The Incredible Shrinking US Navy

Mark Helprin writing in the WSJ raises a very important issue.  It is a dynamic which has been underway for some years now but has been occurring below the threshold of public awareness and debate.  At stake is the continued capability of the US to project power at great distances from our shores and assure the freedom of maritime trade.

Way back during the Reagan administration there was much brouhaha over plans to enlarge the American navy to the level of six hundred ships.  That was an inventory of combatant vessels not seen since the mid-sixties.  The opposition was loud and sustained.  The primary reasons given against the expansion of the navy were cost and the absence of a credible threat at sea beyond the undeniable presence of Soviet submarines carrying nuclear tipped ballistic missiles.  The proponents of expansion argued that the role of the navy went far beyond mere deterrence and the countering of the Soviet boomers.

When night fell on this particular debate, the navy was enlarged albeit not to the six hundred ship level.  In subsequent years the navy has been reduced.  Some reductions were justified with ease such as the retirement of superannuated SSBNs.  Others simply occurred without any particular note or rationale.

The ground truth which must be held firmly in one's grip is that the US is a maritime power.  Further, it has been one since the beginning.  Even with the unfortunate, not to say potentially fatally enervating, decline of the American merchant marine seeming to lessen the importance of protecting seaborne commerce, the reality remains: The US is heavily dependent upon sea lines of communication for the basics of industrial life as well as for much of its economic strength.

As Admiral Mahan demonstrated with history changing effect in his seminal The Influence of Sea Power On History over a century ago, maritime powers alone have the capability to wrest and maintain the initiative when confronted by a continental power's military threat.  Also as Mahan pointed out, control of the sea provides economic security and geopolitical advantage whether a state is confronted by another maritime power or a continental one.  World War II proved each and every of Mahan's contentions.  So did much of the Cold War.  The US Navy and its overwhelming maritime domination gave the US profound advantages in initiative which could and were never contested seriously by the Soviet Union.

Warships are expensive.  Not only are they expensive they become more so with every change in technology.  They are expensive to build.  Quite expensive to man and maintain.  The expense is multiplied by the simple and unavoidable fact that a maritime power needs a lot of ships.

That is the sticking point as well as the thrust of Helprin's piece.  The US must not only have combatants of all types which are technologically advanced, it must have a lot of them if it is to retain its globe girdling capacity. In straitened economic times like the present the possession of a lot of expensive ships crewed by expensively trained people might seem to be a luxury.

It has been argued that the US can rely upon its allies to provide bases from which force can be projected should such be required.  That argument has been made at regular intervals ever since the founding of NATO over fifty years ago.  The expense of a navy was employed as one of the main reasons for the "pactomania" of John Foster Dulles back when Ike was in the Oval.  Many, if not all, of the multilateral and bilateral military assistance treaties entered into during the Cold War were informed by the need for bases from which either or both air and ground forces could be projected.

The rub comes in the inconvenient fact that treaties and agreements are, as Bismark was alleged to have said, "mere scraps of paper," easily blown away by the winds of political change.  The ongoing events in the Mideast demonstrate the accuracy of this position.  Alliances almost hoary with age come unstuck in an instant when a political hurricane passes through.

The US must have its own sovereign bases.  This is where the navy enters the picture.  The ships of a task force are floating sovereignty.  They are bases of force and power projection over which usage the US has absolute control.  There is no need to gain the permission of an ally whose support may fade at the worst possible moment.

Because ships are movable assets, they provide a unique capacity to demonstrate a compelling American interest in a situation occurring anywhere near any ocean.  Right now the US is moving amphibious warfare ships from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea to support diplomatic efforts in Libya.  It is an unfortunate symptom of the decline in the size of the US Navy that the ships and embarked Marines were not immediately available in the Mediterranean as was the case not that many years ago.

It is the global nature of American interests as well as the unique capacity of warships to move rapidly and bring impressive force to bear on a location of concern which obviates the contention that individual ships are far more competent than their predecessors of only twenty years ago.  It is quite true that a single aircraft carrier battle group has more conventional firepower on tap than did an entire fleet at the end of World War II.  It is also irrelevant.

A single carrier battle group can not be in two widely separated locations simultaneously.  As the current world situation shows, there is a very high probability that two or more crises requiring an American response can and do occur simultaneously.  Nor does the existence of one or two high profile crises obviate the ongoing need for sealane protection.  Neither does such end the requirement for a visible presence in areas of the world which appear quiet.

The Deep Thinkers who have complaisantly presided over the run down of the US Navy apparently have failed to appreciate the recent developments in China.  The Trolls of Beijing have decided to trod a path not walked by Chinese for nearly a thousand years--the path which leads to the sea, to maritime power aspirations.

The Trolls have made explicit that the South China Sea is an area of major concern.  They have all but declared the Yellow Sea to be territorial waters.  The Chinese navy has engaged in operations against the pirates of Somalia as well as making courtesy calls on African ports.  All of this is a recapitulation of past Chinese experience--admittedly long past experience.

The Chinese have been bending metal to provide the hardware needed for a true blue water navy which includes at least one aircraft carrier.  It is true that the Chinese are a long, long way from mastering the intricate job of operating a force projection oriented blue water navy, but there is no doubt that the Trolls have placed their feet firmly on the road that leads to that end.

The old opponent Russia has included major additions to its fleet in the defense ramp up currently planned.  Given the ambitious claims made by the Kremlin regarding sovereignty over large portions of the Arctic Sea and the resources below that unattractive body of water, there is little reason to believe the Russians will suddenly decide a new, improved navy is a luxury which can be dispensed with easily and at no loss.

To put a narrow focus on a bit of the Arctic Sea and adjoining water, it might be worth recalling the recent study showing the offshore proven reserves near Alaska have the potential to put that state in the top five oil and natural gas producing countries of the world.  The Russian's territorial claims run right up to (and perhaps beyond) the limits of the Alaskan sub-sea field.  That does raise some interesting possibilities, doesn't it?

The pirates of Somalia may represent a paradigm of an emerging threat which can envelope other areas of the world.  Nor is there any reason to believe these areas will be limited to those populated by Muslims and ringed with failed, failing, or hollow states.  As the quest for resources--and not simply those of a hydrocarbon sort--pushes evermore into the maritime zones, the potential for political or criminal entities to embarrass state actors with piratical acts similar to those taking place off the coast of Somalia grows apace.

Maritime protection missions including those directed against pirates or smugglers as well as guarding exclusive economic zones are tasks for the navy.  They are all ship intensive operations even if the combatants need not have more than a moderate level of individual competence.  This implies the US Navy will need more smaller combatants than it currently possesses.  It also implies the individual ships will have to have a multi-mission capability.

Littoral control and amphibious forcible entry missions are not going to go away simply because Secretary Gates fears the proliferation of relatively inexpensive and capable anti-ship missiles.  Rather, the challenge exists for the US Navy to develop and deploy appropriate threat reduction systems.  This will not be a task accomplished cheaply nor quickly.

Nothing in the area of naval development will be nor can be cheap and quick in its accomplishment.  It takes time, a lot of time, to design and construct new ships, new systems.  The time can be shortened and the expense lessened by refining the procurement process--a task which has bedeviled generations of defense secretaries.  Still it must be done if the erosion of US naval power is to ended and reversed before the anemia is fatal.

For all of those who have hoped that the "end of history" predicted at the time of the Soviet bloc's collapse will arrive finally with the ending of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all that can be said is, "Welcome to the real world."  The choice is blunt and harsh.  Reverse the slow degradation of American naval power or accept a greatly diminished status for the US along with an increase in the costs of nearly everything along with a greater number of threats and strictures to our way of life and independence as a country.

Edging Toward "Kill Or Be Killed"

The jolly maritime marauders of the Somali coast may have finally gone a skiff too far.  The wanton killing of four wrong-side-of-middle-age American yachters by a temporarily leaderless and faction riven clutch of Somali pirates might serve as a long overdue tipping point in the policy of the US and other countries regarding the self-proclaimed Somali "coast guard."

The deaths of the four Americans being held hostage on the fifty-eight foot sailing vessel Quest has provoked the inevitable insinuations of bungling by the American hostage negotiator, but when stripped to the essentials it was an act of brutality for which the Somali perpetrators alone are responsible.  Not even the squid ink spouted by the pirates to the effect that the US Navy fired first--a truly preposterous notion worthy of the mind of someone who has chewed too much khat--alters that.

At root the pirates blundered.  Once they saw that they were almost literally surrounded by combatant ships of the American navy, they must have known the gig was blown.  Instead of accepting the (overly) generous US offer of the Quest as theirs to take, of course leaving the hostages with the Navy, the chuckleheads turned out to be less than serious.  As the American negotiator, reportedly an experienced FBI man, realized he was dealing with an insincere duo he ordered them detained.  The pirates were advised to think the matter over.

Whatever passed for cognition among the Brave Muslim Raiders Of The Briney Deep resulted in two salient actions.  One of the pirates fired an RPG at the nearby frigate.  Others on the seized yacht started shooting.  Among those who stopped bullets with fatal result were the four Americans.  This gory and tragic part of the story was discovered by the SEAL boarding team which also terminally neutralized two overly zealous Somali "coastguards."

The thirteen surviving members of the once merry band of pirates joined their two fellows in enjoying the comforts of the brig on the aircraft carrier Enterprise which introduced them to their most probable future--sterile bulkheads and locked doors.  It also dropped the what-do-we-do-with-them problem in the lap of Attorney General Holder, a man who rather enjoys lecturing Americans on their "cowardice" more than he does enforcing the US Code.

It is not surprising that the Holder Department of Justice has taken a noncommittal "we are considering the options" stance regarding the inconvenient presence of the Somalis in American custody.  It is rather like the Holder view of members of the New Black Panther Party waving clubs in the faces of potential voters outside a Philadelphia polling place--a sort of  well-the-boys-were-just-acting-out-a-bit approach to clear cut violations of the law.

The immediate problem will be solved.  The Somalis will be prosecuted in an American court.  There is no other politically viable way to go.  The pirates had their chance to walk (or, more accurately, sail) away.  They failed to take it and must now take the consequences.

The immediate problem is, of course, the easy one.  Far more difficult is the larger one, the reality that the pirates of Somalia are not only still around but ranging ever farther afield.  More ships and more cargoes and more crew are at risk today than ever before.  This despite the large number of naval vessels from numerous countries dedicated to maintaining safety in the critical sealanes of the region.

The nature of Somalia as a mere geographic expression in which the pathetic excuse for a central government controls very little outside of its official buildings is not going to change in the near future.  The recent combined offensive by forces of the African Union peacekeeping force, the Transitional National Government, and the Ethiopian army along with the militias currently fighting on the side of the government has not altered the balance of power in the venue nor extended stability more than a few blocks.

This means the Deep Thinkers who argue there is no solution to the pirate problem until Somalia once more has a stable, effective government are simply kicking the can down a long and dusty street.  As the pirate threat extends its shadow over more and more of the key routes to and from the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf, there is a very real menace to the global economic recovery.  Additionally, there is an object lesson to other advocates of violent political Islam including those in the environs of the Straits of Malacca showing the power of piracy to hobble the economies of the "infidels" and "apostates" around the world.

Taken in total there is only one response now available to any realistic government.  Actually, it is a response with several components.  The first is the creation of yet one more special international tribunal with jurisdiction over acts of piracy.  The second is a prohibition of ransom payments by ship owners and others.  The third is the mandatory formation of convoys in the affected areas.  The final consists of the stationing of armed guards--preferably regularly organized units of national navies or marine forces--on board ships transiting the danger zone.

This combination would increase the costs of doing business while reducing the profit potential.  While there are alternatives such as armed guards with shoot-to-kill authority and immunity from liability in the (inevitable) incident of misidentification, these are less satisfactory than the full panoply of defensive measures.  Admittedly, there will be resistance to the prohibition of ransom payment, but that resistance can be overcome.  The same is true with respect to the use of deadly force by shipborne defense forces.

It does not good to excuse the piracy with smooth words about just how the poor Somalis have no chance for honest employment or the removal of some pirates will simply assure that new, younger, and more violent candidates will take their place.  Nor does the argument that any robust measures will place the lives of the several hundred hostages currently held in Somali ports at risk deserve genuflection.

The pirates have altered their behavior toward the hostages.  Reports of torture and threats have grown significantly in recent months.  The day will come soon when hostages are killed in exemplary fashion in order to force faster payment of larger ransoms.  The only way this can be defeated is to add a major raid with the objective of freeing as many of the present hostages as possible and the killing of as many pirates as might be conveniently accomplished to the defensive mix.

"Millions for defense; not one cent for tribute!" may have been a popular toast of two hundred years ago when the US faced the pirates of Tripoli.  It was true then.  It is true today.  The US eventually prevailed in the long and unpleasant war with the Bey of Tunis and others of his ilk back then.  The same may--indeed, must--be true today.

The stakes are higher than a mere cost add-on to international trade.  Lives are at risk as shown with the killing of the four Americans.  Beyond that, the pirates are a form of maritime jihadist whose acts can threaten the peaceful commerce of much of the world, a threat which can benefit only those who wish the West harm.

It is to be hoped most ardently that the current administration might take a firm grip on the realities of the world including the pirates and what they mean to the US and other civilized states.  While this hope may be pious given the record to date of the Obama administration, the reality is too dark to admit of being passed on down the line in the hope that a more reality oriented and more robustly minded president may be in the Oval two years hence.

Failure Breeds Catastrophe

A ground truth about Haiti: It was a failed state long before the earthquake hit. Arguably, it was the failed nature of the Haitian state--and the well-meaning but totally ineffectual efforts on the part of the UN--which assured the earthquake became a sizable catastrophe.

The Geek is well aware that he is out of step with the journalists, politicos, academics, and always concerned folks of the world by not seeing the earthquake and its human cost as a tragedy of world historical proportions. The Geek may be a cold dude, but he has a grip on the realities of Haiti which seem to elude all too many.

Haiti has been a failed state since the moment of its creation in a welter of war, disease, and bloodshed. Not because, as the always-terminally-out-to-lunch Reverend Pat Robertson averred in one more mind-boggling rush of total asininity, of a "pact with the devil," but because of the deep seated internal conflicts which have riven Haitian social, political, and economic life for the past two centuries. These divisions have made their existence manifest not only in the simple fact that very few Haitian heads-of-state have died in bed with their boots off, but also in the endemic corruption, governmental inefficiency, structural poverty, and environmental rapine which have marked Haitian history since the giddy-up.

It is a pathetic and telling indictment of a society, a polity, a culture, when the twenty best, most peaceful, most productive years of its existence occurred during a period of foreign (US) military occupation and rule. It is an even more pathetic and harsh indictment of Haitian life when it is realized that some (elderly) Haitians look back fondly on the brutally repressive rule of Papa Doc and his scion, Baby Doc.

The US ended the last great Haitian adventure in authoritarian rule during the early years of the Clinton administration by some tough talk on the part of Colin Powell and the credible threat of the Marines landing one more time. As was often the case with exercises in more muscular diplomacy (see, inter alia, Somalia), the Clinton boys and girls declared victory too soon and drew back in favor of collective efforts by the Organization of American States and (of course) the UN.

Several elections, coups, counter-coups, and rumors of coups later, Haiti has been under the effective tutelage of the UN for the past half decade or so. Internal security has been provided, such as it is, by a UN peacekeeping force while UN and assorted non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have provided the backup for the locally elected government at all levels from the national on down. A very great deal of well-intentioned efforts, money, charitable donations, and peacekeeping services have poured into Haiti. Poured in without any noticeable improvement in the economy, the quality of social life, the efficiency and accountability of government, or the security of physical existence.

Under the beneficent UN/NGO regime, Haiti has remained what it has always been--a social, political, and economic basketcase. It has retained its lamentable status in all these areas for the same, long standing, historically well-rooted reasons of internal divisions, systemic and endemic corruption, and a culture of perpetual violence. To these the years of external support and assistance have grafted a firm belief on the part of Haitians generally that the outside world owes them.

The several seconds of earthshaking have resulted in highlighting these pre-existent dynamics in a dramatic and quite unmistakable fashion. The ramshackle facsimile of a Haitian government has collapsed even more completely than the shoddy built structures on the sides of deforested hills covered by soil subject to liquefaction with less of a stimulus than that provided by a 7.0 temblor. The UN and its NGO accomplices have shown the usual frictions, institutional egos, inability to coordinate effectively which have existed all along. The Haitians--or at least a significant portion of them--have acted out their "frustration" resulting from the perceived failure of the world to provide food, water, medical supplies, housing, and ipods fast enough.

As an overlay to the realities on the ground in Haiti--realities which could be overcome quickly and efficiently if control of the relief and rescue efforts would be vested in one command structure possessing the relevant skills, equipment, and systems--everyone and his/her brother from President Obama to the UN to the usual crew of NGOs is now clamoring for cash money. Not supplies, not services, not expert personnel, not communications and control systems. No. Just send cash. And lots of it.

The UN Secretary General, whose organization is yet to account for the money received and allegedly expended in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami, insists that without beaucoup bucks, the humanitarian disaster in Haiti will know no limits. President Obama has dragooned his two immediate predecessors into ramrodding an all-American cash raising effort. The same will be or already is happening elsewhere in the world, particularly Western Europe.

In Haiti, or, more accurately, in Port-au-Prince, there are people raising merry hell in their expression of the effects of starvation, dehydration, post-traumatic stress disorder, and simple frustration. It is of interest that the vast majority of images from the streets of PaP show young men in good health, men who are, in medical terms, "well nourished," going about the business of looting and pillaging.

Presumably these young, well nourished, well muscled men are those who have been constructing roadblocks of corpses whenever and wherever a relief supply convoy is spotted on the road. The assorted media accounts never state where the hijacked supplies might be taken after seizure, but would it be too cynical, too politically incorrect to bet that whatever is taken is later sold--for cash to those with that most prized of commodities?

Apparently all the UN heavyweights in country are too preoccupied finding a journalist who will pass on their tales of devastation and death without precedent in the UN's history to notice that the UN peacekeeping forces are both too minimal on the ground and too prudent to actually protect the supply convoys. The same spokespersons like their colleagues from the legion of NGOs are too involved with demanding more money to have noticed that supplies already piled up at the one and only airport are not being moved to those who, it is alleged, need them so desperately.

In one of those little ironies which throw the realities on the ground in Haiti into sharp relief, the US aircraft carrier Carl Vinson is just off shore. It has a number of medium lift helicopters just perfect for moving supplies from the airport to those who need them. But, the worthy and ever-so-concerned humanitarians who own and control those supplies are unwilling to allow the US Navy to move them.

Now, the Navy has its downsides as do all the American military services. But, the Navy and the others are very, very good at moving vast mountains of material very quickly and efficiently from central depots to users in the field. The US military has the expertise, the equipment, the systems to move men and material from where they are to where they are needed. Thus, it seems logical that the US military be given the task of moving stuff.

But, that sort of narrow minded logic does not meet the needs of either the UN or the assorted NGOs in their Quest For Bucks. It is that sort of narrow minded logic with an emphasis on results, on getting the job done, which would violate the institutional egos, the personal careers, the heart and soul of humanitarian relief organizations both public and private.

The US military is also very good now at providing security in the context of humanitarian relief and political stability operations. The US military have been undergoing the most rigorous sort of on-the-job training in this sort of operation for some years now. So, it is only logical (there's that icky-poo word again) that the UN and its clones give the responsibility for protecting as well as moving the relief supplies over to the US military.

That won't happen. Not in this world. Even if the movers and shakers of the UN, the OAS, the assorted NGOs, had an attack of honest self-evaluation, the notion of allowing the US military services to move material, save lives, and provide security is simply unacceptable to the high minded, internationalist, post-modernist, multi-culturalists of the aforementioned entities.

As an unfortunate but seemingly necessary consequence of the institutional agendas, histories, and values of the UN and the NGOs alike it will be more of the same in Haiti. Just as the assorted well-meaning but totally ineffectual groups have been screwing the pooch in Haiti for some years now, they will continue to do the same in the days and months to come.

Just as has been the case elsewhere in recent years, the UN and its co-conspirators in doing good will use emotionally laden propaganda, outright deception, and never-ending wails and warnings to keep their collective paws in our pockets. We will continue to have the privilege of paying for their collective failures.

Say it once more, with feeling, "May you live in interesting times."

Pirates Come Back Shooting--Does It Matter?

Not surprisingly the Skiff Riders Of Puntland were back on the job almost before the USS Bainbridge had collected the bodies of their three dead fellow thugs. Neither is there any shock in the news that the Bad Boys of the Somali Coast went after a US flagged cargo ship with, or so the now obligatory pirate spokesman alleged, a specific intent to "destroy" the ship and its crew.

"Unfortunately," this Jolly Swagman's answer to Robert Gibbs continued, "the ship escaped our attack." Right, dude, fer sure, how unsporting of the Americans not to just sit there and take it, suffer your Somali version of retributive justice.

The cowardly Americans hid in the engine room of the Liberty Sun and called for the US Navy and CNN. When the navy in the form of the USS Bainbridge arrived, it was the pirates who had left the area at a high rate of knots. Unfortunately the Bainbridge must not have had access to aerial reconnaissance such that the offensive skiff could be followed and (it is to be hoped sincerely) engaged before it reached the safety of Somalian territorial waters.

Instead, the Bainbridge, with rescued Captain Richard Phillips still onboard, proceeded to escort the slightly damaged Liberty Sun and its cargo of food aid for Africans to the Kenyan port of Mombasa. The Ship Molesters of Somalia undoubtedly were back in port at Eyl or some other coastal hole vowing to try again.

Eleven other wannabe Heroes of the Islamist Sea were not so lucky. They and their thirty foot "motherboat" as well as three skiffs came to the attention of the French. After having been spotted by a helicopter flown from the frigate Nivose, the French warship shadowed the aquatic goons overnight and moved in around dawn at a point five hundred nautical miles off the Somalian coast. Apparently the maritime jihadists offered no resistance as they were all taken alive. Whether or not the eleven will join the three pirates captured in a French commando raid a few weeks ago and face a French tribunal is not clear yet.

These two incidents along with the wave of successful pirate acts over the weekend shows that no more than a single snowflake heralds a blizzard nor a pair of robins, spring does a successful takedown or two mean the Jolly Swagmen of Somalia have been suppressed or even slightly deterred. The incidents along with their precursors do, however, point in the direction which successful policy must go.

Sustained violence, particularly when coupled with credible threats of hostile escalation, must be met with resolve. A resolve to oppose violence with more effective violence. Just like in poker, when the opponent ups the ante, you have to meet the raise--or fold, get out of the game, surrender the pot without contest.

Calls for a UN sponsored exercise in pacification and nation-building are a refusal to stay in the game, to match and call the pirates' bluff. So are the urgings that the "international community" provide the resources necessary for the Somali Transitional National Authority so that this pretender to government status can impose peace and order on Somalia and its neighboring waters. So are delaying gambits such as the construction of new international agencies of coordination or criminal justice.

One, highly doable, course of action is the placement of armed guard parties on US flagged merchantmen. While doing this would impose an increased demand on the already overstretched US military, particularly the Navy and Marine Corps, the demand would not be excessive given the small size of the US flagged merchant fleet. As SecDef Gates said at Maxwell AFB, one does not need a billion dollar warship to defeat a bunch of teenagers in speedboats.

Light weapons, a modest sensor suite and a squad sized detachment would be sufficient to keep even the most audacious crew of Swagmen at bay or kill them if they were so poor at decision making as to press home their attack in the face of superior discipline and firepower. The use of military personnel as the Armed Guard would not only obviate some of the paranoia afflicting lawyers but also has historical precedent--the Armed Guard units on US ships during World War II.

Almost as doable would be the dedication of increased surface warfare and maritime surveillance assets to the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden areas. It boggles the mind that the USS Bainbridge did not have real time data, including imagery of the boat which attacked the Sun Liberty, such that it could shape an interception course once it became clear that the Skiff Riders of Vengeance had broken off their attack.

Either the Bainbridge has less access to airborne platforms than the French frigate Nivose or its commander did not have the authority to pursue the attackers. If the former, our Navy is not what it is alleged to be in the sea surveillance field. If the latter, then there has already been a major failure of political will in or near the Oval Office.

If the difficulty is one of assets it is rather easily rectified. Surely the US has a few P-3 or similar aircraft littering a hanger or apron somewhere. Perhaps we even have a small number of long loiter time UAVs parked somewhere. If we do, they could be redeployed with profit to the WIO/GA AOs. If we don't, then it is about time for some high speed, low drag procurement efforts--or make a deal with the French since they apparently have a surfeit of helicopters.

If the difficulty is one of deficient political will at the highest levels, the problem is not easily solved. It means that the people at the pinnacle of the National Command Authority are basically so risk averse, or so afflicted with the fatal disease of High Mindedness, that the US has no choice but to fold in this particular game of high stakes international poker.

Rather than bow before a scurvy collection of Somali seagoing jihadists, it is to be hoped that the Obama administration can bring itself to realise that the avoidance of small and controllable risks today will simply assure the emergence of larger, even much larger, risks far less susceptible to control in the not-too-distant future. The Obama-ites also have to wake up and get a grip on one fundamental reality: The government of the United States has no responsibility to create a functioning, friendly regime in Somalia; it does have a responsibility to continue the long American historical trajectory of maintaining freedom of peaceful navigation on the high seas.

Or, Team Obama may want to buy into the latest seemingly zany idea of Texas Congressman Ron Paul. Representative Paul went public last week with a video in which he advances an idea that has been chatted about sub rosa for the last couple of years. At first glance the notion seems as out of date and massively irrelevant as stocks in a manufacturer of buggy whips.

"Come on, Geek! Cut to the chase!"

OK, oh impatient one. The idea is for Congress to use a power granted it by the Constitution. The power to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. While no such Letters have been granted since the War of 1812, the authority is still there. It has not been eradicated nor enervated by the assorted treaties and conventions entered into by the US over the past two centuries.

The idea behind Letters of Marque and Reprisal which were issued by all major and some minor powers for centuries is not so much war on the cheap as a means of enhancing one's naval power in either an undeclared conflict or a conflict against a non-state actor. (Yes, both sorts of non-war wars were extant even hundreds of years ago, despite our liking to pretend that they are of modern, even post-modern origin.)

Private interests would be licensed by the Federal Government to undertake offensive operations against pirates in the WIO/GA areas of operation. Performance and compliance bonds would have to be obtained by the candidate privateers who would also have to conduct their operations in a way which conforms with the international laws governing war at sea. Rather than depending upon the value of assets seized from the pirates as compensation as was the case way back when, the Privateers of the Twenty-First Century would have to look to bounties placed upon the heads of the pirates by Congress.

Any proposal to resurrect Letters of Marque and Reprisal from the historical dust will undoubtedly bring an epidemic of knee-knocking, tooth-gnashing, hair-pulling anxiety in the High Minded and Lofty Thinking crowd. These worthy folk will decry the notion as barbaric, so horrid and reprehensible that not even the Cheney-Bush administration proposed it.

Perhaps it is an idea whose time has not yet come. Still, one way or another, the US and countries of similar mind must take the violence to the pirates, up close and personal. The advantages the US and other advanced technology countries have in surveillance, communication and specialised violence application forces gives the good guys an awesome advantage over the Jolly Swagmen of Somalia.

But, (here it is, the inevitable, big "but") our advantages whether in billion dollar warships, or multi-million dollar aerial platforms or the skill and training concentrated in the right index finger of a sniper go for nothing if we do not have the political will to use what we have. Here is the irony: Political will does not even merit a line item in any budget, but without it nothing else matters.

Somalian Pirates Redefine Chutzpah

It used to be that the working definition of chutzpah was the kid who after killing his parents, throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now an orphan. Not anymore.

A fellow who goes by the moniker "Ali" and plays the role of pirate spokesman for the humble fishermen turned seaborne robbers says the world has it all wrong. We ain't no bunch of crooks with AKs and an attitude of greed. No, us pirates are just misunderstood. Here's his quote taken from SFGate http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/10/26/MN6913NSJK.DTL.

We don't know whether they are going to dump a toxin or collect marine resources, but we have to capture any ship that passes through our waters illegally. In Somalia, there is no functioning central government that can manage our waters, so we have appointed ourselves to guard our coast against foreign ships.

Well, golly, shiver me timbers, Ali. You sure had the Geek fooled along with beaucoup other people. And, the ransoms aren't really ransoms. No, the money collected for the release of ship and crew is a "fine" for littering or running over fish with malicious intent.

Yeah. Right, Ali or whatever your name is. You sure have a grip on reality--some sort of reality.alt.

Next the jolly buccaneers of the Niger Delta are going to proclaim that they aren't crooks or insurgents but simply a vigilance committee seeking to protect the delta from oil spills. And, anybody who says otherwise is a misunderstander. So, take that, UN. You ought to be applauding us and not calling for yet another international anti-piracy patrol.

Meanwhile, back in Somalia. Ali seems to have a hard time keeping his narrative neat, orderly and internally consistent as shown by the following quote regarding the tank laden M/V Faina from the deck of which he was speaking via satellite phone.

We saw a big ship, so we decided to capture it, and later we discovered that it was carrying tanks. That made us happy because we got a chance to demand more money

Not that the pirates--oops, the Geek forgot--the Volunteer Somalian Coastguard & Fishery Patrol have gotten any swag yet. Further it doesn't appear that any will be forthcoming in the near future. Tough break, Ali and the rest of you public spirited boys, but remember you all are volunteers doing this tough job out of pure love for your country.

By Ali's logic there is no need for NATO warships to protect food carrying vessels on route to the geographic expression called Somalia. The civic minded so-called "pirates" are simply taking the ships to assure more rapid and efficient delivery of critical foodstuffs to the starving people of the motherland.

Ali and assorted experts and members of the League of the High Minded all agree that the only way to stop the mirthful seizure of ships and crews for ransom is for Somalia to again join the ranks of the nation-states complete with an effective government and the institutions of law enforcement and criminal justice. Sounds good. Until you look a little deeper.

Somalia never existed as a genuine nation-state as this term is generally defined. Somalia is an artifact. Before the coming of the colonial powers, particularly Britain and Italy, the term was a geographic reference only.

The land described by the term was a loose assemblage of tribes held together primarily by a common language and religion (Islam.) Travellers in the region in the decades before the colonial powers took an interest in acquiring the real estate for assorted "strategic" reasons described a land of blood, blood feud, bloody sharia punishments, slavery, and miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles with patches of coffee bush and kif.

After the colonial powers abandoned the region, the artifact of "Somalia" came into existence. Geography gave it a measure of importance during the Cold War with the US first supporting Ethiopia in the long festering dispute over the Ogaden desert. Later the US supported the Somalian regime after Ethiopia went through a regime change installing a Marxist military dictatorship in lieu of the Emperor.

The reshuffling of governments in the waning days of the Cold War along with Eritrean independence started the process of Somalian collapse. The collapse came quickly and bloodily. The blood has not yet ceased to flow. Nor will it in the foreseeable future.

Not only has the blood been flowing non-stop for eighteen years, the artifact called Somalia has disintegrated. There are two de facto and almost de jure spin-offs of the old Somalian construct: Puntland and Somliland.

Both have managed with a fair degree of success to remain at some distance from the never ending war between Islamists, radical Islamists, the Ethiopian "peacekeepers" and the African Union peacekeeping force. Every now and then the violence reaches out and touches these two autonomous regions. Most recently in a wave of five clearly coordinated suicide bombing attacks against installations in both "lands."

The rest of Somalia has reverted to a more lethal version of what the foreign travellers saw a hundred and fifty years ago. There things will stay unless and until either the radical Islamists or the mere Islamists win out. Or, slightly less unlikely, until everyone gets sick and tired of all the meaningless destruction of lives and life itself.

The expectation that a government will arise from the swamp of blood that covers the land of the Somalis is as rational as presuming that aliens from Tau Ceti 4 will swoop down in their enormous triangular craft and spray peace, love and flower power vibes over the place.

Until the outbreak of peace arrives along with the Second Coming or some equally improbable transcendental event, the problem of piracy continues. It is a burden for the (dare the Geek be so politically incorrect as to write) civilized countries.

To quote Lenin, "What is to be done."

Urging proactive self-help as the US Navy has been doing is fine and good, but quite limited in effectiveness. Yes, ship's crews can defend themselves by evasive action and aggressive use of fire hoses as five did in the past day or so. But it is spitting in the ocean.

The naval powers represented in the region must put pressure on ship owners associations as well as the maritime risk insurance industry to require convoys. The NATO and other contingents at sea or coming to the area must provide effective escort services, particularly to vulnerable ships such as chemical or liquefied gas tankers.

Beyond that, it must be recognised that only by increasing the risks while decreasing the potential benefits can crime be constrained. Pirates must again be taught the lesson their progenitors in the 18th and 19th Centuries learned. Everyman's hand is turned against them.

Pirates must be challenged--with fire, if necessary. They must be arrested, if possible. Tried, even if it means the international community has to establish yet another one of those tribunals in the Netherlands.

Pirates must be killed if they do not surrender. This means that there is an excellent chance that non-pirates will die. Such is life--and war.

Get a grip on this. The pirates of Somalia are a legitimate target of war. They are Muslims, every man-jack of them. Most are demonstrably aligned at least somewhat with the Islamist entities that comprise the opposition in the "Global War on Terror."

While we're at it, would somebody please slap "Ali" upside the head. Chutzpah has a purely Jewish copyright and he hasn't paid royalties.

Fighting Pirates--Blackwater Or The Navy

Blackwater Worldwide and the rather bluntly named security company from Mississippi, Hollowpoint, are among the mercenary outfits looking for work in the waters off Somalia. Admittedly not all these private purveyors of security are trigger-pulling thugs like those deployed by the infamous Blackwater bunch. Some, primarily British, don't use lethal force depending instead on brains and less-than-lethal technology to enhance the chances of their clients when faced by fisherfolk turned maritime bandits.

Don't get the Geek wrong, he has no particular objections to killing pirates. He thinks it is a rather good idea. Raising risk while reducing benefits is a time-honored and effective technique of defeating piracy. If anything, the Geek is perturbed by the generous concern for the well-being of the seaborne opportunists of the Somalian coast.

It appears that the fear of lawyers and their landbased ilk is driving a desire on the part of governments, including that of the United States, to "privatize" the risks and liabilities of seeking to end the pirate plague by forceful action. Frankly, it galls the Geek to read a spokesperson for the US Navy encourage the use of private means to repel hostile borders.

It is equally galling to read of NATO hiding behind the need for "regulations" before the assembled armada can do any more than twiddle collective thumbs while the merry raiders of Puntland go about their business of seizing ships and crews. History indicates beyond the law's much beloved "reasonable doubt" that force and force alone ends piracy.

It is quite true that the Somalian pirates are not so forthright as to fly the Jolly Roger before opening fire. It is true that difficulty exists in distinguishing between fishermen and pirates. The same sort of problem as has bedeviled generations of counterinsurgents trying to parse between peasant and guerrilla.

It's nothing new.

We've been there before. And the reality is that some non-guerrillas are killed by mistake. The same would happen if the US or any other nation's navy opens fire. The probability of killing or wounding fishermen can be reduced, but never eliminated. Still, the possibility that non-pirates might be hurt should not be allowed to impair the effort to end a threat to the twenty thousand or so ships transiting the Gulf of Aden on route to or from the Suez Canal.

Impediments to shipping whether in insurance costs or travel time will do harm to an already shaky global economy. Resolute and robust action against piracy will be of global benefit. Failure to take such action will only embolden the marine marauders and put more trade at risk.

To put it simply: make the risk averse lawyers walk the plank and get serious about ending the threat. A large naval force which simply drives around or "monitors" the situation aboard one seized ship or even one which limits its activities to providing convoy escorts to food aid ships bound for Somalian ports is as useless as mammary glands on a bull.

Perhaps the Russians will show the world how pirates can be stopped. Their long-awaited frigate took on water and fresh supplies in Aden the other day. It has to be closing on Somalia and the captive M/V Faina shortly.

In the past the Russians have shown a genuine capacity for robust action and an accompanying willingness to accept innocent casualties when confronted by terrorists and the like. Perhaps that proclivity will be demonstrated in the near future on the Somalian coast.

The Russians seem to understand that warships have weapons. They have guns. As the Squadron Leader Mandrake put it in the film Dr Strangelove, "You have a gun. Use it! That's what the bullets are for. Shoot!"

To stop piracy in the Gulf of Aden or elsewhere, shoot and then let the lawyers dither. That's what lawyers are for. Dithering.

Yo, Ho, Ho! It's A Pirate's Life For Me!

The only real difference between coastal fishing and piracy is that being a pirate is a lot less work. At least in the waters off Somalia.

Well, come to think of it there might be a second difference. Being a pirate is a lot safer than fishing. At least in the waters off Somalia.

OK, there's a third difference. Piracy makes a guy a lot more money than fishing. At least in the waters off Somalia.

Really now, you can't beat the pirate's life. Speedboats, automatic weapons, the rush of climbing over the target's rails with a RPG in your mouth. The thrill of victory as you bring the captive ship and hostages back home to Puntland. The flush of cash in your hand as the shipowners pay the ransom.

Oh, yeah, the pirate's life is a grand one. At least in the waters off Somalia.

The Geek can just imagine all the testicle grabbing fun on board the weapons and tank laden ship today. It's got to be jolly time. Just standing there watching the USS Howard cruise impotently a mile or so away. Just a grabbing and a grinning as the small planes fly overhead and the warships stay a respectful distance away.

It's no wonder that piracy is a growth industry in Somalia (and a few other places as well.) It's no surprise that snatching ships on the high seas has been growing at ten percent or more per year.

Heck, piracy is dead easy, immensely profitable and, best of all, absolutely safe.

If the Geek didn't live a thousand miles from the nearest ocean, he'd be off to fly the Jolly Roger himself. It sure beats working for a living.

Of course piracy hasn't always been so safe. At one time not only did merchant ships carry both the means of self-defense but crews who were ready, willing and able to repel borders. At one time the naval forces of the Great Powers swept up any pirate vessels they encountered. At one time apprehended pirates could expect a choking end on a gallows erected at the high tide line.

There are international conventions which both make illegal and provide for enforcement and judicial measures against piracy for gain on the high seas. US law is not at all kind to those committing piracy. (See, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 81, Section 1651, Piracy under law of nations.)

Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.

It may not be hanging in chains on Execution Dock, but it isn't a nice prospect either. In years gone by, the US Navy along with the Coast Guard had a leading role in suppressing piracy.

In fact, if you think back far enough, say the early 19th Century, the US waged a quasi-war with pirates in the Western Mediterranean. People died in this undeclared war. Merchant seamen. Naval personnel. Pirates. At the end the pirates were suppressed.

So what's happening today?

There's been a lot of talk. And, the US along with such major naval powers as Denmark formed a naval coalition against piracy in the waters off Somalia.

And, in a really, really pirate scaring move, Yemen announced the formation of a special anti-piracy patrol of 1,600 "specially trained" men using sixteen bought-in-Australia speedboats to curb piracy in the Red Sea and adjacent waters. (http://yemenonline.info/news-918.html)

With the exception of the French who have engaged in two special forces operations to liberate captured French registry recreational vessels and those on board, the Western navies and their civilian masters have been amazingly reluctant to authorize any action against the simple fisherfolk turned maritime muggers.

Perhaps this strange lethargy has been produced by the simple reality that the vast majority of the ships and yachts seized have been flying Third World flags of convenience. Many have been owned by firms willing and able to pay ransom for ships and crews. Third, but not least, most of the hostages have been from Third World states.

Considering that the US is a maritime nation (even if our national flag registry is puny) and considering that the Bush Administration has harped ad nauseum about the need for and desirability of international law and order, why is it that our naval assets in the area are limiting their activities to "monitoring the situation?" Oh, yes, and advising ship owners and operators to hire private security forces. (Perhaps Blackwater needs the business.)

Perhaps the US and other Western maritime powers are inhibited by the fear of actually killing some of these poor, scrawny Somalians who are simply seeking to make their way in a harsh world. Then there is the corollary: apprehension of crew members being caught in the crossfire.

One way to discourage piracy is to make the occupation inherently risky. That implies proactive measures. Stop the speedboats or the mother ships and arrest those on board. If they resist, shoot back--with lethal intent. The US Code makes it clear. Those suspected of piracy and brought before a US Federal Court can be tried and convicted.

As a less lethal alternative, the US and other countries can establish convoy rendezvous points and routes. This might slow maritime trade marginally and increase some costs a tad, but it would reduce piracy as an attractive alternative to fishing.

These options and others like them should be considered--quickly.

Why, you ask?

Because the Russians are coming. The Kremlin has indicated that their on route destroyer will operate independently. And, the Russians have always shown a willingness and ability to act robustly in defense of their own national interests, however loosely defined.

Remember that Ukrainian ship on which pirates are grabbing their balls and sticking out their tongues at the USS Howard has three Russians on board. Also, remember that Russia has interests in play regarding the Ukraine.

It could prove interesting for the Pirates of Puntland.