah, the times they just get more and more interesting.
Over in Pakistan, matters of peace are progressing as expected. Fazlullah has "reservations" about the agreement entered into by his "moderate" father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad. The nature of the reservations have not been dilated upon but will be soon in an upcoming meeting between the several parties of Taliban in Swat, government in Islamabad and the in-laws. What do you want to bet that Fazlullah demands more Sharia and less Islamabad in Malakand?
In Islamabad anonymous US Embassy wallahs are favoring the agreement between government and the Taliban-in-Swat crew. They (apparently honestly) think (if that is the right word) the agreement will somehow drive a wedge between the less "extremist" Fazlullah and the more "extremist" Taliban types in the FATA. One may be forgiven if one gets the impression the folks in the embassy have been sampling some of the crops grown in Afghanistan.
In a further, quite delightful wrinkle, "mainstream" Islamists (whatever that term might mean in the Pakistani context) have made a serious proposal to the government. The proposal? That Pakistan cozy up to China in order to escape "the clutches" of the US. These "mainstream" Islamists argue that both China and Pakistan are "victims" of a "US conspiracy." Perhaps they too have been testing the commodities from Afghanistan, but being Islamists that would be scarcely necessary.
Ah, Pakistan, on its own, the folks there would make the current times more than sufficiently interesting.
In Afghanistan the situation continues to go down the tubes. The decision by the Obama Administration to place another 17,000 pairs of US boots on the ground is as welcome as it is late in coming. One can only hope that the boots are on the feet of combat soldiers and not a plethora of REMFs. Guns in the hands are needed, even more than boots on the ground, if Taliban and al-Qaeda are to be denied a military victory.
NATO will be providing more warm bodies, but few of these will be in uniform and even fewer possessed of guns and the authority to shoot them. NATO will be furnishing civilians to "improve the government" (which is desperately needed to be sure,) "improve the justice system" (as if there is any meaningful crossover between Sharia or the Quran on the one hand and European legal systems on the other,) "staunch corruption" (good luck on that one unless the US and other countries decriminalise narcotic drugs,) and "fight drug trafficking" (ah, fer sure, dudes.) All these may be worthy goals, but none are really relevant in the midst of a war which is being lost by the putative good guys.
It deserves noting in the Afghanistan context that Iran has offered assistance. An Iranian vice-president has stated that the Iranian government and businesses stand ready to "pour" investment funds into the country in infrastructure and similar projects. Who says that Iran, broke or not, fails to make large plans and have grand ambitions?
Al-Shabab seems more than ready to go all the way and then some in its pursuit of Sharia Paradise on Earth in the geographical expression called Somalia. Their ranks increased by teenage jihadists from Europe and the US (particularly from the huge Somali refugee communities in Minnesota (of all places,) al-Shabab is willing to accept the Sufi and moderate Sunni challenge.
The refugee stream which will inevitably result from a widening of the sectarian warfare will have a profound effect on Kenya and other neighboring countries. The impact of the refugees will be at least equal to and will probably surpass that of people fleeing Zimbabwe for South Africa and other "frontline" states. You can hear the cries for immediate assistance for the "humanitarian crisis" ringing loud and long from the bootless African Union and the High Minded of the UN.
What with Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, and Zimbabwe, Africa would be sufficient to assure that we live in interesting times.
But, there are more. There is Palestine. There is Israel with a new even more to the Right government. There is the underlying war of Islamism against the ideals and worldviews of the West. There are the profound and long lasting effects of the global economic disaster against which the measures of the US and EU governments have not proven efficacious as yet.
The Geek reckons that right now, the interesting times referred to by the Chinese toast or curse falls squarely on the curse side.
What about you? How do you see our interesting times?
Consider the oil price game. Benchmark crude oil prices on the spot market have dipped as low as thirty-seven bucks the barrel. Great news, right?
Sure. For Americans it is better than the assorted economic stimulus packages presented by pork merchants and ideologues in Washington. For those who produce oil the news sure ain't as one color good.
Even Saudi Arabia and others in the Gulf Coordination Council need a steady base price in the sixty to seventy dollar range to maintain their expansive budgets. Iran, Venezuela and even Russia need higher prices given their ambitions in the military hardware department.
While the difficulties present for these later three countries may bring smiles of relief to Americans, the situation is not so simple. As economic pinching becomes more acute, governments historically have had a difficult time resisting the impulse to direct attention elsewhere. Say, at a "threat" to national survival or ambition.
While it is possible that Russia has matured sufficiently that the Putin Crew can resist tossing threats at the "Imperialist Camp," the lads in the Kremlin will nonetheless prove more rather than less difficult in diplomatic dealings over the short- to mid-term. The situation with respect to the other two bad boys of the oil producing world is not so straightforward given that neither regime has been noted for responsible, adult conduct of a consistent nature.
Iran is the much larger problem child. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has apparently known for three months that the figures it had regarding the Iranian production of low enrichment uranium (LEU) were based on "miscalculations." These Iranian miscalculations were cleared up back in November, but the IAEA only very recently released the new figures.
While many diplomats, nuclear observers and the like professed shock, there was no reason for these protestations of surprise. The information available from open sources demonstrated clearly that the Iranians would reach "breakout" level of LEU production early this year. The IAEA has confirmed this conclusion, reporting that the spinning centrifuges of the mullahocracy have manufactured a metric ton of LEU.
Reaching the minimum "breakout" level of LEU means that the Iranians could now, in principle, switch to the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU.) The mullahs now have the feedstock necessary to produce the twenty-five kilograms nominally necessary for a Mahdi Bomb.
Sure, to do this the Iranian government would have to toss the IAEA inspectors out, set more centrifuges a-spinning and generally make it evident to the world what they were doing. A rational actor might not be expected to take such a risk considering just how many nation-states are arrayed in potential (robust) opposition to this move.
Before we comfort ourselves with that view, we best get a grip on the number of times Revolutionary Iran has taken risks which have paid off. We also best get a grip on the unpleasant ground truth that the men who run the mullahocracy are possessed of an eschatological view which is frankly apocalyptic in nature.
Iran is also making some interesting noises regarding the view from Tehran regarding Bahrain. In language which is eerily reminiscent of that used by Saddam Hussein in the run-up to his invasion of Kuwait, the mullahocracy (or at least its designated spokesmen) have been describing the small country as Iran's "Fourteenth Province."
Bahrain has a microscopic population (roughly 750,000 a third of which is non-native.) The majority of the Bahrainis are Shia. Iran has successfully sponsored two pro-Iranian political associations in the country. Against this the Bahrain government's two thousand man police force has stopped a number of Tehran-backed terrorist actions and may have penetrated the hostile political groups effectively. Beyond this the government has moved to include Shias in the government and meet some--but not all by a long way--of the impoverished Shia majority's economic needs.
Saudi Arabia has, at least rhetorically, extended its protection over Bahrain, but that is a very thin deterrent shield given the House of Sand's past record, as in the Gulf War. The US Fifth Fleet operates out of Bahrain so the American umbrella is present, but not necessarily, given the gestalt of reality today, credible enough.
All on its lonely own Iran is a sufficiently unpredictable and occasionally irrational actor to assure the times today would be more than merely interesting. Of course, Iran has company--and plenty of it.
There is North Korea. The Hermit Kingdom of the North seems to be locked in a perpetual case of the "terrible twos," tossing one international temper tantrum after another. The latest one is ostensibly the result of South Korea's conservative Lee Administration having cast a chill on relations between North and South.
More likely there is a form of regime change occurring in the Hermit Kingdom of the North. Even if the Dear Leader (who has never been a monument to stable, responsible behavior) is alive and more-or-less well, there is sufficient reason to posit that more robust, hard-line types are calling many, if not all, the shots.
The country is broke, many of its people literally famished. North Korea needs massive amounts of foreign aid. But, the aid must come without attached conditions or foreign monitors of any sort or nationality. The aid must be provided not as a matter of humanitarian charity but as a "free-will offering" between equals.
In short, the leadership cadre intends to coerce what the country needs. The temper tantrums involving the far-from-settled nuclear problem or the perspective launch of the made in North Korea ICBM constitute a form of international protection racket. Like the two year old in the grocery store, the North Koreans will stop their tantrum if they get enough candy from the rack.
Of course, as any parent knows, giving in to the tantrum simply encourages a sequel. As between people so it is with nations, peace can be bought but only at an ever increasing price.
Ah, the times they just get more and more interesting.
Over in Pakistan, matters of peace are progressing as expected. Fazlullah has "reservations" about the agreement entered into by his "moderate" father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad. The nature of the reservations have not been dilated upon but will be soon in an upcoming meeting between the several parties of Taliban in Swat, government in Islamabad and the in-laws. What do you want to bet that Fazlullah demands more Sharia and less Islamabad in Malakand?
In Islamabad anonymous US Embassy wallahs are favoring the agreement between government and the Taliban-in-Swat crew. They (apparently honestly) think (if that is the right word) the agreement will somehow drive a wedge between the less "extremist" Fazlullah and the more "extremist" Taliban types in the FATA. One may be forgiven if one gets the impression the folks in the embassy have been sampling some of the crops grown in Afghanistan.
In a further, quite delightful wrinkle, "mainstream" Islamists (whatever that term might mean in the Pakistani context) have made a serious proposal to the government. The proposal? That Pakistan cozy up to China in order to escape "the clutches" of the US. These "mainstream" Islamists argue that both China and Pakistan are "victims" of a "US conspiracy." Perhaps they too have been testing the commodities from Afghanistan, but being Islamists that would be scarcely necessary.
Ah, Pakistan, on its own, the folks there would make the current times more than sufficiently interesting.
In Afghanistan the situation continues to go down the tubes. The decision by the Obama Administration to place another 17,000 pairs of US boots on the ground is as welcome as it is late in coming. One can only hope that the boots are on the feet of combat soldiers and not a plethora of REMFs. Guns in the hands are needed, even more than boots on the ground, if Taliban and al-Qaeda are to be denied a military victory.
NATO will be providing more warm bodies, but few of these will be in uniform and even fewer possessed of guns and the authority to shoot them. NATO will be furnishing civilians to "improve the government" (which is desperately needed to be sure,) "improve the justice system" (as if there is any meaningful crossover between Sharia or the Quran on the one hand and European legal systems on the other,) "staunch corruption" (good luck on that one unless the US and other countries decriminalise narcotic drugs,) and "fight drug trafficking" (ah, fer sure, dudes.) All these may be worthy goals, but none are really relevant in the midst of a war which is being lost by the putative good guys.
It deserves noting in the Afghanistan context that Iran has offered assistance. An Iranian vice-president has stated that the Iranian government and businesses stand ready to "pour" investment funds into the country in infrastructure and similar projects. Who says that Iran, broke or not, fails to make large plans and have grand ambitions?
Al-Shabab seems more than ready to go all the way and then some in its pursuit of Sharia Paradise on Earth in the geographical expression called Somalia. Their ranks increased by teenage jihadists from Europe and the US (particularly from the huge Somali refugee communities in Minnesota (of all places,) al-Shabab is willing to accept the Sufi and moderate Sunni challenge.
The refugee stream which will inevitably result from a widening of the sectarian warfare will have a profound effect on Kenya and other neighboring countries. The impact of the refugees will be at least equal to and will probably surpass that of people fleeing Zimbabwe for South Africa and other "frontline" states. You can hear the cries for immediate assistance for the "humanitarian crisis" ringing loud and long from the bootless African Union and the High Minded of the UN.
What with Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, and Zimbabwe, Africa would be sufficient to assure that we live in interesting times.
But, there are more. There is Palestine. There is Israel with a new even more to the Right government. There is the underlying war of Islamism against the ideals and worldviews of the West. There are the profound and long lasting effects of the global economic disaster against which the measures of the US and EU governments have not proven efficacious as yet.
The Geek reckons that right now, the interesting times referred to by the Chinese toast or curse falls squarely on the curse side.
What about you? How do you see our interesting times?
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