The "Fall" Of Tripoli And Other Polite Fictions

You will recall no doubt that NATO air forces have been operating under the authority of a UN Security Council resolution to "protect" civilians caught in the crossfire between rebels and troops loyal to noted humanitarian,  African "King of Kings," and Brother Leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi.  To some of the NATO countries such as Germany and Turkey, even this limited mission was unacceptably broad and all too fraught with the possibility that someone, somewhere, somehow might kill someone else.  To other members, the US, the UK, and France come to mind, the only way to accomplish the prescribed action was through the removal of Gaddafi.

Since all NATO decisions must be made by consensus, it was inevitable that the actual campaign would be fragmented, relatively ineffective, and of dubious utility in gaining an end to the obnoxious regime.  When President Obama ended the active American combat role in Operation Unified Protector and handed the task over to NATO so as to adopt the policy of "leading from behind," the already lurching effort shambled ever closer to the ditch of failure.  It was no surprise that the combination of NATO fecklessness and rebel ineptitude in the arts and crafts of war not only made the loyalist forces appear downright competent in comparison but moved the war to the dead waters of stalemate.

In the past few weeks, the rebels gained new strength, new courage, new competence and went from a stance of barely held defense to one of successful offensive, particularly in the Berber inhabited mountains of the west.  The mainstream media seemed more than a bit shocked by the sudden transformation.  Many attempts at explanation were offered, but only one seemed to gain traction.

The explanation which stood head and shoulders above all others was the redeployment of NATO aircraft from whatever they had been doing to direct, close, tactical air support of the rebel ground forces.  Whenever and wherever the rebels sought to advance they were preceded by (to  use the most common term employed by the amateur fighters of the rebels) "Mr NATO."  Airstrikes preceded and ran in parallel with rebel attacks such that the rebels were always successful at a surprisingly low cost in lives.

The reports from journalists in the field made it abundantly clear that the rebels had not turned into super-troops during the weeks of stalemate.  Often the advances were held up and even routed by a handful of snipers moving from roof top to roof top or apartment block to apartment block. The engagements were almost risible in their small size.  The associated body counts were equally small.  In short, no evidence of either side having fought with skill or mass was evident in all the myriad accounts coming from the frontlines.

As the NATO air attacks grew in number, there was no significant increase in collateral civilian casualties.  That should have raised flags with all observers.  There were darn few dots to connect.  The rebels were suddenly more effective.  "Mr NATO was always there, on time with hot metal on target.  There was no ramp up in the collateral deaths and damage.

Putting together the dots confirms one conclusion: The more robust proponents of getting rid of the obstreperous Leader had authorized the deployment of special forces personnel or operations officers of the clandestine service to provide training, advise, and, most decisively, forward air control.  In the past couple of days, due  in probability to the euphoria of achieving seeming success, the British and French governments have allowed that special forces personnel both active duty and retired had been and continued to be present in Libya.

The Americans have not been so forthcoming--yet.  In a sense there is no real reason.  After all who but Americans would have been driving black SUVs in conjunction with the advancing Berbers and others from the Western mountains?  Who but Americans wearing jeans and bush shirts would have been encountered standing next to the quite atypical for Libya black Suburbans?  Who but Americans would have been using very advanced commo gear and laser designators while parked on a convenient hilltop watching the rebels mount out as "Mr NATO" circled nearby?

Positing for the moment that the jeans wearing dudes glazing Qaddafi tanks and missile launching trucks were either Agency operations officers or sheepdipped special forces members, then Mr Obama has been telling the truth when denying the presence of American military personnel in Libya.  A narrow, technical truth is nonetheless a truth.  The combination of the primarily Berber forces (recall that the Berbers were never well and truly subjugated by the Italians or the monarchy and steamed hot under the heavy oppression of Qaddafi) are made up of men with many generations of guerrilla warfare in their blood and American directed air delivered firepower was highly effective.

The close cooperation of the Americans with the Western mountaineers also had the advantage of putting some blue sky between Washington and the forces controlled (if that is the correct term) by the Transitional National Council in Benghazi.  The conflicting agendas and presence of advocates of violent political Islam in the TNC makes the development of an alternative locus of political authority desirable.  The Western towns and tribes are under represented in the TNC which makes an alternative locus not only desirable but necessary.  The key role played to date by the Western mountaineers in the "conquest" of Tripoli assures that the future government of Libya will be more inclusive--a key American policy goal.

The results to date make manifest the effectiveness of the direct training, command, and control as well as forward fire direction services provided by British and French military personnel.  Without these critical components as well as the equally important intelligence and targeting assistance coming from the Europeans, the rebels would still be dithering around many, many klicks to the east of Tripoli.  In short, the discrete assistance made the rebels something more like a fighting force and much less of a source of comedic relief.

The important take away is the "victory" to date of the rebels is not a credit to NATO per se but rather to the decisions taken by three major members of the alliance. NATO has not come back from the graveyard of obsolete political assemblies.  Rather the effectiveness of "Mr NATO" and the rebels came despite the alliance not because of it.  On the ground, under the pressure of real world events, what started as a purported out-of-theater operation by NATO became a "coalition of the willing" in the same model as that patented back in 1990 by George H.W. Bush.  But, as a polite fiction the credit will be given to NATO.

A second, parallel polite fiction is already being written by the Obama administration and its supporters in congress and among We the People.  That fiction holds Mr Obama as a pillar of triumphant diplomatic policy and his "leading from behind" policy paradigm as the most important new foreign policy development since the Marshall Plan.  Hooey!  Obama did what he did in the way he did for domestic political reasons alone.  He attended closely to the polls which showed We the People had no inclination for one more war in a Muslim majority country.  This political reality was reinforced strongly by the simple fact that the US had no definite, marketable national interest in play in Libya other than a vague, emotional commitment to the ideal of democracy and a strong distaste for Qaddafi.  There was neither reason nor way in which even the most limited of wars could be sold to We the People and congress--and Obama did the only thing he could do other than abandon the UK and France as well as the Arab League to their own devices with the result that US influence would go even deeper in the tank than it is now.

There is a final polite fiction.  That is the tale of the "fall" of Tripoli.  Leaving aside the tragi-comic features of the last twenty-four hours, the fact remains that Tripoli is not under any sort of rebel control, military or governmental.  The companion fact is that even if Tripoli becomes fully under TNC authority, it does not mean the war is over let alone that a new Libya is well under construction.  The simple, ground truth, the brute fact of life in Libya is that the Libyans will have to be very, very lucky and careful in order to prevent the start of a long, bloody, and destructive set of internal wars.  Beyond that, a successful outcome (defined as a stable Libya with some plausible semblance of democracy) will depend upon the outsiders--the British, the French, the Americans, the UN, the brigades of ever ready NGOs-- to do very little.

The danger from outside Libya is that the well-intentioned foreigners both governmental and NGO will try to do too much rather than too little.  Particularly if there is a period of settling scores, of payback violence, of armed quest for political authority, there will be an almost irresistible temptation to interfere, to impose and keep the peace, to "teach the Libyans to elect good men."  No matter what happens, no matter how much blood might flow, no matter how loud and obnoxious the rhetoric might become, it is critical, utterly central, that the outsiders keep their hands off.  For Libya to emerge eventually as a stable, peaceful, hopefully democratic society and polity, it is imperative that the processes leading to that end state be organic to Libya and the Libyan people.

A new polite fiction is emerging to the effect that we, particularly the British but also the Americans, have learned the big lesson of the dreadful and avoidable experiences in Iraq.  That may be true in an abstract, academic way, but down deep in the emotional brain which drives the really big decisions, it is not.  Should Libya enter a period of adjustment marked with retribution and revenge, it is doubtful that the Deep Thinkers in government and media throughout the US, the UK, France, and elsewhere will be able to kick back and remind the critics, inform the anguished humanitarians, chastise the eager to intervene, that this time the mistakes of Iraq will not be repeated.

The biggest challenge ahead for Libya and its people will not be the capture or killing of Qaddafi.  It will not be which way should the TNC go in preparing for its eventual demise.  It will not be transforming the fighters of the deserts and mountains into a professional constabulary capable of keeping the internal peace.  It will not be who will try the criminals of the former regime.  None of these begins to match the really, really big challenge.

That challenge?

Simple, bucko, the make-or-break of Libya's future is found in a short and easy question: Can the High Minded and Lofty Thinking of the West keep their hands off and their mouths shut.

If the past is any guide, the answer is short and bitter: No.

Butchering A Sacred Cow

The Pentagon is already scheduled to take a big hit in the money department.  In addition, the landmine laden wording of the debt ceiling increase bill assures that should the "super committee" not come up with the requisite 1.2 trillion bucks in additional cuts over the next decade, the "national security" portion of federal expenditures will take another, larger whack.  Potentially, the "national security" community could lose over a trillion bucks during the next ten years.

The term "national security" is not defined in the recent legislation, but it is not unfair to posit that most of the money will be extracted from the pockets of the uniformed services simply because they consume the largest share by far of all dollars spent under the rubric national security.  There is little doubt but those on the political left are gratified by the prospect of the Pentagon hemorrhaging dead presidents by the tanker load as, they assume, the result will be a military incapable of doing its (repugnant) thing.  On the Right there is an equal but opposite emotion--fear.  Those on the right fear that the US will lose its capacity not only to advance and defend its national interests but to protect the physical security of the country itself.

As recent experience has shown in the UK, there is real, clear, and present danger in basing national security planning on the need to reduce expenditures to the practical exclusion of all other considerations.  As you no doubt recall, the Conservative/Liberal Democratic Coalition released its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) late last year.  The SDSR was predicated upon the imperative of reducing the budgetary "black hole" created by the previous Labor government.

As a result of this overarching consideration, the budget of the Services was slashed with a vigor not seen since the opening days of the Great Depression some eighty years earlier.  The Royal Navy lost its only aircraft carrier along with the recently upgraded Harrier jump jets on board.  (There will be a new carrier coming in the rather distant future but without any aircraft allotted--unless the French embark their planes or the US loans the Brits a few of its redundant F/A-18s.)  The air force was cut to the lowest number of aircraft on inventory since just before the Great War.  And, the ground forces were chopped by some thirty thousand slots.

By the time all the slicing and dicing was complete, it became clear that the UK did not have a military capable of "broad spectrum" operations regardless of assurances to the contrary by Prime Minister Cameron.  Indeed, it appeared that when the SDSR was fully implemented, the British would not be capable of replicating their success in the Falklands War of thirty years ago.  It was debatable whether or not the UK would be able to do a replay of its intervention in Sierra Leone a few years back or be a competent partner in interventionary operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Gulf War.

As if to underscore the idiocy of the SDSR, the Cameron/Clegg ministry undertook the Libyan adventure in conjunction with France only weeks after the Review had been released.  Considering the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier, the retirement of the Harriers, the destruction of the new Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft, the addition of the Libyan campaign to the British plate was a perfect example of ignoring self-inflicted constraints in pursuit of political opportunities.  The British reach far exceeded its military grasp.

A parliamentary select committee dominated by Tories issued a scathing report a couple of days back in which the prime minister was roasted.  The select committee in effect denounced the SDSR as having been short-sighted, counterproductive, and as sacrificing the long term interests and influence of the UK on the alter of short-term budgetary exigencies.

The select committee was bang on in its arguments and conclusions.  The only component of the very bad policy contained in both the SDSR and the Libyan adventure was the tacit assurance predicated on decades of experience that the US would be there to pick up any and all military slack.  The British (in common with NATO members generally) was guided by the sincere belief that the US would always be both able and willing to do all the really heavy lifting.

The reality was far different.  As the Libyan campaign has shown, the US was unwilling to do much after the first few days beyond offer verbal support.  The Obama Doctrine of "leading from behind" was invoked so the US could walk away from the Europeans First effort in the benighted but oil filled desert of Libya.

Now that the Americans have openly admitted that the flush days are far in the past, the belief that the US will always be both willing and able to pick up the military burdens of the civilized states generally demands reexamination both abroad and here at home.  In the future the US may be willing but quite unable to employ military force in support of either its diplomacy or its physical security.

Will is one thing.  Ability is quite another.  Political will is perishable.  It can flourish.  Or, it can be exhausted, progressively reduced by a long war without a clear goal or end point in sight.  Political will can be developed almost instantly as in the wake of Pearl Harbor or 9/11.  But, it can be frittered away by inept decision making or bad policy choices.  And, political will can be destroyed intentionally by an administration or a political elite following a given agenda.

Ability, the human and material capacity to wage war, is harder to develop, easier to lose, and expensive to maintain in readiness.  The budget deficit demands that not simply senior military personnel and elected officials consider the real military needs of the US.  Rather, this is a subject all of We the People need to consider, to debate, to answer.  After all, it is our security, the physical integrity of our country, the interests of our economy, society, and polity around the world which are in play whenever the subject of "national security" is raised.  It is our collective future which is at stake should we have too little military capacity to support our diplomacy or to deter potential enemies.  Similarly, it is our collective economic future which is placed in peril should we have too much "defense," too great an expenditure on "national security" (whatever that might mean).

This implies that the proper starting point is not simply the budget chasm.  The British made that major error; there is no need for us to repeat it.  Dollars must be considered.  Dollars and what they purchase must be near the center of things.  But the mounds of dead presidents as well as the hardware they buy or the people they hire cannot and should not be the primary consideration.

The foundations of any national security budget must be a rational, conservative consideration of what does the US need to protect and to what extent does American diplomatic influence rely upon the big stick.  In this connection we have to keep in mind that the US will be a target due to its size and geographic location as well as its social, political, and economic norms and values.  We also must remember that nbe o country has ever been allowed to resign its status as a Great Power.  It would be wise to note as well that international organizations such as the UN are no more effective than their most powerful members allow them to be.

The realities of the world demand that the US, quite unlike the UK or Germany or even the European Union as a totality, must be ready and able (even if not willing) to have a genuine "broad spectrum" capacity.  We have to able to deter or to fight and win every type of war from the nuclear to the asymmetrical.  As a Great Power, the US must have a comprehensive diplomatic portfolio which includes the capacity for the credible use of military force in every sort of mission from an exercise in coercion to humanitarian relief.

The realities of the world also demand that the US acknowledge that it has active enemies.  Some are multidimensional in capability such as China or Russia.  Others may have limited capabilities but are no less a threat for that reason such as advocates of violent political Islam.  The US must not lack the basic capacities to deter, fight and defeat both ends of the spectrum.  This means that no matter which battlefield the enemy chooses from the vacuum of space to the deepest oceans, from the most remote and barren mountains to the virtual worlds of cyberspace the US must be ready and able to fight and win should deterrence and the diplomacy of talk or sanction fail.

None of this means nor implies that the American "national security" budget cannot or should not be cut--even significantly chopped.  But it does mean that the cuts, the reposturing, the redeployments must not be made without careful consideration and full debate not only inside the Pentagon or within Congress but among We the People, the people who both pay the bills and stand at risk if our "national security" components are not up to the challenge.

Implicit in the process is a consideration of what constitutes an "ally," a "partner."  There needs to be a reconsideration of old alliances, of old relationships in light of the post-Cold War realities.  It will be necessary, for example, to disabuse European "allies" of the belief that the US will provide for their defense, will support their diplomatic gambits with our military or step in when the  political or diplomatic aspirations of a partner is not supported effectively by their own organic hard power instruments.

Whether he realizes it or not, David Cameron has provided a fine object lesson for the US.  His SDSR has shown us the dangers of allowing deficits to define national security capabilities.  And, his desire for a spot of glory in Libya has illustrated the pervasive nature of the don't-worry-the-Yanks-will-do-it fantasy.

Every time in the past when the US has wound down a war it has cut the defense budget.  In the past, after World War II, Korea, Vietnam all come to mind, the US has cut too much, too fast.  By so doing we made the world a more dangerous place.  We also made the process of reconstituting our military capacities much more expensive and time consuming.  Perhaps, just perhaps, this time will be different.

Not that the Geek is going to bet his ranch on it.

Speaking With The (Customary) Forked Tongue

Not that many days ago President Obama was in London.  He spoke at some great length and with all apparent warmth and sincerity regarding the special relationship between the US and UK.  Long and loud were Mr Obama's praises of the relationship between we former colonials and the Mother Country.  He even took pains to distort and warp history so as to present a smooth and attractive face of relations unmarred by differences or disagreements.  All in all it was a typical bravura performance by a man for whom words trump actions.

As the mood music played Prime Minister David Cameron and his fellow ministers seemed to take it in.  Smiles and gestures of appreciation all over Westminster.  The shake and grin of the year went well as did the State Banquet at the royal palace.  The president and his "team" undoubtedly boarded Air Force One secure in the belief that they had pulled a successful fast one on the Brits.

Like a pirate ship lowering its false colors and raising the Jolly Roger, the true face of the Obama administration's view of the UK and its "special relationship" came to the fore mere hours later.  While the diplomatic protocols demand forewarning, the hoisting of the skull and crossbones at the meeting of the Organization of the American States (OAS) must have sent a chill through Her Majesty's Government nonetheless.

On 7 June 2011 the US joined all the other members of the OAS in approving a draft declaration on "the question of the Malvinas Islands."  The draft declaration demands that the UK negotiate the status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas, if you are pro-Argentinian) with Buenos Aires.  With this move the US not only linked itself with such profound anti-American regimes as that of Hugo Chavez but stiff armed the British with great gusto.  The US is quite well aware that the UK is not willing in the slightest to negotiate with Argentina or to compromise its long standing sovereignty over the islands.

The US position is not new.  Secretary of State Clinton put it forth back in March 2010 against the backdrop of shrill protests coming from Buenos Aires over the impending arrival of an exploratory drilling platform prospecting for oil in the 200 mile exclusive economic zone surrounding the Falklands.  At that time Her Majesty's Government made their displeasure known, directly and firmly.  It is clear that Mr Obama and his "team" value our alliance with the UK very little regardless of the splendid torrent of oratory poured by the president in the halls of Parliament.

The stance taken by the Obama administration at San Salvador on 7 June serves the US ill.  The demand for negotiation supported by the Clueless Man in the Oval not only devalues the link between the US and the UK, it ignores completely the right of self-determination for the people of the Falklands.  The residents of those faraway and lonely islands have made it quite clear time after time that they are not only British but they desire to remain under the governance of the UK.  There is no desire on the part of the islanders to speak Spanish or live under the sway of the Argentine government.

Any possible questions of sovereignty were settled back in 1982 when the government of Argentina, a military junta, ordered the invasion of the islands after having ended the ongoing and quite desultory negotiations of that distant day.  Much to the surprise and dismay of the generals running Argentina, the British did not accept the accomplished feat but chose to fight back.

In the resulting Falklands War the US after a short period of sitting astride the fence came down flatly on the side of the UK.  Swimming against the tide prevailing at the OAS, the Reagan administration took the position that Argentinian aggression must not be allowed to stand.  The US provided important intelligence to the UK as well as assorted munitions.  When night finally fell on the war, Britannia was victorious.  Aggression had not been allowed to stand.  Most importantly, the Falkland islanders were confirmed in their right to be British.

The Britishness of the islanders is the bedrock of Her Majesty's Government's policy regarding the islands.  Put in terms that even the Obama administration might be able to comprehend: The Britishness of the islanders is non-negotiable.

For a very long while the government(s) of Argentina accepted the verdict of war.  But over the past few years the Argentinian government has been seized by an every growing yearning to plant their flag on the islands regardless of the desires of the locals.  The reason is simple, consisting of three letters: O I L.  There is a chance that a significant oil field exists far below the cold and stormy waters surrounding the Falklands.  With dollar signs in their eyes and envious of the new Brazilian offshore fields, the fine folks at the top of the Argentinian political and financial trees now covet the Falklands.

Apparently following his default position of appeasement brings friends and influence, Mr Obama and his people have thrown the lot of the US behind the ambitions of the Argentinians.  As Mr Obama declared his willingness for We the People to become the best customers of Brazil's new fields, so also must he believe that we should purchase oil from the liberty loving democrats in the country which brought the world Juan Peron and his lovely wife, Evita.

There is no doubt but Ms Clinton or one of her smooth talking subordinates can give a fine sounding justification for this reversal of American policy.  They would invoke the magic of "stability" and hint that the democratically elected government might be replaced by one more junta if the civilians do not redeem the lost patrimony of the islands.  Conceivably the lads and lassies of Foggy Bottom might question the ancient claim exercised by the UK over the islands and choose to ignore the outcome of the more recent war thus concluding the Argentinian claim to be more valid.  Or they might simply say the OAS is the vox populi of the hemisphere and its will is binding upon us--and the UK.

Any such pettifoggery is, beyond question, a crock of caca.  The real deal--other than Obama's reflexive need to stick it to the Brits whenever given a chance--is the conclusion that the UK no longer has the military capacity to defend the Falklands successfully.  That conclusion has a corollary.  Any future passage of arms over the Falklands will necessitate an American participation.  Such participation will be far more extensive than was that of twenty-nine years ago.

The sad reality is the UK lacks the resources it deployed back then.  It no longer has the aircraft carriers and other naval assets which allowed it to mount an amphibious operation over the monumental distance which separates the UK from the Falklands.  Simultaneously, it is true that the Argentinian military is stronger today (at least on paper) then it was.  Moreover, it is probable that Buenos Aires could count on the active support of Hugo Chavez and other leaders for whom the West is a nest of capitalist, imperialist exploiters.

In the event the Argentinians get muscular over the Falkland Islands, the US will have to choose sides.  If it honors both its values and global interests Washington must align with London and be the outsider at the OAS.  If, to the contrary, the administration goes with its ideological predilections and personal prejudices, it must line up with the OAS majority in support of Buenos Aires.  In that event the close, long standing, and quite critical relationship between the US and the UK will be as dead as George III.

Mr Obama has been a one man disaster area in US foreign relations.  Compared to Obama the days of the Bush/Cheney regime constitute a high point of American diplomacy.  In no area has the Obama approach to foreign affairs been more fraught with long term injury than the corner into which the president and his "team" have painted the US over the Falkland Islands.

In essence the Nice Young Man From Chicago has pointed a loaded gun directly at the guts of Uncle Sam's foreign relations.  And he has placed the trigger in the hands of the less than rational Argentinian government.  Get a grip on it: By the action of 7 June the Obama administration has set the stage for a blunder compared to which the invasion of Iraq seems almost like an act of brilliant strategic statesmanship.

What A Great Day!

This is one of those days which makes a guy glad to be alive--that is if he is a maven of how much can go wrong in the world all at the same time.  So much has gone so terribly out of whack in the past twenty-four or so hours that is hard to decide what most tickles the brain, that is, what deserves the virtual ink.

It is quite tempting to take a few shots at that LST (large slow target) named "Pakistan."  It is a hoot and a half to contemplate that less than a couple of dozen Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith can take over a major naval air installation.  That these Glorious Fighters Of The Koran can hold off assorted Pakistani military forces for seventeen hours, destroying a pair of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, gifts of the American people delivered only last June, in the process.

Not since a similar commando unit hit and held the Pakistani army's headquarters a couple of years ago has the Islamic Republic been so humiliated.  It is presumed that the Great Strategists of Islamabad are down on their prayer rugs giving thanks to the deity that the Taliban trigger-pullers did not hit a certain facility only ten klicks over, conveniently adjacent to an airbase where nuclear weapons are stored.  For such small favors, the Pakistanis should give great and prolonged thanks.

For the rest of us, the Taliban raid raises the long standing questions regarding the security of Pakistan's arsenal of one hundred or so nukes to new heights.  After all, the night squad which cut its way through a pair of barbed wire fences and used low tech ladders to scale a wall were not in the same league as the men of Boat Six of Great Abbottabad Raid fame.  If a handful of jihadists with nothing more sophisticated than RPGs, AKs, and a willingness to die could storm the heavily guarded naval airfield, is it impossible for a similar group to do the same at either a nuclear weapons depot or manufacturing facility?

On the upside, such muscular measures might not be needful given the omnipresence of ideological soulmates within the Pakistani military and intelligence services.  Or the direct method might be obviated by the Pakistani version of the hoary Mexican approach of "silver or lead."  It is not unthinkable, considering the prevalence of corruption in the Islamic Republic, that the promise of silver might trump the threat of lead.

On another continent, the ardent observer of frothing wars and failing states must feel a pleasant glow contemplating the attack over the weekend by Sudanese forces on the contested oil center of Abyei.  The Khartoum regime has maintained with a straight face that its attack complete with air strikes and armored units was "retaliation" for the ambush last week of a UN convoy escorted by Sudanese army personnel.  To the not yet officially independent state of South Sudan, the occupation of Abyei constituted an act of war.

Abyei was supposed to have voted as to which side it would join--Sudan or South Sudan--at the same time as the overall referendum on Southern independence.  This did not occur because Khartoum insisted on including a nomadic tribe of Muslim affiliation among those franchised to vote in the election.  This demand was vetoed by the southerners.  As a result, the Abyei question has not been settled.  Nor is it likely to be settled by means other than the violent.

The UN has done the expected--denounce the attack and demand Khartoum withdraw its forces.  Assorted advocates for South Sudan (mainly George Clooney and assorted NGOs) are making predictable noises regarding the US and UK doing something to compel Khartoum to back down.  And, to insure the decibel level of rhetoric is high enough, spokesmen for South Sudan are warning darkly that the occupation of Abyei bodes well to restart the war between South and North which ended in 2005 after twenty-two years and hundreds of thousands of lives due to the diplomacy of the US and UK.

Just what the US or UK can do short of using highly kinetic coercive diplomacy to gain Khartoum's adherence to our policy requirements is unclear.  What is clear is that neither Washington nor London are in any hurry to send warplanes or troops anywhere beyond current theaters of operation.

The upcoming meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron has some potential for both sparks and amusement.  The two leaders are not in perfect tandem regarding what is being done in Libya to say nothing of what should be done.  The British and French are all in favor of more hairy chested efforts than those made to date.  In earnest of this intent, both have announced the deployment of helicopter gunships to the country.  The British will operate Apaches and the French machines of local manufacture from carriers in the Mediterranean.

Both states (the British more vocally) want the US to come back to Libya in a larger and more noise producing way than has been the case in recent weeks.  The redeployment of American A-10 and AC-130 aircraft is much desired by Whitehall.  While more muted in their stance, there is little doubt that M. Sarkozy's government would be very happy to see the weight of the US more heavily on the scales in favor of the rebels.

There is no indication that President Obama is in a mood to honor the requests.  Certainly, there is no evident pawing of the ground in favor of more and more high profile operations visible at the Pentagon.

This contretemps gives added importance to a little noticed event scheduled to occur during the Obama-Cameron meeting.  Reportedly the US and UK will establish a joint national security entity which will coordinate the perceptions and plans of the two countries to allow more effective joint and combined actions globally.  Considering the negative view held by Mr Obama regarding the "special relationship" between the UK and US, this is a surprising development.  If the reports are confirmed by events, it is a most welcome one as well.

While such a joint body may easily be nothing more than a pro forma exercise in policy futility, there is some chance that it will evolve into a genuine mechanism for meshing together the national security strategies and programs of two natural allies.  It might even point in the direction of growing to include several UK descended states--Australia, New Zealand, Canada and India--along with the US and UK into a tightly integrated political/military bloc which would be virtually unchallengeable in years to come.

Now, that sort of "international community" is one which is very pleasant to contemplate.  It gives the Geek a warm feeling and, being a sensitive sort of guy, he will end this post on this potentially very high note.

Defense, Diplomacy, And Development

Those three words constitute a sort of mantra which issues from the mouth of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton at every opportunity.  They also define much of the debate soon to be entered into by the congress as the US makes another of its fitful attempts to come to grips with the deficit and the government's chronic inability to live within its means.

When congress in its collective excuse for wisdom makes the attempt to limit American expenditures, it will be traveling a road already passed over by the British Parliament.  The Coalition government of Cameron and Clegg  inherited a financial debacle from the Labor predecessor which has necessitated deep and painful cuts in all areas of the British budget.  High on the list of those cut was the Ministry of Defense.

The British military, naval, and air services were not simply cut, they were mangled.  The Royal Air Force now possesses the fewest aircraft since before the first shots of World War I.  The Royal Navy in its entirety would not be adequate to provide anti-air and anti-submarine screening for a single US aircraft carrier.  The Royal Army has shrunk to a level which would preclude a successful replay of either the Falklands War or even the intervention in Sierra Leone.

Bad is this seems, there are more cuts in the pipeline.  Dr Liam Fox, the Minister of Defense, has promised more whacks will be taken as soon as the British wrap up their ground presence in Afghanistan.  While Dr Fox specifically mentioned "redundant" vehicles, it is generally understood that the draw down in forces will go beyond vehicles and to the troops who ride them, drive them, and fire their guns.  At least another brigade equivalent in the general purpose forces will permanently case its colors.

Given that Prime Minister Cameron is chomping at his bit to hit the Afghan exit, the next ramp down of British military capacity will come sooner rather than later.  Even though the prime minister and his defense colleague assure the British public (and the US government) that the UK will remain capable of "broad spectrum" operations and will retain its "superb" special operations forces and will acquire more of the new generation of submarines, doubt as to British capacities to join with allied forces in combined and joint operations must linger.

It is clear that the British expect the US to retain its military capacities unscathed by the same budgetary and financial forces which have buffeted the UK.  The same thinking seems to apply generally across Western Europe.

How this wishful thinking can be maintained in the face of accelerating American force withdrawal from Europe boggles the imagination.  There are currently 42, 000 US personnel in Europe.  By 2015 the figure will drop to 37,000.  In comparison there were 213,000 stationed in Europe as the Berlin Wall fell.  And, that number was down from the high point in 1962 of nearly 277,000.

The American justification for the continued retreat from Europe is purely financial.  The aggregate GDP of the European Union is ten percent greater than that of the US.  At the same time the combined defense budgets of the EU states is a mere fraction of that imposed on the US.

It is worth noting that the logic of withdrawal has a momentum of its own.  Force strengths like rocks tend to roll down hill.  And, the imperatives of finance can far outstrip the power of gravity.

The US will lose some significant tactical flexibility and rapidity of response by pulling out of Europe.  It will take measurably longer to move force across an ocean.  More importantly, the interposition of an ocean between the US and the likely conflict areas of the Mideast and Africa provide an important political distance between any future flareup and the decision makers inside the Beltway.  Political and psychological distance is far more critical in slowing or preventing a response than the mere add-on of a few thousand miles.

It may be that this consideration will be moot by the time 2015 rolls around.  There is no way that the American defense department is going to be spared the budget trimming meat ax.  President Obama has made that clear.  Outgoing SecDef Gates has concurred, wholeheartedly.  At least four hundred billion dollars will go over the next decade.  Probably more.  Perhaps even a lot more depending upon the electoral fortunes of the defense conservatives of the Republican Party.

Implicit in the mantra of Secretary Clinton is the hope that insofar as the "defense" leg of the triad is shortened, the legs of "diplomacy" and "development" will be elongated in compensation.  This hope is both false and misplaced.  There is no powerful base of support for either diplomacy or development.

For many of We the People, even among those who are most aware of global politics and the Game of Nations, "diplomacy" is seen as a quasi-mysterious process involving gobs of talk, rounds of dinners, and photo ops.  Whatever it is that diplomats do and with whatever results, there is no belief that it should cost much money.  "Diplomacy" is something like a wand which is waved at vexing problems rather than a useful tool of state in the estimate of many outside of that dismal profession.  So, why does it need money?

"Development" is in even worse shape in the mind of many of us.  Foreign aid is tantamount to an obscenity in the estimate of many conservatives both in and out of congress.  At best it is seen as a form of bribery, a form of rent-a-friend which all too often does not pay off.  At worst it is conceived of as a way of furthering corruption in the recipient country while fostering tumor-like growth in the bureaucracy which doles it out.

Again the recent experience in the UK points at the limits of both debate and understanding when it comes to diplomacy and development.  Critics of the Coalition have pointed with disdain to the Cameron proposal to increase the development budget of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by more than a third at the same time that the British military is undergoing enforced, unilateral disarmament.

Advocates of the British move argue that by fostering education, good governance, and economic development in unstable or collapsing states, the need for military intervention or active defense against terror attacks originating in such places will be obviated.  The same points have been advanced here not only by Secretary Clinton and others in Foggy Bottom but also by Secretary Gates.  If anything Mr Gates has been a more robust proponent of foreign aid as a means of precluding later military action than have the denizens of State and USAID.

In principle it is hard to dissent from the perspective that prevention through foreign development assistance is far preferable to sending in the Marines at some future date.  In principle a strong case can be made for the effective use of foreign aid as a means of helping to create political and social tranquility within a recipient country such as to preclude it becoming a failing state.  In practice, though, it is far easier to identify the examples where foreign aid has not brought about either internal political and social harmony and progress or bribed the recipient government into accepting American policy leadership.

The Cold War landscape is carpeted with the corpses of failed foreign aid programs.  Africa is littered with the results of foreign aid driven corruption, inefficiencies, and betrayed expectations of a better life.  The same is true in large swaths of Asia and Latin America.  The aid has not been simply from the US.  Americans are not the only people to have failed in the development through aid game.  All who have played it have experienced more failures than successes.

Nor did the situation change with the end of the Cold War.  One need look no further than Pakistan than to see that truism at work.  But, if more convincing is necessary, all that is needed is to take a peek at the totality of those receiving development assistance at the government-to-government level to see that lack of success trumps success by a huge margin.

The palpable lack of success in the government-to-government development efforts will go a very long way to assure that budget cutters will find the funding for these programs a politically attractive target even though very few real dollars will be saved even if the totality of US foreign aid in all categories were to be zeroed out.  Slashing here is one of those look-good, feel-good votes that are so attractive to politicians unwilling and unable to make tough decisions.

While diplomacy is no magic wand to be waved at international problems and development no anodyne for internal debacles, both are necessary, even valuable, complements to defense.  The "vanilla" diplomacy of building upon coinciding national interests as well as carefully targeted development aid focusing on projects which are modest in scale, immediate in visible effects, and sustainable over time by local resources alone can go along way to limiting the need for more robust measures--and cost a lot less.

At the same time it must be recognized that "vanilla" diplomacy and targeted development have very real limits.  There are states which require a coercive approach.  There are states which will collapse and fail or have governments come to power which are not only adverse to the interests of the US and its allies but are willing to use asymmetrical means to demonstrate this.

In these contexts it must be remembered that all forms of coercive diplomacy rest finally upon the material ability and political will of the US to employ force in support of its policies.  Likewise the hostile state must be defanged.  The collapsed or collapsing state might well require outsiders come and impose peace.  In all these eventualities, eventualities which will become more rather than less likely over the next decade or two, credible and relevant military force is necessary if a positive outcome from the perspective of the US is desired.

Schoolrooms in Pakistan will not necessarily prevent violent political Islam from taking firm and continuing root there.  Nor will clinics in Yemen assure the place does not collapse into a welter of internal warfare.  Sudan will not become a thriving multi-ethnic, multi-religious, democratic state simply because some donor or another pumps in buckets of cash.  The same caveats may be made with respect to many other psuedo-states.

These unpleasant ground truths imply strongly that planners, both those dealing with budgets and those whose game is international strategy, must put defense first.  This does not mean the US is condemned to be an impoverished bunker, but it does mean that the existence of a full-spectrum and flexible military capacity cannot be sacrificed on the alters of diplomacy and development.

Nor does it mean the cost of budgetary sanity is surrender to hostile forces.

It does mean, however, that the congress and administration must be intelligent and realistic in their world view.  That, unfortunately, is probably too much to expect.

Sic 'Em, Dave, Sarko

David Cameron continues to take the hardline regarding the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libya.  Reportedly he has told his cabinet that there is no need for a UN Security Council resolution in order for the UK or any other country to place Libya under aerial interdict.  In this view Cameron has been joined by Nicholas Sarkozy.  The rather mercurial French president has gone so far as to recognize the rebel national committee as the legitimate government of Libya.

While the UK lacks the resources to do the no-fly job on its own, the British could do so in conjunction with the French.  Considering the recent agreement regarding joint military operations, the possibility of this happening moves up the list of likelihood.

If Cameron continues to feel muscular on the Libyan Question, President Obama will be more isolated in his calculated posture of apparent prudence and cautious statesmanship behind which lurks the fear of being seen as George W. Bush reincarnate.  The pressure ramped up ever so slightly yesterday when Secretary Gates clarified his earlier remarks on the difficulty of imposing a no-fly zone.  The secretary allowed in Manama that the US could do the job all on its lonesome should "President Obama so order."

With the Arab League having unanimously passed a resolution approving a no-fly zone and demanding that the Security Council act accordingly, the assorted member states have picked up a good measure of the political consequences which would ensue should the no-fly zone result in civilian casualties.  This move will reduce, albeit marginally, the negative narrative which will be written by anti-Western elements in the Arab and Muslim majority states generally in the wake of even a very pacifistic airspace denial effort.

The real questions do not involve the ability of the US or the Anglo-French duo or any other major power to impose and maintain a no-fly zone.  The most trenchant question is: Will a no-fly zone actually benefit the insurgents in a significant manner?  As important is this: What actions will follow the imposition of an unproductive no-fly zone.  And, of course, there is the most fundamental question of all: What is the goal of the exercise?

To take the last question first: The actual goal of any intervention either by air or ground must be that of utterly defeating the current regime.  The US and the rest of the West cannot afford a Gaddafi in power after his crushing of the insurgency.  It would not be a return to the status quo ante.  A victorious Gaddafi at best would be the Gaddafi of the worst of the bad old days.  You know, the Gaddafi of PanAm 103.  The Gaddafi who supported any and every movement or regime which opposed the West.  The Gaddafi who sought weapons of mass destruction with an ardor which surpassed that demonstrated by Saddam Hussein.

Preventing this version of Gaddafi, the basic Gaddafi 1.0 who strutted and terrified in the years before the US invaded Iraq, must be the highest priority of any and every responsible Western government, our own included.  All other goals pale into insignificance in comparison.

Now as to the first question: Would a no-fly zone really matter?  Would it preclude a Gaddafi victory?  The answer is simple, blunt, and unpleasant.  The answer is: No!  It is possible that Gaddafi would not even challenge the zone.  He has no need to do so.

The air attacks may scare the untrained, inexperienced people down range, but so far the effect of the attacks has been negligible.  The pilots--whether Libyan or hired hands from Syria or Sudan--have not shown the ability to hit targets.  As a consequence, the strikes have been acoustically and visually impressive but militarily useless.

The winning weapons for the Gaddafi forces have been of the indirect fire sort.  Unguided rockets, tube artillery, the backbones of standoff warfare have done the heavy lifting for the Colonel's killers.  Only after extensive preparatory fire has the armor moved forward to finish the job.

The untrained, poorly organized, massively inexperienced insurgent fighters lack all the basic wherewithal to withstand the physical and morale effects of standoff, indirect fire weaponry.  The same applies to facing down armor, even antiquated main battle tanks and similar vintage infantry fighting vehicles.

In a combat between a small but well equipped force such as the four or so battalions commanded by Gaddafi's kids and a mob, the small force will win.  To put it a slightly different way, the Gaddafi forces enjoy the bravery of being out of range.  Their possession of standoff weapons allows the Colonel's thugs to kill without the risk of being killed.  Any number of wounded insurgents quoted in Western MSM have moaned about the melancholy reality that the Gaddafi troops are never seen let alone shot at but stay safely out of AK-47 or RPG range and pound the holy hell out of the rebel positions.

Conclusion?  A no-fly zone will not tilt the battle in favor of the insurgents.  They are doomed as long as Gaddafi's forces can continue to move slowly along the one road, stopping to shell any insurgent held area into powder until they finally fetch up at the center of resistance, Benghazi.  At that moment it is all over for the insurgents.  Those who can run will fast step to the Egyptian border; those who can't will stay and be blown into small bloody fragments by the Colonel's artillery, rockets, and armor.

(At this point a no-fly zone would benefit the refugee stream heading for Egypt by assuring it would not be decimated by air attack.  That would be a humanitarian good deed, but is not a war winner.  It is not a way of achieving the goal of a Gaddafi free Earth.)

This leaves the second material question:  What happens after the no-fly zone proves nugatory?  Assuming that the leaders of Western governments, including the Clueless Guy in the Oval, concur that the ongoing presence of Gaddafi constitutes everybody's worst nightmare, there is only one option.  The last option standing is the introduction of ground combat units.

There is much fear over doing such.  Some anxiety is merited by factual, historical experience; some, even most, is not.  Drawing on the historical record it is safe to conclude that an operation limited to one discrete goal--the halting of the Gaddafi advance on a predetermined line, for example--markedly reduces the probability of "mission leap" along the lines of what happened in Afghanistan.

The difficulty in employing military intervention is not that of tactics.  Nor is it one at the operational level.  The only real problem is that which comes at the political level--defining in a properly limited way the goal to which the use of force is directed.  Provided that the goal consensually achieved by the major Western powers is that of enforcing a stop line, there is no requirement for "nation-building," no taking of overall responsibility for the future of Libya.

Admittedly, this limited a mission would leave the Gaddafi regime in charge of a truncated Libya.  On the upside, this truncated version of his previous domain coupled with the long term impact of sanctions would serve to erode Brother Leader's material capacity to continue in power.  It would also serve to curtail Gaddafi's potential for international mischief making most gratifyingly.

There is a very unfortunate but very real temptation for political leaders not to leave well enough alone.  They seem to be constitutionally disinclined to accept a half loaf when the full loaf seems to be so much more attractive.  Here the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq are the most important object lessons.  Had the neocon ninnies of the Bush-Cheney years been at all able to restrain their unlimited ambitions, the effort in Afghanistan would have been restricted to a highly doable punitive expedition and the Great Adventure in Regime Change in Iraq would have been limited to the removal of Saddam Hussein.

The US should have rejected any responsibility for doing anything beyond removing two odious regimes, assuring that al-Qaeda was destroyed and eliminating any residual capability in Iraq for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.  All the rest, all the follow-ons of "nation-building" or the constitution of new governments would have been passed on to the indigenous populations with the assistance of those members of the "international community" which cared to offer such.

The goal of any ground intervention must be restricted to the establishment of a stop line beyond which the Gaddafi units would not be allowed.  Taken in conjunction with the existence of an alternative, legitimate government and the assorted international sanctions, the result would be the ejection of Gaddafi from power.  This would be facilitated if the threat of prosecution for crimes against humanity were to be lowered even if not removed totally.  It must be recalled that the Taylor prosecution served as the single greatest spine stiffener provided to Gaddafi and family.

At the moment both Cameron and Sarkozy have shown both greater insight and courage than has Mr Obama.  Having written that, the Geek is constrained to add that neither man has been honest--at least in public.  Their military advice must have emphasized the irrelevance of the no-fly zone.  Their political and diplomatic advisors must have pointed out the array of negative consequences which would attend a Gaddafi victory.  These factors imply that each man must be aware that when night falls, only a ground intervention would prevent the Colonel from emerging triumphant and emboldened.

Since the British and French leaders have led on the Libyan Question, it is now incumbent upon them to tell it like it is.  They must prepare themselves, their publics, and the rest of the world for the necessity of a ground intervention in the very near future.  This also means they and their military and diplomatic high command must design a properly limited mission definition.  And, they have to drag Obama kicking and screaming in their wake.

So, Dave and Sarko, sic 'em!

Watching A Regime Crumble?

Saif al-Islami Gaddifi, the usually well oiled, politely mannered, western-style number one son of the Libyan Brother Leader has become the public face of the embattled regime.  Given Brother Leader's unusual shyness this is an expectable move.  Saif is seen both inside Libya and by foreign observers as a rational, reform-minded, and totally adult sort of guy, quite unlike either his father or younger brothers.

However the message delivered by Saif was not one of peace, reform, and good feelings.  Rather he warned darkly of "civil war" and "hundreds of thousands dead" in appearances on state television.  Events over the past twenty-four hours show his remark must not be taken as hyperbole.

Neither should his observation that his father would fight to the "last man, last woman and last bullet."  The blood spilled in Benghazi coupled with the horizontal escalation of the violent protests to other cities including Tripoli show the matter has become existential to the regime--and family.  The uprising is already existential for the protesters.  If they fail in their goal of ending the Gaddafi regime, the agents of the regime will end them, if not today than certainly in the days and weeks to come.

When conflicts are seen by both sides as directly existential, it not only increases political will, it assures the struggle will become continually more lethal until one side or the other in effect is obliterated.  This has raised the Libyan internal conflict well above those waged in Egypt or Tunisia--and perhaps above that in Bahrain where voices of compromise are still speaking.

As the Gaddafi government stepped up its suppression with the use of fast mover aircraft, it accompanied the purely military and Saif's propaganda with pro-Brother Leader demonstrations in Green Square, Tripoli.  The carefully orchestrated show of popular support for the Gaddafi regime was unintentionally undercut by reports of both airstrikes and automatic weapons fire being heard not far from the Square as the demo went down.

Nor is the legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime enhanced by such high profile kicks in the crotch as the mass resignation of the Libyan delegation to the UN under the leadership of its deputy permanent representative.  It is not known if the Libyan ambassador to the UN shares the views of his mission.  What is certain is the families of the dissident diplomats back home in Libya are not good life insurance risks now--unless the regime collapses.

Perhaps more alarming to the Gaddafi family enterprise is the reported defection of members of the armed services.  Reportedly the defectors include two air force officers who took their jets to Malta rather than attack civilians in Benghazi.  One of the two pilots, both of whom claim to be colonels, has taken the wise precaution of requesting political asylum.  Can't be too safe--if the insurrection fails of its goal.

Other, far lower ranking defections from the army and other security forces have also been alleged.  The allegations are most probably accurate, particularly if those changing sides belong to the same tribe or clan as those being attacked.  Clan, tribal, and regional loyalties trump mere institutional affiliations in Libyan life.  They can even trump religion qua religion.

The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the primary opposition group among the rudimentary political culture which has survived the forty years of suppression, is ginning up for a return home.  Its Washington based spokesman, Ibrahim Sahad, has not received much play in American media but has been quoted overseas as predicting that this time the Brother Leader cannot survive.  He offers no reasons for this conclusion beyond the self-evident and widely known failures of the Gaddifi regime and the impetus given by the use of mercenaries, heavy weapons, and aircraft against the demonstrators.

While no objections can be offered as to Mr Sahad's arguments regarding the weakness of the regime, his group can not yet offer a clear vision of what must be done the day after the regime collapses.  Nor does he make any useful suggestions for the role which might be played by Western governments in facilitating regime change in Libya.  These lacks are indicative of the large, very large problems which will confront the Libyans in the wake of a collapse of the Gaddafis, particularly if the collapse is preceded by a welter of blood letting, a potential which must be taken seriously by outside observers.

Considering that the web of internal security and domestic intelligence organizations involves as many as one in six Libyans, there are a lot of asses in the sling potentially.  This implies there will be no going gently into that good night of exile.  Considering further the conflicting tangle of tribal, clan, and family alliances both for and against the status quo and the large number of potential scores to be settled, betting on a peaceful and orderly transition (such as is pro forma called for by any number of outsiders) is about as likely as a cold day in August in the dunes south of Tobruk.

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is, sadly, almost certainly correct in averring that "rivers of blood" will ensue unless the protests stop.  As there is no high likelihood of the anti-government folk packing it in and waiting to be arrested by the internal security wallahs, the number of bodies is doomed to grow--perhaps exponentially.

The US, the EU, and the UN have been dithering too long already.  It is more than passingly strange that the Security Council can get its collective panties in a twist over a person being killed in Lebanon but remain totally unconcerned about the looming slaughter in Libya.  It is equally interesting that the US, which has shown a remarkable capacity to work itself into a lather over other, less bloody exercises in repression, has been tongue tied about Libya.  Then there is the EU.  That organization can work itself into the highest of high dudgeons over the allegation of a single Palestinian dying at the hands of the IDF but has confined itself to the barest sighs of concern over the use of heavy weapons against civilians in Libya.

Italy and the UK both have large direct investments in Libya,  Italy is the preferred destination of any and all of those who can board a boat on the Libyan coast.  It surpasses understanding why both London and Rome have not become directly, substantially, and materially involved in ending the crisis in Libya before the worst realistic case comes to pass.

Admittedly, Brother Leader is not the poster boy of rational policy or carefully considered reaction to outside influences, but that is no reason to sit back with folded hands as the escalating dance of death continues in Libya.  As the American ambassador to the Court of St James is reported to have said yesterday, Her Majesty's Government bears a measure of responsibility for enhancing the international legitimacy of the Libyan dictator.

The fact that the enhancement occurred during the previous New Labor government is all the more reason the Coalition has both the political freedom and ethical responsibility to take the lead in the EU to seek ways of effective intervention in the Libyan crisis.  While Italy may have a greater direct stake in the outcome of the events in Libya, the current political state of affairs in that country shifts the load to the UK, which has both means and justification for seeking action on the part of the EU and UN.

The US can and should play a supporting role to any British initiative.  The current weakness of the US not only in the region following the incomprehensible veto of the West Bank settlement resolution in the Security Council as well as the all too obvious working both sides of the street during the "Lotus revolution" has drastically curtailed our diplomatic influence and prestige and thus ability to directly operate in Libya.  But, we can still back the play of another responsible actor--and the UK is the best candidate for the role.

It is critical that the end of Gaddafi come before the body count grows much more.  As is the case in every internal war in human history (and most all inter-state wars as well) the dead dictate policy.  The more protesters who are killed the more vengeance will be demanded.  The more vengeance which is feared by partisans of the status quo, the more desperate and lethal the attempt to suppress.  The cycle is clear, and, once started, not easy to interrupt before it has run the full course, until people are simply sickened by the slaughter they have perpetrated and suffered.

Time is running out.  It is running out for the Gaddafi regime.  It is running out for the international community (whatever that might mean in this context) to take measures intended to limit the suffering, end the killing, and start a new clock on a new future.

The Game Is Getting Much Rougher In Libya

The Geek has to admit his hot wash on the initial unrest in Benghazi missed the mark.  He discounted the demonstrations too much because Benghazi has been the epicenter of Hate-Brother-Leader since the prison massacre in 1996.  He also overestimated the positive impact of Gaddafi's unique brand of tribal based politics which is omnipresent even in the army.

It is true that the ongoing protests have centered on Benghazi.  The second largest city in Libya has had the greatest butchers' bill by far.  And, most importantly, the protesters have matched the government in the escalation game.  

Not only have the anti-government forces matched the security wallahs in vertical escalation, they have engaged in successful horizontal escalation as well.  Other cities in eastern Libya have now joined the violence.  Tobruk of World War II fame as well as Al-Bayda, Ajdabiya, and Darnah have seen violent unrest.  In Darnah the insurrectionists briefly seized and held an arsenal, finally leaving with an unknown amount of weaponry.  

In Ajdabiya the protesters burned down several buildings including the local headquarters of Gaddafi's political party and declared the burg to be a "free city."  In Benghazi, the central government in effect has been run out of town.  The anti-government groups attacked the military base (which contains Gaddafi's "Eastern Palace") with an explosives laden vehicle at one point--and with an armored vehicle at another.

The focus on the military installation is understandable given that hours earlier security forces had sallied forth from it in order to attack the funeral demonstration which was carrying the bodies of those killed the previous day to the graveyard.  In an important development, reports from Benghazi indicate that Gaddafi has brought in mercenary troops from Chad to do the dirty work.

The mercenaries whether from Chad or elsewhere were described by locals as kill crazy, a sort of "wild eyed pistol waver not afraid to die."  Grisly tales of people jumping from a bridge to avoid the mercenaries and their bullets compete for attention with stories of helicopter gunships spraying machinegun fire on fleeing civilians.

While it is not possible to divine the truth in the welter of words, it is unmistakable that Brother Leader has decided to ramp up coercion to a degree surpassing that employed in Bahrain or Yemen.  He must be feeling more than a tad desperate.  

The desperation is powered by a fear that the entire east of Libya will go the way of Benghazi, setting the stage either for a tumbling row of dominoes ending in Tripoli or a resumption of the inter-regional warfare which existed prior to the Italian occupation a century ago.  Either development would be fatal to Gaddafi's idiosyncratic forty-two year old regime.

So far Brother Leader has kept a low profile, appearing on state television only briefly.  Apparently, he has given over day-to-day control of the security operation to his number three son, Saadi.  The son is a thirty-seven year old former vocational soccer player who has been described as "fiercely loyal" to dear old dad as well as a potential follow on to Gaddafi senior in running the family business.  He is probably more than tough enough to oversee very robust repression.

In addition to using mercenaries, automatic and even heavy weapons, the Gaddafi regime has taken the customary step of pulling the plug on the Internet and blocking other horizontal communications methods.  Libya is already one of the most isolated countries on the planet and became even more so with the ending of cell phone and Internet communication.  Given the vast distances involved (Benghazi is a thousand kilometers from Tripoli), this does hurt the anti-government movement significantly.

Merely impairing the communications capacities of the protesters does not address the basic conditions which have produced the violent unrest.  Unemployment is at least thirty percent.  Housing is scarce and usually allocated on the basis of political connections.  There is no true national identity but rather a patchwork of clan, tribal, and regional affiliations which are reflected in every institution of state including the armed forces.  There is absolutely no organized political opposition to the Gaddafi regime and its political party expression.  Nor is there any excuse for an open and free media.  In comparison, Egypt was a wide open boisterous democracy and Tunisia a free for all.

The Gaddafi regime has expended (squandered?) vast amounts of its oil and natural gas revenues on utter non-essentials including support for foreign insurgencies, a quest for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a military without a real mission, and grandiose schemes to drill deep wells in the south to bring water to the north.  Very little money has gone to long term development needs whether in infrastructure or education or economic alternatives to the oil and gas.  What did not go to the quixotic delusions of Brother Leader went to the pockets of the well-connected.  The combination has assured damn little has been left over to benefit the Libyan in the street or provide any basis for either long term order or the slow emergence of stability in an evolving national system.

The overthrow of Gaddafi would be a good thing for the Libyans--maybe.  The caveat comes from the simple fact that the four decades of dictatorship have left the country without any semblance of a political culture.  This means Libya is starting from less than Tunisia or Egypt.  In both of those countries there had been a long history of organized opposition.  The opposition might have been suppressed but it was never eliminated.  Even if in exile the opposition continued to develop, to plan, to prepare.  The suppression by Brother Leader has been so complete, so absolute, so far reaching that there is little in the way of an organized and forward looking political alternative to the status quo.

The situation in Libya is also complicated by its having no clear national identity well supported by national institutions.  When even the army reflects tribal and clan roots, it is hard to see from where a unified sense of being Libyan will be found.  Taken in aggregate these factors assure that any overthrow of Gaddafi will not result in a quick transition to a democratic government.  It is not easy to see just who will run the country on even a caretaker basis should Brother Leader and his sons catch the next flight to the Land of Unemployed Dictators.

Both Italy and the UK have large exposures in the Libyan oil and natural gas industry.  Both governments should be working overtime right now on just what can be done practically to keep the trains running on time as well as dissuade the Gaddafi family from further very robust exercises in suppression and set the ground rules for a post-Gaddafi government.  It is not practical to suggest that some foreign or international entity step in to secure a peaceful transition, such would not be acceptable to any Libyan in the street, but the so called international community needs to shoulder a legitimate burden in the sense of aiding the endgame and the emergence of an organic Libyan government.

At least the Obama administration has been mainly silent on events in Libya.  This is as it should be.  Libya is one of the few spots in the Mideast or North Africa where the US interests are minimal.  But, our government would be well advised to nudge the UK, Italy, and the EU generally in the area of contingency planning for the day after the revolts succeed in their goal--or the day the security forces violate any sense of decency in their shedding of demonstrators blood.

It's called being "proactive."  Sadly, the record shows this is an area where the US (and the West) is more than a little deficient.

Need A Country Commit Suicide In The Name Of Human Rights?

The British Prime Minister has put the UK in the center of the storm which has been brewing for years both in Europe and the US.  In a speech before an international conference on terrorism held in Munich, David Cameron mounted a direct frontal assault on the bastion of multi-culturalism.  In spring loaded responses, assorted UK Muslim groups as well as fellow travelers from the British Left countered that Mr Cameron by his stance promoted, among other evils, racism, xenophobia, marginalizing Muslims, and, horror above horror, giving aid and comfort to the far right English Defense League.

In his remarks, the PM drew a sharp distinction between Islam per se and political Islam, particularly that of the violent sort.  He announced that the government would be reversing a course followed by his Labor predecessors.  Instead of remaining silent--or, in fact, even facilitating by money and public facilities--groups and individuals who espoused positions on gender issues, law, and democracy repugnant to defining British values and norms, the government would robustly counter these.  No longer would Her Majesty's ministers genuflect before the multi-cultural totems of de facto segregation, turning a Nelsonian blind eye to "preachers of hate" or allowing separate development of non-majority social and cultural groups.

In the tenor and scope of his remarks, Mr Cameron followed the path explored earlier by German chancellor Merkel and French president Sarkozy.  Not that this reality inhibited the automatic excoriations pouring from both Muslims and the denizens of the Left.  The views offered by the Big Three of the European Union may be offensive to the deeply held beliefs of the "sophisticated" and ever-so-tolerant elites of Europe (and the US) but accurately reflect not only the realities which have insensibly developed in Europe over the past couple of decades but the perceptions of most of the hoi polloi of the UK, France, Germany, and, for that matter, the rest of Western Europe.

As Cameron made clear, the relation between Muslim groups and Muslims generally within the UK and the majority population of that country has profound implications for the internal security of the realm.  Due to rulings by the overreaching European Court of Human Rights, it has become virtually impossible for British authorities to deport even very dangerous, terror inclined believers in violent political Islam.  The same unintended consequence of the ever-so-tolerant-and-accepting elites' decision to invest very broad powers in the unelected, unaccountable Human Rights Court applies to every member of the European Union.

As a report Thursday by the top monitor of counterterrorism in the UK, Lord Alexander Carlile, made plain, the result of the European Human Rights Court decisions taken in conjunction with the rapid growth of violent political Islam in the UK has been to make the country a "safe haven" for terrorists and their supporters.  Similarly, the briefings given to visiting American congresspeople by MI-5 emphasized that the security organ as well as the police are nearly overwhelmed by the number of primarily young Muslims who have surrendered to the appeal of violent political Islam.  The clear implication for the Americans was the threat could not be confined to the UK but could easily cross the Atlantic.

This dreary reality underscores the earlier lessons from Germany.  A decade ago it was the ever-so-tolerant German milieu which allowed the nurturing of several well-educated, economically well-off, young Muslim men to gravitate to the flag of violent political Islam with results which arrested the world's attention on 9/11.  Even with that capstone to a series of earlier outbreaks of violent political Islam, it took years before the German government made any moves to inhibit the activities of those who pursue the defeat of the West.  The power and seductive appeal of multi-culturalism held too great a sway with the German political, media, and intellectual "elite" to do otherwise.

France traveled a similar route albeit without the enormity of 9/11.  Years of violence by "youth" were waved aside by the elite as being nothing more than rage and frustration caused by economic and political marginalization.  It took great political courage as well as the growth of a backlash by French people wondering what had happened to "their France" before the government commenced actions intended, in essence, to compel and end the self-inflicted Muslim segregation from the majority population, the majority culture, the norms, values, and world views which defined the French nation.

Cameron is calling for nothing less.  He is demanding an end to segregation.  True, the segregation was in large measure well-intended by the True Believers in multi-culturalism and cultural relativism.  These True Believers, members in good standing of the self-selected, self-anointed hoi ollogoi, really thought that separate development of Muslim communities following their own native customs and religious traditions would benefit them and, by some mysterious process, the country as a whole.  Well intended segregation even when embraced wholeheartedly by those being segregated is still segregation.  And, segregation harms all, those who are put in the ghettos and those who do the putting.

No matter what gloss is put on the matter, there are no upsides to segregation.  The record of history is very clear on that.  Whether the Jews of Europe or Americans of African ancestry in this country, segregation does only damage, grave, even well nigh onto fatal damage.  The intentions of multi-culturalists does not change this reality one iota.

Cameron, like Merkel and Sarkozy before him, called for (to use a lawyer loved phrase) a bright and shining line to be drawn between Islam as a religion and Islam derived political ideology.  While that sounds like a good idea, it is one which is fraught with danger in application.

The fundamental difficulty is simply that there is no dividing line between Islam as a religion and Islam as a political ideology.  Islam is a self-consciously totalistic system covering all aspects of life, the profane as well as the sacred, the political and economic as well as the theological and eschatological.

On one level Islam is a very simple religion to accept and practice.  Its five pillars are straight forward.  Its basic requirements and strictures are likewise simple, direct and not at all difficult either to articulate or to follow.  The basics of being a good Muslim are arguably simpler in application than are those of being a good Catholic or a good Presbyterian or a good reform Jew.

On  another level, Islam is a very difficult religion to practice in its totality.  This is particularly true when one is a Muslim living in a secular Western country.  The assorted imams, ayatollahs, and sheiks who have preached on the utter incompatibility of Islam and democracy are not perverting the faith.  If, as these clerics believe, all law must come directly from the deity, then the laws of a democracy being made by men are anathema unless they are somehow certified by a cleric as fully compatible with the law of the deity.

Similarly, if, as these clerics preach, women are inherently inferior to men by the will and design of the deity, then any human created laws to the contrary are anathema.  The notion of gender equality is directly contrary to the expressed will of the deity and is an attack upon the deity.  The same reasoning applies to any number of other features of life and law in contemporary Western states.

The lack of any separation between the political state and the religious community, which is a baseline position articulated by any number of Muslim clerics, as well as the absence of any concept akin to the radical British development nearly a thousand years ago of the "King's Peace" assure immense practical difficulties confront Mr Cameron's goal of full integration of Muslims into the larger British comity.

Mr Cameron must recognize this as he asserted in his speech a truth which will not sit well with either many Muslims or their multi-cultural supporters.  He averred that the responsibility to conform with larger, defining British norms, values, world views, and traditions resides with the individual Muslim.  To put it bluntly, Cameron challenged each and every individual Muslim to decide between accepting the defining characteristics of British culture, society, and polity on the one hand or getting out of the UK on the other.

The choice is blunt but fair.  A society, a nation, as well as the state, the polity, is defined by a set of values, norms, traditions, world views, all of which have been developed over generations.  The job of defining is never finished so each and every nation as well as the state which embodies it is a work in progress.  This means that each and every Muslim by agreeing to accept the norms and values currently governing the nation and state in which he lives can enter into the process of the never completed work in progress.

The UK or the Germany or the France or the US of a century hence will not resemble its current incarnation in many aspects.  That is a given.  This implies that Muslims are free to do what so many non-majority groups have done in each of these countries for many generations now--accept the present in order to participate in creating the future.

This ground truth implies that Prime Minister Cameron has issued an invitation which is far greater than the explicit ultimatum.  He has invited the Muslims to leave their cushioned ghetto and enter the mainstream in order to be full participants in creating the UK and the British nation of the years to come.  Seen this way, it is hard to understand why the Muslim groups and their Left wing apologists did other than praise the PM for his generous invitation.

As well as inviting Muslims to join the "Big Society," Mr Cameron has issued a challenge to the elites of Europe to reevaluate their stance.  Implicit in his remarks is a demand that each and every member of the EU as well as their component elites step back and reexamine just what human rights might mean.  He has implicitly demanded that the Human Rights Court be looked at closely and harshly.

Most particularly in the sub-text of his speech, Cameron has rejected the stance of the Court on the balance between the rights and privileges of an individual and the legitimate security needs of a state.  In all too many of its decisions the Court, has seemed to be of the mind that a state must commit suicide in order that a single person's human rights might receive the most generous of protections.

To his credit the British PM has challenged that dubious proposition.  This challenge has come rather late in the day, but finally it has been made.

The Incontestable Irrelevance Of Military Victories

General Sir David Richards, the new head of Her Majesty's Forces, has opened himself to attack.  The general delivered his view that al-Qaeda and others of the violent political Islam persuasion cannot be defeated in any meaningful sense of the word by military means in a recent interview.  If he becomes the subject of vitriol, he can at least comfort himself with the recognition that he has done nothing but tell it like it is.

Sir David has done something quite difficult for a professional soldier--admitted that military victories can be irrelevant to the solution of larger political conflicts.  As he drew a line between conventional peer-to-peer wars and the sort of asymmetrical and messy affray such as that being waged in Afghanistan, the general has simultaneously underscored the value of his assessment and limited its application appropriately.  History powerfully buttresses the accuracy of his conclusion.

The granddaddy of modern defensive insurgencies, the first war of "national liberation," also known as the War of American Independence, proves Sir David's point.  The British Army won most of the battles, losing only two of any significance, but ended up waving goodbye to the former colonies.  As has been the case in every insurgency whether defensive or offensive in nature, the military, its successes and failures, are merely tools for influencing the political will of the two real contestants--the politically articulate portions of the two opposing populations.

The American War of Independence proved the most central point regarding all insurgencies or insurgency-like asymmetrical  conflicts: The side which can spend time and accept casualties will best the side which seeks to save time and limit casualties.  Additionally, the American War of Independence demonstrated that while a side cannot kill its way to victory, the infliction of casualties without reward will exhaust the political will of the less committed side over time.

The same set of lessons was given to the US during its involvement in the Wars of the Vietnamese.  The US won the overwhelming majority of the company sized and larger engagements.  This was irrelevant over the long---to We the People, overly long--haul.  A sizable segment of the politically articulate American public lost political will to continue the effort.  As had been the case with the British nearly two centuries earlier, the American political structure packed it in, picked up our balls, and went home.

The Algerian War of Independence although more complex in its social, cultural, and racial dimensions shows the same irrelevance of mere military victory to political success.  Overlooked by too many is the simple albeit brutal fact that the French military had the insurgents on the ropes.  The combination of a new operational doctrine in the rural areas and the convincing French success in the Battle of Algiers decimated the insurgent capacity to continue effective military or paramilitary operations.  It didn't matter.  The nature of politics not only in the two antagonistic ethnic groups in Algeria but also in France conspired to offset totally any and all victories by French forces.

General Richards is of the view that the same dynamic exists with respect to al-Qaeda and the other purveyors of violent political Islam.  He is not being pessimistic when he concludes that the very best that can be expected from military means is the containment of the threat.  That is accurate, provided one adds that containment will require punitive expedition employment when a specific threat can be linked to a specific foreign location or governmental facilitator.

Al-Qaeda and the others are ideologically motivated.  Much, if not all, of their ideology is both pernicious and persuasive.  In these factors, the ideology of violent political Islam resembles its precursors of National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism.  The one was defeated by military means solely because its purveyors chose the route of peer-to-peer war as the preferred avenue to global success.  The other, which as a result more closely resembles today's violent political Islam, rejected direct aggression selecting instead indirect, proxy, and other nasty little violent expressions.

As noted in yesterday's post, al-Qaeda has opted for the death-by-a-thousand-paper-cuts method of conflict.  This means, quite simply, that military muscle is not as relevant as so many of hawkish temper have hoped.  There are roles, critical ones, for military force, but none are sovereign remedies for the threat which will be confronting us for at least another generation.

The general demonstrated his firm grip on reality when he recommended "upstream" means to combat the ongoing threat.  As the conflict is primary one of values, norms, world views, in short, ideologies, his view has great merit.  It is unfortunate that all too may policy makers and "decider guys" in the US and elsewhere in the West define "upstream" means as being economic in nature.  Spreading money as opposed to ideas per se is not the answer, rather the countries of the West must employ the full panoply of soft power mechanisms with an emphasis on education in order to head off the next generation of wannabe martyrdom seekers.

The power and appeal of Western values, norms, world views, and ideas should never be underestimated.  Nor should they be deprecated as is so often the case by members of the assorted national "elites."  As was seen in the long running conflict with the ideas and institutions of Marxism-Leninism, the potency of the West intellectually, culturally, politically was enough to spell finish to both the Cold War and Soviet Communism.

Bombs and bullets are far more inherently limited in their effect than are words and ideas.  It may be rare, but it is more than simply welcome to read a correct appreciation made by a very experienced and quite senior military commander.  Hail, Britannia!

From Europe, One Good Idea And One (Very) Bad Idea

The British and French governments are demonstrating that they have a capacity for thinking on matters diplomatic and military which is infinitely superior to that monstrous international amphyctony known as the European Union.  The EU has grown from a rather decent, modest concept of enhanced economic unity to a bloated mastodon with delusions of adequacy while the British and French governments under more or less conservative leadership have shown a realistic appraisal of how diplomatic and military clothing must be cut to fit the economic cloth.

In a way quite unforeseeable only a few years ago, London and Paris are edging to a degree of military cooperation without precedent.  This merging of capacities not only magnifies the military strengths of both but addresses points of relative weakness to the advantage of both countries.  It is a foregone conclusion that this development will serve to amp up the diplomatic influence of both as well.

A few days hence French President Nicholas Sarkozy will hold a summit with British PM David Cameron.  The high point of the meeting will be the announcement of a military alliance between the two countries which will see among other features the reconfiguration of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to accommodate RAF aircraft.  This will be a temporary(?) fix bridging the gap between the budget constricted requirement to retire the British fleet of Harrier jump jets and the commissioning of the next generation British carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and the arrival from the US of the Joint Strike Fighter.

There will be other mergers of capacity in the structure of the new alliance.  But, far more important than the details is the existence of the agreement.  This bilateral approach marks a departure from the very tired thinking which has dominated Europe since the end of the Cold War and the rise of the EU.  It provides a viable alternative to both the highly undesirable combined EU military force and the increasingly irrelevant and politically divided NATO.

The alliance is a natural in several basic ways.  France and the UK are the only nuclear powers in Europe.  Both are permanent members of the UN Security Council.  Each has a sizable expeditionary force capacity and a recent history of distant operations including the ongoing one in Afghanistan where France has 4,000 troops deployed at present--not as many as the UK but more than simply symbolic.  The alliance would provide a firm platform for future distant operations provided, of course, the interests of both countries are directly involved.

An indirect benefit for both comes from economies which may result from the alliance.  This would assure that each state would have resources for necessary unilateral operations.  France has a wide variety of post-colonial commitments in Africa as does the UK.  But these commitments are of an individual not a joint nature, so it is critical that each have an autonomous capacity.  The same obtains with respect to the few residues of colonial majesty still sticking to the British lion's mane such as the Falkland Islands where it is unreasonable to expect France or any other state to offer direct assistance.

The recent defense and security review conducted by the Cameron government makes it clear that the UK must operate as a partner with some alliance in most conceivable military activities.  Whether with NATO or in a bilateral context with the US or, now, France, the UK has no realistic choice other than alliance based operations.  Still it is essential that the UK retain a sufficient independent capability to deter, say, Argentinian ambitions regarding the Falklands.

A closer merging of intelligence capacities will accompany the enhanced military alliance.  Both countries have good to excellent intelligence apparatuses and a further level of cooperation will enhance these as well.  When looking at the threats today and into the near future, the name of the game is intelligence.  Closer and more comprehensive sharing of assets and product will give both countries yet another leg up in the contest with advocates of violent political Islam.

All the way around, the developing alliance is a fine idea.  Even the US will benefit, at least incidentally, from its existence.  A thumbs-up to both London and Paris--even if it means Napoleon is spinning in his tomb.

Now for the really bad idea.

The European Union emboldened by the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty has created a new diplomatic monster which will simultaneously undercut the ability of the individual member states to execute effective independent foreign policy and confuse the diplomatic landscape for everybody else.  The grotesquely named European External Action Service (EEAS) is an equally grotesque bureaucratic blight on the great garden of diplomacy.

The EEAS is headed by a Briton, the Baroness (life peerage due to Tony Blair) Ashton.  The Baroness is a person without any discernible qualification for her job to which she was appointed by Gordon Brown.  As the woman has no foreign policy experience, not even a professorship in diplomacy, one can only conclude she got the job as a reward for her years of toiling in assorted Labor Party supported quangos.  As a one time quangocrat Ms Ashton not only has no hands on acquaintance with the trenches of diplomacy, she has no direct contact with politics per se.  She is, in short, a veteran of the remote and lofty world of unelected, unaccountable policy making boards whose let-them-eat-cake attitude toward the inhabitants of the real world is legendary.

The Baroness has a true barony at her disposal.  The EEAS disposes of some 7,000 eurocrats who will labor not only in the Brussels headquarters but in some 137 embassies around the world.  Nor is the Baroness Ashton's fiefdom impoverished.  Its budget comes in at approximately twelve billion dollars.  That is pretty top drawer--as is the Baroness's own reward, nearly three quarters of a million dollars not including perks and bennies.

The personnel deployments are a bit confusing.  There will be forty-six diplomats in the tiny but luscious island of Barbados.  The Turkish contingent amounts to 132 which outstrips the 124 assigned to the US.  Morocco will get ninety-two nudging the less scenic and far more dangerous Afghanistan's eighty-five.  Twenty-nine eurocrats will fetch up in Tajikistan while thirty-one will wade ashore in Yemen.  The numbers roll on and on with little if any relation to either the interests in play or any other real world consideration until the least favored country of Togo gets a mere three, not even enough for a game of whist.

The assorted poohbahs and panjandrums will be housed in appropriately expensive quarters and will ride about in splendid armor plated limos.

As the citizens of the Barony of Ashton ride about so also will they sow diplomatic confusion.  The standard has already been set by the EEAS man in Washington, Joao Vale de Almeida, who let it be known that he spoke for all the EU member states.  He modestly told the assembled press that, where the EU had a unified position, "I am the one leading the show."

Well, this implies that either the EU will have a common position on everything, in which case the member states could save a lot of money by shutting down their embassies for all except routine functions such as visas, or there will not be many common stances, so even the EEAS heavyweight is superfluous.  In either alternative, the existence of the EEAS "ambassador" will raise the question of who is in charge here?

In the best of times, diplomacy is often conducted in turbid waters.  The addition of a foreign policy equivalent of a fifth wheel in no way clarifies the murk.

The Lisbon Treaty removed the requirement that all EU foreign policy decisions be unanimous.  This means that the EEAS may work against the policy interests of one or more member states.  For example, if a majority of EU members vote to cozy up to Tehran, the EEAS will do just that not only in Iran but in other capitals where the eurocratic version of ambassadors will press their host to also hug the ayatollahs tighter.

Stances to the contrary dictated by national interests would not matter.  Thanks to the splendors of democracy, the majority would rule, even if, as in the case of Iran, major players such as the UK, France, and Germany are in the dissenting minority.

The consideration of conflict between a majority position and those of individual members is not academic.  It has already been seen in the context of Hamas and the Gaza Strip as well as with regard to Israel.  It deserves noting in this regard that the Baroness has bloviated at some length about her "clout" in Gaza due to her record of securing financial assistance for the terroristic thugs who run the place.

Looking ahead, the EEAS poses a long term threat to the diplomatic establishments of all its member states.  Due to the very high salary schedules, a budding diplomat faced by a choice between his own country's foreign service and the EU's apparatus will be tempted sorely to go with the money.  This means over time each member will be bled of its most ambitious, most able, and most promising diplomats.  This may bode well for the dreams of the collectivists of Europe, but it has no good impact for the several states.

That was probably one of the intentions of those Eurocrats who designed and built the EEAS.  To these worthies the notion of nation is anathema.  So, they no doubt have hoped that starving each member of talent will be the best way of bringing the hated nation-state to the desired status of extinction.

Now, bucko, that is a really bad idea.