The Pentagon is already scheduled to take a big hit in the money department. In addition, the landmine laden wording of the debt ceiling increase bill assures that should the "super committee" not come up with the requisite 1.2 trillion bucks in additional cuts over the next decade, the "national security" portion of federal expenditures will take another, larger whack. Potentially, the "national security" community could lose over a trillion bucks during the next ten years.
The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security. There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing. On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear. Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.
As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations. As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year. The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.
As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier. The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board. (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.) The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War. And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.
By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron. Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago. It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.
As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released. Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities. The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.
A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted. The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.
The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions. The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack. The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.
The reality was far different. As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support. The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.
Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home. In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.
Will is one thing. Ability is quite another. Political will is perishable. It can flourish. Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight. Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11. But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices. And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.
Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness. The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US. Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer. After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised. It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies. Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).
This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm. The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it. Dollars must be considered. Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things. But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.
The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick. In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values. We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power. It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.
The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity. We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical. As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.
The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies. Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia. Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam. The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum. This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.
None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped. But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.
Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner." There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities. It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.
Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US. His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities. And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.
Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget. In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast. By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place. We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming. Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.
Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.
Showing posts with label US Defense Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Defense Policy. Show all posts
Thursday, August 4, 2011
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
What A Difference A Decade Makes
Ten years ago a group of nineteen men primarily from Saudi Arabia were in the last stages of preparing for their dramatic exit from this world. In the US the major political news revolved around the Social Security "lockbox" and dire warnings of dark conspiracy afoot with Vice-President Cheney's energy task force meeting behind locked doors. The most recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review was silent on asymmetrical warfare and made little mention of unmanned combat systems (UCS.) The "Gang of Five Hundred" had reached a quick consensus on George W. Bush being a one-term president.
And, the US was rolling in bucks. The federal budget was running an embarrassingly large surplus. There was so much loot in Uncle Sam's pockets that tax cuts were agreed by one and all to be a very good idea. There was also a wide consensus on the desirability of increased spending on education and health care for senior citizens. Americans were feeling almost guilty about all that money littering the floors and vaults of the Treasury Department.
The overall American mood was optimistic. There was a degree of buoyancy within We the People that even the boom days of the early and mid-sixties seemed grey and dismal in comparison. The "go-go" years of that famed decade paled into dimness compared with the confidence, even exuberance, seen on Wall Street and Main Street alike. The Summer of '01 was very much a period of "let the good times roll!"
The US was the globe's only superpower. The economy was booming in all sectors--even housing and real estate. Jobs were plentiful. There were no real enemies abroad in the world, only a handful of annoying Arab terrorists such as those who attacked the USS Cole and our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hardly enough to worry about, right?
We now know that the Summer of '01 was the last season of the ancien regime. We know now that the past decade has been the opening period of several rather revolutionary dynamics in national security and foreign affairs.
The concept of asymmetrical warfare has come front and center. The US and other civilized states now must prepare to deter or defeat opponents at any point on a conflict spectrum which runs from the use of terror to the employment of missile delivered nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
The introduction and very rapid evolution of unmanned combat systems (UCS) whether in the air, on land, or in and under the sea indicates that the new technology bodes well to be a game changer equivalent in impact to the introduction of gunpowder weapons. There can be no doubt that even in this early stage of development, the UCS far surpasses in impact both current and near term potential of the submarine, the aircraft carrier, or aircraft themselves.
The nation-state which has served to define global politics for the past five hundred years is now threatened on two fronts. One of these is the supra-national organization. The other can be best seen as sub-national or, to use a longer term, national entities living uneasily within the confines of a state dominated by a different and larger nation.
Another feature which has come to the center of global politics is the latest restatement of a very long standing conflict. It is a conflict which has emerged many times over the centuries. The defining foundation of this very ancient and basic tension is between philosophies of life which center on the individual and views which put the priority upon the community and see the individual as important only insofar as he contributes to the common good of the community.
The tension between individualism and communitarianism dates back to the time when agriculture emerged as a rival to the far more ancient hunting and gathering way of life. To be successful the agriculture based approach to life requires stable communities in which land and labor can be monitored, controlled, guaranteed. The hunting and gathering economy depends upon the voluntary cooperation of individuals so that every person's strengths can be utilized and their weaknesses offset. Agriculture requires both the subordination of the individual to the needs of the community and a hierarchy to assure this subordination.
The individualistically oriented view of life emphasizes the rights of the individual while properly linking these rights with concomitant duties. The communitarian understanding puts a great weight on the duties of the individual--often to the point of ignoring the concept of "rights" completely. The polities which tend to the individualistic end of the spectrum are open and democratic to a significant degree. Polities which lean in the communitarian direction are authoritarian, even autocratic.
In the past, the conflict between the individualistic and communitarian has been seen in the wars between Western democracies and authoritarian ideologically driven states such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. It was the conflict of world views and understandings which hid under the term, "the Cold War." Today it exists as the struggle between civilized states and the exponents of violent political Islam.
Running as a connecting thread between all of these several substantial and rapid changes in the practice of global politics is the equally fast and major transformation of the technologies of information transmission and communication. As a means for facilitating the organization of ad hoc constituencies or as a tool for perception manipulation or as a political force multiplier, the Internet, the cellphone, and their dependencies such as social media have only begun to demonstrate their power and potential quite recently.
Then there is the change in the way in which We the People see ourselves, the world, and our future. In a very important sense, the change in mood and perception during the past decade is also a revolution. Perhaps it is the most important revolution of all. This contention is predicated on a commonplace: The perceptions, attitudes, and, thus, actions of the American public place very real and powerful inducements and constraints on decision and policy makers. In short, the mood of Americans generally is the context in which all national security and foreign policy actions are taken (or not taken.)
(It has gotten too bloody hot to go on for now--105 degrees F here at the computer. Please indulge the Geek and let him go and cool off secure in the knowledge that he will go on with this "thought piece" on the morrow when it might be a tad cooler.)
And, the US was rolling in bucks. The federal budget was running an embarrassingly large surplus. There was so much loot in Uncle Sam's pockets that tax cuts were agreed by one and all to be a very good idea. There was also a wide consensus on the desirability of increased spending on education and health care for senior citizens. Americans were feeling almost guilty about all that money littering the floors and vaults of the Treasury Department.
The overall American mood was optimistic. There was a degree of buoyancy within We the People that even the boom days of the early and mid-sixties seemed grey and dismal in comparison. The "go-go" years of that famed decade paled into dimness compared with the confidence, even exuberance, seen on Wall Street and Main Street alike. The Summer of '01 was very much a period of "let the good times roll!"
The US was the globe's only superpower. The economy was booming in all sectors--even housing and real estate. Jobs were plentiful. There were no real enemies abroad in the world, only a handful of annoying Arab terrorists such as those who attacked the USS Cole and our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hardly enough to worry about, right?
We now know that the Summer of '01 was the last season of the ancien regime. We know now that the past decade has been the opening period of several rather revolutionary dynamics in national security and foreign affairs.
The concept of asymmetrical warfare has come front and center. The US and other civilized states now must prepare to deter or defeat opponents at any point on a conflict spectrum which runs from the use of terror to the employment of missile delivered nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
The introduction and very rapid evolution of unmanned combat systems (UCS) whether in the air, on land, or in and under the sea indicates that the new technology bodes well to be a game changer equivalent in impact to the introduction of gunpowder weapons. There can be no doubt that even in this early stage of development, the UCS far surpasses in impact both current and near term potential of the submarine, the aircraft carrier, or aircraft themselves.
The nation-state which has served to define global politics for the past five hundred years is now threatened on two fronts. One of these is the supra-national organization. The other can be best seen as sub-national or, to use a longer term, national entities living uneasily within the confines of a state dominated by a different and larger nation.
Another feature which has come to the center of global politics is the latest restatement of a very long standing conflict. It is a conflict which has emerged many times over the centuries. The defining foundation of this very ancient and basic tension is between philosophies of life which center on the individual and views which put the priority upon the community and see the individual as important only insofar as he contributes to the common good of the community.
The tension between individualism and communitarianism dates back to the time when agriculture emerged as a rival to the far more ancient hunting and gathering way of life. To be successful the agriculture based approach to life requires stable communities in which land and labor can be monitored, controlled, guaranteed. The hunting and gathering economy depends upon the voluntary cooperation of individuals so that every person's strengths can be utilized and their weaknesses offset. Agriculture requires both the subordination of the individual to the needs of the community and a hierarchy to assure this subordination.
The individualistically oriented view of life emphasizes the rights of the individual while properly linking these rights with concomitant duties. The communitarian understanding puts a great weight on the duties of the individual--often to the point of ignoring the concept of "rights" completely. The polities which tend to the individualistic end of the spectrum are open and democratic to a significant degree. Polities which lean in the communitarian direction are authoritarian, even autocratic.
In the past, the conflict between the individualistic and communitarian has been seen in the wars between Western democracies and authoritarian ideologically driven states such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. It was the conflict of world views and understandings which hid under the term, "the Cold War." Today it exists as the struggle between civilized states and the exponents of violent political Islam.
Running as a connecting thread between all of these several substantial and rapid changes in the practice of global politics is the equally fast and major transformation of the technologies of information transmission and communication. As a means for facilitating the organization of ad hoc constituencies or as a tool for perception manipulation or as a political force multiplier, the Internet, the cellphone, and their dependencies such as social media have only begun to demonstrate their power and potential quite recently.
Then there is the change in the way in which We the People see ourselves, the world, and our future. In a very important sense, the change in mood and perception during the past decade is also a revolution. Perhaps it is the most important revolution of all. This contention is predicated on a commonplace: The perceptions, attitudes, and, thus, actions of the American public place very real and powerful inducements and constraints on decision and policy makers. In short, the mood of Americans generally is the context in which all national security and foreign policy actions are taken (or not taken.)
(It has gotten too bloody hot to go on for now--105 degrees F here at the computer. Please indulge the Geek and let him go and cool off secure in the knowledge that he will go on with this "thought piece" on the morrow when it might be a tad cooler.)
Sunday, May 22, 2011
We Will Not See The Likes Of Him Soon
Robert Gates gave a splendid example of why he will be missed sorely when he steps down as Secretary of Defense next month. His remarks at Notre Dame University's commencement provided an excellent epitome of his intellectual honesty as well as his breadth of thought and imagination.
The subject of Gate's address was the future of American national security forces--and, thus, the role to be played by the US in the world. Pointedly, he noted that the US cannot resign its role as a Great Power. As he commented, his travels around the world as Secretary of Defense have impressed him with the number of countries which want the US to play a larger role in global politics and not a smaller one.
In short, Dr Gates saw first hand, up close and personal, proof of the historical maxim holding no country can resign its status as a great power--although that status may be taken away by the actions of others. In this context, the Secretary commented upon the salient--but to many on the political Left, unpleasant--reality that the final shield of American core values has been the strength and reach of our military power.
As an add-on of key importance, the Secretary warned that there existed other Great Powers whose interests and goals were not completely compatible with our national and strategic interests. This means that only the continued capacity of the American military exists as a check on these ambitions. It was a very clear warning to and about the Trolls of Beijing.
In his reading of history, Gates drew a lesson regarding the ability of the American people to "avert their eyes" from events occurring in distant, remote places. It has been difficult to the point of impossibility for We the People in the past (and the present, he might have added) to see how some affair in a small and far distant country may rebound to the immediate disadvantage of the US and its citizens. It is this willful blindness conditioned by our history on a continent protected on both east and west by broad oceans which has given rise not only to our periods of isolationism but also this diminuendo form of being unable or unwilling to connect the dots linking us with some far off place filled with people having unpronounceable names.
The implication of these twin phenomena of large scale isolationism and small scale who-cares-ism for the Secretary is that of gutting the American military. Gates has lived through several periods during which We the People allowed--even demanded--the hollowing out of our military, air, and naval forces. In each case, a war had just been ended. In each case, there were strong economic imperatives in play. In each case, We the People were sick and tired of the sacrifices required of us. And in each case--after World War II, after the Vietnam War and after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union--the ultimate impact on our capacity to conduct diplomacy as a Great Power was lessened along with our ability to wage effective war if and when required.
We are in a similar situation with these earlier periods today. More so given the potential enervating impact of the federal deficit. There is both a need and a set of political imperatives to engage the national debt and current deficit with effect and dispatch. As the Secretary well knows and has publicly stated on numerous occasions, the defense appropriations cannot be held harmless during the process. They will not be. That is a for sure.
But, as Dr Gates argues in his Notre Dame speech, the process of reducing military expenditures cannot be done at the expense of our real world combat capacities. Administration, overhead, some categories of personnel expenses, some force components can and should be reduced or removed all together. Core combat and force/power projection capabilities as well as the research and development of next gen systems must be taken off the table.
As a Great Power, as the Great Power most trusted by countries around the world to act quickly and decisively in the face of threats, the US has the unique responsibility to maintain a significant full-spectrum capability which can do all missions. The US military, air, and naval forces must be able to do it all--deter or, if necessary, defeat peer opponents, execute low or no lethality interventions, provide humanitarian relief, train and equip friendly forces--the entire ambit of war and warlike utilities.
Dr Gates made reference to a statement purportedly made by Winston Churchill after World War II, ""With greatness comes great responsibility." It is obvious that Gates agrees with Churchill that the US cannot avoid either its greatness nor the responsibilities which come with it. It is evident in Gates' remarks that he believes that continued American greatness depends upon getting our financial affairs in order--and by doing so without gutting our military capabilities.
Gates projects optimism regarding our will and ability to address the parlous financial condition of the country and maintain the basis of global diplomacy--our military potency. He correctly notes all the times in our collective history when we have successfully overcome challenges as large or larger than those confronting us today. His optimism is tempered by a clear headed understanding that the US--its military and civilian decision makers but not excluding We the People--must undertake a penetrating review of our strategic needs and national interests so as to separate properly those which are truly central from those which may be nice, desirable, optimal but remain on the periphery of core interests.
It is easy to infer from his speech that the Secretary does not think this necessary review will be accomplished either easily or quickly. The debate will be both noisy and often uncouth, couched not in the national interest but in far more parochial concerns. Nor will the debate end with all sides walking away with broad smiles.
The review and its consequences will be both long and not pretty. It will be marked by missteps perhaps too many to be counted with ease. But, when night falls Gates remains hopeful. He demonstrated his hope by resort to another, perhaps apocryphal quote from Churchill. "The United States will always do the right thing--after they have tried everything else."
The subject of Gate's address was the future of American national security forces--and, thus, the role to be played by the US in the world. Pointedly, he noted that the US cannot resign its role as a Great Power. As he commented, his travels around the world as Secretary of Defense have impressed him with the number of countries which want the US to play a larger role in global politics and not a smaller one.
In short, Dr Gates saw first hand, up close and personal, proof of the historical maxim holding no country can resign its status as a great power--although that status may be taken away by the actions of others. In this context, the Secretary commented upon the salient--but to many on the political Left, unpleasant--reality that the final shield of American core values has been the strength and reach of our military power.
As an add-on of key importance, the Secretary warned that there existed other Great Powers whose interests and goals were not completely compatible with our national and strategic interests. This means that only the continued capacity of the American military exists as a check on these ambitions. It was a very clear warning to and about the Trolls of Beijing.
In his reading of history, Gates drew a lesson regarding the ability of the American people to "avert their eyes" from events occurring in distant, remote places. It has been difficult to the point of impossibility for We the People in the past (and the present, he might have added) to see how some affair in a small and far distant country may rebound to the immediate disadvantage of the US and its citizens. It is this willful blindness conditioned by our history on a continent protected on both east and west by broad oceans which has given rise not only to our periods of isolationism but also this diminuendo form of being unable or unwilling to connect the dots linking us with some far off place filled with people having unpronounceable names.
The implication of these twin phenomena of large scale isolationism and small scale who-cares-ism for the Secretary is that of gutting the American military. Gates has lived through several periods during which We the People allowed--even demanded--the hollowing out of our military, air, and naval forces. In each case, a war had just been ended. In each case, there were strong economic imperatives in play. In each case, We the People were sick and tired of the sacrifices required of us. And in each case--after World War II, after the Vietnam War and after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union--the ultimate impact on our capacity to conduct diplomacy as a Great Power was lessened along with our ability to wage effective war if and when required.
We are in a similar situation with these earlier periods today. More so given the potential enervating impact of the federal deficit. There is both a need and a set of political imperatives to engage the national debt and current deficit with effect and dispatch. As the Secretary well knows and has publicly stated on numerous occasions, the defense appropriations cannot be held harmless during the process. They will not be. That is a for sure.
But, as Dr Gates argues in his Notre Dame speech, the process of reducing military expenditures cannot be done at the expense of our real world combat capacities. Administration, overhead, some categories of personnel expenses, some force components can and should be reduced or removed all together. Core combat and force/power projection capabilities as well as the research and development of next gen systems must be taken off the table.
As a Great Power, as the Great Power most trusted by countries around the world to act quickly and decisively in the face of threats, the US has the unique responsibility to maintain a significant full-spectrum capability which can do all missions. The US military, air, and naval forces must be able to do it all--deter or, if necessary, defeat peer opponents, execute low or no lethality interventions, provide humanitarian relief, train and equip friendly forces--the entire ambit of war and warlike utilities.
Dr Gates made reference to a statement purportedly made by Winston Churchill after World War II, ""With greatness comes great responsibility." It is obvious that Gates agrees with Churchill that the US cannot avoid either its greatness nor the responsibilities which come with it. It is evident in Gates' remarks that he believes that continued American greatness depends upon getting our financial affairs in order--and by doing so without gutting our military capabilities.
Gates projects optimism regarding our will and ability to address the parlous financial condition of the country and maintain the basis of global diplomacy--our military potency. He correctly notes all the times in our collective history when we have successfully overcome challenges as large or larger than those confronting us today. His optimism is tempered by a clear headed understanding that the US--its military and civilian decision makers but not excluding We the People--must undertake a penetrating review of our strategic needs and national interests so as to separate properly those which are truly central from those which may be nice, desirable, optimal but remain on the periphery of core interests.
It is easy to infer from his speech that the Secretary does not think this necessary review will be accomplished either easily or quickly. The debate will be both noisy and often uncouth, couched not in the national interest but in far more parochial concerns. Nor will the debate end with all sides walking away with broad smiles.
The review and its consequences will be both long and not pretty. It will be marked by missteps perhaps too many to be counted with ease. But, when night falls Gates remains hopeful. He demonstrated his hope by resort to another, perhaps apocryphal quote from Churchill. "The United States will always do the right thing--after they have tried everything else."
Saturday, May 7, 2011
More--And More Important--Fallout From the Death Of OBL
The end of Osama bin Laden will accelerate demands that the US ramp down its presence in Afghanistan. Such a move fits well with the Obama agenda and reelection effort. The more rapid the ramp down the better is the perspective of many Americans, particularly those of budget deficit hawkishness or (strange partners here) the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.
The withdrawal of sizable segments of the American force in Afghanistan would provide several collateral benefits. One of the most important of these is an increase of leverage on the we-play-both-sides crew in Islamabad. There is a simple equation here: Fewer troops means less need for the supply routes through Pakistan, the closure of which constitutes the only real threat the government there can levy.
Additionally, the reduction of US presence will automatically shift more of the burden for suppressing the out of control Frankenstein's monster created by ISI. The causal chain here is less direct than that with the supply lines. Lowering the crucial nature of the land lines of supply allows the US more freedom in lessening its extortion payments which will have the result of shifting costs on to Islamabad. The elite in Pakistan will have the stark choice of accepting a growth of the insurgents and their brand of violent political Islam which brings with it an existential threat or paying the costs of suppressing the insurgency without significant American contributions.
The Pakistanis have been spared facing the implications of their fixation on India and reliance upon proxies motivated by violent political Islam as an operational concept. Initially they were insulated against the consequences of folly by the dynamics of the Cold War. Later, the events of 9/11 continued to benefit the Pakistanis.
Now the death of OBL along with the rapidly warming relations between the US and India make the old Pakistani connection irrelevant to American interests in the region. When the prime minister of Pakistan made his recent suggestion to Karzai that both countries disengage with the US and engage with China, the Geek thought that was an excellent idea. Certainly Pakistan has been moving ever more into the orbit of China. The US now has the freedom to say, get on with it, pal.
The relation between the US and India is both more natural as a confluence of national interests and core values than that with Pakistan has been. The mating of the US and Pakistan was an unnatural one, an artifact of Indian politics of the Cold War and American hyper-reactions to that. A close relation with the US is in the interests of India and the region, far more than is the one between the US and Pakistan.
The linkage of Pakistan and China brings up another bit of fallout from the Great Abbottabad Raid. With the death of Osama the Trolls of Beijing are once more shaking more than a little over the prospect that the US will put China back in the crosshairs. Their fear is not without justification.
The US has gained stature and influence in Asia and the Western Pacific as China has become both more wealthy and militarily potent as well as diplomatically high profile. The Trolls (or at least the think tanks which serve them) have become more and more convinced that China is a very lonely country with few, if any, natural allies while the US is Ms Popularity in comparison.
The Chinese have not failed to observe that the reality of American democracy is the glue which binds it with Asian democracies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and, India. It has hit the Trolls that democracies not only appeal to one another but feel threatened by authoritarian states, particularly those with very, very large military establishments and robust diplomatic agendas.
To the Trolls the fact that the US is a democracy means the US is automatically unpredictable over time. Every election brings with it the possibility of a great shift in US policy in all areas. The Chinese strategic thinkers and military strategists alike fret endlessly about this inbuilt threat of American democracy. The fretting focuses on means by which the US can be limited, bound, or otherwise denied freedom of action on the global and regional stages.
The Trolls (or their Deep Thinkers) have also belatedly realized that the US benefits by not being a power located in Asia. Simultaneously, it has hit the same crew that the US magnifies this benefit by having no territorial claims or ambitions in Asia--quite unlike the Chinese. As a consequence, countries which are not democracies edge closer and closer to the US, a gravitational attraction which runs counter to Chinese strategic and national interests.
The Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh have no doubt reinforced India's move toward the US. It is not coincidental that the relation has widened and deepened in a way which is positively correlated with China's military build up and diplomatic aggressiveness. In a similar fashion the Chinese claims on some eighty percent of the South China Sea have gone a far piece to convincing Hanoi to allow bygones to be bygones and seek tighter relations with the Great Enemy Of The Vietnamese People.
Of course the Chinese have been responsible for much of the isolation confronting them. Not since the Germany of Bismark, Wilhelm, and Adolph has a country exhibited such consistently inept diplomacy managing to either alienate or scare the hell out of almost every country in Asia to say nothing of other areas of the world. The combination of implicit military threats, aggressive acquisition of land in faraway countries, diplomatic bluster, lack of international cooperation on such matters as Iran and North Korea, shows a state with no sense of diplomatic nuance and profound tone deafness as to the best way to win friends and influence policy.
The tub thumping of the Chinese military may even accomplish something thought impossible--cause the US to rethink seriously its love affair with the floating sovereignty behemoths called supercarriers. Their "smart spike" ballistic missiles may (in conjunction with the budget concerns at home) cause the gradual replacement of the Nimitz class and larger ships with larger numbers of smaller, cheaper, and more competent vessels. This would be a development to be hoped for in the most profound fashion.
Of course all of this might be moot given the problems inherent to China today. Dropping water tables, loss of arable land, demographics, a crisis of rising expectations, the movement of American investment in physical plant and industrial production in consumer durables and capital goods back to the US, the steep increase in energy demands including refined petroleum products, the ramp up in internal suppression, the impact of new information and communication technologies may pose some well nigh onto insoluble problems for the Trolls.
With these contextual matters in mind, the Geek says, "Take Pakistan--and welcome to it."
The withdrawal of sizable segments of the American force in Afghanistan would provide several collateral benefits. One of the most important of these is an increase of leverage on the we-play-both-sides crew in Islamabad. There is a simple equation here: Fewer troops means less need for the supply routes through Pakistan, the closure of which constitutes the only real threat the government there can levy.
Additionally, the reduction of US presence will automatically shift more of the burden for suppressing the out of control Frankenstein's monster created by ISI. The causal chain here is less direct than that with the supply lines. Lowering the crucial nature of the land lines of supply allows the US more freedom in lessening its extortion payments which will have the result of shifting costs on to Islamabad. The elite in Pakistan will have the stark choice of accepting a growth of the insurgents and their brand of violent political Islam which brings with it an existential threat or paying the costs of suppressing the insurgency without significant American contributions.
The Pakistanis have been spared facing the implications of their fixation on India and reliance upon proxies motivated by violent political Islam as an operational concept. Initially they were insulated against the consequences of folly by the dynamics of the Cold War. Later, the events of 9/11 continued to benefit the Pakistanis.
Now the death of OBL along with the rapidly warming relations between the US and India make the old Pakistani connection irrelevant to American interests in the region. When the prime minister of Pakistan made his recent suggestion to Karzai that both countries disengage with the US and engage with China, the Geek thought that was an excellent idea. Certainly Pakistan has been moving ever more into the orbit of China. The US now has the freedom to say, get on with it, pal.
The relation between the US and India is both more natural as a confluence of national interests and core values than that with Pakistan has been. The mating of the US and Pakistan was an unnatural one, an artifact of Indian politics of the Cold War and American hyper-reactions to that. A close relation with the US is in the interests of India and the region, far more than is the one between the US and Pakistan.
The linkage of Pakistan and China brings up another bit of fallout from the Great Abbottabad Raid. With the death of Osama the Trolls of Beijing are once more shaking more than a little over the prospect that the US will put China back in the crosshairs. Their fear is not without justification.
The US has gained stature and influence in Asia and the Western Pacific as China has become both more wealthy and militarily potent as well as diplomatically high profile. The Trolls (or at least the think tanks which serve them) have become more and more convinced that China is a very lonely country with few, if any, natural allies while the US is Ms Popularity in comparison.
The Chinese have not failed to observe that the reality of American democracy is the glue which binds it with Asian democracies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and, India. It has hit the Trolls that democracies not only appeal to one another but feel threatened by authoritarian states, particularly those with very, very large military establishments and robust diplomatic agendas.
To the Trolls the fact that the US is a democracy means the US is automatically unpredictable over time. Every election brings with it the possibility of a great shift in US policy in all areas. The Chinese strategic thinkers and military strategists alike fret endlessly about this inbuilt threat of American democracy. The fretting focuses on means by which the US can be limited, bound, or otherwise denied freedom of action on the global and regional stages.
The Trolls (or their Deep Thinkers) have also belatedly realized that the US benefits by not being a power located in Asia. Simultaneously, it has hit the same crew that the US magnifies this benefit by having no territorial claims or ambitions in Asia--quite unlike the Chinese. As a consequence, countries which are not democracies edge closer and closer to the US, a gravitational attraction which runs counter to Chinese strategic and national interests.
The Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh have no doubt reinforced India's move toward the US. It is not coincidental that the relation has widened and deepened in a way which is positively correlated with China's military build up and diplomatic aggressiveness. In a similar fashion the Chinese claims on some eighty percent of the South China Sea have gone a far piece to convincing Hanoi to allow bygones to be bygones and seek tighter relations with the Great Enemy Of The Vietnamese People.
Of course the Chinese have been responsible for much of the isolation confronting them. Not since the Germany of Bismark, Wilhelm, and Adolph has a country exhibited such consistently inept diplomacy managing to either alienate or scare the hell out of almost every country in Asia to say nothing of other areas of the world. The combination of implicit military threats, aggressive acquisition of land in faraway countries, diplomatic bluster, lack of international cooperation on such matters as Iran and North Korea, shows a state with no sense of diplomatic nuance and profound tone deafness as to the best way to win friends and influence policy.
The tub thumping of the Chinese military may even accomplish something thought impossible--cause the US to rethink seriously its love affair with the floating sovereignty behemoths called supercarriers. Their "smart spike" ballistic missiles may (in conjunction with the budget concerns at home) cause the gradual replacement of the Nimitz class and larger ships with larger numbers of smaller, cheaper, and more competent vessels. This would be a development to be hoped for in the most profound fashion.
Of course all of this might be moot given the problems inherent to China today. Dropping water tables, loss of arable land, demographics, a crisis of rising expectations, the movement of American investment in physical plant and industrial production in consumer durables and capital goods back to the US, the steep increase in energy demands including refined petroleum products, the ramp up in internal suppression, the impact of new information and communication technologies may pose some well nigh onto insoluble problems for the Trolls.
With these contextual matters in mind, the Geek says, "Take Pakistan--and welcome to it."
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