The "Fall" Of Tripoli And Other Polite Fictions

You will recall no doubt that NATO air forces have been operating under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution to "protect" civilians caught in the crossfire between rebels and troops loyal to noted humanitarian,  African "King of Kings," and Brother Leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi.  To some of the NATO countries such as Germany and Turkey, even this limited mission was unacceptably broad and all too fraught with the possibility that someone, somewhere, somehow might kill someone else.  To other members, the US, the UK, and France come to mind, the only way to accomplish the prescribed action was through the removal of Gaddafi.

Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime.  When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure.  It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.

In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west.  The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation.  Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.

The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces.  Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to  use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO."  Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.

The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate.  Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size.  The associated body counts were equally small.  In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.

As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties.  That should have raised flags with all observers.  There were darn few dots to connect.  The rebels were suddenly more effective.  "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target.  There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.

Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control.  In the past couple of days, due  in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.

The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet.  In a sense there is no real reason.  After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains?  Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans?  Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?

Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya.  A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth.  The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.

The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi.  The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable.  The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary.  The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.

The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel.  Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli.  In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.

The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies.  Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it.  On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush.  But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.

A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People.  That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan.  Hooey!  Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone.  He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country.  This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi.  There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.

There is a final polite fiction.  That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli.  Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental.  The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction.  The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars.  Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.

The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little.  Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men."  No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off.  For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.

A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq.  That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not.  Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.

The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi.  It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise.  It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace.  It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime.  None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.

That challenge?

Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.

If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.

Form Up The Battalions!

The French are not only punching above their weight in the tough arena of coercive diplomacy, the go-out-and-get-them approach of President Nicholas Sarkozy has taken France from the doldrums of diplomatic irrelevance where it languished as recently as February to the position of calling the West's diplomatic tune.  Not a bad record even for an inveterate gambler, addicted to high-risk, high-payoff ways of playing politics with enough personal energy to (if focused) replace the lost Japanese nuclear reactors.

Sarko currently has French forces deployed in six actual or nearly actual shooting wars--Ivory Coast, Libya, Afghanistan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Somalia.  As one French observer noted recently, in comparison George W. Bush was a blooming pacifist.  While the French public has exhibited a fair degree of disenchantment with the Afghan operation, the other "overseas contingency operations" have not met with significant disapprobation.

More than a little ink--both physical and virtual--has been expended on the possible motives for the new French assertiveness.  To many onlookers, the prime reason has been assigned to Sarkozy's political ambitions coupled with his low standing in the polls, strong opposition, and poor showing in recent municipal elections.  While there is some measure of truth in this interpretation, it is doubtful it is the whole story.

Another input to the Sarko decision making process in recent weeks has been the embarrassment caused by France having botched policy during the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.  Make no mistake about it, the French policy debacle was an embarrassment to Sarkozy, his party, and, most importantly, the French public.  Simply sending an inept--or merely unfortunate--foreign minister to the scaffold was not enough to repair the damage to both reputation and influence.

Another input may well have been a strong desire on the part of Sarkozy to step out from the shadow cast by Germany and its chancellor in the Eurozone.  Germany and France have not been good yokemates, to say the least, with respect to the economic challenges which have beset the EU the past several months.  But, foreign policy gave France--and Sarkozy personally--the chance to shine, shine much brighter than the timid Germans with their fear of all things military and love of all things financial.

Not to be dismissed without consideration is the gentlemanly pushing and shoving between Sarkozy and David Cameron regarding leadership in the newly emerging military relationship.  A robust policy backed by military force gave the French a leg up by demonstrating just which country had the real muscle now.

Nor is it possible to overlook the role played by the US.  Or, somewhat more accurately, the failure of the US to act in its traditional Great Power role.  Whether this deficiency was attributed to the cover story of American overextension and budgetary limitations or the weak kneed nature of the American president, the vacuum existed at the top.  And, Sarkozy well understands that international politics like nature abhors a vacuum.

Then, of course, one might take Sarkozy at his word.  France does have a set of norms, values, and customs by which right is parsed from wrong.  Acting quickly and robustly to protect unarmed civilians from mortal harm at the hands of a regime which had announced its intentions to inflict bloody repression was in complete tandem with French norms and values.  Bombing tanks in Libya or mortar positions in Ivory Coast were exercises meeting the highest tests of French morality regarding governmental conduct.

M. Sarkozy's motives were, as psychiatrists would put it, "overdetermined."  They were the expectable mix of the cynical and the principled, the transient and the eternal, the personal and the disinterested.  The issues which matter most are not those of motivation or intent but rather those of outcome and precedent.

Both Libya and the Ivory Coast constitute situations in which the outcome is not clear.  Should, as seems quite likely at the present, the war in Libya bog down into a protracted stalemate with a de facto partition of the place, the cheers which met Sarko's actions initially are highly likely to turn into jeers of disillusionment.  In the Ivory Coast should it prove out that the supporters of the internationally recognized incoming president, Ouattara, have been responsible for atrocities on a large scale (again as currently appears to have been the case) the applause within France will be replaced by shrugs of disengagement and sneers of disapproval.

In either case the presumption of failed overreach will go a long way to assuring that M. Sarkozy is a one term president.  High-risk, high-payoff gambles are like that.  And, as Clausewitz pointedly noted, "no plan survives first contact with the enemy".

Win, lose, or draw, the precipitous action of the French government has gone a far piece toward reinforcing the notion of R2P as an overarching responsibility of civilized states.  Arguably, R2P, as the Russians and Chinese have maintained, constitutes an unwarranted increase of UN authority.  It is ironic, but France's exercise in sovereign decision making particularly as regards two former colonial possessions and particularly the Ivory Coast intervention, transforms R2P into just what its opponents claim it to be--colonialism under a different and nicer term.

The reality is that most of the world's governments and publics accept the nation-state as the basic unit of global political organization.  This runs against the world view of the Western elites which hold the nation-state to be a relic of the past--and a very dangerous one at that.  The Western elites have embraced the supra-national organization with a lust which boggles the imagination.  The underlying proposition in the mind of the collective Western elite is that the planet is too small and common problems too large to allow nation-states the unfettered sovereignty which they have enjoyed for the past five hundred years.  The size and scope of problems coupled with the lethality of contemporary technologies of war fighting and the power of ideological conviction demand that power reside with international organizations alone.

The historical record of the past half century is littered with examples of governments run amok, of mounds of bodies piled up at the command of governments or non-state actors both fueled by racial, religious, or ideological hatreds.  The ability with which governments can and have killed their own people, generated refugees in the millions, inflicted fear along with physical casualties and destruction has been demonstrated with nausea producing regularity.

It is small wonder that the R2P doctrine was formulated and formally approved by an overwhelming majority of the UN membership.  It is equally of no surprise that the precursors of R2P all the way back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were similarly passed by universal acclamation.  In the waves of disgust and enthusiasm for having created a "better way" on paper, the assembled diplomats lost sight of what might occur when some country and some future time took the strictures seriously and demanded effective enforcement.

The inevitable result of such a demand would be the bringing into sharp conflict of the basic principle of sovereignty and the ideal of international duty.  The always realistic men in the Kremlin and Forbidden City have always held a firm line against the international community intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.  Both have always relied upon their Security Council veto to protect against excesses of Western enthusiasm for intervention of this sort.

For reasons of short-term diplomatic interest both abstained on the Libyan no-fly/civilian protection resolution.  Both are probably regretting having done so as by not going the "No!" route, they have allowed for a crack of precedent to be formed.  How quickly the crack could be widened was seen by the UN peace keeping force in the Ivory Coast ordering four Ukrainian gunships into action against forces loyal to outgoing president Gbagbo.  This attack constituted a significant change in UN peacekeeping operational practice.

The French have pushed a precedent which seems good at the present moment but is fraught with problems for the future.  Chief among these are where will the line be drawn  At what level of international nausea will the civilized states or one of them seek R2P authorization?  What will happen if and when the Security Council does not give its blessings?  Or can the UN be bypassed, with reliance upon one regional organization or another acting in its place?  What happens if the UN says, "yes," but the regional entity decrees "no?"

There are other problems as well.  Some have been outlined in Libya.  Who is responsible for executing any specific R2P operation?  What about the internal mechanisms of any state for approving such expeditions?  This is particularly relevant with regard to the US while totally lacking relevance for the French whose president has royal level prerogative to employ armed force for reasons of state.

Nicholas Sarkozy has well and truly kicked the fire ant hill when it comes to looking ahead.  Without any intention to do so, he has created a precedent with more problems than solutions, more difficulties for tomorrow than certainties.  It may even prove that more civilians in the future will die at the hands of their governments than otherwise would have been the case as an unintended consequence of M. Sarkozy's  motives and consequent action.

Who ever said that irony is not a major feature of history?

Gaddafi Stays On Message While The US Doesn't Have One

It would be easy to admire Gaddafi's tenacity if, indeed, he had any other option.  With an International Criminal Court indictment hanging over his head and very few safe havens to contemplate, Gaddafi has little choice other than to fight on.  As a result it is a no-brainer to see why Brother Leader has stayed on message.

The brain sweat comes in with a question.  Why is it necessary for the US, the assorted European states, the members of the Arab League, and African Union to make it so much easier for the Colonel to keep on keeping on?  Why do all these players seem to have an agenda calculated to assure that not only will Gaddafi maintain power, he will be around to cause enormous amounts of trouble until and unless the indirect pressures of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation take effect?

The Arab League has walked back from its walk back concerning the imposition of the no-fly zone--"What!  You mean you have to fire missiles and drop bombs?"  Apparently working under the assumption that Muslims wouldn't lie about such a matter, the Arab League took Gaddafi's word for appalling civilian casualties but then were convinced just possibly the Gaddfi noise machine was exaggerating the body count.

But the Arab League trepidations found a quick echo in the foreign ministers of both the EU and NATO.  For the last couple of days, the loudest sound in Europe has been that made by knees knocking with fear.  Given that few of the countries represented in either group is noted for resolution in the face of the uncertainties which come with every use of military means, this is no surprise.  It is so unsurprising that it would be a very real shock if the Gaddafi family--some of whose members are very well acquainted with Western ways--had not counted upon this sort of division and worked assiduously to provoke it.

The opposition which has come from one of the Boys in the Kremlin and the Trolls of Beijing is also no shock.  Again it was so expectable that it bends the mind to believe that once again the Gaddafi family was not counting upon it.  The offers by the Gaddafi family to cancel the current oil and natural gas leases and offer them to other countries including China, Russia, and India show some base cunning at work.  The pursuit of divide and conquer particularly with assemblages which are already divided needs no deep thinking.  The payoff has been handsome with India, Brazil, and South Africa joining Russia and China in a chorus of very loud denunciation.

Public support within the US and UK for the current ill and perhaps mis-defined military mission runs around one in three.  It may be higher in France as its citizens seem to be willing to take pride in their country doing something which is compatible with both national interests and national values.  However, the low support in the US has shown itself in the opposition presented to "Obama's War" from the left, right, and center of both parties.

Much of the opposition is predicated upon the all too obvious dichotomy between the goals of the current air operations and the Obama declaratory policy which holds, "Gaddafi must go."  The lack of congruence between the stated goals and the declaratory policy is guaranteed to undercut public confidence and, thus, support for the effort.  President Obama has either been very economical with the truth or quite hallucinatory regarding the endgame in Libya.

Other very obvious disconnects between US actions and policy in Libya with its actions and policies elsewhere in the Arab states also undercuts both understanding and support.  We are in an active shooting war with the announced aim of protecting civilians from an arbitrary and brutal regime in Libya while being merely "concerned" when the same is taking place in Yemen albeit on a arguably lesser scale.  The Obama administration has not even worked itself up to the level of being concerned when it comes to the situation in Bahrain, which leads to the conclusion that oil is thicker than blood given the close cooperation between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

The lack of coherent goals couples with distaste for the war against Gaddafi and the fear of upsetting the always sensitive Muslims to provide the interesting lack of eagerness on the part of everyone to take over the lead in Libya.  The Obama administration is quite keen on passing the baton to someone else.  But there is a palpable lack of takers.  Even if NATO showed willingness to do the job, the Arab League has opposed the idea as have NATO members Turkey and France.  Given the need for all decisions to be made by consensus, Turkish and French opposition kills the concept.

Perhaps France is angling for the job.  Assuming the command and control resident with French forces is up to the job, there is no objection to this.  Even the subordination of American combat units to such a command has precedent.  In this context it might be recalled that the US handed over command during the Dominican Republic intervention in 1965 to Brazil.  American combat forces including ground units served as a part of an Organization of American States task group with the complete approval of the US Congress and media of the day.

Perhaps the muscular and ambitious Nicholas Sarkozy, who has done more than any other single person to push for the current intervention without a salient goal, is or will have second thoughts as the gravity of the "what next?" question sinks in.  There can not be a single observer well oriented in time and place who believes the no-fly zone even with the add-on of strikes against Gaddifi's forces will provide for a stable, secure outcome.  The current operation will not and can not remove Gaddafi and without this there is no possibility of an outcome even tangentially favorable to Western interests and values.

In the best case the current operation will end with Libya divided into two zones.  The eastern one will remain under Gaddafi.  The western one will eventually fall under the sway of advocates of violent political Islam.  All must remember that the west, Cyrenaica, was not only the fountainhead of insurgency against Italy but also the homeland of a very austere form of Islam derived from the old Salifist doctrine.  This is a connection which is as true today as it was a century ago.  We must not forget or overlook this ground truth.

The policies and actions of the West are riddled with internal contradictions.  They are laden with ambiguities. They are freighted with uncertainties to a degree surpassing previous "optional" wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.  It is no surprise that support for the effort is narrow and very shallow.

All that can be written with certainty is that the world will be a nastier and more fearful place should Gaddafi remain in power even over a truncated form of Libya.  It is equally certain that in war unlike other forms of human endeavor, a full loaf is infinitely preferable to a half loaf.  And, what is being done right now is a half loaf approach at best.

Woosh! There Goes Yemen Down The Potty

You know things must be bad when Somali refugees start leaving.  This is happening in Yemen, so there is little hope that the place will escape failed state status.  Of course you can't blame these hyper vigilant survivors of a war without fronts.  They learned up close and personal that he who hesitates is dead.

The Yemeni army is fractured.  Several units have "mutinied" with the result that former comrades-in-arms are now shooting each other.  The army is reflecting the other divisions which have occurred in Yemen subsequent to the quite ill-advised use of highly trained and skilled snipers to kill dozens assembled outside the University of San'a last Friday protesting the thirty-two year old dictatorship of Abdullah Saleh.  As Talleyrand once observed of a particularly stupid bit of political murder committed by his boss, Napoleon, "Sire that was worse than a crime.  It was a blunder."

How much of a blunder Saleh has been discovering the past forty-eight hours.  The chief tribe in this tribal assemblage, his tribe, has called for his ouster.  Several cabinet members--including fellow tribesmen--called it quits over the killings as did ambassador after ambassador.  Now the army has joined in with a senior officer, a commander of the northern district among others and a half-brother who has carried heavy internal security freight among others, leading the parade to opposition.

On the international scene, France continuing its leadership of the free and democratic countries, has become the first state to demand Saleh step down ASAP.  How long will it be before other countries in the West, for example the UK, join the chorus?

According to assorted "experts" the continued collapse of Yemen places the US in the space between a rock and a hard place.  After all, we are reminded, Yemen is a key ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula.

Sure it is.

When evaluating the role of Saleh and Yemen in any contest with AQAP, it is critical to recall that Saleh took over South Yemen, the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, with the assistance of tribesmen who fought under the banner of violent political Islam.  Subsequently, these same folk have constituted the majority of the high command of the anti-terrorist units and a heavy percentage of the actual security force trigger pullers.  This ground truth along with Yemen's tribal nature may be the reason that Yemen has had a singular lack of success in suppressing AQAP.

It can be argued with some legitimacy that a failed Yemen right across the narrow straight from the long failed Somalia will exacerbate greatly the menace to navigation presented by the Merry Buccaneers Of Puntland.  A large grain of truth resides in that contention, but not a large enough one to make of it a pearl of wisdom.

The Yemeni coastguard rivals the Yemeni counter-terrorist forces for ineffectiveness.  This has not been remedied in the slightest by US aid.

Yemen is, has been and will be, whether or not Saleh stays in power, a source of jihadists and pirates alike.  The reason for that is the nature of the human terrain of Yemen.  The deep tribal nature of the place, the extreme poverty which besets the majority, the appeal of the most austere form of Islam, the cultural imperative of tribal solidarity against any outsider combine to assure Yemen is a fertile breeding place for jihad of all sorts.

Nor is the situation in Yemen going to be altered in any meaningful way by the introduction of democracy or any other form of exported "nation-building" including massive economic assistance.  It is critical, foundational, to remember that Yemen is not a nation in any recognizable sense of the word.  Rather it is a collection of rival tribes collected under a single flag which none recognize as being real.

Senior American decision makers headed by Defense Secretary Gates have warned that fragmentation of existing states will not contribute to stability.  While he made that warning with specific reference to the notion of a Libya partitioned into western and eastern components, his proposition is flatly wrong.  When a state, be it Libya, Yemen, or Somalia, is the artifact of well-intentioned Western diplomats, it is not an authentic affair.  Having never been a reality in the minds of most people living there, fragmentation along tribal or cultural lines is a viable option.

It can be argued on the basis of history, both European and non-Western, that nations and the states they create emerge slowly, painfully, and organically from internal imperatives and external pressures.  Only a nation and concomitant state so created can withstand stresses such as those seen in Libya or Yemen.

This suggests strongly that the collapse of Yemen into its component parts is not a bad idea even if the near-term consequences bear no resemblance to a stroll though paradise.  Only by falling apart will there be any hope of Yemen ever coming together in a stable way.

The best policy for France, the UK, or the US is to stay away.  Even if Saleh becomes a perfect imitation of Gaddafi, which is unlikely given the internal dynamics of Yemen, the West must restrain its impulses to impose peace, craft a settlement calculated to keep Yemen intact under some sort of imitation Western liberal government.

There is a lesson from Afghanistan which may be learned once more in Libya.  Outsiders cannot create a nation-state from a traditional, tribal society for which the entire notion of the nation and the state are literally unthinkable.  As was once said, "Don't try to teach a pig to sing.  It won't work.  It will annoy the pig."

The Libyan "Moment" Has Come--And Gone

Not that many years ago the phrase "cheese eating surrender monkeys" was applied by crotch-grabbing, red blooded, red meat eating, American hyperpatriots to the French.  The French government of the day had refused to go along with the Bush/Cheney Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq.  As a result, some of We the People were not only unimpressed, they wanted to rename French fries something more suitable.

Now the term can be applied to the West generally--provided the French and British are specifically exempted.  In diametric opposition to the stance adopted by President Obama and his "foreign policy team," the French have moved quickly to recognize the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya.  In conjunction with David Cameron, President Nicholas Sarkozy called for the immediate imposition of a no-fly zone days ago.

In short, the French are waving the banner of defiance in the face of the American surrender monkeys who evidently prefer to chomp political cheese while Gaddafi moves closer to victory.  In a stunning show of total indifference not only to the upcoming slaughter in Libya but core interests of the US and its allies, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton rejected a no-fly zone after having met with insurgent leaders in Paris.

The secretary waved the White House's white flag with the usual blather about the necessity of the UN Security Council authorizing any such action.  Ms Clinton knows that at least China will veto the idea.  The Russians are inclined in that direction as well but have preferred to use the stall approach demanding operational details before considering any resolution.

Any invocation of the Security Council in the context of the Libyan Question is akin to imploring the Great Ju-Ju with sacrificial maidens in order to avert a total meltdown of the incandescent reactor cores in Japan.  Ms Clinton knows this.  So does President Obama.  Both are simply looking for the safest way out of a very real dilemma.  They want the Libyan Question to answer itself so that Mr Obama will not have to abandon his successful political posture as being anything and everything George W. Bush was not.

The fear of losing his identity as I-Am-Not-George-Bush, the Clueless Guy in the Oval is quite willing to see Libyans die.  Worse, he is willing to place the present and future national and strategic interests of the US in peril--great peril.

There is no doubt but Mr Obama and the rest of his "team" will soon embrace the new narrative being written rapidly by assorted members of the American and European "elites."  The new version of life in Libya has the Colonel "winning" so quickly and convincingly that the imposition of a no-fly zone would be too little and too late to be of value to the insurgents.

There is a good deal of truth to the "new" narrative.  As the Geek has noted in several previous posts, the insurgents' initial buoyant optimism was unwarranted in the extreme.  Their attempt at victory through a rapid escalade were doomed to fail and then time would be on the side of Gaddafi and company.  As has been obvious from the beginning, Brother Leader's forces had better organization, better training, better equipment, and a high degree of motivation which extended from the top down.  In comparison, the insurgents were a disorganized, badly equipped mob with an attitude.

Gaddifi may speak and act like a nut job, but he falls in the old cliche of "crazy like a fox."  He has shown a very real talent for manipulating perceptions in the West as well as playing the divide and conquer game domestically.  As he has a total disregard for the lives and well being of the Libyan people, there has never been any doubt about his willingness and ability to keep power while standing on a mountain of bodies.  In short, he can kill his way to victory--at least a temporary victory.

Even if his continued tenure in office is measured in months, or a couple of years at most, his capacity to do damage, even create havoc should and must not be underestimated.  At present--in largest measure due to the need of President Obama and many other Western leaders such as Ms Merkel for a spine transplant--the Colonel is going to emerge victorious.

Over the longer haul the combination of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation will fatally weaken the Gaddafi family enterprise.  The weakening will occur faster if the insurgents are able to switch to a guerrilla war operational doctrine.  Assorted Western analysts have concluded this is what the future bodes.

Perhaps.  The Libyans of the western region have a history of effective and prolonged guerrilla war.  The campaign against the Italian occupiers was centered in the region surrounding Benghazi, Cyrenaica.  In the end, of course, the Italians prevailed, largely because they were willing and able to kill their way to victory.  Given the resources available to the Gaddafi regime, there are good reasons to assert the government today can do the same only much faster.

This is not to say the insurgents cannot successfully attack the overextended government forces and their very long and highly vulnerable land line of communication.  They can mount attacks.  They can inflict damage and casualties on the Gaddafi loyalists.  They can prevent the Colonel's killers from enjoying unquestioned success, of sleeping soundly after the victory party.  Still, the probability of toppling the Gaddafi regime by means of guerrilla war is slim.

No matter how the cake is cut, the result is the same.  Without foreign assistance, the insurgents will lose.  This means Gaddafi will be back--bigger and badder than ever.  He may not last that many months, but he can make those months pure hell for Libyans--and others as well.

This implies with strength and vigor that some country among the civilized states must take the lead.  It is no use invoking the magic of the United Nations.  The UN Security Council due to the domestic policy considerations so critical to both China and Russia will remain the "god that failed."  NATO is also a non-starter given the position adopted by the Merkel government and supported in principle by other countries as well.  The same applies to the European Union.

Nor can the Libyans and the world look to the US.  President Obama is a genuine "cheese eating surrender monkey" quite willing to sacrifice the national interests of the US on the alter of personal ambition and before the totem of fearing to be seen as one more George W. Bush.

And so the world spins.  Downward--at least from the perspective of the US and other civilized states.

Sic 'Em, Dave, Sarko

David Cameron continues to take the hardline regarding the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libya.  Reportedly he has told his cabinet that there is no need for a UN Security Council resolution in order for the UK or any other country to place Libya under aerial interdict.  In this view Cameron has been joined by Nicholas Sarkozy.  The rather mercurial French president has gone so far as to recognize the rebel national committee as the legitimate government of Libya.

While the UK lacks the resources to do the no-fly job on its own, the British could do so in conjunction with the French.  Considering the recent agreement regarding joint military operations, the possibility of this happening moves up the list of likelihood.

If Cameron continues to feel muscular on the Libyan Question, President Obama will be more isolated in his calculated posture of apparent prudence and cautious statesmanship behind which lurks the fear of being seen as George W. Bush reincarnate.  The pressure ramped up ever so slightly yesterday when Secretary Gates clarified his earlier remarks on the difficulty of imposing a no-fly zone.  The secretary allowed in Manama that the US could do the job all on its lonesome should "President Obama so order."

With the Arab League having unanimously passed a resolution approving a no-fly zone and demanding that the Security Council act accordingly, the assorted member states have picked up a good measure of the political consequences which would ensue should the no-fly zone result in civilian casualties.  This move will reduce, albeit marginally, the negative narrative which will be written by anti-Western elements in the Arab and Muslim majority states generally in the wake of even a very pacifistic airspace denial effort.

The real questions do not involve the ability of the US or the Anglo-French duo or any other major power to impose and maintain a no-fly zone.  The most trenchant question is: Will a no-fly zone actually benefit the insurgents in a significant manner?  As important is this: What actions will follow the imposition of an unproductive no-fly zone.  And, of course, there is the most fundamental question of all: What is the goal of the exercise?

To take the last question first: The actual goal of any intervention either by air or ground must be that of utterly defeating the current regime.  The US and the rest of the West cannot afford a Gaddafi in power after his crushing of the insurgency.  It would not be a return to the status quo ante.  A victorious Gaddafi at best would be the Gaddafi of the worst of the bad old days.  You know, the Gaddafi of PanAm 103.  The Gaddafi who supported any and every movement or regime which opposed the West.  The Gaddafi who sought weapons of mass destruction with an ardor which surpassed that demonstrated by Saddam Hussein.

Preventing this version of Gaddafi, the basic Gaddafi 1.0 who strutted and terrified in the years before the US invaded Iraq, must be the highest priority of any and every responsible Western government, our own included.  All other goals pale into insignificance in comparison.

Now as to the first question: Would a no-fly zone really matter?  Would it preclude a Gaddafi victory?  The answer is simple, blunt, and unpleasant.  The answer is: No!  It is possible that Gaddafi would not even challenge the zone.  He has no need to do so.

The air attacks may scare the untrained, inexperienced people down range, but so far the effect of the attacks has been negligible.  The pilots--whether Libyan or hired hands from Syria or Sudan--have not shown the ability to hit targets.  As a consequence, the strikes have been acoustically and visually impressive but militarily useless.

The winning weapons for the Gaddafi forces have been of the indirect fire sort.  Unguided rockets, tube artillery, the backbones of standoff warfare have done the heavy lifting for the Colonel's killers.  Only after extensive preparatory fire has the armor moved forward to finish the job.

The untrained, poorly organized, massively inexperienced insurgent fighters lack all the basic wherewithal to withstand the physical and morale effects of standoff, indirect fire weaponry.  The same applies to facing down armor, even antiquated main battle tanks and similar vintage infantry fighting vehicles.

In a combat between a small but well equipped force such as the four or so battalions commanded by Gaddafi's kids and a mob, the small force will win.  To put it a slightly different way, the Gaddafi forces enjoy the bravery of being out of range.  Their possession of standoff weapons allows the Colonel's thugs to kill without the risk of being killed.  Any number of wounded insurgents quoted in Western MSM have moaned about the melancholy reality that the Gaddafi troops are never seen let alone shot at but stay safely out of AK-47 or RPG range and pound the holy hell out of the rebel positions.

Conclusion?  A no-fly zone will not tilt the battle in favor of the insurgents.  They are doomed as long as Gaddafi's forces can continue to move slowly along the one road, stopping to shell any insurgent held area into powder until they finally fetch up at the center of resistance, Benghazi.  At that moment it is all over for the insurgents.  Those who can run will fast step to the Egyptian border; those who can't will stay and be blown into small bloody fragments by the Colonel's artillery, rockets, and armor.

(At this point a no-fly zone would benefit the refugee stream heading for Egypt by assuring it would not be decimated by air attack.  That would be a humanitarian good deed, but is not a war winner.  It is not a way of achieving the goal of a Gaddafi free Earth.)

This leaves the second material question:  What happens after the no-fly zone proves nugatory?  Assuming that the leaders of Western governments, including the Clueless Guy in the Oval, concur that the ongoing presence of Gaddafi constitutes everybody's worst nightmare, there is only one option.  The last option standing is the introduction of ground combat units.

There is much fear over doing such.  Some anxiety is merited by factual, historical experience; some, even most, is not.  Drawing on the historical record it is safe to conclude that an operation limited to one discrete goal--the halting of the Gaddafi advance on a predetermined line, for example--markedly reduces the probability of "mission leap" along the lines of what happened in Afghanistan.

The difficulty in employing military intervention is not that of tactics.  Nor is it one at the operational level.  The only real problem is that which comes at the political level--defining in a properly limited way the goal to which the use of force is directed.  Provided that the goal consensually achieved by the major Western powers is that of enforcing a stop line, there is no requirement for "nation-building," no taking of overall responsibility for the future of Libya.

Admittedly, this limited a mission would leave the Gaddafi regime in charge of a truncated Libya.  On the upside, this truncated version of his previous domain coupled with the long term impact of sanctions would serve to erode Brother Leader's material capacity to continue in power.  It would also serve to curtail Gaddafi's potential for international mischief making most gratifyingly.

There is a very unfortunate but very real temptation for political leaders not to leave well enough alone.  They seem to be constitutionally disinclined to accept a half loaf when the full loaf seems to be so much more attractive.  Here the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most important object lessons.  Had the neocon ninnies of the Bush-Cheney years been at all able to restrain their unlimited ambitions, the effort in Afghanistan would have been restricted to a highly doable punitive expedition and the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq would have been limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein.

The US should have rejected any responsibility for doing anything beyond removing two odious regimes, assuring that al-Qaeda was destroyed and eliminating any residual capability in Iraq for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.  All the rest, all the follow-ons of "nation-building" or the constitution of new governments would have been passed on to the indigenous populations with the assistance of those members of the "international community" which cared to offer such.

The goal of any ground intervention must be restricted to the establishment of a stop line beyond which the Gaddafi units would not be allowed.  Taken in conjunction with the existence of an alternative, legitimate government and the assorted international sanctions, the result would be the ejection of Gaddafi from power.  This would be facilitated if the threat of prosecution for crimes against humanity were to be lowered even if not removed totally.  It must be recalled that the Taylor prosecution served as the single greatest spine stiffener provided to Gaddafi and family.

At the moment both Cameron and Sarkozy have shown both greater insight and courage than has Mr Obama.  Having written that, the Geek is constrained to add that neither man has been honest--at least in public.  Their military advice must have emphasized the irrelevance of the no-fly zone.  Their political and diplomatic advisors must have pointed out the array of negative consequences which would attend a Gaddafi victory.  These factors imply that each man must be aware that when night falls, only a ground intervention would prevent the Colonel from emerging triumphant and emboldened.

Since the British and French leaders have led on the Libyan Question, it is now incumbent upon them to tell it like it is.  They must prepare themselves, their publics, and the rest of the world for the necessity of a ground intervention in the very near future.  This also means they and their military and diplomatic high command must design a properly limited mission definition.  And, they have to drag Obama kicking and screaming in their wake.

So, Dave and Sarko, sic 'em!

Cardinal Richelieu And The Death Of The Christian Sodality

Once upon a time, kiddies, long ago in far off Europe, the Western Christians--you know, the Holy Universal Catholic Church, the Western branch of Christianity after the Great Schism of a thousand years earlier--saw themselves as being one great faith community--equivalent to the Arabic word and Muslim concept of the Ummah.  This idea had propelled European political thinking for generations almost beyond count.  The dual rulership of Pope and Emperor, specifically the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, had soldiered on for centuries challenged only briefly on the margins.

Then, in only a couple score of years the intellectual edifice of the Catholic sodality crumbled, fragmented.  It was replaced by the concept of the nation-state pursuing amoral national interest for reasons of state.  This constituted the single most critical and shocking change in European political and social understandings in all the years which followed the collapse of the Roman Empire.

Most surprisingly, the revolution was the work of one man.  More surprisingly the one man was not religious dissident Martin Luther, but a Prince of the Church, Cardinal Richelieu.  Richelieu may have been a Catholic.  He might have been a good Catholic in his beliefs, practices, and life.  But, he was first and foremost a Frenchman.  As a self-conscious man of France, the Cardinal acting in his capacity as First Minister of His Most Catholic Majesty, Louis XIII, rejected the notion of a universal empire of Catholics responsive to Pope and Emperor.  He replaced that hoary bit of received conventional wisdom with the radical idea that a state acted with no moral basis other than what might be in the state's best interests.

In his thinking--and the actions which resulted--Richelieu was the precise opposite of the Holy Roman Emperor, the towering figure of the House of Hapsburg, Ferdinand II.  There is an ancient and not necessarily relevant saying among European historians that the Holy Roman Empire was not holy, was not Roman, and was not truly an empire.  Ferdinand II would have rejected totally the contention that his empire was not just that--an Empire.  He would have pushed back even harder against the characterization of his empire as not being holy.

Ferdinand II was a very good, highly committed son of the Church.  He sincerely believed that foreign policy must be conducted according to the desires and needs of the Christian God.  He also believed with all his heart that he even more than the Pope was capable of both ascertaining the will of God and acting in a consistent moral fashion to achieve the will.  Finally, Ferdinand II accepted completely the idea that there was a single Christian, (Catholic) sodality.  To Ferdinand the rantings of a Luther or a Calvin were the ravings not only of lunatics but the message of the devil.  These heretics and all who supported or agreed with them must be extirpated.

Here it must be recalled that the Protestant Reformation came into existence for religious reasons, but survived because secular rulers in the multitude of petty German states saw protestantism as a tool for national identity and exaltation.  The Reformation grew and spread because Cardinal Richelieu saw the same potential and exploited it with great effect on behalf of French identity and interests.

Which brings us to the most important, most decisive, and (until the mid-Twentieth Century) most bloody war in European history, the Thirty Years War.  The Thirty Years War decided many things.  At the top of the list the war by the time it was ended in 1648 was the permanent destruction of the Catholic Christian sodality--the Christian version of Islam's ummah--replacing it with the self-interested nation-state.  The war lasted thirty years in largest measure because Cardinal Richelieu fearing the encirclement of France by the Hapsburg dominions convinced His Most Catholic Majesty King Louis XIII to underwrite the costs of the war being waged by Protestant rulers including Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.  Finally, seventeen years after Ferdinand II started his war of counter-reformation, France entered the war directly so as to consolidate its position and assure the defeat of the Holy Roman Empire.

That's right, a Prince of the Church and a king who styled himself His Most Catholic Majesty conspired to defeat the champion of Catholicism, Ferdinand II, and the Pope.  While there were apologists for France and Richelieu who tortured logic and murdered reality to justify the actions of king and minister, Richelieu engaged in no such sophistry.  He said what he believed: A nation-state acted in pursuit of its own interests, its own reasons of state, and this was sanctified by results alone.  In short, the ends justified the means.

States were not in Richelieu's view like individual human beings.  While individuals might best be governed by moral or ethical codes in their interactions, states can only pursue self-interest for self-defined reasons.  States unlike people could act properly only insofar as they defended and advanced their collective identity and the interests which arose organically from that.  A nation-state, he concluded, could only survive by defending its identity and interests.  Further, it could only prosper if it advanced its interests even at the expense of other nation-states.

This view, which was universally adopted in the wake of France's clear success, assured there would be conflicts armed and otherwise almost non-stop.  As a consequence Europe experienced more wars per century than any other region of the world.  As another result, Europe emerged as the preeminent region.  The linkage between evolving political complexity, social organization, and technolological advancement with the recurrent limited warfare is clear.

While no historical analogy is exact, an analogy is suggestive.  History does not repeat itself but it can have present day echoes of long past dynamics and events.  So it is with today's political Islam, particularly the variant espousing a global caliphate encompassing the totality of the Muslim ummah.

The current political changes underway in North Africa and the Mideast in predominantly Muslim polities will assure the US and the West generally will have to deal with regimes predicated upon some form of political Islam.  The chief anxiety abroad in the US and elsewhere is that the form of political Islam with which we will be dealing will consist exclusively of the most ambitious sort--the proponents of the global caliphate, the universal ummah.  The European experience, the success of Richelieu against opponents as given to the idea of a faith based universal morality demanding a One True Faith dominated world, suggests that the anxiety might be overdrawn notwithstanding the seeming success of what has been termed "stealth jihad" in parts of Europe and the US.

It merits noting that despite the declarations and hopes within the Western elites that nationalism and the nation-state are bankrupt, dying institutions, they are alive and well throughout the world--including Muslim majority states.  Turkey, Egypt, even Iran are strongly nationalistic in their views.  Arguably, the mullahs in Tehran have been successful in keeping their regime in power by exploiting the nationalism of the Iranian population.

In Egypt, specifically the Egypt of Nasser, the concept of "Pan-Arabism" floundered on the reef of national identity and national interest.  To other Arab states the Nasserist concept smacked of a stealth imperialism.  To Egyptians, the problem was seen differently: Why Pan-Arabism rather than an Arab bloc marching to the music composed and played in Cairo?  All of Nasser's attempts to create a "United Arab Republic" failed due to nationalism.  Even when Islam was invoked, as it was albeit belatedly, the appeal to common faith like the appeal to a common tongue did not overcome national identity.

Turkey has a long history of using Islam to reinforce the Turkish national identity.  Starting in the last days of the Ottoman Empire and extending down to the AKP of today, religion has been invoked as a buttress for the national identity.  Along with language, religion has been employed consistently as a means of identifying and expressing Turkey in comparison to other nations and states.  As Erdogan expressed recently in a speech to expat Turks in Germany, the rejection of assimilation is critical lest Turkish identity and national interests be weakened.  Admittedly, the Turks have taken national identity to extremes as with the forced removal of Armenians early in the Twentieth Century, but the most important takeaway is not the mass deaths of those being removed but rather the reason--nationalism, national identity, and national interest.

As a result it is fair to conclude that the AKP will not surrender Turkish identity or national interest to the radical notion of a universal ummah or the pursuit of a global caliphate.  Nor will the Turkish government put national interest at risk to promote "stealth jihad" or any other form of expansionist political Islam.

The various peoples of the world are today too aware of the reality of national identity.  In this way they are far advanced over the Europeans of the early Seventeenth Century.  They are also far ahead of the Europeans of the time of the Thirty Years War in having a long experience with the formality of the nation-state.  This in and of itself lowers the appeal of the universal ummah and the hallucinatory global caliphate.

None of this implies that a regime based on political Islam will not use Islam law including the barbaric punishments, the degradation of women, and the suppression of free expression.  All may well exist soon in Egypt or elsewhere.  However the adoption of Islamic law in all its backward and barbaric features does not represent a threat to the West and other civilized states in and of itself.  Beyond that, the nature of communications today insures that a highly restrictive and reactionary sort of Islamic code will be met with widespread resistance.  The adoption of Shariah is a self-limiting proposition in any organized state--even as has been seen in Iran.

Universality based on religion is not new.  Nor is it unique to Islam.  History demonstrates that when the universal is met by the specific, the universal loses.  People do not identify on a universal basis.  They construct corporate identities on shared values, language, geographic propinquity, and, most importantly, a shared historically based mythology.  This is what the canny Cardinal intuited in the early Seventeenth Century and supported his concept of the nation-state pursuing national interest at the expense of others.  His ethic not only was alive and well back then, it lives and breathes today--throughout the Muslim world.

From Europe, One Good Idea And One (Very) Bad Idea

The British and French governments are demonstrating that they have a capacity for thinking on matters diplomatic and military which is infinitely superior to that monstrous international amphyctony known as the European Union.  The EU has grown from a rather decent, modest concept of enhanced economic unity to a bloated mastodon with delusions of adequacy while the British and French governments under more or less conservative leadership have shown a realistic appraisal of how diplomatic and military clothing must be cut to fit the economic cloth.

In a way quite unforeseeable only a few years ago, London and Paris are edging to a degree of military cooperation without precedent.  This merging of capacities not only magnifies the military strengths of both but addresses points of relative weakness to the advantage of both countries.  It is a foregone conclusion that this development will serve to amp up the diplomatic influence of both as well.

A few days hence French President Nicholas Sarkozy will hold a summit with British PM David Cameron.  The high point of the meeting will be the announcement of a military alliance between the two countries which will see among other features the reconfiguration of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to accommodate RAF aircraft.  This will be a temporary(?) fix bridging the gap between the budget constricted requirement to retire the British fleet of Harrier jump jets and the commissioning of the next generation British carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and the arrival from the US of the Joint Strike Fighter.

There will be other mergers of capacity in the structure of the new alliance.  But, far more important than the details is the existence of the agreement.  This bilateral approach marks a departure from the very tired thinking which has dominated Europe since the end of the Cold War and the rise of the EU.  It provides a viable alternative to both the highly undesirable combined EU military force and the increasingly irrelevant and politically divided NATO.

The alliance is a natural in several basic ways.  France and the UK are the only nuclear powers in Europe.  Both are permanent members of the UN Security Council.  Each has a sizable expeditionary force capacity and a recent history of distant operations including the ongoing one in Afghanistan where France has 4,000 troops deployed at present--not as many as the UK but more than simply symbolic.  The alliance would provide a firm platform for future distant operations provided, of course, the interests of both countries are directly involved.

An indirect benefit for both comes from economies which may result from the alliance.  This would assure that each state would have resources for necessary unilateral operations.  France has a wide variety of post-colonial commitments in Africa as does the UK.  But these commitments are of an individual not a joint nature, so it is critical that each have an autonomous capacity.  The same obtains with respect to the few residues of colonial majesty still sticking to the British lion's mane such as the Falkland Islands where it is unreasonable to expect France or any other state to offer direct assistance.

The recent defense and security review conducted by the Cameron government makes it clear that the UK must operate as a partner with some alliance in most conceivable military activities.  Whether with NATO or in a bilateral context with the US or, now, France, the UK has no realistic choice other than alliance based operations.  Still it is essential that the UK retain a sufficient independent capability to deter, say, Argentinian ambitions regarding the Falklands.

A closer merging of intelligence capacities will accompany the enhanced military alliance.  Both countries have good to excellent intelligence apparatuses and a further level of cooperation will enhance these as well.  When looking at the threats today and into the near future, the name of the game is intelligence.  Closer and more comprehensive sharing of assets and product will give both countries yet another leg up in the contest with advocates of violent political Islam.

All the way around, the developing alliance is a fine idea.  Even the US will benefit, at least incidentally, from its existence.  A thumbs-up to both London and Paris--even if it means Napoleon is spinning in his tomb.

Now for the really bad idea.

The European Union emboldened by the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has created a new diplomatic monster which will simultaneously undercut the ability of the individual member states to execute effective independent foreign policy and confuse the diplomatic landscape for everybody else.  The grotesquely named European External Action Service (EEAS) is an equally grotesque bureaucratic blight on the great garden of diplomacy.

The EEAS is headed by a Briton, the Baroness (life peerage due to Tony Blair) Ashton.  The Baroness is a person without any discernible qualification for her job to which she was appointed by Gordon Brown.  As the woman has no foreign policy experience, not even a professorship in diplomacy, one can only conclude she got the job as a reward for her years of toiling in assorted Labor Party supported quangos.  As a one time quangocrat Ms Ashton not only has no hands on acquaintance with the trenches of diplomacy, she has no direct contact with politics per se.  She is, in short, a veteran of the remote and lofty world of unelected, unaccountable policy making boards whose let-them-eat-cake attitude toward the inhabitants of the real world is legendary.

The Baroness has a true barony at her disposal.  The EEAS disposes of some 7,000 eurocrats who will labor not only in the Brussels headquarters but in some 137 embassies around the world.  Nor is the Baroness Ashton's fiefdom impoverished.  Its budget comes in at approximately twelve billion dollars.  That is pretty top drawer--as is the Baroness's own reward, nearly three quarters of a million dollars not including perks and bennies.

The personnel deployments are a bit confusing.  There will be forty-six diplomats in the tiny but luscious island of Barbados.  The Turkish contingent amounts to 132 which outstrips the 124 assigned to the US.  Morocco will get ninety-two nudging the less scenic and far more dangerous Afghanistan's eighty-five.  Twenty-nine eurocrats will fetch up in Tajikistan while thirty-one will wade ashore in Yemen.  The numbers roll on and on with little if any relation to either the interests in play or any other real world consideration until the least favored country of Togo gets a mere three, not even enough for a game of whist.

The assorted poohbahs and panjandrums will be housed in appropriately expensive quarters and will ride about in splendid armor plated limos.

As the citizens of the Barony of Ashton ride about so also will they sow diplomatic confusion.  The standard has already been set by the EEAS man in Washington, Joao Vale de Almeida, who let it be known that he spoke for all the EU member states.  He modestly told the assembled press that, where the EU had a unified position, "I am the one leading the show."

Well, this implies that either the EU will have a common position on everything, in which case the member states could save a lot of money by shutting down their embassies for all except routine functions such as visas, or there will not be many common stances, so even the EEAS heavyweight is superfluous.  In either alternative, the existence of the EEAS "ambassador" will raise the question of who is in charge here?

In the best of times, diplomacy is often conducted in turbid waters.  The addition of a foreign policy equivalent of a fifth wheel in no way clarifies the murk.

The Lisbon Treaty removed the requirement that all EU foreign policy decisions be unanimous.  This means that the EEAS may work against the policy interests of one or more member states.  For example, if a majority of EU members vote to cozy up to Tehran, the EEAS will do just that not only in Iran but in other capitals where the eurocratic version of ambassadors will press their host to also hug the ayatollahs tighter.

Stances to the contrary dictated by national interests would not matter.  Thanks to the splendors of democracy, the majority would rule, even if, as in the case of Iran, major players such as the UK, France, and Germany are in the dissenting minority.

The consideration of conflict between a majority position and those of individual members is not academic.  It has already been seen in the context of Hamas and the Gaza Strip as well as with regard to Israel.  It deserves noting in this regard that the Baroness has bloviated at some length about her "clout" in Gaza due to her record of securing financial assistance for the terroristic thugs who run the place.

Looking ahead, the EEAS poses a long term threat to the diplomatic establishments of all its member states.  Due to the very high salary schedules, a budding diplomat faced by a choice between his own country's foreign service and the EU's apparatus will be tempted sorely to go with the money.  This means over time each member will be bled of its most ambitious, most able, and most promising diplomats.  This may bode well for the dreams of the collectivists of Europe, but it has no good impact for the several states.

That was probably one of the intentions of those Eurocrats who designed and built the EEAS.  To these worthies the notion of nation is anathema.  So, they no doubt have hoped that starving each member of talent will be the best way of bringing the hated nation-state to the desired status of extinction.

Now, bucko, that is a really bad idea.

A Frenchman Sends A Warning--To Us

A noted French novelist (a status which amounts in that country to one of public intellectual)by the name of Pascal Bruckner has delivered himself of a piece of non-fiction which is not only a severe indictment of contemporary Europe but a stern warning for the US--particularly our Europhilic hoi oligoi. Titled Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism the book has been brought out by Princeton University Press. It is a must read for anyone interested in the current state of play in international politics--or the self-imposed "graceful decline" of the US.

M. Bruckner argues that Europeans or, more accurately, members of the Western European elite have come to the morbid conclusion that their region, their countries are the fountainhead of all that is evil in the world. A collateral, necessary conclusion is that the underdeveloped areas of the world, not only the former colonial possessions of European states but all the other pseudo-states regardless of how feudal, corrupt, religiously hag ridden they might be are the sole repositories of virtue.

The vast congeries of (to be ever-so-delicate about it) lesser developed countries are referred to collectively by Bruckner as the "South." His usage parallels the common view which has developed without regard to facts either economic or geographic holding the world is somehow divided at the Equator with the "rich" and "developed" places in the north and all the others, the "exploited," the "oppressed," being down south.

An unspoken companion sub-text is that the north is the home of those exploiters, those oppressors, those inventors of capitalism, of fascism, of all other sorts of crimes against humanity--the white guys. The south is, of course, the provenance of "people of color." The sub-text, no less than the open one, is predicated upon a rejection of geographic, demographic, and other realities.

The (as Bruckner sees it) guilt ridden Europeans have been engaging in a never ending exercise in self-flagellation over their presumed historical culpability for such unpleasant manifestations of economic, political, and social trajectories as imperialism, fascism, wars of conquest to say nothing of the machines of killing developed in their own (primarily) internecine conflicts culminating in the butchery and devastation of World War II. At the same time the blinders of guilt have prevented the Europeans from seeing any, let alone all the discoveries, inventions, intellectual revolutions which have provided so much of the good extant in the world today--and provided the motivation and capacity of the Europeans to engage in the self-criticism which has typified recent decades.

The tipping point, it may be inferred from M. Bruckner's assessment, which shoved the European elite over the edge came in the past decade with the challenge to Europe presented by the Islamist jihadists and their apologists. There is much in contemporary history to support that analysis.

High on the list is the sea change in view regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict(s). Not much more than ten years ago Israel was still the preferred party; now it is the most goatish of goats. Or, consider the reaction of the Spanish, not simply the hoi oligoi but the folks in the street to the Madrid subway bombings. The flying finger of guilt was pointed not at the jihadist bombers but at the government. Even those who died in the blasted and twisted metal were seen as having been at least somewhat responsible for their own murders.

More recently European elite opinion has been outraged by expressions of national and cultural identity and pride on the part of the hoi polloi. Accurate, fact-predicated opposition to creeping "Islamization," or what is perceived as cringing submission to the dictates and demands of Muslims have been shrilly denounced by the European elite.

And, as M. Bruckner notes, while anti-Americanism has always been a favored activity on the part of Western Europeans, particularly the French, this old standby has been elevated far beyond mere cult status in the wake of the American response to 9/11. This trajectory strongly supports Bruckner's contention that increasingly Europeans have been seeking to displace their own sense of guilt onto the US as the ultimate inheritor of everything European.

So far, so good. Applause and kudos to M. Bruckner all around. But, the man finally goes astray. Perhaps desperately astray.

M. Bruckner congratulates the US for its self-confidence, courage, resolve, and lack of guilt. As a historian specializing in the US, the Geek can only conclude that this is a exercise in creative non-fiction on the part of M. Bruckner. Or, in a kinder alternative, M. Bruckner is not well acquainted with the "blame America first crowd which has long littered the campuses of our universities and which has extended its long reach well into the media and political structures of this country.

Being French it is possible that M. Bruckner has not noticed that the US political landscape now includes a president who has denied the existence of any sort of genuine "American exceptionalism." That, indeed, President Obama publicly trivialized the notion by equating this long-standing belief with the natural patriotic feelings which afflict the citizens of all countries.

Similarly, M. Bruckner appears in his praise of the US to have missed the rise, one is tempted to write, "the triumph" of cultural relativism within the American elites. He has not seen just how unwilling if not unable so many members of the self-appointed intellectual, political, and opinion molding upper strata are to make value judgments on matters originating in countries outside the US.

He has not seen the decaying political confidence and social cohesiveness which has resulted in an extreme reluctance on the part of the US to assert itself in international affairs, preferring instead to engage in bootless efforts at "outreach," or apologies for alleged wrongs of the past. Apparently, he has not seen the companion degeneration contained in the nation's inability and unwillingness to even secure its own borders.

He has not observed the hand-wringing apologetics offered by the American elites for words and symbols which might be found by someone, somewhere, somehow to be violative of alleged "sensitivities." Nor has the rise of the politics of victimization and the scar it has left on both the American domestic political landscape and its conduct of foreign policy appeared on his radar scope.

In short, M. Bruckner has not shown himself to be aware of a very bitter reality rampant in the rarefied air at the peaks of American intellectual, journalistic, and political life. It is, most tragically, the same air as that breathed in Western Europe. And, it has the same brain damaging effects.

Undeserved feelings of national, collective guilt are abroad in the American hoi oligoi. Like their European counterparts these Americans are willing and ready to declare that their country is one of the foci of global illnesses of all kinds while the South is a source of all that is pure and right in human life.

There are almost as many Americans as Europeans eager to don sackcloth and ashes (or perhaps a burqa) and proclaim our guilt before the sinless of the South. We may not have gone as far down this ill-favored path as the Europeans, but we are headed (at least at the top) in the same direction.

The direction and the consequences are what make M. Bruckner's effort well worth the time of reading. It is a powerful red flag.

The Climate, National Identity, And Extortion

At first, the "mixed messages" sent by President Nicholas Sarkozy to the Muslim population of France and the ongoing rhubarb at the Monster Rally Against Global Warming seem to have little in common. A bit of reflection, however, shows a deep and necessary connection.

Mr Sarkozy stated that discrimination against Muslims was unacceptable to French law and French historical traditions. He went on to say in no uncertain terms that Muslims who came to France as well as those born in the country had to accept the realities of French and European history, which included the centrality of such non-Islamic features as equality before the law, transparent democracy, and--most un-Muslim of all--the powerful impact of the Christian religion on all facets of life.

President Sarkozy bored directly to a vital question not only in France or Europe but throughout the world. That question revolves around both the nature of national identity and the cruciality of national identity to matters of international relations.

The Sarkozy position on national identity and its necessary twin, nationalism, runs counter to the myth making of the chattering, academic, and (some of the) political classes in both Western Europe and the US. The French president spoke reality. He spoke truth.

The truth of his position has been underscored rather dramatically in the brouhaha which has emerged since one of the discussion drafts prepared by the host government, Denmark, was leaked to the Guardian in the UK. This so-called "Danish Text" ignited a firestorm of protest by representatives of the G77 states as well as their advocates among the NGO crowd such as Oxfam.

The important features of the draft discussion text include the apparent scuttling of the Kyoto Accord, the removal of the UN from the role of largess distributor, measures which would limit the economic destruction of the world's advanced economies, and the replacement of hard and fast decrements of carbon emissions by hazier goals. None of these features are exceptional given the current status of the questionable science undergirding the anthropogenic climate change hypothesis, the fragile state of the recovery from the Great Recession, the past record of the UN when administering wealth transfer programs, or the technological realities of carbon reduction.

Nor are any of the features exceptional when considered in terms of national identity, or, to be more blunt, national interest.

The reaction of countries at the bottom end of the international economic spectrum show just how powerful and real national interest, nationalism, is right now in Copenhagen. Lumumba Stanislaus Dia Ping, the Sudanese ambassador to the G77, called the draft document another manifestation of imperialism. In words which would have done any Marxist-Leninist revolutionary proud, he said, "The Empire has always relentlessly and ruthlessly grabbed natural resources."

Presumably the "natural resources" being "grabbed" this time by the "Empire" (whatever that might mean) are the atmosphere and climate of the world. This, of course, overlooks the minor fact that the "Empire" shares both air and weather with even the Sudanese.

A more salient exhibition of the power of national identity and nationalism is resident in the threat by the "poor" countries to walk out of the climate conflab unless their demands for money are adequately met. Again, it was Mr Dia Ping who set the tone by decrying the ten billion dollars to be committed by the "rich" nations (presumably the "Empire") as a "wholly inadequate bribe" which put the "climate crisis" on a lower priority than the Great Recession.

If ten billion dollars per year for the period 2010-2012 is an inappropriately small "bribe," what would Mr Dia Ping consider to be an acceptable figure? Twenty billion? Fifty billion? No limit?

Apparently, the small, poor nations can't agree on the number, but they have achieved a consensus on the notion that "compensation" is necessary. Without the iron clad guarantee of proper wealth transfer from the industrialized nations to the assorted "have nots," there is a threat that the latter group will simply walk out of the Monster Rally.

This dramatic gesture would simply be a means of attention grabbing as well as an instrument of extortion. Most of all, it would be a strong, even strident example of nationalism at work. It might be a very good idea if the G77 states would stage a walk out. Such an action would force the political and perhaps even the chattering class to reevaluate their prize notion that nationalism is a dead or dying force in the politics of international relations.

Both the "Danish Text" and the G77 response show the power of nationalism--cloaked in the garments of national interest--has the compelling power ascribed to it by President Sarkozy's remarks on the relation of French history and culture with that of Islam. The lens of national interest bends whatever light passes through it. It must distort.

But, that distortion is not one of evil intent. It is one of the unique history of a people, of a nation which produces as an inevitable consequence a particular view of the world and what the nation must seek or accept in the dynamics of international relations.

Governments as a result must look out for their own interests, their own survival first and foremost. Democratic, pluralistic countries produce governments which serve their own interests by effectively (appearing to be) serving the best interests of their citizens. Other, less democratic, less pluralistic, less open governments skip the charade of serving the interests of the nation and focus on the personal fortunes and futures of those in government or most tightly connected to it.

The government of Sudan--and many of the G77 states fall in the latter category. These worthies have little if any concern for the well being of those unfortunate to live under their sway. They do, however have a great concern for personal well-being, personal survival, personal finances.

Not surprisingly, the representatives of these governments look to the US and the other industrialized, advanced economies as cash cows to be milked at length. It is for this reason as well, these governments would love to see the UN in charge of wealth redistribution programs as the chances for graft and corruption would be magnified thereby. (For proof of this unflattering contention simply review the Oil-For-Food Program as administered for a decade by the UN.)

Nationalism and its underpinning, national identity, are alive and well every moment of every day. They motivate as well as conceal the efforts by governments great and small to do the work of both running a state and playing the Great Game of Nations in all its many forms. It is this ground truth which links head, shoulder, and hip the cautionary statements of Mr Sarkozy and the gavotte in progress at the Monster Rally in Copenhagen.

More examples of the interesting times in which we live.

Keep The Mullahs In Power Above All Else

The party line in Iran has reversed course. The Supreme Leader has confirmed the change. He now avers that the West was not behind the unrest in Iran following the election. This development came hard on the heels of the Iranian decision to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the Arak heavy water reactor and other sites previously prohibited to them.

The Charm Offensive has gained speed as Friday approaches. The big noise on Friday is the scheduled release of the latest poop out of the IAEA on the Iranian nuke projects. There is very real apprehension that the new report will contain the fruits of US, UK, Israeli, and IAEA intelligence showing the weaponization efforts of the mullahs. If the IAEA drops the ElBaradi protective shield, it will be the result of coordinated multi-lateral pressure and will result in enhanced pressure to "Do Something!" about the emerging Iranian threat on the part of Western opinion molders and politicos.

Reinforcing the potential that the West will "do something" are the recent remarks by both France's Nicholas Sarkozy and, today, Germany's Angela Merkel. Considering that both nations are in the "Billionaire's Club" in bi-lateral trade with Iran, the new harshness is not easily ignored in Tehran--or Qom. The potential of the new measures including the prohibition of gasoline shipments to the country puts added and very real pressure on the economic basket case called Iran.

The deep divisions demonstrated both in the Iranian public and the clerical elite that runs the country have destroyed the facade of the Iranian monolith. The weaknesses within have been and continue to be on display for all to see. In short, Iran looks as unstable as it actually has been for several years, years in which desperation has grown along with economic misery and increasing restiveness under the sway of the reactionary semi-theocracy.

The intent of the Iranian charm offensive is simply to delay the next measures proposed by the US and others, the "crippling sanctions" once promised by SecState Clinton. A second, perhaps overarching intent is to drive a wedge between the US and EU on the one hand and Iran's protectors, Russia and, even more, China.

The goal is to keep the centrifuges spinning in both announced and inspected facilities and the highly probable undisclosed ones. The end goal is to get the bomb. For in possession of the bomb lies the future security of the regime.

Iran has watched US policy to Pakistan closely. We cooperate, support, facilitate the government of Pakistan even though we know perfectly well that the Inter-Services Intelligence wallahs have supported and continue to support Taliban and al-Qaeda. We do this out of fear. Fear that the Pakistani bomb or fissionable materials might fall into the "wrong hands" in the event of a regime collapse. Whether there is any basis in reality for this fear, there can be no denying that it exists at least at the level of anxiety in Washington.

In short, the government of Pakistan may be obnoxious in some, even many, respects, but it is infinitely preferable to no government at all or a government dominated by Islamist jihadists.

The consequence is simple. We will act to secure its continuation in power regardless of other considerations such as expense, human rights violations, corruption, or even its level of perceived legitimacy.

The Supreme Leader in Iran wants the same sort of guarantee above all else. For Grand Ayatollah Khemenei, regime maintenance is what it is all about. This is buttressed by the clear indication that he desires to establish a family dynasty in the quasi-theocracy by seeing his son succeed him as Supreme Leader.

In the short run Iran depends upon its capacity to be a regional troublemaker as well as its foreign protectors China and Russia to purchase time and regime maintenance alike. In the longer term, say in another eighteen to twenty-four months, the Supreme Leader sees the "Pakistani Gambit" as a sovereign remedy to forestall the collapse of the government.

If the US fears the consequences of a Pakistani collapse or Islamist jihadist takeover of Pakistan, it would be even more fearful of Iran falling apart. Right now Iran faces three internal threats, regional defensive insurgencies in Kurdistan and down in Baluchistan. In addition the events of the post-election period show that the potential of an offensive insurgency pitting the large segment of totally discontented and disaffiliated Iranians against the Islamist reactionaries of the clerical establishment and its supporters of the Iran-Iraq War period, the Revolutionary Guard and the jihadist militia.

The specter of a nuclear Iran collapsing in a welter of insurgency and bloodletting with fissile materials at risk would be guaranteed to produce a number of Xanax moments in Washington. The less risky course of action would be to bite down on distaste and do what could be done to prop up the regime. At the least Washington would be deterred from throwing its weight behind one or another insurgent contestant.

Or so the logic tree of the Supreme Leader and his coterie must/might run. Buy time. Keep the centrifuges spinning. Get the fissionables. Play the Pakistani Gambit. Keep the regime running.

And, there it is, one more foreign policy challenge for the Nice Young Man From Chicago and his crew of progressives. Gotta hope they are up to it.

Al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb Puffs Its Chest

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been doing a fair bunch of threatening and killing in recent weeks. The group has been littering the desert with bodies in Algeria and Mali. When AQIM could take time off from shooting soldiers and murdering captives, it wiled away the long hours by making threats.

First the group threatened France. The Islamist jihadists were mightily put out by the derogatory remarks made by Nicholas Sarkozy concerning the wearing of the burqua (AKA "a garbage sack") by women in France. Using the high and lofty wording which Islamists generally employ to justify their intentions to butcher, injure, and terrorise, AQIM warned it would "protect the honor of our sisters" living under the threats of "Islamophobia" in France. The Bravos of Allah's Army called upon French Muslims to join in the "war" against the Crusader oppressors.

Showing a resolve more closely approaching that exhibited at Verdun in 1916 than the version on display in May 1940, the French parliament went ahead with hearings on whether or not to put the body-enclosing bag beyond the pale of law. All that is missing to date is for President Sarkozy to come out singing, "Form your battalions! March! March."

Not at all taken aback by the failure of the Muslims resident in France to take up the challenge and throw up barricades in Paris, AQIM has taken on a bigger target. A much bigger target.

China. That's right, China. The scrofulous group best known for massive atrocities in Algeria and, more recently, ambushing the poorly trained and equipped troops of Mali, has tossed down the gauntlet to one of the world's most formidable militaries backed by a very fine clandestine service and political will almost beyond measure.

But, what else could a poor, humble but True Believing Warrior For the Prophet do given the provocation offered by China in its repression of the Uighurs? While Islamic governments may shy away from confronting Beijing, and the Islamic neighbors of China, the Central Asian Republics, even ally themselves with the Very Big Satan, the Desert Swords of Islam will rise to the occasion.

North Africa, particularly Algeria, is a target rich environment. There are more than fifty thousand Chinese nationals living and working there. Spread thinly across a huge, potentially hostile physical and human terrain, the Chinese, whether oil field workers or employees of other Chinese government sponsored business activities or private citizens pursuing profit and pleasure according to individual definitions, all are now at an elevated risk.

Unlike previous threats or attacks against Chinese nationals as in the Sudan, Beijing responded quickly, vigorously, and publicly to the AQIM declaration. Qin Gang, a ForMin spokesman stated that China would take all necessary measures to protect Chinese personnel and institutions against attack in Africa.

One measure which will not be taken is any backing down in Xanjiang. The central government is--quite literally--death on the three evils of "separatism, terrorism, and extremism." In the estimate of Beijing, the Uighurs are guilty of all three "evils." Being foreigners, the best AQIM can aspire to is guilt in the second two categories. That will be enough, more than enough, if AQIM carries through with its threat.

The Deep Thinkers of the Band of Relentless Fighters For Muslims Everywhere might be well advised to consult history. Knowing these devout adherents of killing their way to the Perfect Peace of the New Caliphate are too busy with prayers or bomb making to consult the books, the Geek, in his public spirited way will give a thumbnail of the relevant historical experience.

Long ago (say in the 1980s CE) and far away (in a place called Lebanon) there were a number of groups which combined True Love of the Prophet with such secular concerns as driving Israel into the sea, freeing the Palestinian people from bondage, removing the apostate rulers of sundry Islamic states, and generally raising merry hell. As part of achieving these Glorious Goals and assured eternity in Paradise, these Fine Men of the Faith practiced the kidnapping of hostages.

They took captive assorted Americans and Europeans. Some were (in a style already familiar to AQIM) murdered after torture. Others (again in a way copied by AQIM) were released upon the payment of ransom. Still others were held until somehow, somewhere, sometime, they simply disappeared.

Simultaneously flushed with success and frustrated at their failure to drive Israel into the sea, free the Palestinians from bondage, force the US to abandon its role in the Mideast, and achieve other goals sanctified in the Koran, the Deep Thinkers of one group among the multitude resolved to alter matters by kidnapping some Russian diplomats.

Some appropriate minions of the Soviet state were duly taken hostage. The captors sat back secure that they had achieved a measure of leverage over events previously denied them.

Having failed to study Soviet history and the methods by which the Soviets often responded to such acts of base counter-revolutionary activity, the hostage-takers were themselves taken by surprise.

Far from bowing to the Will of Allah as expressed by the kidnappings, the Soviet leadership dispatched a team from their highly efficient clandestine service. This team snatched close relatives of the chief kidnappers. After getting frankly Medieval on the bodies of these relatives they were delivered personally to the local Thug-in-Chief.

The surviving Soviets were speedily released. Appropriate funeral services were held for the relatives taken by the clandestine team.

End of story. Well, not quite. The real end is that while Americans, Europeans, and even Israelis were captured by the Intrepid Men of the One True Faith, Russians were now immune from this fate.

The sweep of Chinese history both before and after the Communist Revolution indicates strongly that the Chinese are far more likely to take the Soviet approach than they are to emulate the hand wringing, can't-we-talk-this-over approach of the Americans, particularly the Americans of the Age of Obama. The French did not roll over and ask AQIM to forgive them for the nasty things said by their president. The Chinese are even less inclined than the French to collapse before AQIM's interpretation of the Will of Allah.

Here endeth the lesson--unless AQIM has a further attack of terminal stupidity. (As Allah wills.)