Iran And The Ghost Of Democracy

It has been a year since the government officials counting the vote in Iran reelected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a second term as the country's president. This exercise in creative accounting not only proved famed political philosopher Joseph Stalin correct when he pontificated that the people casting ballots elected no one, that was done by the folks counting ballots, but also initiated a period of protest and repression which was longer than expected but not bloodier.

Amnesty International has released a comprehensive report on the repression portion of the protest-repression dyad. It makes for searing reading. It also constitutes a severe indictment of the Iranian regime and its bully boys. In addition, in the Amnesty International methodical documentation of the human consequences of the Iranian exercise in regime maintenance exists a charge of moral cowardice directed against the US and other Western governments.

The Obama administration generally and the president specifically have maintained a discrete distance from the dance of protest and suppression. This detached approach has been justified on a number of grounds. A firm stance in support of the pro-democracy factions would be counterproductive in that it would bolster the regime's claims that the opponents of Ahmadinejad and the mullahs were foreign puppets. Any measures taken against the Iranian regime would hurt the people we intended to assist. The US had to stay on message, had to focus on stopping the Iranian nuclear program regardless of any other consideration no matter how worthy.

All of these reasons (leaving aside any consideration of the lack of internal consistency) are superficially plausible. All make sense of a sort.

But the real deal exists on a more fundamental level. Any effective support of the pro-democracy elements of Iranian society (which, it must be noted includes members of the clerical ruling class) would automatically violate the imperatives of cultural relativism. This is not an inconsiderable fact given that Mr Obama and many of his "team" are strong adherents of the notion that no one cultural, social, political, or economic system is preferable to another. The president and others of his inner circle really believe that all political, social, economic, and cultural systems are ethically equivalent, and any value judgement which holds one to be "better" than another is the product of insensitivity, chauvinism, or xenophobia.

To take on the mullahs and their frontmen would demand that the US, as a matter of policy, declare that secular, pluralistic democracy is ethically superior to clerical rule, subverted elections, and the wholesale violation of human rights by the government of Iran. Any open, effective support for the dissidents in Iran would require that the US, as a matter of policy, hold that states and institutions produced by the European Enlightenment are inherently superior, hold a moral high ground in comparison to states and institutions produced by the Prophet and his successors.

That sort of thing has been, is, and will remain a definite no-no to people such as Mr Obama for whom cultural relativism is a species of revealed Truth. The only correct course of action open to a person who is a True Believer in the dictates of cultural relativism is expressing a sort of vague distaste for the violence associated with repression surrounded by a preternatural detachment which refuses all value judgments as unacceptable "privileging" of a specific outside political position.

So people die in Iran. So people scream in the torture cellars of Evan prison. So, even the graves of those murdered by the Thugs of the Koran are desecrated. Memories besmirched. Lives destroyed. Bodies mutilated.

Through it all the US, the current administration turns the other way, eyes carefully averted as if we were some thwacking great maiden aunt suddenly confronting a vulgar drunk on the steps of the church. Averting our collective vision not for any real world concern, any realpolitik goal, but simply due to the dictates of an intellectual fad of the moment.

A similar dynamic from the same root is at work in the refusal of Team Obama to name properly the enemy we confront daily not only in distant places but here at home. It is cultural relativism which denies us the right to name the threat which confronts us, the gangsters who menace us.

To call the enemy political Islam is to explicitly exalt other monotheistic religions over Islam. To call the people who try to kill us in Afghanistan or in Times Square, Muslims, is to contravene the requirements of cultural relativism as to do so holds Muslims as occupying an ethical niche inferior to those people who do not follow the strictures of Islam.

There is only one cause for the spineless American posture regarding the Iranian election. It is the same cause as underlies the gutless and brainless refusal to call the threat facing us and the rest of the West by its real name.

The cause is not, as is often alleged, "political correctness." That is simply one more convenient excuse for avoiding the truth.

The truth is simply that at the head of this nation there is a president afflicted by a very dangerous, even fatal mental virus. Other Americans of high rank or office have the same affliction. So do many in the elites of the media and academia. The president and all the others who think as he does have caught the same mind destroying disease.

The name of the disease is cultural relativism.

Unless and until the US government can get out from under the dead hand of cultural relativism the US will continue to fail to protect not only its own core interests but also the ambitions and goals of others who would be as we are--citizens of a republic who are still more free than not. In turn this means the US has surrendered its ancient and quite honorable calling to be the "city on a hill," a shining beacon of hope for all humankind.

Delay Is Good--Up To A Point

The US is a maritime power. It is also a semi-accidental simulacrum of an imperial power. As George Friedman at STRATFOR correctly points out, the US has the "imperial" role not by design nor intent but rather as the inevitable result of its economic and geographical position. And, the Geek adds, its unique history.

These two factors dictate why the US, like Great Britain (but not, as Friedman argues, the Roman Empire) practices a grand strategy which focuses on maintaining a balance of power favorable to its interests and attempting to the greatest degree possible to refrain from the direct commitment of its military force. In the effort to minimize direct US force deployment, the basic approach is not one of "divide and conquer." Rather it is one of "delay, decide, select, support, and sustain."

In practice this means the US has been and continues to be well advised to emphasize standing off from a problem area, observing the interplay of the internal forces, selecting one to support, enshrining that decision in policy, and, finally, executing that policy in terms of supporting and sustaining the selected side. Importantly, the side selected need not be the status quo entity although, unfortunately, it usually has been.

The minimum intervention based select and support approach is the necessary centerpiece of successful counterinsurgency. The corollary of select and support is the manipulation of those entities not selected with the view of providing an impetus to a final power sharing formula. This approach when applied in Iraq along with the overdue "surge" was effective despite the recent spate of bombing spectaculars.

Both Iran and Afghanistan are on the table right now. It is relevant to consider both in terms of delay, decide, select, support, and sustain. This formulation can be used with respect to both internal contestants and potential external associates of the US.

Friedman suggests that the Obama administration has two options regarding Iran. One is the old standby--the military option. The other he proposes is to take a Nixon-like approach. That would mean recognizing Iran as a nuclear power, attempting detente with the mullahs with a view to a common focus against Russia.

There is a third option brushed aside by Freidman. That option is linking the US with Russia against Iran and its overt as well as covert supporters. To accomplish this the US would have to draw a firm line as to what we are willing to do both positively and negatively regarding Moscow's many, many ambitions. It is also necessary that the US forthrightly offer a partnership of equals relationship with Russia in pursuit of high value definable coinciding interests.

Maritime powers typically enlist the aid of other powers, particularly those of the continental sort, in the accomplishment of grand strategic goals. If the US can, in the words of one Israeli commentator, "suck up" to Israel, the Obama administration can and must do the same with Moscow--if it wants a viable option other than the choice of war or, in effect, surrender to Iranian policy dictates.

At the same time, the "correlation of forces" (to employ that nifty old Soviet term) in Iran gives the US a unique opportunity to employ delay, decide, support, and sustain with respect to the several internal contestants within Iran. Given the current indisposition of the Ayatollah Khemenei and the ruptures within both civil society and clerical establishment which persist even now five months after the "election" of Ahmedinejad, the US has an unparalleled opportunity to muck around creatively in the Iranian swamp.

The Afghan situation is absolutely rife with opportunities for delay, decide, support, and sustain. The Afghan nation is not a single entity but rather a congeries of tribes, ethnic backgrounds, languages, and forms of Islam. The constitution is weak. The president is strong in some aspects but not overall. The culture has a long tradition of let's-make-a-deal. Many, if not most, of the Taliban membership is less than True Believers in Islamist jihadism.

And, best of all the culture has a mechanism in place for resolving differences, settling old scores without bloodshed, making inter-community deals, and generally setting the stage for a tolerable facsimile of stability. It is the Grand Assembly of Elders. Ignored since the first American boots hit the ground so long ago in the haste to create a Western style democracy, it provides the best chance for the US to achieve its minimum strategic goal of "not-losing" to the Islamist jihadists.

While it is necessary to augment the number of US trigger pullers as well as training and advisory personnel in-country, it is even more critical that the US employ its current freedom to select a new set of entities and individuals to support and sustain--discretely. The Grand Assembly of Elders is the most appropriate, least intrusive way to effectively use influence for both hostilities termination and ultimate conflict resolution.

There is a very real danger in the delay, decide, support, and sustain approach to strategy. It is possible to delay too long. When that happens, events drive the decision making process as they did during the Bush/Cheney administration. The danger exists right now with respect to both Iran and Afghanistan. The time to exercise options as opposed to reacting to the events created by others is rapidly passing by.

President Obama has much--too much perhaps--on his desk. All are marked, "Action Immediate." He and his people would be very well advised for the best interests of the US to push the files marked "Iran" and "Afghanistan to the very top of the pile.

Time, tide, and national strategy wait for no man. Not even a man named Obama.

Keep The Mullahs In Power Above All Else

The party line in Iran has reversed course. The Supreme Leader has confirmed the change. He now avers that the West was not behind the unrest in Iran following the election. This development came hard on the heels of the Iranian decision to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into the Arak heavy water reactor and other sites previously prohibited to them.

The Charm Offensive has gained speed as Friday approaches. The big noise on Friday is the scheduled release of the latest poop out of the IAEA on the Iranian nuke projects. There is very real apprehension that the new report will contain the fruits of US, UK, Israeli, and IAEA intelligence showing the weaponization efforts of the mullahs. If the IAEA drops the ElBaradi protective shield, it will be the result of coordinated multi-lateral pressure and will result in enhanced pressure to "Do Something!" about the emerging Iranian threat on the part of Western opinion molders and politicos.

Reinforcing the potential that the West will "do something" are the recent remarks by both France's Nicholas Sarkozy and, today, Germany's Angela Merkel. Considering that both nations are in the "Billionaire's Club" in bi-lateral trade with Iran, the new harshness is not easily ignored in Tehran--or Qom. The potential of the new measures including the prohibition of gasoline shipments to the country puts added and very real pressure on the economic basket case called Iran.

The deep divisions demonstrated both in the Iranian public and the clerical elite that runs the country have destroyed the facade of the Iranian monolith. The weaknesses within have been and continue to be on display for all to see. In short, Iran looks as unstable as it actually has been for several years, years in which desperation has grown along with economic misery and increasing restiveness under the sway of the reactionary semi-theocracy.

The intent of the Iranian charm offensive is simply to delay the next measures proposed by the US and others, the "crippling sanctions" once promised by SecState Clinton. A second, perhaps overarching intent is to drive a wedge between the US and EU on the one hand and Iran's protectors, Russia and, even more, China.

The goal is to keep the centrifuges spinning in both announced and inspected facilities and the highly probable undisclosed ones. The end goal is to get the bomb. For in possession of the bomb lies the future security of the regime.

Iran has watched US policy to Pakistan closely. We cooperate, support, facilitate the government of Pakistan even though we know perfectly well that the Inter-Services Intelligence wallahs have supported and continue to support Taliban and al-Qaeda. We do this out of fear. Fear that the Pakistani bomb or fissionable materials might fall into the "wrong hands" in the event of a regime collapse. Whether there is any basis in reality for this fear, there can be no denying that it exists at least at the level of anxiety in Washington.

In short, the government of Pakistan may be obnoxious in some, even many, respects, but it is infinitely preferable to no government at all or a government dominated by Islamist jihadists.

The consequence is simple. We will act to secure its continuation in power regardless of other considerations such as expense, human rights violations, corruption, or even its level of perceived legitimacy.

The Supreme Leader in Iran wants the same sort of guarantee above all else. For Grand Ayatollah Khemenei, regime maintenance is what it is all about. This is buttressed by the clear indication that he desires to establish a family dynasty in the quasi-theocracy by seeing his son succeed him as Supreme Leader.

In the short run Iran depends upon its capacity to be a regional troublemaker as well as its foreign protectors China and Russia to purchase time and regime maintenance alike. In the longer term, say in another eighteen to twenty-four months, the Supreme Leader sees the "Pakistani Gambit" as a sovereign remedy to forestall the collapse of the government.

If the US fears the consequences of a Pakistani collapse or Islamist jihadist takeover of Pakistan, it would be even more fearful of Iran falling apart. Right now Iran faces three internal threats, regional defensive insurgencies in Kurdistan and down in Baluchistan. In addition the events of the post-election period show that the potential of an offensive insurgency pitting the large segment of totally discontented and disaffiliated Iranians against the Islamist reactionaries of the clerical establishment and its supporters of the Iran-Iraq War period, the Revolutionary Guard and the jihadist militia.

The specter of a nuclear Iran collapsing in a welter of insurgency and bloodletting with fissile materials at risk would be guaranteed to produce a number of Xanax moments in Washington. The less risky course of action would be to bite down on distaste and do what could be done to prop up the regime. At the least Washington would be deterred from throwing its weight behind one or another insurgent contestant.

Or so the logic tree of the Supreme Leader and his coterie must/might run. Buy time. Keep the centrifuges spinning. Get the fissionables. Play the Pakistani Gambit. Keep the regime running.

And, there it is, one more foreign policy challenge for the Nice Young Man From Chicago and his crew of progressives. Gotta hope they are up to it.

Disengaged "Engagement" With Iran

The Obama administration has been and remains dedicated to a policy of "engagement" with the mullahs of Iran. Yet, given its stance not only on the stolen election of 12 June but its lengthy aftermath of protests, arrests, torture, murder, and, now, a three part series of show trials, one must wonder just what the word "engagement" means around the White House and Foggy Bottom.

As horrifying tales of torture, rape, and murder leak out around the edges of the Koran Curtain surrounding the Islamic Republic of Iran, the silence thunders on at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and the not-too-distant quarters of Hillary Clinton and the State Department. Even Joe Biden who is normally quick with the lip has been singularly quiet.

Some kind of "engagement," ain't it, bucko?

Oh, there were a few soothing, ambiguous words out of SecState Clinton during her eleven day safari through Africa. But, these amounted to nothing more than boiler plate tropes. There was no bite. No indignation. No condemnation. No "engagement."

Even Ronald Reagan during his period of "constructive engagement" with South Africa was willing to say negative things about some of the more outrageous actions of the white minority regime. Way back when, long before the Nice Young Man From Chicago was born (or that matter the much older Secretary of State either), Franklin Roosevelt, the paragon of the Democratic Party actually, really, honest-to-gosh, for sure, criticised Soviet dictator Joe Stalin for the purges, death camps, and show trials which decorated his reign. Can you believe it? Engagement--and negative at that.

Dwight Eisenhower went more than a tad negative over the show trials and executions which marked the beginnings of the Castro period in Cuba. JFK did the same. Golly, the historical record is replete with examples of American presidents and secretaries of state staking out firm ethical positions regarding the perceived wrongs committed by governments with which the US stood in opposition.

US presidents and secretaries of state have criticised, even strongly condemned, the actions of governments even as we sought to establish or maintain a diplomatic gavotte with them. No matter how much the US might have needed to do a deal with a country, no president, no secretary of state, no administration before that headed by President Obama has failed to take and maintain a strongly enunciated stance when a government has violated norms and values espoused by the United States.

Admittedly, President Obama has opened a new chapter in American diplomacy with his emphasis upon cringing apologies for presumed wrongs committed in the past. Sometimes, as in his reference to Operation AJAX in the course of his Cairo Address, the cringing is so extreme as to violate historical reality. But, he is evidently not one to allow mere historical (or any other form of) truth to get in the way of servile supplication for forgiveness for wrongs never inflicted in the (vain) hope of gaining cooperation from the unwilling in return.

FDR did not let Krystalnacht go by unmentioned, uncondemned. Nor did Harry Truman allow the Soviet excesses of repression slip by without a word. JFK was not given to ignoring the violations of human rights and democracy pass him by without being acknowledged with pejorative (and occasionally salty) comment. Ike even took allies to task for actions contrary to the norms of civilized behavior as in the Sinai War of 1956.

The list goes on through every president, every secretary of state. Until now. Until the Obama Ascendancy.

Mealy mouthed responses to the actions of the reactionary mullahs and their accomplices in wholesale violations of human rights, democratic processes, and judicial procedures are not only out of keeping with the American tradition. The weak-kneed stance of the Obama administration is not pragmatically sanctioned. If the president and his foreign policy team expects that their disengaged, more-than-merely-arm's-length reaction to the mullahocracy will result in some movement toward a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear weapons contretemps, the whole crew has its collective head in an anatomically improbable location.

Considering that the actions of the reactionary clerics in Tehran have proven so reprehensible as to result in evident seismic splits in the clerical ranks generally, the expectation that a tolerant US position on the election and its aftermaths will result in "let's make a deal" is completely unsupportable by the realities. The totalistic reactionaries from Ayatollah Khamenei to "President" Ahmedinejad do not understand tolerance, acceptance, understanding as anything other than weakness--the weakness of surrender.

There is a time and place for the tough line. There is a time and a place for the firm, consistent stance in support of fundamental principles.

Now is the time. Iran is the place.

While the Bush/Cheney administration might have been terribly ill-advised with the invasion of Iraq, it did scare the dickens out of the mullahs. The so-called "grand bargain" might have been a myth and Iran might plausibly have already solved the problems of the physics package for their nascent nuclear weapons program, but the reality is that the mullahs were frightened enough to make exploitable offers of cooperation to the US.

Fear has a powerful capacity to focus the mind. For a few months following the invasion of Iraq the mullahs were afflicted with sufficient fear to provide an opportunity for American diplomacy. It is to be regretted that the Bush administration did not use the brief window of opportunity. The fine military historian Edward Luttwak pointed out recently in the WSJ that the opportunity was forsaken needlessly and would not come again absent an equal application of fear in Tehran.

To be "engaged" requires an ear willing and able to listen. Right now that ear is absent. It will not return unless and until the Iranian regime is given a good reason to do so.

That means the time is now, right now, to crank up the fear machine. If the Obama administration is serious, if the president is honest about policy, the Iranians must not be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons. Given that they are not far from that goal (how far is a matter of debate between people of equally good will) the mullahs must be made to focus their minds. They must be scared again.

This means drop the cringing. Stop the disengaged stance on the vile actions of the mullahs and their ilk. It means stop bemoaning our military weakness, our inability and unwillingness to send more men, more weapons, more ships, more planes, to the far corners of the world in support of policy. It means taking a very strong, very well articulated and quite consistent stance against the current Iranian regime and its actions. It means openly (and covertly) supporting the opposition. It means drawing a firm line in the sand and letting the Iranians know the precise consequences which will result should they cross the line.

It means taking risks. Very real, very large risks. It even means, (say it ain't so) putting the Great Agenda For Transformation at risk.

It means both talking the talk and walking the walk.

It is either that or abject surrender of our core values, principles and, potentially, national and strategic interests to a collection of reactionary True Believers.

That's the choice. It isn't pretty. It isn't nice. It isn't pleasant to contemplate. But, the way in which the choice is made will have massive and continued impact on the future of the US and the world. It is President Obama's call.

The question is simple: Is the Nice Young Man From Chicago both tough enough and smart enough to make it?

One can be forgiven for shuddering over the probable answer.

Congratulations, President Ahmadinejad!

It couldn't happen to a more deserving sort of guy. Kisses, bright blooms in yellow, big smiles--and empty seats in the audience. What a start for the second term as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Wow!

Making Ahmadinejad's inauguration even sweeter must have been the White House's official media flack, Robert Gibbs, calling the Orator-in-Chief, "the elected leader." This is more than previous administrations have done when perversions of election have been employed to sanitize the assumption of public office. This is definitely an honor for Mr Ahmadinejad.

And, to really start off the Ahmadinejad second term in fine style, Iran has three, count them, three honest-to-Allah American hostages. This out performs North Korea, which only managed to snatch two of the highly desirable bargaining commodity.

Perhaps the re-elected(?) president hopes to emulate Kim Jong-il. Mayhaps he entertains happy visions of "private citizen" Bill Clinton jetting in to have a few hours happy talk and then depart with the "pardoned" US spies.

What a way to start off the old second term: Fantasies of secret high-level, back channel talks with senior US diplomats leading to an agreement. You send us one former American president and we give you three captives.

Great photo op. Great chance to create speculation that this shake-grin-and-pardon dynamic will lead to further diplomatic exchanges. Great way to buy more time as the centrifuges spin merrily along.

Even if the dream does not become reality, President Ahmadinejad has one thing going for him. Iran is probably close enough to having break out capacity that there is no need to worry about the very remote possibility of the US orchestrating the ever-rumored "crippling" sanctions.

The highest probability is that Iran will possess a rudimentary but diplomatically effective nuclear arsenal by this time next year. The Hillary Clinton "defense umbrella" statement is virtual confirmation that the US National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 was based on a false predicate.

The correct predicate as has been hinted at by recent European estimates is that the Iranian technicians developed and tested (without fissionable materials) the "physics package" for an implosion type uranium bomb by the time the US invaded Iraq. That, more than fear of the US doing the same to Iran, caused the suspension of the active R&D effort pending the availability of sufficient weapons grade uranium.

Since there is no indication the Obama administration is willing to run the risks which attend automatically upon the employment of the "military option," there is no reason to believe that Iran is going to remain a nuclear-free zone much longer. With sanctions irrelevant and the use of force unrealistic, the only remaining option is the acceptance of Iran as a very junior member of the Global Nuke Club. Kind of gives the shivers, doesn't it?

Of course, Mr Ahmadinejad has ambitions beyond presiding over the creation of the "Mahdi" bomb. He is possessed of global ambition. On Ahmadinejad's first watch Iran made strenuous efforts to penetrate the Horn of Africa from Djibouti to Tanzania. Not content with outflanking the Gulf States, Statesman Ahmadinejad has pursued a love match with Hugo Chavez too well known to deserve comment. This (perhaps) folie a deux has been complemented with flirtation directed at Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

One must never overlook the blushing successes of Ahmadinejad's version of diplomacy in the heart of the Mideast. The relation with Syria. The proxies Hezbollah and Hamas. The prongs of subversion in the Gulf. And on, and on. It has been a sort of mirror image of the "pactomania" which typified the days of John Foster Dulles fifty years and more ago.

Then there has been the big event, backroom relations with China and, to a slightly lesser extent, Russia. These, in turn, have protected Iran's connection with fellow rogue state, North Korea, which has so often served so well as a stalking horse for Tehran.

All in all, Mr Ahmadinejad has crafted a lofty inverted pyramid of diplomatic and economic relations balanced on the thin point of revolutionary Islamist ideology buttressed by terror, subversion, oil revenues, and case hardened intransigence. A magnificent edifice of threat and bluster with little to support it beyond a will and ability to go nuclear, risk civilian lives, employ terror without end, and sheer effrontery.

So much for the upside of the Years of Ahmadinejad and his patron, protector, and soulmate, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. Now for the termite riddled foundation.

Ahmadinejad may not last his second term. The population of Iran in large part is both restive and sullen, freighted with distrust and disillusion. The opposition has been inefficiently and incompletely suppressed. Fear, not affection nor widely perceived legitimacy sustains the reactionary mullahs and their secular kinsmen in power.

The mullahs themselves are more openly and deeply split between pro- and anti-Khamenei factions than has been the case previously. Not even the Revolutionary Guard is immune to the effects of both the split and the dynamics of personalism which color so much of Shia Iranian institutions. Certainly the Iranian regular army and police have already shown the effects of the divisions within; the Revolutionary Guard is not far behind.

The economy is in the tank. Inflation and unemployment are in a neck-to-neck race to see which can reach lunar orbit heights first. Un- and underemployment have hit the educated urban youth the hardest. No future and a lot of time to think about it on the part of people young enough not to be risk averse has been the ruination of previous centralised regimes. Iran is not immune to this.

Much of Ahmadinejad's base of support is bought and paid for. His version of Islamist populism does not come free--or even cheap. If the promised goodies do not keep flowing, the ranks of the discontented, disaffiliated, and potentially violent will grow.

Further growth of unrest will necessitate further repression. Repression must finally be bloody. Given the martyrdom oriented values which permeate Shia generally and recent Iran in specific, the dynamic is martyrdom breeds more martyrdom. In short, the regime may find itself killing its way not to victory but to defeat.

Ahmadinejad may be able to crow about Iran's "Mahdi" bomb within the next twelve months, but the Iranian people will discover an unpleasant truth or two. They will find out that money spent on bombs and delivery systems is money not spent on economic development. They will discover that atomic bombs do not provide nourishment, jobs, longer lives, better lives, international respect, or even absence of fear.

Most of all, the Iranians, the whole long-suffering lot of them, will be hit in the face with the hard fact that the ambitions of True Believers--of Khamenei, of Ahmadinejad, of those who circle around the center of power--are based upon the misery, fear, and blood of the people in general. They will find out the leaders--from the Grand Ayatollah on down--do not give a dessicated camel turd for the commonweal of the common Iranian.

When that happens, no matter how many the Basji and Revolutionary Guard might kill, the edifice Ahmadinejad and Khamenei built will fall. And fall fast. And fall hard.

It will be like what happened in the Democratic Republic of Germany when the hoi polloi discovered how the leaders lived, how they exploited faith and folk. Here, seemingly secure in power now and forever. A day later, gone, dead, buried in the rubble of the Wall.

Iran, Like President Obama, Sucks Up To China

The American president kowtowed and played mood music for the visiting delegation from the Peoples Republic Of China because the US needs the Chinese to continue underwriting the vast expenditures needed for the "Transformation Agenda" and the lunar orbit level deficits which come with it. Iran, in pursuit of an ever increasing level of authority with the world's Muslim population, wants to be recognised as the special protector of China's Uighurs.

As the necessary first step toward gaining influence with the Mandarins of the Forbidden City, the Mullahs of Tehran had their government go on record (again) as supporting China's policy of scarfing up the "lost province" of Taiwan. So much for the "quid." Now for the "pro quo."

Tehran has called on the Chinese government to "respect" the Muslim minority. The Iranian Deputy ForMin, Hossein Sheik al-Islam, delivered the twin message to the Chinese Special Envoy to Iran. The Deputy ForMin underscored just how deeply "concerned" senior members of the Iranian clerical establishment were over the treatment of Muslims in China's restive west.

The Chinese envoy responded, if Iranian accounts are to be believed, with some of the usual diplomatic boilerplate about the "contributions" of the Uighurs to China and, blah-blah. The Chinese diplomat was kind enough not to take the customary posture of rejecting the Iranian demarche as interference in the internal affairs of China.

Wu Sike, the special envoy, was in Tehran after having stopped at several Arab States: Algeria, Qatar and Syria. Overall, the envoy's tasks were multiple as he alluded in his Tehran remarks. They included arms sales, oil purchasing, and building China's reputation as a "partner" in various regional interests. In short, China is flexing its ever developing economic, military, and diplomatic muscles in a critical region the US has long considered its particular bailiwick.

It was nice that the Iranians could take time off from their Imitation of Stalin trial of the dissidents. As the Stalin record shows, pulling off these show trials is a labor and time intensive endeavor--particularly making sure that the right defendant makes the right confession at the right time. And, sticks with it!

It's a good thing the mullahs have barred foreign media from the Great Election Dissident Trial as it does seem to show the frayed edges of haste and poor planning. Worst of all, two prime "dissidents," Moussavi and Khatami, are standing out in the lobby making dramatic accusations of, among other things, the use of torture by the mullahs to achieve the desired confessions. Really, that just won't do. As old Joe himself would have told his imitators, it is critical that there are no negative voices to be heard.

Instead of having stopped the voices before they could get on the global information highway, the mullahs have tried, without success, to drown them with accusations of treason. That is a really pathetic ploy. It is unlikely to play in the Iranian equivalent of Peoria. After all, both Moussavi and Khatami are fixtures of the revolution and senior figures in past Iranian governments. They both may be guilty of many things including a bad sense of timing, but treason to either the nation or the Islamist Revolution is not on the list.

Wu Sike, who, after all, represents a government with some experience in the production of show trials of dissidents, was probably not impressed with the Iranian ineptitude in this crucial area of crypto-totalitarian government practice. Nor would he have been favorably struck by the ongoing signs of fault lines in both the secular and clerical elites. The question of just who is in charge must never arise in a well run total regime.

Wu and his mandarin masters will shrug off the Iranian inefficiency and poorly staged trial as long as the oil flows, China is a favored foreign investor in the oilfields, and Tehran finally prefers Chinese to Russian. Wu has been around a score of years and knows how power is gained and retained in both domestic and foreign contexts.

It is for this reason that Beijing will be unimpressed with Iran's support of Chinese "national unity." It is for this reason that the mullahs of Tehran and Qom are no more likely to be the special protectors of the Muslims in China than they are to be the guardians of Emperor penguins in Antarctica.

The show trial shows something the mullahs and their ilk never suspected would be the case. The strains, contradictions and deep, long-lived rivalries within the elites are showing. And, they are showing to a degree unseen since the years 1997-1999.

Back then the reformers won a stunning victory. They were then quite undone by their own timidity and hesitancy. Torn apart by a lack of unifying vision and, more, a deficiency of instinct for the jugular. When the last gasps of the reformers were drowned in student blood with a ruthlessness of which Beijing no doubt approved but a visibility of which they no doubt disapproved, reform disappeared for a decade.

This time the reactionaries of Khemenei and company took no chances. They rigged the election. Squashed protests. And are now staging a show trial complete with high profile confessions.

Perhaps it is ironic. Perhaps not. But, the reactionaries are running the very real risk of undoing their own cause. Not because they are timid, hesitant. No. Because they have been too robust, too obvious, too heavy, and ham handed.

Special Envoy Wu is probably flying home shaking his head at the Iranian's lack of subtlety, lack of nuance. They do not know something the Chinese government now knows very well. There is a time and place for the sledgehammer. There is a time and place for a tack hammer. The art of effective government is to know the difference. The mullahs just don't get it.

The question for this day is this: Does the Obama administration have a grip on what is happening not only on but below the surface in Iran? This suggests a second question: Does the Obama administration understand that there is a time and place in international politics for the sledgehammer as well as the rubber hammer?

This in turn suggests a third question: Does the Obama administration know the difference and if so, does it care?

Right now the answers do not look good.

Finally, A Fatwa Worthy Of Respect

One of Iran's most senior clerics, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, has issued a fatwa which, in essence, declares the current government of Iran to be illegal. The religious finding, a reply to a series of questions posed by Mohsen Kadivar, an intellectual and cleric, was posted on the website maintained by Kadivar. For the Farsi challenged, a translation is available at MEMRI.

While the fatwa does not name Supreme Leader Khamenei in specific, there is no doubt it constitutes a full scale attack on the current regime of Khamenei and his stooge, Ahmedinejad. It denounces the actions of the Iranian government including its clerical component as violating the basic precepts of Islam and the requirements of Islamic jurisprudence.

Being illegal, the government is liable to removal by the people. Montazeri wrote:

As I said, both religious law and common sense [dictate that] position holders who have lost the right to administer social affairs automatically lose their posts, and their rule is no longer legitimate in any way. If they remain in their position by means of force, fraud, or forgery, then the people must express their opinion regarding the illegitimacy and unpopularity [of these position holders], and remove them from their posts in the least harmful way...

That is very strong language! It is nothing less than the authorisation of revolution, a greenlight for the overthrow of the present Iranian regime, clerics not excepted.

Montazeri argues that the clerics carry the greater responsibility for tossing the illegal, non-Islamic rascals out. Consider his wording carefully:

Obviously, this is a duty incumbent upon all [and not only upon specific individuals]... and none may evade it under any pretext. The elite [i.e. the clerics] have a special obligation [to carry out this task], since they are knowledgeable in religious and civil law, and have greater ability than [the rest of the people]. Their statements have greater influence and carry greater force; therefore, they bear a greater responsibility. They must present [the people]... with an alternative [option], while [preserving the people's] unity and ideological harmony, and establishing parties as well as public and private organizations.

Well, bucko, what does that read like to you? To the Geek it comes very close to the tocsin of rebellion.

While the NYT is probably accurate in its assessment that this fatwa will not have any immediate dramatic effect on the internal dynamic in Iran, the longer term impact of this bold, bald denunciation should not be underrated. Previous clerical statements including those by Montazeri have been cautious, ambiguous, and hesitant.

With this fatwa, Montazeri, who is an old Revolutionary and long-standing power in the Revolutionary government, has challenged his one time, more-or-less colleague, Khamenei. The challenge cannot be ignored without great risk to the status quo. Neither can the Montazeri position be overlooked by the clerical establishment generally.

Montazeri was once considered the most probable successor to Ayatollah Khomenei, but parted company with the founder of the revolution ostensibly over the killing of prisoners which was opposed by Montazeri but actually because of Montazeri's opposition to the idea of clerical rule. This opposition has assured the split between Montazeri and Khamenei deepened and widened over the past twenty years.

Montazeri's implacable resistence to the concept of clerical rule, to theocracy per se means that there is no room for compromise with Khamenei. Khamenei is more of a champion of theocracy naked, pure, and simple than was Khomenei. The esposal of theocracy coupled with Khamenei's apparent ambition of seeing his number two son, Mojtaba, succeed him as Supreme Leader provided even more motivation to Montazeri's opposition.

The eighty-seven year old Montazeri has seized the moment, realistically his last moment, to put the division in views of Iran's governmental nature and collective future into the most clear public view. The dynamics of today with no real weakening in either the willingness of the opposition to continue their campaign of dissent being matched by the total refusal of Khamenei to seek any sort of accommodation with the dissidents gives Montazeri his last, best opportunity to push Iran's internal trajectory in a way he finds acceptable to his view of Islam.

It is necessary to watch closely for signs of how the legion of clerics littering the Iranian landscape react to the Montazeri fatwa. The influence of the clerics cannot and must not be undervalued. In a very real and direct sense, the way in which the clerical establishment splits into pro- and anti-Montazeri camps will determine what sort of Iran the rest of the world will have to deal with in the months and years to come.

As Allah wills---

Sounds Of Battle Off Stage

As the noise and blood of the protests fades out in Tehran and elsewhere, the sounds of battle continue. Now they are off screen, away from Twitter, and unavailable for posting on YouTube.

The offstage battle can be brought out from behind the scenery and shoved down stage center by actions taken by the US and other Western countries. Indeed, it is arguable that the correct actions will bring about a denouement to the current interlocking Iranian crises which is favorable to the interests of the outsiders to say nothing of the Iranian public generally.

While it is legitimate to assert that there is no such critter as a "moderate" inhabiting any of the several religious and secular centers of power in Iran, this should not be taken as meaning that the regime and its instruments are monolithic. Quite the contrary, there are deep fissures within the remnants of the Revolutionary Generation.

One faction which is currently growing in its oppositional solidarity to Supreme Leader, the Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, is comprised of the Revolutionary Old Guard. Its membership includes "defeated" presidential candidate Mousavi. It also numbers within its list such old stalwarts of the deceased Ayatollah Khomenei as the senior clerics Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Montazeri. Along with these ayatollahs as many as fifteen of the twenty mariji (those worthy of emulation) from whose ranks the next Supreme Leader must be chosen are arrayed against Khamenei and his plans for a family dynasty.

It isn't just the religious Old Guard which is joining the lists against the theocratic and dynastic ambitions of today's Supreme Leader. Important secular figures such as Ali Larjani, the current speaker of the Iranian parliament and former chief nuclear negotiator; the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Qalibaf; and Mohsen Rezai, another of the defeated presidential candidates. Even the supposedly one-for-all-and-all-for-one Revolutionary Guard is not solidly behind Grand Ayatollah Khamenei. Ali Jafari, the overall commander of the Revolutionary Guard Corps who was personally chosen by Khamenei, is slipping over to the opposition. So also is the RG's commander of the Tehran district, Ali Fazli.

The reason these rather different components of the Old Guard are jelling in opposition to Khameni is Khamenei's son. Mojtaba Khamenei is the Grand Ayatollah's number two son and has been reportedly being groomed to take over the family business when the old man steps down. Not much is known publicly about Mojtaba beyond the fact that he has the rank of ayatollah in the Shia hierarchy.

While Mojtaba holds the minimum rank required to become Supreme Leader, there is buzz to the effect that he is a theological lightweight even compared with his father. When dear old dad was chosen to follow Khomenei as Supreme Leader, many in the Koranic know, including Grand Ayatollah Rafsanjani, had discounted the possibility since the old man was not too bright in the theology department.

But, whatever Khamenei pere might have lacked in Islamic jurisprudence, he more than made up for in backroom politics. Since the Khamenei family once demonstrated that the ability in the field of practical politics defeats theological competence, few of the Old Guard are now willing to bet that Mojtaba will be knocked out of the box simply because he can't pass hermeneutics 101.

The vibrations on the table top speak of Mojtaba having been the Conductor-in-Chief of the Great Ahmedinejad Election Victory. It is even more clear that Mojtaba has been in charge of the repressions carried out against the post 12 June protesters. Mojtaba is the undisputed man in charge of the basiji. He is, in essence, the Himmler of the regime.

As Mojtaba has emerged from the depths of the shadows in recent days, a number of very nasty rumors have surfaced as well. Most of these focus on Mojtaba's ability to collect money and place it in safe harbors outside of Iran. It has been alleged, for example, that much of the more than two and half gigabucks frozen by the UK on 18 June in keeping with EU and UN resolutions was Mojtaba's personal fortune.

Whether true or not, rumors of large scale peculation are a strong indicator that Mojtaba and Khamenei's plans for a family dynasty are perceived as threats to the Revolution. As such the ambitions and the personalities must and will be opposed both directly and indirectly by the true believers of the Old Guard.

The opposition may be overtly directed against Ahmedinejad. The Old Guard and its sympathisers among younger Iranians can complicate Ahmedinejad's efforts to govern. Any number of monkey wrenches can be tossed in the mechanisms of governance. On the clerical level the same may be done--on steroids. Considering that the Old Guard opponents of the re-elected president and Mojtaba control both the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts, their capacity to hamstring Ahmedinejad is pronounced.

The challenge for the Obama administration as well as the rest of the West is that of putting additional stress on the fragile Iranian economy and the less-than-resilient political system without overdoing it such that the highly nationalistic Old Guard are compelled to drop their opposition to Khamenei's plans. At the same time the imposition of additional stresses particularly on critical civilian sectors of the economy will bolster the opposition's efforts to discredit both Ahemdinejad and the Khamenei family.

It is not beyond the realm of plausibility that the combination of civilian sector economic pressure such as the banning of refined petroleum product sales to Iran and a limit to the amount of food sold to the country and the opposition of the Old Guard will result in the early selection of a new Supreme Leader--and the holding of ahead-of-schedule presidential elections.

If the Obama administration takes proper advantage of the continued opportunity which is presented by the Conservative vs Khamenei struggle (which the Geek doubts) the endgame will be very much in the best interests of all. Iran will not stop being an ambitious power, propelled by nationalism and a firm belief in the divine right of Iran to be a global actor and regional hegemon, but it may be a little less irrational and threatening in its pursuit of ambition.

And, the world may yet dodge the bullet of a war nobody wants.

Getting Back To Business--Iran And The Bomb

President Obama has allowed that he is "not reconciled" to the notion of Iran as a nuclear weapons state. He quickly tacked on that he believed the "international community" was not reconciled to the idea either.

The Obama wording is delightfully ambiguous. Does he mean that while he is not yet "reconciled" to Iran gaining a nuclear weapons capacity he might become such at some time in the nebulous future? Or, is he implying that his current status of not being "reconciled" might eventually harden into one of total irreconcilability?

The President did not deign to explain and the Associated Press reporter did not press him on the matter, preferring to elicit comments on the NBA and the death of Michael Jackson. The placement of the I-am-not-reconciled statement near the end of the interview seems to indicate that neither the president nor the reporter considered the matter of the "Mahdi Bomb" to be one of gravity.

Certainly not the gravity of the President's view of Validimir Putin's having "one foot in the past." It is, of course, Russia's (which is to say Putin's) position on Iranian matters which bode well to continue to prevent any possibility of real and effective sanctions being employed against the mullahocracy. The combination of an election conducted in the manner and with the lopsided outcome typical of the Soviet Union and its satellites with the killing repression of protesters has hardened political support in Europe and elsewhere for more effective sanctions against the Iranian government.

The outre Iranian arrest and detention of local employees of the British embassy in Tehran has united the European Union in a completely atypical desire to "do something" which might at least symbolically punish the mullahs for their egregious violation of diplomatic norms and international conventions on the status of diplomatic mission employees. The "correlation of forces" seemed to be swinging in favor of turning the screws at least a bit on Iran.

Then, along comes Putin's Russia. Let the record show that Russia fancies itself to be a member of the European community (construed broadly and when it is in Russia's interests.) Putin obviously sees himself as a European statesman (albeit one who looks better with his shirt and tie off than when trussed in full business attire.)

In a way which merits President Obama's characterization of having one foot in the past, Putin's government is opposed to any imposition of sanctions over such mere bagatelles as rigged elections, suppressed dissent, and the arrest of locals working for an embassy. As the Soviet (oops! Bad Geek,) Russian press notes with a becoming accuracy, not only is Russia the prime foreign backer of Iran in international fora, its government was the first to both recognise the re-election of Ahmedinejad and congratulate him on that feat.

Russia is building Iran's heavy water reactor which is eminently capable of producing more plutonium than the antiquated North Korean unit at Yongban. It is providing the start up fuel and other services, not all of which may have been mentioned publicly. And, along with NATO stalwarts German and France, it is in the "Billion Dollar Club"regarding last year's trade with the Islamist jihadist Tehran regime. (For the record, China is also in the club, and the US with over eight hundred million dollars of food sales is bucking for membership.)

When the "Billion Dollar Club" is considered, the harsh words of Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy for both Iran's nuclear adventure and its electoral misconduct ring hollow. Factoring in the unlimited diplomatic support of Russia and China, there are strong hints that the sanction regime espoused by the US these many years is but a mixture of empty rhetoric and wishful thinking.

Or, to put it slightly differently and focusing sharply on President Obama's call for "engagement" with the mullahs of Qom and their frontmen in Tehran, it is a quxiotic exercise at best. The President is (in the words of the Geekness who has an unmatched capacity to mangle cliches,) "honking up the wrong tree."

Which brings us to John Bolton. As readers (if any) of the Geek's maunderings will no doubt recall, the Geek is not a big fan of the neocon one-time US ambassador to the UN, Mr Bolton, who has never been in combat nor any closer to the killing and dieing than the Diplomats' Lounge at the UN, is a resolute supporter of war against countries such as Iraq under Saddam or Iran at any time subsequent to 1979.

He has re-entered the lists flying the banner of Israel. It is his position that the time has come for the Israelis to exercise the military option and abate the nascent nuclear menace of Iran. He deposes not on the probability of an Israeli success in the endeavor, apparently either considering such mundane matters as, "will it work?" to be beneath the dignity of a man of his political and intellectual sophistication or subscribing to the notion that the IAF is a collection of Supermen flying aircraft with capabilities transcending those ascribed to UFOs by mavens of that subject.

The consensus of informed and realistic opinion is that an IAF strike or strikes on the complex of hard and hardened targets comprising the Iranian nuclear research, development, and production universe would be, as Wellington said of Waterloo, "a near-run thing." The Iranian government and military have long reckoned with the possibility of an attack by either or both Israel and the US. They have taken impressive measures to make the task tougher and the results more debatable.

While the Iranians are given to bluster in the megaton range, it would be a mistake to undervalue their capacity for mischief making in response to any attack. Even if the Iranians did nothing, not even pushing the "go" button on their terrorist surrogates, the exceptionally nervous crowd known generically as "speculators" would push the price of oil to never-seen-before levels. This action without any other measure being taken by Tehran would be severely disruptive of the US and global economies.

Not a result that Mr Obama would like to deal with, particularly considering his ambitions for "transforming" many basic features of American economic and social life.

But, Mr Bolton has apparently convinced himself that even severe economic and, potentially at least, political turmoil throughout the West and much of the world which would necessarily follow an Israeli attack is of no moment. It is inconceivable that such a staunch supporter of Israel as Mr Bolton has not thought through what the reaction directed against Israel would be if a global economic shock caused by escalating oil prices resulted in the days and weeks following the bombs falling.

Or, perhaps, Mr Bolton is convinced or at least hopeful that the Iranian reaction would be so bloody, so shocking, that the world would rally as one to the defense of Israel. Perhaps not the world, but surely the US, he may have told and sold himself.

Considering the delusional state of Mr Bolton's contention that the current unrest within Iran provides an excellent opportunity for "public diplomacy" to convince the Iranian people that any attack on the nuclear facilities is not an attack on the Iranians--only their government, it is within the realm of plausibility that he has been equally self-deluded on the critical matters of global and US response to the aftershocks of the Israeli attack.

No, Mr Bolton, the Israeli option is not a good way to go.

The Geek is not in favor of a nuclear armed Iran. Iran may or may not be governed by rational men capable of understanding and acting upon the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD.) The mullahs may or may not be equal to Saddam Hussein who, when he received word via Jordan's King Hussein that the Israelis would respond with a nuclear strike to any use of chemical weapons against their country, never ordered the already loaded and good to go Scuds to be launched.

Saddam was a rational actor. The mullahs and their subordinates may or may not be such. It is a risk the US and the rest of the world should not have to entertain. Certainly the Israelis or for that matter the Sunni Arab regimes of the Gulf should not face the very real existential threat that a nuclear armed Iran would constitute regardless of the applicability of the MAD calculus.

This leaves a very unpleasant, quite brutal option. Should President Obama mutate from being merely not "reconciled" to "utterly irreconcilable," the only remaining option is that of a direct US attack on the facilities. There is no genuine doubt that the US could obliterate the nuclear constellation.

The results would not be pretty. The oil shock would come as day follows night. Unless neutralised, the Iranians would respond with conventional and surrogate or proxy forces against the US and its allies both in the region and elsewhere. The Muslim world (at least publicly) would be all frothy with expressions of hatred and demands for revenge. There would be Islamist jihadists aplenty to take up the call and act on it.

Even allies which had given at least tacit and private approval to any American attack would be afflicted with morning after regrets. These regrets would be exhibited in numerous ways, all of which would be unpleasant. Rivals to the US such as Russia and China would leap to take any and all advantages which they might see. The consequences of this feature alone are difficult to prognosticate in detail but would be both extensive and negative overall.

Indeed, a powerful argument can be mounted for the contention that an American attack, even one which was totally successful, would constitute an existential threat to the US in its aftermath. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the nascent nuclear capacity may never present a genuine, direct threat to the US. Have a problem with that? Well, then consider the asymmetry resident presently as well as in the near-term potential of a maturing missile defense technology and a (barely) emergent delivery system technology.

Since the Obama administration is not one particularly enamored with either foreign affairs or contemplating the potential of military operations with a potential for unintended consequences far worse than the threat they were oriented toward countering, it is unlikely in the extreme that the American option would be exercised. It is almost as unlikely that the Obama administration would do anything other than strain every sinew to prevent the exercise of the Bolton supported Israeli option.

So, what does that leave?

Two possibilities.

The first is a diplomatic miracle requiring Russia being induced to switch sides, China, ditto, and the French and German governments cutting their own economic throats by dropping membership in the "Billion Dollar Club." (Oh, and the US deciding that food exports to the citizens living under the current regime were no longer "humanitarian" in nature.)

The second is for President Obama to suddenly realise that he is totally "reconciled" with the idea of Iran joining the Nuclear Club.

A great set of choices, isn't it?

Meanwhile, Back In The AfPak---

Buried away under mounds of important news regarding the demise of Michael Jackson, the world goes on. Ahmedinejad continues to fire salvos of bluster at President Obama while the Iranian ambassador to Mexico maintained darkly that that icky-poo crew at CIA were behind the murder of protest icon, Neda.

Over in the Hermit Kingdom of the North the invective hurling goes on unabated with the North Korean airforce vowing to shoot down any Japanese aircraft which penetrates the sacred space of the North by so much as "0.001 mm." While China is said to be completely supportive of the "tough" sanctions directed against North Korea by the Security Council, the rust bucket purportedly carrying prohibited cargo plodded through the South China Sea watched by satellites and the USS John McCain, which is not expected to do any more than keep eyeballing the suspect ship.

Feeling almost as if he is playing the role of the narrator in some old TV Western serial like the Lone Ranger who periodically intones in the grave but urgent voice of one announcing the impending end of the world, "Meanwhile, back at the ranch...," the Geek directs his attention to the ongoing, even developing affrays in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is beaucoup in progress in these interlocked venues. Most of it is good from the perspective of those who do not desire to see Islamism on the road to triumph.

Granted, leading organs of the American MSM exemplified by the New York Times see defeat for the US, Pakistan and the Karzai where others see the glimmerings of success. The NYT is firmly convinced that the Pakistani glass is near empty rather than filling fast in the wake of the Swat Valley campaign and the commencement of operations in South Waziristan.

The Times is appalled by the lack of apparent devastation in Swat. Their reporter was evidently quite perturbed by the appearance of normality in the district as he flew overhead. Farmers were actually harvesting their crops. Buildings stood intact rather than lying in rubble heaps across the streets and roads. Vast areas of field and forest showed no sign of having been bombed or napalmed into wastelands. Mounds of corpses were conspicuous by their absence.

Putting the visuals together with the prolongation of military operations beyond their first, highly optimistic estimated date for completion, the Times writers concluded that the Pakistani army had not been successful in defeating Taliban. Not only does this conclusion show a deep inability to differentiate between a successful counterinsurgency effort and high intensity conventional war, it indicates a strong desire on the part of the paper to ignore reality in favor of ideological desires.

Why the NYT is so eager to see the Pakistani government defeated in its first genuine, sustained effort to regain control of its country from the rude barbarians of Taliban is not for the Geek to state. What can be written is that the Times is doing a major disservice to the government, military and citizens of Pakistan in its efforts to portray defeat at a time when neither victory nor loss can be accurately assessed or predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty.

While the government of Pakistan is far from attaining any meaningful form of victory in its existential contest with the Taliban, both it and its military forces as well as the general run of the Pakistani population which has supported the counterinsurgency effort deserve both honest reporting and a hearty vote of confidence (and congratulations) for having finally taken up the challenge presented by the Islamist jihadists of Taliban.

The army has evidently fought far more effectively than many in the West predicted. The destruction and collateral civilian casualties were both far below what many on our side of the world feared given the training, organisation and equipment of the Pakistani army. The first sine qua non of successful counterinsurgency is limiting civilian death, destruction and dislocation to the maximum extent possible.

The death and destruction have obviously been limited severely as the Times report makes clear. The dislocation was not so constrained. There resides the major problem confronting the government and its supporters such as the US. The internally displaced persons (IDP) must be returned to their homes, fields and businesses with rapidity. There must be ample assistance provided so that the returning IDPs can restart their lives quickly and effectively. This will require not only substantial amounts of the long green but also a fair, transparent and non-corrupt system of assistance distribution.

That process, the myriad problems of returning and resettling the IDP population as well as giving a proper jump start to their lives is a far, far greater challenge to the government than is the killing or capture of Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban Theocrat-in-Chief. An even greater challenge will confront the lads of Islamabad as the IDPs return to Swat.

That second challenge which will confront the government as the IDPs return is that of providing essential governmental services such as a judicial system which is perceived as fair, transparent, impartial and effective. After all, the reason so many people in Swat originally supported Taliban was the awesome failure of the regime to provide these. Importantly, the jury will remain out for quite some while on this matter and there is no reason for optimism.

Quite simply, the government of Pakistan does not have a good record in providing the essentials of government in any department. Partially this is the consequence of its hyperfocus on war with India over disputed territories including the massive use of limited resources on the development of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. Partially it is the result of the repeated military coups. Finally it is, in part, the necessary result of the deep political divisions which have both scarred the political history of Pakistan and called the army out of the barracks and into the offices of power.

The government and army made the correct decision to use the momentum which is currently on their side by moving into the FATA, particularly South Waziristan the inner sanctum of the Islamist jihadists--Taliban, Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda. Taking the war to the insurgents is absolutely necessary if ultimate success is to be achieved. Keeping the initiative is key.

The South Waziristan nut is one which will be very, very difficult to crack. The writ of Islamabad has never run deeply in the FATA. Establishing it will be a demanding task. On the up side is the propensity of Taliban to kill the wrong people in the wrong place at the wrong time with the result that it alienates the very people whose support is essential.

When a Taliban suicide bomber detonated himself in a mosque in Kandahar he not only killed a jilly-poo of civilians including women and children, he caused the local villagers to take up arms against the Islamist jihadists. As a result the Taliban lost status and potency with the local tribes as well as a number of its trigger pullers and wannabe martyrs.

Taliban's typical Islamist jihadist emphasis on death is the government's "secret" weapon. As long as the military refrains from unnecessary killing and destroying so as to lay the onus of civilian deaths, dislocation and fear on Taliban it will have a better than even chance of defeating the Islamist jihadists and establishing Islamabad's authority in the region.

This development is good news for the US effort in Afghanistan. As the increased American troop presence in Helmand province makes itself felt, the combination of that plus the Pakistani movement into South Waziristan puts Taliban and al-Qaeda in the grip of the vice. More and more, provided Pakistan keeps on with the current operations, the Islamist jihadists can run but they will no longer be able to hide in the remote fastness of the mountains of South Waziristan.

The deep kimchee in which the jihadists are finding themselves has been evidenced in recent weeks by reports showing that the "foreign" fighters are exfiltrating Afghanistan and the FATA and resurfacing in Yemen and Somalia. While it is too early and too much serious fighting remains to make firm predictions, the combination of the US escalation, the new tactical and operational thinking of the US command in Afghanistan, and the ancillary pressure being applied by the Pakistanis does not auger well for the Islamist jihadists.

The correlation of forces (to use that wonderful old Soviet term) in Afghanistan provides a firm reason for President Karzai's call to Taliban not to seek the disruption of August's elections. The Karzai call is not, as the NYT seems to believe, a sign of weakness, but, rather, an indication that the man is reading the tea leaves with a fair degree of accuracy.

The tipping point in both Pakistan and Afghanistan has come. Whether the balance will finally fall in favor of the counterinsurgent forces or not cannot be predicted with certainty today. The situation should clarify in the next thirty to sixty days, but right now all that can be stated with conviction is that the dynamic favors the good guys in both countries for the first time.

Provided that the new tactical and operational approach espoused by the US command in Afghanistan is put into effect and the Pakistani effort continues, by this time next year it should be possible to state firmly that the US has achieved its minimum strategic goal of "not-losing." It is not possible to be so sanguine regarding Pakistan. The government has a far more complex task before it in that it must not only militarily defeat Taliban but it must mitigate the conditions which provided Taliban with its appeal to the men in the streets of Pakistan.

Now, back to the ongoing requiem for Michael Jackson---

Is There A Job Opening For Cato The Elder Today?

In case you have forgotten, Cato the Elder (AKA "the Censor") was famed for demanding at the end of every speech he gave in the ancient Senate of Rome with the words, "Carthago delenda est!" Senator Cato's recurrent demand, "Carthage must be destroyed," wore very thin in the ears of his compatriots and the citizens of the Roman Republic generally.

Cato's astringent view that Carthage represented a clear, present, and very dangerous threat to Rome and its larger interests carried little freight with the Roman elite and plebs alike. Until one fine day the elephants of Hannibal came trumpeting at the gates of the City on Seven Hills. By then it was darn near too late for the laid back folks of the Republic. Hannibal's troops not only crossed the Alps thus taking Rome's dependencies by the back door, they chewed up Rome's active duty army by the legion.

Had the Carthaginian general had that time's equivalent of nuclear weapons or long range missiles, the decline and fall of Rome would have been expedited greatly. Fortunately for the previously war-averse gentry and plebs, Hannibal had no siege engines, no battering rams, no catapults and was stopped by the walls of the city. Rome had the time to out wait Hannibal, who could do nothing but traipse around the landscape doing marginal damage.

Eventually Hannibal had to leave. Then, in the fullness of time, the Romans emerged from behind their walls, built a fleet, carried the war to Carthage, and opened a giant can of vengeance on the inhabitants thereof. Defeating the army, selling the citizens into slavery, pulling down the walls and buildings and, in a final gesture, plowing over the ground and sowing it with salt, the Romans put paid to the ambitions and threats of Carthage.

Requests and suggestions that the US duplicate the final Punic War with respect to Iran are leaking around the right edge of the blogosphere. So far the requests and suggestions are mild, appropriate to a people and a time for which war is even more to be shunned than it was by the Romans of Cato the Elder's time.

The Geek rather suspects that were Cato alive and well today he would see the mullahocracy of Iran as every bit as much of a threat to the national and strategic interests of the US and its allies as was Carthage to the Rome of twenty-two centuries ago. It is difficult for anyone who is well oriented as to time and place right now to construe the Islamic Republic of Iran as anything other than the single largest disturber of international harmony.

The world view, belief system, policies and actions of the Grand Ayatollah Khemenei and his coterie of similarly minded clerics and secular jefes (including his son and preferred successor, Mojtaba Khemenei) assure that Iran will not willingly nor quickly abandon its offensive, destabilizing, and repressive ways. The recent vituperative diatribe issuing from the front man of the mullahocracy, Ahmedinejad, shows that.

Ahmedinejad's tirade, in which he demands that President Obama "apologise" for having expressed "outrage" at the repressive efforts of the mullahs and their henchmen of the basji and police and states that there is no reason for conversations with the US unless and until such an apology is received, demonstrates convincingly that Khemenei pere understands the nature and quality of the ongoing attacks on the regime. The introduction of Khemenei fils and the strong potential of a struggle for both power and rights of succession escalates the stakes in play currently.

While the MSM have paid little attention to either the matter of succession and how it may be directly affecting the post-election crisis, the same MSM have overlooked the role of Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. Al-Sistani who ranks equal with Khemenei in the Shia hierarchy of clerics, has been meeting with dissident heavyweight clerics including Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Rafsanjani is both a former Iranian president and current head of the Assembly of Experts. He is also a long time opponent of GA Khemenei. Rafsanjani opposed the ascension of Khemenei to his current exalted position, ostensibly because Khemenei lacked the theological credentials and juice to do the job. Be that as it may, the crucial reality is that Khemenei outmaneuvered his opponent even though Rafsanjani was an icon of the Revolution.

The most important take away regarding al-Sistani is his often restated public position on the relation of multi-party, multi-denomination democracy and Shia. Put briefly, al-Sistani has taken the position that there is no fundamental discord between democracy and the requirements of observant Shia. Rafsanjani may not have gone so far in public, but neither has he embraced, recently at least, the notion so popular with Khemenei that there is no role for democracy in Islam.

Rafsanjani is getting on in years. So is his presumed bete noir, Khemenei. The notion of a family dynasty cannot be at all appealing to Rafsanjani or others of his generation. More than any of us on the outside, Rafsanjani and others such as former president and current dissident, Mohammad Khatami, and yet another Grand Ayatollah, Hossein Ali Montazeri, know how much and how disastrously the present Supreme Leader has altered the initial course of the Iranian Revolution. More than any of us on the outside can know (or perhaps imagine) these men fear the concentration of unaccountable power within the ambit of the Khemeneis, father and son.

The notion of dealing with men such as Rafsanjani, who was one of those infamous "moderates" during the long, long agony of the Iranian Hostage Affair, is not particularly appealing. However, the very real potential that a combine of Rafsanjani, Montazeri, and al-Sistani can pull off a palace coup cannot be overlooked and must not be ignored. The present turbulence in Iran--particularly if the body count suddenly escalates or Moussavi is arrested as an "agent" of the US, UK, Zionists, whatever--represents the last, best chance Rafsanjani and company have of taking back the fruits of the Revolution from those who would destroy it from within.

This far-from-remote possibility gives a basis for the Obama administration to recast their public posture regarding Iran. Initially the hands-off, detached approach was appropriate. But, that may well no longer be the case. It is true that anything the administration does to hold the mullahocracy's collective feet to the fire might engender more deaths on the streets of Tehran. It is absolutely true that any more robust language, let alone action, from the administration will result in more vitriol from Ahmedinejad.

More importantly, a stronger position taken by the US including rapid passage and signing of the sanctions legislation directed against those companies supplying gasolene and other refined petroleum products to Iran may well provide the critical impetus to the execution of the palace coup. Rafsanjani may be a "moderate" only in comparison with Khemenei but the fact that he has been meeting with al-Sistani (who is an unsung cause of the success of the American "surge" in Iraq and a man who has shown a rapid and effective learning curve in Iraqi politics) shows that he may be open to a new approach to both the internal politics and external relations of Iran.

The least worst outcome for both the Iranians and the rest of the world would be a Rafsanjani orchestrated palace coup. This would allow new elections, a step back from unending confrontation with the US while keeping the thugs of the Revolutionary Guard and basji employed and reasonably content so as to diminish the potential of either a counter-coup or a prolonged and very bloody struggle for power.

Absent a palace coup, without the replacement of the Khemeneis at the top of the power pyramid, there can be no hope of any meaningful change in the regime's approach to either internal politics or foreign relations. Iran will continue to be a threat to the US and its allies. Over time the nature of its threat will increase.

We will, as that reality unfolds, have a compelling need for a latter day Cato. We will need someone to demand over and over again, "Iran must be destroyed."

And, if we do not heed the call, the day will come, come with rapidity and starkness, that the new Hannibal will have his nuclear elephants blaring at our gates.

Sociopaths And Grand Ayatollahs

Even the most high minded, charitable sort of person in the US, in the West, anywhere in the world has to grant the recent election in Iran was no more honest than those in Chicago where the dead rose from the grave and voted while the living voted both early and often. Chatham House, a highly respected and notably impartial outfit in the UK has completed a preliminary survey of the votes based strictly on Iranian official sources.

The conclusion?

Ahmedinejad, which is to say the mullahocracy of Grand Ayatollah Khemenei, stole the election.

Beyond stealing a mere election in which the results are far more symbolic than real, Khemenei and Crew stole something far more critical. They robbed Iranians, particularly the sixty percent born and reared since the overthrow of the Shah, of faith in the Revolution and its fruits.

Khemenei has shown himself to be a power-hungry political creature clothed in clerical garb and turban. He has exposed to people already exploited, impoverished and fearful that he and those who surround him as well as those dependent upon the current regime for place, prestige, and power are utterly indifferent to the present and future of those who live under the regime's club and lie-based authority.

As the Chatham House study makes clear, the slogan, "Down with the dictator," which has resounded around Tehran and the rest of the country for days, is directed at the Grand Ayatollah and not his reelected mouthpiece, Ahmedinejad. In common with the general run of dictatorships over the decades, the Khemenei regime depends upon lying and coercing to keep itself in power.

For American policy makers the key word is "lying." As experience with other dictatorial regimes has shown, diplomacy with the dictator consists of two components. The first is listening without questioning to the endless litany of lies used to justify the regime's position and demands. The second is agreeing to the fundamental tenet of diplomacy, dictator style: "What is mine is mine. What is yours is negotiable."

The Grand Ayatollah is a more complete, comprehensive liar than the average dictator. This exalted status accrues from his position as Allah's Representative on Earth. As Khemenei probably believes this as an absolute and unchallengeable truth, he has no constraints acting on him either as a liar or as a killer.

Believing that his position in power as well as his goals are the will of the divine makes Khemenei a far greater challenge than the merely secular autocrats. He--and those responsible to him--will do whatever is seen to be necessary to maintain the status quo and achieve the great ambitions of nuclear status, regional hegemon, and theocratic state.

In order to survive and achieve, the Grand Ayatollah and his underlings--elected and otherwise--will lie, cheat, steal, threaten, bluster, kill, and terrorise. Throughout it all, through all the deeds considered by less abnormal folks as evil, Khemenei and Crew will believe themselves to be fully justified, completely absolved of both responsibility and sin by the will of the deity--as they understand that will.

If the sewers of Tehran are overloaded by the blood of Iranians dispatched by the thugs of the Basji and automatons of the Revolutionary Guard, the Grand Ayatollah and his companions in mass murder will feel no qualms of personal responsibility, let alone guilt. They will believe, truly believe to the depths of their beings, that the responsibility, the guilt, rests with those who have been killed.

Khemenei and his fellows are identical to the armed robber turned killer who protests, "If he hadn't resisted, I wouldn't have killed him. The rapist who echoes the sentiment, "If she hadn't screamed and scratched me, I wouldn't have strangled her."

Sociopaths and True Believers such as the Grand Ayatollah share one factor in common. Neither the sociopath nor the True Believer takes responsibility for their actions. It is always the Other Guy who is to blame.

So, whether it is a demonstrator against the "dictator" gunned down in Tehran or the "international community" slapped in the face with another violation of Security Council resolutions, the Grand Ayatollah and his subordinates never see themselves as responsible. They are merely carrying out divine will. The fault, the blame, resides with the protester or with the countries that imposed the sanctions.

The hypostasis of the Grand Ayatollah Khemenei's world view whether expressed in internal politics or foreign policy is the same. Those who oppose the will of the divine as interpreted by the Grand Ayatollah are doomed. The guilt lies with them. All that is necessary is that they not oppose the will of the deity as understood by the GA.

Or, more bluntly: "Submit to my way or call down death upon your own heads!"

It is not possible to treat with, negotiate with, compromise with the absolute nature of the True Believer who understands himself to be the instrument of divine will. The normal processes of international (or internal) give-and-take, the standard protocols that have governed international affairs (and internal politics), are beyond the mental realm of people such as the Grand Ayatollah Khemenei.

For Khemenei and his cohort any challenge, whether in the streets of Tehran or the plush surroundings of international diplomacy, is an existential threat in the making. The world view of Khemenei and company is too stark, too absolute, too black and white to admit of challenge, response and compromise.

For Khemenei and his ilk those who challenge them are actually challenging the divine. And, one makes no deals with the devil.

For Khemenei and those who follow and support him, life is a matter of kill or be killed, terrorise or be terrorised. The people facing the motorcycle mounted thugs and triggermen in Tehran understand this brutal reality.

Is the Nice Young Man From Chicago now occupying the Oval Office as insightful, as realistic?

Hope Versus Reality In Iran (and the US)

Following the events on the streets of Tehran and other cities in Iran is exciting, frustrating and, ultimately, tinged with sadness. It is apparent that many of those involved in confronting the mullahocracy want more, much more than a replay of the election.

The beautifully ambiguous chant, "down with the dictator," shows the ambitions of many extend far beyond simply replacing the mouthpiece-of-the-regime, Ahmedinejad, with a kinder, gentler, nicer sort of chap who would still toe the foreign policy line established by the Grand Ayatollah Khemenei. People are more willing to face clubs and bullets when their goal is large than when it is limited, small.

Opposition icon Moussavi has reportedly said he is willing to accept "martyrdom." This is the necessary prerequisite for political success in Iran--if the goal is more than simply to prevail in a disputed election. It is conceivable that Moussavi is playing a cynical game--his call for a general strike is redolent of self-preservation--but it is within the realm of possibility that the hard line prime minister of years gone by has been transformed by recent events into something more than a politico genuflecting to the GA and his coterie.

Perhaps Moussavi has found himself to be the sort of "transformational" figure for Iran that President Obama's flacks trumpet him to be. One might hope that Moussavi has found within himself greater depths and strengths than he had ever thought before.

From the dynamic apparent in the videos and tweets out of Iran, it is clear that more than a few of Iran's younger, more affluent, better educated, and, withal, alienated citizens see this transformational potential in Moussavi. For them, Moussavi is no longer a politician, he is a symbol, an icon of the change they so desperately hope may come.

The brutal, historically documented truth is that reality trumps hope. In Iran the reality is that the regime has the guns and, potentially, the will to use them. Today the minions of the mullahs, the cops, the vigilantes of the Basji used clubs, water cannons, tear gas and genuine, fer sure, lethal bullets to break up the demonstrations in Tehran.

The Basji, which is comprised of the same sort of mentalities as was the Nazi SA, is a reliable crew of sadistic thugs drawn from the margins of Iranian society. Formed back during the existential war with Iraq, the Basji has proved its reliability and importance to regime maintenance over the intervening twenty years. Today, it is the least politically risky force for the GA and his fellow turban-topped, Koran-thumpers to use against the Iranians in opposition.

Should the Basji prove insufficient, the mullahs can order up the Revolutionary Guard. This organ of state is a very good approximation of the Nazi SS at its height. Utterly loyal to the regime, completely dedicated to the preservation of the status quo, and very well armed, trained, equipped, and indoctrinated, the Revolutionary Guard can be depended upon to gun down their fellow citizens in wholesale lots without a qualm should they be directed to do so.

Like the SS or the KGB of the final decades of the Soviet Union, the Revolutionary Guard is virtually a state within the state. The continuation of the RG (to say nothing of the lives and power of the individual officers and men) stands upon maintaining the current regime in full, unquestioned dominance. The mullahocracy (and the rest of the world) can and does bet its collective bippy on the Revolutionary Guard doing its (killing) job.

Martyrdom is the way of Shia. Martyrdom was the key to the Islamic Revolution thirty years ago. It was central to Iran's strategy during the Iraq-Iran War. A little martyrdom, too little martyrdom inflicted upon the opposition will create more opposition. Sufficient martyrdom, the sort that would be inflicted by the Revolutionary Guard and perhaps even the amateurs of the Basji, will drown the opposition in its own blood.

No one should underrate the will of the mullahocracy to keep itself in power. It is clear the GA and his fellows are feeling nervous. It is equally evident that they fear that the opposition in the streets entertains ambitions transcending the removal of their chosen public image, Ahmedinejad. They see the long range target as their theocratic rule and not the political and international figurehead.

The desperate, rapidly shifting diversionary efforts of Khemenei are evidence of this. First he and his cronies blamed the outrage in the streets on "American meddling." The next day the GA announced that "Britain is enemy number one," as he reached far back in Iranian history to grab the magic of evil Albion and its agent the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Most recently, Khemenei went to the Islamist default position and placed responsibility for the demonstrations on the "Zionist controlled media."

(One might be forgiven for wishing that Allah could give His Representative in Qom the right story the first time.)

As history has shown repeatedly, desperate, fearful regimes engage in desperate actions. Like the possibility of mass slaughter such as to put Tienanmen Square deep in the shadows. The Chinese government killed in the hundreds. If massacre comes to Tehran it will be in the thousands.

The bloodletting at Tienanmen was carried out in the hours of darkness as shameful acts should be. The media were not there. Could not be there. The mullahs will not be so fortunate if they order the cancel button be pushed on the opposition. Twenty years has wrought such a transformation that the images and words of those about to butchered will flash around the world nearly instantaneously. The mullahs cannot hope to prevent that--unless they shut down the Internet and cell phone service completely.

Such a blackout would signal their intentions with certainty. The world will know what is contemplated before it happens.

So far, the Obama administration has played the game cautiously and well. It has properly and prudently left public expressions of condemnation up to the Congress and individual Americans. The President is correct when he avers that any posturing by the administration would harm the efforts of the opposition by allowing the mullahs to portray it as an American tool.

This will change with the speed of light if the mullahs in their fear and desperation order the Basji or, worse, the Revolutionary Guard into bloody action.

At that moment the whole world will be watching. It will not be watching Tehran so much as it will turn to Washington, D.C. expecting the American president to do what American presidents have been expected to do for the past sixty some years. Lead.

That's right. Lead. Tell us, show us, what you and by example the rest of us should do now.