Meanwhile In The North Caucasus...

The Kremlin hates to be outpointed, really doesn't like being one upped by the Imperialist Camp.  OK, so Putin did congratulate the US on the Great Abbottabad Raid, but he had to spoil the moment by suggesting that his boys and ours get together on a joint campaign against, well, you know, those pesky terrorists.  Behind the smiles Putin and Company sought to prove that their counterterror forces were every bit as high speed, low drag as Boat Six.

The Lads in the Kremlin did have a small reason to crow over recent developments in the North Caucasus, but, regardless of the best efforts of the spin masters, the "liquidation" of a few Koran-waving trigger pullers is not equivalent to sending Osama bin Laden to his rewards.  April proved to be a very good month for the forces of law and order (or the Russian equivalents thereof.)

Around mid-month the security forces liquidated (don't you love that term?) Israpil Validzhanov.  Israpil had been the jefe grande of Dagestani jamaat, the major exponent of violent political Islam in Dagestan before his final, fatal encounter with FSB operatives.  This was followed on 23 April by the removal of a high profile genuine foreign fighter, an Arab who went by the moniker of Emir Mukhannad.  This Mighty Warrior of the Prophet was a leading (and very controversial) figure in the Chechen Islamist insurgency.

Six days later the adherents of violent political Islam (the Kabardino-Balkaria jamaat) took a very large hit in their leadership echelon when the security forces hit a house in the outskirts of the village of Progress (no joke, that is the name).  When the shooting stopped some hours later, the occupants of the house were all dead--a total of eight men and two women.  The dead were identified as having been the leaders of the group.

In the aftermath of the firefight, the Russian authorities did what so many US prosecutors do--greatly inflate the charges.  The dead men (and women) were held responsible for almost every terrorist operations other than 9/11, 7/7, and the Madrid Subway bombing.  The insurgent group confirmed both the deaths and the critical leadership roles performed by the deceased.

Allowing for the normal Soviet--oops! Bad Geek!--Russian tendency to inflate accomplishments, the dead were very bad actors and the region is better off without them.  What is open to question now is whether or not the government will be able to capitalize on the confusion within insurgent ranks this decapitation operation must necessarily produce.  Based on past experience the prognosis in this area is not wildly optimistic.

This contention is underscored by events in Dagestan following the death of Israpil.  There the insurgents continued to mount at least one operation per day.  On occasion the Islamists oversubcribe their production norm to the embarrassment of the authorities.

During the same period Chechnya has been dominated by government efforts.  Despite some blatant missteps, the government apparently wrested and maintained the initiative.  The situation there shows repeated government initiated strikes against the insurgents.  One can conclude that Chechnya is the epicenter of a major, region wide campaign by the Kremlin to bring the political Islamists to their knees well before the next hot spot grows even hotter.

That next hot spot is the Sochi region of the former Circassian tribal area of the western Caucasus plains.  The Circassian tribes roamed far and free in this area until roughly two hundred years ago when the Russians started their long campaign of conquest.  At the present moment the critical group is the Shapsugs.  They constitute only 12,000 of the five million people living in the Krasnodar region.  This pitiful remnant is important only because (1) the upcoming Winter Olympics of 2014 and (2) there are a lot more Circassians living not too far away.

The Kremlin has started meeting with Shapsug representatives in order to "address their questions."  The Circassians have more than questions; they have a series of very serious complaints not dissimilar from those which motivated the American Indian Movement thirty plus years ago.  These include cultural destruction, poverty, lack of economic development, and the biased nature of social and political institutions and processes.

The larger Circassian population is getting increasingly restless with the Kremlin's ongoing foot dragging.  There has been at least one minor effort to internationalize the contretemps using Georgia as the mechanism.  At the minimum this will cause some pinking of faces in the Kremlin, so there will be a push back directed at Georgia, a state with few cards to play following the border skirmish of a couple of years back.  The Circassians may be hoping that Georgia will seek the aid and support of the EU and/or the US as a way of countering Russian ripostes on the Circassian question.

No matter how the specifics of the Georgia connection play out, the move constitutes an escalation in expressed nationalism on the part of the Circassians, which has taken full advantage of the impending Winter Games.  This enhanced nationalistic sentiment is also reflected in recent attempts by the Circassian National Congress to foster repatriation of Circassians from Turkey, the Mideast, and, perhaps most disturbing to the Kremlin, Libya.  Since the foundation of the modern nationalist movement in 1989, the Circassians have been moving slowly but seemingly inexorably toward a serious push for autonomy at the least and independence at the most.  Russian counter proposals have been vague, amorphous, and amount to the offer of decrees easy to cancel when the Olympics are over.

The Kremlin's strategy is obviously one of stall, delay, and equivocate.  There is little doubt that some Circassians will take this to mean that they must emulate the more robust methods used in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.  While there have not yet been any episodes of violence directly linked to Circassian independence, these will be coming soon.

The tipping point will most probably come when Moscow doesn't allow any significant resettlement of Circassians in the region.  To allow resettlement would be a reversal of decades of Kremlin policy as well as being against the personal inclinations of Putin.  It may be expected that Moscow will seek the cooperation of Turkey in preventing any wholesale relocation of expat Circassians.  Given the current good state of Russian-Turkish relations, it may be anticipated that Ankara will respect Russian desires in this matter.  Considering the relatively lower levels of Circassian population in the Mideast and North Africa, stopping significant migration from Turkey would put a stop to Circassian efforts to bring the tribe back home.

Should the tipping point be reached, the Kremlin will face a problem in counter insurgency rivaling or surpassing the challenges present in the North Caucasus.  This implies the security forces throughout the region must work against the clock big time.  The "siloviki" have their work cut out for them.

It's no wonder that Vladimir of the Bare Chest would like to have some cooperative counter terrorist operations with the US.  Perhaps President Obama can just offer to loan him Team Six for a few weeks?

He's Back And He's BAAAD!

Vladimir Putin, every Russian's "Good Czar" was at his self-promoting, uber-nationalist best speaking to the Duma yesterday.  The assembled parliamentarians--most of whom are card carrying members of Putin's United Russia Party--interrupted the Czar's speech with applause a number of times.  It was almost like the good old days when the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union spoke to his adoring sycophants.

The Putin speech gave one the impression that it is a tryout for next year's presidential campaign.  If so one wants to know one fact above all else:  Have Vladimir and his one time protegee, Dimitri Medvedev, reached an agreement on executing another swap of offices or will Vlad of the Bare Chest be squaring off against Dimitri the Techno-Nerd?

In either event the smart money will be on Putin.  Many of the reasons for this contention are to be found in the substance and tone of yesterday's speech.  At the very core of Putin's remarks as of his worldview is nationalism, pure and quite unapologetic nationalism.

This puts Czar Vladimir at a sharp contrast with Dimitri the Sophisticated.  Medvedev is quite cosmopolitan in comparison with Putin.  He is familiar with the West and is happy with his familiarity.  Dimitri sees much in Western economics, technology, society, and politics worthy of translation into Russian.  He does not see the West, either the EU or the US, as a threat--now or into the far future.  If Russia faces a threat in Medvendev's view, it comes from within, from corruption, from inefficiency, from outdated technology, from lack of venture capital, from disease, from alcohol, from despair.

Putin incarnates all the ancient and defining characteristics of Russian nationalism, the free floating fear of outside threats, the sense of inferiority in comparison with the West, the belief that either a state must expand or it will collapse, the sullen withdrawal into plotting a future caper when challenged or defeated in a current ploy.  Like the Russian people generally over the long sweep of the centuries, Putin can swing almost instantly between grandiose euphoria of triumphs in the making to profound, Arctic nights of bleak and cold feelings of failure.  As has been the case so often with so many of his predecessors--both czars and commissars--Vladimir is eager to be suspicious, alert to the faintest hint of potential threat, trembling on the ragged edge of paranoia, and quite sure that no matter how well affairs are going at the moment, the knife in the back and the kick in the groin are soon to happen.

Putin's speech reflected all of these characteristics.  It was ripe, over ripe, with hosannas onto Vladimir the Brilliant, Vladimir the Resolute, Vladimir the Unbelievably Successful.  It was also stuffed with dire warnings of unspecified foreign threats looming over Russia's present and future.  Putin demanded that Russia be stronger, much stronger, in order to counter these threats.  He declaimed more than once that not only did Russia need more, newer, and better weapons of all categories, it needed more births, more children, more sturdy Russian citizens to carry the burden of defending against the array of unspecified but potentially lethal threats confronting nation and state.

Putin took credit and warned of the need to do more, much more, to improve the economy.  Because Putin was so prescient as to have practiced a form of economic autarchy, Russia had come out of the global recession faster and in better shape than all other states.  He warned that only by following the Putin Paradigm and avoiding "sharp moves and ill-conceived experiments" could Russian prosperity be continued and expanded.  This was a less than well-concealed blow directed against Dimitri who is open to both "moves" and "experiments" imported from the Big Boys of the G-whatever.  Even more pointed was his follow-on comment, "those who are weak will get advice from foreign visitors on which way to go and what policy course to pursue."

Ouch!

However, the observation might have been directed as well at the US which has a sorry record extending from Bill Clinton through George W. Bush to Joe Biden of offering gratuitous and semi-insulting advice to various Russian leaders, including both Putin and Medvedev.  The lesson for future American politicians is simple: Never stoke a Russian's inherent bent toward holding on to his inferiority complex.

The Russian prime minister, the once and (perhaps) future president, rejected any notion that Russia might be swept by a people power movement such as those which have so visibly perturbed the Arab states.  Putin assured any nervous auditors that as long as his firm and steady hand is on the helm and as long as his wise and farsighted mind is on the job, the policies of his government will keep the Russian people happy and fully in support of the government.

In line with his keep-the-peasants-happy philosophy of governance, Vladimir the Most Generous and Compassionate took pride in his past and projected increases in state pensions, welfare programs, and the birth incentive scheme.  In addition, the workers and peasants could take joy in the proposed weapons acquisition program, the best part of a trillion dollars over the next five or so years.  The same constituency would receive benefits beyond counting from the Putin Economic Diversification Plan which would reduce Russia's dependency on resource exploitation.  (This served to steal some of Medvedev's thunder as he has been plumping this approach for years now.)

While Good Czar Vladimir did not name any specific "foreign threat," the repeated references to such plays well to the natural and historically deeply rooted Russian fear of invasion.  There are several candidates for the title of "main enemy."

One, of course, is the old standby, the US.  The technological asymmetries between the US and Russian military forces do not operate to Russia's advantage.  The aging and decrepit nature of so much of the old Soviet military machine particularly in the strategic and force projection categories must be worrisome to a crew given to paranoia.  The difficulties experienced to date in bringing a new ICBM online have done nothing to reduce the apprehensions of American superiority rampant in the highest levels of Russian political and military life.  While the Boys in the Kremlin know perfectly well they have nothing to fear from the current American administration, they cannot be sure that We the People will not toss another George W. Bush, or, worse, Ronald Reagan, into the Oval.

A credible alternative is China.  Putin along with the entire military high command is very well aware that the vast majority of China's nuclear delivery systems have Russian zip codes in their reentry vehicles.  They also fret over the basing of the large and increasingly competent Peoples Liberation Army.  It is clear from the locations of the bases that China is not poised to go to war with Vietnam--or India.  So, much as the US is getting Xanax moments from China's adventures in naval construction, the Russians are having an even larger need for Valium from the positioning of the ground combat forces.

There is a prevalent, vague anxiety over the intents of NATO and the EU with respect to the "near abroad," those constituents of the former Soviet Union which have gone their own independent ways since the early Nineties.  The Kremlin will not be ready to sleep with any degree of soundness unless and until it has reestablished operational dominance over places such as Georgia and the Ukraine.  Strategists in Putin's service undoubtedly see these former glacis states as potential points of conflict between Russia and an expansionist oriented NATO/EU combine.  (Hey! Paranoia does not require realism simply rationality.)

Then there are the Muslims.  The ongoing operations against purveyors of violent political Islam in the North Caucasus represent but one part of the emerging challenge presented by militant Islam.  The difficulties currently experienced by several of the now independent Central Asian Republics have already spilled over into Russia and show strong signs of doing more of the same in the near future.  Coupled with ideological appeal and backed by Iran, the advocates of violent political Islam are poised to be a "foreign threat" without equal.  They are a "main enemy" in the process of being created.

Vladimir Putin is a vastly skilled and able Russian politician.  He understands nationalism of the Russian sort and uses it to advance his claim on the throne.  As a Russian nationalist he is guided in foreign affairs by one guiding principle--the national interests of Russia.  Given the high probability of his being elected president once again next year, there is a strong likelihood the US will be dealing with him for some years to come.  In a way he is the best possible interlocutor for the US to have in the Kremlin.  He is a prime example of what you see is what you get.  This means he will continue to be a very difficult person with whom to make a diplomatic deal, but his motives and goals will never be obscure or hazy--and once he has made a deal he will stick with it, provided such is in Russia's national interest.

The Deep Thinkers of the Obama administration would be well advised to parse Putin's speech very closely and carefully.  To do so is to understand the man and his policy context.  To blow off his speech as mere politics, or to deprecate Putin as an imitation Western politician is to do him and us a great disservice.  Vladimir is not just another politician or one more Russian dictator.  No, he is the Good Czar, and a Good Czar with a totally Russian soul.

Hey! Vladimir! Better Call Off The Ski Resorts

Irony without equal exists in the world news section of the London Daily Telegraph today.  The lead article is, of course, the suicide bombing at the main Moscow airport.  But, sharing the page is a story from the other day which relates of the plans announced by Vladimir Putin and Dimitri Medvedev for a series of five star ski resorts to be built on the hillsides of the North Caucasus.

The irony resides in the fact that the bombing comes courtesy of the the jihadists of the North Caucasus--the insurgency which has spread from Chechnya to the other segments of the North Caucasus in large measure because the Russian efforts at counterinsurgency have been sufficiently robust to inflame but not to suppress.  The Kremlin may have taken false comfort in the slow motion pace of insurgent activities in the North Caucasus while failing to recall that the the jihadists of the North Caucasus have preferred mediagenic attacks far from home, usually in Moscow.

The suicide bombing meets the test of being a politically shocking media spectacular.  It will grab the full and undivided attention of both Putin and Medvedev.  For Putin in particular the bombing has a very real urgency given that he most probably will seek to return to the presidential post in elections next year.

Putin, it should be remembered, won his political bones in 1999 with his successful ending of the Chenchen war.  Each and every outrage since then has reminded the Russian people and particularly the elites that the insurgency continues.  Each and every outrage is a challenge to Putin's reputation and a threat to his future.

The attack on the international arrivals area of Domodedovo airport has thrown down the gauntlet at a time and in a place which will no doubt convince many in the political elite that Putin has lost his magic, that only a well polished surface remains of a man once thought to be tough and innovative enough to provide a secure and prosperous future for the rebuilding Russia.  Medvedev may be the man issuing enhanced security orders today, but no one in the Russian "know" believes that anyone other than Putin is actually responsible for the situation in the North Caucasus.

If Putin is really serious about returning to the president's office--or even remaining as prime minister--he will have to take a much more hands-on approach to the challenge represented by the advocates of violent political Islam in Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.  Gone are the easy going days of appointing a local strongman as capo, or delegating some former KGB general to "clarify the situation and put it to order."  Putin may have to go personally to direct a massive operation aimed not so much at counterinsurgency as at (using the old Russian/Soviet practice) creating a desert and calling it peace.

Next year, 2012, is election time in Russia, and then two years later it is the time of the Winter Olympic Games scheduled to be hosted by Russia in a venue uncomfortably proximate to the heartland of violent political Islam.  This means that for the Kremlin, time is of the essence as attorneys like to put it.  Putin's less than competent, not to say, half-baked, notions of counterinsurgency have frittered away the past several years without either suppressing the leadership or demobilizing support within the population for the goals, if not the total agenda, of the pro-violent political Islam cadre.

From the shortness of time and the probable ill effects upon the elites' perception of Putin's competence, it is not risky to infer that Vladimir of the Bare Chest has few options other than a massive military campaign aimed at the rapid destruction of the jihadists capacity to stage attacks on any but the smallest of small scales. Approaches of greater finesse simply take too much time.

Of course, the use of large military formations, even battalion sized units of special duty troops, carries with it some very real risks.  One risk, of course, is failure.  The local terrain both physical and human favors the insurgents.  The Russian army, even its special duty units, have not demonstrated a high degree of capability so far either in the North Caucasus or Tajikistan.  During the earlier Chechen wars, the Russian military showed the same deficiencies as it had in Afghanistan, including a willingness to kill far more people than genuinely needed to be killed.

Another, larger risk, is that military operations carry with them the strong potential of a negative portrayal in the media of the world.  Media and human rights organizations which feed the media have exhibited both a strong aversion to the reality that people are killed and things broken during wars, including counterinsurgcies. The same crew have demonstrated repeatedly that they have a very tender concern for the fate not only of non-combatants caught in the theater of operations but also insurgents.  Time after time, both media and human rights groups have declared in effect that insurgents are all pure and good but the status quo forces are all evil and malignant.

Russia and Putin need a bad international press like they need another insurgency.  The costs which may be imposed by the US, the EU, and other "concerned" parties may be high.  If that proves to be the case there is a strong probability that the Russian leadership will respond by invoking some of the bad behavior internationally which was once the patented product of the Soviet Union.  This sort of reaction would complicate the diplomatic life of the US and others.

Even with these risks, doing nothing, or nothing more than more of the same, constitutes a greater risk for Mr Putin.  Both he and Mr Medvedev have termed the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus the single greatest security threat facing Russia.  The blast at the airport may convince both, or at least Vladimir (the Strong Horse) Putin that the time has come to treat the insurgents appropriately.

If that proves to be the case, it will take more than Allah's will to save the insurgents.

Vladimir Takes On Another Job

Vladimir Putin, who rose to prominence and power as a result of his bare chested, not to say bare knuckled, approach to peace imposition during the Second Chechen War, has appointed himself jefe grande of the Russian government's special commission on the economic and social development of the North Caucasus Region--which includes in its remit Chechnya as well as the several other provinces currently experiencing insurgency with combined nationalist and political Islamist goals.  Putin's announcement on 1 December indicates that he is now personally going to undertake the mission of "clarifying and putting to order the situation in the North Caucasus" which he previously assigned to others.

The assorted former KGB personnel Putin tabbed for the duty have not demonstrated any convincing degree of success.  The lack of their ability to "clarify and put to order" is shown in the recent statement by the Russian Deputy Prosecutor-General, Ivan Sydoruk, that insurgent violence has doubled this year over last in the North Caucasus Federal District.  On the same day (8 December), President Dimitry Medvedev echoed the theme, improving on it by averring that any local officials who said the situation had improved were lying.

While any downtown street in Juarez is much more deadly than the totality of the North Caucasus, the Russian authorities have allowed that some two hundred local cops and Federal Security Bureau personnel have been killed by insurgents this year.  Another five hundred or so have been wounded.

Not that the violence has run one way.  The Deputy Prosecutor-General stated that more than three hundred insurgents have been "neutralized," which number included sixteen "leaders" officially pronounced as "killed."  By official figures, an impressive number of weapons and explosive materials fell into government hands this year so far.

The fighting has not diminished since the words outpouring from Official Russia twelve days ago.  Even though the weather conditions have been somewhere between foul and rotten, the insurgents have gone along planting IED's and conducting ambushes and hit-and-run raids on police facilities.  The FSB and interior ministry forces have not taken the time off having conducted a number of nocturnal raids on the homes of suspected "militants."

And, so the war lurches along.  Neither side seems capable of hitting a knock out blow.  Given the size of the several distinct districts comprising the North Caucasus, there seems little probability that the Russian government can do so--unless it is willing to undertake a massive escalation and accept the consequences both domestic and international of doing so.  Given the internal divisions which characterize the several separate insurgent groups, the probability of these developing sufficient organizational coherence to go beyond the very low level of combat and terror operations seen the past two years can be assessed as low to non-existent.

Even though the war is as low level in its intensity as can be imagined, the continuation of the several insurgencies in the North Caucasus does represent a real threat to the political and social cohesion of Russia.  The insurgencies directly attack a systemic weak point of the Russian polity and society.

That weak point is nationalism.  Today no less than during the long years of the Communist regime and before it that of the Czars, Russia is bedeviled by what Lenin termed "the Nationalities Question."  In truth, Russia has never even made a pretense of being a "melting pot."  It has been and remains a stew of different nationalities, different ethnic groups, different languages, different confessions of faith.

In this stewpot the Slavs have dominated.  Have ruled.  Have conquered.  And reconquered.  But the Slavs have never hit on a way of creating a Russian society and polity in which national identities merge into a single, greater whole.  The results of conquest have never been consolidated, never assimilated, never unified.

The power of nationalism--both Russian, which is to say, Slav, and non-Russian, which is to say everyone else--was brought into high relief earlier this month in the "football" riots in Moscow.  These outbreaks had much less to do with soccer hooligans than with offended nationalism.  As Medvedev and Putin both made clear in their post-riot press encounters, the government fears these were the harbingers of more and worse to come. As is expectable in Russia, the immediate, default, response was a demand for more robust police action.

The Soviet Union was able to keep the nationalities question from being raised violently by constant, effective repression.  Subsequently, the Russian government has been unwilling or unable to do the same.  So far.  And, by now, the resort to Soviet style methods might be both too late and unacceptable in the no longer bi-polar world.

By taking over the de facto top slot in the North Caucasus affair, Putin apparently is acknowledging that the Soviet methods cannot or should not be used.  Rather, by focusing on economic matters, he is going to attempt to bribe his way to success.  It will be interesting to see if money can succeed where force has not as this approach to counterinsurgency has never been made in a systematic and long-term way.

One rather suspects it will fail.  Nationalism is too potent a force in the lives of people to be countered by mere money.  Worse, when the nationalism has inflamed not only minorities but the dominant Slavs, the use of bribery in the North Caucasus region is likely to outrage those who are not in on the cash cow's flow.  This means the Slavs.

So far, the appeal of outsiders who are proponents of violent political Islam have not had a major influence on the course of the nationalists in the North Caucasus.  This does not mean the situation will continue.  An increasing number of foreign fighters has been reported in the region.  Even though these seem to be trigger pullers and not leadership cadre, the increased pressure on jihadi in Afghanistan, the FATA, and the Central Asian Republics, particularly Tajikistan, hints at a greater influx of more determined global insurgents over the next few months and years.

Putin has undertaken a Labor of Hercules with his self-assigned new post.  He must funnel money in a way which undercuts the nationalists while not infuriating his Slavic Russian base.  At the same time his security forces must keep effective pressure on the insurgent hard core so as to gain the initiative and erode insurgent political will and combat efficiency.  While that is in progress, Putin's government and military must interdict the movement of outsiders into the North Caucasus theater of operations.

As if that is not enough to overload the Putin plate, he must nip incipient insurgent movements within other minorities who resent on an increasing basis the privileges presumably enjoyed by the Slavs.  Then, he has to deal with the increasing ethnic and regional divisions which exist in the Russian armed forces fueled by the regionally based system of conscription.

Well, Vlad of the Bare Chest reportedly enjoyed being characterized as an "Alpha male" in one of the WikiLeaks leaked dispatches.  The challenges he faces in the North Caucasus are such that only the most alpha of alpha males would think of tackling them.

It couldn't happen to a more deserving guy.

Resetting The "Reset" Button?

Life is getting tougher for the Guy In The Oval in the old foreign relations corral.  You know matters are heading down the tubes when Afghan president Hamid Karzai demands--in the WaPo no less--that the US, in a term beloved by noted pundit Sarah Palin, "cease and desist" in executing the highly successful nighttime raids on suspected Taliban and Haqqani sites.

Admittedly this latest twist in the Saga of Hamid puts one in a position of accepting the diagnosis of manic-depressive psychosis once offered by Ambassador Eikenberry.  In the real world the probability of the hours of darkness operations taken always in conjunction with Afghan National Force members being halted is somewhat less than Ron Paul voting to expand the powers of the Federal Reserve System.  Hitting the heavyweights, the hard core of an insurgent group with a rapid tempo is a highly effective means of degrading both the combat efficiency and political will of the target groups.

The fact that some Afghans are bothered by the notion of women and children being rousted by Americans whose combat kit makes them look about as sympathetically human as the Imperial Stormtroops of Star Wars fame is a case of TS.  A few hurt Islamic sensibilities is a small cost to pay for the prospect of genuine lowering of the violence, the blood and death which falls disproportionately on the same civilian population.  Even Karzai must be aware of this governing reality and its necessary corollary: You can't be president of anything if the purveyors of violent political Islam take over or even remain as a viable, nascent threat to the Kabul regime.

The takeaway from the latest gust from the mouth of Hamid is simple:  This too will pass.  Swiftly.

The same realistic optimism cannot be applied to the growing frictions between the Obama administration and the Dynamic Duo in the Kremlin.  The festering issue of American ratification of the pending new START is developing with the rapidity of a case of gas gangrene.

Senator Jon Kyl, (R) Arizona, who is the point man for the GOP on the START ratification, has cut Mr Obama off at the knees.  Obama was so ill-advised (or so unrealistically certain of his own political juice) that he assured Russian president Medvedev that the treaty would be brought to a successful conclusion during the lame duck session.  Kyl has demurred.  This means the treaty in all its contentious whole will linger on until the next Congress with the increased Republican presence in the Senate.

The administration has attempted to sweeten the deal--or, more accurately--has genuflected to Republican fears that the new version of START will limit the capacity of the US to upgrade and modernize its rather elderly nuclear arsenal.  The difficulty comes in that the money pledges are scheduled over a ten year period with no enforceable means of assuring that future administrations and congresses will honor the promises.  Kyl and other Republicans want more money upfront so that work can be started and a dynamic created to make future funding more probable.  On this the current administration has dragged its collective feet.

Overall, the new START is a decent treaty.  It does, as usually has been the case in this sort of matter, give advantages to the Russians.  However none of these seriously alter the balance of terror which has worked so well so long to keep the peace between Russia and the US.  Ratification would provide a reasonably firm basis for other agreements on "tactical" nuclear systems, for example, or a new and more comprehensive test ban understanding.  It might even serve to increase mutual confidence such as to allow the Kremlin to work with the US in the anti-ballistic missile arena.  A creative and mutual understanding in this area would serve both countries' interests in a measurable way.

When the proposed treaty is finally brought to the Senate, the debate may be quite contentious.  There are more than a few Republicans there who are unreconstructed Cold Warriors who seem to believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union was some sort of shrewd commie plot.  There is a bit of truth here, but not in the way presumed.

Vladimir Putin shows both his age and background in his fundamental distrust of the US.  The current prime minister and past (as well as possible future) Russian president is rather much of the Cold Warrior himself albeit in more nationalistic ways than his predecessors of the pre-1991 sort.  That is why he has so obviously left the America brief in the hands of Medvedev.  Putin anticipates failure and is not going to have the tar of catastrophe sticking to his hands.  The Bare Chested Man On Horseback sees the US as the Main Enemy to this day and his attitude is not going to change for the better.

This is another good reason to ratify START.  A quick and relatively low contention ratification process will weaken Putin's hold on the internal levers of power in the Kremlin coterie.  The relative reduction of the power of Putin's anti-American view will enhance the possibilities of enhanced cooperation in the myriad of matters of coinciding national interest which rest on the table currently.

Putin's suspicions about and distrust of the US received a shot of steroids with the sudden, unannounced rendition of Viktor Bout by the government of Thailand.  Bout, a long time international dealer in weapons whose favored customers were rogue states and insurgent or terrorist groups, was indicted for violation of US law following a Drug Enforcement Administration sting operation.  Arrested in Thailand the legal wrangle was finally settled in favor of the American demand that the man be extradited for trial in the US.

When the rendition went down the Russians screamed bloody murder.  It was an unusual event.  Even the Russian foreign minister got into the act.  Rarely, if ever, has an international criminal received such massive and vocal support from the government of a major state.

To the Russians--who had used any amount of pressure and inducement to free Bout from the clutches of the Thais--the extradition as well as the process leading to it were redolent of American arrogance, of the sort of unilateralism regularly decried by Vladimir Putin back in the days of George W.  His foreign ministry and other organs of official opinion singled out the unwillingness of the American side to put its case on the table for mutual examination and joint determination.  This perspective is not uniquely Russian but the passion with which it is stated is as Russian as Ivan the Terrible.

There is, of course, more than insulted Russian national ego involved in the Bout Affair.  Faced with a horrific number of years as a guest of the Bureau of Prisons, there is a chance that Viktor will have an attack of the Talking Disease.  Certainly there are a lot of questions the US would like to place before the one time Russian air force interpreter.  We would like to know just how he got his hands on the more major weapons he peddled.  And, it would be interesting to determine who authorized the use of Russian Air Force transports to carry his "private enterprise" cargo.  The list goes on at some length but you get the point, eh, bucko?

Bout knows where the bodies are buried.  He knows just how ranking the buried bodies are.  He has a set of very good reasons to dime out anybody and everybody.  This gives Viktor a great capacity to produce fear in major sections of the Russian elite both in and out of the government and military services.

Coming hard on the heels of the revelations regarding the defection of a very high ranking spook in the successor agency of Vladimir's alma mater KGB, the prospects of the damage which a fast talking Bout might do is and will cause sleepness nights in the Kremlin and its ancillaries.  Both the Bout Affair and its spook community predecessor have heightened the Putin fear and loathing of the US.  Any delay or modification of the proposed START ratification process will do the same only more so.

President Obama will be meeting the "good cop" of the Dynamic Duo in the context of the upcoming NATO conference at which the top topics will be Afghanistan and the (not officially of course due to Turkish sensibilities) anti-Iran missile defense system.  Both subjects would be benefited greatly by Russian cooperation.  At this juncture, due to the ability of Mr Obama to promise what he cannot deliver and the bonfire of the Bout Affair, this cooperation is less rather than more likely.

In terms of US national interest Medvedev is greatly to be preferred as an interlocutor over his higher profile and nominally junior prime minister, Putin.  It is important, therefore, that both Mr Obama and the Republicans understand this as well as the ground truth that Russia is not going to go away.  It is not and never has been--pace the unfortunate and misguided remarks and policies of George W. Bush and, later, Joe Biden--one with Nineveh and Tyre.

The Russians and the Russian leadership are both insecure and possessed of a prickly sense of national pride. In all diplomatic doings including presidential promises this foundation reality must be kept in mind.  Russia is, at least in the minds of Russians high and low, a Great Power, and it is an absolute imperative that the US treat it as such in all matters, great and small.  Only by doing so with the utmost of sedulousness can the US hope to accomplish critical matters of central national interest.

Red Faces On Red Square

OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the red faces are not in Red Square but right nearby in the Kremlin.  The cause for the embarrassment is easy to discover.  Despite recent declarations of victory, the advocates and practitioners of violent political Islam are not only alive and well in Chechnya but eager to show their vitality.

As if the failure of assorted handpicked retired KGB generals and other hard cases to "clarify the situation" in Chechnya and the other disputed provinces in the North Caucasus were not enough, the highly annoying and quite able jihadists in Tajikistan are demonstrating both resiliency and commitment, which puts the Russians and their local clients behind the power curve.  Worse, the degenerating situation in Tajikistan puts an increased burden on the US and its partners in Afghanistan.

The three suicide commandos, presumably adherents of the "Caliphate of the Caucasus" attacked the parliament building in Grozny.  They died, of course.  They took three locals with them following a gun battle and the detonation of the attackers' suicide bomb vests.

The attack might have been low cost for both insurgents and government, but its effects should not be discounted.  The man placed in charge of Chechnya by Vladimir (I-Put-Out-The-Fires) Putin, a fellow of little scruples, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been trumpeting success over the jihadists this past year.  In less than a half hour of noise and fear, his claims, like those of his boss, were called into serious question.

Making the question all the more compelling was the presence of the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, during the gun battle.  This VIP from the Kremlin went on stage with the "shaken" Chechen parliamentarians almost before the cordite fumes had dissipated.  He thundered, "We will not allow anyone to come at us with a sword."

The predominately Muslim republic has been relatively quiet this year.  But, the operative word is "relatively." Considering that the defensive insurgency has been underway in an off-and-on fashion since 1994, it is not surprising that while the level of violence has subsided, there has been no move toward "victory" by either side.

For the past several years, the war has been slow motion and low in overall casualties.  Still, more than four hundred police and other security personnel have been killed by insurgent acts since 2005.  In addition, over three thousand civilian non-combatants have been killed or wounded by insurgent actions in the same period.  All of the several provinces in the North Caucasus have seen the same phenomena--low intensity, slow tempo, a death by a thousand paper cuts sort of war.

The demographic and economic realities along with nearly identical cultural patterns and social structures assure that the title for Leader in the War For the Caliphate can shift easily between the several provinces of the North Caucasus.  Until today's attack in Grozny, the Russians were of the view that Dagestan was the nexus of the Islamist insurgency.  The subtext read: "Dagestan will be clarified and put to order if the Kremlin can find the correct Kadyrov clone."

The good news to date is that al-Qaeda has shown only the most limited interest in linking with the jihadists of the Caucasus Caliphate.  While there have been some contacts between Mideast based sympathizers of al-Qaeda and the insurgents of Chechnya and coterminous provinces, these have been few and sporadic.  The reason for al-Qaeda's senior leadership having no interest in establishing another franchise in the North Caucasus is self-interest.

Al-Qaeda has nothing to gain by tossing its turban into the North Caucasus ring.  The locals are doing just fine without any external "guidance."  Al-Qaeda has no need to add Russia to the list of its enemies.  While the Russian military and FSB may not be particularly impressive in the results category, both are noted for the ruthlessness with which they will engage a threat.  With no real benefits and a very real downside as well as a disinclination of the locals to seek outside aid, al-Qaeda has been content to sit on the sidelines.

If one is given to a conspiracy theory of politics, the existence of an understanding between the Kremlin and al-Qaeda is conceivable.  The FSB and other organs of state security can turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda dealings in Russia or even quietly facilitate these dealings.  In return, al-Qaeda can agree to not complicate the situation in the North Caucasus.  Stranger relations of mutual convenience have happened in the past.

The good news of al-Qaeda's non-involvement in the Caucasus is more than offset by the ground truths governing the local dynamics.  Kadyrov has been a failure in all but the most superficial aspects of counter-insurgency.  The Kremlin appointed strongman has done nothing to address any of the very long standing causes of political disaffiliation.  Many of these date back to the early Nineteenth century and all have their roots in the forced relocation of the Chechen population during the days of Stalin.

Over and above these historical causes, the severe economic disparity between ethnic Chechens and the Russian minority have grown during the Kadyrov ascendancy.  Money has flowed from the central Russian government to Chechnya and other Caucasus states, but it has tended to fill Russian, not local, pockets.  Even purportedly well-intended measures such as the barring of the long standing practice of bride selling have backfired.

Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are highly traditional, tribal societies.  Any action, any law, any pressure to change time honored, customary familial and social structures will breed resentment and opposition.  This is equally true whether the change sought is that of eliminating the selling of brides or the ill-considered Islamist effort to put Chechen women into burkas.

Back to the drawing board, Vladimir.  The situation will not be "clarified" nor will it "be put to order" unless and until the Kremlin acknowledges and effectively caters to the Chechen sense of nationalism.  The Geek has outlined in previous posts how this can be done, but the fact remains that the Russians are themselves nationalists without superior.  It is fatally difficult for the Boys in the Kremlin to bring themselves to accept that other nation's nationalism is valid.  So, they are stuck with a war which can be "won" only at a very high cost in lives lost and international embarrassment suffered.

In either event, time is not on the side of the Kremlin.  The pressures of time are being accelerated by events in Tajikistan.  The close connection between al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and the Tajik proponents of armed political Islam was underscored by the "discovery" of an al-Qaeda base and training camp in the Rasht valley roughly thirty miles from the Afghan border.

Abdullo Rakhimov who is the heavyweight among Central Asian Republic adherents of Osama bin Laden was in charge of this and other camps in the Rasht valley.  The camps were established originally by the Islamic Union of Uzbekistan (IUU) and have been active for several years.  Rakhimov and his running buddy Mirzohuja Ahmadov recruited wannabe martyrs from throughout the Central Asian Republics and even as far afield as Europe for training in the remote camps.

The IUU has been around since 1991.  Members of this group have been fighting in Afghanistan and are found in the FATA of Pakistan as well.  Recently IUU has been identified as a major facilitator of operations directed against European targets using citizens of Muslim ancestry with valid current European passports.  This make IUU a large and growing threat.

The camps in the Rasht valley were safe until the Tajik government had a attack of delusions of adequacy with the result it dispatched the army into the previous no-go zone.  The move initially had no response from the IUU or Tajik insurgents.  However, the shoe finally dropped when a Tajik unit was ambushed and nearly wiped out.

Since then there have been numerous small engagements between Tajik forces and insurgents.  Also involved were units from the Russian Army's 201st motor rifle division.  This unit shares responsibility for border security.  Unlike its local counterpart forces, the 201st can engage in sustained operations such as the twenty hour fire fight on the frontier last week.

The net result of operations over the past two months indicates the Tajik military is punching above its weight. This implies the Kremlin will have to carry more local water.  Considering Russian interests not only in Tajikistan but the other Muslim majority Central Asian Republics, this picking up the local burden is to be expected.

Russia cannot afford and will not continence an expansion of al-Qaeda or affiliated groups to establish a diffuse network of bases in the region.  Additional forces will be sent in an appropriately low signature way in the very near future, probably before the snows fall.

The US has a bull in this herd.  Tajikistan provides alternative land lines of communication should Pakistan either close the roads it controls or collapses.  The US relations with Russia are a bit touchy in this context, but far more so in Uzbekistan than in Tajikistan.  Provided the US does nothing the Kremlin might interpret as challenging its position in the Central Asian Republics, there is room for useful collaboration between the US and Russia.

The up tick in successful operations by jihadist groups gives additional impetus to the Russian adoption of a firm line against Iranian ambitions.  More than the current US administration, the Kremlin understands the relationship between Tehran and groups espousing armed political Islam everywhere.  To impair Iran's nuclear ambitions is to serve one's interest in eroding the political strength and appeal of jihad.

There is a bit of delightful irony in the situation confronting Russia.  The more the armed political Islamists challenge Russia, the more Russia must act against the ultimate patron of armed political Islam, Iran.  In a sense, the jihadists of the Caucasus and Tajikistan have become our strong allies in keeping Iran from getting the Big Bomb.

Don't you just love it?

Way To Go, Center!

Looks like the Kremlin forgot to push its "reset" button. Not that Vladimir Putin or Dimitri Medvevdev can be held personally responsible. These guys have been too busy since coming to power five years ago to review the file covering espionage operations started back in the days when Bill Clinton was making amorous with White House interns.

The ten Russians arrested in the US along with an eleventh reportedly picked up in Cyprus were popped as the FBI finally wrapped up an investigation which started even as the Republicans in the House of Representatives were protecting American morality by impeaching the president. The timing of the Feebs' move is open to question.

Not even the most pessimistic assessment of the long and winding road of Russian plotting gives any hint that the Moscow Moles were anywhere near any key to any executive lavatory. The snippets of documents filed by the Department of Justice (at least as quoted in the several media accounts) make for fun reading by devotees of the spy versus spy genre but show no real evidence of any honest-to-gosh, bottled in bond, US government secrets.

On the US side the nearly twenty year caper complete with codes and cyphers, false identities, dead drops and brush passes to say nothing of wiretaps, surveillance teams, black bag jobs, and all the other features of a trade craft based spy yarn is portrayed as a major success against a crafty, dedicated, and omnipresent adversary. A reminder, according to at least one old time Soviet secret agent, of the worse days of Cold War excess.

The Russian response has been restrained--at least by Kremlin standards of the past. The Lads in the (New) Kremlin allow as how the people arrested may have been Russian nationals but will not go so far as to concede that their purposes in traveling under false names may have been nefarious in the slightest. Vladimir (The Good Czar) Putin did go a bit ballistic, averring that the "US police had gone out of control" in comments to visiting Bill Clinton.

Vlad Of The Bare Chest did seem more concerned over the timing of the Department of Justice action and its possible aftershocks than he did the slight problem of Russians being caught in rather flagrant disregard of normal protocol. At first the Russian Foreign Ministry took much the same line, noting that the episode should be viewed in the context of the improving relations between Russia and the US.

However, the Foreign Ministry did harden its position a few hours later. The new, improved narrative took the view that the arrests must be seen as an attempt by unnamed but certainly sinister forces to erode the new harmony between the Men in the Kremlin and the Guy in the Oval. There were dark ruminations about similar incidents in the past which always, in the Foreign Ministry's eyes, took place during times of improving relations. The parallel was obvious; by the timing of the arrests and the relative lack of harm done the US, someone in the US government was doing his evil best to toss a spanner in the works.

The timing was a bit odd, considering that only a few days earlier, President Obama had been making ever-so-nice with Dimitri Medvedev. Both men had toasted the successful pushing of assorted "reset" buttons. The Nice Young Man Of The People From Chicago took his counterpart out to a nearby and apparently renowned throughout the world hamburger joint for a quick bite of an appropriately populist food. Smiles all around.

The Russians have been playing the espionage game against the US without pause during and after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Despite changes in name, alterations in the form of government, reduction in geographic extent, erosion of military, economic, and diplomatic power, the game went on. Changes in Russia of a more positive nature since the emergence of Putin and his protegee, Medvedev, would or have served to change the nature and character of the game.

The Russians have a long history of using espionage as a preferred tool of state. Quite often, regardless of the nature or the regime, czar, commissar, or president, the Russians have used espionage to their advantage. The directors of FBI, CIA, and the Office of National Intelligence have all stated on the public record that Russian espionage had continued year after year at or above the level achieved during the Cold War. No one familiar with the spy-versus-spy scene has found a need to dissent from this appreciation.

It has been fashionable for some years within the ever-so-progressive circles of the American hoi olligoi to poo-poo the assessments offered by the US intelligence community regarding the unchanging nature of the Russian love of espionage or its targeting of the US as the "main enemy" as so much Cold War alarmist rhetoric spewed in support of ever greater budgets. It never crossed the closed minds of the "progressives" that maybe, just maybe, the professionals in the wild and wacky world of espionage might possibly know what they were talking about.

The arrests and their high profile juxtaposition with the heady, dare one write, "giddy," meeting of Obama with Medvedev may serve as a healthy corrective for all those in government as well as outside that the Russians play a very hardball game in pursuing national interest. The mere fact that the Russian clandestine service was willing to invest quite a few years in establishing the bona fides of their agents, quite a few patient years of moving their pawns into potential positions of access to critical information found in venues outside of the official agencies, shows a deep commitment to the art and craft of espionage. The fact that the controllers back at Center were content to wait more years before having any real chance of a payoff underscores both the commitment to and high appreciation for the results of spying.

Regardless of what any member of the American elite might wish, Russia is not and will never be an American "friend." This is true not because the Russian government is necessarily and automatically hostile to the US. Rather it is the result of the realistic and realpolitck nature of the Russian pursuit of national interest. The Russians understand that friendship exists only between people, individuals. It does not exist, cannot exist, between states.

It was an English Foreign Secretary who once observed that states have neither lasting friends nor lasting enemies, only lasting interests. The Russians are in tandem with this concept.

Look at it this way. Just because the Russians spy on us doesn't mean they don't like us. Heck, it's only business, nothing personal.

Way To Go, Vladimir!

Yesterday the Geek contended that Russian PM Vladimir Putin had little if any real choice in dealing with the Jolly Pirates of Puntland after they hit the big time by boarding and seizing the Russian government owned, Russian crewed tanker, MV Moscow University. A number of factors both foreign and domestic dictated that the only viable Russian response would be a military one.

Nonetheless it was heartwarming to read of the Russian marines having retaken the ship at the cost of no friendly lives. Unfortunately, only one of the pirates was killed after they opened fire on the approaching marine force.

Putin's decision was made easier by the fact that the ship's crew had taken refuge in the ship's "security room" after having shut down the main engines. This meant the target would be stationary and the only humanoid forms visible would be those of the maritime muggers.

Still, things could have gone wrong. For example, by some concatenation of misfortune the 86,000 tons of oil might have been released, or caught fire. Either would have raised a storm of environmentalist protest. Or, a pirate might have gotten lucky, shot down a troop laden helicopter. Or, unbeknownst to crew or rescuers alike the pirates might have placed a large, lethal explosive charge next to the bulkhead protecting the secure room.

Even for a man who is well known for his decisiveness and relative indifference to body counts, the decision would not have come lightly to Vladimir. To his credit, he made the right choice--quickly. Also to the credit of the Russians, their small surface combatant on station was properly equipped with special operations personnel as well as the necessary support and delivery systems. The senior command had been forward looking in their planning and had anticipated the necessity of putting men on board a pirate-seized ship.

The most important facet of Putin's choice is its existence as a model for and challenge to other governmental leaders. The Russians have joined the French in putting troops on a pirate held vessel in order to effect a rescue. The Russians have surpassed the French in that their operation was conducted on the high seas and resulted in saving ship and cargo as well as crew.

(No, the Geek has not forgotten the US Navy rescue of the captain of the Maersk Alabama as he was held by four thugs-with-guns on a lifeboat. But, that operation was qualitatively different from as well as less risky than that undertaken by the Russians.)

The Russian action does require one to wonder why other governments, particularly those such as the UK, Germany, and China which possess special operations capacities have not used them for the benefit of their nationals, their ships. Perhaps the answer is to be found in the combination of circumstances which forced Putin's hand this time.

There have been previous incidents where Russian nationals have constituted all or part of a crew taken hostage by the Raiders of the Somali Coast. In none of those cases did the Russian navy intervene. This implies that the Kremlin is not moved simply by the sight of Russians in piratical durance vile.

Nor have the Lads in the Kremlin been deterred by merely the thought that "innocent" people might die in the course of a rescue operation. One need remember only the use by Russian special duty troops of a BZ type agent in the conduct of the assault on the terrorist held Moscow theater a few years ago. (Note BZ type agents are only "non-lethal" in theory; in practice this class of "incapacitating agents" will result in at least ten percent fatalities.)

While Western governments as well as Western publics may shy from robust measures fearing loss of non-combatant or hostage lives, this is not the case with Russia. So, what made the difference in this most recent case?

The answer is simple. It was laid out in detail yesterday in the Geek's blog. Putin had no realistic alternative assuming he wanted both to keep his hands on the levers of power and retain the respect of Beijing.

The next Russian crew which runs afoul the Ak-waving, skiff-riding bunch of Somali "unemployed fishermen" may not be so lucky. Militating against this melancholy conclusion is the simple fact that Vladimir The Bold has acted as he did this time. This raises a key question: Can Putin now let go of the tiger whose tail he has so firmly grabbed?

This is a poser for the "Good Czar." The only thing worse than the appearance of weakness is a policy of vacillation. Having taken the tough line, Vladimir The Decisive cannot now shift to one which is--or seems--less firm.

Unless, of course, he wants to change his name from Vladimir to Barak.

Hey, Vladimir, You Going To Wimp Out This Time?

The Jolly Swashbucklers of Somalia have hit the big time with the seizure of the MV Moscow University. The ship is registered under the Liberian flag but is owned by a Russian company and is crewed by honest-to-gosh Russians. It is carrying a fifty megabuck cargo of oil to China.

The ship was taken by the usual skiffs filled with "unemployed fishermen" equipped with the ever present Russian designed AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades (probably also of an initial Russian provenance.) The crew apparently played hide-and-seek with the pirates for some minutes or even hours while sending out distress calls. Finally the crew locked themselves in the ship's "secure room."

To some extent the Russian ship's crew (or at least the captain) has responsibility for the current predicament. The ship was not registered with the Maritime Security Center, which is the clearinghouse for maritime traffic and is supposed to assure a greater level of immunity to pirate attacks.

According to a spokesman for the European Union's pirate fighting detachment in the region, the MV Moscow University contacted a Russian warship on duty in the Gulf of Aden reporting the tanker and its eighty-six thousand tons of oil were being boarded. The Russian anti-submarine warfare vessel Marshal Shaposposhnikov headed to the Moscow University's reported position at flank speed.

As Vladimir Putin is wont to say, the situation is in need of clarification. While it may be presumed the Merry Buccaneers are in control of the ship, this is not certain. If the crew is hunkered down behind the locked, reinforced steel doors of their secure room an interesting question comes to mind: Just how are the Dauntless Ex-Fisherfolk of the Somali Coast going to drive their new acquisition given that it is a tad larger than the outboard powered skiffs they are used to?

Unless the teenage thugs are the greatest sailors since Barnacle Bill, the likelihood of getting the Moscow University to safe(?) harbor in Somalia some five hundred miles away are slim to none. This means they will have to elicit the cooperation of at least some of the Russians. If, as is typically the case, the Brigands of the Briney Deep have RPGs it will be possible for them to blast a good sized hole in the bulkheads or hatches of the "secure room."

Such a robust action brings with it the high chance of one or more Russians ending up dead or, if truly (un)lucky, badly wounded. In the past the Somali Swagmen have been reasonably careful not to kill crew members of the ships they hijack, but accidents can happen.

Right now, even in the absence of Russian corpses Vladimir Putin has a challenge. A very real challenge which if not handled properly will have an impact on his major league problem in the North Caucasus.

Unlike the last time the pirates captured a vessel with a Russian connection--remember?--the ship filled with tanks and other weapons, the MV Moscow University is laden not only with oil but with political symbolism. Consider the name. Now add to it the fact that the ship is owned by Novoship a subsidiary of Sovcomflot. As the name implies, Sovcomflot is owned by the government. Finally, think about the cargo--oil--and the destination--China.

Then there is the crew. Unlike the last time, the time of the tank carrying freighter, the crew is Russian. Not Ukrainian. Not a mixture of swab jockeys from former Soviet components or Warsaw Pact subordinates. Russians.

Think for a moment about the impoverished unemployed fishermen of Somalia. Think particularly of their religion. That's right, bucko, the pirates are Muslims.

Now the Geek is perfectly well aware that it is completely against the good manners of today to link icky-poo things such as armed robbery on the high seas or ineptly constructed but malignly intended vehicle borne improvised explosive devices left in Times Square with a religion. The Geek also acknowledges that Islam qua Islam in all probability is not high on the list of motivations for most Somalian gun-toting skiff-riders.

The connection between piracy for ransom and Islam is not a matter for clerical debate; rather it is a matter of both political and financial importance for the jihadists of Somalia. And, (drum roll, please) the North Caucasus. In Somalia there is a direct link between the pirates and the Islamist jihadist groups currently contending for ultimate ascendancy in Somalia. It has been well documented that the pirate syndicates provide financial comfort to the Islamists. The transactions may fall under the term, "extortion" or "protection," but it is equally likely that the pirates are purchasing information, support, and other services from Islamist jihadist entities. It does not stretch credulity to posit that the pirates are giving money to the Islamists as a free will offering, a material sign of shared religion, mutual values, and common goals.

The insurgents of Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus region are Islamic. The leadership and many of the lower ranking sorts are not only Islamic but Islamist. The impact of political Islam, Islamism, upon the people of the North Caucasus has grown geometrically over the past few years. It is not exaggerating to see the insurgents of the North Caucasus as part of the multi-party wave of Islamist jihadism which includes but is most certainly not limited to the two Talibans and al-Qaeda.

The very blunt and quite unpleasant ground truth facing Vladimir of the Bare Chest is this: If the seizure of the MV Moscow University is allowed to run the normal course of prolonged captivity followed by payment of a large ransom, the jihadists of the North Caucasus will be handed a great propaganda victory. The Mighty Men of the Kremlin will have been humbled by the Will of Allah expressed by a handful of teenagers with automatic weapons.

Worse for Vladimir, Dimitry, and Company the propaganda will have the great advantage of being true. Anything other than a clear, quick ending to the hijacking without the payment of ransom will constitute a defeat of Moscow by the forces of Islam in the eyes (and on the lips) of the Muslim insurgents of the North Caucasus.

In the view of the proud, highly nationalistic Russian people generally any finale to the current contretemps off the Somali coast which does not involve a military dimension--and victory--will be a defeat of Vladimir the Good Czar. At this juncture in Russian history the people of Russia, particularly their hoi polloi, are not inclined to see a defeat of Russian will and arms with equanimity. Being bested by a bunch of dark hued, Muslim kids with speedboats, guns, and chutzpah would be totally unacceptable to Ivan in the street.

Nor would China be impressed by a surplus of "restraint" on the part of the Kremlin. The Mandarins of the Forbidden City tend to base their calculus of power on another country's will and ability to exercise force effectively when faced with a direct challenge. Should Vladimir and the Boys of the Kremlin balk at the jump, the Chinese senior leadership would find it necessary to engage in (to use John Foster Dulles' fine term,) "an agonizing reappraisal" of Sino-Russian relations.

Taken together all these factors and implications add up to an amount of freight far outweighing the cargo of the MV Moscow University. And, that, bucko, must add up to a sleepless night or two for Vladimir Putin. It couldn't happen to a more deserving fellow.

Meanwhile, Back In The Caucasus--

It has been awhile since the last consideration of Vladimir Putin's favorite war--the one in the Caucasus. The Geek, ever motivated by an earnest belief in the fellowship of nations, did offer a recipe for success against the jihadists of Chechnya (and environs) but Vlad Of The Bare Chest did not deign to take the hint.

Instead he chose to send yet one more retired general to the region with orders "to clarify the situation and put it to order." Well, bucko, that just hasn't happened. Nor is it likely to.

The local defensive insurgent agenda which originally powered the jihadists has now been supplemented, if not totally replaced, by the all inclusive, ever expansive one of global jihad. This spells even more trouble for the Guys In The Kremlin and their subordinates in the KGB, oops! the Geek meant to write FSB, to say nothing of the army.

The leadership of the self-organizing Islamist insurgents is now comprised of genuine True Believers in political Islam. Men such as Doku Umarov may be local boys by birth and ancestry but they are globalists in their Islamism guided by clerics such as the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Mohammad al-Maqdidi. Other key figures such as the East Siberian born Alexander Tikomirov now renamed Said Buryatski have spent years studying Islam, Arabic, and the fine art or craft of waging jihad abroad. Buryatski, for example, lived in Egypt for years.

A couple of weeks back FSB special operations personnel killed a genuine al-Qaeda operational level commander, Makhmoud Mokhammad Shaaban, in Dagestan. Shaaban was both an Egyptian national and, according to FSB, the man behind several shootings and suicide bombings. This development pleased FSB as it gave credence to its long held position that the "rebels" in the Caucasus were al-Qaeda inspired and directed.

There have been other signs showing the increased importance of global jihad. An excellent example is the proliferation of "martyrdom" videos on the assorted Islamist websites. This was unheard of only a short time back. In some of the videos all of which feature flags of the North Caucasus "Emirate," the martyrs-to-be are heard chanting in Arabic. And, upon translation, some of what is being said tracks back to the words of al-Maqdidi, the Man Of The Faith who lives in the Kingdom of Jordan.

The prolific Jordanian cleric has been a person of interest to US and other Western intelligence agencies for quite a while now given his relations with and influence upon Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahri. The man is an intellectual heavyweight in the global Islamist movement and must not be underrated in his effect upon the initially rather localized defensive insurgency.

Putin, Medvedev, and Company have tried to continue the failed policy of pretending that somehow Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus are not part of Russia. This pretense has been driven by a desire to assure the conflict is contained to the region.

Russia has at least twenty million Muslims in its population. Only half of these live in the North Caucasus. This means the insurgents have a very real potential to horizontally escalate their war with the Kremlin. And, the Kremlin knows this.

As the hold of global Islamist jihad grows tighter and stronger within the North Caucasus insurgent groups, the drive to carry jihad deeper and stronger into the heartland of Mother Russia will grow apace. At the same time as the technical proficiency of the insurgents increases--as it must given that combat experience in Afghanistan is being transmitted by returning Caucasians--the walls of the Kremlin and the pavement of the square in front will be covered by Russian blood.

Vladimir The Robust has already missed his last, best chance at suppressing the insurgency. The Russian government and "organs of state security" failed to separate the local grievance motivated sheep. Now the power and appeal of the Islamist message assures that the goats are proliferating as the sheep die out.

Iran exists as a complicating factor for Putin, et al. The mullahs can, should they so decide, provide assistance to the jihadi of the North Caucasus. The border with Iran is even more porous than that between the US and Mexico--and we all know how permeable The Great Fence of the Southwest is. Improved munitions such as explosively formed penetrators would constitute a major enhancement of jihadi capabilities.

At the same time the Kremlin must be aware of just how easily weapons and munitions up to and including those of a mass destruction nature can be acquired within Russia itself provided the buyer has the money. Money need not be an issue given the growth in drug usage in Russia and the role Russia plays as a point of transit between the poppy fields of Afghanistan and the markets of Europe.

This reality implies a motive for Russian understanding and cooperation with the US and its allies in the Afghan war. Russia would benefit greatly from a military success on the part of the US in that venue.

In any event the initiative rests firmly with the Islamist jihadists of the North Caucasus as of this moment. Unless the Kremlin acts as though the region is part of Russia and that the conflict can spread rapidly and in an undesirably bloody fashion whenever and wherever the jihadists choose, the war can only favor the insurgents.

Putin, Medvedev, and the rest have a choice to make. It is not a nice choice. They can continue to putter about waiting for the Islamists to strike. Or, they can reprise many episodes in Russian history and create a desert named "peace."

It is nice to see that the US is not alone in making very tough choices.

Delay Is Good--Up To A Point

The US is a maritime power. It is also a semi-accidental simulacrum of an imperial power. As George Friedman at STRATFOR correctly points out, the US has the "imperial" role not by design nor intent but rather as the inevitable result of its economic and geographical position. And, the Geek adds, its unique history.

These two factors dictate why the US, like Great Britain (but not, as Friedman argues, the Roman Empire) practices a grand strategy which focuses on maintaining a balance of power favorable to its interests and attempting to the greatest degree possible to refrain from the direct commitment of its military force. In the effort to minimize direct US force deployment, the basic approach is not one of "divide and conquer." Rather it is one of "delay, decide, select, support, and sustain."

In practice this means the US has been and continues to be well advised to emphasize standing off from a problem area, observing the interplay of the internal forces, selecting one to support, enshrining that decision in policy, and, finally, executing that policy in terms of supporting and sustaining the selected side. Importantly, the side selected need not be the status quo entity although, unfortunately, it usually has been.

The minimum intervention based select and support approach is the necessary centerpiece of successful counterinsurgency. The corollary of select and support is the manipulation of those entities not selected with the view of providing an impetus to a final power sharing formula. This approach when applied in Iraq along with the overdue "surge" was effective despite the recent spate of bombing spectaculars.

Both Iran and Afghanistan are on the table right now. It is relevant to consider both in terms of delay, decide, select, support, and sustain. This formulation can be used with respect to both internal contestants and potential external associates of the US.

Friedman suggests that the Obama administration has two options regarding Iran. One is the old standby--the military option. The other he proposes is to take a Nixon-like approach. That would mean recognizing Iran as a nuclear power, attempting detente with the mullahs with a view to a common focus against Russia.

There is a third option brushed aside by Freidman. That option is linking the US with Russia against Iran and its overt as well as covert supporters. To accomplish this the US would have to draw a firm line as to what we are willing to do both positively and negatively regarding Moscow's many, many ambitions. It is also necessary that the US forthrightly offer a partnership of equals relationship with Russia in pursuit of high value definable coinciding interests.

Maritime powers typically enlist the aid of other powers, particularly those of the continental sort, in the accomplishment of grand strategic goals. If the US can, in the words of one Israeli commentator, "suck up" to Israel, the Obama administration can and must do the same with Moscow--if it wants a viable option other than the choice of war or, in effect, surrender to Iranian policy dictates.

At the same time, the "correlation of forces" (to employ that nifty old Soviet term) in Iran gives the US a unique opportunity to employ delay, decide, support, and sustain with respect to the several internal contestants within Iran. Given the current indisposition of the Ayatollah Khemenei and the ruptures within both civil society and clerical establishment which persist even now five months after the "election" of Ahmedinejad, the US has an unparalleled opportunity to muck around creatively in the Iranian swamp.

The Afghan situation is absolutely rife with opportunities for delay, decide, support, and sustain. The Afghan nation is not a single entity but rather a congeries of tribes, ethnic backgrounds, languages, and forms of Islam. The constitution is weak. The president is strong in some aspects but not overall. The culture has a long tradition of let's-make-a-deal. Many, if not most, of the Taliban membership is less than True Believers in Islamist jihadism.

And, best of all the culture has a mechanism in place for resolving differences, settling old scores without bloodshed, making inter-community deals, and generally setting the stage for a tolerable facsimile of stability. It is the Grand Assembly of Elders. Ignored since the first American boots hit the ground so long ago in the haste to create a Western style democracy, it provides the best chance for the US to achieve its minimum strategic goal of "not-losing" to the Islamist jihadists.

While it is necessary to augment the number of US trigger pullers as well as training and advisory personnel in-country, it is even more critical that the US employ its current freedom to select a new set of entities and individuals to support and sustain--discretely. The Grand Assembly of Elders is the most appropriate, least intrusive way to effectively use influence for both hostilities termination and ultimate conflict resolution.

There is a very real danger in the delay, decide, support, and sustain approach to strategy. It is possible to delay too long. When that happens, events drive the decision making process as they did during the Bush/Cheney administration. The danger exists right now with respect to both Iran and Afghanistan. The time to exercise options as opposed to reacting to the events created by others is rapidly passing by.

President Obama has much--too much perhaps--on his desk. All are marked, "Action Immediate." He and his people would be very well advised for the best interests of the US to push the files marked "Iran" and "Afghanistan to the very top of the pile.

Time, tide, and national strategy wait for no man. Not even a man named Obama.

Those Were The Good Old Days, Comrade

The more things change, the more people long for the "good old days." The truth of the good old days does not seem to matter--at least to the Russians and a sizable swath of folks in the former Warsaw Pact states or the Soviet "Inner Empire."

The tireless trackers of the public pulse at the Pew Research Center have issued a report on public opinion twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet dominated East Bloc. The results in no way perturb the reader's equanimity--provided the reader has a grip on the realities of human perception and belief.

A close parsing of the Pew work shows that, as usual, people are far from consistent in their views. Double--or even triplethink exists to a degree which would surprise even George Orwell. It is, for example, possible to perceive or believe that life was better under Communism and, at the same time, that life is better with a multi-party democratic system.

While that set of opinions may reflect a finely nuanced view which distinguishes between Communism as an economic system and democracy as a political one, giving that much credit to the interviewees is not completely justified. It is undercut by the simultaneous perception or belief that life is satisfactory and that life was better under Communism.

The Geek is not necessarily given to taking polls at face value even when conducted by a highly experienced and quite reputable bunch such as exists at Pew. Journalistic treatments of contemporary public attitudes are usually not even as reliable indicators as the use-with-extreme-caution polling data.

An excellent example of journalistic superficiality is found in today's LA Times. To the credit of the reporter, at least a couple of the person-in-the-street quotes point at the dynamic working in Russia. Twenty and more years ago Russia was the centrality of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a very powerful player in the world. Thus Russia and Russians had something of which to be proud, something that made up (at least in part) for the lackings of life under the commissars.

Another factor which is clearly at work in the views and perceptions of Eastern Europeans, former Soviets, and the Russians is that the centralized authoritarian systems gave a palpable sense of stability and order to life. This is not an inconsiderable feature of the ancien regime.

In the same poll the Pew folks compared (or more accurately, contrasted) the stance of Americans, Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans, and Russians on the matter of the degree to which personal ability and effort as against outside and uncontrollable forces provided for success in life. While sixty-eight percent of Americans gave priority to the personal over the outside forces, only in one other country was a majority (fifty-five percent) prepared to do the same. The country was, of course, the UK.

In all the other countries, both East and West, the minority held the view exalting the personal over the whims of external forces. The minority ranged from the significant, forty-seven percent in France to the definitely minor league, East Germany at thirty percent. The take away is that socialism qua socialism rather than the nature of the government--autocratic versus democratic--conditions opinion to either accept or reject the role played in success by individual effort, ability, and initiative.

In the good old days before the Wall fell the nature of society and polity alike assured that the individual mattered very little if at all. Subsequently, the continuation of socialism throughout the old WarPact and Western Europe has done nothing to raise the sense of personal possibility over that of passive acceptance of what the government had or has to give.

To zero in on the single most critical feature both of the Pew poll and the real world of the Russians is that over half of the population considers it a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. This tracks well with a question asked during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Back then about half the Russians believed it was "natural" that they have an empire.

It is this great well of nationalist sentiment which Vladimir Putin has tapped and continues to use so well to both gain and maintain power. He understands perfectly the underlying, historically driven Russian insecurity. He also understands well the deep and again historically driven Russian need for a stable economic, social, and political system.

It is not that the Russians want to be told what they must and must not do, but rather that Russians are long experienced with stable systems which provide both the context and impetus to do what the individual Russian has always done so well--evade the dicta, the laws, the requirements, to the advantage and benefit of the individual.

Russians have a strong sense of individualism. It is not perceived nor expressed in ways akin to those of the Americans. Still, it is real. It thrives best in a strongly centralized system where fiats are the order of the day and skills of escaping, evading, and exploiting the always extant potentials can be used to the fullest.

In a very real sense it was under Stalin, even during the great tsunami of fear created by the Purges and the Gulag, that the Russian form of individualism flourished. The same can be said accurately of the neo-Stalinist days during the Seventies and early Eighties.

Those were the days, comrade! Plenty of room to live on the black. Lots of boodle just waiting to be taken. And, best of all, we were citizens (sort of) of a highly respected, even justly feared country. Opportunity and pride--what a deal!

The Geek must confess that he, like the Russians, misses the Cold War. Not for the same reasons, of course.

Life in the foreign policy and national security world was a lot easier back then. You knew who the Bad Guys were. They and us stood in a state of dynamic tension. The international system was dangerous. But the very danger implied by the nuclear standoff made for stability.

The men in the Kremlin were rational actors. Stalin and his successors were Nineteenth Century style imperialists as well as insecure nationalists. This assured that their calculations were generally conservative, cautious, careful.

Under the nuclear umbrella held by two hands, one from the Kremlin and the other from inside the Beltway, the world was safe for war. Proxy contests and interventionary operations were conducted in a way which decoupled their existence from the potential of vertical escalation. The building of the Berlin Wall was the symbolic ending of the struggle for Europe and after that there was little real cause for anxiety that the Big Button would be pushed.

The only time the American finger hovered over the Big Button was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was the conservative and ever so nationalistic Kremlin which ended the crisis and gave the overly muscular and underly rational Kennedy administration a way out with the cloak of victory.

Throughout it all the Soviets and the Yankees had a set of coinciding national interests with that of keeping the nuclear option as far to the background as possible. Rhetoric might fly--but not the missiles. Blood might be spilled, but not in the homelands. Threats might exist, but they were known and could be countered effectively and at low risk.

Had Islamist jihadism arisen during the Cold War to a level which might compromise the stability of the international system, the coinciding national and strategic interests would have been such that the two "antagonists" could and would have developed a means to end the terror and its accompanying potential for instability. The Kremlin and the White House both understood and obeyed the same laws of conduct so that instability and its attendant risks of inadvertent resort to vertical escalation might be avoided.

The dunderheaded anti-Communist crusaders who morphed into neo-conservatives at the end of the Cold War did their best to kick Russia and the Russians in the years of turbulent change which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. By doing such the Bush/Cheney crew destroyed the working relationship which had developed during the Cold War. Worse, the net effect of the policies, words, and actions of both the Clinton and Bush/Cheney administrations boosted anti-US sentiment in Russia so that reconstituting the old relationship became more and more difficult as time flowed by.

The Obama administration's often vaunted attempts to push the "reset" button through placation and appeasement have been both fruitless and probably counterproductive. Being human the Russian leaders have not been and will not be impressed by anything other than the combination of strength, well delineated policy, and firm resolve in the application of policy.

This does not imply the necessity of rattling one's saber or engaging in hyperbolic rhetoric. It does mean treating Russia as we treated the Soviet Union. With the appearance and reality of an anxiety tinged respect.

Should Russia continue to develop its increasingly warm relation with China, the result would be most injuring to the US. One of the usually underrated features of the Cold War was the long running sore of the Sino-Soviet split. The last thing the White House should want today is for the two old rivals, even bitter enemies, to link diplomatic, military, and economic arms in a tight embrace.

Neither is it in the better interests of the US for the former Warsaw Pact members to be pulled any deeper into the Kremlin's gravity well than they have been to date. The same may be said regarding many of the Western European nations. The diplomatic center of gravity has been moved ever eastward. Whether by design or sheer absentmindedness as seems more likely, the Obama administration has done nothing to reverse the slow tectonic shift from Washington to Moscow.

This implies the need for Uncle Sam to puff out his chest. Maybe even pound it a bit. It is time to re-invoke the ethos and dynamic of the Cold War. Nothing major, but enough to convince the Russians at all levels of government and society that once again the Russian nation is respected, even feared a bit.

If the Nice Young Man From Chicago were to crank up a new, improved, and diminished Cold War he might be so pleased with the result that he would join Ivan and the Geek as they raise yet one more glass of vodka. As they toast the Cold War---

"To the good old days, tovarisch, when enemies could be friends."