Go Ahead, Kick Iran While It's Down

Tomorrow is the BIG DAY in Geneva. Tomorrow the P5+1 meet with the representatives of Iran. So far the Obama administration--and the President himself--seem all too willing to schmooze rather than confront the mullahs and their frontmen.

All too many times over the past several months--even after the debacle of the June elections and their aftermath--the President and his people seem convinced that Iran is a monolith, a giant which must be approached with great care and only after the performance of required rituals designed to placate the menace.

The truth is that Iran--or at least the Dreadful Duo of Ayatollah Khemenei and the wooden dummy on his lap, Ahmedinejad--are clinging to power only by the threat of force. Senior clerics have faced down the "Supreme Guide" even on such matters as the end date of Ramadan. The opposition continues to flourish even under the guns and clubs of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basiji.

The fault planes which have shown their existence before have shifted with much greater force and duration. The shift is to the disadvantage of the regime.

The Iranians have stated they desire a broad ranging discussion of numerous issues. The goal, according to Ahmedinejad, is to test the political good will of the US. Fine. Take them at their word--but make the agenda one of our own creation.

Start off with an examination of Iran's human rights record in recent weeks, months, and years. Go over it chapter and verse--and go public with all the details. The Iranians have not been overly successful in hiding their capacity for internal brutality, so the sordid facts are available even without a Burn-Before-Reading level security clearance.

Then, go on with a detailed examination of Iran's contribution to world or regional peace. It is worth taking a close and lingering look at Iran's peacemaking role with such noble humanitarian organizations as Hezbollah and Hamas. Or, as an additional feature, the efforts made by Tehran to establish peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, including their foreign aid efforts such as the provision of explosives, weapons, explosively formed penetrators, and other goodies to assorted gunslinging jihadists in both countries.

Of course, even the stooges from Tehran must admit that the whole arena of nuclear weapons proliferation is part of the big picture they say they must discuss in order to test American good faith and will. While it might be necessary for the Great Satan to take a backseat to the more robust French and Germans, the name of the game remains: Iran is an outlaw state.

Sure, the Russians and, even more, the Chinese will protest such a harsh characterization. Still, it remains the accurate and honest characterization of the mullahocracy. And, it will remain such as long as the Dreadful Duo remain in charge.

It might not be out of the question to hint at the potential of regime change. Sure, the Iranians will howl like a collection of stuck pigs and China may well join in the chorus. So what? The opposition Green Movement has made it clear that it shares the concerns of the civilized world regarding the Iranian "Mahdi Bomb." The Green Movement does have a shot at replacing the deeply discredited current regime--and deserves Western assistance in so doing.

The test for the Dreadful Duo is whether they will do anything to stay in power. So far, as long as the "anything" that needs be done is restricted to coercion, suppression, violence, and show trials, they have done just that. The nitty-gritty is whether or not they are willing finally to capitulate to Western demands on the nuclear matter in order to avoid Western support for regime change.

The risk is not that great. If the regime in Tehran decides that even veiled hints of regime change, of Western assistance to the Green Movement, are no more than bluff and calls it, the result is no more fraught with peril than is allowing the Iranian regime to acquire nuclear weapons.

Real sanctions might work. Who knows, they have yet to be tried. Real sanctions will hurt both the regime and the Iranian people. The net effect, though, given the events of the post-stolen election period, will be a strengthening of the opposition and a further erosion of the regime's perceived legitimacy. The sanctions alone might put the regime so far on the ropes that only an eleventh hour agreement to the terms dictated by the West will save their slipping hold on power.

The US and the far more realistic and tough-minded French and--who would have thought--Germans have two goals in the Geneva talks. The overriding one is the ending of the emerging nuclear threat. The other, and far more important in the longer run, is regime change.

Rather than acting as if we are afraid of the Big, Bad Mullahs, we should go ahead and kick the regime right where it hurts. The Dreadful Duo is down--but not quite out. The task is that of finishing them for once and all as the blot on humanity--and Islam--which they are.

Keep The Mullahs In Power Above All Else

The party line in Iran has reversed course. The Supreme Leader has confirmed the change. He now avers that the West was not behind the unrest in Iran following the election. This development came hard on the heels of the Iranian decision to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the Arak heavy water reactor and other sites previously prohibited to them.

The Charm Offensive has gained speed as Friday approaches. The big noise on Friday is the scheduled release of the latest poop out of the IAEA on the Iranian nuke projects. There is very real apprehension that the new report will contain the fruits of US, UK, Israeli, and IAEA intelligence showing the weaponization efforts of the mullahs. If the IAEA drops the ElBaradi protective shield, it will be the result of coordinated multi-lateral pressure and will result in enhanced pressure to "Do Something!" about the emerging Iranian threat on the part of Western opinion molders and politicos.

Reinforcing the potential that the West will "do something" are the recent remarks by both France's Nicholas Sarkozy and, today, Germany's Angela Merkel. Considering that both nations are in the "Billionaire's Club" in bi-lateral trade with Iran, the new harshness is not easily ignored in Tehran--or Qom. The potential of the new measures including the prohibition of gasoline shipments to the country puts added and very real pressure on the economic basket case called Iran.

The deep divisions demonstrated both in the Iranian public and the clerical elite that runs the country have destroyed the facade of the Iranian monolith. The weaknesses within have been and continue to be on display for all to see. In short, Iran looks as unstable as it actually has been for several years, years in which desperation has grown along with economic misery and increasing restiveness under the sway of the reactionary semi-theocracy.

The intent of the Iranian charm offensive is simply to delay the next measures proposed by the US and others, the "crippling sanctions" once promised by SecState Clinton. A second, perhaps overarching intent is to drive a wedge between the US and EU on the one hand and Iran's protectors, Russia and, even more, China.

The goal is to keep the centrifuges spinning in both announced and inspected facilities and the highly probable undisclosed ones. The end goal is to get the bomb. For in possession of the bomb lies the future security of the regime.

Iran has watched US policy to Pakistan closely. We cooperate, support, facilitate the government of Pakistan even though we know perfectly well that the Inter-Services Intelligence wallahs have supported and continue to support Taliban and al-Qaeda. We do this out of fear. Fear that the Pakistani bomb or fissionable materials might fall into the "wrong hands" in the event of a regime collapse. Whether there is any basis in reality for this fear, there can be no denying that it exists at least at the level of anxiety in Washington.

In short, the government of Pakistan may be obnoxious in some, even many, respects, but it is infinitely preferable to no government at all or a government dominated by Islamist jihadists.

The consequence is simple. We will act to secure its continuation in power regardless of other considerations such as expense, human rights violations, corruption, or even its level of perceived legitimacy.

The Supreme Leader in Iran wants the same sort of guarantee above all else. For Grand Ayatollah Khemenei, regime maintenance is what it is all about. This is buttressed by the clear indication that he desires to establish a family dynasty in the quasi-theocracy by seeing his son succeed him as Supreme Leader.

In the short run Iran depends upon its capacity to be a regional troublemaker as well as its foreign protectors China and Russia to purchase time and regime maintenance alike. In the longer term, say in another eighteen to twenty-four months, the Supreme Leader sees the "Pakistani Gambit" as a sovereign remedy to forestall the collapse of the government.

If the US fears the consequences of a Pakistani collapse or Islamist jihadist takeover of Pakistan, it would be even more fearful of Iran falling apart. Right now Iran faces three internal threats, regional defensive insurgencies in Kurdistan and down in Baluchistan. In addition the events of the post-election period show that the potential of an offensive insurgency pitting the large segment of totally discontented and disaffiliated Iranians against the Islamist reactionaries of the clerical establishment and its supporters of the Iran-Iraq War period, the Revolutionary Guard and the jihadist militia.

The specter of a nuclear Iran collapsing in a welter of insurgency and bloodletting with fissile materials at risk would be guaranteed to produce a number of Xanax moments in Washington. The less risky course of action would be to bite down on distaste and do what could be done to prop up the regime. At the least Washington would be deterred from throwing its weight behind one or another insurgent contestant.

Or so the logic tree of the Supreme Leader and his coterie must/might run. Buy time. Keep the centrifuges spinning. Get the fissionables. Play the Pakistani Gambit. Keep the regime running.

And, there it is, one more foreign policy challenge for the Nice Young Man From Chicago and his crew of progressives. Gotta hope they are up to it.

Congratulations, President Ahmadinejad!

It couldn't happen to a more deserving sort of guy. Kisses, bright blooms in yellow, big smiles--and empty seats in the audience. What a start for the second term as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Wow!

Making Ahmadinejad's inauguration even sweeter must have been the White House's official media flack, Robert Gibbs, calling the Orator-in-Chief, "the elected leader." This is more than previous administrations have done when perversions of election have been employed to sanitize the assumption of public office. This is definitely an honor for Mr Ahmadinejad.

And, to really start off the Ahmadinejad second term in fine style, Iran has three, count them, three honest-to-Allah American hostages. This out performs North Korea, which only managed to snatch two of the highly desirable bargaining commodity.

Perhaps the re-elected(?) president hopes to emulate Kim Jong-il. Mayhaps he entertains happy visions of "private citizen" Bill Clinton jetting in to have a few hours happy talk and then depart with the "pardoned" US spies.

What a way to start off the old second term: Fantasies of secret high-level, back channel talks with senior US diplomats leading to an agreement. You send us one former American president and we give you three captives.

Great photo op. Great chance to create speculation that this shake-grin-and-pardon dynamic will lead to further diplomatic exchanges. Great way to buy more time as the centrifuges spin merrily along.

Even if the dream does not become reality, President Ahmadinejad has one thing going for him. Iran is probably close enough to having break out capacity that there is no need to worry about the very remote possibility of the US orchestrating the ever-rumored "crippling" sanctions.

The highest probability is that Iran will possess a rudimentary but diplomatically effective nuclear arsenal by this time next year. The Hillary Clinton "defense umbrella" statement is virtual confirmation that the US National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 was based on a false predicate.

The correct predicate as has been hinted at by recent European estimates is that the Iranian technicians developed and tested (without fissionable materials) the "physics package" for an implosion type uranium bomb by the time the US invaded Iraq. That, more than fear of the US doing the same to Iran, caused the suspension of the active R&D effort pending the availability of sufficient weapons grade uranium.

Since there is no indication the Obama administration is willing to run the risks which attend automatically upon the employment of the "military option," there is no reason to believe that Iran is going to remain a nuclear-free zone much longer. With sanctions irrelevant and the use of force unrealistic, the only remaining option is the acceptance of Iran as a very junior member of the Global Nuke Club. Kind of gives the shivers, doesn't it?

Of course, Mr Ahmadinejad has ambitions beyond presiding over the creation of the "Mahdi" bomb. He is possessed of global ambition. On Ahmadinejad's first watch Iran made strenuous efforts to penetrate the Horn of Africa from Djibouti to Tanzania. Not content with outflanking the Gulf States, Statesman Ahmadinejad has pursued a love match with Hugo Chavez too well known to deserve comment. This (perhaps) folie a deux has been complemented with flirtation directed at Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

One must never overlook the blushing successes of Ahmadinejad's version of diplomacy in the heart of the Mideast. The relation with Syria. The proxies Hezbollah and Hamas. The prongs of subversion in the Gulf. And on, and on. It has been a sort of mirror image of the "pactomania" which typified the days of John Foster Dulles fifty years and more ago.

Then there has been the big event, backroom relations with China and, to a slightly lesser extent, Russia. These, in turn, have protected Iran's connection with fellow rogue state, North Korea, which has so often served so well as a stalking horse for Tehran.

All in all, Mr Ahmadinejad has crafted a lofty inverted pyramid of diplomatic and economic relations balanced on the thin point of revolutionary Islamist ideology buttressed by terror, subversion, oil revenues, and case hardened intransigence. A magnificent edifice of threat and bluster with little to support it beyond a will and ability to go nuclear, risk civilian lives, employ terror without end, and sheer effrontery.

So much for the upside of the Years of Ahmadinejad and his patron, protector, and soulmate, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. Now for the termite riddled foundation.

Ahmadinejad may not last his second term. The population of Iran in large part is both restive and sullen, freighted with distrust and disillusion. The opposition has been inefficiently and incompletely suppressed. Fear, not affection nor widely perceived legitimacy sustains the reactionary mullahs and their secular kinsmen in power.

The mullahs themselves are more openly and deeply split between pro- and anti-Khamenei factions than has been the case previously. Not even the Revolutionary Guard is immune to the effects of both the split and the dynamics of personalism which color so much of Shia Iranian institutions. Certainly the Iranian regular army and police have already shown the effects of the divisions within; the Revolutionary Guard is not far behind.

The economy is in the tank. Inflation and unemployment are in a neck-to-neck race to see which can reach lunar orbit heights first. Un- and underemployment have hit the educated urban youth the hardest. No future and a lot of time to think about it on the part of people young enough not to be risk averse has been the ruination of previous centralised regimes. Iran is not immune to this.

Much of Ahmadinejad's base of support is bought and paid for. His version of Islamist populism does not come free--or even cheap. If the promised goodies do not keep flowing, the ranks of the discontented, disaffiliated, and potentially violent will grow.

Further growth of unrest will necessitate further repression. Repression must finally be bloody. Given the martyrdom oriented values which permeate Shia generally and recent Iran in specific, the dynamic is martyrdom breeds more martyrdom. In short, the regime may find itself killing its way not to victory but to defeat.

Ahmadinejad may be able to crow about Iran's "Mahdi" bomb within the next twelve months, but the Iranian people will discover an unpleasant truth or two. They will find out that money spent on bombs and delivery systems is money not spent on economic development. They will discover that atomic bombs do not provide nourishment, jobs, longer lives, better lives, international respect, or even absence of fear.

Most of all, the Iranians, the whole long-suffering lot of them, will be hit in the face with the hard fact that the ambitions of True Believers--of Khamenei, of Ahmadinejad, of those who circle around the center of power--are based upon the misery, fear, and blood of the people in general. They will find out the leaders--from the Grand Ayatollah on down--do not give a dessicated camel turd for the commonweal of the common Iranian.

When that happens, no matter how many the Basji and Revolutionary Guard might kill, the edifice Ahmadinejad and Khamenei built will fall. And fall fast. And fall hard.

It will be like what happened in the Democratic Republic of Germany when the hoi polloi discovered how the leaders lived, how they exploited faith and folk. Here, seemingly secure in power now and forever. A day later, gone, dead, buried in the rubble of the Wall.

Finally, A Fatwa Worthy Of Respect

One of Iran's most senior clerics, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, has issued a fatwa which, in essence, declares the current government of Iran to be illegal. The religious finding, a reply to a series of questions posed by Mohsen Kadivar, an intellectual and cleric, was posted on the website maintained by Kadivar. For the Farsi challenged, a translation is available at MEMRI.

While the fatwa does not name Supreme Leader Khamenei in specific, there is no doubt it constitutes a full scale attack on the current regime of Khamenei and his stooge, Ahmedinejad. It denounces the actions of the Iranian government including its clerical component as violating the basic precepts of Islam and the requirements of Islamic jurisprudence.

Being illegal, the government is liable to removal by the people. Montazeri wrote:

As I said, both religious law and common sense [dictate that] position holders who have lost the right to administer social affairs automatically lose their posts, and their rule is no longer legitimate in any way. If they remain in their position by means of force, fraud, or forgery, then the people must express their opinion regarding the illegitimacy and unpopularity [of these position holders], and remove them from their posts in the least harmful way...

That is very strong language! It is nothing less than the authorisation of revolution, a greenlight for the overthrow of the present Iranian regime, clerics not excepted.

Montazeri argues that the clerics carry the greater responsibility for tossing the illegal, non-Islamic rascals out. Consider his wording carefully:

Obviously, this is a duty incumbent upon all [and not only upon specific individuals]... and none may evade it under any pretext. The elite [i.e. the clerics] have a special obligation [to carry out this task], since they are knowledgeable in religious and civil law, and have greater ability than [the rest of the people]. Their statements have greater influence and carry greater force; therefore, they bear a greater responsibility. They must present [the people]... with an alternative [option], while [preserving the people's] unity and ideological harmony, and establishing parties as well as public and private organizations.

Well, bucko, what does that read like to you? To the Geek it comes very close to the tocsin of rebellion.

While the NYT is probably accurate in its assessment that this fatwa will not have any immediate dramatic effect on the internal dynamic in Iran, the longer term impact of this bold, bald denunciation should not be underrated. Previous clerical statements including those by Montazeri have been cautious, ambiguous, and hesitant.

With this fatwa, Montazeri, who is an old Revolutionary and long-standing power in the Revolutionary government, has challenged his one time, more-or-less colleague, Khamenei. The challenge cannot be ignored without great risk to the status quo. Neither can the Montazeri position be overlooked by the clerical establishment generally.

Montazeri was once considered the most probable successor to Ayatollah Khomenei, but parted company with the founder of the revolution ostensibly over the killing of prisoners which was opposed by Montazeri but actually because of Montazeri's opposition to the idea of clerical rule. This opposition has assured the split between Montazeri and Khamenei deepened and widened over the past twenty years.

Montazeri's implacable resistence to the concept of clerical rule, to theocracy per se means that there is no room for compromise with Khamenei. Khamenei is more of a champion of theocracy naked, pure, and simple than was Khomenei. The esposal of theocracy coupled with Khamenei's apparent ambition of seeing his number two son, Mojtaba, succeed him as Supreme Leader provided even more motivation to Montazeri's opposition.

The eighty-seven year old Montazeri has seized the moment, realistically his last moment, to put the division in views of Iran's governmental nature and collective future into the most clear public view. The dynamics of today with no real weakening in either the willingness of the opposition to continue their campaign of dissent being matched by the total refusal of Khamenei to seek any sort of accommodation with the dissidents gives Montazeri his last, best opportunity to push Iran's internal trajectory in a way he finds acceptable to his view of Islam.

It is necessary to watch closely for signs of how the legion of clerics littering the Iranian landscape react to the Montazeri fatwa. The influence of the clerics cannot and must not be undervalued. In a very real and direct sense, the way in which the clerical establishment splits into pro- and anti-Montazeri camps will determine what sort of Iran the rest of the world will have to deal with in the months and years to come.

As Allah wills---

Sounds Of Battle Off Stage

As the noise and blood of the protests fades out in Tehran and elsewhere, the sounds of battle continue. Now they are off screen, away from Twitter, and unavailable for posting on YouTube.

The offstage battle can be brought out from behind the scenery and shoved down stage center by actions taken by the US and other Western countries. Indeed, it is arguable that the correct actions will bring about a denouement to the current interlocking Iranian crises which is favorable to the interests of the outsiders to say nothing of the Iranian public generally.

While it is legitimate to assert that there is no such critter as a "moderate" inhabiting any of the several religious and secular centers of power in Iran, this should not be taken as meaning that the regime and its instruments are monolithic. Quite the contrary, there are deep fissures within the remnants of the Revolutionary Generation.

One faction which is currently growing in its oppositional solidarity to Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, is comprised of the Revolutionary Old Guard. Its membership includes "defeated" presidential candidate Mousavi. It also numbers within its list such old stalwarts of the deceased Ayatollah Khomenei as the senior clerics Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Montazeri. Along with these ayatollahs as many as fifteen of the twenty mariji (those worthy of emulation) from whose ranks the next Supreme Leader must be chosen are arrayed against Khamenei and his plans for a family dynasty.

It isn't just the religious Old Guard which is joining the lists against the theocratic and dynastic ambitions of today's Supreme Leader. Important secular figures such as Ali Larjani, the current speaker of the Iranian parliament and former chief nuclear negotiator; the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Qalibaf; and Mohsen Rezai, another of the defeated presidential candidates. Even the supposedly one-for-all-and-all-for-one Revolutionary Guard is not solidly behind Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. Ali Jafari, the overall commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps who was personally chosen by Khamenei, is slipping over to the opposition. So also is the RG's commander of the Tehran district, Ali Fazli.

The reason these rather different components of the Old Guard are jelling in opposition to Khameni is Khamenei's son. Mojtaba Khamenei is the Grand Ayatollah's number two son and has been reportedly being groomed to take over the family business when the old man steps down. Not much is known publicly about Mojtaba beyond the fact that he has the rank of ayatollah in the Shia hierarchy.

While Mojtaba holds the minimum rank required to become Supreme Leader, there is buzz to the effect that he is a theological lightweight even compared with his father. When dear old dad was chosen to follow Khomenei as Supreme Leader, many in the Koranic know, including Grand Ayatollah Rafsanjani, had discounted the possibility since the old man was not too bright in the theology department.

But, whatever Khamenei pere might have lacked in Islamic jurisprudence, he more than made up for in backroom politics. Since the Khamenei family once demonstrated that the ability in the field of practical politics defeats theological competence, few of the Old Guard are now willing to bet that Mojtaba will be knocked out of the box simply because he can't pass hermeneutics 101.

The vibrations on the table top speak of Mojtaba having been the Conductor-in-Chief of the Great Ahmedinejad Election Victory. It is even more clear that Mojtaba has been in charge of the repressions carried out against the post 12 June protesters. Mojtaba is the undisputed man in charge of the basiji. He is, in essence, the Himmler of the regime.

As Mojtaba has emerged from the depths of the shadows in recent days, a number of very nasty rumors have surfaced as well. Most of these focus on Mojtaba's ability to collect money and place it in safe harbors outside of Iran. It has been alleged, for example, that much of the more than two and half gigabucks frozen by the UK on 18 June in keeping with EU and UN resolutions was Mojtaba's personal fortune.

Whether true or not, rumors of large scale peculation are a strong indicator that Mojtaba and Khamenei's plans for a family dynasty are perceived as threats to the Revolution. As such the ambitions and the personalities must and will be opposed both directly and indirectly by the true believers of the Old Guard.

The opposition may be overtly directed against Ahmedinejad. The Old Guard and its sympathisers among younger Iranians can complicate Ahmedinejad's efforts to govern. Any number of monkey wrenches can be tossed in the mechanisms of governance. On the clerical level the same may be done--on steroids. Considering that the Old Guard opponents of the re-elected president and Mojtaba control both the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts, their capacity to hamstring Ahmedinejad is pronounced.

The challenge for the Obama administration as well as the rest of the West is that of putting additional stress on the fragile Iranian economy and the less-than-resilient political system without overdoing it such that the highly nationalistic Old Guard are compelled to drop their opposition to Khamenei's plans. At the same time the imposition of additional stresses particularly on critical civilian sectors of the economy will bolster the opposition's efforts to discredit both Ahemdinejad and the Khamenei family.

It is not beyond the realm of plausibility that the combination of civilian sector economic pressure such as the banning of refined petroleum product sales to Iran and a limit to the amount of food sold to the country and the opposition of the Old Guard will result in the early selection of a new Supreme Leader--and the holding of ahead-of-schedule presidential elections.

If the Obama administration takes proper advantage of the continued opportunity which is presented by the Conservative vs Khamenei struggle (which the Geek doubts) the endgame will be very much in the best interests of all. Iran will not stop being an ambitious power, propelled by nationalism and a firm belief in the divine right of Iran to be a global actor and regional hegemon, but it may be a little less irrational and threatening in its pursuit of ambition.

And, the world may yet dodge the bullet of a war nobody wants.