Ten Pirates In A Leaky Tub

You will recall that last week the Russians taught a bunch of skiff-riding, gun-toting unemployed Somali "fishermen" the error of their ways. Having seized the Russian owned and crewed tanker, MV Moscow University, the pirates then sought to shoot it out with Russian naval infantry undertaking a heliborne rescue and recovery mission. In the process only one Somali buccaneer died.

The Russians later sent the others packing in either (take your pick as news accounts differed after the incident) in their skiff or "an inflatable boat." An hour later the Russians acknowledge that they lost either radio or radar contact with the pirates as they set sail for home some three hundred statute miles away. Fellow Raiders of the Briney Deep safely ashore in Somalia confirm that there has been no contact with their colleagues in crime since the Russians cut them loose without navigation equipment or weapons.

Reportedly the Russians considered (at least briefly) the idea of hauling the pirates back to Moscow for trial but decided not to given the uncertainties in international law and consequent problems in obtaining a conviction. Subsequently, President Medvedev averred that unless and until an adequate international system for bringing pirates to justice, "we will have to act as our forefathers did when they met pirates."

While NPR caustically questioned the correctness of setting the poor dear fishermen from the ungoverned geographic expression of Somalia off without any navigational instruments, it does strike this observer as a useful, cost effective way of giving the Daring Desperadoes of the Deep a better chance of staying alive than either a short drop from a (metaphorical) yardarm or a stint in the Siberian Gulag. If nothing else the Russian action does give a certain impetus to the creation of a special international tribunal to handle the pirates of Somalia and elsewhere.

Not surprisingly the Maritime Marauders have shown their typically overinflated sense of self-importance. An alleged "pirate commander" vowed to hold the Russians responsible for any harm which may have befallen their missing comrades in banditry. This pretense of being akin to a sovereign state is risible to say the least. In reply someone should remind the jacked-up thug just how fast his associates beat feet as the Islamists moved in on their particular pirates' cove.

The problem of securing the sealanes in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden remains. So also does the kindred problem of the spread of piracy to the coast of Nigeria and the growing threat of both piracy and marine terrorism in the Straits of Malacca. The three challenges are linked by a common thread of religiously predicated political ideology. The pirates (and terrorists) of all three regions are directly or indirectly connected with Islamism and its armed twin, jihadism.

While individual shipowners may see the ransoms as an acceptable cost of doing business, the net effect of seizures made and ransoms paid has been the imposition of ever growing collective costs on the global economy. In addition, the seeming impotence of the assembled international flotilla to deter, let alone successfully either defend or recover stolen ships, lowers the credibility of the civilized states generally in their confrontation with global Islamism and jihadism.

At the very minimum the US should throw its diplomatic weight (if any is left) behind the Russian proposal for a UN created "Piracy Court." This approach is long overdue and is equally well provided for by precedent. If the International Criminal Court is any guide, the processes of the proposed court would be so lengthy that any pirates hailed before it would rot a suitably long time in durance more-or-less-vile so that they will be too old to keep on with living on the Somalian version of the Bounding Main even if acquitted.

Better yet, the US (and other countries as well) should go ahead and emulate the Russians in the rescue and recovery of the MV Moscow University and its crew. Most, if not all, the navies currently represented in the anti-piracy patrols have a special operations capability at least equivalent to that of the Russians. Certainly the US does. So, why not use it?

Sure there will be casualties. Pirates will die. (Hopefully.) Perhaps some captive crewmen will as well although that possibility can be lowered significantly if every ship has a secure room such as that aboard the MV Moscow University to which they can retreat after cutting off the main engines. Keeping in contact with the rescue forces would also be possible as shown by the MV Moscow University incident.

Historically, piracy has been suppressed only when the costs of doing piratical business are elevated to an unacceptable level. This has occurred when sufficient numbers of pirates have ended dead: violently dead or incapacitated through long, long incarceration.

Since the current "system" for bringing pirates to justice is not even good enough to aspire to the term "laughable," there is an immediate need to admit that President Medvedev is right: we have to deal with the saltwater brigands as did our ancestors. Perhaps not with a modern replica of Execution Dock, but certainly with a robust willingness to use force. (Adopting the Russian model of setting pirates loose in a leaky boat is strictly optional.)

Way To Go, Vladimir!

Yesterday the Geek contended that Russian PM Vladimir Putin had little if any real choice in dealing with the Jolly Pirates of Puntland after they hit the big time by boarding and seizing the Russian government owned, Russian crewed tanker, MV Moscow University. A number of factors both foreign and domestic dictated that the only viable Russian response would be a military one.

Nonetheless it was heartwarming to read of the Russian marines having retaken the ship at the cost of no friendly lives. Unfortunately, only one of the pirates was killed after they opened fire on the approaching marine force.

Putin's decision was made easier by the fact that the ship's crew had taken refuge in the ship's "security room" after having shut down the main engines. This meant the target would be stationary and the only humanoid forms visible would be those of the maritime muggers.

Still, things could have gone wrong. For example, by some concatenation of misfortune the 86,000 tons of oil might have been released, or caught fire. Either would have raised a storm of environmentalist protest. Or, a pirate might have gotten lucky, shot down a troop laden helicopter. Or, unbeknownst to crew or rescuers alike the pirates might have placed a large, lethal explosive charge next to the bulkhead protecting the secure room.

Even for a man who is well known for his decisiveness and relative indifference to body counts, the decision would not have come lightly to Vladimir. To his credit, he made the right choice--quickly. Also to the credit of the Russians, their small surface combatant on station was properly equipped with special operations personnel as well as the necessary support and delivery systems. The senior command had been forward looking in their planning and had anticipated the necessity of putting men on board a pirate-seized ship.

The most important facet of Putin's choice is its existence as a model for and challenge to other governmental leaders. The Russians have joined the French in putting troops on a pirate held vessel in order to effect a rescue. The Russians have surpassed the French in that their operation was conducted on the high seas and resulted in saving ship and cargo as well as crew.

(No, the Geek has not forgotten the US Navy rescue of the captain of the Maersk Alabama as he was held by four thugs-with-guns on a lifeboat. But, that operation was qualitatively different from as well as less risky than that undertaken by the Russians.)

The Russian action does require one to wonder why other governments, particularly those such as the UK, Germany, and China which possess special operations capacities have not used them for the benefit of their nationals, their ships. Perhaps the answer is to be found in the combination of circumstances which forced Putin's hand this time.

There have been previous incidents where Russian nationals have constituted all or part of a crew taken hostage by the Raiders of the Somali Coast. In none of those cases did the Russian navy intervene. This implies that the Kremlin is not moved simply by the sight of Russians in piratical durance vile.

Nor have the Lads in the Kremlin been deterred by merely the thought that "innocent" people might die in the course of a rescue operation. One need remember only the use by Russian special duty troops of a BZ type agent in the conduct of the assault on the terrorist held Moscow theater a few years ago. (Note BZ type agents are only "non-lethal" in theory; in practice this class of "incapacitating agents" will result in at least ten percent fatalities.)

While Western governments as well as Western publics may shy from robust measures fearing loss of non-combatant or hostage lives, this is not the case with Russia. So, what made the difference in this most recent case?

The answer is simple. It was laid out in detail yesterday in the Geek's blog. Putin had no realistic alternative assuming he wanted both to keep his hands on the levers of power and retain the respect of Beijing.

The next Russian crew which runs afoul the Ak-waving, skiff-riding bunch of Somali "unemployed fishermen" may not be so lucky. Militating against this melancholy conclusion is the simple fact that Vladimir The Bold has acted as he did this time. This raises a key question: Can Putin now let go of the tiger whose tail he has so firmly grabbed?

This is a poser for the "Good Czar." The only thing worse than the appearance of weakness is a policy of vacillation. Having taken the tough line, Vladimir The Decisive cannot now shift to one which is--or seems--less firm.

Unless, of course, he wants to change his name from Vladimir to Barak.

Hey, Vladimir, You Going To Wimp Out This Time?

The Jolly Swashbucklers of Somalia have hit the big time with the seizure of the MV Moscow University. The ship is registered under the Liberian flag but is owned by a Russian company and is crewed by honest-to-gosh Russians. It is carrying a fifty megabuck cargo of oil to China.

The ship was taken by the usual skiffs filled with "unemployed fishermen" equipped with the ever present Russian designed AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades (probably also of an initial Russian provenance.) The crew apparently played hide-and-seek with the pirates for some minutes or even hours while sending out distress calls. Finally the crew locked themselves in the ship's "secure room."

To some extent the Russian ship's crew (or at least the captain) has responsibility for the current predicament. The ship was not registered with the Maritime Security Center, which is the clearinghouse for maritime traffic and is supposed to assure a greater level of immunity to pirate attacks.

According to a spokesman for the European Union's pirate fighting detachment in the region, the MV Moscow University contacted a Russian warship on duty in the Gulf of Aden reporting the tanker and its eighty-six thousand tons of oil were being boarded. The Russian anti-submarine warfare vessel Marshal Shaposposhnikov headed to the Moscow University's reported position at flank speed.

As Vladimir Putin is wont to say, the situation is in need of clarification. While it may be presumed the Merry Buccaneers are in control of the ship, this is not certain. If the crew is hunkered down behind the locked, reinforced steel doors of their secure room an interesting question comes to mind: Just how are the Dauntless Ex-Fisherfolk of the Somali Coast going to drive their new acquisition given that it is a tad larger than the outboard powered skiffs they are used to?

Unless the teenage thugs are the greatest sailors since Barnacle Bill, the likelihood of getting the Moscow University to safe(?) harbor in Somalia some five hundred miles away are slim to none. This means they will have to elicit the cooperation of at least some of the Russians. If, as is typically the case, the Brigands of the Briney Deep have RPGs it will be possible for them to blast a good sized hole in the bulkheads or hatches of the "secure room."

Such a robust action brings with it the high chance of one or more Russians ending up dead or, if truly (un)lucky, badly wounded. In the past the Somali Swagmen have been reasonably careful not to kill crew members of the ships they hijack, but accidents can happen.

Right now, even in the absence of Russian corpses Vladimir Putin has a challenge. A very real challenge which if not handled properly will have an impact on his major league problem in the North Caucasus.

Unlike the last time the pirates captured a vessel with a Russian connection--remember?--the ship filled with tanks and other weapons, the MV Moscow University is laden not only with oil but with political symbolism. Consider the name. Now add to it the fact that the ship is owned by Novoship a subsidiary of Sovcomflot. As the name implies, Sovcomflot is owned by the government. Finally, think about the cargo--oil--and the destination--China.

Then there is the crew. Unlike the last time, the time of the tank carrying freighter, the crew is Russian. Not Ukrainian. Not a mixture of swab jockeys from former Soviet components or Warsaw Pact subordinates. Russians.

Think for a moment about the impoverished unemployed fishermen of Somalia. Think particularly of their religion. That's right, bucko, the pirates are Muslims.

Now the Geek is perfectly well aware that it is completely against the good manners of today to link icky-poo things such as armed robbery on the high seas or ineptly constructed but malignly intended vehicle borne improvised explosive devices left in Times Square with a religion. The Geek also acknowledges that Islam qua Islam in all probability is not high on the list of motivations for most Somalian gun-toting skiff-riders.

The connection between piracy for ransom and Islam is not a matter for clerical debate; rather it is a matter of both political and financial importance for the jihadists of Somalia. And, (drum roll, please) the North Caucasus. In Somalia there is a direct link between the pirates and the Islamist jihadist groups currently contending for ultimate ascendancy in Somalia. It has been well documented that the pirate syndicates provide financial comfort to the Islamists. The transactions may fall under the term, "extortion" or "protection," but it is equally likely that the pirates are purchasing information, support, and other services from Islamist jihadist entities. It does not stretch credulity to posit that the pirates are giving money to the Islamists as a free will offering, a material sign of shared religion, mutual values, and common goals.

The insurgents of Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus region are Islamic. The leadership and many of the lower ranking sorts are not only Islamic but Islamist. The impact of political Islam, Islamism, upon the people of the North Caucasus has grown geometrically over the past few years. It is not exaggerating to see the insurgents of the North Caucasus as part of the multi-party wave of Islamist jihadism which includes but is most certainly not limited to the two Talibans and al-Qaeda.

The very blunt and quite unpleasant ground truth facing Vladimir of the Bare Chest is this: If the seizure of the MV Moscow University is allowed to run the normal course of prolonged captivity followed by payment of a large ransom, the jihadists of the North Caucasus will be handed a great propaganda victory. The Mighty Men of the Kremlin will have been humbled by the Will of Allah expressed by a handful of teenagers with automatic weapons.

Worse for Vladimir, Dimitry, and Company the propaganda will have the great advantage of being true. Anything other than a clear, quick ending to the hijacking without the payment of ransom will constitute a defeat of Moscow by the forces of Islam in the eyes (and on the lips) of the Muslim insurgents of the North Caucasus.

In the view of the proud, highly nationalistic Russian people generally any finale to the current contretemps off the Somali coast which does not involve a military dimension--and victory--will be a defeat of Vladimir the Good Czar. At this juncture in Russian history the people of Russia, particularly their hoi polloi, are not inclined to see a defeat of Russian will and arms with equanimity. Being bested by a bunch of dark hued, Muslim kids with speedboats, guns, and chutzpah would be totally unacceptable to Ivan in the street.

Nor would China be impressed by a surplus of "restraint" on the part of the Kremlin. The Mandarins of the Forbidden City tend to base their calculus of power on another country's will and ability to exercise force effectively when faced with a direct challenge. Should Vladimir and the Boys of the Kremlin balk at the jump, the Chinese senior leadership would find it necessary to engage in (to use John Foster Dulles' fine term,) "an agonizing reappraisal" of Sino-Russian relations.

Taken together all these factors and implications add up to an amount of freight far outweighing the cargo of the MV Moscow University. And, that, bucko, must add up to a sleepless night or two for Vladimir Putin. It couldn't happen to a more deserving fellow.

Somali Pirates--Life Gets Better And Worse

A couple of recent events draws one's attention back to the Jolly Brigands of the Somali Coast. Overall the incidents of late draw a sort of fever chart, tracking the ups and downs of the pirate plague in the waters of northwest Africa.

A week ago the skiff riding thugs captured a Norwegian flagged, Burmese crewed chemical tanker off Madagascar. Due to its route and destination the ship was not registered with the fusion center controlling anti-piracy efforts in and near the Gulf of Aden. In its not-registered status the ship was one of the nine thousand plus vessels plying dangerous waters without letting the assorted patrolling navies know of their existence.

The seizure of the nine thousand ton tanker was good news for the pirates. So also is the unwillingness of shipowners and operators to wait for naval convoys--or even register the passage.

Thus the Norwegian tanker becomes another figure in the loss column. If one stares only at the goats, the number of attempted piracies, the news is all good for the pirates. This year seems on track to equal or surpass last year's record number of attempts--198. If, however, one's attention focuses on the number of successful pirate actions, the news is not at all good for the Thugs of the Blue Briny. Only forty-four ships were taken. That is only two more than the previous year where the numbers were forty-two for 122 attempts.

While the pirate net has spread ever wider, the catch is going the way of the bluefin tuna--down. One very good reason for this development is the acceptance by ship operators that minimum defense measures such as razor wire on the rails, blasting raiders with firehoses and, simplest of all, abrupt maneuvers at high speed turn attempts into failures. The addition of an armed guard has been shown to be the ultimate deterrent. It seems the pirates like to shoot but really don't cotton up to being on the receiving end of fast moving bits of metal.

Another way of showing pirates the downside of their chosen occupation was brought into sharp focus by the French frigate Nivose. The frigate, a component of the EU's naval task group went on a romp last week. The crew stopped and seized four motherships and six assault skiffs. The bag was thirty-five pirates in custody--and, one presumes, a whole lot of hard feelings back on shore.

While the loss of thirty-five members of the Jolly Roger Club is minuscule considering there are fifteen hundred or so pirates organized in seven syndicates doing a handsome business in ransoms (estimated 110 million for 2007 & 2008 combined), the French stop-seize-and-arrest is an arrow pointed in the proper direction.

(The Geek cannot help but wonder, given the current public view of the Obama administration being soft on terrorism, why doesn't one of the president's political men urge him to call up Secretary Gates or JCS Chair Mullen and tell them to ginger up our naval efforts, to, well, you know, out French the French?)

The problem for the French (and the rest of the League of Civilized States) is what to do with the pirates who are captured. All too often Kenya is used as a convenient dump for suspected pirates. The Kenyans are not thrilled by this. Even though the US and other nations help underwrite the direct expenses involved, the dumping of maritime pollution has caused severe difficulties for the Kenyan judicial system and is putting a strain on their jails.

The current practice also puts Kenya at greater risk of terror attacks emanating from Somalia. It is not surprising that members of the Kenyan legal and political establishments have been pushing back, hard, on the use of their country as the designated waste dump.

The Kenyans have been "playing up" in cricket terminology as shown by the recent conviction and sentencing to twenty years of seven pirates captured by the Royal Navy two years ago. Life in a Kenyan slammer might be bad, but at least these seven ex-thugs are better off than the two of their mates who died in the firefight with the Brits.

The UN Convention which governs the legal response to piracy gives primary jurisdiction to the country controlling the ship which captures the pirates. The US observed this law as well as its own domestic laws with the sole survivor from last year's episode which saw an American merchant captain held hostage by pirates thwarted in their attempt to take his ship. Three pirates were "double tapped" by SEAL snipers and the fourth has been indicted in New York.

The reasons that more pirates are not similarly treated (the Geek means arrested, not given head shots much as he prefers the latter) are transparent--and transparently bogus. The US and other Western states fear abuse of their legal systems by those representing and offering apologies for the pirates as well as entertaining some sort of misplaced anxiety that captured thugs-at-sea will claim political asylum.

Duh!

To make life worse, much worse, for the pirates it is necessary for more of the many navies now offering patrol, protection, and overwatch in the threatened sealanes to do what the French did. In addition it is necessary that all captured pirates be taken to stand trial and do their time in Western courts and prisons. The certainty of capture or worse, the sureness that the slow grinding judicial mills of the US, the UK, and other Western nations will produce in the fullness of time a long stretch in durance vile will raise the costs of doing business as a pirate syndicate.

History, a lot of history stretching back to the quite literal days of Julius Caesar, demonstrates that the vocation of maritime banditry loses its appeal when the costs are raised sufficiently. This does not mean we must return to the days of Execution Dock but it does mean that we must stop off loading the problem onto Kenya. It means that the countries who have stepped up to provide some measure of deterrence and protection against the Somali marauders must take the next step--bring the nasty little buggers to our homelands, give 'em a fair trial, let the apologists apologize, let the defense lawyers do their best, and, when the last hurrah has died away, lock the bloody blighters up for a goodly chunk of their lives.

The trouble and expense will be worth it. At the least by making a salutary example of the Somalis, there is some chance a far greater threat to maritime commerce and thus the global economy can be deterred.

That's right, bucko, there is a far greater threat on the near horizon. The Malacca Straits have been targeted according to Singapore maritime security officials. While the group has not been identified, it (or they) are Islamist in nature. The Malacca Straits constitute one of the greatest if not the greatest maritime chokepoint in the world carrying infinitely more trade than does the Gulf of Aden. The Straits are territorial waters for Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, none of which has a significant navy. At the same time none of these rather prickly entities desires international assistance or an international naval presence. And, of course, two of them are Muslim majority countries and have internal problems with Islamist jihadists.

As even a member of the Obama administration should be able to see and understand, there is much more to be gained by showing palpable resolve against the annoying Somali skiffers than simply making the Gulf of Aden less risky. All that is necessary is to look at a map and see just how many very critical shipping lanes merge in the Straits and imagine what sort of destabilizing damage could be done by a few Muslim pirate/terrorists on skiffs of the Somali sort.

Making life worse for the Somali pirates will make life a lot less worse for the rest of us.

Lurching Through The Swamp(s)

The first swamp is, no surprise here, Afghanistan. The early reports (they're all over the web, no real need for links) have it that President Obama, after only three months of study and palaver, and distractions over the "credibility" of Karzai's election, has finally opted for the least worst course of action. This means that another 34,000 US troops will hit the ground over and above the 22,000 already tabbed by the President for service there.

If the early reports are right (and the Geek hopes they are), the mission of the new increment will be against the Taliban strongholds in the Kandahar and Helmand areas. The goal will be the suppression of the Islamist jihadists both soft and hard core. The intent is the creation of an area which is quiet enough for the Afghan national forces to take over and the Afghan government (if any) to provide essential services and establish both functional and existential legitimacy.

By implication at least, the US military is officially out of the nation-building game. If correct, that is a move that is long overdue. While there is much a military force can and should do to provide assistance to local civilians, the top job is restoring sufficient quiet that purely civilian efforts can build a nation--from the base on up to the pinnacle. To date, the building efforts have been in the reverse and thus doomed to fail.

President Obama is to be congratulated for having listened to such advisors as SecDef Gates rather than those such as Vice President Biden--or even National Security Advisor Jones, who was apparently overly traumatized by his service as a junior combat leader in Vietnam to take a fully mature view of the ways in which the effort in Afghanistan differ from the debacle in Vietnam.

The strict focus on suppressing Taliban as an effective combat force coupled with an eye to the exit emphasizes the difference between the approach currently and belatedly underway in Afghanistan and the long delayed and poorly executed "Vietnamization" exercise during the Nixon administration. Now, if Congress does not play the spoiler role it had during the Vietnam endgame, there is a chance the US and its allies will achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not losing."

In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, "not-losing" is the best that can be hoped for in the real world. As the Korean War paradigm shows, "not-losing" is not really fully satisfying but it is enough. It works imperfectly but it works.

The Iranian swamp has grown both deeper and more murky with the mullahs' men announcing that the country would construct another ten enrichment centers while Russia indicated it would not stand in the way of any new sanctions consensus. In a way both announcements merit a mere "well, la-de-dah and humma-humma."

The threat from Tehran to proliferate centrifuges at an awesome rate of knots was a completely expectable response to the IAEA Board of Governors smiting the regime on the hand for its previous actions in that area. If the Iranian regime expected any other action such as a mea culpa from the body for having ever suspected the mullahs of any motives other than the most lofty and humanitarian, they must have been sampling too much of the cargo surreptitiously brought across the border from Afghanistan.

The Russian protestations of solidarity with the sanction oriented West is nice and might have a symbolic value but is nullified in actual effect by the probable blockage from the Chinese. The Gnomes of Beijing have too much invested in Iran and too much need for its oil to move to support sanctions. This means there is no real consensus for the Russians to join or to block. They can, in effect, put the caviar on both sides of their cracker.

Another ship has been sunk in the pirate swamp of Somalia. This time the jolly raiders of the region snatched a tanker bound from Saudi Arabia to the US with about twenty megabucks of cargo on board. Nine men in a skiff took over the thirty man crew of the VLCC without any mention of a struggle, resistance, or the arrival of the naval cavalry.

With the ending of the monsoon which flattened the seas north of the Seychelles, the pirates have been out in full and effective force while the large multi-national naval presence has driven their boats around with little effective impact on the piracy business. As usual many of the MSM (look them up yourself, it isn't hard to find the usual suspects) characterized the pirates as "unemployed fishermen." This is akin to calling the thugs of Al Capone's Chicago Outfit, "unemployed beer delivermen."

There are few effective ways of draining the Somali pirate swamp. And, worse from the soft and sentimental Western perspective, all the ways which would have any effect whatsoever involve both violence and the potential of "innocent" lives being snuffed out.

Unless and until two actions are taken, the pirate swamp will continue to suck in hapless victims. The two actions are easy to describe and easy to take--if political will exists. The first is to require convoying of all vessels transiting the dangerous waters. This could be enforced by the insurance industry--but only if the navies involved drafted and implemented a convoy system.

The second action is to use lethal force. Both security details onboard ships and the naval vessels should have "shoot to kill" authority. Period. Yes, mistakes might be made. "Hold harmless" clauses must therefore exist to immunize ship owners, crews, and security details from either civil or criminal liability.

It would also be of great use if the UN would create another one of those special courts of which it is so fond to deal with pirates captured on the job. The current ad hoc ways of dealing with pirates are both unworkable and unjust. Even better would be an acknowledgement by the UN that ever since Julius Caesar cleared the Mediterranean Sea of pirates, members of that sub species of brigand have been the common enemy of mankind whenever and wherever they have done their dirty deeds.

The final swamp du jour is that of Islam in Western Europe. The Swiss in a referendum have banned by a 57.5 percent margin the construction of minarets. The Swiss government was against the idea. The UN has (of course) deplored the vote's result. And, (again no shock) most published Arab and Muslim opinion is dead against it as well.

While the elites of Europe bemoan this lack of cross cultural sensitivity, the hoi polloi have voted for keeping their little part of Europe, well, European. It is hard if not impossible to accuse the Swiss of prejudice or racism given the way in which their tidy nation has allowed for complete sectarian peace for over five hundred years, but the accusations will--and are--being made nonetheless.

The Muslim press of the Mideast has made the charge that the Swiss and, therefore, by implication all Europeans are practicing a double standard in that they uphold the freedom of speech but oppose cultural items such as minarets and burquas. Of course, the difference between the two matters is palpable.

Then there is the unpleasant and equally uncommented upon reality that Muslim states prohibit the construction of churches, or other non-Muslim religious structures. They fail to note that the Swiss have not banned the building or use of mosques, merely towering minarets. Likewise the critics fail to note all the Muslim countries including some which purport to be democracies prohibit even the use of public buildings for purposes of worship.

The double standard swamp seems to be located more in the Mideast than in Europe. Not that this ground truth will inhibit the same countries from seeking to limit global freedom of expression in the name of protecting religion from criticism.

There it is. One more day of mucking about in the mud of the world, trying to keep one's head above the cloying waters. Will tomorrow be any different? Any better? Any more filled with firm ground and dry boots? Not in this lifetime, bucko.

Some Good Ideas (Well, Three Good Ones)

It is refreshing to see good ideas floating around in the old foreign policy and military affairs world. Usually one is confronted with either stereotyped thinking or very bad notions--particularly from the White House.

It is appropriate that President Obama be first up. It has been reported that the Nice Young Man From Chicago is prepared to let the Karzai government know that the American commitment to his rule and his country is not "open ended."

Well, if true, that proposition deserves support, even applause. Over the past six hundred or so posts, the Geek has harped repeatedly on a very basic requirement for successful "foreign contingency operations"--the credible capacity to de-commit from the "host" government. An excellent example of the historical basis for this contention is found in the end stages of the US participation in the Vietnamese War.

When the Saigon government finally came to believe that the Nixon administration was deadly serious about withdrawing American combat forces and turning the actual fighting over to the ARVNs, the government and the military of South Vietnam got equally serious about defeating both the North Vietnamese invaders and the more-or-less indigenous offensive insurgency of the Viet Cong.

ARVN fought well even as the North staged its final and quite overwhelming offensive in 1975. There is strong reason to conclude that the South would have defeated this very open aggression save for one unexpected, unforeseen development. That development was the action of the Democratic party controlled Congress in preventing the use of American air power and logistic support in aid of the South. This action was taken despite the promises made to the South by the Nixon administration--promises which were essential to the "favorable" outcome of the Paris Peace Talks.

The Vietnam experience contains two important lessons. The first is that only with the emergence of a credible capacity for American de-commitment did the South Vietnamese become ready, willing, and, most importantly, able to fight. The second lesson is rarely considered: Only the US Congress through its heedless acts was able to undercut the ability of the Southern forces to fight effectively.

If both these lessons are properly understood, they provide a firm foundation for an effective end game strategy for the US to pursue in Afghanistan. The capacity to de-commit requires the US and its allies focus on the main task of assuring the Islamist jihadists will have no basis upon which to make the later claim that they had militarily defeated the US and its associates. This prime requirement implies that the US and the others drop notions of turning Afghanistan into a model Western style polity and society.

There can be no gainsaying that Karzai and his entire government is reprehensibly corrupt and self-defeatingly inefficient. This realities are also irrelevant. Corruption and inefficiency are endemic in many areas of the world. Corruption is more than simply business as usual--it is a way of life. Even states which are both allied with us and considered "Western" such as South Korea and Japan have had episodes of corruption in very recent years. Inefficiency is not restricted to Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or Iraq, it is the pandemic disease of governments everywhere--including the good ole US of A.

Telling Karzai to clean up his own personal mess is all well and good. It plays well in the press and within the chattering class. Far more important is the message that the American presence is going to come to an end. When it does, you, Mr Karzai and the rest, will have to keep on living there. Thus, it behooves your own personal interest to make both government and military more effective, less repressive, and more in tune with civilian needs, fears, and hopes.

It also means that Karzai has to do a deal with both his political rival, Abdullah Abdullah, and the less frothing at the mouth leadership of the assorted groups mustered under the convenient banner of the Taliban. But, making deals is what Karzai is best at. It is why he may be the right man to be at the flimsy helm in Kabul.

The second good idea comes from the Spanish Defense Minister, who must have been taking lessons in hard headed realism from the Maggie Thatcher of nearly thirty years ago. Carme Chacon has called for a "blockade" of the three ports in Somalia most often used by the pirates and their motherships. Apparently unimpressed by the unwieldy amphyctony of forty navies which patrols the region, she wants the EU contingent to mount the effort.

A close blockade has much to recommend it, even if events prove it must be expanded beyond the initial three port effort. If the skiff riding thugs can't put to sea, they can't commit acts of piracy.

Of course, the historical record shows that most navies abhor brown or brownish water operations. Most warships, even the smallest, are designed for blue water operations. This does not mean the capacity for close in operations is absent--the new American Littoral Control Ship (LCS) is designed for just such tasks. This means that objections of unsuitability are unfounded.

Nor is there any difficulty with matters of national sovereignty. The Transitional Federal Government has already given foreign naval vessels authority to operate in territorial water.

Still, blockades are tedious, difficult, and mistakes may occur. It is both more fun and easier to drive around in nice shiny ships in deep blue water. If the political leaders of the EU have sufficient testicular fortitude and mental acumen they will take the defense minister's proposal under the closest study--and approve it double quick.

Gustavo de las Casas has done a bit of "thinking the unthinkable" in Foreign Policy. The idea is simple to state, seductive in its purported simplicity, but, ultimately not likely to be anywhere nearly as effective as its proponent thinks.

De Las Casas suggests that it is not yet time to finish the task of destroying al-Qaeda. Weaken it as we have been doing, yes. Obliterate its middle management, no.

He argues (in a questionable analogy) that al-Qaeda is a social networking site, a sort of hellish version of Facebook. By obliterating the middle levels of al-Qaeda, the good guys would force an automatic (and the Geek adds, further) decentralization of Islamist jihadism. The existence of al-Qaeda, de las Casas argues is the best way to detect, track, and, in the fullness of time, wrap up wannabe jihadist martyrs.

He also argues that the US and others should limit their killing of senior and mid-level al-Qaeda figures to those who are demonstrably effective. The others, the duds as it were, should be left in place, unhindered but watched.

There are historical precedents both for and against the propositions advanced by de las Casas. For example, when, during the Reagan administration, the US took out the main Libyan clandestine services communication center, the result gravely impaired the American ability to monitor Libyan operational planning and execution by denying us high quality ELINT. On the other side of the coin, the best successes of the controversial Phoenix program in South Vietnam were those based on killing the competent and encouraging the promotion of the incompetent.

It might be noted that the US and the South Vietnamese in the context of Phoenix had access to very high quality HUMINT which allowed for a reasonably accurate parsing between the competent and incompetent. It is not likely that the same level or quality of intelligence is or will be available to do the same sort of "natural selection" within the ranks of al-Qaeda.

However, the ultimate argument against the de las Casas proposal is simply that Islamist jihadist groups like insurgent groups throughout history are fundamentally self-organizing in nature. What counts the most in the formation of new Islamist jihadists is not the presence or absence of al-Qaeda but the existence of the idea, the concept of Islamist jihadism as a religiously approved action, even a religious obligation.

The importance of al-Qaeda now is its value as a symbol of the requirements, strictures, and sacred writings of Islam taken to their logical extreme. Armed political Islam with a global agenda is infinitely more important in and of itself as a motivator and inspiration to those who seek martyrdom now and into the future than is al-Qaeda or Taliban or Hamas.

Major Hasan needed nothing beyond the precepts of his religion along with the justifications and encouragements offered by clerics such as Anwar al Awliki. The real "facebook" analogy is not to be found in al-Qaeda or any other particular Islamist jihadist group but rather in the web of sites, chat rooms, and so on found all across the vast band of the internet.

By "thinking the unthinkable" de las Casas has performed a service. He has called in effect for a new and more creative thinking about the nature and character of both known organizations and the dynamics by which Islamist jihadists ranks are replenished by new recruits. To this extent his idea is a good one. It deserves follow up.

That's it, foreign policy fans, the few good ideas wandering around the world today. One can hope for more tomorrow. But, not too hard, as disappointment is bound to ensue.

The Anus Bomb And Other Developments

You no doubt recall the attempted assassination of Saudi counter-terrorism capo, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef a few weeks back. The central figure in this "martyrdom operation," one Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri, carried the small bomb and associated triggering mechanism protected by a shield of intestine (of course not from a pig) within the nether reaches of his sigmoid or descending colon.

After having traveled on the prince's private jet and arriving at the prince's house all the while protected by his announced intention of "repenting" of his icky-poo terrorist ways, the device was triggered by a cell phone sending a text message. The resulting blast lightly injured the prince and fragmented the "martyr's" body into some seventy pieces. The collateral damage to the prince's house is visually impressive.

After weeks of silence, intelligence personnel in both France and the US have expressed concern over this new genre of threat. A relatively small device even when the blast is attenuated by the carrier's body could cause explosive decompression and catastrophic structural failure in an airliner at altitude. Whether swallowed in the way long performed by mules carrying drugs or diamonds, or, in the alternative way time honored by convicts, inserted as a suppository, the anus bomb is a new and challenging threat.

Right now there are only two practical ways of inhibiting the use of such devices on airliners. One would be the confiscation of all electronic gizmos which could be used as detonators such as cell phones, ipods, and laptop computers. The other is the use of whole body x-ray scans.

Both of these approaches have major drawbacks--particularly the second. Frequent flyers would be exposed to a significant health risk. That rather makes the hard x-ray scan a non-starter. Confiscation of electronic triggering devices would be a logistics headache to say the least. Beyond that, the development of very low power radio frequency trigger mechanisms in, say, a wristwatch, would be an easy work around for the ambitious wannabe martyr and his controllers.

The inventiveness of the Islamist jihadists is impressive. The anus bomb has long been considered as a potential, but was never really taken seriously until Mr al-Asiri energetically disassembled himself. Now that proof-of-concept testing has been completed, it can be anticipated that design refinements will be undertaken. The al-Asiri bomb is believed to have been only three or so inches in length with an explosive load of only four ounces. Much larger bombs can be accommodated when the suppository method is used.

Another potential is the surgical insertion of a bomb. The human body has a fair amount of waste space in the abdomen particularly if the individual is well provided with adipose tissue.

Anus or belly bombs will prove to be a real challenge for security personnel. There is no easy, cheap, or quick way of detecting a bomb shielded by the body of its carrier. The Geek has to confess he is amused as he considers the assorted screening and detection methods which might be employed. (He is also glad that he no longer flies with the frequency he once did.)

The Nice Young Man From Chicago is a another difficult to counter threat. With the latest indicators from the depths of inside-the-beltway Deep Thinking, presidential variety, the best that can be determined is that Mr Obama is going to compromise on the Afghanistan troop deployment issue.

No great increase, perhaps none at all, and no cut-and-run Joe Biden style decrease either. This position, taken by the president during a meeting with congressional leaders of both parties, was set against the background of deprecating the threat presented by al-Qaeda.

Mr Obama and his national security (look grim for the photo, people) team have all but declared "Mission accomplished" regarding al-Qaeda. Admittedly, al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and the FATA of Pakistan has been attenuated severely. The effective strength of al-Qaeda in the area is in the very low hundreds, perhaps as low as single hundred. These personnel are primarily involved in training and the making of IEDs.

However, as Mark Twain was fond of saying, "Reports of my death have been exaggerated."

Whether al-Qaeda is on the ropes is not particularly relevant. Al-Qaeda has been primarily useful as a symbol around which Islamist jihadists everywhere can self-organize. Even if every last "member" of al-Qaeda to include Osama bin Laden were to be killed, the power of al-Qaeda as a symbol, a myth, would not be erased.

The assorted groups which rally under the rubric of Taliban are far from defeated either in Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is this congeries which is most relevant right now. It is this assemblage of Islamist jihadists which must be defeated. And, the defeat must be clear for all present and potential Islamist jihadists around the world.

Anything less will assure that Islamist jihadism continues to exercise an appeal to many young men in the Muslim population of the globe. Even if the methods employed by Taliban and its ilk, particularly the targeting of civilians, have caused a significant loss of support within Islam, enough are still ready, willing, and eager to find their personal identity and self-worth in combat against the "infidels" and "apostates."

The only way to limit the siren song of Islamist jihadism is the defeat of Taliban. This will not in and of itself spell the end of the jihadist threat, but it will serve to diminish the attractiveness of dying for the faith, or even of becoming a True Believer in that version of Islam.

Longer term, it is essential that Islamist jihadism be countered wherever it exists. This implies that the US and other Western countries including Russia will find it in their national and strategic interests to use military force far from home, in the remote areas where the jihadist seeks sanctuary. It will not just be a long war but a long series of small conflicts extending decades into the future.

While a mort of years stretches before us when contemplating the Islamist jihadist challenge, time is of the essence in decision making on Afghanistan. The president is not yet acting as if he both understands and is responding on this basis. Senator McCain was quite correct when he told the president that "time was not on our side."

President Obama needs to get a grip on this reality. He also needs to get a grip on the nettle of sending sufficient force to Afghanistan so as to assure that militarily the US and its allies achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing."

Enough of the dismal. There are a couple of nifty developments on the upside of life.

The Iranians are missing a couple of nuclear scientists. One went missing in Saudi Arabia during the haj. Sharam Amiri has been reported missing by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The ministry took the unprecedented step of asking the Saudis to look for the missing man. (Quite a few Iranians go missing during the annual pilgrimage, and the Foreign Ministry is typically unconcerned.)

Reportedly Amiri was working at the recently disclosed secret enrichment site before he wandered off. The same was true with respect to the second missing man, Asharq al-Awsat, who goes by his middle name, Ardeblili, and is described by the Iranian government as a businessman. He went off the radar screen while in Georgia (the country) last summer but has been reported to have been spirited off to the US.

Sorry about that, Ahmedinejad. But, couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of folks.

In Somalia, the pirates have received another lesson in the necessity of proper target identification. A bunch of these wild and crazy guys took on the French naval vessel Somme yesterday during the hours of darkness. Apparently they mistook this command and supply ship for a fat juicy merchant vessel. They were wrong. Five survivors are in custody.

The Pirates of Puntland seem to have a fixation on the French. Last May a bunch of the boys took on a French frigate. (How they misidentified such an obvious warship for a merchantman beats the hell out of the Geek.) The pirates were taken for trial in France.

Another gang that couldn't see straight tried to capture the FGS Spessart back on 30 March. While the Spessart is a cargo ship, it is not a merchant one. The Germans demonstrated a will to combat unobserved in Afghanistan and apprehended the gang.

Despite the statistics which show a great increase in the number of pirate attacks attempted in the waters off the northeast African coast, these incidents are good evidence that numbers do not mean success. Nonetheless, it would behoove all hands for the warships in the area not to wait for astigmatic pirates to come to them, but rather to go after the pirates, particularly the "mother ships," with more vigor and determination.

It would also behoove the US and the countries of NATO and the European Union to use their collective clout in the UN to enlarge the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court so that there would be a single judicial body of competence to try and (hopefully) convict the pirates seized in flagrante.

At least the attempt to enlarge the jurisdiction of the ICC would give our UN Ambassador, Susan Rice, something to do. Something of greater good for the world than her brokering of a deal to protect the sensibilities of Muslims at the expense of free, untrammeled speech.

Maybe President Obama can consider telling her to do this just as soon as he tires of kicking the Afghan can down the street.

Somalis Feed Al-Shabab Some Raw Meat

File this one under the When Will They Ever Learn heading. Or, better, perhaps, put it under the category Do They Really, Really Want To Learn?

The "They" in this case is the pretend parliament of the pretend state, Somalia. In a move totally lacking in either surprise or rationality, the parliament of the Somalian Transitional National something or another unanimously passed the imposition of Sharia on the "country." The move was explained as was the earlier approval of the measure by the cabinet as a being a way of appeasing the Islamist jihadists of al-Shabab.

As has been said many times before, appeasement is like tossing raw meat to a wolf in the expectation that by so doing the wolf will become a vegetarian.

The Transitional National Something or Another (TNSoA) will have to do a powerful lot of appeasing. It effectively controls a few blocks in what was once downtown Mogadishu. The Islamist jihadists of al-Shabab have nearly all of southern and central Somalia under their gun--and version of Sharia.

Failing this, the fall-back position has been the assertion that by embracing Sharia as the basis of Somali law, moderate Islamists and Sufis will be mobilized to support the TNSoA.

Right. Fer sure, dudes.

These two positions were also invoked to justify the selection of Sheik Sharaf Sheik Ahmed as the capo d'tutti capi of the TNSoA. Sheik Ahmed is a "moderate" Islamist who was once the Grand Panjandrum of al-Shabab. His selection was presumed to be an appeasement of his one-time followers.

The current al-Shabab heavies made a collective rude gesture and kept on shooting, bombing and stoning women. A motley crew of Sufi and "moderate" Islamists gave rhetorical support to the Sheik. At least they used his selection as Maximum Leader to excuse self-interested shooting back at the al-Shabab gun thugs.

There is just one little problem with the expectations expressed by the TNSoA.

The appeasement won't work. That reality is inherent.

Sharia is susceptible to human interpretation as is any and every system of jurisprudance. The Sharia of the TNSoA may be indistinguishable in application from that of al-Shabab. The difference between Brand A and Brand B versions of Sharia will be nonexistent. In that case why not just let al-Shabab take over? At the least lives will be saved--for now.

In the event the TNSoA version of Sharia is less repressive in application, less oppressive in effect, then there is no reason to believe that the True Believers of al-Shabab will toss in the Koran and go back to whatever peaceful pursuits they followed before going on Allah's War. Right now al-Shabab has power. It is feared. Further, it is winning. Without a strong, strong inducement extending far beyond the mere adoption of Sharia, even all-the-way-and-then-some Sharia, there is no reason to give up the pleasures of killing, raping, stealing and generally raising merry hell in the finest traditions of Somali history.

As has been seen dramatically in Pakistan, appeasement comes a cropper from the very moment it is attempted. The government of Pakistan effectively surrendered to the Islamist jihadists of Swat. They have their much desired Sharia. No woman is safe. Neither is any man who doesn't want to grow a beard. Neither is any video store, Internet cafe or other business which is not fully Sharia approved.

Did that satisfy the Islamists?

Don't be silly. Of course not. Islamists are total in their goals. Swat was not and never could be enough to satisfy them. Now they want the entire country to go Sharia Heavy. Even were that to come to pass, the Islamists would have more demands. They would go from demand to demand until the last slice of the Pakistani salami disappeared down Islamist throats.

It is this reality which puts the lie to those who aver that the ending of Somali piracy can only happen when Somalia has a fully functioning and effective government capable of enforcing the law (of course, only that which is fully compliant with Sharia) and providing meaningful employment to the young men of Somalia. Not even the endorsement of this position by SecDef Gates makes it right.

Sharia allows piracy. The limitation is that the piracy must be directed against the ships of infidels and apostates. The ever-so-Muslim Ottoman Empire had no problems with such of its outlying territories as Tunis engaging in systematic, government sponsored and run piracy as long as the ships and crews seized and enslaved were not Islamic (and Istanbul got its share of the vigorish.)

Historically there have been few ways of making money in Somalia beyond subsistance agriculture and herding. One has been conducting trade in exotic African commodities such as ivory. A second has been dealing in slaves, particularly the transport of Africans to the Arabian states. The third was piracy.

While the trade in body parts from African animals has been reduced in recent years, it still exists. The same can be said regarding human trafficking. But, both of these avenues of enterprise can employ only a few.

Piracy is the big employer. The big money maker. This will not change when Somalia gets a government--if it ever does. Too much must not be made of the few months during which the Union of Islamic Courts functioned as a central government. While, as is to be expected, apologists for the UIC insist that it eradicated piracy and would do so again under the name of al-Shabab, the reality is that conditions in the transitory regime of the UIC were too chaotic for piracy to emerge on an industrial level as has been the case more recently.

The way piracy is stopped is to make it unprofitable compared to the risks involved. This means interdicting pirate boats before they can seize a target. It means killing pirates to either prevent seizures or to recapture ships from them. It means pursuing pirates wherever and whenever they are located. Killing them if they resist. Trying, convicting and jailing them if they don't. Above all, it means preventing ship owners or insurance firms from paying ransoms.

The French and the Americans have shown how it can be done. So also have the Dutch--to a limited extent. A Dutch commando unit (probably Dutch Marines, a completely professional and tough bunch as the Geek knows from personal experience) captured a pirate "mothership." They liberated the captive Yemeni crew. Then, after disarming the pirates, the Dutch cut them loose.

Dutch law gave no alternative. But, the Dutch may have another bite at the apple. Pirates have captured a dredger with a Dutch citizen as a member of the crew. The hijack took place over three hundred miles from Somalia. The dredger is under surveillance by US and other nations' assets.

Dutch law allows the arrest of pirates if one of the victims has Dutch citizenship. One can only hope that the Dutch warship, The Seven Provinces, is underway at flank speed to the present location of the captive dredge. And, that the commandos on board are good-for-go one more time.

The new breed of pirates must be taught the lesson finally learned by pirates of past centuries. Every man's hand is against them. The only sure reward for piracy is berth space in Davy Jones' Locker.

SecState Clinton Doesn't Get A Grip

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has taken a public stance on the Seagoing Jihadists of Somalia. It is memorable only in its relative failure to be realistic and robust.

Assuming that Ms Clinton is not wandering off the Obama Reservation, the administration and president are equally committed to a program of feel-good proposals which will not prove effective in handling the challenge presented by the pirates to US national and strategic interests.

The major features of the Clinton Scheme For Pirate Neutralisation are: (A) The US government will "work" with the shipping industry including insurance firms to reduce vulnerability to pirate attack and seizure; (B) "explore ways to track and freeze pirate assets" along with seeking to "persuade boat builders not to do business with the pirates;" (C) Call for immediate meetings of the international anti-pirate patrol to improve coordination; (D) Have a meeting of all relevant federal agencies on Friday to review the problem and consider options; (E) "Going after" pirate bases in Somalia pursuant to UN resolutions of a few months back.

The SecState being faithful to her roots as a lawyer advised the media, "These pirates are criminals. They are armed gangs on the sea."

Duh! You don't say? Criminals? Gangsters? Who would have thought?

Ms Clinton also opined, "We need to bring Twenty-first Century solutions to bear."

Apparently the use of force against the "criminals," the "armed gangs" is not considered to be a 21st Century solution as Her Secretariness didn't mention that possibility.

OK, to err on the side of accuracy, the SecState did make the ambiguous reference to "going after" the pirate homeports which implies the use of force. But, for reasons previously adduced such an effort would demand the same fatal excursion into "nation-building" which has been seen before not only in Afghanistan, but, in Somalia. Ms Clinton should remember that one. She lived in the White House at the time the wheels came off that particular Noble Experiment.

Come on, Madam Secretary, get a grip. You may make the High Minded happy with your portfolio of non-solution solutions, but you won't stop the pirates. Unless they collapse with a fatal attack of laughter.

The State Department does not need to engage in either special inter-agency task force meetings or the creation of new liaison offices with Treasury. You all at Foggy Bottom don't need to jawbone to or with the shipping industry and insurance companies. You don't even need to dust off ancient plans for how to build a nation in Somalia.

Here is all the people at State need to do.

First, get the Principals together to draft an Executive Order prohibiting any shipping company or maritime insurance firm doing business with or in the US from paying any ransom under any color for any seizure of any ship or crew.

Second, give President Obama the phone number for Nicholas Sarkozy over there in Paris. Tell the President to ask his French counterpart one question.

The question?

"Sarko, how do you get the balls--I mean, the political will--to have your navy take down the pirates?"

Tell Mr Obama to take notes. Perhaps you should do so as well, Ms Clinton. You see, Obama-ites, in the real world, the world in which the High Minded rarely soil themselves by passage, all that is needed is the balls to take on the piratical goons mano a mano and kick their butts.

We have the capacity to do that.

Do you and the president have the will? That is the one and only question.

Pirates Come Back Shooting--Does It Matter?

Not surprisingly the Skiff Riders Of Puntland were back on the job almost before the USS Bainbridge had collected the bodies of their three dead fellow thugs. Neither is there any shock in the news that the Bad Boys of the Somali Coast went after a US flagged cargo ship with, or so the now obligatory pirate spokesman alleged, a specific intent to "destroy" the ship and its crew.

"Unfortunately," this Jolly Swagman's answer to Robert Gibbs continued, "the ship escaped our attack." Right, dude, fer sure, how unsporting of the Americans not to just sit there and take it, suffer your Somali version of retributive justice.

The cowardly Americans hid in the engine room of the Liberty Sun and called for the US Navy and CNN. When the navy in the form of the USS Bainbridge arrived, it was the pirates who had left the area at a high rate of knots. Unfortunately the Bainbridge must not have had access to aerial reconnaissance such that the offensive skiff could be followed and (it is to be hoped sincerely) engaged before it reached the safety of Somalian territorial waters.

Instead, the Bainbridge, with rescued Captain Richard Phillips still onboard, proceeded to escort the slightly damaged Liberty Sun and its cargo of food aid for Africans to the Kenyan port of Mombasa. The Ship Molesters of Somalia undoubtedly were back in port at Eyl or some other coastal hole vowing to try again.

Eleven other wannabe Heroes of the Islamist Sea were not so lucky. They and their thirty foot "motherboat" as well as three skiffs came to the attention of the French. After having been spotted by a helicopter flown from the frigate Nivose, the French warship shadowed the aquatic goons overnight and moved in around dawn at a point five hundred nautical miles off the Somalian coast. Apparently the maritime jihadists offered no resistance as they were all taken alive. Whether or not the eleven will join the three pirates captured in a French commando raid a few weeks ago and face a French tribunal is not clear yet.

These two incidents along with the wave of successful pirate acts over the weekend shows that no more than a single snowflake heralds a blizzard nor a pair of robins, spring does a successful takedown or two mean the Jolly Swagmen of Somalia have been suppressed or even slightly deterred. The incidents along with their precursors do, however, point in the direction which successful policy must go.

Sustained violence, particularly when coupled with credible threats of hostile escalation, must be met with resolve. A resolve to oppose violence with more effective violence. Just like in poker, when the opponent ups the ante, you have to meet the raise--or fold, get out of the game, surrender the pot without contest.

Calls for a UN sponsored exercise in pacification and nation-building are a refusal to stay in the game, to match and call the pirates' bluff. So are the urgings that the "international community" provide the resources necessary for the Somali Transitional National Authority so that this pretender to government status can impose peace and order on Somalia and its neighboring waters. So are delaying gambits such as the construction of new international agencies of coordination or criminal justice.

One, highly doable, course of action is the placement of armed guard parties on US flagged merchantmen. While doing this would impose an increased demand on the already overstretched US military, particularly the Navy and Marine Corps, the demand would not be excessive given the small size of the US flagged merchant fleet. As SecDef Gates said at Maxwell AFB, one does not need a billion dollar warship to defeat a bunch of teenagers in speedboats.

Light weapons, a modest sensor suite and a squad sized detachment would be sufficient to keep even the most audacious crew of Swagmen at bay or kill them if they were so poor at decision making as to press home their attack in the face of superior discipline and firepower. The use of military personnel as the Armed Guard would not only obviate some of the paranoia afflicting lawyers but also has historical precedent--the Armed Guard units on US ships during World War II.

Almost as doable would be the dedication of increased surface warfare and maritime surveillance assets to the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden areas. It boggles the mind that the USS Bainbridge did not have real time data, including imagery of the boat which attacked the Sun Liberty, such that it could shape an interception course once it became clear that the Skiff Riders of Vengeance had broken off their attack.

Either the Bainbridge has less access to airborne platforms than the French frigate Nivose or its commander did not have the authority to pursue the attackers. If the former, our Navy is not what it is alleged to be in the sea surveillance field. If the latter, then there has already been a major failure of political will in or near the Oval Office.

If the difficulty is one of assets it is rather easily rectified. Surely the US has a few P-3 or similar aircraft littering a hanger or apron somewhere. Perhaps we even have a small number of long loiter time UAVs parked somewhere. If we do, they could be redeployed with profit to the WIO/GA AOs. If we don't, then it is about time for some high speed, low drag procurement efforts--or make a deal with the French since they apparently have a surfeit of helicopters.

If the difficulty is one of deficient political will at the highest levels, the problem is not easily solved. It means that the people at the pinnacle of the National Command Authority are basically so risk averse, or so afflicted with the fatal disease of High Mindedness, that the US has no choice but to fold in this particular game of high stakes international poker.

Rather than bow before a scurvy collection of Somali seagoing jihadists, it is to be hoped that the Obama administration can bring itself to realise that the avoidance of small and controllable risks today will simply assure the emergence of larger, even much larger, risks far less susceptible to control in the not-too-distant future. The Obama-ites also have to wake up and get a grip on one fundamental reality: The government of the United States has no responsibility to create a functioning, friendly regime in Somalia; it does have a responsibility to continue the long American historical trajectory of maintaining freedom of peaceful navigation on the high seas.

Or, Team Obama may want to buy into the latest seemingly zany idea of Texas Congressman Ron Paul. Representative Paul went public last week with a video in which he advances an idea that has been chatted about sub rosa for the last couple of years. At first glance the notion seems as out of date and massively irrelevant as stocks in a manufacturer of buggy whips.

"Come on, Geek! Cut to the chase!"

OK, oh impatient one. The idea is for Congress to use a power granted it by the Constitution. The power to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. While no such Letters have been granted since the War of 1812, the authority is still there. It has not been eradicated nor enervated by the assorted treaties and conventions entered into by the US over the past two centuries.

The idea behind Letters of Marque and Reprisal which were issued by all major and some minor powers for centuries is not so much war on the cheap as a means of enhancing one's naval power in either an undeclared conflict or a conflict against a non-state actor. (Yes, both sorts of non-war wars were extant even hundreds of years ago, despite our liking to pretend that they are of modern, even post-modern origin.)

Private interests would be licensed by the Federal Government to undertake offensive operations against pirates in the WIO/GA areas of operation. Performance and compliance bonds would have to be obtained by the candidate privateers who would also have to conduct their operations in a way which conforms with the international laws governing war at sea. Rather than depending upon the value of assets seized from the pirates as compensation as was the case way back when, the Privateers of the Twenty-First Century would have to look to bounties placed upon the heads of the pirates by Congress.

Any proposal to resurrect Letters of Marque and Reprisal from the historical dust will undoubtedly bring an epidemic of knee-knocking, tooth-gnashing, hair-pulling anxiety in the High Minded and Lofty Thinking crowd. These worthy folk will decry the notion as barbaric, so horrid and reprehensible that not even the Cheney-Bush administration proposed it.

Perhaps it is an idea whose time has not yet come. Still, one way or another, the US and countries of similar mind must take the violence to the pirates, up close and personal. The advantages the US and other advanced technology countries have in surveillance, communication and specialised violence application forces gives the good guys an awesome advantage over the Jolly Swagmen of Somalia.

But, (here it is, the inevitable, big "but") our advantages whether in billion dollar warships, or multi-million dollar aerial platforms or the skill and training concentrated in the right index finger of a sniper go for nothing if we do not have the political will to use what we have. Here is the irony: Political will does not even merit a line item in any budget, but without it nothing else matters.

We Won A Skirmish, But Now What?

President Obama, perhaps both coshed and cozened by the international media coverage of the seizure of Captain Richard Phillips, to say nothing of his abortive escape attempt, departed from his initial give-peace-a-chance stance to allow the use of lethal force at the discretion of the local USN commander. The result was three shots, three dead pirates and one freed captain.

All hands (except, of course, the Pirates of Puntland) are pleased with the outcome of the Maersk Alabama affair. Even the French must be happy given that they pioneered the way.

The afterglow of success will undoubtedly fade rapidly. This is inevitable given that one small victory, no matter how emotionally satisfying, does not alter the basic dynamic pitting skiff-riding gun toting thugs against the collective interests of most of the world's nations.

Along with second guessing comes political backbiting.

For example, it has been alleged that the president came late--almost too late--to the conclusion that violence and its attendant risks must be authorised and accepted. The Geek has no problem with the basic contention, provided that it is also acknowledged that the administration and president did finally get a grip on reality and make the right choice.

There are those who argue one successful mission must lead to more (hopefully) successful operations.

Shane Murphy, the executive officer on the Maersk Alabama, has taken the position that the US must take the lead role in defeating the Somali pirates. A similar position has been taken by at least one senior US Navy officer who has been quoted as saying that only by going ashore and directly attacking the pirate strongholds such as that at Ely can success over the long haul be achieved. Annie Jacobsen writing in Pajamas Media today contends that the US must take the leadership role in liberating the more than two hundred captive seamen currently held in Somalia.

Then there are the voices who counsel caution.

Hands are busily wringing over the possibility that the pirates will now become more bloodthirsty.

These anxiety ridden folks harp on just how "humane" the fishermen-turned-muggers have been. They haven't killed anyone. The Nice-Guys-Turned-Crook have even passed the satellite phone around so hostages could call home. Heck, these misunderstood Muslims have even slaughtered a goat or two with which to feast their involuntary guests.

Now, the spokesmen for pessimism announce, because of this reckless American action (they seem curiously unaware of the French precursors) the pirates will shoot first and slaughter sailors not goats. Blood will darken the Gulf of Aden where only peace and flower power were found before.

The aquatic scum of the Somali coast have done their best to stoke this particular bonfire of fear. The AK-wavers don't even like the term "pirate." No. These self-described Muslims are not maritime criminals. Perish the thought! They are "marines," "coastguards" perhaps even, "environmental protection officers." Never pirates.

But now those murderous Americans and the equally homicidal French (yes, the Puntland buccaneers remember the French raids) have changed the rules of the game. Now, vengeance is ours say the Muslim Men of the Jolly Roger.

Not to be left behind the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the Western World are gnashing teeth in a frenzy of apprehension that the US or some other rogue nation (like the French?) will actually seek to use force in the future either to stop crime at sea or rescue the victims of that crime from the Hospitalers of Ely. While Ban ki-Moon has not yet joined the chorus, it is only a matter of time before he does so.

It has already been suggested by one of the UN SecGen's immediate subordinates that the UN declare a role for itself in collapsed states such as Somalia. He argued that since the UN has already carved out a role for itself in collapsing and rogue states ranging from former Yugoslavia to the assorted imploding states of West Africa, that it enlarge its mission to include utter failures such as Somalia.

The UN gambit comports nicely with the assorted High Minded types who have been loudly claiming that there can be no solution to maritime thuggery in the Gulf of Aden without the establishment of a firm, functioning state in place of the current morass of armed Islamist anarchy occupying the region going by the name of Somalia. The motto of this crew seems to be "We have never met a nation we don't want to build."

OK, that lays out the parameters of the debate--a term which the Geek uses generically only. Now it's time to take a closer dekko at the options on the table currently.

Building a nation in Somalia is a labor far surpassing those once undertaken by Hercules. A couple of reasons might be adduced to support this conclusion.

The first is simple. Somalia has never been more than a geographic expression inhabited by contesting tribes which was artificially elevated to the status of nation-state by the interlocking imperatives of the Cold War and de-colonization. It has no reason to exist. It has no shared heritage beyond that of tribal rivalry and playground for outside powers both European and Arab. It has no viable economic base beyond subsistence herding, agriculture, slave-trading and piracy. It has no collective political structure and, arguably, never has had one except that which may have been temporarily imposed by outside forces and internal responses to those foreign vectors.

The second is slightly more complex. In what image and likeness will the nation-state of Somalia be created? The Western style liberal, pluralistic, secular democracy?

Fer sure, dudes, that's the ticket. Dispatching that alternative is easy. Look at Afghanistan. Even in that handwork of the West, a semi-democracy with a more-or-less functioning parliamentary system look what happens when the parliament has the effrontery to pass and the president sign a law on civil status which Western liberals find objectionable. Apparently the West is all for democracy and its institutions until they produce a result which is repugnant to the West.

Then there is the Islamist alternative. An Islamic state with Sharia in effect. The question remains as to just whose interpretation of Islam and Sharia will be given pride of place. Right now that matter is being fought out (literally) between "moderate" Islamists (aka the government) and "extreme" Islamists (aka al-Shabab.) It appears that to Somali Muslims their religious debates are a full contact sport in which fatalities are to be expected.

Get a grip on reality. Nation-building is not an option unless one is smoking or otherwise ingesting a really, really righteous hallucinogen.

A massive raid on the pirate hideouts with the intent of freeing the over two hundred captive sailors is only slightly less hallucinatory. While such a raid by the US with or without the cooperation of other countries is possible in principle, there are some very real complications in practice.

The first of these is the diverse nationalities of the captive crews. At last count more than two dozen nations were represented in the hostage pool. Gaining the agreement of all the governments involved would constitute a diplomatic nightmare of the harshest sort. This is particularly true since very few of the governments would be in a position to offer forces for participation in any hypothetical raid.

The second complication is related to the first as well as having a stand-alone saliency. Not all the hostages would come through the raid alive and well. Quite possibly the majority would be either killed or wounded. In the final analysis it will not matter if captives are killed by pirate bullets or those of the "rescue raiders" or are simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.

What matters is that many would die. This is inevitable given the large number of captives as well as the uncertainties as to their location, number and location of guards, the time necessary to execute the operation and the inherent imponderables of contact.

Along with dead captives it is certain that Somali non-combatants would die as well. The gunslingers of Ely and other pirate ports do not allow the civilians to get the hell out of Dodge. The pirates not unlike Hamas value civilian shields as an inhibitor of hostile action.

Then there are assorted technical problems. If the raid were to be conducted by a multilateral force, how would functions be assigned? Unity of command retained? Intelligence shared and interpreted? How long a preparation would be required? What about rehearsals? How to make sure the targets did not gain forewarning? (Pace, Ms Jacobsen, but a raid of this magnitude takes time to prepare. You can't just send the MEU aboard the USS Boxer ashore with the directions to kick butt and take names along with rescuing the good guys.)

All that is necessary is to remember the Son Tay POW camp raid, the Mayaguez rescue debacle and the disaster at Desert One to get a realistic handle on the complexity of an operation directed at either rescuing the hostage mariners or seeking to capture/kill a significant number of the pirates ashore. Gives one pause for thought, heh?

This leaves, as the least-worst option, a plused-up version of what we and other countries have been doing to date.

Merchant ships should (sit down, all you lawyers and keep quiet) have armed security parties. Perhaps not all, but enough so as to introduce uncertainty in the minds of the Jolly Swagmen as to which ships are sufficiently soft targets to merit attention.

Mandatory convoying systems should be installed. This would be the most effective use of limited naval power resources. And, as two World Wars have demonstrated, convoys may be slower than independent routing, but they are much, much safer for the ships involved.

Maritime surveillance assets must be increased so as to allow detection of suspicious vessels in time for these to be interdicted by friendly naval units. If the stop-and-board order is not obeyed instantly and completely, lethal force must be pre-authorised and used without delay. Any survivors should be taken into custody with a view to judicial proceedings.

Hijacked vessels must be shadowed. They must not be allowed to reach the Somalian coast. If this means forcible entry at sea with the risk of friendly casualties, so be it. Again, surviving criminals should be arrested with the goal of trial.

Where should the trials take place? The best option would be in the national courts of the warship effecting the arrest. This option would obviate the ad hoc agreements such as that in place between the US and Kenya. It would also prevent jurisdictional disputes between the country having registry (often a semi-bogus or totally bogus arrangement) and that of the shipowner or to which the crew holds allegiance.

The International Convention on the Laws of the Sea seems to allow the country effecting the arrest of pirates to hold trial and inflict punishment. While not a perfect answer it is good enough. And, given the current situation as well as its probable horizontal escalation, a good enough solution which is timely beats a perfect answer coming too late.

History is replete with examples of situations where force applied and risks taken early in developing international situation would have (or, on a very few occasions, did) preclude massive violence and bloodshed later. We are at such a critical juncture right now.

We, or at least the French and Americans, have shown testicular fortitude. Now, if we (the French, the Americans and other directly involved countries) have the brains necessary to acknowledge that reality dictates that suitable violence, suitably employed, will have the best chance to abate the threat of piracy off Somalia and prevent its emergence elsewhere, there is reason to be optimistic about the future. If, however, the hand-wringing fearful and High Minded gain ascendancy, the future looks bleak, very, very bleak.

Thumbs Up All The Way Around

Congratulations first of all to Captain Richard Phillips. From the fragmentary news reports coming out of Mombasa it is clear that he was the key figure in setting the stage for his crew's recovery of their ship as well as their personal safety. Putting one's self into the hands of the piratical goons of Somalia was an act of heroism in the finest traditions of the sea--and then some.

The Maersk Alabama's executive officer and crew also deserve kudos for acting quickly to turn the tables on the pirate left to secure them and their ship. While their effort to exchange the Jolly Swagman for the captain failed, it bought time for the cavalry in the form of the USS Bainbridge to arrive. It also assured massive media coverage. The kind of coverage which acts as a powerful lever on an administration which is politically sensitive even if often too high minded for the nation's good.

The Navy--in particular the operators who effected the rescue--are due a salute for doing a demanding job with the highest level of professional competence. A "well done" should go to all hands from all of us, We the People. (In the Geek's estimate the "well done" should also go to Adm. Gregg Smith at CentCom who demonstrated a fine sense of understated irony in properly placing the pirate fatalities on the pirates' poor decision making skills.)

Congratulations must be extended to the Obama administration generally and the President in particular for having done the right thing--keeping out of the affair publicly. When President Obama went two days without saying a single word on the "hostage drama" underway off the African coast, it was an encouraging sign. Silence implied (or at least allowed the inference) that a decision had been made to use direct action after a show of negotiations had been made and failed.

While the competence of the FBI negotiation team must be questioned given the severe cultural and other differences between maritime thugs of Somali provenance and the training and previous experience of the Feebs, negotiations had to be attempted if for no other reason than CYA in the event the direct action resulted in Captain Phillips' death or injury. The negotiation base also had to be touched to mollify the High Minded both inside and without the administration.

The Somali elders interjecting themselves into the negotiation process was drearily predictable given that captured pirates taken to the US might prove to be embarrassing founts of information. The elders' gesture was also predictable since it gave a chance for some sort of assertion to the effect that the old ways of organising Somali society still had merit and potency.

The critical and praiseworthy feature of the aborted negotiations was not the dropping of the ransom demand by the elders. No. That was a non-starter as the old guys of the village square must have known. The fulcrum point was the rejection by the US of the Somali condition that the pirates not be arrested. The acquatic scum could have been cut loose by any member of the Obama administration--the SecState, the AG, the President himself. But, no deal was made. No pirate would walk--except as doing a "perp walk" for the media.

Now to complete the deal, to fire a genuine warning shot across the bows of the Pirates of Puntland, the sole surviving Jolly Swagman has to be tried for his part in the crime. More, he has to be tried here in the US. No off loading the dude onto the courts of Kenya--let alone the Sharia system of that cesspool of Islamist anarchy bearing the moniker Somalia.

Attorney General Holder has stated that the US has the legal authority to try the last Somalian standing in this affair. The Feebie is interviewing the crew of the Maersk Alabama. Presumably they will do the same with Captain Phillips. It would take remarkably stupid money to bet against the feds building a case which will stick.

The French and now the Americans have shown how the task of defeating and deterring pirates is properly discharged. Both country's naval and military forces have shown what history has demonstrated again and again. Piracy is stopped by the robust enforcement of the laws both ancient and modern against the stealing of ships and seizure of crews for ransom.

Ending piracy and pirates does not require complex socio-economic theories. It does not need the constitution of effective western style governments. It does not even depend upon the creation of new international courts or coordinating bodies.

All that is needed is the possession of a credible capacity to use force. And, (this time the critical word is "and," not "but") the political will to use that force regardless of the reality that while risks can be controlled, minimised, they can never be eliminated.

President Obama by keeping silent and finally allowing the naval forces of the US to do their job appropriately has shown that he can have the requisite intellectual and moral courage to exercise political will for the longer term benefit of the US and other nations whose ships and people are put at risk by the Jolly Roger flying thugs of Somalia. It is to be hoped that this is not a one time demonstration. That the President and his people will do it again. If necessary.

It probably will be. The pirates (who describe themselves as Muslims) will be back again. And, in that old time Muslim mood of revenge-wanted-here.

Are The Pirates Of Somalia An Overstated Threat?

John Patch is a thoughtful, experienced man. He has been a Navy surface warfare officer, an intelligence analyst and now teaches at the Army War College. In a tightly reasoned and well argued piece on the US Naval Institute website he contends that the threat posed by the Jolly Swagmen of Somalia is overstated and that the US runs the real risk of basing policy on the emotions of the moment rather than a realistic assessment of national and strategic interests.

The Geek respectfully disagrees with the first part of Patch's argument. The Geek does not, however dissent from the latter component.

That emotion is running above the Plimsoll line with the hostage drama currently underway cannot be denied. The US mainstream media are awash in it. Fox News, for example, characterises the aquatic muggers of Somalia as being the "grave challenge" prophesied by Joe Biden months ago, a challenge which is virtually insoluble. One time Swift boat officer and now Senator John Kerry has called for a "policy debate" on the "growing threat of piracy." There are reports that unidentified "national security officials" are considering cruise missile or Hellfire strikes on al-Shabab "training camps" in Somalia.

Given these indicators it is difficult, no, impossible to argue that emotion is not outstripping reason and realpolitik with respect to the speedboat driving marauders.

"So, what's wrong with a little honest emotion, Geek? What's wrong with wanting to squash the pirates like a bunch of overripe grapes?"

"Yeah, Geek, just yesterday you were leading a cheering section for the French commandos and their president. A little inconsistent, wouldn't you say, Geeko?"

No, the Geek doesn't believe that he is being inconsistent in the least. His position is that the pirates of Somalia constitute a serious American national and strategic interest challenge. A challenge that must both be understood correctly and met in a realistic, prompt manner.

The threat presented by the pirates is more long term than short run. This is true despite the difficulties, delays, inefficiencies and increased expenses the pirate attacks and their necessary counters cause for the shipping industry.

There are several interlocking consequences of the piracy and the so far ineffective responses from the governments of major powers. These sequelae are of equal importance as they serve to reinforce each other.

The first consequence is horizontal escalation of piracy. The Niger River delta is a very likely place for imitative actions. There are others, including those in Southeast Asia.

A decade ago the Peoples Republic of China acted robustly against pirates threatening traffic to and from that country in several maritime chokepoints. Chinese naval vessels took dramatic action including the arrest of entire pirate crews. Quite often the arrests were followed by both trials and executions. As a result piracy was all but completely suppressed. It is making a comeback as a result of the Somalian successes and all but total immunity to adverse consequences.

The second consequence flowing from the conveyor belt of pirate victories is the increase of money available to assorted Islamist/jihadist groups. While it is impossible to audit the pirates' accounts so as to parse between cash going into criminal pockets (including transnational syndicates) and that sticking to the fingers of Islamists, there is no doubt but that the figure is substantial. Admittedly the ransom dollars lining Islamist pockets is small compared to the take from the Afghan opium trade. However not all Islamists have access to the narco-profits of Afghanistan but may have their hands cupped below the pirates' cash stream.

The third, and perhaps most important, consequence over the longer haul is simply precedent. As was the case a decade and more ago, the longer the US and other major western powers appear to be helpless giants before the threats presented by a few bold individuals, the more groups and states harboring ill-will toward the US and the West will be emboldened and empowered to pursue their hostility.

There is no doubt that the unseemly withdrawal of US forces from Somalia executed on orders from President Clinton following the Blackhawk Down incident sent a message of American lack of resolve, political will and capacity to accept casualties to those such as Osama bin Laden who wanted very much to hear and heed. The flaccid and often totally irrelevant responses to terror attacks conducted by the Clinton administration reinforced the image of the US as an inept and irresolute employer of armed force.

During the same years as well as in the decade following, the American concern about the quality and reliability of "actionable intelligence," the existence of "legal authorities," and worry over the necessity of reducing friendly fatalities were interpreted by Islamists as meaning that the US and the American public lacked the intestinal fortitude for waging effective war and seeing its own citizens and soldiers die in the pursuit of national interest. From the perspective of the Islamist jihadist this meant the US was at an automatic and permanent disadvantage.

The bottom line?

Simple and unpleasant. Uncle Sam could have his beard tweaked, his groin kicked without real risk to the tweaker and kicker.

Events to date in Afghanistan and Iraq have not undercut the force of the initial conclusion. Neither has the American response to the pirates of Somalia. At least not yet.

In short a failure to effectively and promptly address the challenge of the Jolly Swagmen particularly now that they have attacked the US directly will parallel in effects the failures of the Clinton presidency to meet in an appropriate up-close-and-personal way the attacks on Americans and American interests. This, Mr Patch, is what makes the seagoing thugs of Somalia an important threat to American national and strategic interests today.

It is because the matter--the consequences--are so important that we cannot react from emotion. Nor can we delay in our response.

In dealing effectively with the problem it is important to get a grip on a couple of basic realities. The first of these is that dealing with the pirates does not require creating a functioning full-featured government in Somalia. This contention is much loved not only by the High Minded who wish to see an ever-growing role for the UN but also by those who wish a plausible means by which action against the pirates can be delayed indefinitely.

All that is necessary is that the risks to pirates be increased and the rewards of piracy reduced. The second of these may be accomplished by nothing more lethal than an Executive Order prohibiting companies doing business in the US from paying ransom under whatsoever name. There is no problem there. Or, at least, there shouldn't be. Paying ransoms simply means there will be more demands for ransom. The shipping industry knows that; it just wants some cover to preclude ransom payment in the future. The Executive Order does that.

Risk to pirates can be increased only through the use of force. This means killing people. High Minded folks and lawyers alike may feel their knees knocking over this prospect, but it is reality. As long as people believe there is no risk involved they will be ready, willing and eager to raise the Jolly Roger and cruise for booty.

Of course the use of force, particularly in a situation such as that currently underway in the ocean off Somalia carries the very real risk of friendly casualties, even friendly fatalities. The French operation the other day underscores that distasteful fact. A French citizen died during the successful rescue raid.

Islamist jihadists have long believed that they, in the words of one of their number, "love death more than the (Americans) love life." The Somali Muslim pirates in the lifeboat with their hostage, Captain Phillips, must share this belief. Why else would they not only have vowed Phillips will die if a rescue operation is attempted but also demand a two million dollar ransom for the captain?

As a matter of effective policy the life of a hostage must be written off as soon as the person is seized by hostiles. While such a stance is repugnant to natural human sentiments, sentiments have no role in policy formulation and execution.

Hostage takers, particularly those such as the Somalis who exhibit mercenary as well as self-protective motivation, want to write a narrative in which the hostage plays the leading role. Their narrative cannot be allowed to stand. It must be rewritten. The hostage must not occupy center stage.

The captor not the captive must stand front and center in the spotlight. His fate and not that of the hostage must be the focus of interest. The captor as well as potential future captors must be invited to consider their own future, their own chances of life or the type of death that awaits.

In order to make the lives of Americans (and others) safer in the future it is necessary to disabuse the pirates of Somalia as it is Islamist jihadists generally that the US government is so tender hearted and soft minded that it will allow national interest to be sacrificed for the life of a single American. Life is precious to us. Life is so precious that sometimes it must be protected by death.

The US must use force. Against the pirates. Even at the risk of an American dying in the process. The scope of force employment can, and perhaps should, include the homeport of the pirate crew responsible for the attempted seizure of the Maersk Alabama. It should, perhaps must, include the capture or sinking of pirate motherships and skiffs even when such are not directly threatening a merchant ship.

Use of force means that lives will be lost. Some of these lives will, inevitably, be "innocent." Policy must accept this and public opinion led to do so as well. The guiding star must be a historical truism that is so commonplace as to be trite. It is far, far better that a few lives be taken early in the game than many, many lives be lost later.