Ten Pirates In A Leaky Tub

You will recall that last week the Russians taught a bunch of skiff-riding, gun-toting unemployed Somali "fishermen" the error of their ways. Having seized the Russian owned and crewed tanker, MV Moscow University, the pirates then sought to shoot it out with Russian naval infantry undertaking a heliborne rescue and recovery mission. In the process only one Somali buccaneer died.

The Russians later sent the others packing in either (take your pick as news accounts differed after the incident) in their skiff or "an inflatable boat." An hour later the Russians acknowledge that they lost either radio or radar contact with the pirates as they set sail for home some three hundred statute miles away. Fellow Raiders of the Briney Deep safely ashore in Somalia confirm that there has been no contact with their colleagues in crime since the Russians cut them loose without navigation equipment or weapons.

Reportedly the Russians considered (at least briefly) the idea of hauling the pirates back to Moscow for trial but decided not to given the uncertainties in international law and consequent problems in obtaining a conviction. Subsequently, President Medvedev averred that unless and until an adequate international system for bringing pirates to justice, "we will have to act as our forefathers did when they met pirates."

While NPR caustically questioned the correctness of setting the poor dear fishermen from the ungoverned geographic expression of Somalia off without any navigational instruments, it does strike this observer as a useful, cost effective way of giving the Daring Desperadoes of the Deep a better chance of staying alive than either a short drop from a (metaphorical) yardarm or a stint in the Siberian Gulag. If nothing else the Russian action does give a certain impetus to the creation of a special international tribunal to handle the pirates of Somalia and elsewhere.

Not surprisingly the Maritime Marauders have shown their typically overinflated sense of self-importance. An alleged "pirate commander" vowed to hold the Russians responsible for any harm which may have befallen their missing comrades in banditry. This pretense of being akin to a sovereign state is risible to say the least. In reply someone should remind the jacked-up thug just how fast his associates beat feet as the Islamists moved in on their particular pirates' cove.

The problem of securing the sealanes in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden remains. So also does the kindred problem of the spread of piracy to the coast of Nigeria and the growing threat of both piracy and marine terrorism in the Straits of Malacca. The three challenges are linked by a common thread of religiously predicated political ideology. The pirates (and terrorists) of all three regions are directly or indirectly connected with Islamism and its armed twin, jihadism.

While individual shipowners may see the ransoms as an acceptable cost of doing business, the net effect of seizures made and ransoms paid has been the imposition of ever growing collective costs on the global economy. In addition, the seeming impotence of the assembled international flotilla to deter, let alone successfully either defend or recover stolen ships, lowers the credibility of the civilized states generally in their confrontation with global Islamism and jihadism.

At the very minimum the US should throw its diplomatic weight (if any is left) behind the Russian proposal for a UN created "Piracy Court." This approach is long overdue and is equally well provided for by precedent. If the International Criminal Court is any guide, the processes of the proposed court would be so lengthy that any pirates hailed before it would rot a suitably long time in durance more-or-less-vile so that they will be too old to keep on with living on the Somalian version of the Bounding Main even if acquitted.

Better yet, the US (and other countries as well) should go ahead and emulate the Russians in the rescue and recovery of the MV Moscow University and its crew. Most, if not all, the navies currently represented in the anti-piracy patrols have a special operations capability at least equivalent to that of the Russians. Certainly the US does. So, why not use it?

Sure there will be casualties. Pirates will die. (Hopefully.) Perhaps some captive crewmen will as well although that possibility can be lowered significantly if every ship has a secure room such as that aboard the MV Moscow University to which they can retreat after cutting off the main engines. Keeping in contact with the rescue forces would also be possible as shown by the MV Moscow University incident.

Historically, piracy has been suppressed only when the costs of doing piratical business are elevated to an unacceptable level. This has occurred when sufficient numbers of pirates have ended dead: violently dead or incapacitated through long, long incarceration.

Since the current "system" for bringing pirates to justice is not even good enough to aspire to the term "laughable," there is an immediate need to admit that President Medvedev is right: we have to deal with the saltwater brigands as did our ancestors. Perhaps not with a modern replica of Execution Dock, but certainly with a robust willingness to use force. (Adopting the Russian model of setting pirates loose in a leaky boat is strictly optional.)

Way To Go, Vladimir!

Yesterday the Geek contended that Russian PM Vladimir Putin had little if any real choice in dealing with the Jolly Pirates of Puntland after they hit the big time by boarding and seizing the Russian government owned, Russian crewed tanker, MV Moscow University. A number of factors both foreign and domestic dictated that the only viable Russian response would be a military one.

Nonetheless it was heartwarming to read of the Russian marines having retaken the ship at the cost of no friendly lives. Unfortunately, only one of the pirates was killed after they opened fire on the approaching marine force.

Putin's decision was made easier by the fact that the ship's crew had taken refuge in the ship's "security room" after having shut down the main engines. This meant the target would be stationary and the only humanoid forms visible would be those of the maritime muggers.

Still, things could have gone wrong. For example, by some concatenation of misfortune the 86,000 tons of oil might have been released, or caught fire. Either would have raised a storm of environmentalist protest. Or, a pirate might have gotten lucky, shot down a troop laden helicopter. Or, unbeknownst to crew or rescuers alike the pirates might have placed a large, lethal explosive charge next to the bulkhead protecting the secure room.

Even for a man who is well known for his decisiveness and relative indifference to body counts, the decision would not have come lightly to Vladimir. To his credit, he made the right choice--quickly. Also to the credit of the Russians, their small surface combatant on station was properly equipped with special operations personnel as well as the necessary support and delivery systems. The senior command had been forward looking in their planning and had anticipated the necessity of putting men on board a pirate-seized ship.

The most important facet of Putin's choice is its existence as a model for and challenge to other governmental leaders. The Russians have joined the French in putting troops on a pirate held vessel in order to effect a rescue. The Russians have surpassed the French in that their operation was conducted on the high seas and resulted in saving ship and cargo as well as crew.

(No, the Geek has not forgotten the US Navy rescue of the captain of the Maersk Alabama as he was held by four thugs-with-guns on a lifeboat. But, that operation was qualitatively different from as well as less risky than that undertaken by the Russians.)

The Russian action does require one to wonder why other governments, particularly those such as the UK, Germany, and China which possess special operations capacities have not used them for the benefit of their nationals, their ships. Perhaps the answer is to be found in the combination of circumstances which forced Putin's hand this time.

There have been previous incidents where Russian nationals have constituted all or part of a crew taken hostage by the Raiders of the Somali Coast. In none of those cases did the Russian navy intervene. This implies that the Kremlin is not moved simply by the sight of Russians in piratical durance vile.

Nor have the Lads in the Kremlin been deterred by merely the thought that "innocent" people might die in the course of a rescue operation. One need remember only the use by Russian special duty troops of a BZ type agent in the conduct of the assault on the terrorist held Moscow theater a few years ago. (Note BZ type agents are only "non-lethal" in theory; in practice this class of "incapacitating agents" will result in at least ten percent fatalities.)

While Western governments as well as Western publics may shy from robust measures fearing loss of non-combatant or hostage lives, this is not the case with Russia. So, what made the difference in this most recent case?

The answer is simple. It was laid out in detail yesterday in the Geek's blog. Putin had no realistic alternative assuming he wanted both to keep his hands on the levers of power and retain the respect of Beijing.

The next Russian crew which runs afoul the Ak-waving, skiff-riding bunch of Somali "unemployed fishermen" may not be so lucky. Militating against this melancholy conclusion is the simple fact that Vladimir The Bold has acted as he did this time. This raises a key question: Can Putin now let go of the tiger whose tail he has so firmly grabbed?

This is a poser for the "Good Czar." The only thing worse than the appearance of weakness is a policy of vacillation. Having taken the tough line, Vladimir The Decisive cannot now shift to one which is--or seems--less firm.

Unless, of course, he wants to change his name from Vladimir to Barak.

Somali Pirates Go Way Over The Edge

The pirates of Somalia have never been humorous. There is nothing amusing about their banditry on the high seas. But, the Thugs of the Somali Coast have now joined with al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other Islamist jihadist groups by practicing terrorism pure and simple.

The motive for the escalation on the part of the pirates is not hard to find. Despite the increase in the number of pirate attacks, and regardless of their increasing range of operations, the tide is not running in the favor of the maritime criminals. The increased naval patrols have resulted both in an increase in the number of thwarted attacks and the number of pirates captured. (But, unfortunately, not in the "killed" category."

The pirates have responded to this state of affairs by threatening to kill or torture their captives unless their demands are met. And, the demands? No shock here, they want prisoner pirates released instantly if not sooner.

The crew holding a British couple kidnapped on board their yacht just over two weeks ago have raised their requirement for release from a several million dollar ransom to threats to "punish" or even "torture" the pair unless seven captive pirates held onboard a German warship are released. How seriously to take the threats and demand made by phone from "Omer" a pirate media relations wallah is hard to tell.

On the one hand the Germans do have seven bad guys in custody, taken quite red handed. On the other the pirates are reportedly "frustrated" because they have not had any positive message from the British Foreign Office or the family of the kidnapped couple regarding their simple request for seven million bucks.

Apparently this particular crew could and can not differentiate between a well insured commercial vessel and a small yacht owned by people of modest means. Caught by their own stupidity and greed, the only recourse seen was a dramatic escalation in threats. Balancing this is the possible belief by the less than worldly wise knuckle draggers as to the possible influence the British government can exercise on the Germans.

The threat against at least three members of a Spanish tuna boat seized some days ago must be taken more seriously. The pirates have stated they will kill the three men who have been taken ashore if the Spanish government does not release two pirates captured by their navy.

As is to be expected the families of the three threatened men have tearfully begged the Spanish government to let the pirates go. The government has said, "No."

How long Madrid will hang tough is hard to predict. The pirates are aware of the dramatic effects exercised on a Spanish election by the Madrid train bombings. The capitulation of the new government to the demand that Spain withdraw its forces from Iraq are well known throughout the Islamic world.

The Deputy Defense Minister of Spain has already pointed to a face saving way of getting the pirates out of Spain. He dilated at some length about the potential of sending the pirates to another jurisdiction. Presumably the alternative jurisdictions include either Somalia or the semi autonomous region of Puntland.

While the pirates might be spirited by such a measure from Spanish custody to that of a, shall we say, less rigorous place, it would not assure the freedom of the captive Spaniards. Nor would it preclude further demands, more conditions, ramped up requirements.

The unfortunate reality that insurance companies as well as ship owners have been willing to pay ransom over the past several years of ever increasing pirate depredations has propelled both the acceleration of piracy and the escalation of demands. If no ship owners paid, no ships would be seized. The equation is both simple and, to ship owners, cargo consignees, and others in the business, quite unacceptable.

Unless and until two factors are changed in the equation of pirates versus civilization, the sea east from Somalia will be both ever more unsafe and the rapacity of the pirates ever more expansive.

The first factor which must change is that of ransom. There must be an absolute prohibition on the payment of ransom by any ship owner, any maritime insurance company, any consignee.

The second factor is less palatable to the refined sensitivities of the West. The costs of doing business for the pirates must be increased--greatly. In the real world this means the rules of engagement must be altered to allow the use of lethal force against suspected pirate boats and the "mother ships." It also means armed guards on commercial vessels crossing the pirate zone as well as immunity from liability if mistakes are made.

By decreasing rewards and increasing costs, the young men, even those of an Islamist jihadist frame of mind, would be encouraged to seek alternative employment. Without these measures there is little doubt but that the pirates will become more numerous, more aggressive, more given to threats, and, worst of all, ever more Islamist jihadist in nature.

Up until this past year the pirates have been seen by shipowners, shipping line executives, the insurance industry as nothing but an additional cost of doing business. Up until recently the pirates have been seen by ship crews as just one more hazard in their underpaid trade. Up until very recently the pirates have been seen by most governments as a nuisance requiring the diversion of expensive assets to a secondary zone justifiable only in terms of domestic politics or in the interests of more realistic training.

Now, with intentionally terrorist threats being credibly uttered, with the documentable presence of Islamist jihadist sentiment, influence, and effects, the halfway measures employed to date are no longer appropriate. Now there is no alternative to more robust approaches.

Well, there is an alternative. Do nothing and hope for some miracle which will end the pirates before they actually carry out some of their threats. And, that seems to be the American and Western way of doing things.

Not a pleasant thought if the pirates have your personal hind end in a sling, is it?