Christian(?) Terrorism and Cultural Relativism

Reading the manifesto of Anders Behring Brevik is a bit of a trudge, a long yomp uphill with wind and a cold rain in your face--and mud sucking at your boots.  But, it is worth it.  More than, say, the Unibomber's treatise on the ills of technology, the Norwegian's great effort, "2083: A European Declaration of Independence" provides real insight into a warped mind.  In this it is not unlike reading Osama bin Laden's "declaration of war" against the US some fifteen years ago.

This is an appropriate analogy as Mr Berserker Brevik is a mirror image of the assorted practitioners of violent political Islam.  Brevik, like bin Laden, made a list of quite valid objections to key aspects of contemporary life in the areas of the world in which each lived.  Bin Landen's negative views of US policy to (and presence in) the Mideast were neither lunatic nor trivial.  Brevik's critique of both multiculturalism and the impact of assimilation resistant Muslim immigrants upon Western Europe are also neither lunatic nor trivial.

The objective, intellectual predicates of bin Laden and Brevik were unobjectionable.  Neither was over the edge in their thinking in and of itself.  Where each went over the edge was in the manner by which they made their thoughts manifest.  It was in the reliance upon lethal violence as the only way of obtaining redress for unacceptable conditions that the two men--one a Muslim with Salifist roots and the other a "fundamentalist" Christian (whatever the word "fundamentalist" might mean in this specific case)--became brothers in spirit.

The spiritual kinship between Brevik and his Muslim opponents carries a risk for all of us in the West which needs both recognition and effective addressing.  The public opinion molding "elites" of Western academia, journalism, and politics, as well as many of us in the non-elite are damned currently with an overabundance of fairmindedness, openmindedness, tolerance, and a desire to accept the other which is evident only in its absence within the ranks of those who subscribe to political Islam.

This tendency, which is both a source of strength and weakness within the West, is already evident.  The NYT has set its sights on those who have written and spoken negatively regarding Islam--particularly those cited and quoted in "2083."  There can be little doubt but other individuals and organs will take the same censorious path.

This is as wrong as a soup sandwich--and as dangerous as tossing sweating dynamite against a stone wall.  Any effort to suppress open and critical assessment of negative aspects of Islam such as the myriad contained in political Islam, particularly the form which admires and employs violence in pursuit of its goals, simply because as one person quoted by the NYT put it, "words have consequences," is both anathema to the ideals of the US and other Western states but dangerously counterproductive.  Regardless of individuals such as the apparently delusional Brevik, there is a crying need to expose the dark underside of Islam.

Had Brevik been a Muslim, his actions would be applauded by many around the majority Muslim countries--and within the self-segregating Muslim enclaves dotting the European landscape from Norway to the UK to France, Germany, and beyond.  But, Brevik was purportedly a Christian, and thus his actions receive only the condemnation they deserve from Christians around the world.

In this there resides the most significant distinction between the two religions.  Islam celebrates violence undertaken in either the defense or the expansion of the faith.  Christianity denounces violence.  Regardless of the many, many times that Christians have violated their faith, the reality remains unchanged--Jesus was not the Man of the Sword (or the bomb or the semi-automatic rifle.)  There is no faith rooted excuse or reason for offensive violence.  There can be and is no greater difference between the two largest monotheistic religions than that.

Whether the people and opinion molders of the West like the idea or not, there is and will be for some while to come a struggle between the advocates of violent political Islam and the civilized states.  As part of this struggle there will be ongoing attempts to use the openmindedness, the tolerance, the desire to be fair which characterizes the West against it.  The only defenses against this are understanding of the nature and motives of the adversary and a willingness to reject the pernicious concept of cultural relativism.

Cultural relativism hides behind the bland and "fair" term of multiculturalism.  This doctrine holds that no society, no polity, no culture is inherently "better" or "superior" to any other.  Cultural relativism holds that it is impossible to have absolute standards regarding human behavior, that all standards can be applied only within specific cultural contexts, preferably only by individuals living within the context.

This idea is, of course, utter bilge.  The Christians who condemn the acts of their fellow, Brevik, show this.  So do the Norwegians who make no excuses for their fellow countryman.  In this affirmation of condemnation there is a recognition of a universal principle--murder most foul is just that, murder most foul.  It cannot be excused nor justified by even very legitimate concerns.  There is no excuse.

It is the willingness to condemn Brevik which gives the West the right to condemn the actions of his spirit brothers of al-Qaeda or Taliban.  Murder most foul is murder most foul.  No excuses.  No moral justification.  No resorting to theological spinning and weaving.

In sharp contrast, Muslims of the Mideast and Northwest Asia have been willing to pile vitrupitation upon vitriol in their consideration both of Brevik and the early speculation that a Muslim group might have been behind the atrocities.  At the same time, there is not and never has been the slightest rejection of the murder most foul committed by Muslims in the name of the Prophet and faith.

In this difference resides the justification for not censoring criticism of Islam.  In this difference resides the need to continue critiquing that which deserves it within Muslim ranks.  Brevik is an anomaly and has been cast out as such both in Norway and throughout the West.  In the lands of Islam, however, Brevik's spirit brother, Osama bin Laden, remains a hero, a model, a zenith to which all too many aspire.

Consider that difference and ask yourself, "Are all cultures really equal?"

The Land Of Pinocchio Is At It Again

No one oriented in time and place expects governments to be open, honest, and ever truthful in their public (or most private) statements.  Diplomacy is often a contest of careful mendacity on a par with the sort practiced by lawyers working in an adversarial system.  That is, blatant duplicity of the easily exposed sort is eschewed in favor of the well-crafted framing of a statement, an issue, a position.  The good diplomat like the good advocate in court depends on what is not said even more than that which is said to mask the truth--particularly when the truth is uncomfortable from one's perspective.

The heavyweights of the Pakistani military and intelligence service (ISI) fail to meet the standard of proper diplomatic lying.  This is unfortunate as the armed forces and ISI are the government of Pakistan far eclipsing in both power and public esteem the elected civilian political structure.  As such, they are far more a part of the problem and in no way a contributor to the solution as regards the threat posed to civilized states by the damaged but not yet defeated advocates of violent political Islam which stalk Afghanistan, the FATA, and Pakistan proper.

The power elite of the armed forces and ISI is back at it.  As has so often been the case, they are lying in a fashion which boggles the mind in its breathtaking absurdity.  In the most recent ejaculations of denial and counter accusation, the spokesman for the Pakistani general staff insults the intelligence of all who read or hear his thundering denunciation of a recent spate of articles and editorials linking the ISI and armed forces with groups dedicated to violent political Islam and the recent murder of a well known and respected Pakistani journalist.

The immediate reaction of any half-way intelligent and well-informed person to the preposterous posturing of Major General Athar Abbas' remarks is to quote Ronald Reagan's comment during one of the 1980 debates, "There he goes again."  The line delivered with a slow, sad shake of the head.  The modern major general was announcing that the shoe put upon the collective foot of the Pakistani military and ISI fit tightly--it pinched and he was yelling, "Ouch!"

As unbelievable fables go, the Abbas Denial was on a par with the outpouring of outraged dignity following the Great Abbotabad Raid.  The credibility of the Pakistanis, never high, was stretched far beyond its Young's Modulus with the earnest protestations of innocence with which the Pakistani heavies met the news that the Americans had found and liquidated Osama bin Laden within pistol shot of their very own military academy.

While the US government for reasons of state (the justification of all ill-advised and ultimately less than productive actions) has downplayed the possibility that the senior ranks of our "ally" in the "joint" war with al-Qaeda, the various Talibans, and all similar groups could possibly have known that bin Laden resided close at hand in comfortable isolation, this reticence should not be interpreted as accepting the Pakistanis as being pure and lofty of motives and intentions.  Indeed, it is hard to see how anyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the long standing relationship between ISI and the army on the one hand and the several terror merchant groups on the other could keep a straight face while stating they had seen "no smoking gun."

Back in the Oligocene--the days of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush--one did not have to be a member of the American intelligence community to know that ISI and the Pakistani armed forces were connected hip and shoulder with various Islamist groups, including the one which would come to power in Afghanistan as the Taliban.  Minority opinion in both administrations warned against turning over responsibility for the endgame in the anti-Soviet effort in Afghanistan to the Pakistanis as the latter would take advantage of the opportunity to install entities hostile to the interests of the US in the region and globally.  As is usually the case, the minority was shoved to the margins so they could watch their gloomy prognostications come to pass with the fullness of time.

Way back in the regime of Zia it was obvious that the Pakistani military would eagerly embrace the ideas of the dictator which focused on importing Wahhibism so as to promote Islam of the most austere and demanding sort as a mechanism of social and political cohesion.  The implications of this were high profile: The Islamification program would drive a move to the more and more extreme.  The program would facilitate the growth of violent political Islam oriented groups.  And, ultimately it would assure that Pakistan would become an evermore Islamist state.

American decision makers were immune to the negative counsel, seeing instead an easy way to slip out of the continued burden of doing something in a small, inconvenient, and out of the way state with a history of being ungovernable.  Anyway, the boys of Islamabad were big on reassuring Washington's rarefied levels about the pacifistic nature of Islam and the need of the Pakistani people for a stronger national identity in the face of Indian aggression.

In the event, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the cold war put the problem of Pakistan and its operations in Afghanistan very much on the far back burner.  The Clinton administration was so disinterested in Pakistan that its Deep Thinkers would have had a hard time finding the place on a map--until the Pakistanis demonstrated their nuclear capacity.  By then, of course, it was too late.  Too late to stop the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.  Far too late to undo the damage done by the Pakistani backed installation of Taliban in Kabul.

Of course, the ending of the cold war reduced Pakistan's importance in American eyes.  For decades Islamabad had depended upon the Left-leaning policies of India to turn on the spigot of US military aid along with the occasional civilian project.

The best thing that happened to Pakistan was the attack on 9/11.  After a nearly proforma demonstration of reluctance, Islamabad signed on to the Global War on Terror in exchange for massive amounts of American money.  It was interesting to say the least that the goodies demanded by the armed forces of Pakistan were those useful for high intensity conventional war with India rather than the more pedestrian items having utility in counterinsurgent or counter terrorist operations.

To keep the goodies flowing, the Pakistanis had to rely on their capacity to lie convincingly and in a well-timed manner.  They played a transparently double game from the very outset of the so called "joint" effort.  Given that the US already knew that the only reason Osama bin Laden had escaped a cruise missile strike years before 9/11 was a phone call from Islamabad, yet we went on catering to the Pinocchio of the Sub-continent. There was no intention of even closing the borders to Taliban and al-Qaeda personnel escaping the American invasion and its aftermath let alone actually fighting the Mighty Men of the Koran.

But the Pakistanis talked a good game.  And, because they had a nuclear arsenal, we had to pretend they were telling us the truth.  All we could do was hope that the bribes we paid bought us sufficient influence on their decision making that the armed forces and ISI might stop their training, supporting, harboring, and strategic planning efforts.

The hope was illusory at best.  However, the US had compounded its errors by invading Iraq and so mishandling the day after "victory" that it became the main event and Afghanistan a mere sideshow.  As a result, we had to continue believing the palpably false assurances of cooperation issuing from Islamabad on a daily basis.  The reality was far different.  The Pakistanis provided sanctuary in the FATA in return for a promise, since broken, that the Great Warriors of the One True Faith would limit themselves to killing Americans and apostate Afghans.

During the long interim from 2004-2010 the Taliban(s) and the Haqqani network as well as al-Qaeda rested, retrained, refitted, and grew safe from harm in the cities and hillsides of Pakistan and the FATA.  As a result, the Americans were losing more and more in country and the Pakistani military and ISI felt more and more confident in their ability to lead Uncle Sam around by the nose using a string of lies.

The pity of it all was the lies worked.  They worked because there seemed no viable alternative available to American decision makers.  We became co-conspirators in our own defeat.  Our role was limited to a continued refusal to blow the whistle on the easily demonstrated prevarications of the Pakistanis.  One of the services provided by Private Bradley Manning and his publicists at WikiLeaks has been to expose many (but not all) of the lies peddled by Islamabad as well as the reality that American diplomats knew them to be untruths.  In short we were not stupid, merely adrift at the policy level.

The Pakistani string of successful lying came to an end dramatically in May.  There was no way the lies of the Pakistanis could be accepted, even as a pretense, after the raid.  It is regrettable that the Obama administration has not taken advantage of the sea change initiated by Boat Six to force the Pakistanis to choose sides finally and definitely.

The biggest advantage which will accrue to the US from the decision to draw down our forces in Afghanistan and adopt more of a counter terrorist posture is our logistics dependence upon Pakistan will be decreased.  This means we will be in a much better position to link any continued assistance to Islamabad on demonstrated performance rather than nice sounding words.  It is much harder to lie by actions than it is with mere words.  So, Pakistan will be deprived of its advantage, an advantage it has used against us for a decade now.

While it may not be approved diplomatic form, it would be good politics both domestic and international to call the liars of Islamabad to account.  Diplomacy is usually conducted by vague words and ambiguous phrases so everyone walks away claiming success, but the Pakistanis need to be handled with a direct and blunt approach.

The time is now to say to Islamabad, to the armed forces, to ISI, to Major General Abbas, "Cut the crap!  You're busted!"

Think Globally, Act Locally

This old bumper sticker phrase much loved by the tree hugging crowd some twenty years ago has become the new, de facto slogan of al-Qaeda under the direction of its new capo d' tutti capi, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  This, in itself, is not surprising as the good doctor has long been known for his possessing a far greater interest in making Egypt a model of shariah in action than in establishing a global caliphate.

What makes the latest expression of the world according to Zawahiri (it has a catchy title: The Message of Good Hope and Tidings For Our People In Egypt.  OK, maybe it loses something in translation.) is the way in which he combines the ideas of making Egypt safe for a Salifist view of Islam with the further disestablishment of the US as a force in the region.  The six parts of "The Message" are themselves a riff on Zawahiri's earlier and vastly important philosophical book best known by its short title Exoneration.  In both he argues that the successful jihad mounted to date by al-Qaeda and its franchises forced the Obama administration to abandon Mubarak and prepare the way for the success of violent political Islam in Egypt.

In both "The Message" and "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri contends that the moment has come to shift the focus of jihad on the internal revolutions in Egypt and other countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia and Syria so as to put more pressure not only on the local apostate rulers but on the US.  In essence he is calling for al-Qaeda to act not as a global non-state player but rather as the facilitator and coordinator of local efforts such as those being waged by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP,) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM,) and al-Shabaab.  It is clear that he believes that the US will be overstretched by simultaneous challenges mounted by these groups as well as smaller entities and lone wolves preying on soft targets throughout the Mideast and North Africa.

Even in this context it is self-evident that al-Zawahiri's focus in on Egypt.  His view of the Ummah is through the prism of Egyptian nationalism.  He sees the (in his eyes) necessary victory of the most austere form of Islam in Egypt will vault the country to primacy in the emerging caliphate.  As a good Egyptian nationalist, one who rivals the quite secular Nasser as a hyper-nationalist, al-Zawahiri sees Cairo as the fulcrum of the new Islam, the next Caliphate.

To this end "The Message" calls upon Egyptian Muslims to act as one, to act quickly and decisively so as to assert Egypt's pride of place among the Muslim majority states of the world.  This appeal will not fall on deaf ears.  Overlooked in all the hoopla over the yearning for genuine democracy expressed during the overthrow of Mubarak is a very basic and potent ground truth: Egyptians have felt diminished as a people, a nation over the past thirty years.  After the national high point of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the road has been strictly downhill.

Egyptians have increasingly seen themselves as citizens of a diminished country.  More and more they have come to see themselves as having lost status, position, even dignity.  The thought that Egypt had become nothing more than a dependency of the US rankled--deeply.  As is the case in Russia, the notion of having lost national status not only rankled, it motivated.  Mubarak was deeply hated not simply because he presided over a country neck deep in corruption, nepotism, inequity, but because he had not only acquiesced in but actively fostered the decline of Egypt in the region and in the world.  On Mubarak's watch, many believed and continue to believe, Egypt was no longer a country worthy of respect but rather the object of derision.

Al-Zawahiri's skilled blending of religion and nationalism serves to counter this pervasive sense of Egyptian degradation.  By seizing the present moment, al-Zawahiri argues, Egyptians can reclaim their dignity, their status, their pride, their place in the sun.  Merging the Egyptian national identity with the true belief of basic and uncompromising Islam will bring salvation, or, if not salvation, at least pull Egypt and its people out of the slough of the marginalized, the trivialized, the ignored, the bowed head beggers.

Al-Zawahiri promises that an Egypt powered by Islam of ninety proof purity will once more be what it seemed to be many, many years ago during the heyday of Nasser--a force in the world, a country that could call the tune danced to by supposed superpowers.  All that is required, the one time medic alleges, is for Egyptians not to fall prey to American blandishments or secret plots made in the USA and hold true to the calls of the faith and the needs of political Islam--including the use of violence should such be either necessary or desirable.

In "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri extends his argument to include countries such as Yemen, Syria and the states of North Africa.  His position is both simple and inherently attractive, particularly to younger members of the over-educated and underemployed middle class.

In short he says, "All of you, Syrians, Yemeni, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans are members of societies which were once great.  You are all citizens of states which were once respected, even feared by the infidels.  You are people of nations which were once great but are now small."

He then asks the essential question, "Why?  Why were you who were once so great are now so small?"

And, unsurprisingly, he gives the correct answer.  "Because you abandoned the path of pure and true Islam.  Because you surrendered to government by apostates, by turncoats who say they are Muslims but act and govern as if they are kaffir."

Then comes the expected call to arms.  "You will be great once more, respected and feared once again, feel the dignity you deserve only when you join the jihad.  Only when you throw out the apostates and restore genuine Islamic rulers will you regain your greatness."

Shrewdly al-Zawahiri backs his argument by emphasizing Islam's stance on social justice, economic equity, and political openness.  He contrasts the nature of the Islamic posture in all these critical and highly emotional issues with the stance of the US and Uncle Sam's local clients.  He wraps all the ills of the Islamic Mideast and North African states in an American flag.  He demands locals act for local goals while doing so in the global context of putting increased pressure on the US--pressure to withdraw.

It is worth considering that the thinking of al-Zawahiri has been picked up, reflected and even amplified by other high profile advocates of violent political Islam.  Anwar al-Awalacki in Yemen has done this in recent weeks.  Indeed much of the theoretical writing in the several issues of Inspire might have come from the keyboard of the American born and educated cleric, but the ideas and arguments, the logic and goals, are those of al-Zawahiri.

Even in the geographic expression, Somalia, where one is surprised to discover a level of literacy which would allow the reading of al-Zawahiri's rather dense prose, the locals have been extolling the ideas of the medic turned mass murderer.  The same applies to recent musings by spokesmen for AQIM.  Clearly, al-Zawahiri has a message that many are both reading and amplifying.

The US has been playing the role assigned to it in The World According to Ayman.  Our aid to the Ugandan forces in Somalia has been increased as has been the assistance provided to the fictitious government of Somalia.  Shortly we can expect more Predator strikes in Somalia along with a significant ramp-up of the remote controlled death from above operations in Yemen.  Carefully targeted special operations will not be long in the offing.

The regional impact of the ongoing mess in Libya is growing.  There will be a requirement in the not-too-distant future for the US to make some choices as to what we should or must do to help the local forces and governments in their struggle with AQIM.  While we have no bulls in the herd, particularly as compared with European countries, the small but rapidly growing AQIM will reach the level of potential threat to US interests long before the next election here.

Think Globally, Act Locally!  Al-Zawahiri has it right.  So right that we may soon be wishing for the good old days of Osama bin Laden.  The legion of experts assured us that al-Zawahiri would be a nebbish as the Lord High Poobah of al-Qaeda because he had the charisma of a nematode.

What a crock!  Brains beat charisma every time--particularly in war.

What A Difference A Word Makes

Ten years ago in an exercise of free association the challenge "terrorist" or "terrorism" would have brought an instant and automatic response from the lips of most Americans: "Arab." Nowadays the same challenge words would bring a different reaction.  Despite the best efforts of the Obama administration and other devotees of the high minded and lofty thinking school of politically correct multiculturalism, the words "terror" or "terrorist" would result in the reply of "Muslim."

Why this change considering that way back in the salad days of international terrorism the vast majority of the Arab perpetrators were at least nominally adherents of Islam?  A close examination of the curricula vitae of the assorted leaders of the numerous groups who bombed, shot, and garroted their way into the Mideast datelines of the Seventies, Eighties, and most of the Nineties shows that none were Christian let alone Jewish.  They were, without exception, Muslims.  Yet, the description "Arab" always prevailed.

There are several reasons for the change in both nomenclature and its underlying implications.

At the top of the list is the fact that the terrorists of the earlier, "Arab" age were pursuing a goal which was rational even if not realistic.  The master bombmakers, the hijackers of aircraft, the killers of Olympic athletes, the shooters of tourists and Jewish civilians were doing their dastardly deeds in the quest to roll back the verdict of conventional war.  More specifically, from the time that Yassir Arafat of late and unlamented memory created Fatah and dedicated it to the establishment of a Palestinian state, the goal of all the alphabet soup of terrorist groups was to reverse the outcome of the Six Day War of 1967 and the Wars of Independence from almost twenty years earlier.

The use of terror tactics might have been ethically reprehensible, but the goal was understandable, rational because it was political.  A pretender to statehood was employing the only tactical concept available to it as it sought to become a state at the expense of a far stronger, far better organized, and (at the time) far more widely supported state.  As the apologists for "Arab" terrorism stated repeatedly at the time, Arafat and his imitators (more correctly, competitors) were using the only means available to the dispossessed, the marginalized, the politically and militarily debilitated.

Even the use of "Arab" terrorist groups by states as proxies not only against Israel but against each other was rational.  In the inter-Arab disputes which constituted a hallmark of regional politics during the Sixties, Seventies, Eighties, and beyond, the use of terrorists as weapons served to decouple rivalry from the potential of regionally destructive escalation.  The Baathists of Syria and Iraq were not only willing but almost eager to use one sponsored group or another not only against the mutual enemy of Israel but as a means of settling the never ending quarrel between the two wings of the Baathist movement.  Syria was a master at using its sponsored terrorists as a wedge to destabilize Lebanon so as to provide the necessary excuse to intervene in Lebanese affairs--to provide stability and protect civilian life, don't you know?

The employment of state-sponsored and facilitated terrorist groups as a matter of state policy might have been abhorrent to the norms of conflict and diplomacy, but it was rational.  It did provide options seen as necessary by most in the region while maintaining the fiction of regional, ethnic, and religious harmony.  The technique also had the benefit of allowing sufficient plausible deniablity to prevent an effective coordinated response by the "international community" or even individual states--including the US.  In a sense "Arab" terror flew under the radar of global political mechanisms even while attracting global media attention.

It was the global media attention which gave "Arab" terrorism both its power and its utility as a rational tool of state.  The fear and loathing caused by "Arab" terrorist outrages was presumed by its creators and sponsors to result in the end effect of compelling Israel to relinquish the territory occupied in the wake of the Six Day War.  At the same time, the focus on high profile events and personalities in the "Arab" terrorist escapades served as a sort of squid's ink--a cloud behind which state sponsors could conceal their intentions and degree of involvement alike.

It should never be forgotten that the many different groups of the "Arab" terrorist days were avowedly secular.  The politics of most involved whether as leaders or low level operators were a combination of nationalism and socialism.  There was very little if any reference to Islam in either the programs or statements of the many different members of the movement.  Yassir Arafat, for example, made no reference to Islam in his very high profile appearance at the podium of the UN General Assembly.  From the documents he allegedly wrote or the speeches he made, one can get no impression that the Fatah chairman was a Muslim.  The same applied to all the other media stars of the "Arab" terrorist movement.

It was only after the nature and outcome of the Iranian Islamic Revolution percolated through the Arab population that there was any shift from the secular focus to one which admitted religion.  The long lag time between the toppling of the Shah and the emergence of Islam to the public consciousness of the nascent "Islamic" terrorist movement was in part the result of two simple facts. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was (1) non-Arab and (2) non-Sunni.

The barrier to the influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution becoming a model for a new generation of Mideast terrorists was broken by events in one more non-Arab country.  That country was Afghanistan.

The anti-Soviet fighters of Afghanistan were avowedly and devoutly Muslim in the majority of cases.  Since the only core definer of the Afghan identity which transcended tribal affiliations and loyalties was religion, this is not surprising.  The power of Islam did come as a surprise to many of the Arab volunteers who entered the Afghan conflict at and after its midpoint.  The Arab influx was a byproduct of the strong relation which had developed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

The Pakistani dictator, Zia, had put a program emphasizing Islam in place with the goal of unifying the population in the forever war with India.  Zia had enlisted the support of Saudi Arabia in this "Islamization" campaign.  Saudi Arabia had provided the money and clerical manpower necessary to establish an extensive network of Wahhibist mosques and madrassas.  It was as inevitable as a displaced rock rolling downhill that this campaign would have ramifications.  Among these was an introduction of Arab Peninsula youth via Pakistan to the "holy war" against the Red Army.

The Afghans and their Arab emulators gave unalloyed thanks to the deity for success against the Soviets.  They also used the language of the Koran to describe the fighters, those killed in action, and the blessings of the deity as a means of increasing and maintaining morale during the long, bloody years of war.  More than a few of the Arabs involved saw the power resident in their religion to offset the material and technological advantages enjoyed by infidel and apostate enemies.  A new vow was soon to be heard from many of the Arabs having experience in Afghanistan.  No longer would the power of belief of the One True Faith sleep unused in the pages of the Koran and other sacred writings.  Now this power would be tapped to assure victory over the long triumphant infidels and their apostate local satraps.

Osama bin Laden was the best known, the most notorious of these Arab exponents of the new, far more militant view of the commands of the Koran, the orders of Allah.  There were many others.  What separated bin Laden from the rest was his willingness to announce where he stood and demand that others of faith stand with him.  His success in gaining recruits and developing an organization rapidly during the early and mid-Nineties was the result not so much of his charisma and communication skills but rather that so many were already of like mind.

The shift from "Arab" to "Muslim" terror predated the (in)famous bin Laden declaration of war on the US by more than a decade.  For those who like the idea of a specific defining event or date, the day of the truck bombing of the World Trade Center serves the purpose.  This event was a self-conscious act taken on behalf not only of an "Arab" goal--the ending of American support for Israel--but also as a shot in the global holy war which (if the deity wills) would end with the establishment of a worldwide caliphate.

It would have been appropriate for the Clinton administration to acknowledge that the US was facing a new threat--religiously based terror.  But, the administration in common with the majority of the media and academia, seized on the political portion of the motive while ignoring the fact that in the mind and words of the men who planned and executed the attack, politics was totally and inseparably connected with religion albeit in a subordinate role.

The administration made the same fundamental error when further attacks ensued.  These--the strike on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the boat borne IED which nearly sank the USS Cole--were all manifestations of the Osama bin Laden concept of "Muslim" terror.  Yes, there was a political goal involved, but that goal was both inherent with and subordinate to the dictates of Islamic belief.  By narrowly focusing on the political aspect of the goal, the Clinton administration missed the perfect chance to define the enemy properly and direct US responses more accurately and effectively.

A more accurate definition of the enemy, his overarching goals, the foundations of his motives, the strengths and weaknesses of the appeals for support which must be predicated on the underlying beliefs, would have allowed the US to mount a better counter challenge.  More importantly, by defining the enemy correctly, it would have been possible for Americans to know what they stood for as well as what they were standing against.

The initial error made by the Clinton administration has been continued by both the Bush/Cheney and Obama administrations.  This is to be regretted.  The nature of any war against "Arab" terrorism and that of the "Muslim" variety must be different as the two expressions of terror are substantially different in both goal and motive.

Get a grip on this.

"Arab" terrorism was rational.  It sought defined and rather narrow political goals.  Terror was a tactic pure and simple.  If the tactic did not work, it could be altered or even abandoned without any loss of status or identity by so doing.

"Muslim" terror is irrational.  While it may incorporate narrow and definable political goals, these are subordinate to matters of faith.  The suicide bomber is not so much seeking a political goal as he is performing an act of faith.   Because the "martyrdom" operation is rooted in deeply held beliefs derived from the sacred writings of Islam, tactical reliance on terror cannot be abandoned without damage to the strength of the faith.

The "Arab" terrorist could be deterred or defeated.  He could be convinced by failure to abandon terrorism when the costs outweighed the benefits.  He was in most essential respects a rational actor subject to the same inducements and constraints as combatants using other forms of tactics.

The "Muslim" terrorist cannot be deterred and can be defeated only by being killed.  Mere opprobrium or failure in his operations will not necessarily cause him to seek a tactical alternative to terrorism.  As his act is one of faith and not politics as such, he will not change his ways simply because the aggregate of costs is greater than the benefits.  As a person committing an act of faith, a testament to personal strength of belief and willingness to obey the presumed demands of the deity, the "Muslim" terrorist is not a rational actor.  He is not subject to the same inducements and constraints as other combatants, including terrorists of the "Arab" sort.

In short, the "Muslim" terrorist is a far harder target than was his "Arab" cousin.  He is hard to kill and possessed of a mind impossible to change.  This implies that the US and other civilized states will have a much harder time dealing with the "Muslim" terrorist than was first thought (and still is) by those who mistake the political gloss for the religious center of the act of faith we call terrorism.

Terrorism is a tactic of war.  The "Arab" practitioner of the craft knew this.  He knew the rules which defined success and failure in the use of any tactic, terror included.  The "Muslim" may pay lip service to the notion that terror is a tactic, but he really believes it to be the strongest possible confession of faith that the individual believer might make.

When you think about it for a bit, it makes you recollect the years of shadowy groups known usually by their initials as having been the good old days.  And, so they were.

Cranking Up A (Too) Rapid Pull Out From Afghanistan

Reportedly the Obama administration is ginning up a public relations effort oriented at justifying a very rapid withdrawal of significant combat forces from Afghanistan.  Jerking out a giant posse of grunts from the Land Of Karzai will not only meet with widespread approval within the war weary American public, it will be greeted with hosannas on the part of Obama's base, particularly the congressional contingent where a very other worldly congresswoman has demanded that fifty thousand trigger pullers be brought back to CONUS ASAP.

The thought of a faster withdrawal will not only fit with the recently revealed conversations between the US and representatives of Mullah Omar but also with the latest expression of distaste for the presence of the "foreign forces" delivered by Hamid Karzai.  The US should be talking with Taliban.  The participation of this group in a comprehensive peace agreement is fundamental.  Given that Mullah Omar has long repented of his ill-advised extension of "Muslim hospitality" to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, there is strong reason to conclude that the old leadership of the group is ready to exchange the politics of the AK-47 for a less robust means of acquiring and exercising power.

Karzai is comfortable with Taliban as he and they share language and cultural ties as well as religion.  Taliban without the al-Qaeda dimension is no threat to Pushtu dominance.  The other ethnic and cultural groups which make up the Afghan mosaic are not so sure.  And, considering the memories of Taliban's repressive regime, there is no reason for women to support any role for Taliban in the future.  However, it is probable that Mullah Omar and his generational colleagues learned some key lessons in the limits of theocracy and may well be less objectionable in their attitudes and actions regarding women, education, and popular culture.  In any event, the US is well advised to abandon the hopelessly misguided Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/Neocon Ninny notion of creating a modern Western style nation-state in Afghanistan.

The necessity of a political solution including Taliban is recognized and has been so for years by all observers well oriented in time and place.  The administration's new add-on in justifying a rapid and steep draw down in US combat forces centers on the effectiveness to date of our efforts to destroy al-Qaeda's organizational integrity and efficiency.  There is no doubt but the Predator strikes in the FATA along with special forces operations including but not limited to the Great Abbottabad Raid have severely degraded al-Qaeda's upper and mid-level management.  The organization has been disrupted severely.

This does not mean al-Qaeda no longer exists.  It does.  Nor does it mean that al-Qaeda no longer represents a threat to the US or other civilized states.  It does.  Rather, the point of the administration's argument is simply that al-Qaeda in Afghanistan no longer is central to the panoply of threats presented by assorted advocates of violent political Islam.  This is true.

It is also far less relevant than the administration would have any of us believe.

There are two ramifications of an overly rapid, overly steep withdrawal which the administration does not credit.  The first is the recuperative power of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan given the ready availability of support from Pakistan and the unwillingness of the Pakistani military or intelligence service to block that support.  The second is the power of history.

The US must not cut and run in a way which will allow the advocates of violent political Islam and their supporters or apologists to write a narrative in which the centerpiece is the assertion that the Mighty Warriors of the One True Faith defeated the infidel crusaders.  It was the willingness and ability of Osama bin Laden and others to claim victory over the Soviet forces which provided the original legitimacy for al-Qaeda and other similar groups--including the Taliban of Mullah Omar.

The Islamist version of history is not only specious, it is a total fabrication giving credit to Arab fighters which was and is totally undeserved.  Insofar as anyone defeated the Red Army, it was the Afghans--and the support they received from the US.  Afghan courage, blood, and endurance along with American technology defeated the Soviets--as much as they were defeated by external pressures.  The down and dirty truth was that the Soviets were not defeated.  They simply gave up.  This loss of political will was the made-in-the-Kremlin equivalent of the American self-inflicted defeat in Vietnam.  In a very real sense, the Afghan fighters simply had to keep on fighting, refuse to admit defeat until the Soviets packed it in.  This, of course, is the basic cause of any insurgent's success right on back to the patriot "victory" in the American War of Independence.

The Arab hijacking of reality in the according-to-Osama interpretation of history was a work of fiction which prevailed simply because nobody challenged it at the time.  The cause driven bin Laden invented a tale and kept telling it to all who would listen until one fine day it was taken, at least in the Arabian Peninsula, as the gospel truth.  The tale-telling sheik told his tale of faith and fighting so well and so often that the money and recruits flowed in.  Osama's version of history may not have been a Big Lie as Dr Goebbels understood the term, but it turned out to be a Great Lie, the greatest lie of the last decades of the Twentieth Century.

The bin Laden approach to creative fiction as history recommends itself to any and all advocates of violent political Islam today--and into the future.  If the American forces are withdrawn hastily and in too great a number, the next bin Laden will claim that the infidels were militarily defeated by the Holy Fighters Of The Koran.

It will not be a true and accurate history to be sure.  That does not and will not matter.  It will be the history that many Muslims will want to believe.  It will be history as they deeply wish it to have been.  There is no Islamic concept of history as we in the West understand the concept.  Rather, all history is in Muslim eyes a record of great men doing great deeds on behalf of the faith and in the pure name of the faith.  Thus the defeat of the infidel crusaders by the followers of Islam, the followers of the "martyred" Great and Learned Osama bin Laden will be believed eagerly and fervently by many future recruits to the cause of violent political Islam.

This powerful ground truth is not and will not be accepted by the Deep Thinkers in and around the Oval.  Yet it exists as a reality, a reality as potent and long lasting in effect as the American deficit and the war weariness of We the People.  In the contest between a work of fiction, a myth on the one hand, and mere facts, mind numbing statistics, the aggregate of countless after action reports, the first will defeat the second--particularly when the myth meets the needs of people who perceive themselves to have been exploited, marginalized, trivialized even though they are the members of a community promised global dominance by the deity and his prophet.

Wars are ultimately won and lost not on the physical battlefield but on the ineffable terrain of the human mind. It is this foundation truth that gave the Osama bin Laden fictional history of how the Arab true believers defeated the Red Army its power and persistence.  It is this foundation truth which will give some future myth maker vast potency when he creates the fiction holding the infidel Americans were defeated by the blood, courage, and conviction of the Men of Islam.

Contrary to a prevalent American belief, history does matter.  It matters far, far more than money and elections--even the reelection of Barack Obama.

More--And More Important--Fallout From the Death Of OBL

The end of Osama bin Laden will accelerate demands that the US ramp down its presence in Afghanistan.  Such a move fits well with the Obama agenda and reelection effort.  The more rapid the ramp down the better is the perspective of many Americans, particularly those of budget deficit hawkishness or (strange partners here) the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.

The withdrawal of sizable segments of the American force in Afghanistan would provide several collateral benefits.  One of the most important of these is an increase of leverage on the we-play-both-sides crew in Islamabad.  There is a simple equation here: Fewer troops means less need for the supply routes through Pakistan, the closure of which constitutes the only real threat the government there can levy.

Additionally, the reduction of US presence will automatically shift more of the burden for suppressing the out of control Frankenstein's monster created by ISI.  The causal chain here is less direct than that with the supply lines.  Lowering the crucial nature of the land lines of supply allows the US more freedom in lessening its extortion payments which will have the result of shifting costs on to Islamabad.  The elite in Pakistan will have the stark choice of accepting a growth of the insurgents and their brand of violent political Islam which brings with it an existential threat or paying the costs of suppressing the insurgency without significant American contributions.

The Pakistanis have been spared facing the implications of their fixation on India and reliance upon proxies motivated by violent political Islam as an operational concept.  Initially they were insulated against the consequences of folly by the dynamics of the Cold War.  Later, the events of 9/11 continued to benefit the Pakistanis.

Now the death of OBL along with the rapidly warming relations between the US and India make the old Pakistani connection irrelevant to American interests in the region.  When the prime minister of Pakistan made his recent suggestion to Karzai that both countries disengage with the US and engage with China, the Geek thought that was an excellent idea.  Certainly Pakistan has been moving ever more into the orbit of China.  The US now has the freedom to say, get on with it, pal.

The relation between the US and India is both more natural as a confluence of national interests and core values than that with Pakistan has been.  The mating of the US and Pakistan was an unnatural one, an artifact of Indian politics of the Cold War and American hyper-reactions to that.  A close relation with the US is in the interests of India and the region, far more than is the one between the US and Pakistan.

The linkage of Pakistan and China brings up another bit of fallout from the Great Abbottabad Raid.  With the death of Osama the Trolls of Beijing are once more shaking more than a little over the prospect that the US will put China back in the crosshairs.  Their fear is not without justification.

The US has gained stature and influence in Asia and the Western Pacific as China has become both more wealthy and militarily potent as well as diplomatically high profile.  The Trolls (or at least the think tanks which serve them) have become more and more convinced that China is a very lonely country with few, if any, natural allies while the US is Ms Popularity in comparison.

The Chinese have not failed to observe that the reality of American democracy is the glue which binds it with Asian democracies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and, India.  It has hit the Trolls that democracies not only appeal to one another but feel threatened by authoritarian states, particularly those with very, very large military establishments and robust diplomatic agendas.

To the Trolls the fact that the US is a democracy means the US is automatically unpredictable over time.  Every election brings with it the possibility of a great shift in US policy in all areas.  The Chinese strategic thinkers and military strategists alike fret endlessly about this inbuilt threat of American democracy.  The fretting focuses on means by which the US can be limited, bound, or otherwise denied freedom of action on the global and regional stages.

The Trolls (or their Deep Thinkers) have also belatedly realized that the US benefits by not being a power located in Asia.  Simultaneously, it has hit the same crew that the US magnifies this benefit by having no territorial claims or ambitions in Asia--quite unlike the Chinese.  As a consequence, countries which are not democracies edge closer and closer to the US, a gravitational attraction which runs counter to Chinese strategic and national interests.

The Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh have no doubt reinforced India's move toward the US.  It is not coincidental that the relation has widened and deepened in a way which is positively correlated with China's military build up and diplomatic aggressiveness.  In a similar fashion the Chinese claims on some eighty percent of the South China Sea have gone a far piece to convincing Hanoi to allow bygones to be bygones and seek tighter relations with the Great Enemy Of The Vietnamese People.

Of course the Chinese have been responsible for much of the isolation confronting them.  Not since the Germany of Bismark, Wilhelm, and Adolph has a country exhibited such consistently inept diplomacy managing to either alienate or scare the hell out of almost every country in Asia to say nothing of other areas of the world.  The combination of implicit military threats, aggressive acquisition of land in faraway countries, diplomatic bluster, lack of international cooperation on such matters as Iran and North Korea, shows a state with no sense of diplomatic nuance and profound tone deafness as to the best way to win friends and influence policy.

The tub thumping of the Chinese military may even accomplish something thought impossible--cause the US to rethink seriously its love affair with the floating sovereignty behemoths called supercarriers.  Their "smart spike" ballistic missiles may (in conjunction with the budget concerns at home) cause the gradual replacement of the Nimitz class and larger ships with larger numbers of smaller, cheaper, and more competent vessels.  This would be a development to be hoped for in the most profound fashion.

Of course all of this might be moot given the problems inherent to China today.  Dropping water tables, loss of arable land, demographics, a crisis of rising expectations, the movement of American investment in physical plant and industrial production in consumer durables and capital goods back to the US, the steep increase in energy demands including refined petroleum products, the ramp up in internal suppression, the impact of new information and communication technologies may pose some well nigh onto insoluble problems for the Trolls.

With these contextual matters in mind, the Geek says, "Take Pakistan--and welcome to it."

Stop The Sketch! It's Getting Too Silly!

The Great Abbottabad Raid is generating more fall out than the Japanese nuclear reactor--combined with Chernobyl.  Everyone is getting in on the act.  The Pakistanis, of course, keep on changing their story.  The Iranians are of the view bin Laden wasn't killed.  The Arab press is in a frenzy of angered denunciations.

In a quirky twist, the Taliban has taken the position that bin Laden died of "natural causes" and the US simply took advantage of its knowledge of this unfortunate act of Allah.  Well, that is no more over the edge than the massive outpouring of "deather" conspiracy theories which are littering the web like spam on growth hormone.

Over on the sidelines stand spokesmen for the Native American community.  These worthies are severely twisted in the panties department over the use of the name "Geronimo" in connection with the killing of bin Laden.  Being proud of the three eighths of his genome which comes courtesy of the Hot Springs Apache (of which Geronimo was a member), the Geek has to allow he was a bit bent out of shape at first.  Geronimo was an outstanding example of the irregular warfare leader who with a handful of his fellows waged protracted conflict against both the Americans and Mexicans before finally being captured.  He was held as a "POW" first in Florida and then at Fort Sill until his death in 1909 which captivity was both unjustified and legally questionable by standards of the day.  But, a bit of reflection removed the Geek's initial consternation as it should the Native American organizations as well.

The use of the name Geronimo was simply a piece with the usual cultural blindness of the white eyes.  As such it was microscopic in effect compared with the more lethal expressions of the same defect as the reservation system, the boarding schools, and the compulsory conversion to Christian religion.  To the outraged Native Americans, the Geek can only advise, "Get a grip.  It's not that big a deal.  Worry about the things that really matter."

In the things-that-really-matter department one also finds the contretemps over to whom belongs the most credit for the elimination of The Great Sheik of Sheiks, The Martyr of All Martyrs, Oh, Osama.  Here the partisans of George W. Bush square off with the advocates of President Obama.  This is akin to asking who deserved the credit for the first manned lunar landing, JFK or Richard Nixon.  In each case, the former committed the US to the effort but the culmination occurred on the latter's watch.  Most importantly, that which is never started cannot be finished.  That rather settles the matter from the point of view called rational, but politics, particularly the divisive sort associated with both presidents W. Bush and Obama, are not given to rational argument.

Far more serious is the outpouring of negative views of the successful American take down in Europe.  It is not surprising that the Archbishop of Canterbury has joined with the Vatican in being disquieted by the killing. Nor is it exactly shocking that a British historian specializing in US history would conflate the conduct and outcome of Boat Six's operation with the Wild West traditions of vigilante justice or even Pat Garret shooting Billy the Kid in the back as the Kid slept in a semi-drunk stupor.

At least one French outlet riffed on the Wild West theme, but with somewhat more positive implications.  The writer of this article correctly equated what happened to bin Laden with the endgame for Japan in World War II.  The Greatest Warrior Hero Of All Muslims made the same fatal error as did the Japanese high command before Pearl Harbor--grossly underestimating the long term will of the American people to avenge an outrage of humiliating proportions.  Back then it took us nearly four years and tens of thousands of killed to wreak a terrible vengeance.  This time it took almost ten years but, thankfully, far fewer good men dead to do the same to bin Laden.

Nipping across the Rhine to Germany and the rhetorical atmosphere turns dark, cold, and filled with dank disapproval.  The online version of a major circulation newspaper of purportedly center-right persuasion took the US to task in tones which were more than mildly condemnatory.  The left-wing Spiegel took precisely the same line in wording that was no harsher, no nastier, and showed no less comprehension of both the requirements of international law and the realities under which special operations forces conduct high pucker factor actions.  Indeed all along the continuum of political orientation in the German media, the situation was the same--the US committed a war crime by not assuring bin Laden was taken alive and brought to trial.

Unstated in this silliness is the reality that had the members of Boat Six been ordered to take bin Laden alive regardless of risk, that would have been done.  The men of Boat Six as well as all the other SEAL teams and special operations forces generally are so well disciplined, so highly motivated, so well trained that they carry out orders to the letter even when doing such exposes them to great risk.  However, we can be sure that the same people who now criticize the US for killing bin Laden would have carped at his receiving a fair trial in the US.

These same High Minded and Lofty Thinking people--including popes and archbishops, Islamic scholars and German media moguls--would have griped unendingly about the impossibility of the Americans providing a fair, open, and impartial trial.  They would have denounced any use of the military tribunals.  At the same time they would have alleged that no jury could be assembled anywhere in the US which could be considered impartial.

The demands for an international tribunal would be filling the ether today had we taken the Heroic Protector of the Koran alive.  Some would be urging that a special shariah compliant court of authentic Muslim scholars of Islamic jurisprudence be assembled to guard against cultural chauvinism.  The condemnations and demands would have accelerated to and beyond ludicrous speed.

The ever ready to dump on the US crowd in Germany and elsewhere in Europe need to get a grip on a ground truth: Bin Laden attacked the US in a most dastardly fashion.  The president of the time committed the US to a policy of vengeance.  His successor was obligated by the chains of political reality to carry forward with that commitment.  He, after the usual dithering, picked the only viable option.  The men of Boat Six had permissive orders which put the priority on saving American lives.  They did their job with perfection.  The perfection is underscored by the simple fact that only one hostile managed to fire at the assault force.

The core of a successful commando raid is that of giving the target no chance to shoot and no chance to run.  This was done.  Period.  The presence of weapons in easy reach coupled with permissive orders means the shooting of bin Laden was a "good shoot."  Period.

Just remember, all you critics out there in virtual land, all bin Laden needed to do to stay alive was to raise his hands.  Had he done so, we would be facing a host of other criticisms and complaints right now, but bin Laden would not only be alive--he would have access to the very best medical care--at no cost to him or his organization.  What a deal!  He should have taken it.

But, he didn't.  He chose to go out the way he had always wanted ever since courting death at Soviet hands.

US Commits Murder--So Say The Usual Suspects

Late yesterday afternoon the White House issued a revision of the "Osama Meets The SEALs" narrative.  Almost instantly the usual suspects sprang into action with denunciations of the US as a criminal enterprise.  The High Minded and Lofty Thinking protectors of human rights ranging from the ever present UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, all the way to German ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt and assorted human rights lawyers and activists have alleged that the US commandos engaged in flat out assassination in violation of international law.

One man, the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights and fundamental freedoms, Martin Scheinin, a Finnish lawyer who has leveled criticisms against the US and its war on terror in the past, swam against the prevailing current.  In Sheinin's view the US did not violate international law but rather strengthened it by having used a means which provided bin Laden with the possibility of surrendering.  Scheinin takes the rational position that had bin Laden "raised the white flag" he would have avoided being killed on the spot.

Scheinin is right and the others, the legions of those High Minded and Lofty Thinking folks whose hearts have been blighted by the idea that Osama bin Laden is dead, are wrong.  The SEALs are tightly disciplined and very highly trained professional warriors who would have accepted any affirmative sign of surrender on the part of bin Laden.  The mere fact that he gave no such signal--which need be no more complex than raising the hands--in the context of armed resistance by others is sufficient.  Absent a clear and unambiguous sign of submission (something at which any Muslim should be well accomplished),  the man or men present were well within the limits of legal requirement and mission briefing alike to push the delete key on the terrorist leader.

In one of the cited articles, the Asia director for Human Rights Watch demanded that "law enforcement" procedures should apply in situations such as that in the bin Laden compound.  It is unclear just what might be meant by the words chosen, but it is doubtful that any law enforcement personnel facing an identical situation with a known criminal gang engaged in armed resistance would have acted other than did the SEALs.  The HRW executive missed the point--in a context of armed resistance, when facing a man with known propensities for resistance, an individual is compelled to use deadly force unless there is a clear, unmistakable sign of surrender.

While it may bother those whose lives are so orderly and well protected that they have never had to make the sort of decisions made by either special forces troops or law enforcement personnel, the reality is as Mr Scheinin inferred in his assessment: The onus is on the person facing arrest to surrender.  In short, Osama bin Laden chose to die rather than submit, a course of action in keeping with his life philosophy and religious ideology.

Helmut Schmidt among others drew a series of incorrect analogies from history.  For example, opponents of the American action have invoked both the Nuremberg trials and that of Slobodan Milosevic as the paradigms for the handling of Osama bin Laden.  Neither is apposite.  The senior Nazi officials as well as the one-time Serbian jefe grande surrendered without a struggle.  There you have it.  Had Osama bin Laden simply held up his hands as the aforementioned war criminals did, he would be alive and well right now in US custody.

Other critics such as Geoffrey Robertson, a well known Australian human rights lawyer, alleged that justice was not done in the case of Osama bin Laden.  Mr Robertson is of the view that justice can only be done by the process of arrest, trial, conviction, and punishment.  He is wrong.  Justice came as a swift and shocking event to Osama in a way quite similar to the manner in which death came for some three thousand people on 9/11.  Actual justice would have required that Osama bin Laden experience the same horrid dread of the inevitable that afflicted the last moments of those on the doomed airliners.

One can only hope that he did.

It Was A Good Day, But Not The Final Day

The death of Osama bin Ladin is good--and long overdue--news.  The means of the man's demise is a credit to what is arguably the best special operations unit in the world today, Boat Six of the Navy's SEALs.  The consequences of this termination with extreme prejudice are easy to overstate.

Also easy to overstate is the decisive courage of President Obama.  The most annoying aspect of the aftermath of the Raid At Abbottabad has been the praise lavished on the Guy in the Oval.  Much has been made as well of the lack of unanimity among the presidential advisors concerning the raid.  Lack of unanimity is a good thing--it would have been better, much better for the US had there been more dissent from the group think during the run up to the Bay of Pigs or the adventure in regime change in South Vietnam which resulted in the death of the authoritarian ruler, Diem, and the onset of a decade of political chaos in the insurgency and American riddled republic.  And, to be sure, it would have been better had the White House crew of George W. Bush had a few more dissidents and a lot fewer team players.

When the interminable number of National Security Council meetings--five--finally came to an end, the president took the only rational choice available--a commando style operation.  The stand-off alternatives might not have done the job correctly as was the case with the recent attack in Tripoli which missed Gaddafi the dad but did manage to kill his youngest son and three of that man's children.  Or, even if the stand-off alternative did succeed, there would have been even less convincing proof of Osama's death than is the case currently.  And, not a trivial consideration, only the up-close-and-personal approach would have the positive collateral of collecting useful material to keep intelligence analysts occupied.

Of course, there would have been those in the NSC or supporting staff who would have feared a replay of "Blackhawk Down"--a prospect which came oh-so-close when one of the birds either suffered a mechanical malfunction or combat damage and had to be left on the ground.  Others might have felt a pucker factor over the possibility of American combat fatalities and how that would play at home.  Still others might have dreaded a complete debacle equivalent to that at Desert One.

Since no special operations senior commander would be so out of touch with reality as to guarantee success, there was a risk with the operation, but the use of Boat Six went a very long way to mitigate that consideration.  So also have the vast improvements generally in the tactics, techniques, and materiel of special operations.  When night fell, the use of the commando raid option was the only way to go--other than to convince oneself that the intelligence just was not sufficient and let the moment go by ungrasped.

There is, in the real world at least, never enough intelligence.  It is rare to the point of being nonexistent for a Two Shop--including CIA--to say, "This is the real deal, one hundred percent sure thing."  For an intel weenie to say such a thing would be identical to the Spec Ops guy saying success would be certain.  In this case, even given the chance that the narrative released by the Obama administration regarding the long, winding, and rough road traveled is a cover for simple penetration, the correlation of intelligence factors was strong, even very strong--and it just doesn't get any better than that.

One cannot help but wonder if the decision making process was so lengthy because so many lawyers must have been involved.  It rather appears that the actual planning and rehearsal for the raid took less time than did the five meetings of the NSC and who knows how many confabs between the legal counsel for the principals.  It may  even be that the factor tilting the final decision in favor of the on-the-ground option were legal considerations, specifically the existence of a remote chance that bin Laden could have been taken prisoner.  No matter how slight that chance might be and no matter how certain it was that Osama or those around him would offer armed resistance thus allowing fire to be returned, the legal fiction of a possible arrest was maintained.  That would have been impossible using the stand-off options.

The theoretical option of turning over the "actionable intelligence" to the Pakistanis was, no shock here, a non-starter.  Outside of Islamabad, is there anyone willing to hazard the view that the Pakistani army, Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, and government had no idea that Osama had been living in a nice, large, and well furnished semi-prison located cheek-to-cheek with a major military academy and a large army base for some years?  Similarly, is there anyone, again outside of Pakistan, who would argue with a straight face that Osama could not have lived on the outskirts of Abbottabad without a "support service" furnished by Pakistanis, and not just ideological soulmates operating as private citizens?

The movers and shakers of Pakistan will have to do a lot of fast talking--something at which they are quite experienced and competent.  The Obama administration will not put too much pressure on the Koran loving senior men at ISI or in the army.  Congress, particularly the House, is not likely to be quite so easy going--and they control the flow of bribes to Islamabad.  Even considering that factor, the odds are in favor of the US going along with some (very) modest changes in Pakistani behavior and public protestations of innocence in a manner not unlike that of earlier administrations and congresses (think Panay Incident.)

The removal of bin Laden from the board does not change the Great Game of countering terror conducted by proponents of violent political Islam in any significant way.  The global movement has sufficient inertia, manpower, and experience to keep on going and growing even with the loss of Osama to the welcoming arms of seventy-two virgins.  Even if the US is able to follow on by removing the al-Qaeda number two man, al-Zawahiri, it will not make an end to to violent political Islam as  practiced by Taliban, AQIM, AQAP, or any of the other groups.

In short, the Abbottabad Raid has been an emotionally satisfying moment in a long and bloody war with years if not decades yet to run.  It demonstrated not only the very high competence of the US in a very demanding form of military operation but also the dedication the country can have over two administrations of vastly differing political ideologies and world views.  It also has shown that Mr Obama like JFK has the capacity to wreak havoc when his masculinity has been challenged--which bin Laden has done to a degree not equaled even by JKF's bete noir, Fidel Castro.

The game will go on.  The war between the civilized states and the reactionary, barbaric proponents of violent political Islam will continue.  Obama will get a bump in the polls.  His reelection chances may even have been enhanced.  On the upside, Osama bin Laden will not be around to enjoy life and the Great Game.

"Sword Of Justice"--One Plenty Bad Man

Regardless of how matters play out in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden's presumably as-good-as-on-the-ropes al-Qaeda has brought a new/old and very dangerous player to the global board.  Bin Laden personally named the new operations director, the man in direct operational charge of violent efforts against the West generally and the US in particular.

The man's name may be Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi or Ibrahim Madani.  He has been called Omar al-Somali.  His self-chosen sobriquet is Saif al-Adel.  Translated this comes out as, sword of justice.  Modest, eh what?

Muhammad or Ibrahim or Omar or Saif was born in 1960.  Or, perhaps, 1963.  If you get the idea that there is little extant in the open literature regarding this one time colonel in the Egyptian army, that is correct.  Most of the little that is known comes from the Sword's autobiography written five years ago, and is difficult or impossible to confirm without the resources of CIA (and perhaps not even then.)

The details are less important than the main theme of the man's thinking, his concept of how to wage effective war against the US and the other "infidel, Crusader states."  He has a clear concept that is well rooted in a sound understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of his enemy.

In 1987 Saif al-Adel was a rather impatient person with great ideas of how to reform the apostate government of Egypt.  His notions featured both a truck bomb and the use of a civilian aircraft as a cruise missile.  Both instruments of death and mayhem were to be employed against Egypt's parliament building.  The plans were aborted when security forces rolled up Saif and his fellow plotters of the rather directly albeit unimaginatively named group al-Jihad.   In the slammer Mr Adel became underwhelmed with the views of his fellow advocates of violent political Islam.

No, bucko, it is not as if the future Sword of Justice became disillusioned with the precepts and goals of violent political Islam.  That would have made future life too simple, too peaceful.  Rather the man viewed his fellow travelers as too impatient, too filled with zeal, and too able to underestimate the capacities of the assorted components of the House of War and its apostate tools.

For reasons known only to the heavyweights of Egyptian internal security, the man who would become the Sword of Justice was released.  He decamped to--where else?--Peshawar.  In those hospitable environs he made contact with the new kids of jihad, al-Qaeda.  He spent '91 and '92 in Khost training al-Qaeda trigger pullers and bomb throwers in the basics of military art and science.

Not surprisingly Saif trailed along when Osama bin Laden relocated to Sudan.  As has been attested to by the convicted terrorist, Mohammed Odeh, Saif was engaged at the bin Laden owned Damazine Farm where he whiled away the days teaching.  No, he was not instructing in the area of agricultural science but rather giving tuition in the manufacture and use of explosives.

When not giving helpful hints on how to blow things up and kill people, Saif waxed philosophical.  He was all in favor of moving the jihad to other areas of the world as Taliban was winning in Afghanistan and conditions in Sudan were not suitable to martyrdom operations.  Apparently Saif could forgo the inviting conflict in Bosnia as there is no record of his having accompanied any of the Mideast origin jihadis to that nasty little war.  Instead it appears that the peripatetic Egyptian spent several years traveling around the constellation of training camps in Africa and Asia set up by al-Qaeda and others of the violent political Islam sort.  Reputedly he was involved directly in forming working relations with jihadist groups in Iraq.

Saif was involved in the planning of 9/11.  In the late summer debate over the final execute decision, Adel took sides with Omar in opposing the idea.  The dissent registered by Mullah Omar and seconded by Adel was documented to the satisfaction of the 9/11 Commission.

As the US troops entered Afghanistan, Saif al-Adel left.  He went to Iran where he amused himself by planning and organizing several attacks on US and other foreign troops.  During its transient spasm of fear following the American invasion, the Iranian government authorized the arrest of Adel and other al-Qaeda leadership figures.  He was released a few months later.

The Saif al-Adel of 2005 was a man far different from his younger incarnation, the wannabe bomber of the Egyptian parliament.  The differences are what make the Sword a dangerous, a very dangerous opponent now.

Adel has become a prophet of protracted conflict.  His observations and ruminations had combined to convince him that the US along with the rest of the West could not survive a lengthy siege of terror politically. Operationally this means he supports relatively small, one-off, single actor attacks as opposed to the 9/11 sort.  In his estimate the best method of operation is one which envisions attacks no larger than the 7/7 London bombing or the similar strike on the Madrid subway.  In his mind a slow motion sequence of such attacks carried out over a long enough time primarily by homegrown "martyrdom seekers" would exhaust Western political will such that maximal Islamist demands would be met.

Adel is also convinced that it is essential that the global movement in violent political Islam have no geographic base.  The identification of Afghanistan with al-Qaeda was, he has concluded, a ghastly mistake, bad for both Afghanistan and al-Qaeda.

The Sword seeks a network of facilitators and recruiters even more diffuse than that which has existed in recent years.  He intends to make the "leaderless war" a reality.  The absence of an identifiable and thus targetable geographic center will inhibit, even prohibit, a Western retaliation or will render any retaliation far more provocative than punishing.

In both of these theses Adel is far more right than wrong.  American political will is strengthened mightily by a direct attack on our citizens and our soil.  Even if the butchers' bill is far smaller than that of 9/11, the demand of We the People for retaliation would be loud and long.  Provided there is a place upon which to retaliate, the probability of an American president not doing so is very, very slim at best.

A series of attacks, large or small in effect, but carried out by homegrown operatives gives no target against which to retaliate.  The absence of an identifiable outside figure, foreign group, alien sanctuary would prevent any meaningful American response beyond the judicial (provided the actors survive the act.)  The same dynamic would apply to Western European states.  The combination of Western values, norms, political relations render each and every government a pitiful helpless giant when confronted by domestic actors who have no direct, actionable ties with a foreign puppetmaster.

Adel intends to make an operational doctrine compatible with the political statement of Mullah Omar, who in 2009 explicitly (and belatedly) separated the Taliban in Afghanistan from the violent acts of groups such as al-Qaeda.  Adel like Omar understands that this sort of explicit rhetorical and operational separation serves best the coinciding interests of both states and non-state actors which share a commitment to political Islam.

Bright lad, eh, bucko?

Operational successes under a (distant and discrete) al-Qaeda umbrella when coupled with the current political trajectories in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, North Africa, and portions of sub-Saharan Africa will bode best for the fortunes of resurgent political Islam.  The combination will allow for peace in the "House of Islam" and a better form of war in the "House of War."

In his current thinking Saif al-Adel is putting into practice the idea first broached by the great-grandfather of contemporary violent political Islam, Abul Ali Mawdudi.  More than seventy years ago Mawdudi wrote, "war in the name of Islam is a revolutionary ideology which seeks to change the social and political order of the entire war."

And, so it is.  Now Saif al-Adel gives the ideology a new and far sharper edge.

The Geek's Praise And Pan For The Week

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton finally stepped out of the shadows this week--twice really, but one of these rare appearances has already been covered. The real praise for the often invisible SecState is for her honesty in Pakistan.

She had the guts to bring the rhino in the john front and center as she quite properly accused the government of Pakistan for having had the knowledge necessary to get Osama bin Laden and his number two guy, Zawahiri, at any time over the past nine years. As an exercise in "fence-mending," her approach is noteworthy in its unconventionality. But, public honesty in this matter is long overdue--and still incomplete.

The government of Pakistan or at the very, very least, its Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has known where the top men of al-Qaeda have been all along the way. The many, many stories of bin Laden's having traipsed around the country, including stays in military hospitals, have been too numerous, too consistent, and from too many diverse sources over the years to be the creation of fabricators and other pitfalls in the wacky world of intelligence.

Further, when the intimate relationship between ISI and the Taliban of Afghanistan is factored into consideration, it becomes even more unlikely that the al-Qaeda pandjandrums' whereabouts is unknown to the Boys of Islamabad. They may have experienced the embarrassment of having their creation, Taliban, turn against its creators, but that doesn't imply the ISI has lost its ability to collect what is known as "actionable intelligence."

They have. They know it. We know it. They know that we know. So, there is no excuse to pussy-foot around the issue. And, to her credit, Ms Clinton hasn't kept on the artful dodging that typified the Bush/Cheney years. Presumably, some of the credit must go to President Obama for allowing the sharp and amazingly public change in policy.

Pakistan, in a way which resembles the old French policy of placating terrorist groups but which has taken it to much, much greater extremes, has sought to buy its peace from terror attacks by both permitting "foreign" groups to operate from its soil and protecting them from other "foreign" antagonists. The government and military of Pakistan sat back, hands folded on their collective laps, until it had become explosively evident that Taliban had slipped its ISI leash and unilaterally cancelled the old deal.

The US would have acted quickly and (hopefully) effectively had the government of Pakistan, the Pakistani military, or ISI given notice of bin Laden's or Zawihiri's address. Not only did the phone call never come, the Pakistani organs publicly (and privately) maintained they were completely mystified and baffled as to where any of the terrorist heavyweights might be. They often added that the wanted men must still be in Afghanistan.

Considering the largess spread by the US Congress and administrations both past and present, a largess which will be paid by our descendants on to the fifth generation, the Clinton Bluntness Gambit is well justified. Now, both the administration and the congress must back her play. The challenge, the glove cast before Islamabad, must be renewed--and expanded. It is all well and good to praise the Pakistanis for finally having taken some sort of more or less effective action against the Islamist jihadists, but that is not enough.

It is not enough to justify all the money we have and will spend on the Lads of Islamabad. It is not enough that they have finally decided that they have to do something or lose their heads to the swords of what they like to call "miscreants."

To not only justify the money we have lavished upon their regime and its assorted military goodies, they must now show they really have joined the side of civilization in opposition to the barbaric forces of the Islamist jihadists. To do this they must hand us the head of Osama bin Laden, with or without the rest of his body. Ditto, al-Zawihiri.

It may have been a thumbs-up for Secretary Clinton. But, it is the back of the Geek's hand to the UN Human Rights Council. Well, to err on the side of specificity, its Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, Philip Alston.

Mr Alston is all het up over the use of Predators and Reapers in the FATA of Pakistan. He is reportedly even more exercised over the unwillingness of the US, specifically CIA, to supply the family jewels on how targets are determined and engaged. The Special Rapporteur used language in his press conference the other day which echoed very well the approach taken by Justice Goldstone regarding the IDF.

He hinted darkly that the US "may" be committing war crimes in its use of UAVs. He can't be sure of this, however, unless the US provides all the relevant and requested information.

There is no doubt that Mr Alston would like to know the details of UAV missions and the supporting targeting systems. So would the targets. And their supporters around the world, many of which are represented on the Human Rights Council.

When not engaged in absurdities such as the widely decried hang wringing over the probable abuse of the human rights of transgendered persons as was the case with the UNHRC in-house "expert" on counterterrorism, the august body undertakes travesties such as its perversion of the already malformed Goldstone Panel Report. Now, the Council wants to drag the US into the same mire as it has Israel.

Recently the Jerusalem Post quoted a critic as terming the Goldstone effort as "a Magna Carta for terrorists." Mr Alston seems to be doing his best to augment the Goldstone effort.

While there is no debating the unfortunate fact that non-combatants have died from the Predator attacks, there is also no debating that this was not the desired effect of the attacks. US decision makers and those who execute the decisions are quite well aware of the ground truth that the killing of uninvolved civilians is counterproductive to say the least.

The gold (not Goldstone) standard for adjudicating an action during war as a crime is that of intent. The law of land warfare in the US and everywhere for that matter is intent pure and simple. It has been acknowledged for decades, centuries, perhaps longer, that in war civilians will be killed. It is unavoidable. Inescapable. So, showing a commonsense usually lacking in the area of jurisprudence, the standard of intent was evolved long times past.

Mr Alston needs to get a grip. The collateral loss of civilian life is an unfortunate reality of war whether carried out by UAVs or undertaken in a very up close and personal fashion. And, intent cannot be proven or disproven from an examination of the protocols and procedures for targeting and servicing the targets chosen.

Not unless someone, somewhere, at sometime, deep inside the Beltway wrote an order saying in effect," It is our intent that civilians be intentionally targeted." Sooner whales will fly than that sort of order would surface--or even exist. Not even Dick (Kill-'em-All-And-Let-Hell-Sort-It-Out) Cheney was that stupid.

Are You Man Enough?

The hoary question, "Are you man enough to---," is defunct in the US and most of the West, at least within the ever-so-polite circles of the academic, political, and chattering classes. It is, however, far from dead in most of the world, particularly in places such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The concept of "manliness" or machismo is found not only in Spanish cultures but in most of those where Islam is dominant. The reason for this is not that Islamic cultures are somehow "backward" or insensitive to gender issues but rather that the religion in and of itself is male oriented. It is, after all, a religion created by and for warrior based tribes of the Arabic Peninsula. The spread of Islam was not only by the sword but by the strong appeal of its belief structure to men of tribally based societies. This can be seen simply by tracing where Islam has enjoyed the greatest growth, persistence, and popular support.

War in an Islamic context is celebrated to a degree which has not been seen in the West for nearly a century. The strong belief in the purifying and consolidating nature of war on a society would not have been unfamiliar to Europeans or Americans at the outset of World War I. The combination of the "industrialization of death" and the consequent death toll served to erase the attractiveness of war in the Western mind.

That is most assuredly not the case in Islamic societies--even those such as Iran which have experienced prolonged and very costly wars. Even in Iraq where many have turned against sectarian war in the wake of the death count of the past several years, war is still lauded as the duty--even the privilege --of the believer.

Societies which have a pronounced tribal orientation such as is the case in both Afghanistan and Pakistan accept the view of war as an instrument of societal purification and consolidation to an even greater extent than those in which tribal affiliation has been weakened by the rise of a purely national identification. To put it bluntly: War is a symbol and a test of one's manhood.

The linkage between war and manhood is weak if it exists at all in the US and the rest of the West. We tend to deprecate the existence of this sort of linkage as atavistic, as a symptom of some sort of psychopathology, as "testosterone poisoning." The ultimate asymmetry in the "asymmetrical warfare" between ourselves and the Islamist jihadists is that we see war as an unpleasant reality forced upon us while the opposition sees it as a sign of personal worth, personal commitment, personal manhood.

What is to us a "continuation of politics by violent means" is to the jihadists a visible testament to belief and courage, to faith and manhood. This means that the political will of the Islamist jihadist is far more deeply rooted, far more pervasive, and infinitely more difficult to erode or eradicate than is ours. For us it is mere policy; for the jihadist it is the nature of life both now and eternal.

The recent attacks by Taliban in Pakistan, particularly the raid on the Pakistani version of the Pentagon have made the contest in that country very much one of mano a mano. The assault in Rawalpindi may prove to be the single greatest mistake ever committed by Taliban.

The Pakistani Army has no choice other than to finally launch a real attack on the Taliban strongholds in South Waziristan. It is either that or admit that the single most important institution in Pakistan has no cajones. The second alternative is outside the realm of possibility.

The attack also demonstrates to the ever hopeful pro-Islamists within the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence that their creation, Taliban, is no longer under their control--or even capacity to influence. The monster has escaped the Dr Frankenstein.

At nearly the same time Taliban again demonstrated its ability to be its own worst enemy. The teenage suicide bomber who blew himself up in Swat killed a half dozen troops, but eradicated several dozen civilians. Pakistanis, like Afghans, object to seeing civilians killed by either the foreign infidels or Islamist jihadists.

The net result of the recent Taliban attacks has been to enhance the political will of the Pakistani civilians, government, and, most of all, the Army to destroy Taliban. The only uncertainty in the minds of Pakistanis exists with respect to the US.

There is much doubt in both Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the willingness of the US to continue, let alone enhance, its efforts in Afghanistan. The opposition, most notably the two senior figures of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, have expressed confidence that the Americans will soon cut and run. This sense has been echoed in at least diminuendo form by members of the Pakistani military, legislature, and media.

There is a growing belief in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that the US does not have the testicular fortitude to keep on keeping on. Preparations have been underway in both countries by members of the local elites to get out of Dodge ahead of the Taliban victory--or the American pull out. The two are seen as one.

The spectre of Vietnam hangs heavy in the air of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. People in both countries as well as here in the US look back at the end game of that war as paradigmatic of what is soon to happen in Afghanistan. Unlike some American commentators who use the specious analogy of Vietnam to prove that we are engaged in a war we cannot win, the folks in Pakistan see the correct parallel. They see the US simply tossing in the towel and leaving--which is precisely what was done in the final days of the Vietnam War.

Behind the carping and hissy-fit tossing over American UAV attacks in the FATA and (yet to come) Baluchistan, the Pakistani government and military want the US and its allies to stay the course in Afghanistan. With the realization that Taliban has escaped its creator's control, there is a genuine anxiety as to what will happen if the US quits the war before the Islamist jihadists are well and truly defeated.

It is critical that Taliban, al-Qaeda, and others of the Islamist jihadist ideology not have any basis to claim that the US has been defeated by their efforts. These groups have a fine record of distorting history to prove their point. The constant claim of Osama bin Laden, Omar, and others is that the jihadists defeated the Red Army.

More recently, when the US evacuated a remote outpost which had been the scene of a heavy Taliban attack a few weeks earlier, Taliban claimed it was the result of its victory over the infidels. In reality the Taliban probe had been repulsed with very heavy losses after several hours of bitter, close range combat between the outnumbered defenders and the jihadists. That reality did not bother the Taliban propagandists. They pointed to the fact that the outpost had been abandoned. That was enough.

In order to achieve even the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing," the US and its allies must carry the war up close and personal to the Islamist jihadists. While taking pains to assure that any civilian casualties are the result of jihadist actions, we and our allies, including the Afghan National Forces, must confront the jihadists in very personal combat. We must accept the enemy's linkage of war with manhood.

This brutal reality means our forces must take greater risks than would otherwise be the case. Our superiority in stand-off weapons is of no assistance when the enemy scorns death dealt from a safe distance. Taliban and the others will not allow us to demonstrate the bravery of being out of range.

Whether we like the idea or not (and the Geek does not), the enemy's concept of war demands that we revert to "don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes." If--and only if--we show the Islamist jihadists repeatedly that we have both the capacity and personal will to take the war right to their doorstep will we be able to achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing." To put it crudely, we have to show the Islamist jihadists that we have bigger balls than they do.

This may be an atavistic way of war. It isn't the sort of war we in the US (or the West generally) prefer to fight. But, it is the understanding of war which is inherent to both Islam and the tribally based societies of Northwest Asia. And, now get a grip on this, the locals define what war is and how it must be fought. The locals see war as manhood. We must do the same, unpleasant as that may be.

The US military is and has been awash in phrases such as "kill the enemy in close combat," or "find, fix, and destroy." The war in Afghanistan demands that these phrases be translated from paper slogans to the reality of life and death in the mountains and deserts of Afghanistan.

This is the "war of necessity" to which President Obama alluded some weeks ago in Phoenix. It is the way in which the war must be fought--if we are to "not-lose." It means that we must send more troops into hazard. It means that We the People and our purported representatives in Washington must accept an ever lengthening butcher's bill.

It means that both We the People and our representatives must accept the ground truth that what is at stake in Afghanistan is not simply the future of the people who live there or next door in Pakistan. It means that We the People and our representatives must accept the overarching reality that all Islamist jihadist groups everywhere in the world are linked head and hip so that a defeat one place is a defeat everywhere. Or, a success in one place is a victory for Islamist jihadism everywhere.

Finally, it means that President Obama must show that his manhood no less than that of the jihadists is at stake in the barren hills of Afghanistan. Only Mr Obama has the power to decide who has the bigger balls--the US or the Koran-thumping, trigger-pulling, bomb-wearing Warriors of Allah.

That's a hell of way to see matters, but it's a fact.