The Anus Bomb And Other Developments

You no doubt recall the attempted assassination of Saudi counter-terrorism capo, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef a few weeks back. The central figure in this "martyrdom operation," one Abdullah Hassan al-Asiri, carried the small bomb and associated triggering mechanism protected by a shield of intestine (of course not from a pig) within the nether reaches of his sigmoid or descending colon.

After having traveled on the prince's private jet and arriving at the prince's house all the while protected by his announced intention of "repenting" of his icky-poo terrorist ways, the device was triggered by a cell phone sending a text message. The resulting blast lightly injured the prince and fragmented the "martyr's" body into some seventy pieces. The collateral damage to the prince's house is visually impressive.

After weeks of silence, intelligence personnel in both France and the US have expressed concern over this new genre of threat. A relatively small device even when the blast is attenuated by the carrier's body could cause explosive decompression and catastrophic structural failure in an airliner at altitude. Whether swallowed in the way long performed by mules carrying drugs or diamonds, or, in the alternative way time honored by convicts, inserted as a suppository, the anus bomb is a new and challenging threat.

Right now there are only two practical ways of inhibiting the use of such devices on airliners. One would be the confiscation of all electronic gizmos which could be used as detonators such as cell phones, ipods, and laptop computers. The other is the use of whole body x-ray scans.

Both of these approaches have major drawbacks--particularly the second. Frequent flyers would be exposed to a significant health risk. That rather makes the hard x-ray scan a non-starter. Confiscation of electronic triggering devices would be a logistics headache to say the least. Beyond that, the development of very low power radio frequency trigger mechanisms in, say, a wristwatch, would be an easy work around for the ambitious wannabe martyr and his controllers.

The inventiveness of the Islamist jihadists is impressive. The anus bomb has long been considered as a potential, but was never really taken seriously until Mr al-Asiri energetically disassembled himself. Now that proof-of-concept testing has been completed, it can be anticipated that design refinements will be undertaken. The al-Asiri bomb is believed to have been only three or so inches in length with an explosive load of only four ounces. Much larger bombs can be accommodated when the suppository method is used.

Another potential is the surgical insertion of a bomb. The human body has a fair amount of waste space in the abdomen particularly if the individual is well provided with adipose tissue.

Anus or belly bombs will prove to be a real challenge for security personnel. There is no easy, cheap, or quick way of detecting a bomb shielded by the body of its carrier. The Geek has to confess he is amused as he considers the assorted screening and detection methods which might be employed. (He is also glad that he no longer flies with the frequency he once did.)

The Nice Young Man From Chicago is a another difficult to counter threat. With the latest indicators from the depths of inside-the-beltway Deep Thinking, presidential variety, the best that can be determined is that Mr Obama is going to compromise on the Afghanistan troop deployment issue.

No great increase, perhaps none at all, and no cut-and-run Joe Biden style decrease either. This position, taken by the president during a meeting with congressional leaders of both parties, was set against the background of deprecating the threat presented by al-Qaeda.

Mr Obama and his national security (look grim for the photo, people) team have all but declared "Mission accomplished" regarding al-Qaeda. Admittedly, al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and the FATA of Pakistan has been attenuated severely. The effective strength of al-Qaeda in the area is in the very low hundreds, perhaps as low as single hundred. These personnel are primarily involved in training and the making of IEDs.

However, as Mark Twain was fond of saying, "Reports of my death have been exaggerated."

Whether al-Qaeda is on the ropes is not particularly relevant. Al-Qaeda has been primarily useful as a symbol around which Islamist jihadists everywhere can self-organize. Even if every last "member" of al-Qaeda to include Osama bin Laden were to be killed, the power of al-Qaeda as a symbol, a myth, would not be erased.

The assorted groups which rally under the rubric of Taliban are far from defeated either in Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is this congeries which is most relevant right now. It is this assemblage of Islamist jihadists which must be defeated. And, the defeat must be clear for all present and potential Islamist jihadists around the world.

Anything less will assure that Islamist jihadism continues to exercise an appeal to many young men in the Muslim population of the globe. Even if the methods employed by Taliban and its ilk, particularly the targeting of civilians, have caused a significant loss of support within Islam, enough are still ready, willing, and eager to find their personal identity and self-worth in combat against the "infidels" and "apostates."

The only way to limit the siren song of Islamist jihadism is the defeat of Taliban. This will not in and of itself spell the end of the jihadist threat, but it will serve to diminish the attractiveness of dying for the faith, or even of becoming a True Believer in that version of Islam.

Longer term, it is essential that Islamist jihadism be countered wherever it exists. This implies that the US and other Western countries including Russia will find it in their national and strategic interests to use military force far from home, in the remote areas where the jihadist seeks sanctuary. It will not just be a long war but a long series of small conflicts extending decades into the future.

While a mort of years stretches before us when contemplating the Islamist jihadist challenge, time is of the essence in decision making on Afghanistan. The president is not yet acting as if he both understands and is responding on this basis. Senator McCain was quite correct when he told the president that "time was not on our side."

President Obama needs to get a grip on this reality. He also needs to get a grip on the nettle of sending sufficient force to Afghanistan so as to assure that militarily the US and its allies achieve the minimum necessary strategic goal of "not-losing."

Enough of the dismal. There are a couple of nifty developments on the upside of life.

The Iranians are missing a couple of nuclear scientists. One went missing in Saudi Arabia during the haj. Sharam Amiri has been reported missing by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The ministry took the unprecedented step of asking the Saudis to look for the missing man. (Quite a few Iranians go missing during the annual pilgrimage, and the Foreign Ministry is typically unconcerned.)

Reportedly Amiri was working at the recently disclosed secret enrichment site before he wandered off. The same was true with respect to the second missing man, Asharq al-Awsat, who goes by his middle name, Ardeblili, and is described by the Iranian government as a businessman. He went off the radar screen while in Georgia (the country) last summer but has been reported to have been spirited off to the US.

Sorry about that, Ahmedinejad. But, couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of folks.

In Somalia, the pirates have received another lesson in the necessity of proper target identification. A bunch of these wild and crazy guys took on the French naval vessel Somme yesterday during the hours of darkness. Apparently they mistook this command and supply ship for a fat juicy merchant vessel. They were wrong. Five survivors are in custody.

The Pirates of Puntland seem to have a fixation on the French. Last May a bunch of the boys took on a French frigate. (How they misidentified such an obvious warship for a merchantman beats the hell out of the Geek.) The pirates were taken for trial in France.

Another gang that couldn't see straight tried to capture the FGS Spessart back on 30 March. While the Spessart is a cargo ship, it is not a merchant one. The Germans demonstrated a will to combat unobserved in Afghanistan and apprehended the gang.

Despite the statistics which show a great increase in the number of pirate attacks attempted in the waters off the northeast African coast, these incidents are good evidence that numbers do not mean success. Nonetheless, it would behoove all hands for the warships in the area not to wait for astigmatic pirates to come to them, but rather to go after the pirates, particularly the "mother ships," with more vigor and determination.

It would also behoove the US and the countries of NATO and the European Union to use their collective clout in the UN to enlarge the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court so that there would be a single judicial body of competence to try and (hopefully) convict the pirates seized in flagrante.

At least the attempt to enlarge the jurisdiction of the ICC would give our UN Ambassador, Susan Rice, something to do. Something of greater good for the world than her brokering of a deal to protect the sensibilities of Muslims at the expense of free, untrammeled speech.

Maybe President Obama can consider telling her to do this just as soon as he tires of kicking the Afghan can down the street.

Once More Taliban Defeats Taliban

In past posts the Geek has hammered away on a critical point. In an insurgency the insurgents are often their own worst enemy. Excesses executed by the insurgents serve to alienate potential support among the uncommitted majority and push the center closer to the counterinsurgent side.

In Iraq the defeat of the insurgents of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups was evident as soon as these Islamist jihadist True Believers became overly robust in imposing their unique and intolerant view of what constituted proper Muslim behavior. As soon as that happened it was inevitable that popular revulsion would set in to the benefit of the Americans and the Baghdad government. The insurgent propensity for using suicide bombs against soft, civilian targets hastened the coming of the end.

The same dynamic has been seen in Afghanistan. Particularly as Taliban hit soft civilian targets two years ago, opinion shifted toward the government. This trend slowed and even reversed in the face of American and Coalition air strikes which resulted in civilian casualties. The pendulum can swing quickly if Taliban--particularly non-Afghans fighting for Taliban--start up the civilian targeting again or chop off too many heads, hands or other body parts in the name of Islamist purity.

Now we are seeing the dynamic in full swing in Pakistan. As the Geek predicted some months ago, Taliban overplayed its hand in Swat. Further, under government pressure, Taliban ramped up a sucide bombing effort directed not against government, military or police targets but rather against civilians.

The result has been so dramatic that even the New York Times, which so often seems to be on its knees beseeching some almighty power for an American defeat, has recognised it. Beatings, beheadings, killings generally along with extortion, bully-boy ass kickings, expropriations and generalised repression of the most egregious sort alienated even those who first welcomed the promise of fair, impartial, uncorrupt Sharia.

As it lost in Swat, Taliban resorted to the tried and true tactics of terror. Suicide and other bombs exploded around the country. In common with the Iraqis and Afghans, the Pakistanis can tolerate a fair amount of lethal violence directed against legitimate targets such as military and police posts or governmental installations. It may not be a time for a shrug and yawn, but as long as the bombs and bullets are restricted to an acceptable range of targets, there's no particular rush to anger.

This is why the Geek chortled with more than a little glee when some damnfool Taliban type blew himself up during Friday prayers at a mosque in the Upper Dir District. When the body parts were reassembled, the count was over thirty killed, some of them children.

It was a case of a bomb too far.

The locals have taken to the hills. In pursuit of Taliban. Particularly the foreign fighters in Taliban's service. With a verve which almost puts the outrage of the Minutemen of Concord to shame, the tribals have surrounded several villages harboring Taliban fighters. To say the local and national governments are pleased is to engage in extreme understatement. The local tribesmen have formed an irregular militia at least five hundred strong and opened a large, economy size can of whup-ass on the (to use the current approved Pakistani government term) "miscreants."

This development indicates the creation of a new, creative synergy in Pakistan. The success of the Pakistani army in Swat has both driven the Taliban to unacceptable extremes and emboldened the locals by giving them faith that the army will not leave them dangling out in the gales of politics--Pakistani style. By their action the tribesmen have given encouragement of the most visible sort to Islamabad to keep the pressure on the turbaned fanatics.

Keeping the heat on Taliban is critical. It is every bit as important as the need for Islamabad to address (with the backstage assistance of the US and others) the needs of the refugees from Swat including their return to the region and re-establishment of their disrupted lives.

Insurgencies are determined as to their outcome (just as conventional wars are) by possession of the initiative. The Big Mo (to quote George H.W. Bush) is key to success on the battlefield. It is just the same in the contest for allegiance and perceived legitimacy. Right now the bloodshed has bought Islamabad time to meet the requirements for functional legitimacy with the displaced persons of Swat, the tribes of the FATA and the disillusioned generally.

But, as the decision makers of Islamabad (and Washington) try to focus on the non-violent aspects of regaining and maintaining the ascendancy in the struggle for perceived legitimacy among the uncommitted or partially committed majority, it is essential that the armed pressure be kept on the Taliban trigger pullers. The war--as the tribesmen of Upper Dir are showing--must be brought up close and personal to the Taliban. They must be given no sanctuary, no place to hide, to regroup, to replenish the means and will to keep on fighting.

This requirement loops into the usage of the new American forces in Afghanistan. Operations in the border area must mesh to an effective extent with both regular and citizen militia forces doing their thing in and near the FATA. Only in that way will the "anti-miscreant" forces create an anvil and hammer which will mean the end of Taliban as a clear and present danger to both countries.

A second requirement is that the onus for civilian casualties must be placed upon Taliban, most importantly the foreign elements within Taliban. Both Afghans and Pakistanis appear to have the same rough calculus of acceptability: Muslim local kills Muslim local is OK; Muslim foreigner kills Muslim local is not OK; non-Muslim foreigner kills Muslim local is very, very bad.

That priority of perception must be kept in mind when planning and executing all military operations. It must govern not only what is done but how it is done. As a consequence American lives will be placed at greater risk. But, without taking all possible measures to assure that all of us outside non-Muslims do not kill local Muslim non-combatants, we do nothing but strengthen the appeal of Taliban.

This reality is yet one more unpleasant ground truth in a war which has already developed more than a few new, distasteful realities. But, to win we must insist that only the enemy kill the women, the children, the non-combatant.

In that way we can help Taliban kill its way to defeat.