The Next Ten Years

The US (and a hell of a lot of other countries) is approaching the zero point marking the official start of "The Global War On Terrorism (GWOT.)"  To err on the side of accuracy, the US had already been in a war against advocates of violent political Islam for eight years when the hijacked passenger aircraft were turned into cruise missiles.

Osama bin Laden had dispatched his declaration of war against the US six years earlier, but few here paid any attention.  Two years before that, violent political Islamists only semi-associated with al-Qaeda had tried to take down the World Trade Center with a VBIED.  The Clinton administration in the lawyerly way which typified that brand treated this informal, undeclared act of war by a non-state actor to be a criminal offense rather than an act of overt aggression.  The later al-Qaeda sponsored attacks on the USS Cole, the Khobar Towershousing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania did merit a military response of a limited and highly irrelevant sort.  The dispatch of Tomahawk missiles rather than FBI teams must have bothered the peace loving Clintonites--and was equally ineffective.

The 9/11 strikes could not be termed other than an act of war even if the aggressor was a non-state actor.  It was Afghanistan's misfortune to be the state on whose territory and under whose protection the attack was planned and launched.  It was even more unfortunate that the head of the Taliban government (if that term is truly apposite), Mullah Omar, valued Islamic hospitality over the territorial integrity of his country or the lives of his fellow Afghans.

Nearly ten years later there is little doubt but the original al-Qaeda is all but dead.  At the least this particular band of violent political Islamists has been organizationally weakened to the point it presents no direct threat to the US or other "infidel" states.  The same cannot be said of Taliban, particularly as it appears that the US and its allies are seeking a political accommodation with the group and are supported in this by at least some critical segments of the Kabul regime.

Neither can there be any optimism about success having been achieved against any of the many groups espousing and practicing violent political Islam which have come into existence since 9/11.  Some of these have consciously adopted the al-Qaeda brand name or claimed affiliation with the legendary name of the initial group and its leader.  Two of these, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), constitute very real threats to the nations of the West as well as regional states.

As between the two al-Qaeda franchises, the first, AQAP, is the larger menace.  Located in the rapidly disintegrating state of Yemen, AQAP has not only established a strong presence (effectively becoming the government of at least one province), it has brokered relations with two African entities, al-Shabaab in the fictional country of Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Africa's most populous country.  Because of its successes to date and apparent prospects for doing even more in the months and years to come, AQAP has become the  new focus of the Americans as they pursue the GWOT.

The US is currently planning to ramp up its use of armed UAVs with the goal of replicating the success in targeted assassinations enjoyed in the FATA of Pakistan.  The use of the highly lethal unmanned platforms over the past two years in particular has been largely responsible for the emasculation of al-Qaeda and the progressive reduction of Taliban's ability to conduct hard target operations.  The Obama administration believes the Predators and Reapers can work the same grim magic in Yemen against the AQAP.

The ongoing political crisis in Yemen with its prospect of internal war gives a new urgency to the challenge of defeating AQAP before its creative bomb makers can score a success or before the American born and educated immam, Anwar al-Awlaki, can smooth talk another incomplete personality into undertaking a one man martyrdom operation.  Should an Awlaki guided suicide bomber or a well concealed package bomb penetrate US security with a resultant high body count, it would be difficult or impossible to avoid sending the troops one more time to a land filled with inhospitable terrain and flatly hostile people.

Awlaki is a mediagenic fellow.  AQAP's online publication Inspire is equally attractive to the Western media. The past bombing attempts by AQAP have been noteworthy in both the imagination behind them--and their failure.  Overall AQAP has attracted a very great deal of attention and generated a significant amount of apprehension without having actually done anything significant outside of Yemen.

In short, AQAP is far more shadow than substance.  AQAP is, in the deathless words of Chairman Mao,  "a paper tiger."

The fear that AQAP will slide easily into power in Yemen as the state energetically disassembles is overstated.  There are a couple of reasons for this push back against the conventional wisdom.

The first is the tribal nature of Yemen's population.  AQAP is primarily supported by one tribe, the one from which Awlaki springs.  Other tribes are not thrilled by taking orders from either AQAP or its tribal sponsor.  They will fight to preserve their autonomy and the privileges which go with it.

The second reason is the Salifist austerity of the AQAP is not compatible with the views of most Yemenis.  In those cities where AQAP has been able to establish dominance in recent months, the locals have bridled rapidly when confronted with the severe limitations the Salifists place upon life and its few pleasures.  This is in keeping with prior experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the austere advocates of violent political Islam outwore their welcome with surprising speed.  Salifists from Kabul to Somalia have proven themselves to be their own worse enemies.

The combination of popular rejection and tribal hostilities automatically limits the probability or even the possibility of AQAP exercising an increasing sway in the ruins of Yemen.  Their natural support base is too deficient to provide for long term, unchallenged authority.  They would not even find the same percentage of initial support as Taliban had in its first year or two in power.  (And, never forget, Taliban never had a firm hold on the non-Pushtu population of Afghanistan.)

There is an important caveat to this.  Should the US kill too many civilians, the base of support for AQAP will grow rapidly.  This is not to say Yemenis will embrace either Salifist religious ideology or necessarily support AQAP's agenda of violent political Islam.  They will simply seek to resist the Americans who are killing their kinsmen.

Reports out of the FATA are contradictory, but the many which point at increased animosity directed at the US as a result of the Predators killing non-combatants should not be discounted.  Neither should they be diminished.  The Afghans have demonstrated great antipathy over the killing of civilians by US and allied forces.  The same animosity is not shown regarding the deaths of civilians caused by Taliban bombs and bombers.  In both the FATA and Afghanistan, the locals expect their Muslim civilians to be killed by Muslim combatants.  It is OK.  A fact of life.  But, they do not cotton up to being killed by infidels.

When the infidel Predators cause collateral fatalities in Yemen, the first result will be the engendering of hostility to the US and those Yemenis who support or are seen as supporting the US.  The winner would be AQAP.

The US is facing the prospect of a self-fulfilling prophecy in Yemen.  In the attempt to stamp out a menace which does not yet exist, we are in danger of creating a genuine menace which cannot be stamped out.

We did this once before.  In Vietnam.  The bombing campaign directed against infiltration into South Vietnam by North Vietnam which did not exist prior to the commencement of the bombing resulted in the North starting up infiltration of supplies and trained manpower which could never be stopped.

Arguably, we are doing much the same today in the FATA although the prospect may very well be overstated.  But even in an overstated form, any bolstering of the Taliban or Haqqani network is not in our better interests. So far, the balance between positive and negative effects in the FATA has been on the plus side of the ledger. However, that is not a proof of concept which should be used to justify the employment of UAVs in Yemen.

Right now, the least-worst option is using the Predators in a watch and wait role only.  The situation in Yemen is to tenuous to run the risk of tilting affairs in favor of AQAP.  Watch, wait, and try to work sub rosa to help the Yemeni themselves contain and finally eliminate the adherents of violent political Islam.  Odds are the locals can do the job--unless we 'help' them in a lethal way.

Carrying Water And Doublethinking

Leon Panetta is an old Chicago pol.  He came of political age as a cog in the oldest, longest running, smoothest operating machine in the US--the Cook County Democratic Party.  As such, he knows well the primary duty of a machine man--loyalty to the Boss.  By definition the Boss is the Nice Young Man From Chicago, Barack Obama.

Only the overarching requirement of loyalty could have impelled the new Secretary of Defense as he moved from his old job of DCIA to announce that the defeat of al-Qaeda was "within reach."  Only days later Mr Panetta demonstrated the requisite degree of doublethink when he thundered against the possibility of doubling the 400 billion dollar cut in the next decade's defense budget under the debt ceiling increase deal.

Given that the American participation in the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq is in its death throws and the rush to the exit has started in Afghanistan, the new SecDef is perfectly well aware that the costs of war will go down as well which will allow for significant decreases in the Pentagon expenditures without a single real cut in procurement or force size.  And, if his statement regarding the impending end of al-Qaeda is taken at face value, the need for the large security establishment created in the immediate wake of 9/11 and the consequent decisions of George W. Bush evaporates as well.  If al-Qaeda does well and truly turn its collective toes to the sky, the need for mountains of money marked "For the Pentagon" goes away.

Presumably, the end of al-Qaeda would allow the US to return to the (relatively) lower levels of defense appropriations which characterized the days prior to 9/11.  In that case, Panetta should quit his bitchin' and find a few additional programs to cut so as to please his Boss properly.

Of course, the Panetta Dictum regarding the morbidity of al-Qaeda like the rumors of Mark Twain's death is greatly exaggerated.  Al-Qaeda is not dead.  It is not on some sort of Islamic life support.  It is not even gravely ill.

The real deal of which Leon the Loyal must be completely aware considering his previous job as well as his daily access to the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (as well as the Presidential Intelligence Brief) is that al-Qaeda has morphed.  It has changed profoundly from its original form.  Most critically, it is far more of a threat in its current incarnation than it was in the Bad Old Days.

In the far distant Eocene of 2001, al-Qaeda was a small, hierarchical organization with a tight command and control system.  It was dependent upon Osama bin Laden as inspiration, decision maker, leader, and chief fund raiser.  None of this obtains today.  Nor has it obtained for some time.  Long before bin Laden went to Paradise, the "Base" had fissioned, decentralized, become far more of an idea than an institution.

Just as American doctrine and tactics changed under the stresses of real wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so also have the operational concepts and organizational methods of the al-Qaeda predicated practitioners of violent political Islam.  Arguably, the Mighty Men of the Koran have changed more radically and more effectively than have the armed forces of the US.

The most obvious feature of the new, improved "al-Qaeda" is the spawning of franchises.  Both al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are obvious spin-offs or imitators of the famed original.  "Allied" groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia may not use the old brand name but exist as self-conscious copies of Osama's group.  It is a brute fact that AQAP has become a larger threat to the civilized states than the ragged band of drone pressed fugitives headed by al-Zawihiri lurking in either the stone huts of the FATA or living in relative comfort in anonymous houses in some sprawling Pakistani city.

The far more important change in the universe of violent political Islam is the transformation of the old al-Qaeda brand into a metaphysical idea.  This coupled with the elevation of bin Laden from a jihadi ideal to the Perfect Martyred Warrior of the Prophet has provided the intellectual substrate for the emergence of powerfully motivated "lone wolf" terrorists.

In this context it is important to recall that war, all war, exists first as an idea.  It matters not in the least what type of war or what level of intensity, war is first and foremost an intellectual construct.  The now dead or captured theorists of Islamist martyrdom operations along with bin Laden have provided a basic set of ideas which define asymmetrical warfare from the point of view of the advocate of violent political Islam.  These ideas have been enlarged, filled out, and spread by the assorted jihadist websites as well as videotaped sermons (and hectoring) by Muslim clerics.  Many of these Men of the Islamic Cloth are quite unknown in the West.  Others, most notably Anwar al-Awlacki, are nearly household names throughout the civilized states.

Self-radicalization facilitated by the web and the arguments of clerics great and small, well known and unknown alike has become the major feature of the current version of al-Qaeda.  Individuals or very small groups of self-radicalized adherents of violent political Islam represent a very real threat to the civilized states as well as a quite meaningful challenge to security and law enforcement agencies.  The several high profile arrests of wannabe "martyrs," the spectacular failures of the Underwear Bomber and the Times Square Bomber, or the quick police follow-up on the alert gun shop clerk in Kileen, Texas do not militate against the reality of the jihadist threat or the thinness of the margin between tragedy and tragedy narrowly averted.

Of course, crowd sourced terror does not exist alone.  In addition to the ideological support provided by the memes originating with al-Qaeda 1.0 and the effective tools of self-radicalization and not completely irrelevant instruction in the practical considerations of waging one man wars on the West, there exist potent and growing al-Qaeda facsimiles.  AQAP has been acknowledged properly as the single largest threat.  AQIM is growing.  Rapidly.

The senior French investigative judge holding the counterterrorism brief has issued a reassuring nostrum to the effect that AQIM does not represent a threat to Europe.  This pronouncement is rather like patting the hoi polloi gently and telling them not to worry their pretty little (empty) heads about terrorism, that the adults in the government know better.  In this way M.Marc Trevidic echoed Panetta's declaration of al-Qaeda's impending death.  Feel good words which belie the substance of reality.

AQIM has extended its reach to Nigeria.  Kidnapping Europeans.  This is an expansion of their reach with the view to forcing changes in European policy.  In short, it is terror of the violent political Islamic sort.  Operations in Nigeria taken in conjunction with the local Islamist group would have been unthinkable a year ago.  Now, the action shows a growing potential to strike Europeans if not Europe.  There is every reason to believe that by this time next year AQIM will rival AQAP as a threat to the West generally.

Al-Shabaab may have evacuated Mogadishu, but that is not a sign of its defeat regardless of what the imitation government of Somalia may say.  Rather, the real potential of al-Shabaab was demonstrated by its set of highly lethal attacks in Uganda last year.  Al-Shabaab has tight links with AQAP as well as a ready source of English speaking recruits in Somali refugee communities in the US.  It is one more rapidly growing threat.

Of his two contradictory statements, Panetta was much closer to the truth when he warned against overly dramatic cuts in the Pentagon budge.  He must know that ten years from now the US will be engaged heavily even if not with conventional forces on the ground.  He must be aware perfectly that the war against the advocates of violent political Islam will be ongoing in 2022 as it is today.  Probably on a larger scale geographically.

Panetta may be a good machine politician, but he is also an American.  Doublethink like loyalty to a misguided Boss has its limits.  When push comes to shove as it must in the next few months, it is likely that the Secretary of Defense will fight with all the political skills he possesses to assure the the US has the means necessary to continue the fight against the forces of violent political Islam until the civilized states finally win.

Leon Panetta came a very long way during his years as DCI.  That was a surprise to any and all who have personal acquaintanceship with the mindset of typical Chicago pols.  It has been obvious that Panetta has learned that there is a wide and dark world out there,  that the limits of Cook County are not the limits of the US, that the interests of the machine are transcended by the interests of the US.  If a bit of experience can manufacture that level of miraculous transformation, it is not impossible that a few months running the Pentagon and talking more and more often with commanders responsible for the lives of those under them will carry the transformation to the next step--a Leon Panetta who is willing and ready to drop his Boss's water bucket in the higher cause of the country as a whole.

Think Globally, Act Locally

This old bumper sticker phrase much loved by the tree hugging crowd some twenty years ago has become the new, de facto slogan of al-Qaeda under the direction of its new capo d' tutti capi, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  This, in itself, is not surprising as the good doctor has long been known for his possessing a far greater interest in making Egypt a model of shariah in action than in establishing a global caliphate.

What makes the latest expression of the world according to Zawahiri (it has a catchy title: The Message of Good Hope and Tidings For Our People In Egypt.  OK, maybe it loses something in translation.) is the way in which he combines the ideas of making Egypt safe for a Salifist view of Islam with the further disestablishment of the US as a force in the region.  The six parts of "The Message" are themselves a riff on Zawahiri's earlier and vastly important philosophical book best known by its short title Exoneration.  In both he argues that the successful jihad mounted to date by al-Qaeda and its franchises forced the Obama administration to abandon Mubarak and prepare the way for the success of violent political Islam in Egypt.

In both "The Message" and "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri contends that the moment has come to shift the focus of jihad on the internal revolutions in Egypt and other countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Tunisia and Syria so as to put more pressure not only on the local apostate rulers but on the US.  In essence he is calling for al-Qaeda to act not as a global non-state player but rather as the facilitator and coordinator of local efforts such as those being waged by al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP,) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM,) and al-Shabaab.  It is clear that he believes that the US will be overstretched by simultaneous challenges mounted by these groups as well as smaller entities and lone wolves preying on soft targets throughout the Mideast and North Africa.

Even in this context it is self-evident that al-Zawahiri's focus in on Egypt.  His view of the Ummah is through the prism of Egyptian nationalism.  He sees the (in his eyes) necessary victory of the most austere form of Islam in Egypt will vault the country to primacy in the emerging caliphate.  As a good Egyptian nationalist, one who rivals the quite secular Nasser as a hyper-nationalist, al-Zawahiri sees Cairo as the fulcrum of the new Islam, the next Caliphate.

To this end "The Message" calls upon Egyptian Muslims to act as one, to act quickly and decisively so as to assert Egypt's pride of place among the Muslim majority states of the world.  This appeal will not fall on deaf ears.  Overlooked in all the hoopla over the yearning for genuine democracy expressed during the overthrow of Mubarak is a very basic and potent ground truth: Egyptians have felt diminished as a people, a nation over the past thirty years.  After the national high point of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the road has been strictly downhill.

Egyptians have increasingly seen themselves as citizens of a diminished country.  More and more they have come to see themselves as having lost status, position, even dignity.  The thought that Egypt had become nothing more than a dependency of the US rankled--deeply.  As is the case in Russia, the notion of having lost national status not only rankled, it motivated.  Mubarak was deeply hated not simply because he presided over a country neck deep in corruption, nepotism, inequity, but because he had not only acquiesced in but actively fostered the decline of Egypt in the region and in the world.  On Mubarak's watch, many believed and continue to believe, Egypt was no longer a country worthy of respect but rather the object of derision.

Al-Zawahiri's skilled blending of religion and nationalism serves to counter this pervasive sense of Egyptian degradation.  By seizing the present moment, al-Zawahiri argues, Egyptians can reclaim their dignity, their status, their pride, their place in the sun.  Merging the Egyptian national identity with the true belief of basic and uncompromising Islam will bring salvation, or, if not salvation, at least pull Egypt and its people out of the slough of the marginalized, the trivialized, the ignored, the bowed head beggers.

Al-Zawahiri promises that an Egypt powered by Islam of ninety proof purity will once more be what it seemed to be many, many years ago during the heyday of Nasser--a force in the world, a country that could call the tune danced to by supposed superpowers.  All that is required, the one time medic alleges, is for Egyptians not to fall prey to American blandishments or secret plots made in the USA and hold true to the calls of the faith and the needs of political Islam--including the use of violence should such be either necessary or desirable.

In "Exoneration" al-Zawahiri extends his argument to include countries such as Yemen, Syria and the states of North Africa.  His position is both simple and inherently attractive, particularly to younger members of the over-educated and underemployed middle class.

In short he says, "All of you, Syrians, Yemeni, Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans are members of societies which were once great.  You are all citizens of states which were once respected, even feared by the infidels.  You are people of nations which were once great but are now small."

He then asks the essential question, "Why?  Why were you who were once so great are now so small?"

And, unsurprisingly, he gives the correct answer.  "Because you abandoned the path of pure and true Islam.  Because you surrendered to government by apostates, by turncoats who say they are Muslims but act and govern as if they are kaffir."

Then comes the expected call to arms.  "You will be great once more, respected and feared once again, feel the dignity you deserve only when you join the jihad.  Only when you throw out the apostates and restore genuine Islamic rulers will you regain your greatness."

Shrewdly al-Zawahiri backs his argument by emphasizing Islam's stance on social justice, economic equity, and political openness.  He contrasts the nature of the Islamic posture in all these critical and highly emotional issues with the stance of the US and Uncle Sam's local clients.  He wraps all the ills of the Islamic Mideast and North African states in an American flag.  He demands locals act for local goals while doing so in the global context of putting increased pressure on the US--pressure to withdraw.

It is worth considering that the thinking of al-Zawahiri has been picked up, reflected and even amplified by other high profile advocates of violent political Islam.  Anwar al-Awalacki in Yemen has done this in recent weeks.  Indeed much of the theoretical writing in the several issues of Inspire might have come from the keyboard of the American born and educated cleric, but the ideas and arguments, the logic and goals, are those of al-Zawahiri.

Even in the geographic expression, Somalia, where one is surprised to discover a level of literacy which would allow the reading of al-Zawahiri's rather dense prose, the locals have been extolling the ideas of the medic turned mass murderer.  The same applies to recent musings by spokesmen for AQIM.  Clearly, al-Zawahiri has a message that many are both reading and amplifying.

The US has been playing the role assigned to it in The World According to Ayman.  Our aid to the Ugandan forces in Somalia has been increased as has been the assistance provided to the fictitious government of Somalia.  Shortly we can expect more Predator strikes in Somalia along with a significant ramp-up of the remote controlled death from above operations in Yemen.  Carefully targeted special operations will not be long in the offing.

The regional impact of the ongoing mess in Libya is growing.  There will be a requirement in the not-too-distant future for the US to make some choices as to what we should or must do to help the local forces and governments in their struggle with AQIM.  While we have no bulls in the herd, particularly as compared with European countries, the small but rapidly growing AQIM will reach the level of potential threat to US interests long before the next election here.

Think Globally, Act Locally!  Al-Zawahiri has it right.  So right that we may soon be wishing for the good old days of Osama bin Laden.  The legion of experts assured us that al-Zawahiri would be a nebbish as the Lord High Poobah of al-Qaeda because he had the charisma of a nematode.

What a crock!  Brains beat charisma every time--particularly in war.

The Latest Twist For A Long Running Insurgency

Once upon a time the Spanish flag whipped in the sirocco where sandy wastes met the sea in a geographic expression then known as Spanish Sahara. Thirty-seven years ago, even before Richard Nixon cashed in his Watergate tinted chips, a group known by its Spanish initials as Polisario declared itself to be the vanguard of an independence oriented revolution. (Well, to use the proper term, a defensive insurgency with the goal of making the hot, arid, economically useless desert a zone as free of Spaniards as it is rain.)

The post-Franco Spanish government allowed as how it was quite willing to let this meaningless remnant of past colonial glory go its own way. At a speed which would put a thoroughbred racing camel to shame both Morocco and Mauritania claimed the now orphaned area of miles and miles of nothing but miles and miles. Polisario disagreed. Forcefully.

The lackluster Mauritanian simulacrum of an army after a tad of defeat in its token resistance packed it in. The Moroccans were made of sterner stuff. By 1976 Morocco was in defacto control of most of what was now called simply, Western Sahara.

Never one to admit defeat--and having secured the not unimportant backing of Algeria--Polisario kept on with the good fight. Over the next decade or so the Moroccans pushed the Berber and Arab fighters of Polisario back until their only secure bases were refugee camps in Algeria.

Following the UN brokered ceasefire in 1991, which had the promise of a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara as a key feature, Morocco secured its status in the largest and more valuable part of the place with a sand berm of monumental dimensions. Polisario repaired to lick its considerable wounds in the Algerian camps. Given that Algeria had leveraged a seat in the Organization of African Unity for Polisario and continued to support its political and military ambitions, the situation was acceptable to the Polisario insurgents, leader and follower alike.

The situation stayed in this stasis with the promised referendum being postponed time after time and Morocco perfecting its hold on most but not quite all of Western Sahara for the next decade. The stasis continued for several reasons chief among which was the political crisis and attendant mass deaths which blighted the Algerian political and social landscapes as government and Islamist (primarily Salifist) opposition. The Algerian military needed more stability not less and thus acted to inhibit Polisario's ambitions.

The new century opened with changes in Morocco, particularly the coming to the throne of Mohammed VI in 1999. Since then the Kingdom has been able to inaugurate a series of political, social, and, most importantly, economic development measures which have had the incidental benefit of strengthening Morocco's hold on Western Sahara. This development has raised the bar to Polisario's success.

Also impairing Polisario in realizing its long-held dream of independence is the recurrent tilt of the UN, particularly the Security Council, in Morocco's favor. Thus frustration has grown year by year during the past decade in the camps of Algeria. No one is more frustrated and willing to embrace the most extreme of measures than the young men who have been born and come of age in the camps.

Once again something first noted in the concentration camps of the American West (aka "Reservations") has been demonstrated in the remote camps of Algeria. As on the assorted "reses" of the US and the refugee camps inhabited by Palestinians, the involuntary "refugees" constitute a ready, willing, able, and eager source of recruits for war. Even the certainty of death in war has once again been proven to be less unacceptable than continued life in the camps.

As a result the young men of the camps have become a source of recruits for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Polisario-AQIM linkage has been demonstrated with increasing frequency in the past several months with Polisario members and leaders such as Imam Muhamad Seedi and Abu Musab Abdul Wadud.

The Polisario recruits are powerfully motivated--and not simply nor solely by the desire for independence. The Salifist ideology of AQIM is at least as important--probably more so--in providing the impetus to revival within the almost moribund ranks of Polisario. This implies that the fresh troops are as willing to kill and die in Algeria as they are in Morocco or Western Sahara.

AQIM is not noted for harboring limited ambitions. The reach of the AQIM dreams (or, perhaps delusions) is seen in their urging that Morocco be attacked. The goal is not the liberation of Western Sahara. No. That would be too limited. The aim is that of compelling the Kingdom and Army of Morocco to serve as the mechanism of Islamist revanchism.

The target of the revanchist dream is Spain. More precisely it is the recovery of the lost province of al-Andalus. Actually the goal is not limited to the far marches of the Pyrenees, and since the Islamic and Islamist tenet is that any territory over which the crescent flag of the Prophet's forces once flew is forever Muslim, AQIM and its supporters demand the reconquest of south France. (Apparently the victory of Geoffry Martel at Tours was only a preliminary decision.)

AQIM has failed to gain great traction in Algeria perhaps because the memories of the pools of blood are too recent in the collective memory of Algerians generally. The addition of a large chunk of the twenty-five or so thousand young men without a country but with a faith is a most welcome boost to AQIM.

The "refugees" from Western Sahara also provide a strong mechanism for penetrating on a peer-to-peer basis the alienated youth of Morocco--thirty percent of whom are currently unemployed. Radicalization of Moroccan young men was shown in a melodramatic way last week with the deportation of two such from Italy following the discovery of their hazy plan to kill the current pope.

Moroccans are well represented in France, Spain, and Italy. They are present all through the EU. Not all are even marginally integrated in their host societies. Not all are meaningfully employed. More than a few have convinced themselves that they and their religion is the focus of baseless excoriation by Europeans. These, particularly those of the last category, represent fertile recruiting pools. The same religion based approach which has proven quite successful with the Polisario in Algeria will work with the rootless young men living in Europe.

Morocco presents a cheerful face to the world, particularly the West and the US. It likes to portray itself as a modern, tolerant, open society with a well-respected and regarded constitutional monarch supported by a democratically elected parliament. In comparison to other Muslim majority states, the Kingdom does enjoy a wide measure of civil rights, a relatively free press, a reasonably efficient bureaucracy, and a prosperous economy.

The image is attractive. It is also fragile. Morocco as a state is tenuous. It would fall before a resolute Islamist attack. This is precisely what AQIM intends as the first, necessary step to grander things.

Polisario provides a tool to mobilize people against the Kingdom. This is the case not only in the arena of domestic stability but also in international fora. Polisario has legitimacy in international affairs given its status in the African Union. It is not a declared terrorist entity unlike AQIM. It has access to the UN. And to the international media as shown by its protests during the vote to reauthorize the UN mandate in Western Sahara.

AQIM and Polisario are not strange bedfellows. Their goals are intertwined, interlocked, not simply coinciding but mutual. Beyond that, the two groups share the most intimate of connections, those of faith.

Just Who Is Winning?

There has been some good news from (some of) the front in the war between the civilized nations of the world and Islamist jihad. The Marja area has been cleared of the majority of Taliban trigger pullers so the civilian government might try to establish itself and gain credibility with and support from the locals. In Pakistan the government, military, and ISI have continued in their program of selective apprehension of Afghan Taliban senior figures.

So much for the good news. It isn't much but it does show a considerable improvement in the AfPak region compared to a few months ago.

Then, there is the rest of the world.

While there is the appearance--and even some reality--of a truce in Yemen, the failing state continues to attract Islamists and jihadi faster than a honey tree draws bees. The pirates of Somalia continue to operate even though the world's press yawns. More importantly the Koran waving, AK toting thugs of al-Shabaab continue to operate with success despite losses in recent combat in the capital Mogadishu.

The al-Shabaab jihadist leadership is feeling symptoms of the "victory disease" in that it has declared war against Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. The "war" which has been declared has already been defined by al-Shabaab to be one of suicide and similar terror attacks against which none of the listed countries is well prepared to counter the threat.

The Islamist faction in Nigeria has increased in both size and appeal. The greatest manifestation of this is the up-tick in attacks on Christian communities and churches. The government is going through a period of internal instability with the result it has not been able to suppress the jhadists effectively. Rather they have been repressed just enough to consolidate their structures and enhance their appeal to those who are inclined to feel persecuted or neglected.

Then there is North Africa....

Important in and of itself the countries of North Africa--Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mali--are important. They contain vast quantities of natural resources including hydrocarbons. The region is even more critical as a potential launching pad for jihadist attacks on European targets.

These countries--in particular Mali with its vast expanses of nothing but nothingness--are the stomping ground of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.) Currently AQIM is small, not more than a thousand adherents but one has to be bullish on its future.

AQIM is descended from the Algerian Islamist Fighting Front for Salvation and Combat which waged a very bloody war with that country's security forces in the Nineties following the Algerian army's cancellation of elections which would have brought the Islamists to power. The war was, not unlike the long war of national independence, both dirty and deadly. At the end of active hostilities the surviving jihadists withdrew to the desert wastes of Mali, an area about the size of France.

The group spent the years in the wilderness profitably, developing organizational coherence, ideological consistency, and increasingly close relations with al-Qaeda. Capitalizing on a number of grievances within the more marginal members of regional societies as well as the frustrated ambitions of the often over-educated, under-employed urban youth of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and even Libya, AQIM gained supporters, if not active combatants.

In more recent months and years AQIM has concentrated on kidnapping foreigners including oil workers and attacking security forces. This sort of humdrum has been dramatically punctuated by spectaculars, the most eye popping of which was the December 2007 attack on a UN facility in Algeria which killed seventeen staffers as well as twenty locals.

The impoverished, ramshackle governments of Mali and Mauritania have proven themselves to be utterly incompetent in dealing with AQIM even when the group subjects the governments to intense embarrassment both domestically and internationally. The efforts underway in both countries have been complemented (but not made any less ineffective) by both the US and the EU declaring AQIM to be a terrorist entity.

Recent economic aid and preliminary military assistance have not had any measurable or even noticeable impact upon the fortunes of Mali or Mauritania. AQIM continues to operate with impunity in both. Both governments--and some Western analysts--have downplayed the spike in AQIM recruiting and operations by overstating the importance of the working relationship between the Islamist jihadists of AQIM and local criminal gangs including smugglers and kidnappers.

While these relations exist having been carefully cultivated by AQIM during the Wilderness Years, they facilitate rather than replace the abilities inherent in the group. The criminals are a sort of force multiplier and not the force itself. The AQIM force itself has been growing not only by local recruiting but as a result of individuals from Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria having come to join the "good fight." It is only a matter of time (and not much of it) before gunslingers from Iraq and places east start appearing on the overhead imagery of the desert camps.

The initiative continues to reside with the Islamist jihadists for one set of very simple and compelling reasons. The first is the existence of a very credible (to True Believers or wannabe True Believers) ideology promising eschatological rewards as well as anodynes for "this world" inequities and injustices. The second is the self-organizing nature of all the myriad Islamist jihadist groups. The non-existence of a Jihadist Central Command is the second greatest strength of the enemy in the current war(s).

The greatest strength is, of course, the unmentionable reality that the Sacred Writings of Islam contain all the justifications needed for the waging of the dirtiest of wars. Islam provides a credible basis, if interpreted by the "right" cleric for any and all wars including the possession and implied use of nuclear weapons.

The combination of religious predicates and self-organization means the Islamist jihadist enemy can move fast, change locations, agendas, and threaten different targets. It has and will retain the initiative into the foreseeable future. The nations comprising the League of Civilized States may win individual battles, claim victory in assorted little wars, but will not be able to kill the hydra of innumerable heads unless and until the nature and character of the enemy is openly acknowledged.

Don't hold your breath.

What! Me Worry? Not About "Eurabia"

Once upon a time, long ago, Newsweek was a staid, stolid magazine. Way back then, back when Ike was in the White House and the collective knees of We the People knocked like castanets with gran mal epilepsy, it was the boring, fact-oriented rival of the froth spewing icon of the Luce Empire, Time. High school students groaned when they were forced to read the dull words of Newsweek rather than the more stimulating pap of Time. Boring or not, Newsweek had the advantage of being free of opinion, particularly the ill-informed and unsourced sort.

Times have changed. Now Newsweek is not only thin in size and coverage, it is very, very lacking in weight, particularly intellectual weight. It is, however, long, indeed, very, very long on politically correct opinions of dubious intellectual honesty or robust factual undergirding. As an example of this, one might consider the magazine's treatment of what it is pleased to call the "Myth of Eurabia." Written by William Underhill, a staff hack who has penned articles on such diverse subjects as mosquitoes, Prince Charles, the Labor Party's difficulties, and the race for the so called "god particle," the piece portrays any and all who have voiced alarm at developments in Europe, pointing to the Muslim minority gaining an undue influence on the region's political, social and cultural structures, as a crew of paranoic scaremongers.

Nothing in Mr Underhill's string book indicates that he has any special qualifications to write on the complex subject of the Muslim impact on European politics, society, and culture to say nothing of the longer term implications of their growing and increasingly strident numbers in the European states. This in no way deters him from pushing a multi-cultural agenda with the intent of both reassuring the reader and demonising all who have found cause for concern in the Muslim penetration of Europe from the UK to the depths of the former Warsaw Pact.

Mr Underhill starts off by branding those who warn of the emerging Islamist threat to ancient European cultural values, social norms, political institutions, and world view as being "far right." The use of the term "far right" as the broad tar brush is as common, intellectually bankrupt, and ethically objectionable as was the use of the phrase "red-baiter" against anyone who spoke against Soviet espionage and subversion efforts a half-century ago.

(Let the record show that during the long, dark days of the most frigid Cold War, Newsweek did not stoop to the loathsome practice of name calling. The editors in those days let such reprehensible practices reside with the minions of Luce-world.)

Let us grant that Mr Underhill is correct when he avers Muslims will not be a majority of the Western European population in the next half-century even though that is a debatable proposition. Let us further grant Mr Underhill's undocumented and undocumentable contention that most Muslims are quite happy with the extant European social norms, cultural values, and political processes and institutions.

Even with these concessions, Mr Underhill's main point--Muslims are dear, sweet, harmless and ever-so-likable, and somewhat exotic friends and neighbors--is subject to the Scots verdict, at the very best. His second major conclusion, that any who do not share his view of Muslims are members of a pointy-headed, bigoted, knuckle-dragging assemblages of racists, Islamophobes, and fascists is totally unproven.

Those who warned of the threat to Europe posed by Adolph Hitler and similar national socialists long before German re-armament and renunciation of the Verseilles Treaty made it patent were right. Those who saw a threat to Europe and the Western World in Stalin's ambitions were right no matter how often they were dismissed as "red baiting right wingers." Twice within living memory the accurate Cassandra's have been dismissed as the loonie fringe only to be proven right.

Mr Underhill has made a choice. On the basis of little evidence and much wishful thinking and politically correct celebration of multi-culturalism, he has concluded that the Islamic population of Europe is a pure blessing to that old, tired continent. He has determined on the same basis that there is nothing happening in Europe today or in the near future which should concern, let alone worry Americans. With a sweeping certainty he dismisses all who have seen a potential threat contained in the Muslims of Europe, not only to those states but the US as well, as being a bunch of myth-making scaremongers of the worst, most racist sort.

Mr Underhill has taken a dangerous position. He has taken one which is difficult, if not impossible to maintain in the face of the realities of Islam and Islamism.

While there are peaceful Muslims in numbers which defy counting, Islam qua Islam is not peaceful. It is a warrior's religion. It is a religion without limits either as to its territorial sway or the means employed to gain the fullest possible expansion of its domination.

Islam is a religion in which there is no firebreak between the sacred and the profane, between mosque and state, between public and the private. One of the major appeals of Islam to converts as well as those born to the faith is the emphasis on community, a global community which has only in the past thirty years become aware of its strength, numbers, and global reach. As a result, the ever more extensive demands of the Islamist has grown in stridency--and influence.

Mr Underhill fails to note that there have been no organised, large scale protests by Muslims in Europe (or anywhere) against the bloody excesses of the Islamist jihadists. This lack of public opposition to the most revolting tactics of the "martyrdom seekers" speaks volumes to the willingness of Muslims generally to accept and tacitly approve of any and all efforts by their more militant coreligionists to seize and hold power. As an alternative explanation of Muslim silence, it might be posited that the observant Muslim has been terrorised into submission by the threats and acts of his Islamist jihadist brethren.

In either case, Mr Underhill's argument that Muslims are so fractured and fragmented that they can not serve as an effective political force is vitiated. If Muslims resident in France, Germany, or the UK cannot and do not publicly express total, absolute disapprobation of Islamist actions, then there exists a de facto community coherence which protects and potentiates the activities of the most extreme within the Muslim community.

Even in the immediate aftermath of 7/7 and the Madrid bombings, the denunciations coming from what might best be termed "public Muslims" were strangely redolent of the pro forma, the formulaic. They were mere genuflections before the alter of outraged majority opinion of a purely and obviously self-protective nature. This is not to gainsay the contention that there were individual Muslims who were shocked by the attacks and reprobated their having occurred as well as those who carried them out, but rather to indicate the community as a community never disavowed the acts and the actors, the sin and the sinners, if you like.

Mr Underhill, as is the case with so many of the American and European intelligensia, the "useful idiots" as Lenin termed them, fails to parse properly between the attitudes of the European (and American) elite and the hoi polloi of both continents. Mr Underhill partakes fully of the typical elite disdain for the great unwashed of the general population, the people who do not write for major media outlets or pontificate at conferences of learned academics or rub elbows comfortably with the elect in the halls of power.

As elections including the recent one for members of the European Parliament indicate, there is a great and growing gulf between the world views of the elite and the hoi polloi. Increasingly, the hoi polloi are not content to keep their mouths shut in the presence of their "betters," to keep their place, keep their mouths shut, and follow the leaders.

In the minds of the elite (and Mr Underhill), nationalism is dead and should be buried. The age of multi-culturalism is upon the world and should be welcomed by all proper minded people. The hoi polloi obviously do not agree.

The voices from the bottom are being heard to the discomfort of Mr Underhill and the elite generally. There is an irony here. Back in the years right after World War II the French broke their arms patting themselves on the back for having suddenly discovered the voices of the heaving masses of the people previously unheard by historians.

The French and later the historians and intellectuals of all Europe and the US engaged in orgies of self-congratulations for giving long overdue credit to the perspicacity and sagacity of the working classes; the women of field, factory and kitchen; the privates huddling in the trenches. The true voice of the people these intellectuals assured each other and the rest of us were the valid source of history, of the collective wisdom of the folk.

Now, the voices are in the present, in the political and not the safe reaches of the past. Because the wisdom, the perspacacity, the sagacity of the hoi polloi does not meet the desires, expectations, or exhortations of the elite, the people are no longer fountainheads of understanding. Now they are the tools of the "far right." Now they are the misguided fools of nationalism and cultural stolditity.

The elite, Mr Underhill in specific, may sputter and pour soothing syrup but they may be the fools. Perhaps it would be best if the elite listened instead of tut-tutting. Heed instead of assuming it has both the capacity and right to lead.

Al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb Puffs Its Chest

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been doing a fair bunch of threatening and killing in recent weeks. The group has been littering the desert with bodies in Algeria and Mali. When AQIM could take time off from shooting soldiers and murdering captives, it wiled away the long hours by making threats.

First the group threatened France. The Islamist jihadists were mightily put out by the derogatory remarks made by Nicholas Sarkozy concerning the wearing of the burqua (AKA "a garbage sack") by women in France. Using the high and lofty wording which Islamists generally employ to justify their intentions to butcher, injure, and terrorise, AQIM warned it would "protect the honor of our sisters" living under the threats of "Islamophobia" in France. The Bravos of Allah's Army called upon French Muslims to join in the "war" against the Crusader oppressors.

Showing a resolve more closely approaching that exhibited at Verdun in 1916 than the version on display in May 1940, the French parliament went ahead with hearings on whether or not to put the body-enclosing bag beyond the pale of law. All that is missing to date is for President Sarkozy to come out singing, "Form your battalions! March! March."

Not at all taken aback by the failure of the Muslims resident in France to take up the challenge and throw up barricades in Paris, AQIM has taken on a bigger target. A much bigger target.

China. That's right, China. The scrofulous group best known for massive atrocities in Algeria and, more recently, ambushing the poorly trained and equipped troops of Mali, has tossed down the gauntlet to one of the world's most formidable militaries backed by a very fine clandestine service and political will almost beyond measure.

But, what else could a poor, humble but True Believing Warrior For the Prophet do given the provocation offered by China in its repression of the Uighurs? While Islamic governments may shy away from confronting Beijing, and the Islamic neighbors of China, the Central Asian Republics, even ally themselves with the Very Big Satan, the Desert Swords of Islam will rise to the occasion.

North Africa, particularly Algeria, is a target rich environment. There are more than fifty thousand Chinese nationals living and working there. Spread thinly across a huge, potentially hostile physical and human terrain, the Chinese, whether oil field workers or employees of other Chinese government sponsored business activities or private citizens pursuing profit and pleasure according to individual definitions, all are now at an elevated risk.

Unlike previous threats or attacks against Chinese nationals as in the Sudan, Beijing responded quickly, vigorously, and publicly to the AQIM declaration. Qin Gang, a ForMin spokesman stated that China would take all necessary measures to protect Chinese personnel and institutions against attack in Africa.

One measure which will not be taken is any backing down in Xanjiang. The central government is--quite literally--death on the three evils of "separatism, terrorism, and extremism." In the estimate of Beijing, the Uighurs are guilty of all three "evils." Being foreigners, the best AQIM can aspire to is guilt in the second two categories. That will be enough, more than enough, if AQIM carries through with its threat.

The Deep Thinkers of the Band of Relentless Fighters For Muslims Everywhere might be well advised to consult history. Knowing these devout adherents of killing their way to the Perfect Peace of the New Caliphate are too busy with prayers or bomb making to consult the books, the Geek, in his public spirited way will give a thumbnail of the relevant historical experience.

Long ago (say in the 1980s CE) and far away (in a place called Lebanon) there were a number of groups which combined True Love of the Prophet with such secular concerns as driving Israel into the sea, freeing the Palestinian people from bondage, removing the apostate rulers of sundry Islamic states, and generally raising merry hell. As part of achieving these Glorious Goals and assured eternity in Paradise, these Fine Men of the Faith practiced the kidnapping of hostages.

They took captive assorted Americans and Europeans. Some were (in a style already familiar to AQIM) murdered after torture. Others (again in a way copied by AQIM) were released upon the payment of ransom. Still others were held until somehow, somewhere, sometime, they simply disappeared.

Simultaneously flushed with success and frustrated at their failure to drive Israel into the sea, free the Palestinians from bondage, force the US to abandon its role in the Mideast, and achieve other goals sanctified in the Koran, the Deep Thinkers of one group among the multitude resolved to alter matters by kidnapping some Russian diplomats.

Some appropriate minions of the Soviet state were duly taken hostage. The captors sat back secure that they had achieved a measure of leverage over events previously denied them.

Having failed to study Soviet history and the methods by which the Soviets often responded to such acts of base counter-revolutionary activity, the hostage-takers were themselves taken by surprise.

Far from bowing to the Will of Allah as expressed by the kidnappings, the Soviet leadership dispatched a team from their highly efficient clandestine service. This team snatched close relatives of the chief kidnappers. After getting frankly Medieval on the bodies of these relatives they were delivered personally to the local Thug-in-Chief.

The surviving Soviets were speedily released. Appropriate funeral services were held for the relatives taken by the clandestine team.

End of story. Well, not quite. The real end is that while Americans, Europeans, and even Israelis were captured by the Intrepid Men of the One True Faith, Russians were now immune from this fate.

The sweep of Chinese history both before and after the Communist Revolution indicates strongly that the Chinese are far more likely to take the Soviet approach than they are to emulate the hand wringing, can't-we-talk-this-over approach of the Americans, particularly the Americans of the Age of Obama. The French did not roll over and ask AQIM to forgive them for the nasty things said by their president. The Chinese are even less inclined than the French to collapse before AQIM's interpretation of the Will of Allah.

Here endeth the lesson--unless AQIM has a further attack of terminal stupidity. (As Allah wills.)