As had been expected for several weeks, Rick Perry has entered the GOP contest. Of this the Geek is both glad and positive. Governor Perry appears to possess the stomach and head necessary for a down and dirty campaign against the Nice Young Man From Chicago which is singularly lacking with other Elephant hopefuls.
The Geek became a fan of Texas politics during the years necessity compelled him to live and work in the Lone Star Empire. The doings at that model of law making decorum called the "Lege" were and are as fascinating as the inner workings of the Cook County (Ill.) Democratic machine. The emergence of Perry showed him to be a man having a strong, visceral understanding of the political soul of most Texans. Over the past year Perry's performance has demonstrated that this gut level talent is not restricted to the denizens of the LSE but extends to many of We the People.
It is important to enter an important caveat here, a warning of relevance to international politics. Other significant leaders who have exhibited a strong, visceral understanding of their people's national politics such as Vladimir Putin have seen that understanding stop abruptly at the border. They have little if any understanding of the political mood or mode of other people in other countries.
Governor Perry stated strongly in Charleston that he was a strong believer in "American exceptionalism," which places him in very sharp contrast with the relativistic Mr Obama. This posture while laudable in itself demands yet another caveat in the arena of global affairs. The "exceptionalism" part of the phrase consists of characteristics, attributes, and values which are under a permanent export ban. American exceptionalism is not only made in America by dint of suffering, war, political struggles, and endless effort, it must forever stay in the land of its fabrication. It is unique to us for it is uniquely us and ours. No bayonet, no tank, no stealth fighter, no UAV, no aid program, no propaganda effort, no executive order or congressional enactment can force its export to other, foreign soils. As a transplant it must fail.
On his campaign website, Mr Perry avers that his service as a C-130 driver as well as his many foreign trips as governor give him insight into the needs of American diplomatic and national security policy. While it is true that the governor flew Herky birds with numerous RONs and TDYs, the result would be an intimate acquaintance with nocturnal resorts of entertainment and recreation but little contact with the dark doings of foreign chanceries or the gavottes in distant corridors of power. (To this truism any person with a peripatetic military experience can attest.) And, as governor Mr Perry's overseas jaunts were in the interest of the economic development of the LSE not the national interests of the US.
In his speech at Charleston, the Texan was more than kind when he characterized whatever passes as foreign policy within the Obama administration as a "muddle." It is, of course, far worse than that. It is even worse than a collection of blunders wrapped in empty, high sounding rhetoric. Rather, it is an ideologically driven exercise in ad hoc reaction coupled with a set of self-defeating visions of how the world ought to be if only it were designed in Left leaning academic salons located near the University of Chicago campus.
At least implicitly (if Rick "No One Crosses Me and Lives" Perry can ever be merely implicit) the Texas Cyclone of Prayer vowed to change this. He evidently intends to assure the US once again walks tall and proud on the international stage. This would be a welcome change after the years of "leading from behind" but carries with it yet another, larger caveat.
This caveat resides in the coterie Perry has assembled to date as his advisers on foreign and national security affairs. Without notable exception, it is comprised of neocon ninnies out of the years of the Bush/Cheney administration. At the head of the list is the execrable Doug Feith, the top architect of the debacle in Iraq. Other members have an equally illustrious record. From their post administration writings and speeches, it is apparent they have neither learned nor forgotten a single iota. None have seen the failings produced by their own ideologically predicated view of the world and the role of the US in that world.
Unless Governor Perry expands his advisory staff, there is a very grave danger that his understanding of the abilities and limits of American power will be as disastrously off the mark as were those of George W. Bush. Neither the US nor the world can live with yet another ideologically predicated misreading of what the US can and cannot do with respect to the internal workings of other countries.
It is important to note that not since George H.W. Bush left office has the US enjoyed the services of a president who was both internationally focused and relatively bereft of ideological blinders. The many years of Clinton, George W. Bush and His Hindmost, Barack Obama--each with either or both a disinterest in foreign affairs or ideological predicates of overwhelming power--have seen the steady decline of the US as a Great Power with influence and potency. Given that the next president will be laboring under serious budgetary constraints, the question of the relations of the US with the rest of the world as well as the American capacity and will to defend and advance its national interests will be under very severe challenge.
More than ever we will need a president who realistically assesses our national interests and tailors our diplomacy and military to protect and advance those interests regardless of extraneous considerations including ideological preferences and prejudices. The next president will face a world which remains what it always has been--a dangerous place replete with countries which oppose us and our interests and actors both state and non-state who wish to do us harm. The world will also contain countries which share values and norms with us and with which we have coinciding national interests.
The next president must do what the present incumbent has failed to do with striking obviousness--parse between the enemies and the allies. He must be able and willing to cozen and stroke the latter while drawing in a credible manner the necessary lines in the sand regarding the former.
As Perry lacks any significant foreign policy experience and whose direct experience with military affairs and war fighting is limited to the perspective offered from the cockpit of a C-130, he will depend heavily on his foreign policy and national security teams. Given his first picks as advisers, there is, unfortunately, little if any reason to be hopeful in this regard.
In the future national interest as well as his own personal political fortune, Governor Perry ought to fire the present advisory staff. It is the only smart and prudential thing to do. He has to put daylight between himself and George W. Bush, and listening to the old gang of neocon ninnies is not the way to offset the inevitable Obama camp attacks seeking to make Perry look like the much disliked (not to say hated) Bush, Jr.
(Full disclosure in blogging statement: The Geek is not angling for a job with the Perry camp as he is constitutionally incapable of working for anyone.)
Showing posts with label US National Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US National Security. Show all posts
Sunday, August 14, 2011
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Butchering A Sacred Cow
The Pentagon is already scheduled to take a big hit in the money department. In addition, the landmine laden wording of the debt ceiling increase bill assures that should the "super committee" not come up with the requisite 1.2 trillion bucks in additional cuts over the next decade, the "national security" portion of federal expenditures will take another, larger whack. Potentially, the "national security" community could lose over a trillion bucks during the next ten years.
The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security. There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing. On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear. Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.
As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations. As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year. The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.
As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier. The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board. (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.) The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War. And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.
By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron. Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago. It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.
As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released. Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities. The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.
A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted. The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.
The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions. The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack. The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.
The reality was far different. As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support. The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.
Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home. In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.
Will is one thing. Ability is quite another. Political will is perishable. It can flourish. Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight. Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11. But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices. And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.
Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness. The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US. Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer. After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised. It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies. Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).
This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm. The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it. Dollars must be considered. Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things. But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.
The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values. We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power. It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.
The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity. We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical. As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.
The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies. Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia. Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam. The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum. This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.
None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped. But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.
Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner." There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities. It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.
Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US. His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities. And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.
Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget. In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast. By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place. We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming. Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.
Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.
The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security. There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing. On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear. Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.
As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations. As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year. The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.
As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier. The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board. (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.) The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War. And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.
By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron. Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago. It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.
As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released. Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities. The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.
A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted. The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.
The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions. The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack. The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.
The reality was far different. As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support. The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.
Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home. In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.
Will is one thing. Ability is quite another. Political will is perishable. It can flourish. Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight. Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11. But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices. And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.
Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness. The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US. Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer. After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised. It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies. Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).
This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm. The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it. Dollars must be considered. Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things. But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.
The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values. We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power. It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.
The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity. We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical. As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.
The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies. Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia. Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam. The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum. This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.
None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped. But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.
Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner." There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities. It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.
Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US. His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities. And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.
Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget. In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast. By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place. We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming. Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.
Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
A Suggestion For Republican Presidential Aspirants
The next election is going to be decided primarily but not exclusively on the matter of jobs and who has the better ideas for creating them. Other matters such as the deficit, national security, and foreign policy will be (much?) further down the list of voter concerns. Of course, a terrorist outrage will change the priorities rather rapidly.
The reality is that jobs and the deficit are linked directly and materially to both national security and foreign policy. There are a lot of people who may not like that linkage, may even argue that it doesn't exist today any more than it did in the good old days of the cold war. Wishful thinking, for the world and its politics to say nothing of its economic dynamics have shifted markedly since the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union faded away.
The short period of apparent American unipolar dominance has ended. The globalization phenomena have continued. And, the threat of violent political Islam remains upon us. All of these provide links between jobs, the deficit, national security, and foreign policy. Given that no serious contender on the GOP side has put forth any excuse for a foreign and national security policy beyond traditional boilerplate and bromides, the Geek being public spirited has taken it upon himself to provide some ideas for the so far empty Republican platitudes.
Any viable foreign policy for the future must be predicated upon a few clear cut predicates which are both in our national interest and comport reasonably well with our historical values and norms. Fortunately, it is not hard to have a policy which is true to our roots while protecting and advancing our future. The matter is actually so simple that even a politician can grasp it.
The first principle of American foreign policy must be that of non-intervention. By this, it is meant that the US will not intervene in the purely internal affairs of a sovereign state. We may deplore and rhetorically condemn a state for what it does to its citizens. We may deny it any cooperation, assistance, or support, but we will not use any method to seek regime change. Unless. Unless a state harbors, facilitates, or engages in the direct or indirect use of force against our interests, our citizens, or, under carefully circumscribed circumstances, those of states with which the US has a close and ongoing relationship. Unless a state infringes on this bright and shining line, it and its leaders are safe from our kinetic capacities.
The US should get out of the foreign aid game except for humanitarian needs and then only in conjunction with ad hoc coalitions of states and NGOs having a shared concern in the specific need. It is particularly critical that the US not provide any direct aid to any Muslim majority state so as to preclude the usage of that aid as "proof" that the US is paying jizya. All too often Muslim clerics have taken the public position that the foreign aid provided by the US to, say, Egypt, is not aid but rather the protection money paid to Muslims under the doctrine of infidel submission to Muslim protection.
In a similar way, the US should ramp down its payments to the UN both for direct operating expenses and peacekeeping until they reach a level that the American per capita payment is no more than the average per capita contribution from the General Assembly's aggregate membership. The UN is not particularly useful nor effective in meeting the needs of now and the future. Far better are ad hoc coalitions brought together by coinciding national interest. These coalitions have been far more effective from the days of the First Gulf War until now than has either the UN or regional organizations.
The US must also get out of the arms transfer game. No more free weapons to anyone. While direct military sales should remain intact, the long standing program of providing free or cut rate weapons to "friendly" states has long outlived its usefulness. Over the decades, this approach has done much to perpetuate in power an array of highly distasteful dictatorships to no real advantage of the US and many disadvantages.
The time has come to dismantle the web of overseas military bases which are a no longer needed legacy of the cold war. A few, small joint tenancy bases for rapid reaction and special operation forces must be retained but major overseas deployments and basing of heavy American units is not a strategic advantage any longer given the changes in the nature of future threats and defense technology generally.
Now for something radical. The time is on us to furl the nuclear umbrella. It is not credible any longer given the changes in the makeup of the nuclear club in recent years. While the US must retain a finite deterrent oriented nuclear capability, the reality of now and the future is that regional balances of nuclear deterrence is more likely to be more credible to those smaller powers most tempted to go to war over long standing frictions or ambitions. While this necessarily implies nuclear proliferation, this consequence will not make the globe less safe, rather it extends the dynamic of high risk equals high stability which was the hallmark of the cold war to potential regional conflicts.
This proposal does not mean an end to conflict but rather makes the world safe for war. Conflicts will have to be carried on in ways which decouple the potential of escalation across the nuclear threshold. With the possible exception of an eschatological regime, states are not given to mutual suicide pacts. This in turn implies that most future wars--at least those between nuclear capable states--will be conducted by proxy, terror, targeted killings, or will occur in cyberspace. Not pretty to be sure but without the globe rocking impact of even a very limited nuclear exchange.
This radical proposal is not radical so much as it is an honest acknowledgement that the nuclear control regime as well as the missile technology control counterpart sought by the status quo powers of the US, the USSR, and China has failed substantially. States for reasons which are sufficient to themselves have violated the agreements which they have signed and transferred or allowed to have transferred prohibited knowledge and materials to non-nuclear, non-missile states. This will continue with or without a clear abandonment by the US of the failed agreements and dependent regimes.
Knowledge is the key word here. Not simply for nuclear and related matters but as a prime, perhaps the prime criterion for defining American relationship with other states. Given that invention, innovation, and the pursuing of new knowledge is the key to a better, more prosperous and perhaps more stable and secure global future, it is imperative that the US guide its foreign relations on the principle of commitment to open and free inquiry and expression in all fields of discourse without exception or limit.
Our closest, broadest, and most profound relations must be with states which show a total dedication of some duration to free and open inquiry, expression, and exchange of information. While relations with states which limit freedom of inquiry and expression are both possible and necessary, these must be both ad hoc and based simply on specific coinciding interests. The most intimate relations the US can have are those with states which share the value of untrammeled inquiry and expression.
The more restrictive a state is of free inquiry and expression, the more arm's length the relation with the US should, must be. This will work to the disadvantage of the restrictive state over time as will its very restrictiveness. Indeed, a viable national security strategy is to cooperate with the restriction of information flow to the restrictive state. This will hurt the restrictor far more than it will the US and its collaborators in this form of intellectual blockade.
Even though the US must retain a nuclear arsenal of finite deterrent orientation, our emphasis must be on approaches suitable for the post-nuclear environment. This means further development of post-nuclear weapons systems whether hyperbaric explosives, smart nails, or similar projectiles and means of delivery. It also means a much greater capacity in special operations including those of a lethal and black nature. And, above all, it means a focus on cyberspace in both defensive and offensive ways.
The day of the massive naval fleet, the floating sovereignty of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier battle group, are ending. This also applies to heavy armored forces which demand forward deployment or a long build-up period. Arguably, the day of the manned bomber is also over or nearly so given the rapid improvements in the technology of UAVs. On the budget front, this is a mix of good and bad news: less money for force maintenance but a lot more bucks for research, development, and procurement. Such is life--no peace dividend.
This cursory view of the national security and foreign policy waterfront is meant to be indicative not a prescription. The real deal on which to get a grip is simply that the world has changed and is changing more and much faster than the Romney-Gingrich-Palin-Huntsman-or whoever group appears to recognize. It has changed more and much faster and in directions quite foreign to the mind of Professor Obama. Someone out there needs to understand this and make some detailed policy statements that show they are actually well oriented in time and place.
It won't happen of course. But one can hope for a change. It is our future which is at risk.
The reality is that jobs and the deficit are linked directly and materially to both national security and foreign policy. There are a lot of people who may not like that linkage, may even argue that it doesn't exist today any more than it did in the good old days of the cold war. Wishful thinking, for the world and its politics to say nothing of its economic dynamics have shifted markedly since the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union faded away.
The short period of apparent American unipolar dominance has ended. The globalization phenomena have continued. And, the threat of violent political Islam remains upon us. All of these provide links between jobs, the deficit, national security, and foreign policy. Given that no serious contender on the GOP side has put forth any excuse for a foreign and national security policy beyond traditional boilerplate and bromides, the Geek being public spirited has taken it upon himself to provide some ideas for the so far empty Republican platitudes.
Any viable foreign policy for the future must be predicated upon a few clear cut predicates which are both in our national interest and comport reasonably well with our historical values and norms. Fortunately, it is not hard to have a policy which is true to our roots while protecting and advancing our future. The matter is actually so simple that even a politician can grasp it.
The first principle of American foreign policy must be that of non-intervention. By this, it is meant that the US will not intervene in the purely internal affairs of a sovereign state. We may deplore and rhetorically condemn a state for what it does to its citizens. We may deny it any cooperation, assistance, or support, but we will not use any method to seek regime change. Unless. Unless a state harbors, facilitates, or engages in the direct or indirect use of force against our interests, our citizens, or, under carefully circumscribed circumstances, those of states with which the US has a close and ongoing relationship. Unless a state infringes on this bright and shining line, it and its leaders are safe from our kinetic capacities.
The US should get out of the foreign aid game except for humanitarian needs and then only in conjunction with ad hoc coalitions of states and NGOs having a shared concern in the specific need. It is particularly critical that the US not provide any direct aid to any Muslim majority state so as to preclude the usage of that aid as "proof" that the US is paying jizya. All too often Muslim clerics have taken the public position that the foreign aid provided by the US to, say, Egypt, is not aid but rather the protection money paid to Muslims under the doctrine of infidel submission to Muslim protection.
In a similar way, the US should ramp down its payments to the UN both for direct operating expenses and peacekeeping until they reach a level that the American per capita payment is no more than the average per capita contribution from the General Assembly's aggregate membership. The UN is not particularly useful nor effective in meeting the needs of now and the future. Far better are ad hoc coalitions brought together by coinciding national interest. These coalitions have been far more effective from the days of the First Gulf War until now than has either the UN or regional organizations.
The US must also get out of the arms transfer game. No more free weapons to anyone. While direct military sales should remain intact, the long standing program of providing free or cut rate weapons to "friendly" states has long outlived its usefulness. Over the decades, this approach has done much to perpetuate in power an array of highly distasteful dictatorships to no real advantage of the US and many disadvantages.
The time has come to dismantle the web of overseas military bases which are a no longer needed legacy of the cold war. A few, small joint tenancy bases for rapid reaction and special operation forces must be retained but major overseas deployments and basing of heavy American units is not a strategic advantage any longer given the changes in the nature of future threats and defense technology generally.
Now for something radical. The time is on us to furl the nuclear umbrella. It is not credible any longer given the changes in the makeup of the nuclear club in recent years. While the US must retain a finite deterrent oriented nuclear capability, the reality of now and the future is that regional balances of nuclear deterrence is more likely to be more credible to those smaller powers most tempted to go to war over long standing frictions or ambitions. While this necessarily implies nuclear proliferation, this consequence will not make the globe less safe, rather it extends the dynamic of high risk equals high stability which was the hallmark of the cold war to potential regional conflicts.
This proposal does not mean an end to conflict but rather makes the world safe for war. Conflicts will have to be carried on in ways which decouple the potential of escalation across the nuclear threshold. With the possible exception of an eschatological regime, states are not given to mutual suicide pacts. This in turn implies that most future wars--at least those between nuclear capable states--will be conducted by proxy, terror, targeted killings, or will occur in cyberspace. Not pretty to be sure but without the globe rocking impact of even a very limited nuclear exchange.
This radical proposal is not radical so much as it is an honest acknowledgement that the nuclear control regime as well as the missile technology control counterpart sought by the status quo powers of the US, the USSR, and China has failed substantially. States for reasons which are sufficient to themselves have violated the agreements which they have signed and transferred or allowed to have transferred prohibited knowledge and materials to non-nuclear, non-missile states. This will continue with or without a clear abandonment by the US of the failed agreements and dependent regimes.
Knowledge is the key word here. Not simply for nuclear and related matters but as a prime, perhaps the prime criterion for defining American relationship with other states. Given that invention, innovation, and the pursuing of new knowledge is the key to a better, more prosperous and perhaps more stable and secure global future, it is imperative that the US guide its foreign relations on the principle of commitment to open and free inquiry and expression in all fields of discourse without exception or limit.
Our closest, broadest, and most profound relations must be with states which show a total dedication of some duration to free and open inquiry, expression, and exchange of information. While relations with states which limit freedom of inquiry and expression are both possible and necessary, these must be both ad hoc and based simply on specific coinciding interests. The most intimate relations the US can have are those with states which share the value of untrammeled inquiry and expression.
The more restrictive a state is of free inquiry and expression, the more arm's length the relation with the US should, must be. This will work to the disadvantage of the restrictive state over time as will its very restrictiveness. Indeed, a viable national security strategy is to cooperate with the restriction of information flow to the restrictive state. This will hurt the restrictor far more than it will the US and its collaborators in this form of intellectual blockade.
Even though the US must retain a nuclear arsenal of finite deterrent orientation, our emphasis must be on approaches suitable for the post-nuclear environment. This means further development of post-nuclear weapons systems whether hyperbaric explosives, smart nails, or similar projectiles and means of delivery. It also means a much greater capacity in special operations including those of a lethal and black nature. And, above all, it means a focus on cyberspace in both defensive and offensive ways.
The day of the massive naval fleet, the floating sovereignty of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier battle group, are ending. This also applies to heavy armored forces which demand forward deployment or a long build-up period. Arguably, the day of the manned bomber is also over or nearly so given the rapid improvements in the technology of UAVs. On the budget front, this is a mix of good and bad news: less money for force maintenance but a lot more bucks for research, development, and procurement. Such is life--no peace dividend.
This cursory view of the national security and foreign policy waterfront is meant to be indicative not a prescription. The real deal on which to get a grip is simply that the world has changed and is changing more and much faster than the Romney-Gingrich-Palin-Huntsman-or whoever group appears to recognize. It has changed more and much faster and in directions quite foreign to the mind of Professor Obama. Someone out there needs to understand this and make some detailed policy statements that show they are actually well oriented in time and place.
It won't happen of course. But one can hope for a change. It is our future which is at risk.
Thursday, April 14, 2011
Coercion Is Not The Only (Or The Best) Way
George Kennan's "Long Telegram" of 1946 constituted a seminal moment in American foreign policy. More, it served to define a strategic world view emphasizing the need to confront and contain threats. While perhaps unintended by Kennan, there was a natural tendency on the part of American leaders both civilian and military to place an onus on coercion as the preferred instrument by which to confront and contain.
In his later years, the famed diplomat and historian bemoaned the "militarization" of his musings on containment as applied to one area--the Eurasian landmass--and one opponent--Russia under the Soviets. He maintained that he had never implied containment to be a sovereign remedy of universal applicability or that coercive military threats should be the primary tool of diplomacy.
The Geek has always been of the view that Kennan's later appreciation of his thinking was honest and accurate. Kennan had a profound mind capable of fine gradations of nuance. Unfortunately the politicians and diplomats, the soldiers and operations analysts who were called upon to put containment into practice under the overall requirements of the Long Telegram inspired NSC 68 were not so fine grained in their understandings of time and place, of world and politics, of threats and opportunities. NSC-68 (signed by President Truman in 1950) has not only governed the warp and woof of American foreign and national security policies ever since but has served to make these policies increasingly irrelevant, increasingly unrelated to the contemporary realities of global politics and evermore counterproductive.
The reason for the persistence of the NSC-68 mode is simple. It worked. The doctrine of containment enforced primarily by coercive means headed by the US military did contribute significantly to the downfall of the Soviet Union. While not the sole cause by any stretch, the American persistence in applying containment, in surrounding the Soviet sphere with a steel ring of bases and alliances, of being both willing and able to fight wars of dubious connection to the Kremlin, placed real and continued pressures on the inefficient Soviet regime with important consequences which served in aggregate to sap the political will of the Soviet elite to keep on keeping on.
Sanctified by apparent success, the draw-a-line-in-the-sand mentality of the Cold War soldiered on. The natural inclination of people to divide groups into two categories--Us and Them--was reinforced by the intellectual legacy of containment. The equally natural inclination of most people to rely on coercion first in the accomplishment of goals was likewise buttressed by the seeming success of militarily predicated coercion during the Cold War.
The short span of time which elapsed between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of attacks by advocates of violent political Islam did not permit for any sort of measured appraisal of the containment-by-coercion mode of the Cold War. As a result, the default response of the American government and We the People was rooted in the Cold War paradigm: divide US from Them, draw a line in the sand, employ military coercion to bend Them to Our will.
The focus on military based coercion was seen as early as the mid-Fifties to be having the expectable albeit unintended consequence of warping all aspects of American foreign policy, the national economy, and virtually all aspects of our domestic society and polity in ways that might not be at all beneficial over time.
In foreign relations the Are-you-with-us? test dominated all other considerations. Foreign governments which failed the test were put beyond the pale as Nasser, among others, found out.
The economic effects of NSC-68 gave rise to what Ike notably called "the military-industrial complex" which extended far beyond cabals of generals and industrialists to include academia, the media, and even entertainment. (Recall the "mine shaft gap" line in Dr Strangelove, the perfect risible parody of all the many "gaps" which punctuated political discourse for thirty and more years.)
Investment in both human and physical capital alike which were completely appropriate were justified politically as being required by "national security." (Think of the Interstate highway system or even the name of the first federal student loan project, the "National Defense Student Loan" program.)
Even the first stumbling efforts of the national government in the field of civil rights were explained as being necessary not for reasons of inherent justice or domestic tranquility but rather to deny the "Communists" from reaping a propaganda harvest in the context of the decolonizing Third World. And, it is worth remembering the assaults on free speech made by those seeking to present a unified American public resolute in its defense of all rights and freedoms against the "Communist" menace.
We are now a full twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failed coup against the Yeltsin government in Russia. We are now more than ten years into a seemingly endless confrontation with the forces of violent political Islam, seeking without measurable success to contain the new threat by coercion based primarily upon military means.
And, it might be asked fairly, "What have we learned?"
At the very least it might be asserted with accuracy that we have learned the limits or, to be more honest, the irrelevance of coercion based containment. A sign, small but telling, that at least some of the American establishment has learned this highly valuable lesson.
Two serving officers, one Navy and the other a Marine, have delivered themselves of a very important "private" paper. While "private," this product of two staffers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not have become public had it not been approved of by very senior members of the Defense Department.
Writing under the pen name of "Mr Y" in intentional imitation of Kennan who published an article in Foreign Affairs based on his Long Telegram under the pseudonym of "Mr X," the two officers, Captain Porter and Colonel Mykleby, have offered a viable alternative to the containment by coercion thesis of Kennan. While not complete in itself, the paper points in a new direction, a direction which places far less reliance upon either coercion or the military and places far more emphasis on refocusing our efforts on traditional American values such as entrepreneurship and education and, in the foreign relations sphere, on engagement and influence rather than dominance.
At the center of the "Mr Y" paper is the contention that the world is not a venue composed of threats but rather a complex political ecology in which opportunities for engagement and influence far outnumber actual threats requiring deterrence or defeat by purely military means. They argue forcefully against the contention that those who are not obviously "with us" must be resolutely "against us." They also contend with vigor that the US has become destructively astigmatic in its focus on violent political Islam.
While there is room for debate regarding the second contention, the overall thrust against dividing the people of a complex and rapidly evolving global population into simple camps of threats and allies is well neigh onto impossible to defeat. So also is a critical accompanying theme: The necessity of properly balancing the foundational reality of the nation-state with the need for and existence of supra-national entities.
This secondary theme deserves more consideration than the two officers give it. For example, they overlook the critical reality that strong centrifugal forces are at work in a large number of "states." The reality that some "states" are such in name only as well as the potent disintegrative pressures of language, culture, religion, and defining mythology are fracturing more than a few actual states, some of which have long historical existence. The addition of sub-state entities to the mix gravely complicates the global political ecology.
With respect to the US the two authors are of the view that policy has gone very much astray. They argue the self-evident but willfully ignored: the US has not invested well or enough in the development of its most important asset, its human capital. In a way they are simply enlarging the perspective of that wise and insightful soldier, Dwight Eisenhower. Ike held that the diversion of money into weapons and other military equipment came at the expense of human capital investment. And that is a ground truth none can deny.
The same applies to the argument adduced by the captain and the colonel to the effect that the real strength, the fountainhead of all our instruments of national power, resides in the creativity, energy, and efforts of Americans in all fields of endeavor. From those comes American prosperity, American self-confidence, the American optimism which has been such a notable feature of the American character for over two hundred years. All aspects of national power, hard as well as soft, arise from the reality of prosperity, the actuality of confidence, the presence of optimism.
The authors contend for a diplomatic paradigm based on engagement and influence. This approach, they imply but do not state, would allow for a level of American authority on the global stage which would equate to operational dominance without any of the obnoxious features of "with-us-or-against-us" which have so often blighted our relations with other states. This assessment is so self-evident that the need to set it forth even by implication should not be necessary. The fact that it was put forth serves to underscore just how drastically the Cold War model has skewed American diplomacy.
Mr Y has lit a candle against the current foreign and national security darkness. One can hope it will ignite an intellectual firestorm, but as a historian, the Geek cannot be so optimistic. As recent debates and votes on the budget demonstrate, the Congress is still stuck in the morass of coercion first and shows no sign of desiring otherwise. It is unfortunate, but it is quite unlikely that Mr Y's paper will have even a small fraction of the influence enjoyed by the Long Telegram.
In his later years, the famed diplomat and historian bemoaned the "militarization" of his musings on containment as applied to one area--the Eurasian landmass--and one opponent--Russia under the Soviets. He maintained that he had never implied containment to be a sovereign remedy of universal applicability or that coercive military threats should be the primary tool of diplomacy.
The Geek has always been of the view that Kennan's later appreciation of his thinking was honest and accurate. Kennan had a profound mind capable of fine gradations of nuance. Unfortunately the politicians and diplomats, the soldiers and operations analysts who were called upon to put containment into practice under the overall requirements of the Long Telegram inspired NSC 68 were not so fine grained in their understandings of time and place, of world and politics, of threats and opportunities. NSC-68 (signed by President Truman in 1950) has not only governed the warp and woof of American foreign and national security policies ever since but has served to make these policies increasingly irrelevant, increasingly unrelated to the contemporary realities of global politics and evermore counterproductive.
The reason for the persistence of the NSC-68 mode is simple. It worked. The doctrine of containment enforced primarily by coercive means headed by the US military did contribute significantly to the downfall of the Soviet Union. While not the sole cause by any stretch, the American persistence in applying containment, in surrounding the Soviet sphere with a steel ring of bases and alliances, of being both willing and able to fight wars of dubious connection to the Kremlin, placed real and continued pressures on the inefficient Soviet regime with important consequences which served in aggregate to sap the political will of the Soviet elite to keep on keeping on.
Sanctified by apparent success, the draw-a-line-in-the-sand mentality of the Cold War soldiered on. The natural inclination of people to divide groups into two categories--Us and Them--was reinforced by the intellectual legacy of containment. The equally natural inclination of most people to rely on coercion first in the accomplishment of goals was likewise buttressed by the seeming success of militarily predicated coercion during the Cold War.
The short span of time which elapsed between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of attacks by advocates of violent political Islam did not permit for any sort of measured appraisal of the containment-by-coercion mode of the Cold War. As a result, the default response of the American government and We the People was rooted in the Cold War paradigm: divide US from Them, draw a line in the sand, employ military coercion to bend Them to Our will.
The focus on military based coercion was seen as early as the mid-Fifties to be having the expectable albeit unintended consequence of warping all aspects of American foreign policy, the national economy, and virtually all aspects of our domestic society and polity in ways that might not be at all beneficial over time.
In foreign relations the Are-you-with-us? test dominated all other considerations. Foreign governments which failed the test were put beyond the pale as Nasser, among others, found out.
The economic effects of NSC-68 gave rise to what Ike notably called "the military-industrial complex" which extended far beyond cabals of generals and industrialists to include academia, the media, and even entertainment. (Recall the "mine shaft gap" line in Dr Strangelove, the perfect risible parody of all the many "gaps" which punctuated political discourse for thirty and more years.)
Investment in both human and physical capital alike which were completely appropriate were justified politically as being required by "national security." (Think of the Interstate highway system or even the name of the first federal student loan project, the "National Defense Student Loan" program.)
Even the first stumbling efforts of the national government in the field of civil rights were explained as being necessary not for reasons of inherent justice or domestic tranquility but rather to deny the "Communists" from reaping a propaganda harvest in the context of the decolonizing Third World. And, it is worth remembering the assaults on free speech made by those seeking to present a unified American public resolute in its defense of all rights and freedoms against the "Communist" menace.
We are now a full twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failed coup against the Yeltsin government in Russia. We are now more than ten years into a seemingly endless confrontation with the forces of violent political Islam, seeking without measurable success to contain the new threat by coercion based primarily upon military means.
And, it might be asked fairly, "What have we learned?"
At the very least it might be asserted with accuracy that we have learned the limits or, to be more honest, the irrelevance of coercion based containment. A sign, small but telling, that at least some of the American establishment has learned this highly valuable lesson.
Two serving officers, one Navy and the other a Marine, have delivered themselves of a very important "private" paper. While "private," this product of two staffers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not have become public had it not been approved of by very senior members of the Defense Department.
Writing under the pen name of "Mr Y" in intentional imitation of Kennan who published an article in Foreign Affairs based on his Long Telegram under the pseudonym of "Mr X," the two officers, Captain Porter and Colonel Mykleby, have offered a viable alternative to the containment by coercion thesis of Kennan. While not complete in itself, the paper points in a new direction, a direction which places far less reliance upon either coercion or the military and places far more emphasis on refocusing our efforts on traditional American values such as entrepreneurship and education and, in the foreign relations sphere, on engagement and influence rather than dominance.
At the center of the "Mr Y" paper is the contention that the world is not a venue composed of threats but rather a complex political ecology in which opportunities for engagement and influence far outnumber actual threats requiring deterrence or defeat by purely military means. They argue forcefully against the contention that those who are not obviously "with us" must be resolutely "against us." They also contend with vigor that the US has become destructively astigmatic in its focus on violent political Islam.
While there is room for debate regarding the second contention, the overall thrust against dividing the people of a complex and rapidly evolving global population into simple camps of threats and allies is well neigh onto impossible to defeat. So also is a critical accompanying theme: The necessity of properly balancing the foundational reality of the nation-state with the need for and existence of supra-national entities.
This secondary theme deserves more consideration than the two officers give it. For example, they overlook the critical reality that strong centrifugal forces are at work in a large number of "states." The reality that some "states" are such in name only as well as the potent disintegrative pressures of language, culture, religion, and defining mythology are fracturing more than a few actual states, some of which have long historical existence. The addition of sub-state entities to the mix gravely complicates the global political ecology.
With respect to the US the two authors are of the view that policy has gone very much astray. They argue the self-evident but willfully ignored: the US has not invested well or enough in the development of its most important asset, its human capital. In a way they are simply enlarging the perspective of that wise and insightful soldier, Dwight Eisenhower. Ike held that the diversion of money into weapons and other military equipment came at the expense of human capital investment. And that is a ground truth none can deny.
The same applies to the argument adduced by the captain and the colonel to the effect that the real strength, the fountainhead of all our instruments of national power, resides in the creativity, energy, and efforts of Americans in all fields of endeavor. From those comes American prosperity, American self-confidence, the American optimism which has been such a notable feature of the American character for over two hundred years. All aspects of national power, hard as well as soft, arise from the reality of prosperity, the actuality of confidence, the presence of optimism.
The authors contend for a diplomatic paradigm based on engagement and influence. This approach, they imply but do not state, would allow for a level of American authority on the global stage which would equate to operational dominance without any of the obnoxious features of "with-us-or-against-us" which have so often blighted our relations with other states. This assessment is so self-evident that the need to set it forth even by implication should not be necessary. The fact that it was put forth serves to underscore just how drastically the Cold War model has skewed American diplomacy.
Mr Y has lit a candle against the current foreign and national security darkness. One can hope it will ignite an intellectual firestorm, but as a historian, the Geek cannot be so optimistic. As recent debates and votes on the budget demonstrate, the Congress is still stuck in the morass of coercion first and shows no sign of desiring otherwise. It is unfortunate, but it is quite unlikely that Mr Y's paper will have even a small fraction of the influence enjoyed by the Long Telegram.
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
The Incredible Shrinking US Navy
Mark Helprin writing in the WSJ raises a very important issue. It is a dynamic which has been underway for some years now but has been occurring below the threshold of public awareness and debate. At stake is the continued capability of the US to project power at great distances from our shores and assure the freedom of maritime trade.
Way back during the Reagan administration there was much brouhaha over plans to enlarge the American navy to the level of six hundred ships. That was an inventory of combatant vessels not seen since the mid-sixties. The opposition was loud and sustained. The primary reasons given against the expansion of the navy were cost and the absence of a credible threat at sea beyond the undeniable presence of Soviet submarines carrying nuclear tipped ballistic missiles. The proponents of expansion argued that the role of the navy went far beyond mere deterrence and the countering of the Soviet boomers.
When night fell on this particular debate, the navy was enlarged albeit not to the six hundred ship level. In subsequent years the navy has been reduced. Some reductions were justified with ease such as the retirement of superannuated SSBNs. Others simply occurred without any particular note or rationale.
The ground truth which must be held firmly in one's grip is that the US is a maritime power. Further, it has been one since the beginning. Even with the unfortunate, not to say potentially fatally enervating, decline of the American merchant marine seeming to lessen the importance of protecting seaborne commerce, the reality remains: The US is heavily dependent upon sea lines of communication for the basics of industrial life as well as for much of its economic strength.
As Admiral Mahan demonstrated with history changing effect in his seminal The Influence of Sea Power On History over a century ago, maritime powers alone have the capability to wrest and maintain the initiative when confronted by a continental power's military threat. Also as Mahan pointed out, control of the sea provides economic security and geopolitical advantage whether a state is confronted by another maritime power or a continental one. World War II proved each and every of Mahan's contentions. So did much of the Cold War. The US Navy and its overwhelming maritime domination gave the US profound advantages in initiative which could and were never contested seriously by the Soviet Union.
Warships are expensive. Not only are they expensive they become more so with every change in technology. They are expensive to build. Quite expensive to man and maintain. The expense is multiplied by the simple and unavoidable fact that a maritime power needs a lot of ships.
That is the sticking point as well as the thrust of Helprin's piece. The US must not only have combatants of all types which are technologically advanced, it must have a lot of them if it is to retain its globe girdling capacity. In straitened economic times like the present the possession of a lot of expensive ships crewed by expensively trained people might seem to be a luxury.
It has been argued that the US can rely upon its allies to provide bases from which force can be projected should such be required. That argument has been made at regular intervals ever since the founding of NATO over fifty years ago. The expense of a navy was employed as one of the main reasons for the "pactomania" of John Foster Dulles back when Ike was in the Oval. Many, if not all, of the multilateral and bilateral military assistance treaties entered into during the Cold War were informed by the need for bases from which either or both air and ground forces could be projected.
The rub comes in the inconvenient fact that treaties and agreements are, as Bismark was alleged to have said, "mere scraps of paper," easily blown away by the winds of political change. The ongoing events in the Mideast demonstrate the accuracy of this position. Alliances almost hoary with age come unstuck in an instant when a political hurricane passes through.
The US must have its own sovereign bases. This is where the navy enters the picture. The ships of a task force are floating sovereignty. They are bases of force and power projection over which usage the US has absolute control. There is no need to gain the permission of an ally whose support may fade at the worst possible moment.
Because ships are movable assets, they provide a unique capacity to demonstrate a compelling American interest in a situation occurring anywhere near any ocean. Right now the US is moving amphibious warfare ships from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea to support diplomatic efforts in Libya. It is an unfortunate symptom of the decline in the size of the US Navy that the ships and embarked Marines were not immediately available in the Mediterranean as was the case not that many years ago.
It is the global nature of American interests as well as the unique capacity of warships to move rapidly and bring impressive force to bear on a location of concern which obviates the contention that individual ships are far more competent than their predecessors of only twenty years ago. It is quite true that a single aircraft carrier battle group has more conventional firepower on tap than did an entire fleet at the end of World War II. It is also irrelevant.
A single carrier battle group can not be in two widely separated locations simultaneously. As the current world situation shows, there is a very high probability that two or more crises requiring an American response can and do occur simultaneously. Nor does the existence of one or two high profile crises obviate the ongoing need for sealane protection. Neither does such end the requirement for a visible presence in areas of the world which appear quiet.
The Deep Thinkers who have complaisantly presided over the run down of the US Navy apparently have failed to appreciate the recent developments in China. The Trolls of Beijing have decided to trod a path not walked by Chinese for nearly a thousand years--the path which leads to the sea, to maritime power aspirations.
The Trolls have made explicit that the South China Sea is an area of major concern. They have all but declared the Yellow Sea to be territorial waters. The Chinese navy has engaged in operations against the pirates of Somalia as well as making courtesy calls on African ports. All of this is a recapitulation of past Chinese experience--admittedly long past experience.
The Chinese have been bending metal to provide the hardware needed for a true blue water navy which includes at least one aircraft carrier. It is true that the Chinese are a long, long way from mastering the intricate job of operating a force projection oriented blue water navy, but there is no doubt that the Trolls have placed their feet firmly on the road that leads to that end.
The old opponent Russia has included major additions to its fleet in the defense ramp up currently planned. Given the ambitious claims made by the Kremlin regarding sovereignty over large portions of the Arctic Sea and the resources below that unattractive body of water, there is little reason to believe the Russians will suddenly decide a new, improved navy is a luxury which can be dispensed with easily and at no loss.
To put a narrow focus on a bit of the Arctic Sea and adjoining water, it might be worth recalling the recent study showing the offshore proven reserves near Alaska have the potential to put that state in the top five oil and natural gas producing countries of the world. The Russian's territorial claims run right up to (and perhaps beyond) the limits of the Alaskan sub-sea field. That does raise some interesting possibilities, doesn't it?
The pirates of Somalia may represent a paradigm of an emerging threat which can envelope other areas of the world. Nor is there any reason to believe these areas will be limited to those populated by Muslims and ringed with failed, failing, or hollow states. As the quest for resources--and not simply those of a hydrocarbon sort--pushes evermore into the maritime zones, the potential for political or criminal entities to embarrass state actors with piratical acts similar to those taking place off the coast of Somalia grows apace.
Maritime protection missions including those directed against pirates or smugglers as well as guarding exclusive economic zones are tasks for the navy. They are all ship intensive operations even if the combatants need not have more than a moderate level of individual competence. This implies the US Navy will need more smaller combatants than it currently possesses. It also implies the individual ships will have to have a multi-mission capability.
Littoral control and amphibious forcible entry missions are not going to go away simply because Secretary Gates fears the proliferation of relatively inexpensive and capable anti-ship missiles. Rather, the challenge exists for the US Navy to develop and deploy appropriate threat reduction systems. This will not be a task accomplished cheaply nor quickly.
Nothing in the area of naval development will be nor can be cheap and quick in its accomplishment. It takes time, a lot of time, to design and construct new ships, new systems. The time can be shortened and the expense lessened by refining the procurement process--a task which has bedeviled generations of defense secretaries. Still it must be done if the erosion of US naval power is to ended and reversed before the anemia is fatal.
For all of those who have hoped that the "end of history" predicted at the time of the Soviet bloc's collapse will arrive finally with the ending of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all that can be said is, "Welcome to the real world." The choice is blunt and harsh. Reverse the slow degradation of American naval power or accept a greatly diminished status for the US along with an increase in the costs of nearly everything along with a greater number of threats and strictures to our way of life and independence as a country.
Way back during the Reagan administration there was much brouhaha over plans to enlarge the American navy to the level of six hundred ships. That was an inventory of combatant vessels not seen since the mid-sixties. The opposition was loud and sustained. The primary reasons given against the expansion of the navy were cost and the absence of a credible threat at sea beyond the undeniable presence of Soviet submarines carrying nuclear tipped ballistic missiles. The proponents of expansion argued that the role of the navy went far beyond mere deterrence and the countering of the Soviet boomers.
When night fell on this particular debate, the navy was enlarged albeit not to the six hundred ship level. In subsequent years the navy has been reduced. Some reductions were justified with ease such as the retirement of superannuated SSBNs. Others simply occurred without any particular note or rationale.
The ground truth which must be held firmly in one's grip is that the US is a maritime power. Further, it has been one since the beginning. Even with the unfortunate, not to say potentially fatally enervating, decline of the American merchant marine seeming to lessen the importance of protecting seaborne commerce, the reality remains: The US is heavily dependent upon sea lines of communication for the basics of industrial life as well as for much of its economic strength.
As Admiral Mahan demonstrated with history changing effect in his seminal The Influence of Sea Power On History over a century ago, maritime powers alone have the capability to wrest and maintain the initiative when confronted by a continental power's military threat. Also as Mahan pointed out, control of the sea provides economic security and geopolitical advantage whether a state is confronted by another maritime power or a continental one. World War II proved each and every of Mahan's contentions. So did much of the Cold War. The US Navy and its overwhelming maritime domination gave the US profound advantages in initiative which could and were never contested seriously by the Soviet Union.
Warships are expensive. Not only are they expensive they become more so with every change in technology. They are expensive to build. Quite expensive to man and maintain. The expense is multiplied by the simple and unavoidable fact that a maritime power needs a lot of ships.
That is the sticking point as well as the thrust of Helprin's piece. The US must not only have combatants of all types which are technologically advanced, it must have a lot of them if it is to retain its globe girdling capacity. In straitened economic times like the present the possession of a lot of expensive ships crewed by expensively trained people might seem to be a luxury.
It has been argued that the US can rely upon its allies to provide bases from which force can be projected should such be required. That argument has been made at regular intervals ever since the founding of NATO over fifty years ago. The expense of a navy was employed as one of the main reasons for the "pactomania" of John Foster Dulles back when Ike was in the Oval. Many, if not all, of the multilateral and bilateral military assistance treaties entered into during the Cold War were informed by the need for bases from which either or both air and ground forces could be projected.
The rub comes in the inconvenient fact that treaties and agreements are, as Bismark was alleged to have said, "mere scraps of paper," easily blown away by the winds of political change. The ongoing events in the Mideast demonstrate the accuracy of this position. Alliances almost hoary with age come unstuck in an instant when a political hurricane passes through.
The US must have its own sovereign bases. This is where the navy enters the picture. The ships of a task force are floating sovereignty. They are bases of force and power projection over which usage the US has absolute control. There is no need to gain the permission of an ally whose support may fade at the worst possible moment.
Because ships are movable assets, they provide a unique capacity to demonstrate a compelling American interest in a situation occurring anywhere near any ocean. Right now the US is moving amphibious warfare ships from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea to support diplomatic efforts in Libya. It is an unfortunate symptom of the decline in the size of the US Navy that the ships and embarked Marines were not immediately available in the Mediterranean as was the case not that many years ago.
It is the global nature of American interests as well as the unique capacity of warships to move rapidly and bring impressive force to bear on a location of concern which obviates the contention that individual ships are far more competent than their predecessors of only twenty years ago. It is quite true that a single aircraft carrier battle group has more conventional firepower on tap than did an entire fleet at the end of World War II. It is also irrelevant.
A single carrier battle group can not be in two widely separated locations simultaneously. As the current world situation shows, there is a very high probability that two or more crises requiring an American response can and do occur simultaneously. Nor does the existence of one or two high profile crises obviate the ongoing need for sealane protection. Neither does such end the requirement for a visible presence in areas of the world which appear quiet.
The Deep Thinkers who have complaisantly presided over the run down of the US Navy apparently have failed to appreciate the recent developments in China. The Trolls of Beijing have decided to trod a path not walked by Chinese for nearly a thousand years--the path which leads to the sea, to maritime power aspirations.
The Trolls have made explicit that the South China Sea is an area of major concern. They have all but declared the Yellow Sea to be territorial waters. The Chinese navy has engaged in operations against the pirates of Somalia as well as making courtesy calls on African ports. All of this is a recapitulation of past Chinese experience--admittedly long past experience.
The Chinese have been bending metal to provide the hardware needed for a true blue water navy which includes at least one aircraft carrier. It is true that the Chinese are a long, long way from mastering the intricate job of operating a force projection oriented blue water navy, but there is no doubt that the Trolls have placed their feet firmly on the road that leads to that end.
The old opponent Russia has included major additions to its fleet in the defense ramp up currently planned. Given the ambitious claims made by the Kremlin regarding sovereignty over large portions of the Arctic Sea and the resources below that unattractive body of water, there is little reason to believe the Russians will suddenly decide a new, improved navy is a luxury which can be dispensed with easily and at no loss.
To put a narrow focus on a bit of the Arctic Sea and adjoining water, it might be worth recalling the recent study showing the offshore proven reserves near Alaska have the potential to put that state in the top five oil and natural gas producing countries of the world. The Russian's territorial claims run right up to (and perhaps beyond) the limits of the Alaskan sub-sea field. That does raise some interesting possibilities, doesn't it?
The pirates of Somalia may represent a paradigm of an emerging threat which can envelope other areas of the world. Nor is there any reason to believe these areas will be limited to those populated by Muslims and ringed with failed, failing, or hollow states. As the quest for resources--and not simply those of a hydrocarbon sort--pushes evermore into the maritime zones, the potential for political or criminal entities to embarrass state actors with piratical acts similar to those taking place off the coast of Somalia grows apace.
Maritime protection missions including those directed against pirates or smugglers as well as guarding exclusive economic zones are tasks for the navy. They are all ship intensive operations even if the combatants need not have more than a moderate level of individual competence. This implies the US Navy will need more smaller combatants than it currently possesses. It also implies the individual ships will have to have a multi-mission capability.
Littoral control and amphibious forcible entry missions are not going to go away simply because Secretary Gates fears the proliferation of relatively inexpensive and capable anti-ship missiles. Rather, the challenge exists for the US Navy to develop and deploy appropriate threat reduction systems. This will not be a task accomplished cheaply nor quickly.
Nothing in the area of naval development will be nor can be cheap and quick in its accomplishment. It takes time, a lot of time, to design and construct new ships, new systems. The time can be shortened and the expense lessened by refining the procurement process--a task which has bedeviled generations of defense secretaries. Still it must be done if the erosion of US naval power is to ended and reversed before the anemia is fatal.
For all of those who have hoped that the "end of history" predicted at the time of the Soviet bloc's collapse will arrive finally with the ending of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, all that can be said is, "Welcome to the real world." The choice is blunt and harsh. Reverse the slow degradation of American naval power or accept a greatly diminished status for the US along with an increase in the costs of nearly everything along with a greater number of threats and strictures to our way of life and independence as a country.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Keep America Safe--Well, It's An Idea
Liz Cheney, the eldest daughter of Dick (Waterboard The Bastards!) Cheney has started up a new group, Keep America Safe, along with Weekly Standard jefe, William Kristol, and the sister of one of the pilots killed on 9/11, Deborah Burlingame. The goal of the new group is to provide coherent and timely rebuttals to the foreign policy gambits of the Obama administration generally and the President in particular.
Ms Cheney, who is no stranger to either politics or blunt talk, is to be congratulated for attempting the impossible. That's right, impossible. The mission of Keep America Safe falls into the impossible mission category not because the Obama administration and the President have crafted and implemented a foreign policy of a such a nature as to render it impervious to criticism but rather because there appears to be no policy at all.
The Nobel Peace Prize winning President has been in the Oval for not quite nine months. But, nine months is long enough to provide gestation to a new human being. It ought to be sufficient to do the same for a foreign policy.
One casts about in vain for some sign of an "Obama Doctrine." One searches without result for even a "new order." The signs and portents of a global vision are conspicuous by their absence.
Reaching out with an open hand to the "Arab/Muslim World" has brought kudos from the multi-cultural oriented crowd, but no returns in the real world. Leaning on Israel to stop the "settlements" has resulted in no favorable responses from either the Palestinian Authority or the Arab countries aligned with it.
The "reset" button of US-Russian relations has been pushed so hard and heavy by the Deep Thinkers of the Obama White House and Foggy Bottom that the print has worn off. In return the Russians are not giving more than a purely symbolic millimeter in the great game of sanctions against Iran. What they have been doing is flexing their economic, diplomatic, and, (say it ain't so, Vladimir) military muscles in the general direction of Eastern Europe.
As a result of the renewed Russian presence on their frontiers and the perceived abandonment of the members of the old Warsaw Pact by the Obama administration, the diplomatic center of gravity has shifted markedly from Washington to Moscow. The folks of the former Soviet Bloc states are getting nervous and wondering if they should brush up on their Russian and quit learning English.
The Mandarinate of China continues to enlarge its military capacity far beyond the level necessary for defense purposes. At the same time Beijing has launched new economic programs in conjunction with Russia, Japan, and South Korea. Not content with firming its position as the regional hegemon of Asia, the Chinese are continuing to expand their no-strings-attached version of foreign aid in Africa.
Lest it be forgotten, the Men of the Forbidden City are up to their dandruff in both economic and diplomatic partnership with Iran. As if that weren't enough, the Chinese are rapidly expanding their relations with Pakistan including a new agreement on joint efforts to counter terrorism. This means that Islamabad has a viable alternative to the US in the bribery department. Given the unhappiness expressed by the Pakistani Army and members of the opposition parties to the terms and conditions applied by the Kerry-Lugar foreign aid bill, this is a development that is of concern to the US.
The Obama administration is remarkably disengaged from Latin America other than to hector Honduras over a perfectly constitutional ejection of the sitting president by the country's Supreme Court and Legislature. There is no seeming concern over the every closer linkage between Iran and Venezuela. Nor does there seem to be any sense of urgency regarding the deteriorating domestic tranquility in Mexico and other Central American countries.
Then, of course, there is Afghanistan. The President promises a decision on whither we go in that desolate place within "weeks." No need to get excited, folks, no need to rush to judgement, the war has been going on for quite awhile now and we've been losing for most of that time, but, no need for worry. Kick on back and see how things go.
Mr Obama has been described as "preternaturally" calm (a description which formerly was applied to Dick Cheney) no matter what the pressures might be. The problem comes when preternatural calmness gradates into coma as seems to be the case with Afghanistan--or the challenge of the Islamist jihadists generally.
It is long past time to ask of the President and his people just what the global vision of the administration might be. At the same time, a degree of specificity far transcending banal but pleasant words concerning a "nuclear weapons free world" or "greater international engagement"must be demanded.
The main point in the blistering video released by Keep America Safe as part of its organizational launch is simply that Mr Obama talks real pretty. Quite true. The President's words wash over one's mind like a gentle and cooling mist on a hot day.
However, when the President's mild, mellow, and soothingly delivered soliloquies are parsed in written form, they have no substance. Nor do they show any realistic understanding of how international politics is pursued. They do not even have the content of the speeches of Woodrow Wilson (who also talked right pretty) or, JFK (who was even a prettier talker than Mr Obama).
Woodrow Wilson was a man possessed of the most lofty thoughts and sentiments. He believed in the ethical imperative of the US working hard and long to make the world, as he put it, "safe for democracy" and equally, unmarred by aggressive war. He did express his goals and means with specificity. Where Wilson stumbled to the ultimate detriment of the world was in not using the power at his disposal to cozen or coerce other countries into agreement with his views and means.
JFK likewise had lofty ideas. He expressed them as well as the means he proposed to achieve them with both conviction and force. His administration like those of his predecessors had a definite vision of the world that the US would prefer to exist in. The President and all of his administration expressed both in terms which were concrete and understandable. Where his administration failed was, like that of Woodrow Wilson, in the implementation of the vision.
Even Bill Clinton, a president without any deep and abiding interest in foreign affairs, possessed a vision of the world which he and those around him thought to be most compatible with American interests. The neo-liberal view of a world distinguished by peace through open, free trade, globalization, free markets, and the like might have been ill-considered and ultimately detrimental to American national and strategic interests, but it was self-consistent and coherent.
Beyond I-am-not-George W. Bush, Mr Obama has no vision for the world. He is apparently gripless with respect to answering the question or what sort of world is most compatible with the interests, needs, and values of the US.
As a result, Mr Obama can draw no lines in the sand. He cannot say with consistency what conduct is either acceptable to the US or not. Neither can he erect any directional signs pointing to the kind of world in which the US can flourish.
Without a clear view of the type of world best suited to the US now and into the future, Mr Obama and his administration can neither formulate nor execute coherent, internally consistent, and viable policy. Without a clear world view, it is not possible to define either friends or enemies of the US. To distinguish between those governments with which the US has significant coinciding national interests and those with which we are in opposition.
Without a vision, Mr Obama and his administration can only lurch from one crisis (either real or apparent) to another. It can only temporize. It can only act ad hoc. This means that the US cannot provide what even its enemies want and need--a clear, easily understood point of reference.
Providing a visible point of reference with which a country and its government can either agree or oppose has been the hallmark of American foreign policy since Theodore Roosevelt sat in the Oval. It is the reality which hides behind the word, "leadership."
When the US fails in this regard as it has from time to time over the past century, the world is the worst for it. When, for example, FDR could not or would not annunciate a vision and pursue a policy consistent with it, both Europe and Asia stumbled to and over the precipice of war.
When the US seems hesitant or uncertain as to what it will and will not accept as was the case during the Truman administration with respect to Asia, again the consequences are both profound and negative. Events of the late Forties and very early Fifties show that it is even worse for the US not to have both a vision and a consistent policy than it is to have ones which are wrongheaded.
Mr Obama is floundering. He has no world vision. He has no standard to which policy can be tailored and executed. He is not capable of maintaining focus on a foreign policy challenge because he has no predicate for doing so.
Mr Obama cannot take charge and move out on time sensitive foreign policy measures but must leave them to his people while he floats, preternaturally calm, above the fray. He is content to leave Afghanistan to be fought out between Gates and Clinton on one side and Biden, Jones, and his Chief of Staff on the other. He can do nothing else as he has no clear idea what the US and thus the world needs, against whom war must be fought and with whom alliances are viable.
Good luck, Ms Cheney and group. Let the Geek know when the Obama-ites have a policy with which you disagree. It is hard to be in opposition to a vacuum. And that is what the Obama foreign and national security "policies" are.
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