Moving Uranium--Faux Pas Or Provocation?

Watching the people who watch Iran has become as much fun as watching the people who watched the Kremlin was in the good ole days of the Cold War.

The latest piece of amusement came along after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publicly reported that the Iranians had moved (with IAEA inspectors standing by) most of their stockpile of low enrichment uranium from its underground storage facility to a processing plant above ground. That's right, bucko, over two tons of the stuff right there in a shed visible and attackable from the air.

The physical movement came on the heels of the policy move announced by the Iranian Orator-in-Chief to the effect that Iran was proceeding with enrichment to the twenty percent level in order that Iranians might not lack medical radioisotopes produced in the elderly, US furnished nuclear reactor. The deed coming so quickly in the wake of the words pushed the hot buttons of Iran watchers from Tokyo to Washington. After all, even the most ignorant of diplomats and decision makers understands that once the twenty percent enrichment level is made it is all a bob sled run downhill to weapons grade product.

A flurry of meetings, consultations, and viewings-with-alarm ensued at warp speed. The focus of all these--including at least some of the recent visits to Israel by senior US military figures--has been twofold: Why did the Iranians move the goods? and How to keep Israel from responding to the opportunity?

The rather large contingent of those who believe the Iranians are slicker than Bill Clinton on a good day quickly (one is tempted to write "reflexively") ascribed the move to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) which is allegedly seeking to invite an Israeli attack in pursuit of both national unity and a final war with the "Zionist entity." They argue that putting all the nuclear eggs in one basket (well, one large specially constructed cask) with a figurative sign reading "Bomb Here" would constitute an invitation the Israelis could not refuse and the results would be good from the perspective of a badly beleaguered regime.

The Iranian people would unite as one behind the mullahs and the mullahs' men. The hounds of war would be unleashed with the possible result being the "final solution" of the Zionist problem.

As a piece of reasoning this impressive exercise in conspiracy thinking hangs together. It meshes well with the rhetoric of the regime. It takes some account of realities both in the region and the world. It is good enough to assure that the given-to-nervousness Obama administration would launch a quiet diplomatic offensive to keep the Israelis on the reservation.

As reasoning the hypothesis is justifiable. As an exercise in realistic assessment it is not.

Iran is rather unlikely to place the vast majority of its uranium, its potential future nuclear capability, its diplomatic trump card, at high risk. The Koran wavers of Tehran are willing to take calculated risks but not make risky gambles. They are most likely convinced that neither Israel nor the US is convinced that the time is right for the "military option."

This assessment is correct. The push-comes-to-shove moment is not yet here. Arriving rapidly perhaps but not yet upon us.

Reinforcing the low probability of the move being a provocation is the reality that the Iranian centrifuge cascade has been showing itself to be inherently creaky and possessed of a less than impressive reliability. LEW once strewn across the landscape by missiles or bombs is not quickly nor easily replaced--particularly if the means of production are inefficient and cranky.

There is a simpler explanation. It lacks the charm and high drama of the Iranians-as-super-manipulators notion. But, it does meet both technical requirements and the past caution shown by the regime.

The alternative is this. The order to go ahead with twenty percent enrichment caught the engineers by surprise. To execute quickly they had no option but to move the LEW en bloc to the above ground facility and start the new cascade spinning. As was the case in the old Soviet Union, nothing must take precedence over meeting production norms.

This meant taking the calculated risk that Israel would be restrained from seeing an opportunity and taking it. This implied relying upon the Obama administration to carry Tehran's water effectively. It also assured that the production demand could be met in a timely fashion without delaying the production of more LEW.

Given the Obama administration's commitment to sanctions and consequent diplomacy, the Iranian bet was a safe one. Considering that China opposes sanctions as do several current members of the UN Security Council such as Brazil, the last thing the administration needs would be a typically muscular Israeli rising to the nuclear bait.

There is no doubt but JCS Chairman Mullen conveyed the "don't do it!" message loud and clear when he stopped in Israel last week. In doing so he was backstopped by the chief of police in Dubai and his investigation into the assassination of Hamas arms smuggler al-Mabhouh and the consequent diplomatic imbroglio.

The take-away? Simple. The Iranians are clever, but not that clever. They are goal oriented. Not yet suicidal.

Big Shock--Iran Does A Sideslip

To the surprise of no person well oriented as to time and place the mullahs are trying to wiggle out of the "done deal" with the P5+1 in Vienna. Brokered by the IAEA the deal would have had Iran send most of their low enriched uranium to Russia for enrichment to twenty percent, the level required for the old US provided reactor used by Tehran for the production of "medical isotopes." After enrichment the fuel would have been forwarded to France for fabrication into fuel rods not susceptible to further enrichment.

The UN sponsored agreement was seemingly favored by Iran which sent the typical encouraging words at Vienna while saying the opposite back home. By the Friday deadline the governments of the US, France, and Russia had all signed off officially on the deal. The Iranians said they needed more time--even though they leaned toward acceptance.

The Obama administration reportedly responded with mild disappointment to this development. If the Deep Thinkers and Global Strategists of the White House and Foggy Bottom are mildly disappointed about the delay, what do they think of the apparent counterproposal out of Tehran? The word from Iran is that the regime now wants to buy twenty percent enriched uranium from abroad while keeping their low enrichment stockpile safely at home.

An unnamed "diplomat" appeared on the state run PRESS TV to aver that the world powers should accept this "confidence building" proposal and that "they should avoid past mistakes in violating agreements and try to win the trust of the Iranian nation." It is hard to decide whether to laugh or simply shake the head in dismay.

Dismay?

Yes, dismay that anyone might have thought the Iranians would actually go forward with the deal to which they had initially agreed after several days of tough talk and sundry palaver. It would have been a shock of seismic proportions had the mullahs and their factotums actually gone along with the agreement without any attempts to stall, buy time, test political will within the assorted capitals of the P5+1, or in some other fashion undercut or enervate the agreement.

Even more dismaying is the thought that any person involved with the negotiations or within the policy formation groups behind them would have believed that a decision with the implications of that calling for the shipment of 1.2 metric tons of low enriched uranium would be made with the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei apparently out of service. With the grand supremo perhaps hovering in the anteroom to the next life, who is in charge in Iran? Who would dare make a final decision absent the imprimatur of the Chosen Voice of Allah (or the Hidden Imam, take your pick?)

There are divisions within both the secular government and the clerical establishment on the nuclear question among others. These divisions are no reason to hope for a significant modification in the country's international (or internal) behavior. If anything the splits will force a harder stance by the most hardline individuals in the regime. The use of internal factionation to justify harder lines and more resolute stances under pressure is a historically honored practice by authoritarian regimes.

If the Obama administration was prepared for the Iranian reaction it would be both welcome and far more unexpected than was the latest version of the Tehran shuffle. If the administration was expecting a move of this nature, the probable counter will be a firm and swift denial of the gambit. The French and British will join in highest likelihood. The Russians will council patience as will the Chinese. The Germans will swing either way depending on the political mood du jour.

The mullahs and their frontmen will then pin the tail of blame on the Great Satan and its companions. They will then offer--with appropriate gestures of magnanimity--to continue the talks in Vienna or somewhere.

The Chinese will agree immediately. The Russians, their noses slightly bent out of place by the Tehran rejection, will take a bit longer but go along with more talk.

The Germans will stick a wet finger into the political winds. The French will most probably hang tough. The Brits will wait to see how Obama and company respond.

The administration will again be divided as it has been all along (and as it is on Afghanistan) between the hawks such as SecState Clinton and the doves such as National Security Advisor Jones. Veep Biden will talk more or less tough while leaning hard to the dove side. President Obama will, as has usually been the case, try to stay above the fray as time rushes on.

The internationalist minded, multi-culturally inclined people at the top will once more offer the open hand and the open mind. Time will continue to march on as the centrifuges both announced and otherwise continue to spin.

It has been reported that the Israelis are anxiety ridden. They have good reason to reach for either the big bottle of tranks or the operational plans for an attack on Iran--no matter how unlikely to succeed and likely to be the cause of a world of hurt for the US--and the globe.

The Israelis are right to be worried. And, they are not alone.

Sometimes It All Kind Of Gets You Down

The "all" in this case is the sheer mass of hypocrisy, mendacity, naivety, and ideological blindness proliferating in the global politics arena. Admittedly, all of these less than desirable features of the human condition are and always have been rife in the human condition--including the relations between states and pretenders to statehood--but the quantity has reached totally astonishing proportions.

Leading the mendacity list today is the sermon on radio marking the end of Ramadan given by Iran's Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. In his view the US knows perfectly well that it is lying when it alleges the mullahocracy is pursuing nuclear weapons. As is customary in such matters, the ayatollah hid behind the scrim of Islamic religious tenets, averring that possession of nukes would contravene the word of the Prophet. Of course, Khamenei conveniently ignored the Approved By Islam doctrine of lying to protect believers and the belief from infidel inflicted harm.

The ayatollah did hint at some possible slackening in the persecution of anti-Ahmedinejad demonstrators, but his support for the Master Of Mendacity did not relax in the slightest. The "re-elected" Orator-in-Chief holds a tie for Blatant Lie of the Week with his well-rehearsed denial of the Holocaust as a "myth" and a fiction created by the West in order to foist the "Zionist Entity" on the Arab Mideast. The Ahmedinejad version of history was so blatantly false that even the European Union--not noted for its unquestioning support of Israel--joined the US, the UK, and even the original home of the pogrom, Russia, in denouncing it. The Swedish president of the EU did the job even though his native country has had problems over anti-Semitic publications based on falsehoods recently.

Muslims--Islamist jihadists, to err on the side of accuracy--also head the list in the hypocrisy department albeit indirectly. The venue is the geographic expression dubbed "Somalia," but the hypocrites are not the al-Shabaab gun slingers and suicide bombers. Not this time. This time the Hypocrite of the Week Award goes to the UN and the African Union.

The reason for the award is simply the title given the personnel sent to Somalia under the rubric of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM.) These unfortunate souls are termed "peacekeepers." Given that there is no peace to keep in the bloody sands of Somalia, the term is singularly inapposite. Calling the troops from Uganda and Burundi "targets" or "bomb catchers" would be accurate, but the name "peacekeeper" is as wrong as calling a T-bone steak a watermelon.

Of course it is equally hypocritical to call the the UN created Transitional Federal Government in Somalia a "government." A body appointed by foreigners which controls only a small section of the "capital" and a slice of two of nearby desert is scarcely a government. It may be a convenient fiction of the "international community" or even a government-in-waiting, but it is certainly not a functioning entity exercising sovereign control of a territory and a people.

The recent al-Shabaab suicide bombing of an AMISOM base using purloined UN vehicles should give the word to both the UN and the AU. The US and other parties which have played a role in Somalia had best heed the word as well.

The word is simple. Accept that al-Shabaab exercises de facto control and stop the fiction of the Transitional Federal Government or go for the alternative. The alternative is one that no state, let alone supra-national bodies, wish to consider. The alternative is to go into Somalia in force and destroy al-Shabaab. Go into Somalia in force and impose peace. Only then can the peace be kept.

The third option, the option currently being pursued by the outsiders is to hope that the TFG can be kept in some twilight existence long enough that foreign trainers and foreign supplies might pump life into a new Somalian national force capable of suppressing al-Shabaab and other Islamist jihadist groups. So far the third option has shown little probability of ultimate success, but at least it limits non-Somali casualties.

Naivety blooms in the Obama administration's proposed Security Council resolution on nuclear non-proliferation. It demonstrates a touching faith in the efficacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), related conventions, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent states from joining the ever-expanding Nuclear Club. More, the draft resolution, which will be on the table when President Obama chairs the Security Council meeting during his star turn at the Tower of Babel By The Hudson, exhibits an overly great faith in the willingness of states to renounce their own economic and political interests by enforcing provisions of the new expansion of the NPT.

For example, should Iran either be found in violation of any of the provisions of the NPT, or should it withdraw from the NPT, Russia would be required to remove the nuclear reactor and other equipment sold to Iran prior to the declaration of violation or the country's withdrawal from the treaty. The same would be required of other countries whose businesses sold single or dual use equipment employed by Iran in any of its nuclear activities--even those arguably permitted by the NPT.

That will happen on the same day the Geek looks out and sees a whale majestically flying with the hawks over the canyon outside his windows. Can we say, "Naive?"

In principle the draft resolution is fine. It looks good on paper. It reads better than most UNSC gibberish. But...

It is as Bismarck famously quipped, "a piece of paper." A treaty to be observed as long as necessary and ignored whenever convenient--provided ignoring can be done without undue penalty.

Iran has shown a fine ability to ignore assorted Security Council and other pieces of paper without inordinate consequences. It will be able to do so as long as enforcement of agreements relies upon the collective action of nations each of which follows the dictates of its own self-defined national and strategic interests.

If Iran is run by a government which is rational no matter how radical its rhetoric and some of its actions might be, there is no great additional danger presented to either the region or the world by its joining the Nuclear Club. Pakistan has done so without any great perturbation of either regional or global political order.

Sure, the existence of weapons grade fissile materials in Pakistan gives rise to legitimate anxiety regarding its security from the grasping fingers of Islamist jihadist groups. The same would be true in the case of Iran. However, that threat is far more manageable than would be the aftermath of attacks on the Iranian nuclear complex and related targets.

In any event the draft resolution which President Obama will present is no particular threat--as long as no one actually believes it will have any real world impact. The problem comes in that diplomats tend to think that what they do in the shuffling, presenting, and voting on pieces of paper has a real world effect. They are so invested in the process of diplomacy, of achieving some sort of result on paper, that they overlook the actual outcome of the process and its effects on the behavior of states in the real world of power politics.

The otherworldliness of diplomats has its place. As long as your life does not depend on it.

Comes now the subject of ideological blindness. The cause of ideological astigmatism this time is the Obama administration's cancelling of the land-based ABM system in Central Europe. There has been an outpouring of opposition to this. Most of it is misplaced in its basis.

While the cancellation may be questioned as to its diplomatic import on US relations with the countries on Russia's western frontier, it is not, in and of itself, a capitulation to Russian demands. Nor have have the Russians seen it this way as is illustrated by their modest response to it--the decision not to deploy Iskander missiles on the Polish border.

The original decision by the Bush/Cheney administration to deploy the land-based system was itself faulty on several levels. The first was the length of time necessary to reach initial operational capability (IOC). The second was simply that the system was inherently inflexible. The third was the effect it had on Russian paranoia.

The proposed replacement is technologically superior, takes less time to reach IOC, and has built in flexibility. Being sea-based it takes advantage of American superiority in maritime technology and the inherent flexibility that using the sea confers. Tactically, the use of sea-based systems provides a capacity for defending the defense which is absent in fixed base systems. Politically, the use of the sea avoids the unpleasant necessity to rely upon and periodically stroke the governments of host countries.

Far from weakening the American capacity to credibly defend Europe, the Mideast, and, eventually, the CONUS itself, the dropping of the Central European option in favor of a maritime one strengthens it. At the same time, going back to sea eliminates the factor of political winds from disturbing defense systems--a not inconsiderable factor given the potential for radical political change which is resident in many of the Central European states.

Paradoxically, considering the charges of abject surrender to the Russians, the beefing up of naval ABM capacities has the extra effect of providing additional defensive capabilities against a Russian short- or mid-range missile attack on either Europe or the Mideast. As the maritime systems evolve in the next few years, it may even provide an additional complication for any Russian planner contemplating an attack on the US.

Reflexive accusations of "surrender," of "weakening" the US come easy to those who automatically oppose any initiative offered by the Obama administration. Considering all of the really, really bad ideas which have issued from the current administration in the foreign policy realm, it is easy to see how attractive automatic opposition may be. In this case it is not--except as regards the impact on the diplomatic center of gravity as seen from Central Europe.

There have been many other examples of hypocrisy, mendacity, naivety, and ideological blindness this past week or so. The above have been only the cream of the slime on the top of the pond.

More than that the Geek could not take. He is a sensitive soul.

Let's Gang Up On Israel--One More Time

The Parade Marshal was Iran. The Drum and Bugle Corps included all the Arab states. Marching in line were a number of the so-called "lesser developed" countries. Joining in for the fun were China and "listen-more-closely-to-US-concerns" Russia.

The festivities were conducted by the 150 members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the annual meeting of this august (and questionably neutral) body. The guest of honor was Israel.

Israel along with India and Pakistan has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and this has exercised the collective outrage of the "international community"--or, to err on the side of accuracy, forty-nine components of that alleged "community." Forty-five other states including the US refused to join in the collective display of displeasure and sixteen apparently could not decide whether or not they were incensed by Israel's non-participation in the NPT.

To nobody's surprise the Iranian delegate to the IAEA crowed about what a great day this was for the Palestinian people and what "a glorious moment" the vote was. Presumably it was a good day for the Man From Mullahland as it took the spotlight for a brief instant off the Iranian pursuit of the "Mahdi Bomb" and focused it on the "Zionist Entity."

The Israeli possession of a sizable nuclear arsenal is the world's worst kept secret although the government of the country never has confirmed nor denied its existence. Instead the government of Israel has repeatedly and coyly maintained it would never be the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons to the Mideast. Whatever that might mean.

It is a debatable point as to whether or not the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons has increased or decreased Israeli security. When the decision to embark upon a nuclear procurement program was made back in the days when Ike was in the White House and Israel was both outnumbered and outgunned by the assorted Arab states, it was (correctly) seen as a necessary and prudential precaution.

The US turned a semi-Nelsonian eye to the Israeli developments during the days of Camelot and its successor, the LBJ administration. The Israeli nuclear program developed quickly and successfully using means both fair and foul--including the "theft" of yellowcake shipments. By the time of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israelis had a significant nuclear capability.

One result of this capacity was its threatened use of the "Sampson Option," which caused the Nixon administration to strip US stockpiles of needed conventional arms and supply critical intelligence to the Israelis. The rapid American re-supply effort was responsible in part for the breathtakingly rapid reversal of Israeli fortunes on the ground in Sinai and, even more importantly, on the Golan Heights.

The US and the Soviet Union both feared the consequences of the Israelis employing the "Samson Option" more than they did even the potential of a direct confrontation, so Moscow backed down from its rhetorical threats as its own sources confirmed the Israeli threat was both real and imminent. From the Israeli perspective, having nukes paid off even when not used.

Israel has nothing to gain and everything to lose by joining the NPT. There is no inducement the US or any other country can provide which would cause Israel to rethink its position on nuclear weapons. Jews learned the very hard way seventy years ago that when push comes to shove, they are on their own. And, no one should forget that a prime reason for the establishment of Israel was to provide a sure and certain final redoubt for Jews of the world.

The Iranian quest for nuclear weapons makes it far more impossible for Israel to set aside a policy which has served it well for decades. The Iranian bomb may or may not be an existential threat to Israel--no less an authority than Defense Minister Barak asserted it was not just the other day. However, given the display of vitriol on the part of Ahemdinejad at the al-Quds Day celebrations in Tehran, it would be foolhearty in the extreme to bet the life of the country on the goodwill or good sense of the mullahs.

The majority was predicated on a pair of false assumptions. One was simply the old theme of "Muslim solidarity." The other was the bogus belief on the part of many nuclear have-not nations that the US and other nuclear powers sought to control access to nuclear technology for their own economic benefit. It might be noted in passing that the US--with the exception of the recent agreement between it and India--is and has not been a major exporter of nuclear equipment and technology. Both the French and the Russians have been far, far more active in this area.

The US and other Western countries may be cautious in who buys equipment and knowledge from them. This is for good reason. These countries are the most likely to become the targets of weapons either nuclear or radiological which may derive from these sales. Russia is less worried. The Kremlin may be wrong in its view, only time will tell.

In any event, countries with a presumed need for access to nuclear technology which possess the means to pay and membership in the NPT have and will continue to have no real problem in acquiring the equipment and knowledge they desire. It is, after all, a profit deal for the vendors.

A related question is simply that of the effectiveness and impartiality of the IAEA. Recent disclosures, particularly that of the "secret annex" to the last IAEA report on Iran, show a startling lack of impartiality or even attention to duty on the part of the IAEA senior leadership. Given the record of Dr ElBaredi on the Iranian question, there is little if any reason to trust the IAEA in the discharge of its responsibility to detect and prevent violations of the NPT.

Only time can tell if the new regime at IAEA will be any more efficient and less partisan than the outgoing one. But the reality continues: If the IAEA cannot be fully trusted, if the IAEA cannot resist the siren song of ideology or ethnic loyalities, the NPT is a dead letter.

It was the perceived partisanship or blatant ineffectiveness of the IAEA which prompted Israel to abate potential nuclear nuisances in Iraq nearly thirty years ago and Syria last year. It may also eventually necessitate a similar but far more risky and costly operation directed against Iran.

Nuclear proliferation is a reality. It is one which grows with each failure of IAEA to do its task fully and effectively. It grows with every successful evasion of the NPT by states such as North Korea.

While some countries such as South Africa, Brazil, and even Libya have publicly abandoned their quest for nukes, there are others who seek to acquire the Big Bomb. Arguably, there are more of the latter than the former.

Instead of meaningless grandstanding, the members of the IAEA should be investing their efforts into protecting themselves from future planting of nuclear mushrooms by making the NPT and the IAEA more effective. Israel is a done deal. Deal with those yet to come. Deal with the threats yet to emerge--now before it is too late to do so.

Keep The Mullahs In Power Above All Else

The party line in Iran has reversed course. The Supreme Leader has confirmed the change. He now avers that the West was not behind the unrest in Iran following the election. This development came hard on the heels of the Iranian decision to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the Arak heavy water reactor and other sites previously prohibited to them.

The Charm Offensive has gained speed as Friday approaches. The big noise on Friday is the scheduled release of the latest poop out of the IAEA on the Iranian nuke projects. There is very real apprehension that the new report will contain the fruits of US, UK, Israeli, and IAEA intelligence showing the weaponization efforts of the mullahs. If the IAEA drops the ElBaradi protective shield, it will be the result of coordinated multi-lateral pressure and will result in enhanced pressure to "Do Something!" about the emerging Iranian threat on the part of Western opinion molders and politicos.

Reinforcing the potential that the West will "do something" are the recent remarks by both France's Nicholas Sarkozy and, today, Germany's Angela Merkel. Considering that both nations are in the "Billionaire's Club" in bi-lateral trade with Iran, the new harshness is not easily ignored in Tehran--or Qom. The potential of the new measures including the prohibition of gasoline shipments to the country puts added and very real pressure on the economic basket case called Iran.

The deep divisions demonstrated both in the Iranian public and the clerical elite that runs the country have destroyed the facade of the Iranian monolith. The weaknesses within have been and continue to be on display for all to see. In short, Iran looks as unstable as it actually has been for several years, years in which desperation has grown along with economic misery and increasing restiveness under the sway of the reactionary semi-theocracy.

The intent of the Iranian charm offensive is simply to delay the next measures proposed by the US and others, the "crippling sanctions" once promised by SecState Clinton. A second, perhaps overarching intent is to drive a wedge between the US and EU on the one hand and Iran's protectors, Russia and, even more, China.

The goal is to keep the centrifuges spinning in both announced and inspected facilities and the highly probable undisclosed ones. The end goal is to get the bomb. For in possession of the bomb lies the future security of the regime.

Iran has watched US policy to Pakistan closely. We cooperate, support, facilitate the government of Pakistan even though we know perfectly well that the Inter-Services Intelligence wallahs have supported and continue to support Taliban and al-Qaeda. We do this out of fear. Fear that the Pakistani bomb or fissionable materials might fall into the "wrong hands" in the event of a regime collapse. Whether there is any basis in reality for this fear, there can be no denying that it exists at least at the level of anxiety in Washington.

In short, the government of Pakistan may be obnoxious in some, even many, respects, but it is infinitely preferable to no government at all or a government dominated by Islamist jihadists.

The consequence is simple. We will act to secure its continuation in power regardless of other considerations such as expense, human rights violations, corruption, or even its level of perceived legitimacy.

The Supreme Leader in Iran wants the same sort of guarantee above all else. For Grand Ayatollah Khemenei, regime maintenance is what it is all about. This is buttressed by the clear indication that he desires to establish a family dynasty in the quasi-theocracy by seeing his son succeed him as Supreme Leader.

In the short run Iran depends upon its capacity to be a regional troublemaker as well as its foreign protectors China and Russia to purchase time and regime maintenance alike. In the longer term, say in another eighteen to twenty-four months, the Supreme Leader sees the "Pakistani Gambit" as a sovereign remedy to forestall the collapse of the government.

If the US fears the consequences of a Pakistani collapse or Islamist jihadist takeover of Pakistan, it would be even more fearful of Iran falling apart. Right now Iran faces three internal threats, regional defensive insurgencies in Kurdistan and down in Baluchistan. In addition the events of the post-election period show that the potential of an offensive insurgency pitting the large segment of totally discontented and disaffiliated Iranians against the Islamist reactionaries of the clerical establishment and its supporters of the Iran-Iraq War period, the Revolutionary Guard and the jihadist militia.

The specter of a nuclear Iran collapsing in a welter of insurgency and bloodletting with fissile materials at risk would be guaranteed to produce a number of Xanax moments in Washington. The less risky course of action would be to bite down on distaste and do what could be done to prop up the regime. At the least Washington would be deterred from throwing its weight behind one or another insurgent contestant.

Or so the logic tree of the Supreme Leader and his coterie must/might run. Buy time. Keep the centrifuges spinning. Get the fissionables. Play the Pakistani Gambit. Keep the regime running.

And, there it is, one more foreign policy challenge for the Nice Young Man From Chicago and his crew of progressives. Gotta hope they are up to it.

Golly! Gee! You Mean We Can't Trust The IAEA?

For a long, long time (say about the past six years) there has been more than a few sneaking suspicions that the outgoing director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been shading the truth about what was going on in Iran. It has been easy to poo-poo these suspicions as being mere prejudice based on Dr Mohammad ElBaradi's religious affiliation and ethnic background.

It would be tempting to dismiss the latest allegations of ElBaradi having massaged and manipulated the publicly released quarterly reports on Iran's "compliance" with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as they emanate from Israel. While it is quite true that Israel is anything but a disinterested party in the ongoing Iranian nuclear contretemps, this does not mean the odor of hanky-panky in the reports department is an artifact, a creation of Israeli propagandists.

At the present, Israel has less rather than more reason to escalate its differences with the soon-to-leave ElBaradi or the IAEA. The reason for this assessment rests in the recent demand by the Arab League that the UN entity force Israel under its purview. To this end the Arab League has requested the backing of the European Union. Many, if not all, the member countries of the EU have been tilting more and more against Israel in recent years, so the possibility of the Arab demarche receiving European support is far from remote.

In the past Israel has been quiet and careful in its criticism of ElBaradi. This caution would be expected to be extended given the Arab League move and the necessity of allowing the incoming IAEA Director-General, the Japanese diplomat Yukiya Amano, a chance to get up and running. It would have been far more in keeping with past precedent if the Israelis (or the Americans) discretely hinted that the new broom ought to sweep the doubts of the past aside by putting the full reports including the classified annexes on the public record.

Unless the Israelis (and the US among others) are already convinced that for some set of unknown reasons Yukiya Amano has already committed himself to keeping the lid on the past, there is no reason to raise the issue of ElBaradi's candor and forthrightness now--other than to make certain that the full facts are on the open table prior to the late September deadline for an Iranian gesture of compliance. If the suspicions and allegations of ElBaradi having shaded the public truth are demonstrated to have been correct, the result may well be a shift in public opinion in both Western Europe and the US to favor more robust actions to insure Iran does not get the bomb.

It has long been an open secret that the US and the UK among others have not trusted the ElBaradi regime. The legacy of distrust goes back to the days just before the American invasion of Iraq. At that time the Bush/Cheney administration frankly and flatly tossed aside the conclusions of the IAEA and other inspection groups regarding the Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Dr ElBaradi was hacked off by this cavalier dismissal--with good reason as events later showed. It is for this reason that he may have chosen to soften the edges of harsh truth regarding Iran. The process by which the Director-General prepares the reports provides ample opportunity for distorting the findings of the inspection teams under the Safeguards Office.

Another possibility for Israel having gone public right now is the utterly preposterous demand by Iran that the IAEA take up its proposal to ban all attacks by anyone, anywhere, at any time on nuclear facilities. With a presumably straight face the Iranians risibly maintain this demand is not prompted by any fear of an Israeli attack on their nuke plants.

Oh, no, not at all. Fer sure, dudes. The Iranians have been present all along during the decade or so during which the IAEA has debated proposals banning attacks on nuclear facilities which might liberate radioactivity into the atmosphere. All these proposals have been blocked, not by the US seeking to maintain its so-called "nuclear hegemony," but by all the nuclear powers. The various rationales have been confusing, incoherent, and often contradictory but all reflect the basic reality that no nuclear power is willing to limit its targeting options such as to preclude the pre-emptive neutralisation of unlaunched nuclear weapons.

The re-awakening of doubts regarding the candor and capacity of the IAEA under the twelve years of Dr ElBaradi's stewardship is a good way of refocusing attention on Iran and the danger it may soon present not simply to Israel or even the region but the world. It is also a fine way to focus the attention of the incoming Director-General in case he harbors any intention of replicating the ElBaradi mode of operation.

Whatever Dr ElBaradi's intentions and motives may have been (and the Geek is not psychologist enough to speculate on the many potentials), the consequences of having shaded, or, at the least, being seen as having shaded the truth on Iran, has been counterproductive. The ability of the IAEA to function, as was noted by the man behind its creation, President Dwight Eisenhower, is its inherent credibility. Should ElBaradi be shown to have sacrificed credibility, to have rendered ambiguous that which should have been clear, stark, he will have thrown away the credibility of the organisation.

Without total, unquestioned, and unquestionable credibility, the IAEA loses its potential to slow the race to nuclear weapons, which is well underway from Tehran to Pyongyang to Rangoon. Without credibility of the highest, most unimpeachable sort, the vision of a nuclear free world articulated most recently by President Obama fades further in the fog of self-perceived, self-defined national interest.

The very fact that doubts and questions regarding the completeness, the accuracy, the truth of the ElBaradi authorised public reports on Iran demands that the US move with dispatch and effectiveness to assure the rapid, full release of all reports including the initially classified annexes from the Safeguards Office. If it turns out that the ElBaradi regime did play fast and loose with the truth, at least that can be shown to be a fact of the past.

The US was a strong backer of the incoming Director-General. The US must exert all necessary persuasion on the new man to make utterly sure that no future massaging, manipulation, or bending of hard truths occurs. Without these actions, there is no way that the world will see less rather than more mushroom clouds in the future.