One More Time--UN "Peacekeepers" Can't Keep The Peace

The Geek has been a harsh critic of UN peace keeping operations most of the past thirty or so years.  While there have been some exceptions, the general rule is simply that the blue helmet crowd is not worth a fraction of what it costs the UN, which is to say the American taxpayer.

One more splendid example of the common rule comes from Sudan.  You might recall that after forces from South Sudan ambushed a UN aid convoy protected by units of the Khartoum army, the northerners responded by an attack on the contested border town of Abyei.  The incursion and concomitant looting and burning lasted two days during which thousands of residents hit the dust for points south.  During the festivities, the UN peace keeping force drawn from the army of Zambia hunkered down in its dug in compound, heads between their no doubt quavering knees.

This aspect of the story was widely, one is tempted to write "universally" ignored by the MSM of the world.  An honorable and lonely exception was Reuters Africa whose correspondent investigated this neglect of duty with a fine degree of assiduousness.  The article notes in several places that the UN is both "livid" and is "investigating" the incident.  The Zambian mission to the UN had no comment.  Wow!  What a shock.

This is not the first time that the Zambian contingent has determined that discretion was the better part of valor.  Nor is it likely to be the last.

The Abyei fiasco is typical of UN peace keeping operations in Africa.  In the Congo the blue helmet bunch has been recurrently unable to furnish protection to local civilians besieged, raped, and murdered by one or another of the assorted "rebel" groups.  This has been true even when the UN outpost has been within easy earshot of the rapine.  Nor was the performance of peacekeeping force notably better elsewhere from the Ivory Coast to points east.

The usual reasons given for the under performing nature of the peacekeepers is that they are drawn in the main from the poorest of the poor undeveloped countries.  Thus the personnel are underpaid, undertrained (if trained at all) under equipped (if equipped at all) and very, very poorly officered.  All of this is true.  It is also irrelevant.

There is no explicit requirement that the UN peacekeeping office use forces of this nature.  Rather, these are the only forces generally available.  More developed countries with professional armies seem to be reluctant in the extreme to deploy in the service of humanity.  There are normally valid domestic political imperatives behind this stance.

(Arguably even the presence of a Western professional army is no guarantee of success.  Recall that the small Dutch contingent present at Srebrenica as Ratko Mladic demanded the handover of all Muslim males could not offer resistance, and their request for air support was ineffective as it was submitted on the wrong form.  The result was eight thousand Muslim dead.)

The notion of peacekeeping is flawed in several essential respects.  The first is the requirement that peace already exist--at least in principle--before the blue helmet boys arrive to maintain it.  There is no writ for the UN force to impose peace and then keep it.  The second is the need for the government of the recipient country to request or approve the UN move.  In the context of Sudan the offer of Ethiopia to provide additional peacekeeping troops is contingent upon both Khartoum and Juba signing off on the proposal.  Thirdly, the peacekeeping forces are almost always too small and too lightly armed to intimidate effectively any and all locals inclined to fighting.

The final flaw is the one demonstrated by the Zambians at Abyei.  There is no real stomach for the idea of getting killed in the middle of someone else's war for the abstract of "peace."  This is a very commonsense approach.  It is bad enough to risk one's only skin in a conflict in which one's nation has a direct stake and in which one fights under one's own national command.  It is far less appealing to die for someone else's notions of peace or victory.  For societies and polities barely beyond the tribal stage of abstract loyalties (if that far along the continuum of political abstraction), the desire not to die in a truly meaningless conflict is all the more potent.

For a Zambian or anyone else from any country, there is no inbuilt loyalty to the supreme abstractions expressed in the UN.  Dying under the baby blue banner has no appeal, brings no glory, has no intrinsic reward potential.  When the bullets are flying, the best thing to do is what the Zambians did--dig a deep hole and stay there until the noise ceases.

The lofty thinkers behind the concept of the UN as a peacekeeper in the violent internal affairs of a state and nation which are, at least in theory, sovereign and independent, need to get a grip on the realities as perceived through the eyes of men sent far from home for little material reward to risk themselves in pursuit of something which is utterly meaningless to them.  If the lofty thinking, high minded people at the UN are serious about the notion of armed intervention in the bloody internal politics of a state or establishing an armed presence on the line dividing two combatant states, they need to stop outsourcing the duty to the unfortunate poverty ridden lesser states of the General Assembly--even when these states are eager for the "honor"of doing the dirty work.

Peacekeeping is a form of mercenary warfare.  Period.  This means the forces employed must be heavily armed enough and well disciplined enough to overawe the local combatants.  Overawing means the probability of actual shooting and dying is reduced.  A clear superiority in the task of killing means killing will be less likely.  Beyond that, it means that should the locals not stay properly impressed, the peacekeepers will have the ability to kill without being killed.

This approach would be more expensive to the UN (or the US which is the single largest financial supporter of these missions).  It also means the forces will have to be drawn from the most militarily competent members of the UN, the Great and Near Great Powers.  This, in turn, will open a very large box of political problems for the leaders of these Powers (with the exception of authoritarian regimes--and we all know who these are).  The political problems will in their turn make the Powers a bit more reluctant and circumspect in their handling of interventions under the blue flag.

An increase in reluctance would not be a bad idea.  While the notion and optics of internal violence or border skirmishes with clouds of emotionally appealing refugees is disconcerting, the bitter reality of the utility of both the violence and its consequences must be recognized.  The problems which produced the violence will not be settled by outside intervention, foreign interference.  They may be tamped down, made less visible, but they will still exist to be dealt with by future violence of an increased nature.  All peacekeeping efforts accomplish much of the time is kicking the can down the road.

It would be far better in the long term for the violence to produce a solution to the problem as contrary to the cliche so loved by the lofty thinking sort, violence does settle problems.  History is replete with examples.  It is also filled with examples of how prematurely truncated violence breeds a further outbreak of even bloodier violence.

The world was not produced by Walt Disney.  Nor is the human race given to peace, love, and flower power.  Political and social evolution is often propelled by suffering and dying, by instability and conflict.  The sensitive sort of person might wish it were otherwise, but the dreary history of the human race at least since we left the Eden of hunting and gathering shows the opposite to be the case.  Organized social and political life is characterized by redness of tooth and claw.

Nature is far more gentle and kind creature than is the human.  Get a grip on it.

The African Union Is Off Its Meds Again

There are some real problems in Africa.  Problems which well deserve the full attention of the African Union's Peace and Security Committee.  This crew is chaired by Ramtane Lamamra, who should be a very busy man.

Insofar as Mr Lamamra is busy it is not with the war in Somalia.  Nor is it with the invasion and occupation of Abyei by Sudan.  No, these are mere bagatelles in the estimate of Mr Lamamra and his colleagues on the Peace and Security Committee--or so it appears.

The African Union and its Peace and Security Committee are meeting in Addas Abba with only one pressing item on their agenda.  That issue is Libya.  To err on the side of accuracy, the issue is not so much Libya per se but rather the AU's perception that it has been shunted to the sidelines as "an observer in this calamity."  Jean Ping, another AU heavyweight, echoes the plaint of African irrelevancy.

The AU is desperately keen on ending the NATO program of air strikes.  Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra are of the expressed view that it is terribly, terribly necessary that the NATO planes sit silent and bereft of bombs on the runway if a political solution is to be found for Libya.  The AU is also quite sure that it has a plan, a road map to use their term, which will lead to a peaceful and successful outcome in Libya.

The problem in the estimate of the AU is the noise of the exploding bombs is so loud that no one will listen to their plan.  The minor detail that the AU plan allows Brother Leader to remain in power while the details of change are worked out and this is quite, quite unacceptable to the rebels seems to be unimportant--at least in the estimate of Mr Ping and Mr Lamamra.  The unpleasant matter of the rebels having rejected the AU approach is not seen by the AU as important.

The rebels are suspicious of the AU.  They have taken the uncharitable view that the strong financial ties between the AU and Gaddafi renders the organization a less than neutral party in the present matter.  Of course, the rebels are simply giving due recognition to reality--Gaddafi has been a major money man behind not only the AU but a wide selection of African politicians including not a few current heads of state.

The AU blithely overlooks the realistic position of the rebels.  The organization also ignores its own record of complete incompetence in dealing effectively with the armed chaos of assorted collapsing African states over the past couple of decades.  The body even manages to focus a blind eye on its lack of substantial let alone effective actions in the morasses of Somalia or Sudan.

No more than the Arab League is the African Union capable of brokering a peace in the context of an internal war.  Libya is no more susceptible to the good offices of the AU than was the situation in Yemen amenable to the efforts of the Gulf Coordinating Council.  In both states there was finally no room for even the slightest compromise between the rivals for power.  Gaddafi no more than Saleh is willing to give up and go into that good night without a fight to the edge of death--and perhaps beyond.

The Arab League was sensible enough to realize it could play no useful role in Yemen.  The members recognized that the political differences between the various regimes precluded a single political will and without that the AL had no credible capacity to coerce and thus no way of influencing the outcome in Yemen. Rather than expose this to global view, the AL simply looked the other way.  The GCC was willing to give it a shot having more to lose by not trying than by trying and losing.

The AU has the political and military potency of a steer.  It normally accepts this condition by ignoring unpleasant situations such as those in Sudan or Somalia.  Normally, the AU tries to keep its sheer impotency out of public view.  The ill-advised peace mediation effort in Libya is an anomaly understandable only in terms of the organization having a sense of loyalty to a man who wrote some very large checks to it.

Libya is a tough nut to crack as NATO has been discovering.  It is a tough nut because the slyly nutty man who has run Libya for two generations is personally tough.  He is not going to surrender or accept a humiliating defeat which would see him in jail, on trial, or facing the hangman.  Negotiation is a means of buying time and only that.  The solution to the Libyan problem will be found only in the death of Gaddafi.

Even that may not be enough.  The rebels are poorly organized with no common agreement beyond the proposition that Gaddafi must go--preferably feet first.  The rebels are no more amenable to negotiations than is Gaddafi.  What might or will happen the day after Gaddafi's body is buried remains very much up in the air.  There is no rebel consensus.  Nor is there a Western concept--other than sweet mood music about democracy and the like.

The AU has been so blind to the real dynamics in play in Libya--or owe such a debt to Gaddafi--that it ignored the non-negotiable foundations of both sides.  This diplomatic tone deafness is in no way covered up by a campaign of whining about the noise of NATO bombs.  The AU should stop its bitching and simply accept that it is an entity without any real reason to exist other than the egos of the respective members.

What A Great Day!

This is one of those days which makes a guy glad to be alive--that is if he is a maven of how much can go wrong in the world all at the same time.  So much has gone so terribly out of whack in the past twenty-four or so hours that is hard to decide what most tickles the brain, that is, what deserves the virtual ink.

It is quite tempting to take a few shots at that LST (large slow target) named "Pakistan."  It is a hoot and a half to contemplate that less than a couple of dozen Mighty Warriors Of The One True Faith can take over a major naval air installation.  That these Glorious Fighters Of The Koran can hold off assorted Pakistani military forces for seventeen hours, destroying a pair of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, gifts of the American people delivered only last June, in the process.

Not since a similar commando unit hit and held the Pakistani army's headquarters a couple of years ago has the Islamic Republic been so humiliated.  It is presumed that the Great Strategists of Islamabad are down on their prayer rugs giving thanks to the deity that the Taliban trigger-pullers did not hit a certain facility only ten klicks over, conveniently adjacent to an airbase where nuclear weapons are stored.  For such small favors, the Pakistanis should give great and prolonged thanks.

For the rest of us, the Taliban raid raises the long standing questions regarding the security of Pakistan's arsenal of one hundred or so nukes to new heights.  After all, the night squad which cut its way through a pair of barbed wire fences and used low tech ladders to scale a wall were not in the same league as the men of Boat Six of Great Abbottabad Raid fame.  If a handful of jihadists with nothing more sophisticated than RPGs, AKs, and a willingness to die could storm the heavily guarded naval airfield, is it impossible for a similar group to do the same at either a nuclear weapons depot or manufacturing facility?

On the upside, such muscular measures might not be needful given the omnipresence of ideological soulmates within the Pakistani military and intelligence services.  Or the direct method might be obviated by the Pakistani version of the hoary Mexican approach of "silver or lead."  It is not unthinkable, considering the prevalence of corruption in the Islamic Republic, that the promise of silver might trump the threat of lead.

On another continent, the ardent observer of frothing wars and failing states must feel a pleasant glow contemplating the attack over the weekend by Sudanese forces on the contested oil center of Abyei.  The Khartoum regime has maintained with a straight face that its attack complete with air strikes and armored units was "retaliation" for the ambush last week of a UN convoy escorted by Sudanese army personnel.  To the not yet officially independent state of South Sudan, the occupation of Abyei constituted an act of war.

Abyei was supposed to have voted as to which side it would join--Sudan or South Sudan--at the same time as the overall referendum on Southern independence.  This did not occur because Khartoum insisted on including a nomadic tribe of Muslim affiliation among those franchised to vote in the election.  This demand was vetoed by the southerners.  As a result, the Abyei question has not been settled.  Nor is it likely to be settled by means other than the violent.

The UN has done the expected--denounce the attack and demand Khartoum withdraw its forces.  Assorted advocates for South Sudan (mainly George Clooney and assorted NGOs) are making predictable noises regarding the US and UK doing something to compel Khartoum to back down.  And, to insure the decibel level of rhetoric is high enough, spokesmen for South Sudan are warning darkly that the occupation of Abyei bodes well to restart the war between South and North which ended in 2005 after twenty-two years and hundreds of thousands of lives due to the diplomacy of the US and UK.

Just what the US or UK can do short of using highly kinetic coercive diplomacy to gain Khartoum's adherence to our policy requirements is unclear.  What is clear is that neither Washington nor London are in any hurry to send warplanes or troops anywhere beyond current theaters of operation.

The upcoming meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron has some potential for both sparks and amusement.  The two leaders are not in perfect tandem regarding what is being done in Libya to say nothing of what should be done.  The British and French are all in favor of more hairy chested efforts than those made to date.  In earnest of this intent, both have announced the deployment of helicopter gunships to the country.  The British will operate Apaches and the French machines of local manufacture from carriers in the Mediterranean.

Both states (the British more vocally) want the US to come back to Libya in a larger and more noise producing way than has been the case in recent weeks.  The redeployment of American A-10 and AC-130 aircraft is much desired by Whitehall.  While more muted in their stance, there is little doubt that M. Sarkozy's government would be very happy to see the weight of the US more heavily on the scales in favor of the rebels.

There is no indication that President Obama is in a mood to honor the requests.  Certainly, there is no evident pawing of the ground in favor of more and more high profile operations visible at the Pentagon.

This contretemps gives added importance to a little noticed event scheduled to occur during the Obama-Cameron meeting.  Reportedly the US and UK will establish a joint national security entity which will coordinate the perceptions and plans of the two countries to allow more effective joint and combined actions globally.  Considering the negative view held by Mr Obama regarding the "special relationship" between the UK and US, this is a surprising development.  If the reports are confirmed by events, it is a most welcome one as well.

While such a joint body may easily be nothing more than a pro forma exercise in policy futility, there is some chance that it will evolve into a genuine mechanism for meshing together the national security strategies and programs of two natural allies.  It might even point in the direction of growing to include several UK descended states--Australia, New Zealand, Canada and India--along with the US and UK into a tightly integrated political/military bloc which would be virtually unchallengeable in years to come.

Now, that sort of "international community" is one which is very pleasant to contemplate.  It gives the Geek a warm feeling and, being a sensitive sort of guy, he will end this post on this potentially very high note.

Failed And Failing States--And Violent Political Islam

There is a pair of diplomatic T. rex sized critters stomping around the room today.  As this nearly conjoined twin blunder about threatening to trash the international furniture, all the polite people in high places carefully avert their eyes and keep their mouths resolutely shut.

Virtually all hands studiously have ignored the reality presented by violent political Islam.  With the notable exception of former British prime minister Tony Blair there has been a veritable conspiracy of silence concerning not only the nature of the enemy of the civilized states but, more importantly, the success which has been enjoyed by the enemy over the past several years.  Instead of confronting the face of the enemy, rather than name the name of the guilty, the tired, hackneyed, long discredited tropes regarding poverty, political marginalization, the Israeli refusal to make a deal acceptable to the Palestinians, or American foreign policy generally are trotted out as if repetition could remake reality.

Even though the recent rumors of back channel talks between the Karzai government and elements of both Taliban and the Haqqani network give some hint that the military pressures are showing on the political will of the insurgents to continue, this straw in a favorable wind is more than offset by the many alarming (and that is not too strong a word) developments in Pakistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and other parts of the North Caucasus to say nothing of Yemen, Sudan, and Nigeria.  The bad outnumbers the faint good by an overwhelming amount.

Pakistan is lurching ever closer to either collapse or a co-option by the indigenous groups advocating violent political Islam.  Even though those Pakistanis who found from personal experience that living in the Islamic paradise promised by Taliban was far closer to hell on Earth than the heavenly reward have had ample time and opportunity to spread the word, the majority of the people are so fed up with the corruption and inefficiency of the government that the Islamist way seems the better one.  Coupled with a virulent anti-Americanism, which has been in no significant way lessened by the outpouring of US aid following the floods, this widespread public mood bodes poorly for the future stability of Pakistan.

Even a perfectly calibrated American policy which demonstrates the ideal mix of pressure and inducement will not change the underlying reality--most Pakistanis have come to see the US as being in demonic alliance with both India and Israel.  This unholy trinity constitutes the stuff of Pakistani nightmares--and has as little substance.  However, the power of the nightmare is great and real.  Thus the US and others in the small and beleaguered community of civilized states had best prepare for the eventuality of Pakistani state failure or the equally probable embrace by Islamabad of some variant of political Islam.  To do less is to court major disaster given the nuclear arsenal in Pakistan's possession.

This aspect of regional political context also demands a very hard look be taken at our current goals and plans in Afghanistan.  Bluntly, there is no hope of accomplishing more than further perturbation of armed political Islam espousing groups before changes in Pakistan render our presence in Afghanistan nugatory.  The best nightfall case we can now expect in Kabul is a regime which includes both Taliban and the Haqqani network.  This implies that the most we can hope for is a regime which will not provide support, sanctuary, or assistance to advocates of armed political Islam contemplating operations outside Afghanistan or the FATA of Pakistan.

The upcoming strategic review of the AfPak campaign will have little realistic alternative to that of reorienting to a goal of a coalition government in Kabul whose components are willing to forswear cooperating with groups such as al-Qaeda.  Ironically, this means we must "settle" for a goal and definition of victory which should have been in place when the first American boots hit the ground all those years, dollars, and dead bodies ago.  Had only we gone for the punitive expedition model in the first place, sigh.

Preparations for the Pakistani implosion should accompany the reframing of goals in Afghanistan.  It will be nearly impossible to assure that Pakistan does not become even more than it currently is the seedbed of plots against the West by violent political Islamists.  The most the US and others can hope to do successfully is pull Pakistan's nuclear fangs.  That along with finally turning off the great spigot of foreign aid will do much to lower the danger presented by Islamists emerging from the hospitable human and geographic terrain of that country.

Shifting from Northwest Asia, the unpleasant facts of failing states must be confronted.  There has been more than a little wringing of hands over the impending collapse of Yemen and what that would mean taken in conjunction with the mess called Somalia.  Yemen seems doomed to fail.  It is running out of its only cash crop--oil.  It is running out of water for its population burgeoning not only from indigenous increase but from the flow of refugees from Africa.  The government is so corrupt, so unbelievably inefficient, so riddled with cronyism, so laden with denial as to make the lads in Islamabad look like recipients of the Nobel Prize in good governance.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is not responsible for the current sorry state of affairs in Yemen.  It is not behind the two separate defensive insurgencies.  Nor is it an outside agitator stirring up discontent within the population.  Those honors belong to the government.  True, they are enhanced by the history and social construction of the Yemeni people.

However, AQAP can and is benefiting from the internal disorder created in largest measure by the government.  To the extent AQAP benefits, the other countries of the Arabian Peninsula as well as the civilized states generally will suffer.  This implies that the US has a dog in the fight.

The problem comes in that there is little, if anything, that the US and other outside powers can do about the root causes of insurgency or political disaffiliation within Yemen.  We can provide aid, military supplies, and training, intelligence support, but none of these will change the fundamental trajectory of Yemen.  Its failure is virtually certain so the most outsiders can hope for is the delay of the final collapse.

Time is a precious commodity since time is what is needed to build a diplomatic consensus about what the "international community" can do, if anything, regarding the challenge of failed states generally and those which harbor violent political Islam in particular.  Perhaps this will mean the nearly impossible task of reinventing the old "trusteeship" concept of the UN.  Perhaps it will mean an open ended international "peace keeping" presence oriented to suppressing advocates of violent political Islam--even though this will seem one more example of a "war on Islam."

The challenge of failed and failing states looms larger, much larger, when the dynamics of Sudan are considered.  The real deal is Sudan is poised on the brink of multi-party internal war.  The North-South divorce will not occur without bloodshed even if the vote goes off as scheduled and is cleaner than clean, attested to by Jimmy Carter.  The North is not going to let the cash cow of Southern oil get milked without Khartoum holding the pail.  And, the South will not twiddle its thumbs if Southerners living in the North are persecuted, which seems as likely as the Pope being against married priests.

Darfur is doomed to crank up again.  There are no alternatives.  The Khartoum regime isn't about to see the huge desert area drift away while it may have to watch the South go its separate way.  The residuum of hate left from the past conflict assures scores still must be settled in the one acceptable currency--dead bodies.

Africa's most populous state must be placed on the list of failing states.  The frontline of political Islam runs through the country.  The dynamics of the upcoming election are framed by the Muslim versus everyone else contest.  Much of the prevailing sentiment is anyone who is not Muslim is the enemy.  Given the record of what can be termed politely as "sectarian" violence, the election  is not going to settle the great divide which pits Nigerian against Nigerian.  The most active and influential group in the Muslim north is avowedly violent political Islam in its agenda and methods.

The last time Nigeria fell apart was over forty years ago.  The secessionist movement was defeated, but the time was long and the cost high.  While Nigeria recovered from that adventure in falling apart before it collapsed as a state, it was a near run thing.  Since then much has changed so that the probability of holding together this side of failure in the likely event of a Muslim generated internal war is low to nonexistent.

That's enough as the Geek is a sensitive sort of guy who can take only limited amounts of bad news.  The takeaway is self-evident though.  The enemy is violent political Islam.  The best friend of the enemy is the failed and failing state.  And, the time to get a grip on both is short.

The Hilary Clinton Learning Curve

Ten days or so back the ever supportive NYT spouted off on the presumed "steep learning curve" exhibited by the Nice Smiley Young Man From Chicago. The Geek posted his assessment of this. His view was not complimentary.

Now it is the turn of Secretary of State Clinton. The hot wash is far more positive.

The central indication that Ms Clinton has learned a lot over the past year came buried in her speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington today. Surprisingly or not, the WaPo picked up her nuanced change in focus in today's remarks compared to those delivered to the same audience a year back.

Last year Ms Clinton delivered herself of what had to be a piece of Obama approved blather regarding the need to alter the global political dynamic from a "multi-polar world" to a "multi-partnered" one. This exercise in the rhetoric of pure balderdash overlooked a couple of ground truths.

The first was simply that the world of a year ago was not "multi-polar" although it was well on the way to becoming one due to the presidential emphasis on "outreach," apology, and self-inflicted diminishment of the US as the primary global actor. It was clear in speech after speech as well as policy after policy that Mr Obama was ideologically committed to decreasing the influence of the US in all areas of world politics while exalting the UN above all others. On Obama's watch there was to be no "American exceptionalism" and, thus, no robust American leadership. He sought to do the impossible--unilaterally resign American Great Power status.

The second ground truth absent from Ms Clinton's declaration of the World According To Barack was the fact that partnership in international affairs is based upon the coincidence of national interest. "Partnership" is a matter of subjectively defined national self-interest and is defined by specific contexts.

The events of the past year have proven that the Obama intent of resigning American Great Power status has been countered effectively by the demands and expectations of other countries. Ms Clinton's statement today demonstrates that she understands this whether or not the Clueless Man In the Oval recognizes it or not.

Equally evident is Ms Clinton having awakened to the fact that partnership is both contextual and based upon coinciding national or strategic interest. Her redefinition also acknowledges that "partnership" arises from American leadership, from a clear understanding on the part of other governments as to the nature and character of both American national interests and what the US intends to do to achieve goals arising from those interests.

While still genuflecting before the totem of no-more-American-unilateralism, it is plain from both the body of Ms Clinton's remarks and the Q&A session that she appreciates the power of implicit unilateralism in gaining and sustaining multilateral consensus on coinciding national interests. The specter of unilateralism in the background has the effect of focusing other governments on the search for effective multilateral means to achieve policy goals which may arise from American national interests but mesh with their own. To this extent the Crazy American Thesis as practiced by Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush has great effectiveness in assuring future administrations achieve cooperation which might not otherwise be forthcoming.

The secretary employed the gaining of a new round of sanctions from the UN Security Council and the follow on of even tougher moves by the EU as well as the US and other countries as a prime achievement of the Obama administration as well as a paradigm for future actions. Of course, she might have noted with equal or greater justice the use of the UNSC by George H.W. Bush as the key move in generating the unprecedented coalition which fought the Gulf War. (Or to err on the side of historical accuracy the employment of the same venue by George W. Bush in gaining support for his Great Adventure In Regime Change in Iraq.)

Ms Clinton might even have mentioned the simple fact that We the People have never been particularly comfortable with unilateral action, greatly preferring a multilateral approach. As far back as Harry Truman, the US has routinely sought (and often achieved) the presence of the baby blue fig leaf of UN authorization to cover the genitalia of American policy. The use of multilateral diplomacy is not new with the Obama administration or the Clinton stewardship at Foggy Bottom. It is business as usual.

While her speech was notable in the absence of specific policy considerations, Ms Clinton did touch on three key issues slopping over her diplomatic plate. The current direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority topped the list.

Ms Clinton was guardedly optimistic on the course of the talks. She did gloss over both the contextual matters which threaten to sink the ship before it really gets underway and the estranged relationship between agreement on a framework for settlement and the actual implementation. These holes are understandable as no one wants to focus on the downsides before there are any upsides worthy of mention.

The secretary was not any more comprehensive regarding Iran. The sanctions are hurting Iran to be sure, but to what avail? That question was neither directly asked nor even indirectly answered. Perhaps if she had been pushed by one of the foreign policy mavens present, Ms Clinton would have agreed with retired dictator Fidel Castro, who opined there was no chance the mullahs would abandon their search for the bomb.

It was a bit of a surprise that she zeroed in on the upcoming referendum in Sudan. After characterizing the situation as a "time bomb," she did say the US was expanding its diplomatic efforts with both North and South Sudan as well as other African countries. Left unsaid was another unpleasant truth. If the vote does not go the way both parties want--which is a self-evident result--the disenchanted loser will crank up the still-on-hold war.

Of course, raising that highly inconvenient truth would have demanded a then-what-will-we-do?follow up. It's often best, or at least more politic to leave sleeping realities keep on snoring.

To her credit, Ms Clinton did link the American budget deficit to foreign affairs. The real deal is that an overly broke, overly frugal US will be severely handicapped in playing the Game of Nations.

Foreign policy on the cheap can have its upsides. For example the cost factor was key in deciding to wage war in Yemen and Pakistan with a very low footprint, using Special Forces assets for training and supporting locals as well as Predators rather than louder, more expensive manned aircraft. In these wars of the fringes the needs of economy mesh perfectly with diplomatic considerations and the nature of the local human terrain.

Overall however, diplomacy is impaired greatly by the perception globally that the American economy is on the semi-permanent skids and the government's bloated expenditures are funded to large extent by foreign government investors. If nothing else, diplomacy is impaired by a perception that the best days of the American way of economic life are behind us. The appeal of the American economy and the way of life it has supported have been high on the list of "soft power" features.

Reading the atmospherics gives the impression that not only has the Secretary of State moved firmly out of the shadows of Hillary-who? cast by the presumed foreign policy expert of the administration, Joe Biden, but that she has done so with the approval of the president. It may be that the Clueless One in the Oval has finally faced up to the fact that the enemies of the US are not going to roll over because Barack Obama is in the White House or that our allies are encouraged in their relationship because he can talk real pretty.

If true this is to the good of the nation. Ms Clinton has shown both a steep learning curve and an impressive degree of recent maturity. In any event it would seem that the president has enough to do what with blowing the economy, shooting the health care and education systems in the head, maiming American efforts in space and technology, and generally undermining American self-confidence. Leaving foreign relations to someone else is a very good idea.

Sudan, The Next In Line

Sudan has been collapsing for years now. The country has been hit by two, count them, two, defensive insurgencies. One involved the primarily Christian and animist South which has sought for decades to free itself from the remote, predominately Arab Muslim North. The other is the ongoing morass called "Darfur."

Both have been expensive in lives lost. Both have been inconclusive to date. Both, but more importantly the one in the South, are on the brink of renewal.

At the same time the central government, the Muslim one in Khartoum under the unpleasant leadership of a born-again proponent of violent political Islam, Omar al-Bashir, is not given to compromise with US policy requirements. Nor is the indicted war criminal inclined to renounce violence either "official" or through the use of informal mechanisms resembling the pogroms of Imperial Russia.

Khartoum has much at stake. The territorial integrity of Africa's largest country is at risk, quite explicit risk given the referendum scheduled under the 2005 truce deal brokered by the Bush/Cheney administration. Also at great risk is the future of the oil rich land surrounding the city of Abyei and extending into the South.

The referendum on the status of the South is currently scheduled for January 2011. A second vote is to be held on the Abyei question. There is no doubt but the Black African population of the South will vote for independence. Not surprisingly the Arab Muslim North will take the opposite position.

A vote for succession in highest probability will restart the southern insurgency. It will be every bit as bloody and destructive as the the twenty-one years of fighting which ended with the truce. Too much is in play to allow either side to settle for much less than a total victory, a victory which will give the winner all or the vast majority of the cash flow from the extensive oil deposits.

Even without the enormous cash cow mooing away under the sands of the South, the legacy of the first round of insurgency as well as the generations of antipathy which preceded 1984 would be enough to assure an internal war viewed by both North and South as a total war of national survival. The long-standing animus held by Arab Muslim for African Christian or animist is returned measure for measure. That enough insures any future war will be fought without any restraint.

The passions both North and South are deep, hot, and sufficient to power Sudan into a condition tantamount to Somalia. That potential is more than enough to bring many a night without sleep to the Deep Thinkers responsible for US policy in the area.

The policies adopted and actions taken by outside powers have done nothing to facilitate a negotiated end to the brewing war. The indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court was notably ill-considered. This action provided instant support for Bashir by the majority of African states whose collective political leadership has come to conclude (with some justice) that the ICC singles out African rulers for unique attention. At the same time the indictment provided the Organization of the Islamic Conference and even the Arab League to rally around Bashir's flag.

No matter how distasteful any governmental figure in any member state of these several organizations might find Bashir and his government, the identity politics so central to each group demands solidarity in the face of "Western" threat. Beyond providing a diplomatic prop for the odious Omar, the support given him by these three international entities constitute a potent antidote to foreign pressure on Khartoum.

Not that the outsiders have much more potential pressure points at their disposal. As all American policy makers holding a brief for Sudan must recognize full well, Sudan is under sanctions equivalent to those applied to Iran or North Korea. This means there ain't a whole lot of options for those who believe against all odds in the efficacy of sanctions.

The only set of divisions rivaling those in Sudan are the splits in the Heavyweight Strategists of Team Obama. While Mr Obama has been concerned with the important matters such as where to take the next family vacation and Ms Clinton worried over how to pin the human rights violator's tail on the UN Human Rights Council donkey, the Sudan policy questions have been handed over to the bench.

The polar opposites on the bench are Susan Rice, the UN Ambassador, and J. Scott Gration, Mr Obama's Special Envoy. These two can agree on only one basic premise: Sudan is a mess and likely to get worse.

The opposing views of Ms Rice and Mr Gration were painted over last October when the administration after months of gestation and labor delivered itself of a non-policy policy. Depending upon whether or not the Sudanese government(s) met or did not meet specified milestones, the defaulter(s) would either be rewarded or punished.

"Duh" doesn't adequately cover the rational response to this monumental effort in diplomatic genius.

Ms Rice has been possessed of a deep, visceral distaste for the Bashir regime since she personally witnessed some of the consequences of Khartoum's version of counterinsurgency in Darfur. There can be little doubt but she favors "punishment," preferably of the sort awarded to Saddam Hussein.

Mr Gration for reasons which he has not articulated in a convincing way advocates a policy of "rewards." He is all for providing incentives to Khartoum. The nature of the incentives as well as the intended results are less than clear.

In the field Joe Biden has been doing what passes for heavy lifting. He has met with Silva Kiir the Honcho of All Honchos in South Sudan. Mr Kiir is all in favor of (a) peace, (b) independence and (c) the US doing "something." Joe I-Am-Too-An-Adult Biden also achieved a breakthrough of world historical importance in that he gained the support of Egypt for the referendum.

Not that Egypt hauls much freight in Khartoum. (What freight Cairo might haul is contained in the escalating dispute between Egypt and Sudan over water, the all-important water of the Nile.)

China hauls beaucoup more freight with Bashir (and Kiir.) Chinese influence in the two Sudans is predicated upon Chinese national interest. Specifically, the same interest which has occasioned Beijing's large position in Iran--the need for secure, long term oil supplies preferably at below world market prices.

The president apparently understands China's pivotal position in each of the two Sudans. He raised the issue of the referendum in his bilateral meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao. Their meeting was polite and the Troll From Beijing noncommittal. It was rather the same as the conversations the two men have had regarding Iran.

No matter how events play out in Sudan, the Trolls have covered their bets. Also it can be assumed the Chinese will throw decisive weight behind the contender providing the better deal.

Mr Obama also attended a meeting between his National Security Advisor, Gen. James Jones USMC (ret), and former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who has been designated as the main man for implementing the results of the referendum. (Of course, for Mr Mbeki to be a player, the referendum must come to pass and the results not attended by overwhelming violence, but it seems Mr Obama is a perpetual optimist.)

It's a bit of a poser. The US and other Western countries have very little left in the sanctions area. The US and other Western countries have very little if any influence. While the subject of inducements is open, the only one likely to have a positive impact on Khartoum would be a quashing of the ICC indictment with guarantees it would not be reissued at some convenient future date.

This option would not prove popular with many countries of the EU where the abstract of "justice" has more potency than the avoidance of one more spectacle of African blood letting. (It probably would be no more popular with the American president considering his touching faith in equal justice under law in the international arena.)

There is no realistic way the administration might hope to play a "China card" as Beijing has no compelling reason to play a constructive role in the situation. Their interests are already covered, and the Trolls of Beijing have a well-founded belief in the competence of their intelligence and foreign services to know the right moment to make a move and the right move to make.

In principle one option is left by apparent default. This would be the Rice-favored Adventure in Regime Change. Real world constraints of a self-evident nature confine this option to the realm of the hypothetical.

In any even the administration has about a month, maybe two at a stretch, if there is going to be even a remote chance of the independence referendum being held early next year. Forget January. But, unless the Southerners have a firm belief the referendum will take place before the long, hot days of summer, the insurgency may start without delay.

A policy must be in place before the votes are counted here if there are going to be any votes to count in Sudan. Then, unless the policy can (a) defang Bashir, (b) assure with credible guarantees Southern independence, (c) demarcate the border in an agreeable way, (d) divide oil revenues in a way seen by both North and South as equitable, (e) provide a way to prevent the Darfur conflict from spreading, and (f) create an effective way to police and neutralize the border between North and South, the war will crank back up anyway.

Then, Sudan will become a blood soaked geographical expression rather resembling Somalia on a far grander scale. At this point al-Qaeda and other proponents of violent political Islam can genuflect deeply, bounce their foreheads on the mosque floor, and give heartfelt thanks to a most merciful and compassionate Allah for providing a new and improved base in their effort to bring "peace to the "House of War."

Ain't that a wonderful picture?

ADMIN NOTE: The Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments. Due to spam comments he has been forced to take defensive measures. He apologizes for any frustration which may ensue.

The World--The Good, The Bad And The Ugly

Well, war fans, Coach Obama has announced the new game plan for the Afghanistan venue. As a hot wash, it looks good. At least it has all the features widely touted by a counterinsurgency specialist at all the US military schools ten and more years ago.

According to the model presented back then, an insurgency had several major components. All of them had to be addressed with effect if the battle for the human terrain was to be won by the counterinsurgents.

The starting point of the model was simply that most people in an insurgent environment simply want to be left alone, left in peace to do their own thing, raise their children and hope for a better life in the future. That starting condition is met in Afghanistan.

Focusing on the insurgent force(s) the model posited three circles, nested one inside the other.

The outer, largest circle was the passive mass support base, people who were willing to cooperate with the insurgents as long as doing so required minimal risk.

The next circle was the active mass support base. This group provided direct, material support to the insurgency including fighters both full and part-time.

Finally there was the hard core insurgents. The full-time, fiercely dedicated militants who were ready and able to give their all to achieve the goal of the insurgency.

On the counterinsurgent side the circles were equal and opposite. The government had its own hard core, its own active mass support base and an outer fringe of passive supporters.

Surrounding both sets of circles was the majority of the population. The ever present people in the middle whose support and allegiance or at least tacit acceptance would be necessary to final victory by either side.

The new strategy announced by President Obama contains features which are explicitly directed to the overlapping tasks of killing the hard core insurgents, demobilizing support from the insurgent active and passive mass support base and seeking to attract members of the uncommitted majority to the government's passive (and it is to be hoped, active) mass support base. This is precisely the approach which should have been taken by "shock-and-awe" delusionist Rumsfeld and the rest of the neocon ninnies at the get-go seven plus years ago.

(That assessment is given with the predicate that for domestic political reasons and to placate the sensitivities of High Minded Western Europeans, the US had rejected the rational approach of a punitive expedition which would have been quick, dirty, conclusive and left Afghanistan as it was found--a collection of tribes in uneasy coexistence open to Pakistani hegemony.)

The Obama strategy kind of, sort of addresses the sanctuary problem. Doing something effective with the FATA is absolutely essential if the US is going to achieve the necessary strategic minimum of abating the threat of transnational terror acts planned and commanded from that region.

Cross-border sanctuaries bedeviled the US throughout the War in Vietnam. Bombing raids and cross-border incursions never settled the problem and, arguably, enhanced them. The use of deep penetration special operations forces including indigeneous but American led paramilitary groups provided the start of a solution but were never carried out for sufficient duration with sufficient forces.

The single largest swamp of doubt in the Obama strategy is the will and capacity of Pakistan to work with positive results to end the insurgency in the FATA. So far there is no indication that Islamabad either understands the counterinsurgency model outlined above or, if it does, has both the will and capacity to at accordingly.

The Pakistani military and paramilitary forces have undertaken any number of highly visible operations in the FATA but without noticable effect. The sweeps have generated refugees and resentments in wholesale quantities which has (if history is a guide) benefited the insurgents and only the insurgents.

The "peace" agreements recently concluded with "moderate" Islamists are not any sign of Islamabad demobilizing support for the Taliban insurgents. The men who signed on behalf of the "moderate" Islamists are themselves neither moderate nor pro-status quo. The groups which hold sway now in Swat and areas of the FATA are totalists in pursuit of the same ends as the trigger-pullers and suicide vest wearers. Identity of ends implies identity of interests, identity of support for Islamism and identity of opposition to the current regime.

Without Pakistan as a full and effective collaborator in the border area, the US in Afghanistan is in the same position as it was with relationship to Cambodia and Laos during the War in Vietnam. The insurgents and their external supporters have both base areas and lines of supply readily available on soil controlled by ineffectual or pro-insurgent governments.

Overall, the preliminary assessment of Coach Obama's new game plan must be mixed. It does not have a real thrust to the sanctuary conundrum. It is very good on paper in the pure counter insurgency component. But, paper ain't practice. And, there is a very wide and deep gulf of difficulty between the words on paper and the doings in the field.

So much for the "good." Now for the "bad."

The International Criminal Court (ICC) tops the list of the bad today. This creation of the High Minded and Lofty Thinking legalists of Europe and elsewhere has shown once more (if such needed to be demonstrated yet again) that High Minded behavior that ignores the messy realities of human activity automatically invokes the Law of Unintended Consequences. Take a dekko--

Omar Bahsir has cocked a snoot at the ICC and the High Minded generally with his recent trips. True, he has been properly cautious flying only to countries coterminous with Sudan. (The first real, albeit theoretical risk will come when and if Omar jets off to Doha for the Arab League get together.)

The Trips of Omar have not been intended nor have they served simply to make a rude gesture toward the ICC. They have been intended to underscore the degree of antipathy held by the African Union and, more to the point, the Arab League for the ICC issued arrest warrant. They also serve to ramp up the pressure on the UN Security Council to suspend the warrant.

The Tribulations of Omar have had the unintended consequence of highlighting the alleged "double standard" held by the West regarding presumed violations perpetrated by the IDF in Gaza. This argument will gain great force with the accusations currently hurled at Israel regarding the actions of its forces during Operation Cast Lead.

Then, of course, the ICC action put the refugees of Darfur squarely in the cross hairs. The ejection of major international aid groups and other subsequent actions by Omar Bashir's regime were both predictable and (in the eyes of the regime) justified. Considering that the regime has shown itself quite willing to see the population of Darfur die in large numbers, there is no reason to believe that it will suddenly turn tender in its affections for the displaced and mal-treated Muslims of the predominantly black refugee population.

There is also no reason to believe that threats to hold Bashir responsible for the consequences of the ejection of aid workers such as were made by SecState Clinton prior to her we-feel-your-pain visit to Mexico will have any useful effect. How many arrest warrants can the ICC issue on one man? How many new charges can it bring? What difference will that make?

The ICC and its High Minded backers are definitely "bad" on this issue. One can only hope that the Security Council will bring some political sanity to the matter. That would be "good."

And now, the "ugly."

Seeing the "ugly" in international affairs in the past few days isn't as hard as it seems. The UN Human Rights Council runs away with the title.

And, why is that?

By a vote of 23-11 with 13 abstentions, the foes of free expression and those of a cowardly disposition passed the measure long pushed by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference which seeks to ban something called "defamation of religion."

The relevant language reads, "Defamation of religion is a serious affront to human dignity leading to a restriction on the freedom of adherents and inciting religious violence." Zeroing in on the real deal, the resolution continues, "Islam is frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism."

Oy veh! The chutzpah of the OIC is nothing short of overwhelming. Either that or the panjandrums of the group are living in an alternative reality. While the resolution has no binding effect and similar language has been removed from the draft outcome document for Durban II, this exercise in Orwellian distortion and speech suppression is nonetheless the nose of the camel in the tent of the West.

There are already misguided public opinion molders and political figures in Western countries such as the goo-brained Canadian whose name the Geek gags at writing who have honestly (?) argued that religions and their adherents deserve special protection lest sensitivities be irritated. By this reasoning (if that word is accurate) the British medical journal Lancet deserves severe castigation for having editorially accused Pope Benedict XVI of having "publicly distorted science" in his recent remarks regarding the non-utility of condoms in preventing HIV infection.

Hey, the Pope likes cats. He's gotta be a sensitive sort of guy, right? And, his religious postulates regarding sexual conduct are a matter of Church doctrine. He and they have been defamed within the scope of the wording adopted by the Human Rights Council.

Suppressing speech, expression generally, inquiry, are all ugly. Almost as ugly as shouting, "Allahu akbar" while flying an aircraft into a building, pushing the clicker on a suicide vest while in a mosque or stoning, burning or beheading women. But, the Geek can't write that, given that Islam is "defamed" by his words.

Right. Fer sure, dudes.

High Minded Morality Hurts People--Again

Omar al-Bashir is a very unpleasant person. He is almost into the Idi Amin category and could, now that the High Minded are helping him, aspire to the status of Pol Pot.

The International Criminal Court is another UN invention intended to please the High Minded and Lofty Thinking types who really, really believe that there is such a critter as enforceable international law. So far the ICC has enjoyed a somewhat paltry catch, thuggish characters from the former Serbian government and a pair of sociopaths from failed African states.

These international felons were at the time of their arrest former heads of state or members of deposed governments. But, now the ICC seeks the heights of issuing an arrest warrant for a sitting head of state. Presumably, after sitting around one of the marijuana selling cafes in Amsterdam, the worthies of the ICC thought that had they only been around in the 1930s the world could have been spared the worst excesses of Adolph Hitler or Joe Stalin both of whom were well known for wholesale internal massacres undertaken for ideological reasons.

The comparison of Omar al-Bashir with two of the three greatest mass slaughterers in history is unfair to the Sudanese. (For ten points name the third.) Still, his notion of effective counterinsurgency seems akin to the notion of creating a desert and calling it peace. And, there seems little doubt that Omar is motivated by ideological considerations.

Al-Bashir is an Islamist. His supporters and corps of executioners are Islamists. His victims in the main are infidels who according to Islamist interpretations of Islam deserve to be sent to hell with all possible dispatch. A small minority of Omar's targets are merely observant Muslims who fail to support his Allah driven agenda of religious and ethnic purification with sufficient ardor.

There is good and sufficient reason to cap Omar with or without due process of law.

But, the reach of the ICC far exceeds its grasp.

As a drearily predictable consequence of this exercise in judicial hubris a lot of people are going to suffer. Suffer greatly. Suffer, in many cases, unto death.

Just how the hell gripless are the members of the ICC? Did these inflated egos really expect that al-Bashir would fly up to Amsterdam and submit to arrest? Go to the nearest Dutch embassy and ask to be handcuffed forthwith?

Omar, the African Union and the Arab League, to say nothing of Sudan's number one trading partner and foreign investment, China, all warned that any issuance of an arrest warrant would be counterproductive. Even relatively moderate Muslim states such as Jordan evidenced support for their embattled coreligionist.

Making support more than mere rhetoric, a Chinese company signed a contract to build roads two days after the ICC demanded al-Bashir's incarceration pending trial. Hello! Is there anybody home at the ICC.

Omar did the expected. Hot on the heels of the warrant, the Sudanese government cancelled the operating licenses of thirteen international aid organisations and booted their collective posteriors out of the country. As an instant riposte the ICC made threats that the humanitarian crisis expected as a consequence might result in yet more charges against the president of Sudan.

Wow! That ought to give old Omar pause for thought. Right. Fer sure, Dudes of the ICC.

Has no one noticed within the Legions of the High Minded that pressure consolidates political will of the target long before it might crush that will? History is replete with examples of that principle. If history is too tough a subject, consider how a snowball is made.

Right. You squeeze loose flakes and they become a ball. Squeeze long and hard enough the once flaky stuff becomes a headbopping iceball.

Get the picture, you of the High Minded?

Now the ICC, Darling of the High Minded, has placed a couple of million Sudanese in harm's way. In case anyone has missed it the refugee camps in the desert lack a few amenities such as water, food, adequate protection from the elements and basic medical care. All of these were provided by the High Minded outfits expelled by al-Bashir.

So, now what?

One possibility is that the UN Security Council will suspend or otherwise overrule the ICC's action. This is the preferred option as it will allow a face saving way for the situation to be defused and the international aid organisations to return to their essential work.

China's position on the Security Council and its critical role not only in Sudan but in relation to other vexing US concerns makes this action viable. That is if the US goes along with it. We have the veto. And, given the predilections of our ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, coupled with President Obama's inability to "even fake an interest in foreign policy" our use of the veto to block any suspension of the warrant is not an impossible outcome.

There is an alternative. Regime change. But, Sudan today is not Panama twenty years ago. It is not even Afghanistan in 2002.

No national leader of any country well oriented as to time and place is going to support in any way, shape or manner an invasion of Sudan. To the probable dismay of Ms Rice and others of a High Minded nature, ousting Omar at the point of a bayonet and frog marching the perp in handcuffs, shackles and disgrace to the Netherlands is a non-starter.

Reality dictates that unless and until a well-placed bullet preferably fired by a gun in Sudanese hands solves the problem the world is stuck with Omar al-Bashir. The best thing to do is cooperate in a Security Council action to suspend or even quash the warrant and get the aid workers back to the job.

The Geek is not to be numbered among the twenty-six percent of Americans who have a favorable view of the UN and its major subsidiaries. He lost all faith in that Utopian outfit when it shifted its mission from maintaining international peace (its original function) to mucking about in the internal matters of member states.

The al-Bashir episode shows one more time that the UN and all its manifold coercive creations such as the ICC should stick to the task of keeping international peace. Anything else invites entrance into morasses in which there is no easy or clean exit. Walking into the internal dynamics of a state--even a thugocracy such as Sudan--hurts the innocent and assures the guilty have a stronger grip on power.

Human Rights And National Interest

Last Monday a group headed by two Clintonites, William Cohen, the one time Secretary of Defense and Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, released a report timed to coincide with the Sixtieth Anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. This report took the position that "genocide" and "mass atrocities" threatened American national security and interests.

The report urged the incoming Obama Administration to reorganise the National Security Council and other components of the national security establishment to reflect this conclusion. While cheerfully acknowledging that the Cohen-Albright report is filled with High Minded, Lofty Thinking, the Geek is unconvinced that enforcement of "human rights," however narrowly they may be defined, is necessarily in the national or strategic interests of the United States.

Even the matter of genocide is not necessarily one that the US should, let alone, must, respond to even in the context of multilateral action. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (ratified by the US in 1988) like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was the product of its time.

Specifically, the Genocide Convention was the product of revulsion throughout the Western world over the state sponsored slaughter of discrete ethno/linguistic/religious communities by the Nazi government of Germany. (It is doubtful that Joe Stalin was all that perturbed by the tales of extermination considering his extensive personal experience with liquidating undesirable populations.)

In 1948 the definition of genocide was easy. The example was right in front of the world's leaders and peoples. In more recent years, the edges of definition have become ever more fuzzy, ever more blurred by propagandists and ideologues alike. The political goals and ideological imperatives override any objective definition and consensual understanding of the actions which genuinely constitute genocide.

The charge of "genocide" is hurled at the Israelis by partisans of the Palestinians. It is heaved by the Kremlin to justify the Russian invasion of Georgia. Taliban chieftains accuse the US of pursuing genocide in Afghanistan. The central regime of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charges the government of Rwanda of genocide by proxy.

You get the point.

The highly undistinguished former Secretary of Defense and his equally-at-sea counterpart from State want the military to incorporate genocide prevention (and, presumably, punishment) in its official doctrine. (Hint to Mr Perry: It's already there in all the doctrinal corpus that covers interventionary operations.) The report also demands that the intelligence community add genocide and related human rights violations to its already overstocked plate of missions and tasks. (Hint to Mr Perry and Ms Albright: Such reporting is already present even if it is not labeled as such.)

The Geek does not contemplate genocide with total detachment and equanimity although he is willing to admit that life as a historian hardens one to the extent and brutality of calculating governmental brutality. He is not willing to buy into the proposition that genocide per se let alone violations of human rights constitutes a threat to American national interests and security which compels response beyond the rhetorical.

There are several historically rooted reasons buttressing the contention that massive violations of human rights including the starkest expression of violation, genocide, does not constitute a threat to national interests and security. Some of these should be self-evident to Mr Perry and Ms Albright as they witnessed them during the Clinton years.

The first of these historical experiences is a negative lesson from a generally positive outcome. The venue was the ruins of Yugoslavia. The time frame was the 1990s. The cause was "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. The outcome was a seeming success with the atrocities ended and at least some of the major perpetrators arrested.

The important lesson is not that the intervention by NATO worked. While that is true, it is also less important than the negative lesson which must be taken away from the experience. The operation, including the low risk, high payoff bombing campaign worked simply because of the unique nature of the Bosnian context.

The venue was small, easily isolated. The ethnic rivals were easily identified. The support among the larger population for the atrocities committed by the ethnic cleansers was weak and easily eroded. The participants on all sides came to be revolted by their own excesses. Beyond that, there was a growing fear that if the chaos was not ended quickly, it would become an unendable monster as the dead increasingly dictated a policy of revenge and counter-revenge.

There was an almost palpable sense of relief in the disintegrating remnants of Yugoslavia when NATO and the US provided a way out. Promised a chance to end the mutual dance of slaughter without any particular group losing either face or internal cohesion.

In short, Mr Perry, Ms Albright, et al should take a firm grip on the ground truth of Bosnia. It constitutes a success which is nearly non-replicable.

There are other realities which the group headed by the ex-SecDef and ex-SecState should get a grip on. It is even more important that Susan Rice and others in the incoming Obama Administration get a grip on the limitations inherent to any attempt to prevent or punish genocide or other crimes against the purported rights of all humans.

Mr Perry and Ms Albright were around during the debacle of the US intervention in Somalia. They were witnesses if not architects of the disastrous adventure in mission creep which saw the US start out with the High Minded but achievable goal of protecting UN humanitarian relief convoys and distribution centers. Over the span of only a few months, the mission shifted from one of defending convoys and centers to one of suppressing warlords and building a nation.

Insufficient force combined with deficient planning and an excess of ignoring basic intelligence concerning the Somalis and an exuberance of ideology to assure an American defeat. Make no mistake about it. We were defeated in Somalia. Defeated in the field in the course of one botched commando style raid. Defeated in our political will by the televised imagery of American corpses dragged through the dust of Mogadishu.

The defeat of the US in Somalia had long term consequences. Consequences with which we are still dealing. The American defeat convinced Osama bin Ladin and others that the US lacked the stomach for killing and being killed. It convinced these prototypical jihadists that they could achieve their policy goal of forcing the US out of the Mideast if only they could inflict enough casualties in a high profile way on our citizens and troops.

The rest is, as they say, history. More properly, it is the Law of Unintended Consequences at work.

Another argument against taking action whenever and wherever violations of human rights occurs is the nature of international politics. Countries such as China and Russia have a sensitive regard for protecting "internal affairs" from the actions or even the inspection of outsiders. It is necessary to balance our national interests which may well require the understanding cooperation of major actors such as these two permanent members of the Security Council with emotional or ethical repugnance at the acts of governments such as that of Sudan.

In short, we must carefully assess where our genuine interests reside and not be driven by ideological considerations or the emotional gales of people outraged by gory media depictions of atrocities. Every Great Power from Great Britain in the Sudan over a hundred years ago to us in the past decade has suffered the negative consequences of emotional and ideologically driven policy decisions.

A final cautionary note for all of those eager to embrace the propositions of the Perry-Albright report (that means you, Ms Rice,) Well intended humanitarian actions may well have the result of freeing obnoxious governments from the necessity of basic reform. The efforts of High Minded, Lofty Thinking outsiders to alleviate human suffering in the short-term may well result in the paradoxical effect of assuring the suffering continues in the long run.

The paradoxical effects of well-intended efforts at humanitarian relief can be seen time after (literally) bloody time in Africa. Sometimes and under some conditions the best love is tough love, the best humanitarian gesture is doing nothing. There are times and places such as Zimbabwe today where only the absence of aid and the concomitant increase of human suffering will serve to cure the greater ill: The government of Kleptocrat in Chief Robert Mugabe.

It is neither pleasurable nor instructive to stand by with folded arms as people suffer and die. Neither is it pleasurable or instructive to watch as foreign troops fight, kill, and die in order to end atrocities or punish their perpetrators.

That's why foreign policy is usually a matter of choosing the least-worst option. That is why only cool assessment of genuine national interests and not feel good emotions or ideology must be the basis for foreign policy.

The US, China and the OIC--Strange Bed Buddies

The decision by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to seek an arrest warrant for the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, has made for a surprising and awkward joining of interests between the US, the PRC and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

OK, perhaps not so much a juncture of interests as an intersection of anxiety. The crossing is marked by the ICC. The Chinese don't like it at all. The US is uncomfortable with it. Many member states of the OIC are afraid of it.

The Geek has to admit he is not thrilled by this monument to international High Mindedness either. It strikes him as another example of an emotion driven, feel-good reaction to the atrocious behavior of a small number of zealots and True Believers in leadership positions.

The 1998 Rome Statute which created the ICC conferred an ambiguously broad jurisdiction on the court charging it with authority to try and convict individuals regardless of status for a portmanteau of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. As a result of the breadth of jurisdiction and the grave potential for abuse of a politically or ideologically based nature, the current administration withdrew the assent granted to the Rome Statute by President Clinton in 2000. As a result the Statute has never been presented to the Senate for ratification.

Despite the fact that the US is not a party to the court, the current administration is loath to take any action which might be seen as granting any legitimacy to the ICC. As a result the W. Bush Administration has been, at best, ambivalent in its response to the widely applauded decision of prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to seek the arrest warrant. To get the skinny, go to the AP http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jPO0qnku-2vJhJuBSUT5B8Qc61AAD91U5QC80.

The PRC, not unlike fellow Security Council member, Russia, opposes the ICC as it does all attempts by international entities to involve themselves in matters which are arguably of a purely internal nature. While Beijing officials aren't about to go on TV making so blunt a statement (particularly with the Olympic Games days away), there is not a shred of doubt regarding the government's position. The last thing China wants given its own record on suppressing internal political dissent is the potential for outside judgement.

(For the full Chinese position on the ICC arrest effort see the official news dispatch
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews+articleid_2394265&title=China_Expresses_Serious.html)

The same is true with respect to Russia. (Can we say, "Chechnya?")

Thus there is a good to excellent chance that the UN Security Council will interdict the prosecutor's efforts to see Omar in the slam. Any Security Council blockage will be suitably camouflaged and concealed, lest the High Minded of the world take umbrage.

And, umbrage will be taken. If not by governments, then by high profile non-governmental organisations. One has already given notice in an interview with Voice of America. The Save Darfur Coalition Policy Director Amjad Atallah, gave notice that his vocal group expects the Security Council to meet the same high standards as the ICC prosecutor. VOA has the interview http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/2008-07-15-voa43.cfm.

Finally the OIC has rung in with a statement by its General Secretary to the effect that the attempt to seek the arrest of Bashir represents a "double standard." The OIC jefe clearly means that if Omar the Butcher ends up in the hoosegow in the Hague, OIC demands that he be joined in durance vile by any number of Israeli political and military figures. You can check the Geek's interpretation at http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/topic_detail.asp?t_id=1226.

Omar and his regime are not nice. The Sudanese government both under Omar and his predecessors has shown a remarkable appetite for bloodshed and an amazing willingness to see large numbers of Sudanese (particularly those who are Black and non-Muslim) die as a result of starvation caused by government action as well as more active measures. In principle, bringing the entire thuggish crew of mass killers to trial is a fine idea.

But we must remember the yawning gap between principle and practice. That gap serves to define the universe of unintended consequences which may well ensue. In Sudan these consequences might well entail further suffering and death.

Beyond the Sudan the consequences which may very well result from the precedent established by an arrest warrant bearing the name Omar al-Bashir could spread very wide. Politics and ideology permeate the air of High Minded international entities such as the ICC. Much as the Geek is uncomfortable with having a position which coincides with that of the current administration (let alone the PRC), he has to agree that the ICC is a field of landmines and one must walk very, very softly and slowly in such an area.

The Organisation of the Islamic Conference--

Gets it wrong again! The combination of arrogance and tunnel vision demonstrated at the recently concluded 35th meeting of the OIC Foreign Ministers is one more example of the destructive influence of hyper-focus on Islam as a political/religious identity.

The meeting, as has been previously noted, took place in Uganda. Among the subjects considered, as posted yesterday, was a plea by a coalition of Islamic human rights groups to the effect that the OIC could not continue to be silent in the face of the "killing and suffering" of "millions of Muslims" at the hands of "Black Africans." The coalition was disingenuous in its characterisation of events in the Darfur region of the Sudan.

Sudan is a majority Muslim country with approximately seventy percent of its population being Sunni. These are primarily concentrated in the north. The minuscule Christian population is found in or near the capitol of Kharthoum. Darfur is populated by a mixture of "indigenous" faith subscribers and Muslims.

It is not a surprise that the OIC ignored the human rights coalition's plea. The Sudanese government, which includes Muslims and non-Muslims alike, is sufficiently Islamic to fall under the protective blind eye which the OIC and its members routinely turns toward violence which is strictly or predominantly Muslim-on-Muslim.

The OIC passed a resolution on Sudan. It called for negotiations (yawn) and pointed the Flying Middle Finger of Blame at one rebel group and "outsiders" seeking to put pressure on the Sudanese government. http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200806/FOR20080623b.html.

As far as the OIC is concerned, Sudan goes in the same category as Somalia. Let Muslim kill or displace Muslim and Allah will sort it all out in the end. We at the OIC have more important matters to handle.

More important than states foundering in waves of blood?

You bet.

There's those cartoons. Those damn Danes and their Freedom of Speech Fetish.

Consider, http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/topic_detail.asp?t_id=1156.

A spokesman of the OIC Observatory on Islamophobia today in a statement expressed disappointment and dismay at the decision of the Western High Court of Aarhus in Denmark that the publishing of offensive cartoons of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005 and reprinted earlier this year by 17 other Danish newspapers was not illegal under Danish law on the ground that terror acts were carried out in the name of Islam.

Well, considering facts, something that the OIC does only when it is in the interests of Islam, the Danish court's finding is correct. Not that this minor consideration slowed down the Islamic group.

The spokesman reiterated the principled position of the OIC and that of the OIC member states that terrorism had no connection with Islam or with any other religion and that its proponents were the common enemy of entire international community , He added that the linkage drawn by the Danish Court between Islam with terror to legalize the printing of the offensive cartoons and causing widespread insult to the sentiments of the Muslims was most unfortunate and that it could create a precedent for exacerbation of Islamophobia.

Crank up the old noise machine, please. But, while you are at it, would you be so kind as to explain why the OIC has no difficulty finding Islam compatible with the eternal exsanguinations in Somalia and Sudan?

Speaking of "principled" positions, consider the other truly awesome example of arrogance, of delusions of adequacy coming out of the ole OIC. Unfortunately this aspect of the recently concluded meeting has been overlooked by the msm.

It shouldn't be. (The matter hasn't been ignored by some web newsletters. You can see, for example, http://www.crosswalk.com/news/11577911/ or for a little fuller coverage and more quotes there is Cyber News Service at, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200806/FOR20080623a.html

It is an indicator of the shape of international politics to come. The OIC is demanding that any restructuring of the UN Security Council done in a way which does not take into full and effective account the fact that Muslims constitute one fifth of the human race will be opposed. There are several plans being mooted about for the reconstitution of the Security Council, but none currently provide for the maximal Muslim goal.

That goal?

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said this month that Islamic countries must secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council because “the Islamic world has been deprived of the power to defend itself."

Yeah. Right.

It seems that Iran has been doing a darn good job of "defending" itself against the Security Council in the contest over its uranium enrichment program. Other Islamic countries such as pre-2003 Iraq and pre-2002 Afghanistan have also done very well in the defend-against-the-Security-Council game.

Just last week, during the same time frame as the OIC was cranking up its bitch over not being adequately represented in the Security Council (despite the fact that Islamic countries get their shot at being elected to the reserved regional seats for the Mideast and Asia) the representatives of Egypt, Iran and Pakistan made a travesty out of the UN Human Rights Council meeting as they pressured the Council's president into issuing a gag order preventing all critical mention of sharia. This was defense of a sort. An objectionable sort.

The Geek has long been of the view that some sort of restructuring of the Security Council might well be in order. While not particularly enamored of any of the currently mooted plans, he is happy that discussion is open.

A discussion would be unacceptable that contains either a dilution of the current veto power held by the five permanent members (such as would be the case by adding a Muslim veto) or an ending the right of veto held by the five.

It is not that the Geek is notably Islamophobic. He is equally opposed to admitting India or for that matter Germany or Japan to the Veto Wielders' Club. Nor is the Geek unaware of how often and how counterproductively the veto has been employed to block arguably collective interests in order to serve the agenda of a single permanent member.

On the whole the five permanent members use of the veto has been functional. Barely so on occasion, but still functional. It has forced not only the more effective building of coalitions and even consensus, it has also provided for the effective explorations of alternatives which might otherwise have been left unknown territory.

The US might well consider the relative importance of the UN to it and it to the UN. Way back in the beginning, back in San Francisco over sixty years ago, a number of small countries protested the Great Power veto. The US representative ostentatiously ripped a copy of the UN Charter in half. It was a clear message. The world could have a UN with the Great Power veto intact--or it could learn to live without a UN.

The choice was clear. It was made. Correctly.

In the course of the next administration we may well be faced with the same choice. It must be made clearly. And correctly.