Ten Pirates In A Leaky Tub

You will recall that last week the Russians taught a bunch of skiff-riding, gun-toting unemployed Somali "fishermen" the error of their ways. Having seized the Russian owned and crewed tanker, MV Moscow University, the pirates then sought to shoot it out with Russian naval infantry undertaking a heliborne rescue and recovery mission. In the process only one Somali buccaneer died.

The Russians later sent the others packing in either (take your pick as news accounts differed after the incident) in their skiff or "an inflatable boat." An hour later the Russians acknowledge that they lost either radio or radar contact with the pirates as they set sail for home some three hundred statute miles away. Fellow Raiders of the Briney Deep safely ashore in Somalia confirm that there has been no contact with their colleagues in crime since the Russians cut them loose without navigation equipment or weapons.

Reportedly the Russians considered (at least briefly) the idea of hauling the pirates back to Moscow for trial but decided not to given the uncertainties in international law and consequent problems in obtaining a conviction. Subsequently, President Medvedev averred that unless and until an adequate international system for bringing pirates to justice, "we will have to act as our forefathers did when they met pirates."

While NPR caustically questioned the correctness of setting the poor dear fishermen from the ungoverned geographic expression of Somalia off without any navigational instruments, it does strike this observer as a useful, cost effective way of giving the Daring Desperadoes of the Deep a better chance of staying alive than either a short drop from a (metaphorical) yardarm or a stint in the Siberian Gulag. If nothing else the Russian action does give a certain impetus to the creation of a special international tribunal to handle the pirates of Somalia and elsewhere.

Not surprisingly the Maritime Marauders have shown their typically overinflated sense of self-importance. An alleged "pirate commander" vowed to hold the Russians responsible for any harm which may have befallen their missing comrades in banditry. This pretense of being akin to a sovereign state is risible to say the least. In reply someone should remind the jacked-up thug just how fast his associates beat feet as the Islamists moved in on their particular pirates' cove.

The problem of securing the sealanes in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden remains. So also does the kindred problem of the spread of piracy to the coast of Nigeria and the growing threat of both piracy and marine terrorism in the Straits of Malacca. The three challenges are linked by a common thread of religiously predicated political ideology. The pirates (and terrorists) of all three regions are directly or indirectly connected with Islamism and its armed twin, jihadism.

While individual shipowners may see the ransoms as an acceptable cost of doing business, the net effect of seizures made and ransoms paid has been the imposition of ever growing collective costs on the global economy. In addition, the seeming impotence of the assembled international flotilla to deter, let alone successfully either defend or recover stolen ships, lowers the credibility of the civilized states generally in their confrontation with global Islamism and jihadism.

At the very minimum the US should throw its diplomatic weight (if any is left) behind the Russian proposal for a UN created "Piracy Court." This approach is long overdue and is equally well provided for by precedent. If the International Criminal Court is any guide, the processes of the proposed court would be so lengthy that any pirates hailed before it would rot a suitably long time in durance more-or-less-vile so that they will be too old to keep on with living on the Somalian version of the Bounding Main even if acquitted.

Better yet, the US (and other countries as well) should go ahead and emulate the Russians in the rescue and recovery of the MV Moscow University and its crew. Most, if not all, the navies currently represented in the anti-piracy patrols have a special operations capability at least equivalent to that of the Russians. Certainly the US does. So, why not use it?

Sure there will be casualties. Pirates will die. (Hopefully.) Perhaps some captive crewmen will as well although that possibility can be lowered significantly if every ship has a secure room such as that aboard the MV Moscow University to which they can retreat after cutting off the main engines. Keeping in contact with the rescue forces would also be possible as shown by the MV Moscow University incident.

Historically, piracy has been suppressed only when the costs of doing piratical business are elevated to an unacceptable level. This has occurred when sufficient numbers of pirates have ended dead: violently dead or incapacitated through long, long incarceration.

Since the current "system" for bringing pirates to justice is not even good enough to aspire to the term "laughable," there is an immediate need to admit that President Medvedev is right: we have to deal with the saltwater brigands as did our ancestors. Perhaps not with a modern replica of Execution Dock, but certainly with a robust willingness to use force. (Adopting the Russian model of setting pirates loose in a leaky boat is strictly optional.)

Way To Go, Vladimir!

Yesterday the Geek contended that Russian PM Vladimir Putin had little if any real choice in dealing with the Jolly Pirates of Puntland after they hit the big time by boarding and seizing the Russian government owned, Russian crewed tanker, MV Moscow University. A number of factors both foreign and domestic dictated that the only viable Russian response would be a military one.

Nonetheless it was heartwarming to read of the Russian marines having retaken the ship at the cost of no friendly lives. Unfortunately, only one of the pirates was killed after they opened fire on the approaching marine force.

Putin's decision was made easier by the fact that the ship's crew had taken refuge in the ship's "security room" after having shut down the main engines. This meant the target would be stationary and the only humanoid forms visible would be those of the maritime muggers.

Still, things could have gone wrong. For example, by some concatenation of misfortune the 86,000 tons of oil might have been released, or caught fire. Either would have raised a storm of environmentalist protest. Or, a pirate might have gotten lucky, shot down a troop laden helicopter. Or, unbeknownst to crew or rescuers alike the pirates might have placed a large, lethal explosive charge next to the bulkhead protecting the secure room.

Even for a man who is well known for his decisiveness and relative indifference to body counts, the decision would not have come lightly to Vladimir. To his credit, he made the right choice--quickly. Also to the credit of the Russians, their small surface combatant on station was properly equipped with special operations personnel as well as the necessary support and delivery systems. The senior command had been forward looking in their planning and had anticipated the necessity of putting men on board a pirate-seized ship.

The most important facet of Putin's choice is its existence as a model for and challenge to other governmental leaders. The Russians have joined the French in putting troops on a pirate held vessel in order to effect a rescue. The Russians have surpassed the French in that their operation was conducted on the high seas and resulted in saving ship and cargo as well as crew.

(No, the Geek has not forgotten the US Navy rescue of the captain of the Maersk Alabama as he was held by four thugs-with-guns on a lifeboat. But, that operation was qualitatively different from as well as less risky than that undertaken by the Russians.)

The Russian action does require one to wonder why other governments, particularly those such as the UK, Germany, and China which possess special operations capacities have not used them for the benefit of their nationals, their ships. Perhaps the answer is to be found in the combination of circumstances which forced Putin's hand this time.

There have been previous incidents where Russian nationals have constituted all or part of a crew taken hostage by the Raiders of the Somali Coast. In none of those cases did the Russian navy intervene. This implies that the Kremlin is not moved simply by the sight of Russians in piratical durance vile.

Nor have the Lads in the Kremlin been deterred by merely the thought that "innocent" people might die in the course of a rescue operation. One need remember only the use by Russian special duty troops of a BZ type agent in the conduct of the assault on the terrorist held Moscow theater a few years ago. (Note BZ type agents are only "non-lethal" in theory; in practice this class of "incapacitating agents" will result in at least ten percent fatalities.)

While Western governments as well as Western publics may shy from robust measures fearing loss of non-combatant or hostage lives, this is not the case with Russia. So, what made the difference in this most recent case?

The answer is simple. It was laid out in detail yesterday in the Geek's blog. Putin had no realistic alternative assuming he wanted both to keep his hands on the levers of power and retain the respect of Beijing.

The next Russian crew which runs afoul the Ak-waving, skiff-riding bunch of Somali "unemployed fishermen" may not be so lucky. Militating against this melancholy conclusion is the simple fact that Vladimir The Bold has acted as he did this time. This raises a key question: Can Putin now let go of the tiger whose tail he has so firmly grabbed?

This is a poser for the "Good Czar." The only thing worse than the appearance of weakness is a policy of vacillation. Having taken the tough line, Vladimir The Decisive cannot now shift to one which is--or seems--less firm.

Unless, of course, he wants to change his name from Vladimir to Barak.

Hey, Vladimir, You Going To Wimp Out This Time?

The Jolly Swashbucklers of Somalia have hit the big time with the seizure of the MV Moscow University. The ship is registered under the Liberian flag but is owned by a Russian company and is crewed by honest-to-gosh Russians. It is carrying a fifty megabuck cargo of oil to China.

The ship was taken by the usual skiffs filled with "unemployed fishermen" equipped with the ever present Russian designed AK-47 and rocket propelled grenades (probably also of an initial Russian provenance.) The crew apparently played hide-and-seek with the pirates for some minutes or even hours while sending out distress calls. Finally the crew locked themselves in the ship's "secure room."

To some extent the Russian ship's crew (or at least the captain) has responsibility for the current predicament. The ship was not registered with the Maritime Security Center, which is the clearinghouse for maritime traffic and is supposed to assure a greater level of immunity to pirate attacks.

According to a spokesman for the European Union's pirate fighting detachment in the region, the MV Moscow University contacted a Russian warship on duty in the Gulf of Aden reporting the tanker and its eighty-six thousand tons of oil were being boarded. The Russian anti-submarine warfare vessel Marshal Shaposposhnikov headed to the Moscow University's reported position at flank speed.

As Vladimir Putin is wont to say, the situation is in need of clarification. While it may be presumed the Merry Buccaneers are in control of the ship, this is not certain. If the crew is hunkered down behind the locked, reinforced steel doors of their secure room an interesting question comes to mind: Just how are the Dauntless Ex-Fisherfolk of the Somali Coast going to drive their new acquisition given that it is a tad larger than the outboard powered skiffs they are used to?

Unless the teenage thugs are the greatest sailors since Barnacle Bill, the likelihood of getting the Moscow University to safe(?) harbor in Somalia some five hundred miles away are slim to none. This means they will have to elicit the cooperation of at least some of the Russians. If, as is typically the case, the Brigands of the Briney Deep have RPGs it will be possible for them to blast a good sized hole in the bulkheads or hatches of the "secure room."

Such a robust action brings with it the high chance of one or more Russians ending up dead or, if truly (un)lucky, badly wounded. In the past the Somali Swagmen have been reasonably careful not to kill crew members of the ships they hijack, but accidents can happen.

Right now, even in the absence of Russian corpses Vladimir Putin has a challenge. A very real challenge which if not handled properly will have an impact on his major league problem in the North Caucasus.

Unlike the last time the pirates captured a vessel with a Russian connection--remember?--the ship filled with tanks and other weapons, the MV Moscow University is laden not only with oil but with political symbolism. Consider the name. Now add to it the fact that the ship is owned by Novoship a subsidiary of Sovcomflot. As the name implies, Sovcomflot is owned by the government. Finally, think about the cargo--oil--and the destination--China.

Then there is the crew. Unlike the last time, the time of the tank carrying freighter, the crew is Russian. Not Ukrainian. Not a mixture of swab jockeys from former Soviet components or Warsaw Pact subordinates. Russians.

Think for a moment about the impoverished unemployed fishermen of Somalia. Think particularly of their religion. That's right, bucko, the pirates are Muslims.

Now the Geek is perfectly well aware that it is completely against the good manners of today to link icky-poo things such as armed robbery on the high seas or ineptly constructed but malignly intended vehicle borne improvised explosive devices left in Times Square with a religion. The Geek also acknowledges that Islam qua Islam in all probability is not high on the list of motivations for most Somalian gun-toting skiff-riders.

The connection between piracy for ransom and Islam is not a matter for clerical debate; rather it is a matter of both political and financial importance for the jihadists of Somalia. And, (drum roll, please) the North Caucasus. In Somalia there is a direct link between the pirates and the Islamist jihadist groups currently contending for ultimate ascendancy in Somalia. It has been well documented that the pirate syndicates provide financial comfort to the Islamists. The transactions may fall under the term, "extortion" or "protection," but it is equally likely that the pirates are purchasing information, support, and other services from Islamist jihadist entities. It does not stretch credulity to posit that the pirates are giving money to the Islamists as a free will offering, a material sign of shared religion, mutual values, and common goals.

The insurgents of Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus region are Islamic. The leadership and many of the lower ranking sorts are not only Islamic but Islamist. The impact of political Islam, Islamism, upon the people of the North Caucasus has grown geometrically over the past few years. It is not exaggerating to see the insurgents of the North Caucasus as part of the multi-party wave of Islamist jihadism which includes but is most certainly not limited to the two Talibans and al-Qaeda.

The very blunt and quite unpleasant ground truth facing Vladimir of the Bare Chest is this: If the seizure of the MV Moscow University is allowed to run the normal course of prolonged captivity followed by payment of a large ransom, the jihadists of the North Caucasus will be handed a great propaganda victory. The Mighty Men of the Kremlin will have been humbled by the Will of Allah expressed by a handful of teenagers with automatic weapons.

Worse for Vladimir, Dimitry, and Company the propaganda will have the great advantage of being true. Anything other than a clear, quick ending to the hijacking without the payment of ransom will constitute a defeat of Moscow by the forces of Islam in the eyes (and on the lips) of the Muslim insurgents of the North Caucasus.

In the view of the proud, highly nationalistic Russian people generally any finale to the current contretemps off the Somali coast which does not involve a military dimension--and victory--will be a defeat of Vladimir the Good Czar. At this juncture in Russian history the people of Russia, particularly their hoi polloi, are not inclined to see a defeat of Russian will and arms with equanimity. Being bested by a bunch of dark hued, Muslim kids with speedboats, guns, and chutzpah would be totally unacceptable to Ivan in the street.

Nor would China be impressed by a surplus of "restraint" on the part of the Kremlin. The Mandarins of the Forbidden City tend to base their calculus of power on another country's will and ability to exercise force effectively when faced with a direct challenge. Should Vladimir and the Boys of the Kremlin balk at the jump, the Chinese senior leadership would find it necessary to engage in (to use John Foster Dulles' fine term,) "an agonizing reappraisal" of Sino-Russian relations.

Taken together all these factors and implications add up to an amount of freight far outweighing the cargo of the MV Moscow University. And, that, bucko, must add up to a sleepless night or two for Vladimir Putin. It couldn't happen to a more deserving fellow.