Third Time, Lucky?

The US tried.  It failed.  Ethiopia tried (with US backing.)  It failed.  Now it is Kenya's time.  The third country up in an attempt to restore some semblance of order to the bloody chaos called "Somalia."  Will this effort end as did the two predecessors with failure, humiliating withdrawal, and the leaving of a geographic expression with no real reason to exist as a state in even more of a sanguinary mess?

The US failed as a combination of mission leap, one disastrously ill-planned operation, and the lack of both a policy focus and political will in and around the Oval.  When Bill Clinton inherited the "humanitarian" operation initiated by George H.W. Bush, he neglected to define the goal of the force deployed in country.  For reasons which escape rational analysis, his administration decided it was necessary to engage in regime change.  This was odd as there was no real regime to change but rather a welter of tribal leaders engaged in a robust contest for supremacy.  The man on the top at that moment was particularly unpleasant but no threat to the long term prospects for the Somali people.

In a fit of absent mindedness, someone decided--and others farther up the food chain confirmed this choice--to go after the Unpleasant Guy On Top.  The result was the loss of nearly two dozen special forces troops, the bodies of whom were depicted being pulled around, naked, in the dirt of the streets by gangs of cheering women.  This nauseating vision was displayed on the televisions of Americans with the result that Clinton and Company determined to cut and run rather than take proper action against the Somalis responsible.

This loss of political nerve was not justified and counterproductive, not only in Somalia but all over the Arab and Muslim world.  It was this ostentatious failure of testicular and policy fortitude which gave the muscle to Osama bin Laden and his odious outfit as well as other advocates of violent political Islam.

With American support and assistance, the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia in the opening years of this century.  They were successful in toppling the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was an effective government albeit given to policies and means antipathetic to American and Western norms.  The ICU was speedily replaced by "the Youth" better known as al-Shabaab.  This crew was orders of magnitude more dedicated to the cause of austere, violent political Islam than the ICU had been.

The Ethiopians rapidly found out that they had bitten off far more than they (or their now preoccupied American sponsors) could chew and swallow conveniently.  For two years the Ethiopians held on, never secure even in their own bases, unable to broker a coalition of Somali tribal leaders willing to take over the burden of freeing their own country from the ever less popular zealots of al-Shabaab.  Finally, the Ethiopians tossed in their towel and departed, leaving the field to the victorious "Youth."

From there it has been all down hill not only for the people caught in Somalia but for the West generally.  As international diplomats played the game of creating a government and the African Union--well at least two member countries--deployed "peace keeping" forces to the center of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab consolidated its hold on the southern third of the country while pinning the Transitional Federal Government and its AU troops to a few blocks around the presidential palace.

During the same time, ambitious Somalis found a new and very profitable line of work--piracy.  Even now with warships of several dozen navies on patrol, the maritime marauders commandeer ships every week with tens, no, hundreds of millions of dollars of ransom collected.  The consensus of "experts" around the world is the pirates will not be defeated unless and until there is a functioning government with effective control of the Somali coast.

In recent months, the Gangbangers of Somalia, both landbased and maritime, have expanded their actions to include the kidnapping of Westerners frequenting expensive Kenyan resorts within in a convenient distance of Somalia.  This has perturbed the Kenyans mightily.  Even more disconcerting to Nairobi has been the tsunami of refugees flowing over the border.  The tidal wave has grown since the drought enhanced famine has been worsened by al-Shabaab's stopping of food aid by international agencies.

The hundreds of thousands of Somalis self-dumped on Kenya is an unacceptable economic burden on the country.  More, it represents a clear national security threat given Somali claims on the northern portion of Kenya and the large number of al-Shabaab agents living in Nairobi and Mombasa.

Kenya has clear reasons to see the end of al-Shabaab at least in the southern portion of the place.  With this in mind, Nairobi aimed at the Somali port city of Kismayo.  The port is the major source of al-Shabaab revenue: taxes on trade, particularly charcoal, headed for Yemen.  It is also a prime source of pirates.

With its invasion, Kenya is doing a service not only for itself but for the West generally.  Al-Shabaab is a threat not only to African states and the sea lines of communication but more broadly.  Not only is it "officially" allied with al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab has direct operational links with al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and Nigeria's Boko Haram.  Adding al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to the mix is apparently in the works.  Given the widespread proliferation of weapons including MANPADS from the old Libyan arsenals, it is to be expected that al-Shabaab's military competence and potential for transnational terror will grow.

The biggest question is simply: Will Kenya succeed where others have failed?

The prognosis is, at best, mixed.  The Kenyan armed forces have no real experience with war, even the limited sort of which al-Shabaab is capable.  The forces are large, reasonably well equipped and trained, but without combat experience, it is hard to see if these factors are all that important.  The launch of the invasion just as the annual rains were scheduled to start (they commenced on time) shows a lack of proper planning.  The two thousand men across the border have been bogged down in the mud for some days now with the mechanical transport totally immobilized.

Overall the force (ten thousand at most) seems too small to deal with a highly mobile opponent along with the demands of MOUT--if the Kenyans do reach Kismayo.  The Kenyan air dominance will not matter once their ground forces are in close contact with al-Shabaab fighters.  The fight will become a slogging match between the mechanized, fire power heavy Kenyans and the more mobile, lightly equipped guerrilla opponents.

At that point, it will be what all asymmetrical wars must be--a contest of political wills.  Already there are indications that the Kenyan opinion molding elite lack the stomach for a protracted war, which is exactly what the invasion will become without a game changer.

There is only one game changer which might be available.  Not the African Union.  Not the other states of the Horn of Africa.  Nobody local is capable of altering the nature of the war.

The role of game changer properly belongs to NATO.  Fresh off its "victory" in Libya, most of the NATO combatants already have a dog in the fight--the pirates.  Certainly NATO ships have been heavily involved in the anti-pirate patrols and have actually killed pirates!

The leaders of France, the UK, the US and perhaps some of the others will be well advised to man up and back the Kenyan play.  NATO has the aircraft, the ships, the logistics, the special forces, the intelligence assets necessary to change the game in Somalia quickly and surely.  The pirates along with the bloody hands of the brutal killers of al-Shabaab provide more than enough justification for entering the war, even for invoking the doctrine of R2P.

There is no need to invoke the UN.  Even the opposition of the AU can be ignored with impunity.  The morass of Somalia is intolerable now--and will only get worse should the Kenyans suffer the same fate as did the Americans and Ethiopians.  A robust NATO effort will be gratefully acknowledged (even if privately only) and might even silence some of the loud voices criticizing the alliance's efforts in Libya.

Get on with it, Messers Sarkozy, Cameron, Obama--the history books are waiting.

One More Famine In Somalia

Records of both history and climate data show recurrent droughts have hit the horn of Africa generally and Somalia in particular with regularity.  It was a drought induced famine which invited the US humanitarian intervention in the dismal geographic expression called Somalia during the waning days of the George H.W. Bush administration.  This adventure in feeding the starving brought with it a bout of mission creep and finally the humiliating withdrawal of US personnel following the ill-advised, poorly planned, and hastily executed failed raid on a chief warlord.

Since then the US has provided aid, humanitarian as well as military, to the Somalian people and their most recent experiment in government, the Transitional Federal Government.  The aid has been cut substantially in recent years due to well founded concerns that it might have been benefiting the al-Shabaab gunslingers more than the civilians for whom it was intended.  When the Mighty Warriors of the Koran ordered an end to the activities of international aid organizations including the UN, American aid functionally ended along with that provided by other civilized states.

The situation in al-Shabaab dominated portions of the country has grown ever worse.  Partially, this is the effect of the drought.  But more it has been the result of the combination of ineptitude and brutality which is the hallmark of al-Shabaab's  notion of proper governance according to the finer points of Islam.  The joining of hunger beyond description and fear of the thugs of Islamic purity has resulted in a flood of refugees pouring into vastly overcrowded camps in Kenya and new rather informal facilities in Ethiopia--a country where famine also stalks the land.

The UN and international organizations such as Oxfam have declared that an official famine exists in large portions of Somalia.  Oxfam has pointed the great finger of blame at the US and the European Union, alleging that both entities have been slow and inadequate in their response to the emergency despite ample warnings and importuning.

The Flying Finger of Guilt is misplaced to say the least.  The US has increased its food aid to the region, including an additional twenty-eight million bucks worth of food for Somalis.  The EU has done likewise.  At the center of affairs the UN believes it can successfully negotiate a mode of existence with al-Shabaab which will allow the food and accompanying aid workers to work in the regions they dominate.  But this remains an open question.

Dark hints have been made to the effect that the ongoing US effort to counter both al-Shabaab and its close affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, are complicating the business of making a deal with the gunsels of al-Shabaab.  The necessary inference is that the US should stop its semi-clandestine war with both advocates of violent political Islam.  Ironically, Oxfam, the same group which deplores the US drone attacks on al-Shabaab fighters has also mentioned the need to invoke Responsibility to Protect in order to meet the current crisis.  Of course, R2P would require a massive military campaign including ground combat forces, but that seems to have eluded the Lofty Minded of Oxfam.

In their orgy of finger pointing at the West, the folks at Oxfam and other NGOs seem to have overlooked a couple of salient facts.

Fact the first: The states of the African Union have contributed not even penny number one to famine relief in the Horn.

Sure, Kenya is taking a hit with the refugee camp, the largest on Earth, but that does not make up for the utter lack of interest in helping on the part of the AU generally.  This reinforces the perception that while the AU likes to talk about African solutions to African problems, they are unable or unwilling to do more than talk.  Let the West do the heavy lifting seems to be the unstated motto of the Union.

Fact the second:  The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference) has provided no money, no food, no logistics, no nothing.  Perhaps the OIC has forgotten that Somalia is a majority Muslim state--a member of the organization.  Perhaps the OIC and its over fifty members have forgotten the many strictures regarding the Muslim obligation for charity.  Perhaps the OIC is simply too worried about something they call "Islamophobia" and cartoons of the Prophet to notice a few hundred thousand starving Muslim women and children.  Or, perhaps the OIC and all its members--some of whom have most of the money in the known universe--simply believe it is the Will of Allah that so many perish so wretchedly, and thus it would be blasphemous at best to intervene with food aid.

The West ought to propose to the OIC the following deal.  You pay and we will feed.  You fork over some of your petrodollars and we, particularly we Americans, will provide food at fair market price to be distributed in Somalia or the refugee camps.  You pay for transportation and distribution.  And, if we need to use force to get the food past your fellow Muslims in al-Shabaab, you pay for the bullets necessary.

Of course the money heavy governments of the OIC will not accept this deal, fair as it is.  This means the taxpayers of the US and the other civilized states will have to carry the freight for some generations to come.  It is both a curse and a blessing that the West has learned through past experience that some things, like mass starvation, are simply unacceptable.  So, Westerners will do the heavy lifting while the AU and OIC sit by with folded hands and indifferent expressions.

Frankly, the idea in and of itself flatly rankles the Geek's rear end.  Famine should be equally unacceptable to the governments of the AU and, even more, the OIC.  The fact that both seem totally unconcerned about the bitter reality of life and death in the Somalia of al-Shabaab stands as stark accusation against not only the two organizations but the religious faith which purportedly provides the foundation of one.

The African Union Is Off Its Meds Again

There are some real problems in Africa.  Problems which well deserve the full attention of the African Union's Peace and Security Committee.  This crew is chaired by Ramtane Lamamra, who should be a very busy man.

Insofar as Mr Lamamra is busy it is not with the war in Somalia.  Nor is it with the invasion and occupation of Abyei by Sudan.  No, these are mere bagatelles in the estimate of Mr Lamamra and his colleagues on the Peace and Security Committee--or so it appears.

The African Union and its Peace and Security Committee are meeting in Addas Abba with only one pressing item on their agenda.  That issue is Libya.  To err on the side of accuracy, the issue is not so much Libya per se but rather the AU's perception that it has been shunted to the sidelines as "an observer in this calamity."  Jean Ping, another AU heavyweight, echoes the plaint of African irrelevancy.

The AU is desperately keen on ending the NATO program of air strikes.  Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra are of the expressed view that it is terribly, terribly necessary that the NATO planes sit silent and bereft of bombs on the runway if a political solution is to be found for Libya.  The AU is also quite sure that it has a plan, a road map to use their term, which will lead to a peaceful and successful outcome in Libya.

The problem in the estimate of the AU is the noise of the exploding bombs is so loud that no one will listen to their plan.  The minor detail that the AU plan allows Brother Leader to remain in power while the details of change are worked out and this is quite, quite unacceptable to the rebels seems to be unimportant--at least in the estimate of Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra.  The unpleasant matter of the rebels having rejected the AU approach is not seen by the AU as important.

The rebels are suspicious of the AU.  They have taken the uncharitable view that the strong financial ties between the AU and Gaddafi renders the organization a less than neutral party in the present matter.  Of course, the rebels are simply giving due recognition to reality--Gaddafi has been a major money man behind not only the AU but a wide selection of African politicians including not a few current heads of state.

The AU blithely overlooks the realistic position of the rebels.  The organization also ignores its own record of complete incompetence in dealing effectively with the armed chaos of assorted collapsing African states over the past couple of decades.  The body even manages to focus a blind eye on its lack of substantial let alone effective actions in the morasses of Somalia or Sudan.

No more than the Arab League is the African Union capable of brokering a peace in the context of an internal war.  Libya is no more susceptible to the good offices of the AU than was the situation in Yemen amenable to the efforts of the Gulf Coordinating Council.  In both states there was finally no room for even the slightest compromise between the rivals for power.  Gaddafi no more than Saleh is willing to give up and go into that good night without a fight to the edge of death--and perhaps beyond.

The Arab League was sensible enough to realize it could play no useful role in Yemen.  The members recognized that the political differences between the various regimes precluded a single political will and without that the AL had no credible capacity to coerce and thus no way of influencing the outcome in Yemen. Rather than expose this to global view, the AL simply looked the other way.  The GCC was willing to give it a shot having more to lose by not trying than by trying and losing.

The AU has the political and military potency of a steer.  It normally accepts this condition by ignoring unpleasant situations such as those in Sudan or Somalia.  Normally, the AU tries to keep its sheer impotency out of public view.  The ill-advised peace mediation effort in Libya is an anomaly understandable only in terms of the organization having a sense of loyalty to a man who wrote some very large checks to it.

Libya is a tough nut to crack as NATO has been discovering.  It is a tough nut because the slyly nutty man who has run Libya for two generations is personally tough.  He is not going to surrender or accept a humiliating defeat which would see him in jail, on trial, or facing the hangman.  Negotiation is a means of buying time and only that.  The solution to the Libyan problem will be found only in the death of Gaddafi.

Even that may not be enough.  The rebels are poorly organized with no common agreement beyond the proposition that Gaddafi must go--preferably feet first.  The rebels are no more amenable to negotiations than is Gaddafi.  What might or will happen the day after Gaddafi's body is buried remains very much up in the air.  There is no rebel consensus.  Nor is there a Western concept--other than sweet mood music about democracy and the like.

The AU has been so blind to the real dynamics in play in Libya--or owe such a debt to Gaddafi--that it ignored the non-negotiable foundations of both sides.  This diplomatic tone deafness is in no way covered up by a campaign of whining about the noise of NATO bombs.  The AU should stop its bitching and simply accept that it is an entity without any real reason to exist other than the egos of the respective members.

A Little Fear Would Mean A Great Deal Of Respect

The days when the US was both feared by its enemies and respected by its allies and most of the nonaligned are over.  That is a given.  It is also self-evident.  Equally obvious is the absence of American influence in the councils of states both hostile and friendly.

The reason for this does not reside with the economic catastrophe which started in late 2007 and continues to date.  The reason the US is largely irrelevant to the calculations of governments around the world is the failure of the Obama administration, most particularly and importantly the president personally, to develop and consistently implement a foreign policy which is rooted in American norms and values and seeks to foster or protect our national and strategic interests.

Mr Obama is personally responsible for the decline and near fall of the US as a Great Power.  He is personally responsible for the simple and sad fact that no country, no dictator, no advocate of violent political Islam, no aggressive, ambitious regime fears us.  The wrath of the United States is seen to exist no longer.  Without the perception of potential wrath there is no fear.  And, without the capacity to engender fear in those who oppose us, there can be no respect in the estimate of those who are favorable in their inclinations to us.

As recently as 2008 the US was seen as a leader.  Seen as the Greatest of Great Powers.  Seen through the prism of fear by opponents.  And viewed with genuine respect by all others.

Whether the motivations are ideological or purely personal or some mixture (a subject more suitable for a practitioner of a discipline other than history), the fact remains that the US has lost its capacity to influence the world.  While still a Great Power by all the metrics applicable, the president and his "team" have pretended that we are no different, no better, no more powerful than any small and marginal country anywhere on the face of the Earth.  As a result, the states of the world can afford to ignore us and seek leadership elsewhere.

One result of this is implied in a question posed by Nile Gardner in the Daily Telegraph: "Do tyrants fear America anymore?"  The answer, of course, is, "no."  Gardner places the blame correctly on Mr Obama's timid approach to global politics.

If anything, this interpretation is too kind.  The Obama way of dealing with foreign affairs is not merely timid.  It is far worse.  The Obama approach is a combination of utter indifference, contempt for the past role of the US in world affairs, and ideologically predicated naivete.  As a consequence he has been well behind the wave in each and every one of the recent developments in the Mideast.  Another result has been that he has alienated allies ranging from the UK to Israel.  Still another is the simple fact that both Russia and China can turn a blind eye to American policy entreaties without hesitation--or adverse result.

Obama could learn from history--were he so inclined.  He could learn from the example of Ronald Reagan, a man with whom he has compared himself recently.  Early in the Reagan presidency the administration directly tackled the problem of low global fear of the US.  In carefully calculated moves, the US quickly refurbished its image as a strong and borderline ruthless state by (1) invading Grenada under plausible pretenses and (2) attacking Libya by air with even more plausible pretenses.

Neither operation was really necessary to safeguard directly threatened American interests either national or strategic.  Both were utterly essential in rebuilding the respect and fear which had been so completely lost during the disastrous Carter years.  Whether the result was fear, respect, or, in the case of the rather anti-American French government, the "crazy American hypothesis," the net consequence  was that all, both foe and friend, had to recognize that the US was back as an independent and assertive actor on the world stage.

Should the Clueless Guy in the Oval tire of presiding over the Incredible Shrinking United States, and decide the time had come for a little creative and effective fear engendering, a very good target of Uncle Sam's wrath would be the port havens of the Somali pirates.  The recent killing of four Americans gives a good enough plausible reason to forcibly abate the nuisance presented by the pirates of Puntland.

The key to the success of a fear and respect engendering exercise in American power projection is contained in one word--punitive.  The goal would not be the creation and building of a nation-state in Somalia.  Such is impossible as the disaster in Afghanistan and the near debacle in Iraq have made manifest.  The purpose of the exercise would be the liberation of as many hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates, broadly defined as is convenient in the scope of a short duration military raid.

Lest the current administration be inhibited by residual folk memories of "Blackhawk Down," it needs to recalled that the operation was very poorly planned and worse in its execution.  It needs to be noted that had the operation been postponed a matter of hours, the Marine light armored vehicles would have been available for ground support.  Such a ground component would have militated against any success by the Somali forces even with their numerical advantages.

It is also important, indeed vital, to note that the US has a number of very experienced combat forces in its inventory even with the Afghan war still in progress.  We have learned volumes in both Iraq and Afghanistan which is directly transferable to a short duration punitive expedition.  Such an operation would not be manpower heavy.  Nor can it last more than a matter of a few tens of hours.  Combined with air action, an up close and personal raid would not only free captives but kill gun slingers and intimidate potential successors to those who have died for the "cause."

Provided the operation meets the requirements of being hard, fast, violent, and highly lethal, there is no reason the US cannot nor should not mount it unilaterally.  After all, it was our citizens who died at the hands of the pirates.  Retaliation is a recognized right.  It was the right invoked by the Bush/Cheney administration for the invasion of Afghanistan.

Provided the Americans and retrieved international hostages are evacuated fully in a matter of hours, two days at the most, the diplomatic repercussions will be favorable.  Yes, there will be cries of horror from the ever-so-sensitive members of the Western European and American elites, but even Mr Obama might be able to ignore the expectable.

Somalia will be no more of a mess afterward than it was before.  There might even be some improvement given the deterrent impact of such a punitive raid on the survivors, even those at a distance from the action.  The Somali gun thugs have no experience with the high degree of lethality American forces dispose in even limited usage venues.  For once, "shock and awe" would have a high degree of applicability.

In a way, the mounting of a punitive expedition on the pirate lairs would give us a chance to replay Afghanistan correctly.  This would be good.  It would draw a line between that which can be done--punish bad guys--and that which is impossible--construct a modern Western style nation-state from a traditional, tribal Muslim base.  It would also be good in that such an operation would put all bad actors on alert as to what might come their way should they get too over the edge.

Most importantly and most beneficially, a quick and dirty raid would show the world, from our allies in Western Europe to our opponents in the Kremlin, Tehran, Beijing, Caracas, and elsewhere that the US was not a potted plant decorating the global arena.  And that, bucko, is something the world needs badly right now.

Edging Toward "Kill Or Be Killed"

The jolly maritime marauders of the Somali coast may have finally gone a skiff too far.  The wanton killing of four wrong-side-of-middle-age American yachters by a temporarily leaderless and faction riven clutch of Somali pirates might serve as a long overdue tipping point in the policy of the US and other countries regarding the self-proclaimed Somali "coast guard."

The deaths of the four Americans being held hostage on the fifty-eight foot sailing vessel Quest has provoked the inevitable insinuations of bungling by the American hostage negotiator, but when stripped to the essentials it was an act of brutality for which the Somali perpetrators alone are responsible.  Not even the squid ink spouted by the pirates to the effect that the US Navy fired first--a truly preposterous notion worthy of the mind of someone who has chewed too much khat--alters that.

At root the pirates blundered.  Once they saw that they were almost literally surrounded by combatant ships of the American navy, they must have known the gig was blown.  Instead of accepting the (overly) generous US offer of the Quest as theirs to take, of course leaving the hostages with the Navy, the chuckleheads turned out to be less than serious.  As the American negotiator, reportedly an experienced FBI man, realized he was dealing with an insincere duo he ordered them detained.  The pirates were advised to think the matter over.

Whatever passed for cognition among the Brave Muslim Raiders Of The Briney Deep resulted in two salient actions.  One of the pirates fired an RPG at the nearby frigate.  Others on the seized yacht started shooting.  Among those who stopped bullets with fatal result were the four Americans.  This gory and tragic part of the story was discovered by the SEAL boarding team which also terminally neutralized two overly zealous Somali "coastguards."

The thirteen surviving members of the once merry band of pirates joined their two fellows in enjoying the comforts of the brig on the aircraft carrier Enterprise which introduced them to their most probable future--sterile bulkheads and locked doors.  It also dropped the what-do-we-do-with-them problem in the lap of Attorney General Holder, a man who rather enjoys lecturing Americans on their "cowardice" more than he does enforcing the US Code.

It is not surprising that the Holder Department of Justice has taken a noncommittal "we are considering the options" stance regarding the inconvenient presence of the Somalis in American custody.  It is rather like the Holder view of members of the New Black Panther Party waving clubs in the faces of potential voters outside a Philadelphia polling place--a sort of  well-the-boys-were-just-acting-out-a-bit approach to clear cut violations of the law.

The immediate problem will be solved.  The Somalis will be prosecuted in an American court.  There is no other politically viable way to go.  The pirates had their chance to walk (or, more accurately, sail) away.  They failed to take it and must now take the consequences.

The immediate problem is, of course, the easy one.  Far more difficult is the larger one, the reality that the pirates of Somalia are not only still around but ranging ever farther afield.  More ships and more cargoes and more crew are at risk today than ever before.  This despite the large number of naval vessels from numerous countries dedicated to maintaining safety in the critical sealanes of the region.

The nature of Somalia as a mere geographic expression in which the pathetic excuse for a central government controls very little outside of its official buildings is not going to change in the near future.  The recent combined offensive by forces of the African Union peacekeeping force, the Transitional National Government, and the Ethiopian army along with the militias currently fighting on the side of the government has not altered the balance of power in the venue nor extended stability more than a few blocks.

This means the Deep Thinkers who argue there is no solution to the pirate problem until Somalia once more has a stable, effective government are simply kicking the can down a long and dusty street.  As the pirate threat extends its shadow over more and more of the key routes to and from the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf, there is a very real menace to the global economic recovery.  Additionally, there is an object lesson to other advocates of violent political Islam including those in the environs of the Straits of Malacca showing the power of piracy to hobble the economies of the "infidels" and "apostates" around the world.

Taken in total there is only one response now available to any realistic government.  Actually, it is a response with several components.  The first is the creation of yet one more special international tribunal with jurisdiction over acts of piracy.  The second is a prohibition of ransom payments by ship owners and others.  The third is the mandatory formation of convoys in the affected areas.  The final consists of the stationing of armed guards--preferably regularly organized units of national navies or marine forces--on board ships transiting the danger zone.

This combination would increase the costs of doing business while reducing the profit potential.  While there are alternatives such as armed guards with shoot-to-kill authority and immunity from liability in the (inevitable) incident of misidentification, these are less satisfactory than the full panoply of defensive measures.  Admittedly, there will be resistance to the prohibition of ransom payment, but that resistance can be overcome.  The same is true with respect to the use of deadly force by shipborne defense forces.

It does not good to excuse the piracy with smooth words about just how the poor Somalis have no chance for honest employment or the removal of some pirates will simply assure that new, younger, and more violent candidates will take their place.  Nor does the argument that any robust measures will place the lives of the several hundred hostages currently held in Somali ports at risk deserve genuflection.

The pirates have altered their behavior toward the hostages.  Reports of torture and threats have grown significantly in recent months.  The day will come soon when hostages are killed in exemplary fashion in order to force faster payment of larger ransoms.  The only way this can be defeated is to add a major raid with the objective of freeing as many of the present hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates as might be conveniently accomplished to the defensive mix.

"Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute!" may have been a popular toast of two hundred years ago when the US faced the pirates of Tripoli.  It was true then.  It is true today.  The US eventually prevailed in the long and unpleasant war with the Bey of Tunis and others of his ilk back then.  The same may--indeed, must--be true today.

The stakes are higher than a mere cost add-on to international trade.  Lives are at risk as shown with the killing of the four Americans.  Beyond that, the pirates are a form of maritime jihadist whose acts can threaten the peaceful commerce of much of the world, a threat which can benefit only those who wish the West harm.

It is to be hoped most ardently that the current administration might take a firm grip on the realities of the world including the pirates and what they mean to the US and other civilized states.  While this hope may be pious given the record to date of the Obama administration, the reality is too dark to admit of being passed on down the line in the hope that a more reality oriented and more robustly minded president may be in the Oval two years hence.

Failed And Failing States--And Violent Political Islam

There is a pair of diplomatic T. rex sized critters stomping around the room today.  As this nearly conjoined twin blunder about threatening to trash the international furniture, all the polite people in high places carefully avert their eyes and keep their mouths resolutely shut.

Virtually all hands studiously have ignored the reality presented by violent political Islam.  With the notable exception of former British prime minister Tony Blair there has been a veritable conspiracy of silence concerning not only the nature of the enemy of the civilized states but, more importantly, the success which has been enjoyed by the enemy over the past several years.  Instead of confronting the face of the enemy, rather than name the name of the guilty, the tired, hackneyed, long discredited tropes regarding poverty, political marginalization, the Israeli refusal to make a deal acceptable to the Palestinians, or American foreign policy generally are trotted out as if repetition could remake reality.

Even though the recent rumors of back channel talks between the Karzai government and elements of both Taliban and the Haqqani network give some hint that the military pressures are showing on the political will of the insurgents to continue, this straw in a favorable wind is more than offset by the many alarming (and that is not too strong a word) developments in Pakistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and other parts of the North Caucasus to say nothing of Yemen, Sudan, and Nigeria.  The bad outnumbers the faint good by an overwhelming amount.

Pakistan is lurching ever closer to either collapse or a co-option by the indigenous groups advocating violent political Islam.  Even though those Pakistanis who found from personal experience that living in the Islamic paradise promised by Taliban was far closer to hell on Earth than the heavenly reward have had ample time and opportunity to spread the word, the majority of the people are so fed up with the corruption and inefficiency of the government that the Islamist way seems the better one.  Coupled with a virulent anti-Americanism, which has been in no significant way lessened by the outpouring of US aid following the floods, this widespread public mood bodes poorly for the future stability of Pakistan.

Even a perfectly calibrated American policy which demonstrates the ideal mix of pressure and inducement will not change the underlying reality--most Pakistanis have come to see the US as being in demonic alliance with both India and Israel.  This unholy trinity constitutes the stuff of Pakistani nightmares--and has as little substance.  However, the power of the nightmare is great and real.  Thus the US and others in the small and beleaguered community of civilized states had best prepare for the eventuality of Pakistani state failure or the equally probable embrace by Islamabad of some variant of political Islam.  To do less is to court major disaster given the nuclear arsenal in Pakistan's possession.

This aspect of regional political context also demands a very hard look be taken at our current goals and plans in Afghanistan.  Bluntly, there is no hope of accomplishing more than further perturbation of armed political Islam espousing groups before changes in Pakistan render our presence in Afghanistan nugatory.  The best nightfall case we can now expect in Kabul is a regime which includes both Taliban and the Haqqani network.  This implies that the most we can hope for is a regime which will not provide support, sanctuary, or assistance to advocates of armed political Islam contemplating operations outside Afghanistan or the FATA of Pakistan.

The upcoming strategic review of the AfPak campaign will have little realistic alternative to that of reorienting to a goal of a coalition government in Kabul whose components are willing to forswear cooperating with groups such as al-Qaeda.  Ironically, this means we must "settle" for a goal and definition of victory which should have been in place when the first American boots hit the ground all those years, dollars, and dead bodies ago.  Had only we gone for the punitive expedition model in the first place, sigh.

Preparations for the Pakistani implosion should accompany the reframing of goals in Afghanistan.  It will be nearly impossible to assure that Pakistan does not become even more than it currently is the seedbed of plots against the West by violent political Islamists.  The most the US and others can hope to do successfully is pull Pakistan's nuclear fangs.  That along with finally turning off the great spigot of foreign aid will do much to lower the danger presented by Islamists emerging from the hospitable human and geographic terrain of that country.

Shifting from Northwest Asia, the unpleasant facts of failing states must be confronted.  There has been more than a little wringing of hands over the impending collapse of Yemen and what that would mean taken in conjunction with the mess called Somalia.  Yemen seems doomed to fail.  It is running out of its only cash crop--oil.  It is running out of water for its population burgeoning not only from indigenous increase but from the flow of refugees from Africa.  The government is so corrupt, so unbelievably inefficient, so riddled with cronyism, so laden with denial as to make the lads in Islamabad look like recipients of the Nobel Prize in good governance.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is not responsible for the current sorry state of affairs in Yemen.  It is not behind the two separate defensive insurgencies.  Nor is it an outside agitator stirring up discontent within the population.  Those honors belong to the government.  True, they are enhanced by the history and social construction of the Yemeni people.

However, AQAP can and is benefiting from the internal disorder created in largest measure by the government.  To the extent AQAP benefits, the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula as well as the civilized states generally will suffer.  This implies that the US has a dog in the fight.

The problem comes in that there is little, if anything, that the US and other outside powers can do about the root causes of insurgency or political disaffiliation within Yemen.  We can provide aid, military supplies, and training, intelligence support, but none of these will change the fundamental trajectory of Yemen.  Its failure is virtually certain so the most outsiders can hope for is the delay of the final collapse.

Time is a precious commodity since time is what is needed to build a diplomatic consensus about what the "international community" can do, if anything, regarding the challenge of failed states generally and those which harbor violent political Islam in particular.  Perhaps this will mean the nearly impossible task of reinventing the old "trusteeship" concept of the UN.  Perhaps it will mean an open ended international "peace keeping" presence oriented to suppressing advocates of violent political Islam--even though this will seem one more example of a "war on Islam."

The challenge of failed and failing states looms larger, much larger, when the dynamics of Sudan are considered.  The real deal is Sudan is poised on the brink of multi-party internal war.  The North-South divorce will not occur without bloodshed even if the vote goes off as scheduled and is cleaner than clean, attested to by Jimmy Carter.  The North is not going to let the cash cow of Southern oil get milked without Khartoum holding the pail.  And, the South will not twiddle its thumbs if Southerners living in the North are persecuted, which seems as likely as the Pope being against married priests.

Darfur is doomed to crank up again.  There are no alternatives.  The Khartoum regime isn't about to see the huge desert area drift away while it may have to watch the South go its separate way.  The residuum of hate left from the past conflict assures scores still must be settled in the one acceptable currency--dead bodies.

Africa's most populous state must be placed on the list of failing states.  The frontline of political Islam runs through the country.  The dynamics of the upcoming election are framed by the Muslim versus everyone else contest.  Much of the prevailing sentiment is anyone who is not Muslim is the enemy.  Given the record of what can be termed politely as "sectarian" violence, the election  is not going to settle the great divide which pits Nigerian against Nigerian.  The most active and influential group in the Muslim north is avowedly violent political Islam in its agenda and methods.

The last time Nigeria fell apart was over forty years ago.  The secessionist movement was defeated, but the time was long and the cost high.  While Nigeria recovered from that adventure in falling apart before it collapsed as a state, it was a near run thing.  Since then much has changed so that the probability of holding together this side of failure in the likely event of a Muslim generated internal war is low to nonexistent.

That's enough as the Geek is a sensitive sort of guy who can take only limited amounts of bad news.  The takeaway is self-evident though.  The enemy is violent political Islam.  The best friend of the enemy is the failed and failing state.  And, the time to get a grip on both is short.

"The Kids" Are Getting Plumb Dangerous

Al Shabaab, (the youth, if you prefer English) has hit outside its home turf of Somalia for the first time. It was a hard hit. A hard hit which "The Kids" had promised if Uganda did not remove its "occupying" troops from the few blocks which comprise the writ of the Transitional Federal Government.

The High Minded and Lofty Thinking diplomats of the West created the fiction of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and then abandoned the field to the forces of the African Union. The AU is notoriously long on ambition and delusions of adequacy. It is equally short on competence, funding, able armed forces, and consistent political will.

When all the AU promises had been made, only Uganda and Burundi sent peacekeeping forces. Of these, the Ugandans have done the most freight hauling. Uganda has done this for several reasons, none of which are altruistic. In large measure the Ugandan government has kept its presence in Mogadishu as an emblem of its enlarging status on the continent.

With the discovery and proving of significant oil reserves, Uganda has been announcing its ambitions to be a major player in African affairs. New visions of prosperity and the status which such will bring in its wake have been accompanied by apparent success in finally defeating the long running sore caused by the Lords Resistance Army's insurgency. Muscle flexing in Somalia can be seen as a natural extension of these factors as well as a counter to the influx of refugees from Somalia.

The deadly triple bombing during the World Cup final game in Uganda's capital Kampala gives the country's government a stark choice: withdraw from Somalia or enlarge the effort. Neither option is good.

Al Shabaab is riven at present between two major competing factions. One wants to focus on the final elimination of the TFG and the installation of a shariah compliant Islamist regime. The other, the internationalist wing which is aligned with al-Qaeda and numbers hundreds of foreign fighters in its ranks, wants to export the war to other countries in the Horn of Africa including not only Uganda but Kenya as well. The Kampala attack hints that the internationalists are either winning the internecine struggle or are both willing and able to go it alone.

Either of these two alternatives indicates that the very dynamic the US feared when it employed the Ethiopian army as a proxy to eliminate the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) is coming to pass. The ICU was seen by the US as providing another safe haven for violent political Islamists of the al-Qaeda variety. The extirpation of this potential was seen as both necessary and high priority.

The failure of the US and other Western governments to look one day beyond that upon which the ICU was deposed guaranteed that the aftermath would be worse. As Somalia has never been other than a mere geographic expression in which all politics were local and clan based, the avenue of chaos was wide open to any group sufficiently motivated and willing to kill. Of the various groups so oriented, al-Shabaab was the most dedicated and most willing to pile up corpses.

With the exception of former British Somalia, which peeled itself away from the rest of the mess assembled by Western diplomats at the UN a half century earlier, Somalia rapidly fell under the shariah clad heel of al-Shabaab. Resistance to "The Kids" was just enough to ensure the group became more and more extreme, more willing to kill, more dedicated to winning--and more willing to call for outside support.

It was the political equivalent of a person taking just enough antibiotic to assure the weak bacteria were killed and the survivors made stronger, more resistant, and more deadly. Al-Shabaab is comprised of battle tested and slaughter hardened survivors.

These indigenous survivors have been reinforced in recent months by equally battle tested and slaughter hardened fighters from other theaters including Iraq and Afghanistan. They have also been joined by recruits from the twenty plus years of Somalian diaspora. Arabs, Afghans, Uzbeks, returning refugees or the children of refugees, all are united by the ideology of violent political Islam, by the vision of a global caliphate or, at the least, by a deep and abiding hatred of the infidels of the West and all the baggage those infidels carry.

The less than half-hearted measures taken to date by the US and other Western countries to bring, or, to err on the side of accuracy, impose, stability on Somalia have done absolutely nothing useful. All have been counterproductive. From the cut-and-run decision taken by President Clinton in the wake of the killing of nineteen special forces troops in an ill-conceived and worse executed attempt to "arrest" a Somalian warlord nearly twenty years ago to the present time, the actions of the US could not have been more carefully calculated to produce an Islamist victory and the dreaded new safe harbor for al-Qaeda.

The triple bombing in Kampala should serve as a wakeup call not simply for Uganda or the AU but for the US and the West generally. The hope that proxies would provide a low risk, low cost way of preventing an Islamist takeover of Somalia has been proven disastrously wrong. Al-Shabaab has shown a will and ability to engage in significant horizontal escalation of the war. It is no longer an internal matter, resident in Somalia alone.

With the Kampala attack "The Kids" have shown their threats to Kenya and elsewhere must be taken seriously. The Bad Boys Of The True Faith can and will make good on their threats. The proof is in the mangled bodies of those who died, shredded by al-Shabaab's bombs. "The Kids" own the initiative now. They can choose when, where, and how to strike. No country, certainly not Kenya, nor Yemen is safe.

It will not be sufficient to leave the task up to the AU. While the association may want that to be the case, the bitter ground truth is that the Union is not up to the job. Not even a massive influx of foreign money will change that. Only years of careful training backed by shipments of modern equipment can spin up the AU forces to a level of skill which would allow them to undertake either effective stability operations in Somalia or adequately guard against replays of the Kampala attack.

That leaves the usual fall back--the US and the West. Considering that the US is still neck deep in the Big Muddy of Afghanistan, it is not in the cards for Washington to send in the Marines or the airborne. Considering the West is locked in a losing contest of wills with Iran on the rather critical matter of the mullahs getting their Mahdi Bomb, it staggers the imagination to conclude that the European Union or any member state will decide to send troops to Somalia.

To go completely outside the box--how about Russia? That's a non-starter considering that the Kremlin cannot even deal effectively, "clarify and put to order" in the words of Vladimir Putin, the Islamist insurgency in the Caucasus--and that is conveniently close to Russia.

To keep on pushing the envelop of theoretical possibilities--what about China? Well, China always needs more oil and Uganda has oil. Perhaps China can form its version of Blackwater security and contract with Kampala. That would assure one country could be held harmless against "The Kids."

No. The Geek was being jocose. Even as a hedge against the loss of Iranian oil, China is quite pleased to sit back and watch--as it deals with its own homegrown Islamists.

In short, there will be no volunteers from anywhere willing and able to take on "The Kids." Any way the political-military cake is sliced, al-Shabaab looks to get the biggest piece. Worse, the auguries point to the better organized, more resolute, more ambitious internationalist faction winning out over the provincials so as to assure that Somalia will be both the long feared safe haven and a major exporter of both violence and political Islam.

Oh, well, as Allah wills.

Ten Pirates In A Leaky Tub

You will recall that last week the Russians taught a bunch of skiff-riding, gun-toting unemployed Somali "fishermen" the error of their ways. Having seized the Russian owned and crewed tanker, MV Moscow University, the pirates then sought to shoot it out with Russian naval infantry undertaking a heliborne rescue and recovery mission. In the process only one Somali buccaneer died.

The Russians later sent the others packing in either (take your pick as news accounts differed after the incident) in their skiff or "an inflatable boat." An hour later the Russians acknowledge that they lost either radio or radar contact with the pirates as they set sail for home some three hundred statute miles away. Fellow Raiders of the Briney Deep safely ashore in Somalia confirm that there has been no contact with their colleagues in crime since the Russians cut them loose without navigation equipment or weapons.

Reportedly the Russians considered (at least briefly) the idea of hauling the pirates back to Moscow for trial but decided not to given the uncertainties in international law and consequent problems in obtaining a conviction. Subsequently, President Medvedev averred that unless and until an adequate international system for bringing pirates to justice, "we will have to act as our forefathers did when they met pirates."

While NPR caustically questioned the correctness of setting the poor dear fishermen from the ungoverned geographic expression of Somalia off without any navigational instruments, it does strike this observer as a useful, cost effective way of giving the Daring Desperadoes of the Deep a better chance of staying alive than either a short drop from a (metaphorical) yardarm or a stint in the Siberian Gulag. If nothing else the Russian action does give a certain impetus to the creation of a special international tribunal to handle the pirates of Somalia and elsewhere.

Not surprisingly the Maritime Marauders have shown their typically overinflated sense of self-importance. An alleged "pirate commander" vowed to hold the Russians responsible for any harm which may have befallen their missing comrades in banditry. This pretense of being akin to a sovereign state is risible to say the least. In reply someone should remind the jacked-up thug just how fast his associates beat feet as the Islamists moved in on their particular pirates' cove.

The problem of securing the sealanes in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden remains. So also does the kindred problem of the spread of piracy to the coast of Nigeria and the growing threat of both piracy and marine terrorism in the Straits of Malacca. The three challenges are linked by a common thread of religiously predicated political ideology. The pirates (and terrorists) of all three regions are directly or indirectly connected with Islamism and its armed twin, jihadism.

While individual shipowners may see the ransoms as an acceptable cost of doing business, the net effect of seizures made and ransoms paid has been the imposition of ever growing collective costs on the global economy. In addition, the seeming impotence of the assembled international flotilla to deter, let alone successfully either defend or recover stolen ships, lowers the credibility of the civilized states generally in their confrontation with global Islamism and jihadism.

At the very minimum the US should throw its diplomatic weight (if any is left) behind the Russian proposal for a UN created "Piracy Court." This approach is long overdue and is equally well provided for by precedent. If the International Criminal Court is any guide, the processes of the proposed court would be so lengthy that any pirates hailed before it would rot a suitably long time in durance more-or-less-vile so that they will be too old to keep on with living on the Somalian version of the Bounding Main even if acquitted.

Better yet, the US (and other countries as well) should go ahead and emulate the Russians in the rescue and recovery of the MV Moscow University and its crew. Most, if not all, the navies currently represented in the anti-piracy patrols have a special operations capability at least equivalent to that of the Russians. Certainly the US does. So, why not use it?

Sure there will be casualties. Pirates will die. (Hopefully.) Perhaps some captive crewmen will as well although that possibility can be lowered significantly if every ship has a secure room such as that aboard the MV Moscow University to which they can retreat after cutting off the main engines. Keeping in contact with the rescue forces would also be possible as shown by the MV Moscow University incident.

Historically, piracy has been suppressed only when the costs of doing piratical business are elevated to an unacceptable level. This has occurred when sufficient numbers of pirates have ended dead: violently dead or incapacitated through long, long incarceration.

Since the current "system" for bringing pirates to justice is not even good enough to aspire to the term "laughable," there is an immediate need to admit that President Medvedev is right: we have to deal with the saltwater brigands as did our ancestors. Perhaps not with a modern replica of Execution Dock, but certainly with a robust willingness to use force. (Adopting the Russian model of setting pirates loose in a leaky boat is strictly optional.)

Way To Go, Vladimir!

Yesterday the Geek contended that Russian PM Vladimir Putin had little if any real choice in dealing with the Jolly Pirates of Puntland after they hit the big time by boarding and seizing the Russian government owned, Russian crewed tanker, MV Moscow University. A number of factors both foreign and domestic dictated that the only viable Russian response would be a military one.

Nonetheless it was heartwarming to read of the Russian marines having retaken the ship at the cost of no friendly lives. Unfortunately, only one of the pirates was killed after they opened fire on the approaching marine force.

Putin's decision was made easier by the fact that the ship's crew had taken refuge in the ship's "security room" after having shut down the main engines. This meant the target would be stationary and the only humanoid forms visible would be those of the maritime muggers.

Still, things could have gone wrong. For example, by some concatenation of misfortune the 86,000 tons of oil might have been released, or caught fire. Either would have raised a storm of environmentalist protest. Or, a pirate might have gotten lucky, shot down a troop laden helicopter. Or, unbeknownst to crew or rescuers alike the pirates might have placed a large, lethal explosive charge next to the bulkhead protecting the secure room.

Even for a man who is well known for his decisiveness and relative indifference to body counts, the decision would not have come lightly to Vladimir. To his credit, he made the right choice--quickly. Also to the credit of the Russians, their small surface combatant on station was properly equipped with special operations personnel as well as the necessary support and delivery systems. The senior command had been forward looking in their planning and had anticipated the necessity of putting men on board a pirate-seized ship.

The most important facet of Putin's choice is its existence as a model for and challenge to other governmental leaders. The Russians have joined the French in putting troops on a pirate held vessel in order to effect a rescue. The Russians have surpassed the French in that their operation was conducted on the high seas and resulted in saving ship and cargo as well as crew.

(No, the Geek has not forgotten the US Navy rescue of the captain of the Maersk Alabama as he was held by four thugs-with-guns on a lifeboat. But, that operation was qualitatively different from as well as less risky than that undertaken by the Russians.)

The Russian action does require one to wonder why other governments, particularly those such as the UK, Germany, and China which possess special operations capacities have not used them for the benefit of their nationals, their ships. Perhaps the answer is to be found in the combination of circumstances which forced Putin's hand this time.

There have been previous incidents where Russian nationals have constituted all or part of a crew taken hostage by the Raiders of the Somali Coast. In none of those cases did the Russian navy intervene. This implies that the Kremlin is not moved simply by the sight of Russians in piratical durance vile.

Nor have the Lads in the Kremlin been deterred by merely the thought that "innocent" people might die in the course of a rescue operation. One need remember only the use by Russian special duty troops of a BZ type agent in the conduct of the assault on the terrorist held Moscow theater a few years ago. (Note BZ type agents are only "non-lethal" in theory; in practice this class of "incapacitating agents" will result in at least ten percent fatalities.)

While Western governments as well as Western publics may shy from robust measures fearing loss of non-combatant or hostage lives, this is not the case with Russia. So, what made the difference in this most recent case?

The answer is simple. It was laid out in detail yesterday in the Geek's blog. Putin had no realistic alternative assuming he wanted both to keep his hands on the levers of power and retain the respect of Beijing.

The next Russian crew which runs afoul the Ak-waving, skiff-riding bunch of Somali "unemployed fishermen" may not be so lucky. Militating against this melancholy conclusion is the simple fact that Vladimir The Bold has acted as he did this time. This raises a key question: Can Putin now let go of the tiger whose tail he has so firmly grabbed?

This is a poser for the "Good Czar." The only thing worse than the appearance of weakness is a policy of vacillation. Having taken the tough line, Vladimir The Decisive cannot now shift to one which is--or seems--less firm.

Unless, of course, he wants to change his name from Vladimir to Barak.

Hey, Vladimir, You Going To Wimp Out This Time?

The Jolly Swashbucklers of Somalia have hit the big time with the seizure of the MV Moscow University. The ship is registered under the Liberian flag but is owned by a Russian company and is crewed by honest-to-gosh Russians. It is carrying a fifty megabuck cargo of oil to China.

The ship was taken by the usual skiffs filled with "unemployed fishermen" equipped with the ever present Russian designed AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades (probably also of an initial Russian provenance.) The crew apparently played hide-and-seek with the pirates for some minutes or even hours while sending out distress calls. Finally the crew locked themselves in the ship's "secure room."

To some extent the Russian ship's crew (or at least the captain) has responsibility for the current predicament. The ship was not registered with the Maritime Security Center, which is the clearinghouse for maritime traffic and is supposed to assure a greater level of immunity to pirate attacks.

According to a spokesman for the European Union's pirate fighting detachment in the region, the MV Moscow University contacted a Russian warship on duty in the Gulf of Aden reporting the tanker and its eighty-six thousand tons of oil were being boarded. The Russian anti-submarine warfare vessel Marshal Shaposposhnikov headed to the Moscow University's reported position at flank speed.

As Vladimir Putin is wont to say, the situation is in need of clarification. While it may be presumed the Merry Buccaneers are in control of the ship, this is not certain. If the crew is hunkered down behind the locked, reinforced steel doors of their secure room an interesting question comes to mind: Just how are the Dauntless Ex-Fisherfolk of the Somali Coast going to drive their new acquisition given that it is a tad larger than the outboard powered skiffs they are used to?

Unless the teenage thugs are the greatest sailors since Barnacle Bill, the likelihood of getting the Moscow University to safe(?) harbor in Somalia some five hundred miles away are slim to none. This means they will have to elicit the cooperation of at least some of the Russians. If, as is typically the case, the Brigands of the Briney Deep have RPGs it will be possible for them to blast a good sized hole in the bulkheads or hatches of the "secure room."

Such a robust action brings with it the high chance of one or more Russians ending up dead or, if truly (un)lucky, badly wounded. In the past the Somali Swagmen have been reasonably careful not to kill crew members of the ships they hijack, but accidents can happen.

Right now, even in the absence of Russian corpses Vladimir Putin has a challenge. A very real challenge which if not handled properly will have an impact on his major league problem in the North Caucasus.

Unlike the last time the pirates captured a vessel with a Russian connection--remember?--the ship filled with tanks and other weapons, the MV Moscow University is laden not only with oil but with political symbolism. Consider the name. Now add to it the fact that the ship is owned by Novoship a subsidiary of Sovcomflot. As the name implies, Sovcomflot is owned by the government. Finally, think about the cargo--oil--and the destination--China.

Then there is the crew. Unlike the last time, the time of the tank carrying freighter, the crew is Russian. Not Ukrainian. Not a mixture of swab jockeys from former Soviet components or Warsaw Pact subordinates. Russians.

Think for a moment about the impoverished unemployed fishermen of Somalia. Think particularly of their religion. That's right, bucko, the pirates are Muslims.

Now the Geek is perfectly well aware that it is completely against the good manners of today to link icky-poo things such as armed robbery on the high seas or ineptly constructed but malignly intended vehicle borne improvised explosive devices left in Times Square with a religion. The Geek also acknowledges that Islam qua Islam in all probability is not high on the list of motivations for most Somalian gun-toting skiff-riders.

The connection between piracy for ransom and Islam is not a matter for clerical debate; rather it is a matter of both political and financial importance for the jihadists of Somalia. And, (drum roll, please) the North Caucasus. In Somalia there is a direct link between the pirates and the Islamist jihadist groups currently contending for ultimate ascendancy in Somalia. It has been well documented that the pirate syndicates provide financial comfort to the Islamists. The transactions may fall under the term, "extortion" or "protection," but it is equally likely that the pirates are purchasing information, support, and other services from Islamist jihadist entities. It does not stretch credulity to posit that the pirates are giving money to the Islamists as a free will offering, a material sign of shared religion, mutual values, and common goals.

The insurgents of Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus region are Islamic. The leadership and many of the lower ranking sorts are not only Islamic but Islamist. The impact of political Islam, Islamism, upon the people of the North Caucasus has grown geometrically over the past few years. It is not exaggerating to see the insurgents of the North Caucasus as part of the multi-party wave of Islamist jihadism which includes but is most certainly not limited to the two Talibans and al-Qaeda.

The very blunt and quite unpleasant ground truth facing Vladimir of the Bare Chest is this: If the seizure of the MV Moscow University is allowed to run the normal course of prolonged captivity followed by payment of a large ransom, the jihadists of the North Caucasus will be handed a great propaganda victory. The Mighty Men of the Kremlin will have been humbled by the Will of Allah expressed by a handful of teenagers with automatic weapons.

Worse for Vladimir, Dimitry, and Company the propaganda will have the great advantage of being true. Anything other than a clear, quick ending to the hijacking without the payment of ransom will constitute a defeat of Moscow by the forces of Islam in the eyes (and on the lips) of the Muslim insurgents of the North Caucasus.

In the view of the proud, highly nationalistic Russian people generally any finale to the current contretemps off the Somali coast which does not involve a military dimension--and victory--will be a defeat of Vladimir the Good Czar. At this juncture in Russian history the people of Russia, particularly their hoi polloi, are not inclined to see a defeat of Russian will and arms with equanimity. Being bested by a bunch of dark hued, Muslim kids with speedboats, guns, and chutzpah would be totally unacceptable to Ivan in the street.

Nor would China be impressed by a surplus of "restraint" on the part of the Kremlin. The Mandarins of the Forbidden City tend to base their calculus of power on another country's will and ability to exercise force effectively when faced with a direct challenge. Should Vladimir and the Boys of the Kremlin balk at the jump, the Chinese senior leadership would find it necessary to engage in (to use John Foster Dulles' fine term,) "an agonizing reappraisal" of Sino-Russian relations.

Taken together all these factors and implications add up to an amount of freight far outweighing the cargo of the MV Moscow University. And, that, bucko, must add up to a sleepless night or two for Vladimir Putin. It couldn't happen to a more deserving fellow.

Too Good For Our Own Good

Over the past century or so the primary characteristic of American foreign policy has been the tension between realism and ideology. While there has been some seesawing back and forth between the extremes of realpolitik and idealism run rampant, the overall trend has been toward the ideological pole.

Ideals have a very real place in the making and executing of foreign policy. Even ideology in and of itself is not necessarily bad. When, however, the dictates of ideology--any ideology--suppress a careful calculation of the realities resident in a situation, the consequences are most likely going to be poor, even disastrous.

In this context it is utterly essential to remember that governments are not moral beings like individual humans. Governments are impersonal constructs which function as agents on behalf of the nation, the society, or, more properly, that component of society which functions as the polity. It is the polity which sets the pace. The polity determines the nature of national interest. The government functions as the agency which seeks to advance or protect the national interest.

Government is to polity as a lawyer is to the client. That analogy is not precise but it is close enough to the reality of global life to serve as a quick guide.

National interest is composed of concerns or values widely shared within the polity. Some of these are long-lived, virtually permanent features on the national landscape. Others are evanescent, driven into existence by a high profile event, acted upon and then flicker out as new events, new concerns flash across the horizon of the polity's awareness. Still others, arguably the most filled with potential disaster, are the result of a specific ideology.

Stepping back in time a bit, for the first century and more of its existence, the US had little in the way of foreign relations. The men who founded this country were practical politicians and realists. Their view was simply that the US had only one true, compelling national interest--survival. They realized that this new nation was a very small fish in a large ocean populated by sharks with long, sharp teeth.

Despite some horrid miscalculations early in the Nineteenth century, which included almost getting into simultaneous wars with both England and France, the US played a cautious, highly conservative, and ideologically flat role in the world through and beyond the War Between the States. Even our advance into the colonial adventure at the bitter end of the Mauve Decade was justified as conservative--a defensive action needed to assure that our long standing national interest of open, free maritime commerce and access to foreign markets remained intact in the Pacific and Asia.

The first real excursion into an ideologically driven policy came at the bitter end of the Nineteenth century when John Hay announced the famed "Open Door" policy with respect to China. This policy was of the declaratory sort which meant it had neither legal standing nor an inbuilt capacity for enforcement. It is doubtful that any country among the collection of raptors who regarded China with appraising eyes saw any need to heed the new US policy--including the US itself.

On occasion, declaratory policy is harmless, a kind of feel-good move in keeping with the prevalent opinion within an influential segment of the polity. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact is one example. No one took this measure seriously beyond a few really sincere peace advocates. Others such as the Open Door policy or the Monroe Doctrine come to be enshrined as national interests worthy of implementing unilaterally if necessary--by force of arms if that is required.

We got away with the Monroe Doctrine in largest measure because the British saw no profit in challenging it. We did not escape unscathed from the Open Door because the Japanese saw great profit in challenging it. So embedded had the Open Door become that the US had no wiggle room for negotiation when the Japanese started to close the door--firmly and permanently. The result was in all the media a few years back. It was called World War II in the Pacific.

Ideology went front and center in both the definition of national interest and the conduct of foreign relations during the years of Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson was a Christian man, a very Christian one, who had strong views on international morality. He saw nations as being bound by the same moral codes as operated on individual people. And, just as a person who violates the moral code may be subject to either punishment or some other form of correction, so should a state which he saw as a bad actor.

Acting on a moral base and totally overlooking the reality that governments are agents not principles, Wilson sought to "teach the Mexicans to elect good men," using Marines and, later, the Army as instructors. Horrified at the submarine's necessary sneakiness and apparently believing that the presence of an American civilian on a British ship (even one which was legally a warship) rendered that boat immune from attack, Wilson worked with vigor and effect to guide the US into war only months after he had been re-elected on a "he kept us out of war" platform.

It is always important to keep in mind that the US had no national interest, nothing which directly, substantially, and materially affected its status in the world, its prosperity, its security in issue on the battlefields of the war. Further, at the time Wilson was spinning his moral distaste with the submarine and the Kaiser for whom they sailed into a full-bore crusade to "make the world safe for democracy," and to wage a "war to end wars," the belligerents on both sides of No Mans Land were on the ropes, approaching collapse economically and psychologically.

A peace of exhaustion was in the offing. This peace would have come even allowing for the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent offensive on the Western Front. The German offensive ran out of human steam well short of a meaningful end. It was not a war-winner let alone an attack defeated by the efforts and losses of the recently arriving American "doughboys."

Had the US stayed on the sidelines, the war would have ended in mutual exhaustion. Arguably the peace would have proven both more equitable and much longer lasting than did the one hammered out (to the accompaniment of the disillusionment of Wilsonian ideals) at Versailles.

Wilson's ideals--including the League of Nations--were ideologically driven pure and simple. While they were momentarily popular with the common folk of Europe, they foundered not only on the cynicism of European leaders, but more importantly, on the bedrock of nationalism throughout the continent--and in the US. The outcome of the ideologically predicated, completely unnecessary American involvement in WW I and the peace process was highly negative to all parties. Its effects linger on even today to the continued vexation of US interests in the Mideast.

In a rational world, the lessons of the Wilson misadventure would have resounded loudly down through the years. This world being marked by an absence of rationality, they did not.

The aftermath of WW II which was called into existence by the unintended by well neigh onto certain merging of the effects of the Open Door and the Versailles Treaty was marked by another burst of idealism and ideology.

The UN was FDR's genuflection before the alter of Wilson. The systemic flaw--that the architects of the UN deemed any and all "nations" to be fully functional "nation-states" in which the large and the small, the mature and the juvenile, the democracies and the autocracies were all seen as equal--constituted a fatal flaw. This flaw was joined by a second. The misplaced belief that the US and the USSR possessed a broad spectrum of coinciding national interests regardless of the vast gulf of history, values, and sense of security which existed between them.

Then there was the Cold War and the concomitant militarization of the doctrine of containment. The Soviet Union represented a massive political threat to Western Europe, particularly France and Italy in the closing years of the Forties, but it was no military threat. Nor would it become one for many, many years--if ever. The US in particular mis-read the blustering rhetoric of the Stalin regime and constructed a bogeyman of gargantuan proportions.

The false image of Soviet military expansion linked with the rise of domestic anti-Communism to create an atmosphere in which the ideology of opposing Communism, assumed to be a global conspiracy of super-human brilliance and persistence became the defining American foreign policy force. This, in turn, produced NSC-68 and the resulting arms race which was, unsurprisingly, mirror imaged in the Soviet Union.

There is not sufficient space here to trace the several historical trajectories and political agendas which resulted in this ideological dynamic. But, you can trust the Geek; he is a doctor. Suffice it to say, the Soviet Union was a hostile entity; it held no brief for the US; it would seek political advantage anywhere in the world where it could do so without running any real risk of a direct, military confrontation with the US which it (correctly) saw as technologically, economically, and culturally superior to itself.

But, rather than playing the Game of Nations as it was, rather than defining our national interests realistically and narrowly, we chose to play the game as our defining ideology feared it might be. This meant that we had to involve ourselves directly and substantially in the affairs of countries in which we had no genuine national interest in play. It also meant we fought a long, and, finally, lost war which was neither necessary nor in our interests.

While the game which we played during the Cold War had some good outcomes such as the success of Apollo in 1969, overall the consequences were far from beneficial to our longer term interests. One of those fields which suffered during the Cold War with results which still detain us at length is found in the incorporation of ideologically derived features into the overall definition of national interest.

Consider democracy. Consider the infinitely amorphous area termed, "human rights." Both have become permanent, central features whenever US policy and national interests are discussed. Such was not the case in past years, way back in the distant decade of the Seventies, remember them? Disco, gas shortages, stagflation, Jimmy Carter? Yeah that was the Decade From Hell.

It is also the decade when the US discovered support of democracy, and focusing on human rights to be central to our national interests. Before the epiphany of that time the US had mouthed much on democracy and done little. We had been content to cozy up with any dictator even the most unseemly if that regime gave the appearance of short-term order (which we cheerfully and quite improperly interpreted to be the equivalent of long-term stability) so as to keep the commies out.

Similarly we were remarkably indifferent to human rights (whatever the term might mean in any given context.) This unengaged attitude applied not only to the actions of "our" dictators but operated with respect to Moscow or Beijing as well. We were silent to all but the most egregious Soviet acts unless there was immediate propaganda hay to be made as in the case of the Berlin Wall, the crushing of the Hungarians in 1956, or the Prague "Spring" eleven years later.

All this changed when the tsunami comprised by Watergate, the debacle in Vietnam, the revelations of the Church and Pike committees, and the revulsion over the Pinochet coup in Chile rolled over the domestic political landscape. Politicians as dissimilar as Scoop Jackson (the senator from Boeing) and Jimmy Carter waved the banner of "human rights" as the Europeans held a mighty convention which gave forth a document on human rights signed by all, including the Soviets, which promised a new day for humanity not unlike the Soviet Constitution of 1937--and was equally a dead letter before the ink was dry.

The Reagan administration raised high the battle flag of democracy--at least rhetorically and joined in the human rights hymn. So well was the imagery of democracy and human rights portrayed that almost no one questioned the relevance of either to the requirements of American national interest. After all, who could be against either?

Both are good in principle, in the abstract. But, neither necessarily protects or advances our national interests such as global stability, open commerce, an absence of war, or economic success. And, each brought with it the potential for ideologically driven interference in venues both remote and tangential to national interests. Further, both carry with them automatically the potential for expansiveness of application which violates the constraints of realism.

The fact that democracy in and of itself brings no guarantee of either stability or peace is seen in the blunt fact that Hitler came to power via an election which met the tests of transparency, fairness, and inclusiveness used even today by Jimmy Carter and others of the election-fairness community. The reality that democracy does not bring leaders agreeable to American national interests is seen right now in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. The reality that democracy does not lead to the sort of stability best for the US is dramatically apparent in Iraq.

Basing any aspect of foreign policy on human rights is to base it on the most slippery of slopes. There may be a Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed by all the member countries of the UN, but there is no one universally accepted protocol for defining, let alone enforcing this international version of declaratory policy. There is no practical mechanism for holding each and every country to a single standard in any area of human rights. That is self-evident in the differing fashions in which women are treated in Muslim as compared with non-Muslim countries or the vast gulf in the free exchange of ideas between China on the one hand and the US on the other or the exploitation of children in both industry and warfare.

Human rights and democracy are matters of aesthetics or sensibilities; they are not national interests. The same may be said regarding "humanitarian crises."

Consider Somalia in December 1992. Starvation was real, widespread in that geographical expression. International food aid through either the UN or the plethora of non-governmental organizations concerned with such matters was impeded or stolen by assorted gangs of thugs, various gunslinging bands of diverse warlords. It was not getting to the starving people clustered in camps.

This was disturbing to say the least. It made for images of compelling anguish on the TV screens of the developed world. It was a macabre spectacle of the best sort. But, was it a matter of such compelling US national interest that it merited the deployment of American troops?

George H.W. Bush thought so. For whatsoever constellation of reasons the recently defeated president sent the Marines ashore. He assured We the People the mission would be short, successful and, above all, the right-thing-to-do. Of course, it was longer, bloody, unsuccessful and set the stage for both the emboldenment of al-Qaeda and the concomitant hesitant policy of the Clinton administration in meeting the jihadist challenge.

Overall, the Somalia deployment was a bad thing for American national interests. But, it was neither the last nor the worst conflation of the ideological or the idealistic with the realistic requirements of American national interest.

That point came with George W. Bush. Flagrant idealism caused the mission leap in Afghanistan from a punitive expedition clearly in American national interest to the goal of "nation-building"--a clear impossibility given the history, demographics, and culture of that place. Worse, pure, unadulterated ideology aiming at the chimera of planting democracy in the Arab Mideast caused the invasion of Iraq. This action above all others taken by the US in the past quarter century if not more was the most harmful to US national interests both in the region and around the world which can be seen in the historical record. It was as if Dick Cheney took his famed shotgun and blasted the face clean off Uncle Sam.

Now, as has been noted in many, many posts, the post-modern, multi-cultural, community organizing on a grand scale ideology of President Obama is with us. So far the results have been as can be expected from history--a failure harmful to the real world interests of the US. Once again events are proving that when realpolitik is kicked aside in the interests of ideology, only disaster can be expected.

The question is this. Will the disaster be on the scale of Bush in Somalia or Woodrow Wilson in and after World War I? Well, bucko, only time will tell.

Somali Pirates--Life Gets Better And Worse

A couple of recent events draws one's attention back to the Jolly Brigands of the Somali Coast. Overall the incidents of late draw a sort of fever chart, tracking the ups and downs of the pirate plague in the waters of northwest Africa.

A week ago the skiff riding thugs captured a Norwegian flagged, Burmese crewed chemical tanker off Madagascar. Due to its route and destination the ship was not registered with the fusion center controlling anti-piracy efforts in and near the Gulf of Aden. In its not-registered status the ship was one of the nine thousand plus vessels plying dangerous waters without letting the assorted patrolling navies know of their existence.

The seizure of the nine thousand ton tanker was good news for the pirates. So also is the unwillingness of shipowners and operators to wait for naval convoys--or even register the passage.

Thus the Norwegian tanker becomes another figure in the loss column. If one stares only at the goats, the number of attempted piracies, the news is all good for the pirates. This year seems on track to equal or surpass last year's record number of attempts--198. If, however, one's attention focuses on the number of successful pirate actions, the news is not at all good for the Thugs of the Blue Briny. Only forty-four ships were taken. That is only two more than the previous year where the numbers were forty-two for 122 attempts.

While the pirate net has spread ever wider, the catch is going the way of the bluefin tuna--down. One very good reason for this development is the acceptance by ship operators that minimum defense measures such as razor wire on the rails, blasting raiders with firehoses and, simplest of all, abrupt maneuvers at high speed turn attempts into failures. The addition of an armed guard has been shown to be the ultimate deterrent. It seems the pirates like to shoot but really don't cotton up to being on the receiving end of fast moving bits of metal.

Another way of showing pirates the downside of their chosen occupation was brought into sharp focus by the French frigate Nivose. The frigate, a component of the EU's naval task group went on a romp last week. The crew stopped and seized four motherships and six assault skiffs. The bag was thirty-five pirates in custody--and, one presumes, a whole lot of hard feelings back on shore.

While the loss of thirty-five members of the Jolly Roger Club is minuscule considering there are fifteen hundred or so pirates organized in seven syndicates doing a handsome business in ransoms (estimated 110 million for 2007 & 2008 combined), the French stop-seize-and-arrest is an arrow pointed in the proper direction.

(The Geek cannot help but wonder, given the current public view of the Obama administration being soft on terrorism, why doesn't one of the president's political men urge him to call up Secretary Gates or JCS Chair Mullen and tell them to ginger up our naval efforts, to, well, you know, out French the French?)

The problem for the French (and the rest of the League of Civilized States) is what to do with the pirates who are captured. All too often Kenya is used as a convenient dump for suspected pirates. The Kenyans are not thrilled by this. Even though the US and other nations help underwrite the direct expenses involved, the dumping of maritime pollution has caused severe difficulties for the Kenyan judicial system and is putting a strain on their jails.

The current practice also puts Kenya at greater risk of terror attacks emanating from Somalia. It is not surprising that members of the Kenyan legal and political establishments have been pushing back, hard, on the use of their country as the designated waste dump.

The Kenyans have been "playing up" in cricket terminology as shown by the recent conviction and sentencing to twenty years of seven pirates captured by the Royal Navy two years ago. Life in a Kenyan slammer might be bad, but at least these seven ex-thugs are better off than the two of their mates who died in the firefight with the Brits.

The UN Convention which governs the legal response to piracy gives primary jurisdiction to the country controlling the ship which captures the pirates. The US observed this law as well as its own domestic laws with the sole survivor from last year's episode which saw an American merchant captain held hostage by pirates thwarted in their attempt to take his ship. Three pirates were "double tapped" by SEAL snipers and the fourth has been indicted in New York.

The reasons that more pirates are not similarly treated (the Geek means arrested, not given head shots much as he prefers the latter) are transparent--and transparently bogus. The US and other Western states fear abuse of their legal systems by those representing and offering apologies for the pirates as well as entertaining some sort of misplaced anxiety that captured thugs-at-sea will claim political asylum.

Duh!

To make life worse, much worse, for the pirates it is necessary for more of the many navies now offering patrol, protection, and overwatch in the threatened sealanes to do what the French did. In addition it is necessary that all captured pirates be taken to stand trial and do their time in Western courts and prisons. The certainty of capture or worse, the sureness that the slow grinding judicial mills of the US, the UK, and other Western nations will produce in the fullness of time a long stretch in durance vile will raise the costs of doing business as a pirate syndicate.

History, a lot of history stretching back to the quite literal days of Julius Caesar, demonstrates that the vocation of maritime banditry loses its appeal when the costs are raised sufficiently. This does not mean we must return to the days of Execution Dock but it does mean that we must stop off loading the problem onto Kenya. It means that the countries who have stepped up to provide some measure of deterrence and protection against the Somali marauders must take the next step--bring the nasty little buggers to our homelands, give 'em a fair trial, let the apologists apologize, let the defense lawyers do their best, and, when the last hurrah has died away, lock the bloody blighters up for a goodly chunk of their lives.

The trouble and expense will be worth it. At the least by making a salutary example of the Somalis, there is some chance a far greater threat to maritime commerce and thus the global economy can be deterred.

That's right, bucko, there is a far greater threat on the near horizon. The Malacca Straits have been targeted according to Singapore maritime security officials. While the group has not been identified, it (or they) are Islamist in nature. The Malacca Straits constitute one of the greatest if not the greatest maritime chokepoint in the world carrying infinitely more trade than does the Gulf of Aden. The Straits are territorial waters for Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, none of which has a significant navy. At the same time none of these rather prickly entities desires international assistance or an international naval presence. And, of course, two of them are Muslim majority countries and have internal problems with Islamist jihadists.

As even a member of the Obama administration should be able to see and understand, there is much more to be gained by showing palpable resolve against the annoying Somali skiffers than simply making the Gulf of Aden less risky. All that is necessary is to look at a map and see just how many very critical shipping lanes merge in the Straits and imagine what sort of destabilizing damage could be done by a few Muslim pirate/terrorists on skiffs of the Somali sort.

Making life worse for the Somali pirates will make life a lot less worse for the rest of us.