Two politicians, one Democratic--President Obama--and the other a Republican presidential wannabe--Rick Santorum--embarrassed themselves and, in so doing, tossed a pie in the faces of many Americans. Of course, it is a bit unfair to equate the two as one is a member in good standing of a large but still fringe group of We the People and the other is the chief executive of a country which is still a Great Power even in its self-inflicted decline.
Santorum, in his bid for commemoration in the Hall of Exceptional Bad Taste In Politics was assisted by members of the audience present for the Fox/Google Debate in Florida. A large portion of the audience was comprised of the same sort of self-destructive Republicans as had made noteworthy performances in two previous debates. These people constitute the slavering red meat eaters of the intellectually challenged segment of the Party of Elephants whose most evident characteristics are a lack of good taste, a deficiency in empathy, and, most importantly a strong unconscious desire to lose elections.
The former senator from Pennsylvania and champion of the farther Right shores of the badly misnamed "social conservative" wing of the GOP was goaded into a profound demonstration of deep ignorance regarding the realities of military life particularly during wartime by a question posed by a gay soldier currently stationed in Iraq. The question had to do with the deletion of "don't ask, don't tell" (DADT) so that homosexuals can serve openly in the US armed forces.
Needless to detail at length, Mr Santorum is against the current policy. He would seek to turn the calender back to the years of DADT with the accompanying demand that non-heterosexuals engage in a combination of deceit and denial. Leaving aside the political impossibility (and ignoring the boos issuing from the oral cavities of the denizens of the Very Very Right) suffice it to note that Santorum's stated desire to emulate Dr Who or Mr Peabody constituted the lesser part of his exceptional ignorance of military life.
The peak of Santorum's idiocy and lack of knowledge came when he stated, "any type of sexual activity has absolutely no place in the military."
That observation is a show stopper for sure. As any and everyone who has spent time in any of the armed forces knows, sex is a constant and highly favored activity often bordering on obsession. So it has been since Achilles was a private. So it will be as long as young people are found in a military service. Even years hence when combat is delegated to machines, it is highly probable that the people monitoring the killbots will have a hard time keeping their utilities buttoned tightly.
Not since the anti-sex campaigns of World Wars I and II when the American morality police pretended that our troops were so pure of heart and mind that they must be protected from the evils of prostitutes both amateur and professional has anyone betrayed the degree of out-to-lunchness exhibited by Mr Santorum. If, indeed, he really does believe what he said, then he has disqualified himself from serious consideration for any office of trust and confidence under the Constitution by virtue of pure, unadulterated ignorance and irremediable stupidity (or ideological blindness.)
A far more important bit of televised damage was inflicted on the US by President Obama's speech to the UN General Assembly. It was more than enough to make a person squirm in raw and unrelieved embarrassment as the POTUS delivered a set of remarks which could have been written by the execrable foreign minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman. The kindest explanation for the presidential exhibition of seriously pathetic policy arises from the overarching Obama need to be reelected--and the crucial relation between that goal and the Israel Lobby.
As the recent by-election in New York demonstrated, there is a strong current of unhappiness with Obama's stance on Israel within the American Jewish community. Shoring up support in this portion of the eroding Democratic base is an urgent matter. Not surprisingly, more than a few political analysts both here and abroad have identified this as the prime mover behind the Obama position, which constituted a nearly complete reversal of policy (such as it was) a year ago.
The problem with this explanation even if it is as accurate as appears, is that international politics is a more unforgiving arena than the domestic sort. Very real lives are at stake. Very real countries with equally real interests are in play. The issue of an Israel-Palestinian settlement is inherently existential in nature and does not allow for the flexibility or retakes common in domestic affairs.
The president threw away the good offices stature once enjoyed by the US. The strident tones and relatively extreme nature of his position taken in the context of past stances undercut any possibility of Washington being seen as an honest broker seeking a fair and equitable solution to the several seemingly intractable problems besetting the Israelis and their Palestinian interlocutors.
This leaves the task to such as the European Union or the Quartet with the US playing a marginal role at best. Mr Obama's "approved by AIPAC" speech also eroded to the point of nonexistence any influence Washington might have had with the Palestinian Authority or its Mideast state supporters. Worse, the president appeared to put the US squarely in opposition to the majority of the "Arab Spring" movers and shakers.
This last consideration is arguably the most critical of all. While the US would see its influence reduced in any event as the groups espousing austere, politically oriented Islam will be the power either in or behind the throne in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere, there was and remains no need to reduce influence all the more. The status of the Palestinians ranks high as a motivator on much of the "Arab street." While it is more than a bit hypocritical that this was not the case in the ancient days when Jordan "occupied" the West Bank and Egyptian troops held the supreme hand in the Gaza Strip, it is a reality today which must be recognized and addressed by American policymakers.
Obama's Mideast policy (to use the term generically only) has been and remains an area deserving of the attentions and ministrations of FEMA. He and his "team" have done the seemingly impossible--gotten each and every aspect wrong for more than two and a half years. Far more than even George W. Bush, the Nice Young Man From Chicago has managed to alienate every stakeholder in each and every Arab state as well as non-Arab countries such as Turkey. The UNGA address was the final nail in the coffin of American presence in the Mideast.
Santorum (with the able aid of the boo happy bunch) humiliated the Republican Party in the eyes of all but the most avid of elephants. Mr Obama did much more. The president managed--without assistance--to put the US firmly behind the eight ball throughout the rapidly changing Mideast.
No American president has done that before. No American president in search of reelection has ever degraded the influence of his country in pursuit of votes. Finally, Mr Obama has something real to apologize for.
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
Saturday, September 24, 2011
Saturday, September 17, 2011
Ethno-Religious Democracy And The Next Mideast War
Turkey has declared rhetorical war on Israel. To err on the side of accuracy, the Islamist leaning government in Ankara has been escalating words to almost the this-means-war level over the past few days. Behind this development resides not only an ambition of regional power status but the explosive growth of a new Turkish nationalism based on the merging of ethnic and religious identities, which has substantially replaced the strongly secularist predicated sense of national self inaugurated by Kemal Attaturk.
The target of Turkey's ever more intemperate attacks has likewise reinvented its sense of national identity on the merging of religion and nationalism. When founded, Israel was both a Jewish state and an outpost of European socialist thought which centered upon secularism.
The seismic shift in Turkey's national identity came only in the past decade when the long ignored peasant population of the Anatolian highlands moved to the urban centers of Ankara and Istanbul in large enough numbers to form an effective political base for the AKP, a party whose roots ran deeply into the rich soil of political Islam. When the internal migrants, searchers for a better life, joined with the equally ignored Muslim clerical establishment, it became possible to organize the discontented and marginalized new arrivals into a potent political base. This, in turn, brought the AKP to power--a power it has developed further by defanging the military and the secular elites of the cities.
The shift of Israeli politics from the secular left to the ethno-religious right started back in 1977 when Likud tapped the pool of resentment felt within significant segments of the Israeli population. By melding a new coalition of expansive hyper-nationalists, new immigrants, and the more religiously minded, Likud was able to gain power. As the years went by, the nationalist and religiously observant right was strengthened in numbers by arrivals from the Soviet Union, and, after the collapse of that state, its ruins.
The movement to the right was accelerated by the First Intifada and the consequent bloodletting imposed by the Palestinian terrorists. This reaction on the part of the Israeli public was to be expected. Terror is normally counterproductive. With every suicide bomber, every rocket, every new outrage, the median of Israeli politics moved more and more into the right hand lane.
The external pressure joined with the Second Intifada to push Israelis even more into the harsh and uncompromising position of national identity based on the juncture of Jewishness and Israeli-ness. This dynamic was fully predictable as pressure consolidates political will long, long before it fractures it. In this context, it is easy to see why the ill-advised efforts by the Obama administration to put the screws to Israel generally and the Netanyahu government in particular were counterproductive failures.
The result is the current loggerheads relation between mirror image politicians--Erdogan and Netanyahu--along with the daggers drawn nature of Turkish-Israeli relations. A larger consequence of national identities based on the merger of ethnic and religious definitions is looming as the "Arab Spring" rolls into Fall, a Fall which will be marked with a very early freeze.
Democracy is dangerous. The power of this truth informed the thinking of the authors of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. Democracy is nothing more or less than the popular expression of whatever fad, fancy, or fantasy can be employed effectively to move voters to mark one person's name preferentially.
Among the many fads, fancies, and fantasies which can be employed to this end, none are more powerful than nationalism and religion. The advocates of political Islam in Egypt, in Libya, in Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Arab Muslim states know this perfectly. Knowledge need only to be put into action.
In the classic treatment of revolution, Anatomy of Revolution, the author makes a key point. Although only ancient offensive insurgencies were considered in this book, the power of this one observation has been enhanced by each and every revolution which has succeeded in the post-World War II years.
The point?
Revolutions move to the extreme. That is to say, the group with the most radical agenda for change following the overthrow of the old regime will win. The reasons for this inevitable move to the extreme are few and simple. The more extreme the group, the more sweeping will be the changes contained in its agenda. In addition, the more extreme groups are tightly organized, their action plan is simple, easy to understand, and addresses fundamental fears and aspirations held by the majority of the public.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the Salifists, and others advocating political Islam are all tightly organized. All have agendas which are virtually interchangeable, making group merger thinkable. And, most importantly, all have action plans which are predicated on the strictures and requirements of Islam as well as the notions of dignity and pride resident in nationalism.
In all the countries involved in the dramatic events of the past nine months, the advocates of political Islam enjoy great advantage over their secular opponents. Not only are the assorted groups well organized and possessed of a radical agenda, all make profound appeals to both Islam and national pride. "Stand tall, you are Egyptian" is a chant virtually identical to the more recent, "Stand tall, you are Muslim."
The necessary inference from what has been observed and reported throughout the Mideast and North Africa is simply that Egypt, Libya, and perhaps others will move to the totalistic national sense of self which has been in play in Turkey and Israel. One implication of this trajectory is that Turkey will fail to reestablish the Ottoman Empire. Another, far more disturbing one considering all that has been at work in the Israeli political system is that war will become far more likely in the near to mid-term.
The next war will sneak up on the West. This is to be expected. The elites of the West generally discount nationalism as a spent force, a ancient relic which has outlived whatever usefulness it once may have possessed. At the same time, the Western elites of politics, the media, and academia pretend that religion does not exist as a real force in the lives of people and the policies of governments.
In the US, in the West, the leaders of state and molders of opinion alike will not see what is happening on the Arab streets and states alike. What will not be seen, cannot be prevented.
Pleasant thought, eh?
The target of Turkey's ever more intemperate attacks has likewise reinvented its sense of national identity on the merging of religion and nationalism. When founded, Israel was both a Jewish state and an outpost of European socialist thought which centered upon secularism.
The seismic shift in Turkey's national identity came only in the past decade when the long ignored peasant population of the Anatolian highlands moved to the urban centers of Ankara and Istanbul in large enough numbers to form an effective political base for the AKP, a party whose roots ran deeply into the rich soil of political Islam. When the internal migrants, searchers for a better life, joined with the equally ignored Muslim clerical establishment, it became possible to organize the discontented and marginalized new arrivals into a potent political base. This, in turn, brought the AKP to power--a power it has developed further by defanging the military and the secular elites of the cities.
The shift of Israeli politics from the secular left to the ethno-religious right started back in 1977 when Likud tapped the pool of resentment felt within significant segments of the Israeli population. By melding a new coalition of expansive hyper-nationalists, new immigrants, and the more religiously minded, Likud was able to gain power. As the years went by, the nationalist and religiously observant right was strengthened in numbers by arrivals from the Soviet Union, and, after the collapse of that state, its ruins.
The movement to the right was accelerated by the First Intifada and the consequent bloodletting imposed by the Palestinian terrorists. This reaction on the part of the Israeli public was to be expected. Terror is normally counterproductive. With every suicide bomber, every rocket, every new outrage, the median of Israeli politics moved more and more into the right hand lane.
The external pressure joined with the Second Intifada to push Israelis even more into the harsh and uncompromising position of national identity based on the juncture of Jewishness and Israeli-ness. This dynamic was fully predictable as pressure consolidates political will long, long before it fractures it. In this context, it is easy to see why the ill-advised efforts by the Obama administration to put the screws to Israel generally and the Netanyahu government in particular were counterproductive failures.
The result is the current loggerheads relation between mirror image politicians--Erdogan and Netanyahu--along with the daggers drawn nature of Turkish-Israeli relations. A larger consequence of national identities based on the merger of ethnic and religious definitions is looming as the "Arab Spring" rolls into Fall, a Fall which will be marked with a very early freeze.
Democracy is dangerous. The power of this truth informed the thinking of the authors of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. Democracy is nothing more or less than the popular expression of whatever fad, fancy, or fantasy can be employed effectively to move voters to mark one person's name preferentially.
Among the many fads, fancies, and fantasies which can be employed to this end, none are more powerful than nationalism and religion. The advocates of political Islam in Egypt, in Libya, in Tunisia, and elsewhere in the Arab Muslim states know this perfectly. Knowledge need only to be put into action.
In the classic treatment of revolution, Anatomy of Revolution, the author makes a key point. Although only ancient offensive insurgencies were considered in this book, the power of this one observation has been enhanced by each and every revolution which has succeeded in the post-World War II years.
The point?
Revolutions move to the extreme. That is to say, the group with the most radical agenda for change following the overthrow of the old regime will win. The reasons for this inevitable move to the extreme are few and simple. The more extreme the group, the more sweeping will be the changes contained in its agenda. In addition, the more extreme groups are tightly organized, their action plan is simple, easy to understand, and addresses fundamental fears and aspirations held by the majority of the public.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the Salifists, and others advocating political Islam are all tightly organized. All have agendas which are virtually interchangeable, making group merger thinkable. And, most importantly, all have action plans which are predicated on the strictures and requirements of Islam as well as the notions of dignity and pride resident in nationalism.
In all the countries involved in the dramatic events of the past nine months, the advocates of political Islam enjoy great advantage over their secular opponents. Not only are the assorted groups well organized and possessed of a radical agenda, all make profound appeals to both Islam and national pride. "Stand tall, you are Egyptian" is a chant virtually identical to the more recent, "Stand tall, you are Muslim."
The necessary inference from what has been observed and reported throughout the Mideast and North Africa is simply that Egypt, Libya, and perhaps others will move to the totalistic national sense of self which has been in play in Turkey and Israel. One implication of this trajectory is that Turkey will fail to reestablish the Ottoman Empire. Another, far more disturbing one considering all that has been at work in the Israeli political system is that war will become far more likely in the near to mid-term.
The next war will sneak up on the West. This is to be expected. The elites of the West generally discount nationalism as a spent force, a ancient relic which has outlived whatever usefulness it once may have possessed. At the same time, the Western elites of politics, the media, and academia pretend that religion does not exist as a real force in the lives of people and the policies of governments.
In the US, in the West, the leaders of state and molders of opinion alike will not see what is happening on the Arab streets and states alike. What will not be seen, cannot be prevented.
Pleasant thought, eh?
Labels:
Benjamin Netanyahu,
Islam,
Israel,
Political Islam,
Recip Erdogan,
Turkey
Thursday, September 8, 2011
What Is Erdogan Smoking?
The Islamist-leaning jefe grande of the AKP and prime minister of Turkey, Recip Erdogan, is proving to be something of a regional loose cannon. It is one thing to demand an apology from Israel for the badly mishandled boarding of the Mavi Marmora, but it is a far different matter to threaten war.
Make no mistake about it, the bellicose prime minister's promise/threat to provide naval cover for future "aid" flotillas headed for Gaza is the next best thing to a declaration of war against Israel. Erdogan might not like it, but the Israeli blockade of Hamas ruled Gaza does conform with international law as well as the customs of war at sea. That inconvenient truth has been made clear time after time, most recently in the Palmer Report. The report severely criticized the Israelis for the conduct of the blockade but emphasized that the blockade per se was and is totally legal.
This means that any Turkish naval units convoying the "aid" vessels would be seeking to break an internationally recognized and legal blockade by armed force. That is a pretty good operational definition of war. Perhaps the huffing and puffing PM did not realize that as he allowed his mouth to run away from adult supervision, but if the Turkish navy shoots, the Israelis will shoot back, just as sure as it is hot as hell in Texas.
Having made the promise/threat, the AKP government now had best hope that no pro-Palestinian group will take up the offer. Given that the "humanitarian" NGO behind the Mavi Marmora flotilla has very close ties to the government, it may be expected that at least that group, IHH, will be controllable. But there are many other entities willing to use the specious cover of humanitarian aid convoys to embarrass Israel and, given the Erdogan commitment, perhaps start a war which will end the Zionist menace once and for all.
Certainly there are enough entities, including both state and non-state actors, which fervently desire an end to Israel. Of these, most would be willing to manipulate a face off between Turkey and Israel into the long hoped for War of the Final Solution. Erdogan's promise/threat darn near invites some group to do just that.
There is the chance that Erdogan was motivated not only by his ambition to recreate the Ottoman Empire in an updated form but also by an exaggerated belief that his navy could simply intimidate the Israelis into allowing the Turk protected "aid" convoy to steam unimpaired to port in Gaza. The Turkish navy is much larger than its Israeli counterpart. The TCG has eight former US Perry class frigates as well as more modern classes including eight MEKO vessels. The Turks also can deploy an impressive number of smaller combatants headed by six French built corvettes.
The Israeli navy is small in comparison. However the almost microscopic coastal defense oriented IDF naval forces include three highly competent Dolphin class submarines whose tube launched missiles constitute a serious threat to any surface opponent. Far more importantly, any confrontation between Turk and Israeli would occur within very easy range of the Israeli land based air force. The Turks have no credible way of countering the Israeli air threat. Period.
Israeli air dominance means it is game, set, and match to those fighting under the blue and white flag of Israel.
Erdogan is apparently too busy contemplating his diplomatic brilliance to remember the hortatory advice which ended the sci-fi classic, The Thing, "Watch the skies!"
The Islamist PM has also overlooked the vast difference between impressing the Arab street with anti-Israeli oratory (very good) and saber rattling (which scares the hell out of the same street.) Turkey has gained a whale of a lot of traction in the Mideast by cocking a snoot at Israel by way of words and diplomatic rupture. This does not mean the Arabs or their governments, either new or old, are hoping for a return of the Ottoman Empire under any guise. Nor are all hands thrilled by the prospect of a new regional war whether initiated by intent or miscalculation.
The same dynamics and considerations apply to the second of Erdogan's promises/threats. The expansive, not to say delusional, PM also declared that the Turks will guarantee the maritime commons and subsea resources against Israeli exploitation. This is a more comprehensive commitment than the convoying of humanitarian flotillas. At the same time, it places the Turks in a more vulnerable position by greatly enlarging the possibility of starting a war of miscalculation. It also places Turkey in the role of regional semi-hegemon pretending that no one can drill below the water of the Eastern Mediterranean without Ankara's remit. This is a preposterous assertion which will alienate not only the government of Cyprus but a host of others as well.
Alienation takes many forms. And, alienation can have a host of consequences, none of which is positive from Ankara's perspective.
For example, the present Egyptian government (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) may be happy with the new military agreement between itself and Turkey. It may be pleased with the prospect of joint military, naval, and air exercises to be held early next year. But, neither SCAF nor any successor government other than one dominated by the more extreme Salifists would be thrilled by a joint war against Israel. After all, the Egyptians are a lot closer to Israel and know from experience what that can mean if the bullets fly and the bombs fall.
Every Arab state is too preoccupied currently with internal problems to seek a war. If a war of miscalculation would ensue after a Turk-Israeli shoot out at sea, there would be few Arabs rushing to the frontline. The Turks would find themselves rather alone in the matter.
Erdogan (who now deserves the Joe Biden Award) has no choice in the real world now other than to back down. Fortunately for him the walking back can be done quietly. He and the AKP will lose a bit of street cred, but that is preferable to losing a war.
Make no mistake about it, the bellicose prime minister's promise/threat to provide naval cover for future "aid" flotillas headed for Gaza is the next best thing to a declaration of war against Israel. Erdogan might not like it, but the Israeli blockade of Hamas ruled Gaza does conform with international law as well as the customs of war at sea. That inconvenient truth has been made clear time after time, most recently in the Palmer Report. The report severely criticized the Israelis for the conduct of the blockade but emphasized that the blockade per se was and is totally legal.
This means that any Turkish naval units convoying the "aid" vessels would be seeking to break an internationally recognized and legal blockade by armed force. That is a pretty good operational definition of war. Perhaps the huffing and puffing PM did not realize that as he allowed his mouth to run away from adult supervision, but if the Turkish navy shoots, the Israelis will shoot back, just as sure as it is hot as hell in Texas.
Having made the promise/threat, the AKP government now had best hope that no pro-Palestinian group will take up the offer. Given that the "humanitarian" NGO behind the Mavi Marmora flotilla has very close ties to the government, it may be expected that at least that group, IHH, will be controllable. But there are many other entities willing to use the specious cover of humanitarian aid convoys to embarrass Israel and, given the Erdogan commitment, perhaps start a war which will end the Zionist menace once and for all.
Certainly there are enough entities, including both state and non-state actors, which fervently desire an end to Israel. Of these, most would be willing to manipulate a face off between Turkey and Israel into the long hoped for War of the Final Solution. Erdogan's promise/threat darn near invites some group to do just that.
There is the chance that Erdogan was motivated not only by his ambition to recreate the Ottoman Empire in an updated form but also by an exaggerated belief that his navy could simply intimidate the Israelis into allowing the Turk protected "aid" convoy to steam unimpaired to port in Gaza. The Turkish navy is much larger than its Israeli counterpart. The TCG has eight former US Perry class frigates as well as more modern classes including eight MEKO vessels. The Turks also can deploy an impressive number of smaller combatants headed by six French built corvettes.
The Israeli navy is small in comparison. However the almost microscopic coastal defense oriented IDF naval forces include three highly competent Dolphin class submarines whose tube launched missiles constitute a serious threat to any surface opponent. Far more importantly, any confrontation between Turk and Israeli would occur within very easy range of the Israeli land based air force. The Turks have no credible way of countering the Israeli air threat. Period.
Israeli air dominance means it is game, set, and match to those fighting under the blue and white flag of Israel.
Erdogan is apparently too busy contemplating his diplomatic brilliance to remember the hortatory advice which ended the sci-fi classic, The Thing, "Watch the skies!"
The Islamist PM has also overlooked the vast difference between impressing the Arab street with anti-Israeli oratory (very good) and saber rattling (which scares the hell out of the same street.) Turkey has gained a whale of a lot of traction in the Mideast by cocking a snoot at Israel by way of words and diplomatic rupture. This does not mean the Arabs or their governments, either new or old, are hoping for a return of the Ottoman Empire under any guise. Nor are all hands thrilled by the prospect of a new regional war whether initiated by intent or miscalculation.
The same dynamics and considerations apply to the second of Erdogan's promises/threats. The expansive, not to say delusional, PM also declared that the Turks will guarantee the maritime commons and subsea resources against Israeli exploitation. This is a more comprehensive commitment than the convoying of humanitarian flotillas. At the same time, it places the Turks in a more vulnerable position by greatly enlarging the possibility of starting a war of miscalculation. It also places Turkey in the role of regional semi-hegemon pretending that no one can drill below the water of the Eastern Mediterranean without Ankara's remit. This is a preposterous assertion which will alienate not only the government of Cyprus but a host of others as well.
Alienation takes many forms. And, alienation can have a host of consequences, none of which is positive from Ankara's perspective.
For example, the present Egyptian government (the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) may be happy with the new military agreement between itself and Turkey. It may be pleased with the prospect of joint military, naval, and air exercises to be held early next year. But, neither SCAF nor any successor government other than one dominated by the more extreme Salifists would be thrilled by a joint war against Israel. After all, the Egyptians are a lot closer to Israel and know from experience what that can mean if the bullets fly and the bombs fall.
Every Arab state is too preoccupied currently with internal problems to seek a war. If a war of miscalculation would ensue after a Turk-Israeli shoot out at sea, there would be few Arabs rushing to the frontline. The Turks would find themselves rather alone in the matter.
Erdogan (who now deserves the Joe Biden Award) has no choice in the real world now other than to back down. Fortunately for him the walking back can be done quietly. He and the AKP will lose a bit of street cred, but that is preferable to losing a war.
Labels:
Gaza,
Israel,
Mavi Marmora,
Recip Erdogan,
Turkey
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Yes, Bibi, Great States Do Apologize
The apparent center of gravity in the current degradation of relations between Turkey and Israel is the failure of the latter to offer an acceptable, formal apology for the nine deaths which occurred at the hands of IDF personnel during the encounter between Israel and the utterly bogus "relief" flotilla headed by the Mavi Marmora. The Palmer Report concluded that while Israel had international law and custom on its side as regarded the naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, the enforcement of the blockade as well as the resultant deaths constituted an egregious act of overreach.
The incident on board the ship handed anti-Israeli elements, including the Islamist leaning AKP government of Turkey a heaven sent opportunity to make much propaganda at the expense of the Jewish state. In this context the Turks have demanded repeatedly that Israel not only provide compensation for those wounded and killed by IDF members but also provide an acceptable apology. Israel has agreed to compensation but has balked over the idea of an apology. Prime minister Netanyahu has maintained that doing so would damage Israeli public morale among other sinister things. In this he has been backed (or exceeded) by the always ready to breath fire foreign minister, Lieberman. The far right of the Israeli political spectrum has been monolithic in the rejectionist stance adopted by Netanyahu.
It seems that the Netanyahu government believes that an apology for an action seen as being defensive in nature and not overdone in view of the provocations offered by activists on board the Mavi Marmora who were armed with bludgeons and similar weapons would somehow lessen Israel in the eyes of its citizens and the world generally. This is an utterly specious notion.
The first reason for declaring the Netanyahu stance specious is simply that the raid was poorly conceived and even more poorly executed. It seems preposterously arrogant that the raid's planners and commanders did not anticipate any armed resistance to the IDF boarding party. Did these experienced military officers really, really believe the activists sponsored by a group with a long record of hostility to Israel would not seek a confrontation? Or, were they of the view that the simple arrival of the dreaded IDF would cause an instant collapse of will on the part of the activists? Either flies in the face of both experience and realistic military planning.
To put it bluntly, the boarding was as badly botched as, for example, the special operations force attempt in Somalia twenty years back which resulted in Blackhawk down. The IDF blew it pure and simple when they mounted the assault. This is not a mark against the troops who fast roped down to decks filled with men ready and eager for a violent confrontation, men who were willing to court and accept death at the hands of the IDF, men willing to be martyrs for the faith and the cause.
Apologizing for your own side's errors is no shame--only a transient embarrassment for those in charge. Admitting that better thinking, better planning, better timing, better methods and tactics would have resulted in a death free takeover of the ship is no sin, no humiliation, but rather an expression of a willingness and capacity to learn from mistakes.
The second reason the Netanyahu posture is specious not to say vacuous is simply that great nations can and do apologize. By this the Geek does not mean the bogus exercises of mea culpa engaged in by President Obama for American "transgressions" both real and imagined but in all cases resident in the far distant past. No, the Geek means such examples as that provided by General Stanley McChrystal, sitting, legs crossed, feet bootless, on the rug covered floor of an Afghan stone hut apologizing for fatalities inflicted by forces under his command upon civilians, upon members of the family in whose house he sat.
The humble, human gesture of offering apologies for lives cut short in no way humiliated the general, nor the forces in his command, nor the nation in whose service he and his people fought. Rather, it demonstrated that a great and powerful country disposing military force of nearly unlimited power could admit it did inadvertent wrong, wreaked unintended havoc and death--and, most importantly, could acknowledge and apologize for it.
Unlike General McChrystal, there will be no need for Mr Netanyahu to face the kin of those who died at the hands of the IDF. Mr Netanyhu will not have to take off his shoes, sit on the floor, and personally say, "I am truly sorry for the deaths my men caused and the pain inflicted upon you by our actions. Mr Netanahu can do the job by written words, words carefully crafted by diplomats and vetted by politicians, words which can be totally insincere provided they do not read as such. It can be an antiseptic charade without any requirement for the direct person-to-person dynamic which involved McChrystal.
True, the Turks will crow over an apology. The Erdogan government will distort it, use it to advance Turkey's status in its ambitious plan of a neo-Ottoman Empire. That will be to the shame of Ankara not Israel. And, it is debatable that the resultant propaganda will be any more destructive of Israel's interests than is the ongoing festering crisis of diplomacy and trade.
Best of all, the issuance of an apology puts the ball back in the Turk's court. The apology would place the onus on Ankara to put up or shut up, to restore the status quo ante or admit the whole issue was false, a gambit intended to put Israel on the unending defensive, a way to back out of the previous policy of cooperation between the two countries. This manner of clarification is in Israel's interest, is it not?
Get a grip, Mr Netanyahu! An apology is in your interests. It is in the better interests of your country. Offering one will not diminish Israel; it will buff the country's image and status around the world and in the US. It will not even bruise your ego. It might even enhance your sense of self. It will have been you who called the Erdogan bluff.
The incident on board the ship handed anti-Israeli elements, including the Islamist leaning AKP government of Turkey a heaven sent opportunity to make much propaganda at the expense of the Jewish state. In this context the Turks have demanded repeatedly that Israel not only provide compensation for those wounded and killed by IDF members but also provide an acceptable apology. Israel has agreed to compensation but has balked over the idea of an apology. Prime minister Netanyahu has maintained that doing so would damage Israeli public morale among other sinister things. In this he has been backed (or exceeded) by the always ready to breath fire foreign minister, Lieberman. The far right of the Israeli political spectrum has been monolithic in the rejectionist stance adopted by Netanyahu.
It seems that the Netanyahu government believes that an apology for an action seen as being defensive in nature and not overdone in view of the provocations offered by activists on board the Mavi Marmora who were armed with bludgeons and similar weapons would somehow lessen Israel in the eyes of its citizens and the world generally. This is an utterly specious notion.
The first reason for declaring the Netanyahu stance specious is simply that the raid was poorly conceived and even more poorly executed. It seems preposterously arrogant that the raid's planners and commanders did not anticipate any armed resistance to the IDF boarding party. Did these experienced military officers really, really believe the activists sponsored by a group with a long record of hostility to Israel would not seek a confrontation? Or, were they of the view that the simple arrival of the dreaded IDF would cause an instant collapse of will on the part of the activists? Either flies in the face of both experience and realistic military planning.
To put it bluntly, the boarding was as badly botched as, for example, the special operations force attempt in Somalia twenty years back which resulted in Blackhawk down. The IDF blew it pure and simple when they mounted the assault. This is not a mark against the troops who fast roped down to decks filled with men ready and eager for a violent confrontation, men who were willing to court and accept death at the hands of the IDF, men willing to be martyrs for the faith and the cause.
Apologizing for your own side's errors is no shame--only a transient embarrassment for those in charge. Admitting that better thinking, better planning, better timing, better methods and tactics would have resulted in a death free takeover of the ship is no sin, no humiliation, but rather an expression of a willingness and capacity to learn from mistakes.
The second reason the Netanyahu posture is specious not to say vacuous is simply that great nations can and do apologize. By this the Geek does not mean the bogus exercises of mea culpa engaged in by President Obama for American "transgressions" both real and imagined but in all cases resident in the far distant past. No, the Geek means such examples as that provided by General Stanley McChrystal, sitting, legs crossed, feet bootless, on the rug covered floor of an Afghan stone hut apologizing for fatalities inflicted by forces under his command upon civilians, upon members of the family in whose house he sat.
The humble, human gesture of offering apologies for lives cut short in no way humiliated the general, nor the forces in his command, nor the nation in whose service he and his people fought. Rather, it demonstrated that a great and powerful country disposing military force of nearly unlimited power could admit it did inadvertent wrong, wreaked unintended havoc and death--and, most importantly, could acknowledge and apologize for it.
Unlike General McChrystal, there will be no need for Mr Netanyahu to face the kin of those who died at the hands of the IDF. Mr Netanyhu will not have to take off his shoes, sit on the floor, and personally say, "I am truly sorry for the deaths my men caused and the pain inflicted upon you by our actions. Mr Netanahu can do the job by written words, words carefully crafted by diplomats and vetted by politicians, words which can be totally insincere provided they do not read as such. It can be an antiseptic charade without any requirement for the direct person-to-person dynamic which involved McChrystal.
True, the Turks will crow over an apology. The Erdogan government will distort it, use it to advance Turkey's status in its ambitious plan of a neo-Ottoman Empire. That will be to the shame of Ankara not Israel. And, it is debatable that the resultant propaganda will be any more destructive of Israel's interests than is the ongoing festering crisis of diplomacy and trade.
Best of all, the issuance of an apology puts the ball back in the Turk's court. The apology would place the onus on Ankara to put up or shut up, to restore the status quo ante or admit the whole issue was false, a gambit intended to put Israel on the unending defensive, a way to back out of the previous policy of cooperation between the two countries. This manner of clarification is in Israel's interest, is it not?
Get a grip, Mr Netanyahu! An apology is in your interests. It is in the better interests of your country. Offering one will not diminish Israel; it will buff the country's image and status around the world and in the US. It will not even bruise your ego. It might even enhance your sense of self. It will have been you who called the Erdogan bluff.
Monday, September 5, 2011
Turkey's Foreign Policy--Clever Calculation Or Flat Out Stupid
Until very recently, the announced foreign policy of Turkey under the Islamist leaning AKP has been one of "zero problems" with its regional neighbors. This exercise in fantasy started to crumble under the bitter winds of the "Arab Spring."
Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi. The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain. The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.
After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters. Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels. In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.
Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad. The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran. Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.
The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom. Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."
The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days. At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen. By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.
The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance. Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.
The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident. Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer." The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship. Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora. Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.
The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so. The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.
As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.
It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan. So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians. It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.
Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq. While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders. This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.
One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.
It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want. The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed. They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.
The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border. This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing. The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any. In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.
Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge. They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible. They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible. They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan. Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.
The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy. The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside. True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp. Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.
Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey. But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support. As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders. Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.
Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.
Ankara did not know whether to go with the new flow or stand resolutely alongside the embattled regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi. The Erdogan government blew first hot and then cold on the uprisings in Bahrain. The name of the Turkish diplomatic game regarding Syria was vacillation.
After a long period of agonizing indecision, Ankara finally did come down on the side of the Egyptian protesters. Then, after more of the same, the Turks reluctantly sided with the Libyan rebels. In the latter case, it is not trivial to note that Ankara robustly opposed the use of force--either to protect civilians or to provide the anti-government forces with an air capacity.
Only after the longest possible period of watching and waiting did the Erdogan government come out publicly against Bashar al-Assad. The delay and equivocation in this case was due to a powerful desire in Ankara not to damage their rapprochement with Tehran. Possibly this was enhanced by the pending announcement of the decision to host the basing of the new American X band radar on Turkish soil, a move which would raise the hackles of the ayatollahs.
The alternative to irritating Iran over Syria was to court further distancing from the majority of the Arab street which was strongly supportive of the "Arab Spring" movements and saw the Syrians as martyrs to the cause of freedom. Biting the bullet, Erdogan and his fellow Islamists denounced the Assad regime as having lost Turkish governmental "confidence."
The Syrian demarch was too little too late to satisfy the pro-freedom groups proliferating in the Mideast to the disadvantage of Ankara's desire to recreate the Ottoman days. At the same time, the twin moves of condemning Syria and accepting the X band radar did infuriate the ayatollahs and their frontmen. By poor timing, the Turks fell between the two stools and emasculated the "zero problems" gambit.
The effect has been to put more pressure on Erdogan to take the strongest possible anti-Israel stance. Only by Israel baiting of the highest sort could Turkey hope to keep or rebuild its stature not only on the Arab street but within the chanceries of the region.
The attractions of playing the Israel card are self-evident. Erdogan came to prominence in 2009 by stalking off the stage at Davos while loudly accusing Israel president Peres of being a "murderer." The next year the Israelis enhanced Erdogan's status as the champion of the Palestinians by a heavy handed but legal stopping of the bogus aid flotilla with nine fatal casualties among those on board the lead ship. Ever since that day, the Erdogan government has made rich PR hay by flogging the dead horse of the Mavi Marmora. Most recently his demand for an apology has been reinforced by a downgrading of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey with highly positive results among the denizens of the Arab street.
The escalation of the diplomatic contretemps has assured Turkey's "zero problems" is not only defunct but stinkingly so. The sickly sweet smell of death hangs around Turkey's regional diplomacy.
As if alienating the Iranians, the Israelis, the Libyans, the Egyptians, and the Syrians was not enough, Ankara has undertaken a number of high casualty attacks by air and artillery against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. The series of air strikes and artillery stonks was purportedly in retaliation for an ambush conducted on Turkish soil by members of PKK, the long lived Kurdish insurgent group seeking the creation of a true Kurdish state.
It is true that PKK has sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan. So does the group PJK which has been waging low intensity war against the Iranians. It is this geographic and political locus which gives Tehran and Ankara a coinciding national interest. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps stages the same sort of hyperactive response to guerrilla attacks as does the Turkish army.
Stripped to its essentials, both Turkey and Iran have been waging undeclared international war against Iraq. While the Shia dominated pseudo-government in Baghdad sheds no tears for dead Iraqi Kurds, the recent attacks by Turkey have produced an unacceptable number of civilian deaths and, thus, have cast doubt upon the Baghdad government's will and ability to guarantee the integrity of its national borders. This is a very poor idea just months before the final expulsion of the Americans from Iraq.
One more problem for the Turks "zero problems" approach to regional life.
It is not out of line to wonder when the Iraqi Kurds will say, "Enough is enough" and move robustly to protect their own population regardless of what the Shias of Baghdad may want. The Kurdish peshmerga are numerous, well armed, very well motivated, and reasonably well armed. They have the advantage of fighting on home ground in terrain which favors the defense.
The Turks have deployed a regimental sized combat group near to the Iraqi border. This as well as recent oratory from Erdogan's boys seems to indicate a ground assault may be in the offing. The Turks have done this in the past with limited results--if any. In the past they have gotten away with incursions but may find the going far more difficult in the future--if the Kurds allow the peshmerga to return fire.
Of course, this will present the Obama administration with a very real challenge. They will have to placate the Turks, if such is possible. They will have to deter the Kurds, if such is possible. They will have to work overtime to prevent a defacto split of Iraq into an Arab Iraq and a Kurdish Kurdistan. Given that the US has no leverage in Baghdad and the Turk's decision to allow basing of the X band radar gives them the whip hand, it is difficult to see what the US can do in the event the Turkish army moves into Iraqi Kurdistan and meets resistance from the provincial militia.
The "zero problems" stance bodes well to be replaced in reality with a "problems everywhere" policy. The Deep Thinkers of the AKP have to decide where Turkey's national interests reside. True, it would be best for Ankara if it could be the balancing point between the West and the Muslim states of the Mideast and Central Asia, but it seems the reach of Turkish ambitions far outstrips the competence of its policy grasp. Thus, it seems appropriate that the Turks decide if it is better for their longer term interests to back down and align with the West as has been the case for the past sixty plus years or side with the mullahs, the ayatollahs, the imams of the Muslim states including Iran and Pakistan but against the Saudis and the other Gulf countries.
Erdogan is obviously a good politician in the context of Turkey. But, like other good politicians he has made the mistake of conflating public adulation with total support. As Woodrow Wilson learned nearly a century ago at Versailles, there is a world of difference between cheers on the street and cutting effective policy deals with foreign leaders. Applause is nice, but policy success is much better.
Well, just one more problem for the "zero problems" guy.
Labels:
Iran,
Iraq,
Israel,
Kurdistan,
Recip Erdogan,
Syria,
Turkey,
Zero Problems
Sunday, July 31, 2011
Norwegian Ethical Exceptionalism
Svein Sevje, Norway's ambassador to Israel, delivered a rather unique ethical proposition in an interview the other day. Presumably reflecting the official position of the leftwing government in Oslo, the ambassador opined that Palestinian terror attacks against Israeli civilians were more morally justifiable than the bombing and shooting actions of Brevik a week before.
This stance makes manifest the belief within the highest circles of Norwegian politics that the throat slitting of a sleeping infant along with slightly older siblings and the parents during the hours of darkness by a group of Palestinian men was not a criminal act but rather the necessary and understandable consequence of Israel's ongoing semi-occupation of the Palestinian Authority governed West Bank. The fact that Israel continues to dominate in most salient respects the Palestinian population of the lands taken from Jordan during the Six Day War apparently makes right any and all terrorist outrages committed against any and all Israelis. The actions of Mr Brevik in sharp contrast cannot be justified in any way, shape, or form.
With respect to the latter contention, the Geek is complete agreement. Considering the first proposition, the one holding Palestinian Muslim throat slitters, gunslingers, suicide bombers, and rocket firing gangs totally blameless is, in the Geek's estimate, a mind boggling exercise in cultural relativism. Stripped to its essentials, the ambassador's remark as well as the government policy it reflects holds that there is no such critter as an absolute standard of right and wrong, moral and immoral, ethical and unethical.
This is a destructive, preposterous position which serves to undercut the norms and values which, while developed in the West over centuries of bloodshed, have become the centerpiece of such testaments to hope and aspiration as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Before the rise of the pernicious notion of cultural relativism, the West generally held that there existed a set of ethical (or moral, should you prefer) absolutes which served to define rigidly the outer limits of acceptable individual and state conduct. These absolutes served to progressively render the West more peaceful, more humane, more given to fairness and acceptance, more willing to negotiate, and less ready to reach for the nearest trigger.
These absolutes, primarily predicated upon Christian and Jewish concepts, made the West an evermore kind, decent, generous, and humane place. These bright and shinning lines separating the acceptable from the unacceptable also served to make the wars of the West somewhat less brutal, somewhat less all consuming in their butchery, a bit more ready to seek the possible as opposed to the ideal outcome.
In recent years the rise of cultural relativism, the idea that no culture, no society, no system of beliefs or norms and values was in any way superior to others, has risen to grasp the elites of the West in its bony, clutching fingers. Particularly, people of the Left have allowed themselves to be mentally and morally strangled by the notion of relativism by coming to accept the proposition that by doing so they make themselves paragons of "fairness," of "open mindedness," of "acceptance," and of "tolerance." As the Left elite of academia, of politics, of the media have embraced relativism, these public opinion molders have sought to marginalize anyone who disagreed from the glories of relativism as "racists," or "xenophobes," even as "fascists."
To believe and argue that not all cultures, not all societies, not all belief systems, not all norms and values are equal in moral or ethical strength became politically incorrect to the highest degree. To accept relativism was to be progressive, fair minded, and sophisticated. The best way to parse between a member in good standing of the elite, the hoi olligoi, and a hairy palmed, knuckle dragging, slope browed denizen of the hoi polloi was on the basis of acceptance or rejection of cultural relativism.
Norwegians, particularly those on the Left and in the elite of politics, media, and academia have prided themselves and their country on its open minded, fair, and tolerant acceptance of those different from themselves. That is, of course, laudable--up to a point. The point comes when recurrent acts of terror including those of the most bestial sort are excused as the legitimate response to "illegal" military occupation. That point comes when acts of equal barbarity are assessed as morally different with one justified by purely contextual matters including cultural differences.
It is ironic in the extreme that the Norsk ambassador by his words reinforced one of the main points made at great and repetitive length in Brevik's manifesto--the pernicious pervasiveness of cultural relativism in Norway and Europe generally along with the lethal effects of this belief on political and social structures. Mr Sveje and the government which issued his credentials just don't get it. Neither, one might surmise, do a large number of Norwegians--and Europeans as well as Americans.
The "it" that Sveje and others don't get is simply that both history and contemporary affairs demonstrates clearly that some cultures, some societies, some norms and values, some belief systems, some governmental systems are better, more ethical, more moral, if you prefer, than others. In this context, it is clear that the West is superior in all ethical respects to the Muslim states. The West has gone through a very, very long learning curve of blood, destruction, mass death, suffering on a cosmic scale, and has come out purified in many essential respects. At the same time, the West is aware of its ongoing imperfections and continues to seek to rectify them.
The West may not have been blameless. But, in comparison to Muslim states and societies, it is not blameworthy today. And, in this connection Israel must be considered to be part of the West.
Consider the reaction throughout the West to Brevik's one man massacre. Universal condemnation even from those who share the fears of "Islamification" expressed by the terrorist murderer. Christian entities and clerics have been monolithic in their denunciation of Brevik's actions.
In sharp contrast Osama bin Laden remains a celebrated hero in Muslim societies and states. So do his emulators, his subordinates, his followers, and successors.
Consider Somalia. Thousands starve. Tens of thousands flee starvation. The Muslim group, al-Shabaab, prevents famine relief while engaging in an orgy of religiously predicated violence. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation sits back with folded hands and indifferent expressions watching the famine do its deadly work apparently convinced that starvation on this cosmic scale is the will of the deity such that any relief effort would be blasphemy at best, apostasy at worst.
At the same time it is the West which seeks to provide succor to the displaced and dying Somalis. It is the West which provides food and money, management expertise and aircraft, trying desperately to save lives written off by al-Shabaab and the OIC.
Consider Israel. While there are Israelis both in and out of government who are intransigent in the extreme, there is also a large, vibrant contingent of civil society and religiously motivated Israelis seeking peace, willing to see Palestine come into full, free existence. At the same time, the Palestinians are unwilling to grant Israel's right to exist (Hamas) or unwilling to acknowledge the realty that Israel is a Jewish state (Fatah.) The historical record demonstrates clearly that the "sins" of the Israelis are far outnumbered by those of the Palestinians--going back over eighty years.
Consider terrorism around the globe. How often does one read of radical extremist Buddhists taking hostages or detonating suicide vests? How many violent political Hindus fly aircraft into civilian structures shouting praise to one or another of their pantheon? Are Catholics, or Lutherans noted for their commitment to "martyrdom operations?" The use of terror attacks, of IEDs, of suicide bombings is almost exclusively the dominion of Muslims in service to what they perceive as their duty to their almighty.
No, Mr Ambassador, you are wrong. Dangerously wrong. Your attitude and that of your government and the Norwegian elite behind that government are sabotaging all that makes the West what it is. You, with your dedication to the specious and historically unjustified notion of cultural relativism, are attacking all which has been learned over a score of deadly, bloody centuries by the West and which makes the West today the last best hope of humanity.
Murder is wrong. Period. Terror, which is to say, murder for a political goal, is wrong. Period. The Arab Muslim slitting the Jewish infant's throat is equal in evil to Brevik with his bomb and gun. Period. Get a grip on it, Svein.
This stance makes manifest the belief within the highest circles of Norwegian politics that the throat slitting of a sleeping infant along with slightly older siblings and the parents during the hours of darkness by a group of Palestinian men was not a criminal act but rather the necessary and understandable consequence of Israel's ongoing semi-occupation of the Palestinian Authority governed West Bank. The fact that Israel continues to dominate in most salient respects the Palestinian population of the lands taken from Jordan during the Six Day War apparently makes right any and all terrorist outrages committed against any and all Israelis. The actions of Mr Brevik in sharp contrast cannot be justified in any way, shape, or form.
With respect to the latter contention, the Geek is complete agreement. Considering the first proposition, the one holding Palestinian Muslim throat slitters, gunslingers, suicide bombers, and rocket firing gangs totally blameless is, in the Geek's estimate, a mind boggling exercise in cultural relativism. Stripped to its essentials, the ambassador's remark as well as the government policy it reflects holds that there is no such critter as an absolute standard of right and wrong, moral and immoral, ethical and unethical.
This is a destructive, preposterous position which serves to undercut the norms and values which, while developed in the West over centuries of bloodshed, have become the centerpiece of such testaments to hope and aspiration as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Before the rise of the pernicious notion of cultural relativism, the West generally held that there existed a set of ethical (or moral, should you prefer) absolutes which served to define rigidly the outer limits of acceptable individual and state conduct. These absolutes served to progressively render the West more peaceful, more humane, more given to fairness and acceptance, more willing to negotiate, and less ready to reach for the nearest trigger.
These absolutes, primarily predicated upon Christian and Jewish concepts, made the West an evermore kind, decent, generous, and humane place. These bright and shinning lines separating the acceptable from the unacceptable also served to make the wars of the West somewhat less brutal, somewhat less all consuming in their butchery, a bit more ready to seek the possible as opposed to the ideal outcome.
In recent years the rise of cultural relativism, the idea that no culture, no society, no system of beliefs or norms and values was in any way superior to others, has risen to grasp the elites of the West in its bony, clutching fingers. Particularly, people of the Left have allowed themselves to be mentally and morally strangled by the notion of relativism by coming to accept the proposition that by doing so they make themselves paragons of "fairness," of "open mindedness," of "acceptance," and of "tolerance." As the Left elite of academia, of politics, of the media have embraced relativism, these public opinion molders have sought to marginalize anyone who disagreed from the glories of relativism as "racists," or "xenophobes," even as "fascists."
To believe and argue that not all cultures, not all societies, not all belief systems, not all norms and values are equal in moral or ethical strength became politically incorrect to the highest degree. To accept relativism was to be progressive, fair minded, and sophisticated. The best way to parse between a member in good standing of the elite, the hoi olligoi, and a hairy palmed, knuckle dragging, slope browed denizen of the hoi polloi was on the basis of acceptance or rejection of cultural relativism.
Norwegians, particularly those on the Left and in the elite of politics, media, and academia have prided themselves and their country on its open minded, fair, and tolerant acceptance of those different from themselves. That is, of course, laudable--up to a point. The point comes when recurrent acts of terror including those of the most bestial sort are excused as the legitimate response to "illegal" military occupation. That point comes when acts of equal barbarity are assessed as morally different with one justified by purely contextual matters including cultural differences.
It is ironic in the extreme that the Norsk ambassador by his words reinforced one of the main points made at great and repetitive length in Brevik's manifesto--the pernicious pervasiveness of cultural relativism in Norway and Europe generally along with the lethal effects of this belief on political and social structures. Mr Sveje and the government which issued his credentials just don't get it. Neither, one might surmise, do a large number of Norwegians--and Europeans as well as Americans.
The "it" that Sveje and others don't get is simply that both history and contemporary affairs demonstrates clearly that some cultures, some societies, some norms and values, some belief systems, some governmental systems are better, more ethical, more moral, if you prefer, than others. In this context, it is clear that the West is superior in all ethical respects to the Muslim states. The West has gone through a very, very long learning curve of blood, destruction, mass death, suffering on a cosmic scale, and has come out purified in many essential respects. At the same time, the West is aware of its ongoing imperfections and continues to seek to rectify them.
The West may not have been blameless. But, in comparison to Muslim states and societies, it is not blameworthy today. And, in this connection Israel must be considered to be part of the West.
Consider the reaction throughout the West to Brevik's one man massacre. Universal condemnation even from those who share the fears of "Islamification" expressed by the terrorist murderer. Christian entities and clerics have been monolithic in their denunciation of Brevik's actions.
In sharp contrast Osama bin Laden remains a celebrated hero in Muslim societies and states. So do his emulators, his subordinates, his followers, and successors.
Consider Somalia. Thousands starve. Tens of thousands flee starvation. The Muslim group, al-Shabaab, prevents famine relief while engaging in an orgy of religiously predicated violence. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation sits back with folded hands and indifferent expressions watching the famine do its deadly work apparently convinced that starvation on this cosmic scale is the will of the deity such that any relief effort would be blasphemy at best, apostasy at worst.
At the same time it is the West which seeks to provide succor to the displaced and dying Somalis. It is the West which provides food and money, management expertise and aircraft, trying desperately to save lives written off by al-Shabaab and the OIC.
Consider Israel. While there are Israelis both in and out of government who are intransigent in the extreme, there is also a large, vibrant contingent of civil society and religiously motivated Israelis seeking peace, willing to see Palestine come into full, free existence. At the same time, the Palestinians are unwilling to grant Israel's right to exist (Hamas) or unwilling to acknowledge the realty that Israel is a Jewish state (Fatah.) The historical record demonstrates clearly that the "sins" of the Israelis are far outnumbered by those of the Palestinians--going back over eighty years.
Consider terrorism around the globe. How often does one read of radical extremist Buddhists taking hostages or detonating suicide vests? How many violent political Hindus fly aircraft into civilian structures shouting praise to one or another of their pantheon? Are Catholics, or Lutherans noted for their commitment to "martyrdom operations?" The use of terror attacks, of IEDs, of suicide bombings is almost exclusively the dominion of Muslims in service to what they perceive as their duty to their almighty.
No, Mr Ambassador, you are wrong. Dangerously wrong. Your attitude and that of your government and the Norwegian elite behind that government are sabotaging all that makes the West what it is. You, with your dedication to the specious and historically unjustified notion of cultural relativism, are attacking all which has been learned over a score of deadly, bloody centuries by the West and which makes the West today the last best hope of humanity.
Murder is wrong. Period. Terror, which is to say, murder for a political goal, is wrong. Period. The Arab Muslim slitting the Jewish infant's throat is equal in evil to Brevik with his bomb and gun. Period. Get a grip on it, Svein.
Saturday, July 16, 2011
A Democracy Fails
Israel was established as a Western heritage democracy. In and of itself this was an amazing phenomenon. There was little in the history of the Jews, either in Biblical days or in the long centuries of the diaspora which linked democracy with the Jewish tradition. Yet the driving personalities of the Zionist movement as well as those who fought for an independent Jewish state insisted on bringing the democratic ideals of Western and Central Europe to the country which was simultaneously ancient and new.
The seamless merging of ancient and modern can be seen in two defining characteristics of Israel and the Zionists who worked so long and hard to bring the dream to fruition. The long dead language of Hebrew was brought back from the linguistic graveyard. Democracy was embraced. King David could walk the streets of Israel today and understand all that was said around him. But the Biblical King would not begin to understand the democracy which is, or to err on the side of accuracy, was basic to Israel.
One of strongest reasons so many Americans supported Israel with ardor and depth during the Fifties, Sixties, and beyond was its highly evident commitment to democracy. When someone stated that Israel was the only outpost of democracy in the Mideast during the first forty or fifty years of the state's existence, it was simply a recognition of reality. In more recent years, the same claim must be seen not as a statement of fact but rather the product of the propagandist's tendentiousness.
It is important to keep in mind that there was no tradition of democracy in the historical experience of the Jewish people either before or after the savage Roman repression of the second uprising. Only insofar as Jews participated in democratic processes as such developed fitfully and painfully in the several European states or in the US was there any direct experience with the complex nature of democracy. In a very real sense, the pioneering Zionists and the Jews who answered the call of freedom implicit in the creation of the Jewish state brought democracy in all its manifold ways and complexities with them, political freight carried in their knapsacks as they got off the boat on the sandy shore of the land which would become Israel.
It is also critical to recall that the Jews of Western and Central Europe were not the only Jews involved in the project called Israel. Arrivals from the autocracies of the Mideast constituted a great and growing part of the citizenry. Later, vast numbers of Jews arrived from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. The latter like their coreligionists from the Mideast had no direct experience with democracy. They had no basis on which to predicate an understanding of the mix of processes of trade offs, of compromises, of partial successes which jointly make up the intricate interior of democracy.
For many years, Israel against all odds remained a vibrant democracy. Not even the addition of refugees from the autocratic antisemitic states of the Mideast threatened the effectiveness and buoyancy of democracy, Israeli style. The robust nature of Israeli democracy was demonstrated repeatedly under extreme stress. Neither a surprising initial defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War nor unending terror attacks undercut or distorted the democratic processes.
Democracy it appears could survive and prosper no matter what until Israelis themselves turned against the concept and its instrumental effects. While a portion of the Israeli sellout of their own democracy can be assigned to the impact on the polity of the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union, that was only a minor factor. The major cause of the erosion of democracy has been the combination of an increasingly fundamentalist form of the Jewish faith with an evermore strident sense of nationalism.
In this dynamic, quite evident after 1990, the Israelis have echoed the Muslim states surrounding them. From the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the contemporaneous "Holy War" against the Red Army in Afghanistan, the force of the more austere and fundamentalist schools of Islam have combined with growing nationalism to produce the plethora of groups espousing political Islam. This includes those groups and leaders embracing violence as an acceptable tool of politics. The Israeli responses have included the growth of a similar, even identical, mix of religion and nationalism to the disadvantage of real democracy.
This process can be tracked easily by looking at the ever lessening status of the political Left in Israel. Looking back at the salad days of Israel, one sees the Left as ever triumphant at the polls. The Right was marginal at best and irrelevant most of the time. Only since the First Intifada has the Right emerged to power.
In recent years, the nature of Israeli politics has become one of the Right versus the Further Right. In the current Israel, the Left has become instrumentally a mere ghost, a marginal figure with less substance than a desert mirage. Electoral contests are between the "Moderate" Right and the Further Right. All too often it has been and is the Further Right which wins. In the recent past, the biggest loser has been not the Left per se or the "Moderate" Right but the nature and character of democracy itself.
During the current administration of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Knesset has lurched evermore to the farthest shores of the Right. The Nakba Law, the loyalty oaths, the overkill reaction to the "flotillas," and, most recently and disturbingly, the anti-boycott law are all demonstrations of the way in which the Further Right is willing to lethally distort the appearance of democratic processes and structures to enervate democracy and imperil the future of the state. While some manifestations of religion linked nationalism run amok such as the demand that Israeli universities sing the national anthem at all conceivable occasions are bizarre but not harmful, others such as the recently passed full fledged assault on freedom of speech--the anti-boycott law--are fatally injurious to any meaningful exercise of democracy.
There is no fundamental difference between the abridgement of free political speech contained in the law prohibiting any Israeli from speaking or writing in support of the boycott on products originating in the "settlements" constructed on land seized during the Six Day War and the continued attempts by the renamed Organization of Islamic Cooperation to prevent something called "defamation" of religions and religious figures. Both are misguided efforts to protect something "sacred" from any criticism or opposition by limiting rights of expression.
The status of the "settlements" is contentious to say the least. There are many activists in many countries, including Israel, who consider the new cities built on land occupied by the IDF forty-four years ago to be illegal at worst and illegitimate at best. As a result, there is and has been an effort to boycott products originating in these areas. Since the government of Israel does not identify those goods or products originating in the settlements, the only course of action available to those who wish to boycott settlement products is that of boycotting all goods made or grown in Israel. This is true even for Israelis who have no desire to see their country de-legitimized or otherwise harmed.
Urging boycotts on the settlements including denial of services by Israelis to the settlements is a legitimate political tactic for those Israelis who see their government's hanging on to the settlements as inherently wrongheaded. The goal of the new law--which is probably, almost certainly, violative of the several basic laws held by the Israeli Supreme Court to be equivalent to a constitution--seeks to deny this tool of political speech to Israelis and others in Israel who oppose current government policy.
The Israeli Further Right is like Muslim political advocates in that it refuses to compromise. The Further Right goes to the mat on everything. It is dedicated to an all-or-nothing approach to politics which is anathema to democracy. Under the sway of the Further Right, Israel bodes well to become just one more standard issue Mideastern state lacking the will and ability to practice genuine democracy with all its messy deal making, horse trading, and compromises which leave no one completely happy.
Absent a genuine democracy, Israel loses a powerful claim on American understanding and support. Actions such as the anti-boycott law are repugnant to American norms and values. Even the powerful efforts of the Israel Lobby will not be able to hide this reality from politically articulate Americans and their congressional representatives. Not even the best efforts of AIPAC can convince Americans that Israel deserves support when its governmental actions show the country to be one more semi-autocracy with some democratic trappings.
Israel must rediscover its roots. Not the ones in the Hebrew Bible, but the ones carried ashore by the early Zionists and the refugees from the hectatombs of Europe. For its future, Israel must get back to its past, to the past containing genuine democracy and all the risks which accompany democracy. Artificial, monolithic consensus, the consensus of enforced silence, serves Israel very poorly. To secure its future, Israel and the Israelis must channel their past, the noisy, vibrant democracy which characterized the place for decades. Only then will they have a genuine claim on American sympathy and support.
The seamless merging of ancient and modern can be seen in two defining characteristics of Israel and the Zionists who worked so long and hard to bring the dream to fruition. The long dead language of Hebrew was brought back from the linguistic graveyard. Democracy was embraced. King David could walk the streets of Israel today and understand all that was said around him. But the Biblical King would not begin to understand the democracy which is, or to err on the side of accuracy, was basic to Israel.
One of strongest reasons so many Americans supported Israel with ardor and depth during the Fifties, Sixties, and beyond was its highly evident commitment to democracy. When someone stated that Israel was the only outpost of democracy in the Mideast during the first forty or fifty years of the state's existence, it was simply a recognition of reality. In more recent years, the same claim must be seen not as a statement of fact but rather the product of the propagandist's tendentiousness.
It is important to keep in mind that there was no tradition of democracy in the historical experience of the Jewish people either before or after the savage Roman repression of the second uprising. Only insofar as Jews participated in democratic processes as such developed fitfully and painfully in the several European states or in the US was there any direct experience with the complex nature of democracy. In a very real sense, the pioneering Zionists and the Jews who answered the call of freedom implicit in the creation of the Jewish state brought democracy in all its manifold ways and complexities with them, political freight carried in their knapsacks as they got off the boat on the sandy shore of the land which would become Israel.
It is also critical to recall that the Jews of Western and Central Europe were not the only Jews involved in the project called Israel. Arrivals from the autocracies of the Mideast constituted a great and growing part of the citizenry. Later, vast numbers of Jews arrived from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. The latter like their coreligionists from the Mideast had no direct experience with democracy. They had no basis on which to predicate an understanding of the mix of processes of trade offs, of compromises, of partial successes which jointly make up the intricate interior of democracy.
For many years, Israel against all odds remained a vibrant democracy. Not even the addition of refugees from the autocratic antisemitic states of the Mideast threatened the effectiveness and buoyancy of democracy, Israeli style. The robust nature of Israeli democracy was demonstrated repeatedly under extreme stress. Neither a surprising initial defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War nor unending terror attacks undercut or distorted the democratic processes.
Democracy it appears could survive and prosper no matter what until Israelis themselves turned against the concept and its instrumental effects. While a portion of the Israeli sellout of their own democracy can be assigned to the impact on the polity of the influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union, that was only a minor factor. The major cause of the erosion of democracy has been the combination of an increasingly fundamentalist form of the Jewish faith with an evermore strident sense of nationalism.
In this dynamic, quite evident after 1990, the Israelis have echoed the Muslim states surrounding them. From the time of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the contemporaneous "Holy War" against the Red Army in Afghanistan, the force of the more austere and fundamentalist schools of Islam have combined with growing nationalism to produce the plethora of groups espousing political Islam. This includes those groups and leaders embracing violence as an acceptable tool of politics. The Israeli responses have included the growth of a similar, even identical, mix of religion and nationalism to the disadvantage of real democracy.
This process can be tracked easily by looking at the ever lessening status of the political Left in Israel. Looking back at the salad days of Israel, one sees the Left as ever triumphant at the polls. The Right was marginal at best and irrelevant most of the time. Only since the First Intifada has the Right emerged to power.
In recent years, the nature of Israeli politics has become one of the Right versus the Further Right. In the current Israel, the Left has become instrumentally a mere ghost, a marginal figure with less substance than a desert mirage. Electoral contests are between the "Moderate" Right and the Further Right. All too often it has been and is the Further Right which wins. In the recent past, the biggest loser has been not the Left per se or the "Moderate" Right but the nature and character of democracy itself.
During the current administration of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Knesset has lurched evermore to the farthest shores of the Right. The Nakba Law, the loyalty oaths, the overkill reaction to the "flotillas," and, most recently and disturbingly, the anti-boycott law are all demonstrations of the way in which the Further Right is willing to lethally distort the appearance of democratic processes and structures to enervate democracy and imperil the future of the state. While some manifestations of religion linked nationalism run amok such as the demand that Israeli universities sing the national anthem at all conceivable occasions are bizarre but not harmful, others such as the recently passed full fledged assault on freedom of speech--the anti-boycott law--are fatally injurious to any meaningful exercise of democracy.
There is no fundamental difference between the abridgement of free political speech contained in the law prohibiting any Israeli from speaking or writing in support of the boycott on products originating in the "settlements" constructed on land seized during the Six Day War and the continued attempts by the renamed Organization of Islamic Cooperation to prevent something called "defamation" of religions and religious figures. Both are misguided efforts to protect something "sacred" from any criticism or opposition by limiting rights of expression.
The status of the "settlements" is contentious to say the least. There are many activists in many countries, including Israel, who consider the new cities built on land occupied by the IDF forty-four years ago to be illegal at worst and illegitimate at best. As a result, there is and has been an effort to boycott products originating in these areas. Since the government of Israel does not identify those goods or products originating in the settlements, the only course of action available to those who wish to boycott settlement products is that of boycotting all goods made or grown in Israel. This is true even for Israelis who have no desire to see their country de-legitimized or otherwise harmed.
Urging boycotts on the settlements including denial of services by Israelis to the settlements is a legitimate political tactic for those Israelis who see their government's hanging on to the settlements as inherently wrongheaded. The goal of the new law--which is probably, almost certainly, violative of the several basic laws held by the Israeli Supreme Court to be equivalent to a constitution--seeks to deny this tool of political speech to Israelis and others in Israel who oppose current government policy.
The Israeli Further Right is like Muslim political advocates in that it refuses to compromise. The Further Right goes to the mat on everything. It is dedicated to an all-or-nothing approach to politics which is anathema to democracy. Under the sway of the Further Right, Israel bodes well to become just one more standard issue Mideastern state lacking the will and ability to practice genuine democracy with all its messy deal making, horse trading, and compromises which leave no one completely happy.
Absent a genuine democracy, Israel loses a powerful claim on American understanding and support. Actions such as the anti-boycott law are repugnant to American norms and values. Even the powerful efforts of the Israel Lobby will not be able to hide this reality from politically articulate Americans and their congressional representatives. Not even the best efforts of AIPAC can convince Americans that Israel deserves support when its governmental actions show the country to be one more semi-autocracy with some democratic trappings.
Israel must rediscover its roots. Not the ones in the Hebrew Bible, but the ones carried ashore by the early Zionists and the refugees from the hectatombs of Europe. For its future, Israel must get back to its past, to the past containing genuine democracy and all the risks which accompany democracy. Artificial, monolithic consensus, the consensus of enforced silence, serves Israel very poorly. To secure its future, Israel and the Israelis must channel their past, the noisy, vibrant democracy which characterized the place for decades. Only then will they have a genuine claim on American sympathy and support.
Friday, July 15, 2011
More "Followership" From The Hindmost
Coming late and out of breath from the unusual bout of exertion, the US today decided that the rebels, The Transitional Government" is the only legitimate game in Libya. The US has extended full diplomatic recognition to the far less than coherent bunch in Benghazi. The practical effect of this move is the freeing of the billions of Gaddafi bucks languishing in American custody, impounded under UN sanctions.
The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.
Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government. Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid. It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists. There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.
There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi. The US has no direct stake in the country. Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play. That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company. It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.
There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya. It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.
The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy. The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy. While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.
One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions. An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia. The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.
The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft. In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US. Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.
If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests? Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.
No, bucko, not oil. The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran. It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq. These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure. But there is a far more important audience.
That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran. In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges. More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.
Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort. It is focused on getting the bomb. Period. There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.
Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US. In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so. As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.
"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat. A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved. The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.
Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge. This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour. We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy. In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force. They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant. The mullahs are right in this. Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.
The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation. The Israeli government shares it. Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat. They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world. A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.
The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant. There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in. If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.
Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational. It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US. Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.
The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure. The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset. As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.
A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event. But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well. This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.
To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer. To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut. However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader. In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.
The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!" The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."
As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact. By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu. That is not a failure of policy. It is not even a simple error of judgement. It is a world class blunder.
The American extension of recognition comes long after similar acts by the UK and France as well as other, lesser members of the anti-Gaddafi coalition. The reasons for the lengthy American delay are inscrutable although it may be contended that Mr Obama has been too involved with negotiating a treaty over the deficit with his Republican interlocutors to have had much time to waste on minor matters such as Libya.
Arguably, there was no real need to grant diplomatic recognition and the international legitimacy that entails in order to give the Libyan money back to the Libyans in the personage of the Transitional Government. Arguably, the granting of diplomatic recognition was premature in that the nature of the Benghazi crew is not exactly pellucid. It is still unclear as to who holds the balance of power in the Transitional Government--the advocates of violent political Islam (some of whom have pulled triggers against Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan) or the secularists. There is no way of being sure that the end result of the regime change will be more or less favorable to American national and strategic interests.
There is a larger reason to have not extended the prize of diplomatic recognition to the Lads In Benghazi. The US has no direct stake in the country. Other than the general imperative of countering the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the US has no definite or definable interests in play. That reality enough was enough to have militated against our involvement in the air campaign against Gaddafi and Company. It is also sufficient to undercut any push to granting enhanced status to the rebels whose interests more likely than not do not run in parallel with our own.
There is something even more disquieting contained within the delayed but unnecessary recognition of the rebels as the only legitimate government in Libya. It is the same disquieting factor already seen in play with the vacillating policy regarding Mubarak and the "Lotus Revolution" in Egypt or the similarly disconnected set of moves masquerading as policy regarding Syria.
The disquieting, not to say alarming, dynamic at work in Libya, Syria, and Egypt is that of indecision, lack of focus, and an apparent unwillingness to engage in the messier, less pleasant aspects of diplomacy. The Nice Young Man From Chicago is too given to compromise, too willing to evade responsibility, too averse to making clear cut decisions and holding to them (unless a basic tenet of his ideology is at work) to engage in the risky business of establishing and hewing to a foreign policy. While the Secretary of State may not be as averse to muscular diplomacy, it has become evident that Ms Clinton lacks the capacity to differentiate between that which is really important and those options which simply appeal on an emotional level.
One of the inevitable results of the Obama approach to foreign policy has been that of eroding confidence in the will of the US to undertake difficult actions. An excellent example of this is the Saudi decision to broaden their weapons acquisition efforts to include Germany and Russia. The movers and shakers among the gerontocracy running the Kingdom have concluded that the US is unreliable even as a source of expensive hardware.
The Saudis have noted with interest and no doubt considerable apprehension the way in which the US under both George W. Bush and Mr Obama has evaded the formal request by Taiwan to purchase sixty new generation F-16 aircraft. In doing so the Obama administration has blatantly violated the law, specifically the law requiring the US to see to Taiwan's defense needs as defined by Taiwan not the US. Considering that not selling the F-16s to Taiwan will result in the loss of thousands of good paying jobs during economically tenuous times, not even American self-interest can offset the stifling influence of Beijing on US policy.
If Beijing can put the screws to the US such that American jobs are sacrificed along with the law and US interests in Asia, Prince Bandar among others must have reasoned, what are the odds that at some point the US will go lame in an area crucial to Saudi existential interests? Right now only one feature ties US interests to those of the Saudis.
No, bucko, not oil. The only real coinciding national interests between ourselves and the Saudis is fear and loathing of Iran. It is important in this context to underscore the importance of the recent high profile allegations of Iranian complicity in lethal attacks on US service personnel in Iraq. These statements are aimed in part at the bootless excuse for a central government in Iraq to be sure. But there is a far more important audience.
That more important group of auditors is located in Tehran. In a real sense the comments regarding Iranian sponsorship of the attacks on Americans stands as a proxy for the most recent developments in the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranians have installed examples of two next gen centrifuges. More importantly, these as well as hundreds of the older, less efficient models have been placed in hardened, underground facilities.
Taken together, these twin, interlocking developments make manifest the nature of the Iranian nuclear effort. It is focused on getting the bomb. Period. There is no need for any more discussion on that aspect of the Iranian nuke program.
Rather, the only place for discussion is on the general question of options available to the US. In this discussion the unique Obama approach to policy in the Mideast becomes relevant, highly so. As the administration's fit-and-start facsimile of policy in Libya, Syria, and Egypt demonstrates, it is germane to ask whether or not the US will deign to lead from the front.
"Leading from behind" is not, as the White House creator of the term must have believed, a feat of brilliant statesmanship putting Obama on a par with Bismark or Talleyrand, but rather a total abdication of leadership. As the resulting mess in Libya shows in full color and stereo sound, the concept of leading from the rear is not only intellectually bankrupt but operationally equates with self-inflicted defeat. A robust, albeit unpopular, US presence at the head of the NATO pack would have allowed a bad policy to be redeemed from the failure it so richly deserved. The absence of the Americans in any meaningful, violent way from the effort has assured that the bad policy would fail, and, worse, would fail in a way which rebounded to the discredit of NATO as well as key allies.
Despite the documented successes of the sanctions imposed on Iran, most notably those impinging on maritime trade, the mullahs move closer to the "Mahdi Bomb" with every spin of every centrifuge. This means that push-comes-to-shove time looms closer by the day, by the hour. We the People place great faith in the efficacy of diplomatic and economic sanctions as the best form of coercive diplomacy. In doing so, the American public overlooks the unpleasant reality that the effectiveness of sanctions rests in the last analysis on the perceived will and ability of the imposer of sanctions to use military force should the sanctions fail.
Not to put too fine a point on it, the Iranian government and the mullahs behind it are convinced the US lacks the will to use military force. They may (in private) be willing to grant that the US has the material capacity to destroy not only the nuclear facilities but Iran, but they are of the view that mere material ability is irrelevant. The mullahs are right in this. Ability without political will is simply so much very expensive hardware.
The Iranians are not alone in this appreciation. The Israeli government shares it. Benjamin Netanyahu along with the majority of his cabinet and party are convinced that the US is a toothless tiger regarding the looming Iranian threat. They are also certain that the Obama administration is already willing to adjust its policy to an Iran with nuclear capabilities along with the implications this brings to the region and the world. A similar sense of things must be growing as well in Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf states.
The current government of Israel is both crazy enough and filled with existential dread enough to go it alone in a strike on the Iranian nuclear plant. There may even be a lingering belief that should Israel start the war, the US must join in. If nothing else, the Netanyahu ministry probably believes that should Israel mount the first strikes and cause a mass attack in return by Iran and its closer adjuncts in Lebanon and Gaza, the American congress will do the necessary heavy lifting to assure the US moves fast and hard to bring the new war to a successful conclusion.
Given the power of the Israel Lobby in Congress, the Israeli calculus is not irrational. It is a realistic reading of the political landscape of the US. Even though an Israeli originated war with Iran would be devastating to the fragile American (and global) economic recovery, the US would have very few choices other than to join the fight with the goal of bringing the war to the most rapid and decisive conclusion.
The most rapid and decisive ending to an Israeli-Iranian war would be the total destruction of the Iranian governmental, military, and economic infrastructure. The US could accomplish this using only conventional munitions, but the job would be longer and more difficult than might be presumed at the outset. As the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have shown, the ancient saw holding that wars are always longer and more difficult to end than seems to be the case at the beginning has not been obviated by changes in technology.
A war between Israel (and the US) on the one side and Iran (and its proxies) on the other would be a world historical event. But, the obtaining of a nuclear capacity by Iran would prove to be such as well. This means the matter is a choice regarding the perceived lesser of two evils.
To the Israelis, particularly the government of Netanyahu, the choice is a no-brainer. To the US, the choice is not so simple and clear cut. However, to be in the position to make a choice, the US, and, more specifically the Obama administration, must be universally perceived as a leader. In this context it is critical to recall that the most effective form of leadership is leadership from the front.
The leader, as the Infantry School at Fort Benning makes plain, shouts, "Follow me!" The leader does not say, "Go ahead, I'm right behind you."
As today's decision regarding the rebels in Libya shows, Mr Obama has not yet learned this vital fact. By default he has handed control of the future of the US and the world to Benjamin Netanyahu. That is not a failure of policy. It is not even a simple error of judgement. It is a world class blunder.
Sunday, June 26, 2011
What A Difference A Word Makes
Ten years ago in an exercise of free association the challenge "terrorist" or "terrorism" would have brought an instant and automatic response from the lips of most Americans: "Arab." Nowadays the same challenge words would bring a different reaction. Despite the best efforts of the Obama administration and other devotees of the high minded and lofty thinking school of politically correct multiculturalism, the words "terror" or "terrorist" would result in the reply of "Muslim."
Why this change considering that way back in the salad days of international terrorism the vast majority of the Arab perpetrators were at least nominally adherents of Islam? A close examination of the curricula vitae of the assorted leaders of the numerous groups who bombed, shot, and garroted their way into the Mideast datelines of the Seventies, Eighties, and most of the Nineties shows that none were Christian let alone Jewish. They were, without exception, Muslims. Yet, the description "Arab" always prevailed.
There are several reasons for the change in both nomenclature and its underlying implications.
At the top of the list is the fact that the terrorists of the earlier, "Arab" age were pursuing a goal which was rational even if not realistic. The master bombmakers, the hijackers of aircraft, the killers of Olympic athletes, the shooters of tourists and Jewish civilians were doing their dastardly deeds in the quest to roll back the verdict of conventional war. More specifically, from the time that Yassir Arafat of late and unlamented memory created Fatah and dedicated it to the establishment of a Palestinian state, the goal of all the alphabet soup of terrorist groups was to reverse the outcome of the Six Day War of 1967 and the Wars of Independence from almost twenty years earlier.
The use of terror tactics might have been ethically reprehensible, but the goal was understandable, rational because it was political. A pretender to statehood was employing the only tactical concept available to it as it sought to become a state at the expense of a far stronger, far better organized, and (at the time) far more widely supported state. As the apologists for "Arab" terrorism stated repeatedly at the time, Arafat and his imitators (more correctly, competitors) were using the only means available to the dispossessed, the marginalized, the politically and militarily debilitated.
Even the use of "Arab" terrorist groups by states as proxies not only against Israel but against each other was rational. In the inter-Arab disputes which constituted a hallmark of regional politics during the Sixties, Seventies, Eighties, and beyond, the use of terrorists as weapons served to decouple rivalry from the potential of regionally destructive escalation. The Baathists of Syria and Iraq were not only willing but almost eager to use one sponsored group or another not only against the mutual enemy of Israel but as a means of settling the never ending quarrel between the two wings of the Baathist movement. Syria was a master at using its sponsored terrorists as a wedge to destabilize Lebanon so as to provide the necessary excuse to intervene in Lebanese affairs--to provide stability and protect civilian life, don't you know?
The employment of state-sponsored and facilitated terrorist groups as a matter of state policy might have been abhorrent to the norms of conflict and diplomacy, but it was rational. It did provide options seen as necessary by most in the region while maintaining the fiction of regional, ethnic, and religious harmony. The technique also had the benefit of allowing sufficient plausible deniablity to prevent an effective coordinated response by the "international community" or even individual states--including the US. In a sense "Arab" terror flew under the radar of global political mechanisms even while attracting global media attention.
It was the global media attention which gave "Arab" terrorism both its power and its utility as a rational tool of state. The fear and loathing caused by "Arab" terrorist outrages was presumed by its creators and sponsors to result in the end effect of compelling Israel to relinquish the territory occupied in the wake of the Six Day War. At the same time, the focus on high profile events and personalities in the "Arab" terrorist escapades served as a sort of squid's ink--a cloud behind which state sponsors could conceal their intentions and degree of involvement alike.
It should never be forgotten that the many different groups of the "Arab" terrorist days were avowedly secular. The politics of most involved whether as leaders or low level operators were a combination of nationalism and socialism. There was very little if any reference to Islam in either the programs or statements of the many different members of the movement. Yassir Arafat, for example, made no reference to Islam in his very high profile appearance at the podium of the UN General Assembly. From the documents he allegedly wrote or the speeches he made, one can get no impression that the Fatah chairman was a Muslim. The same applied to all the other media stars of the "Arab" terrorist movement.
It was only after the nature and outcome of the Iranian Islamic Revolution percolated through the Arab population that there was any shift from the secular focus to one which admitted religion. The long lag time between the toppling of the Shah and the emergence of Islam to the public consciousness of the nascent "Islamic" terrorist movement was in part the result of two simple facts. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was (1) non-Arab and (2) non-Sunni.
The barrier to the influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution becoming a model for a new generation of Mideast terrorists was broken by events in one more non-Arab country. That country was Afghanistan.
The anti-Soviet fighters of Afghanistan were avowedly and devoutly Muslim in the majority of cases. Since the only core definer of the Afghan identity which transcended tribal affiliations and loyalties was religion, this is not surprising. The power of Islam did come as a surprise to many of the Arab volunteers who entered the Afghan conflict at and after its midpoint. The Arab influx was a byproduct of the strong relation which had developed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
The Pakistani dictator, Zia, had put a program emphasizing Islam in place with the goal of unifying the population in the forever war with India. Zia had enlisted the support of Saudi Arabia in this "Islamization" campaign. Saudi Arabia had provided the money and clerical manpower necessary to establish an extensive network of Wahhibist mosques and madrassas. It was as inevitable as a displaced rock rolling downhill that this campaign would have ramifications. Among these was an introduction of Arab Peninsula youth via Pakistan to the "holy war" against the Red Army.
The Afghans and their Arab emulators gave unalloyed thanks to the deity for success against the Soviets. They also used the language of the Koran to describe the fighters, those killed in action, and the blessings of the deity as a means of increasing and maintaining morale during the long, bloody years of war. More than a few of the Arabs involved saw the power resident in their religion to offset the material and technological advantages enjoyed by infidel and apostate enemies. A new vow was soon to be heard from many of the Arabs having experience in Afghanistan. No longer would the power of belief of the One True Faith sleep unused in the pages of the Koran and other sacred writings. Now this power would be tapped to assure victory over the long triumphant infidels and their apostate local satraps.
Osama bin Laden was the best known, the most notorious of these Arab exponents of the new, far more militant view of the commands of the Koran, the orders of Allah. There were many others. What separated bin Laden from the rest was his willingness to announce where he stood and demand that others of faith stand with him. His success in gaining recruits and developing an organization rapidly during the early and mid-Nineties was the result not so much of his charisma and communication skills but rather that so many were already of like mind.
The shift from "Arab" to "Muslim" terror predated the (in)famous bin Laden declaration of war on the US by more than a decade. For those who like the idea of a specific defining event or date, the day of the truck bombing of the World Trade Center serves the purpose. This event was a self-conscious act taken on behalf not only of an "Arab" goal--the ending of American support for Israel--but also as a shot in the global holy war which (if the deity wills) would end with the establishment of a worldwide caliphate.
It would have been appropriate for the Clinton administration to acknowledge that the US was facing a new threat--religiously based terror. But, the administration in common with the majority of the media and academia, seized on the political portion of the motive while ignoring the fact that in the mind and words of the men who planned and executed the attack, politics was totally and inseparably connected with religion albeit in a subordinate role.
The administration made the same fundamental error when further attacks ensued. These--the strike on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the boat borne IED which nearly sank the USS Cole--were all manifestations of the Osama bin Laden concept of "Muslim" terror. Yes, there was a political goal involved, but that goal was both inherent with and subordinate to the dictates of Islamic belief. By narrowly focusing on the political aspect of the goal, the Clinton administration missed the perfect chance to define the enemy properly and direct US responses more accurately and effectively.
A more accurate definition of the enemy, his overarching goals, the foundations of his motives, the strengths and weaknesses of the appeals for support which must be predicated on the underlying beliefs, would have allowed the US to mount a better counter challenge. More importantly, by defining the enemy correctly, it would have been possible for Americans to know what they stood for as well as what they were standing against.
The initial error made by the Clinton administration has been continued by both the Bush/Cheney and Obama administrations. This is to be regretted. The nature of any war against "Arab" terrorism and that of the "Muslim" variety must be different as the two expressions of terror are substantially different in both goal and motive.
Get a grip on this.
"Arab" terrorism was rational. It sought defined and rather narrow political goals. Terror was a tactic pure and simple. If the tactic did not work, it could be altered or even abandoned without any loss of status or identity by so doing.
"Muslim" terror is irrational. While it may incorporate narrow and definable political goals, these are subordinate to matters of faith. The suicide bomber is not so much seeking a political goal as he is performing an act of faith. Because the "martyrdom" operation is rooted in deeply held beliefs derived from the sacred writings of Islam, tactical reliance on terror cannot be abandoned without damage to the strength of the faith.
The "Arab" terrorist could be deterred or defeated. He could be convinced by failure to abandon terrorism when the costs outweighed the benefits. He was in most essential respects a rational actor subject to the same inducements and constraints as combatants using other forms of tactics.
The "Muslim" terrorist cannot be deterred and can be defeated only by being killed. Mere opprobrium or failure in his operations will not necessarily cause him to seek a tactical alternative to terrorism. As his act is one of faith and not politics as such, he will not change his ways simply because the aggregate of costs is greater than the benefits. As a person committing an act of faith, a testament to personal strength of belief and willingness to obey the presumed demands of the deity, the "Muslim" terrorist is not a rational actor. He is not subject to the same inducements and constraints as other combatants, including terrorists of the "Arab" sort.
In short, the "Muslim" terrorist is a far harder target than was his "Arab" cousin. He is hard to kill and possessed of a mind impossible to change. This implies that the US and other civilized states will have a much harder time dealing with the "Muslim" terrorist than was first thought (and still is) by those who mistake the political gloss for the religious center of the act of faith we call terrorism.
Terrorism is a tactic of war. The "Arab" practitioner of the craft knew this. He knew the rules which defined success and failure in the use of any tactic, terror included. The "Muslim" may pay lip service to the notion that terror is a tactic, but he really believes it to be the strongest possible confession of faith that the individual believer might make.
When you think about it for a bit, it makes you recollect the years of shadowy groups known usually by their initials as having been the good old days. And, so they were.
Why this change considering that way back in the salad days of international terrorism the vast majority of the Arab perpetrators were at least nominally adherents of Islam? A close examination of the curricula vitae of the assorted leaders of the numerous groups who bombed, shot, and garroted their way into the Mideast datelines of the Seventies, Eighties, and most of the Nineties shows that none were Christian let alone Jewish. They were, without exception, Muslims. Yet, the description "Arab" always prevailed.
There are several reasons for the change in both nomenclature and its underlying implications.
At the top of the list is the fact that the terrorists of the earlier, "Arab" age were pursuing a goal which was rational even if not realistic. The master bombmakers, the hijackers of aircraft, the killers of Olympic athletes, the shooters of tourists and Jewish civilians were doing their dastardly deeds in the quest to roll back the verdict of conventional war. More specifically, from the time that Yassir Arafat of late and unlamented memory created Fatah and dedicated it to the establishment of a Palestinian state, the goal of all the alphabet soup of terrorist groups was to reverse the outcome of the Six Day War of 1967 and the Wars of Independence from almost twenty years earlier.
The use of terror tactics might have been ethically reprehensible, but the goal was understandable, rational because it was political. A pretender to statehood was employing the only tactical concept available to it as it sought to become a state at the expense of a far stronger, far better organized, and (at the time) far more widely supported state. As the apologists for "Arab" terrorism stated repeatedly at the time, Arafat and his imitators (more correctly, competitors) were using the only means available to the dispossessed, the marginalized, the politically and militarily debilitated.
Even the use of "Arab" terrorist groups by states as proxies not only against Israel but against each other was rational. In the inter-Arab disputes which constituted a hallmark of regional politics during the Sixties, Seventies, Eighties, and beyond, the use of terrorists as weapons served to decouple rivalry from the potential of regionally destructive escalation. The Baathists of Syria and Iraq were not only willing but almost eager to use one sponsored group or another not only against the mutual enemy of Israel but as a means of settling the never ending quarrel between the two wings of the Baathist movement. Syria was a master at using its sponsored terrorists as a wedge to destabilize Lebanon so as to provide the necessary excuse to intervene in Lebanese affairs--to provide stability and protect civilian life, don't you know?
The employment of state-sponsored and facilitated terrorist groups as a matter of state policy might have been abhorrent to the norms of conflict and diplomacy, but it was rational. It did provide options seen as necessary by most in the region while maintaining the fiction of regional, ethnic, and religious harmony. The technique also had the benefit of allowing sufficient plausible deniablity to prevent an effective coordinated response by the "international community" or even individual states--including the US. In a sense "Arab" terror flew under the radar of global political mechanisms even while attracting global media attention.
It was the global media attention which gave "Arab" terrorism both its power and its utility as a rational tool of state. The fear and loathing caused by "Arab" terrorist outrages was presumed by its creators and sponsors to result in the end effect of compelling Israel to relinquish the territory occupied in the wake of the Six Day War. At the same time, the focus on high profile events and personalities in the "Arab" terrorist escapades served as a sort of squid's ink--a cloud behind which state sponsors could conceal their intentions and degree of involvement alike.
It should never be forgotten that the many different groups of the "Arab" terrorist days were avowedly secular. The politics of most involved whether as leaders or low level operators were a combination of nationalism and socialism. There was very little if any reference to Islam in either the programs or statements of the many different members of the movement. Yassir Arafat, for example, made no reference to Islam in his very high profile appearance at the podium of the UN General Assembly. From the documents he allegedly wrote or the speeches he made, one can get no impression that the Fatah chairman was a Muslim. The same applied to all the other media stars of the "Arab" terrorist movement.
It was only after the nature and outcome of the Iranian Islamic Revolution percolated through the Arab population that there was any shift from the secular focus to one which admitted religion. The long lag time between the toppling of the Shah and the emergence of Islam to the public consciousness of the nascent "Islamic" terrorist movement was in part the result of two simple facts. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was (1) non-Arab and (2) non-Sunni.
The barrier to the influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution becoming a model for a new generation of Mideast terrorists was broken by events in one more non-Arab country. That country was Afghanistan.
The anti-Soviet fighters of Afghanistan were avowedly and devoutly Muslim in the majority of cases. Since the only core definer of the Afghan identity which transcended tribal affiliations and loyalties was religion, this is not surprising. The power of Islam did come as a surprise to many of the Arab volunteers who entered the Afghan conflict at and after its midpoint. The Arab influx was a byproduct of the strong relation which had developed between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
The Pakistani dictator, Zia, had put a program emphasizing Islam in place with the goal of unifying the population in the forever war with India. Zia had enlisted the support of Saudi Arabia in this "Islamization" campaign. Saudi Arabia had provided the money and clerical manpower necessary to establish an extensive network of Wahhibist mosques and madrassas. It was as inevitable as a displaced rock rolling downhill that this campaign would have ramifications. Among these was an introduction of Arab Peninsula youth via Pakistan to the "holy war" against the Red Army.
The Afghans and their Arab emulators gave unalloyed thanks to the deity for success against the Soviets. They also used the language of the Koran to describe the fighters, those killed in action, and the blessings of the deity as a means of increasing and maintaining morale during the long, bloody years of war. More than a few of the Arabs involved saw the power resident in their religion to offset the material and technological advantages enjoyed by infidel and apostate enemies. A new vow was soon to be heard from many of the Arabs having experience in Afghanistan. No longer would the power of belief of the One True Faith sleep unused in the pages of the Koran and other sacred writings. Now this power would be tapped to assure victory over the long triumphant infidels and their apostate local satraps.
Osama bin Laden was the best known, the most notorious of these Arab exponents of the new, far more militant view of the commands of the Koran, the orders of Allah. There were many others. What separated bin Laden from the rest was his willingness to announce where he stood and demand that others of faith stand with him. His success in gaining recruits and developing an organization rapidly during the early and mid-Nineties was the result not so much of his charisma and communication skills but rather that so many were already of like mind.
The shift from "Arab" to "Muslim" terror predated the (in)famous bin Laden declaration of war on the US by more than a decade. For those who like the idea of a specific defining event or date, the day of the truck bombing of the World Trade Center serves the purpose. This event was a self-conscious act taken on behalf not only of an "Arab" goal--the ending of American support for Israel--but also as a shot in the global holy war which (if the deity wills) would end with the establishment of a worldwide caliphate.
It would have been appropriate for the Clinton administration to acknowledge that the US was facing a new threat--religiously based terror. But, the administration in common with the majority of the media and academia, seized on the political portion of the motive while ignoring the fact that in the mind and words of the men who planned and executed the attack, politics was totally and inseparably connected with religion albeit in a subordinate role.
The administration made the same fundamental error when further attacks ensued. These--the strike on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the boat borne IED which nearly sank the USS Cole--were all manifestations of the Osama bin Laden concept of "Muslim" terror. Yes, there was a political goal involved, but that goal was both inherent with and subordinate to the dictates of Islamic belief. By narrowly focusing on the political aspect of the goal, the Clinton administration missed the perfect chance to define the enemy properly and direct US responses more accurately and effectively.
A more accurate definition of the enemy, his overarching goals, the foundations of his motives, the strengths and weaknesses of the appeals for support which must be predicated on the underlying beliefs, would have allowed the US to mount a better counter challenge. More importantly, by defining the enemy correctly, it would have been possible for Americans to know what they stood for as well as what they were standing against.
The initial error made by the Clinton administration has been continued by both the Bush/Cheney and Obama administrations. This is to be regretted. The nature of any war against "Arab" terrorism and that of the "Muslim" variety must be different as the two expressions of terror are substantially different in both goal and motive.
Get a grip on this.
"Arab" terrorism was rational. It sought defined and rather narrow political goals. Terror was a tactic pure and simple. If the tactic did not work, it could be altered or even abandoned without any loss of status or identity by so doing.
"Muslim" terror is irrational. While it may incorporate narrow and definable political goals, these are subordinate to matters of faith. The suicide bomber is not so much seeking a political goal as he is performing an act of faith. Because the "martyrdom" operation is rooted in deeply held beliefs derived from the sacred writings of Islam, tactical reliance on terror cannot be abandoned without damage to the strength of the faith.
The "Arab" terrorist could be deterred or defeated. He could be convinced by failure to abandon terrorism when the costs outweighed the benefits. He was in most essential respects a rational actor subject to the same inducements and constraints as combatants using other forms of tactics.
The "Muslim" terrorist cannot be deterred and can be defeated only by being killed. Mere opprobrium or failure in his operations will not necessarily cause him to seek a tactical alternative to terrorism. As his act is one of faith and not politics as such, he will not change his ways simply because the aggregate of costs is greater than the benefits. As a person committing an act of faith, a testament to personal strength of belief and willingness to obey the presumed demands of the deity, the "Muslim" terrorist is not a rational actor. He is not subject to the same inducements and constraints as other combatants, including terrorists of the "Arab" sort.
In short, the "Muslim" terrorist is a far harder target than was his "Arab" cousin. He is hard to kill and possessed of a mind impossible to change. This implies that the US and other civilized states will have a much harder time dealing with the "Muslim" terrorist than was first thought (and still is) by those who mistake the political gloss for the religious center of the act of faith we call terrorism.
Terrorism is a tactic of war. The "Arab" practitioner of the craft knew this. He knew the rules which defined success and failure in the use of any tactic, terror included. The "Muslim" may pay lip service to the notion that terror is a tactic, but he really believes it to be the strongest possible confession of faith that the individual believer might make.
When you think about it for a bit, it makes you recollect the years of shadowy groups known usually by their initials as having been the good old days. And, so they were.
Saturday, June 18, 2011
If You Like Pakistan, You'll Love The "Arab Summer"
Now that all the hyperbolic prattling about the wave of democracy rushing tsunami like over the sands of Arabia is fading away, perhaps overpowered by the sounds of exploding NATO delivered ordnance in Libya, it is possible to take a less biased look at the most likely course of events for the long hot Arab "summer" which is looming like the smoke of an Arizona wildfire. While the details of the forthcoming "summer" are obscure, the broad outlines are coming more clear by the day.
It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months. This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment. It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military. Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.
In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed. This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism. Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.
Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence. There is a simple reason for this prediction. Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam. Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.
Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely. At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade. At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power. Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979. To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.
The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired. As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood. It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders. Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast. No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces. At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.
The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora. This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.
Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination. This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole. Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.
The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states. They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools. There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan. The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.
The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt. The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk. Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole. The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased. As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.
The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises. This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists. Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy. Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign. Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly. The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.
The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies. This disengagement will exclude Israel. The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.
With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense. The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems. As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium. In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.
If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM. The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0. With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.
The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building." We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention. This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.
The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible. The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition. The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest. To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.
On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan. All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring. The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad. The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training. Damn good training."
It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months. This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment. It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military. Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.
In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed. This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism. Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.
Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence. There is a simple reason for this prediction. Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam. Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.
Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely. At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade. At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power. Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979. To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.
The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired. As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood. It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders. Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast. No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces. At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.
The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora. This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.
Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination. This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole. Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.
The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states. They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools. There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan. The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.
The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt. The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk. Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole. The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased. As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.
The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises. This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists. Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy. Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign. Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly. The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.
The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies. This disengagement will exclude Israel. The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.
With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense. The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems. As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium. In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.
If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM. The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0. With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.
The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building." We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention. This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.
The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible. The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition. The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest. To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.
On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan. All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring. The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad. The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training. Damn good training."
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
All Together Now--Cry For The Poor Palestinians
Way back in the dark ages otherwise known as the Forties, there was a series of affrays in a small portion of the Mideast then called on all the maps as "Palestine" or the "Palestinian Mandated Territory." The interlocking series of nasty little wars called either the "War of Independence" or "The Catastrophe" was occasioned by a combination of factors. Some of these factors were indigenous to the region. Others, far larger in impact on both the people of the region and the world generally, were the result of a specific ideology applied ruthlessly by a particular regime and its allies in other countries.
One result of the affray was the generation of a generation of refugees. It is critical to understand that the refugees were not simply a mass of ever-so-innocent civilian victims caught between the millstones of events and forces far outside their control. Nor was there any thought at the time of the affrays and their concomitant refugee streams that the displaced individuals and their descendants would be the pawns of governments and ideological devotees for years, decades, and finally generations.
On occasions, social and political forces have a power which transcends the capacity of any government or group of governments to control. The months and years immediately following the end of World War II in Europe and the revelations regarding the magnitude of the Nazi campaign of racial extermination now called the "Holocaust" was such an occasion.
The movement to create (or, perhaps more accurately, to recreate) the ancient Jewish homeland in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire known as Palestine had been underway in a series of fits and starts since the late Nineteenth Century. The confusingly ambiguous bit of British political expediency executed during the worst days of World War I known as the Balfour Declaration provided some seeming basis for the creation of a "Jewish National Homeland" in the Ottoman occupied territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. A brilliantly worded bit of diplomatic gibberish, the Balfour Declaration appeared to provide either (A) the foundation of a Jewish state or (B) a Jewish homeland inside an Arab state or (C) both.
The Arabs resident in the land more or less affected by the Declaration both cooperated with and bitterly opposed the transfer of land from Arab to Jewish ownership. Some Arabs, primarily absentee landowners, were quite willing to sell their land to Jews. Other Arabs, primarily lesser landholders and ambitious Muslim clerics, frothed with opposition. Several times the opposition turned violent particularly when the crowds were lashed by sermons preached by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a man who was so antisemitic as to make Adolph Hitler seem a Hebrewphile in comparison.
The British ran the place as they did the neighboring territory called back then "the Trans-Jordan." The British government was at best given to vacillation regarding the settlement of Jews in the territory given to their mandate by the League of Nations. Most of the time both the British Army and Foreign Ministry were dominated by Arabists given to a romantic view of the Arabs. In practice this meant the relevant officials on the ground in the region as well as back in London tilted British policy to fit the desires, not to say demands, of the Arabs. Even as the Nurenberg War Crimes Tribunal was hearing the evidence of the mass slaughter of the Jews of Europe as a state policy, the British government and its minions in Palestine consistently favored the Arab position of total opposition to the creation of even a minimalist form of Jewish National Homeland.
The revelations of the Nazi state policy of mass slaughter did have a profound impact on many people both in Europe and the US. Americans were notably disturbed by the images and testimony of gas chambers and death transports. While mild and "gentlemanly" antisemitism had been a common currency in the US prior to the end of the war, all such attitudes and behaviors were set aside with rapidity and vigor under the impact of the tales of savage, premeditated murder on a scale previously unthinkable.
The US became a supporter of the more expansive interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. This support was not highly visible. It was not one of loud voices in Congress or demonstrations in the street. This was not the American way in those more innocent days. Still, the mood of We the People was evident. There was a sense of collective guilt within much of the American elite. We had stood silent on the sidelines during the Thirties. We had refused to believe the first horrifying stories of persecution as they oozed out of Germany and German occupied territory. During the war, we had done nothing to impede the machinery of slaughter even as our government (like that of the UK) became increasingly aware of its existence.
Guilt required atonement. The atonement took the form of supporting the creation of a Jewish state in the mandated territory of Palestine. It can and has been argued that the American guilt feelings had the net result of transferring misery from the Jews of Europe to the Arabs of Palestine. There may be a shred of truth to this. But, if so, it is irrelevant.
The US did its dead level best to see the Jewish state brought into existence peacefully with the least possible ill-effects for the already resident Arab population. We bent much diplomatic influence to this task. The influence was backed with money. We invoked the UN. We tried negotiation. We urged the Arab governments to step back, work with us in solving a problem which had an impact on the Jews of Europe, the Arab Muslims of the Mideast, and other people and religions far from both the Mideast and Europe. To us, the problem of the Jewish state was an affair which had meaning and impact for humanity generally.
The crux of the problem, the single reason a diplomatic question became a shooting war rests not with the Jews of Europe seeking a permanent sanctuary nor with the ideology of Zionism. The responsibility for the wars does not reside with the US or with the European states. Most assuredly, it does not rest with the pro-Arab men of the British government and military. No. None of these can have the tail of fault pinned on their behinds.
All the responsibility for the war and the refugees rests solely with the Arab governments of the day. Well. to err on the side of accuracy, some of the blame must rest with the Muslim clerics who preached not only holy war against the hated Jews and their infidel supporters but also called upon Arab Muslims to leave their homes, to flee to the protection of the armies of the faithful so as to return in victory behind the conquering tanks of the believers.
Arab tanks were rolling. Arab artillery was firing. Arab infantry were shooting. All even before the new state of Israel proclaimed its existence. The war was on, declared not by words but by shooting, shelling, and bombing long before any state could recognize the existence of the new state.
The Arab armies moved long before the UN could urge peace. The Arab armies sought to extinguish the nascent Jewish state before any UN resolution seeking a peaceful ending could be introduced let alone passed and put into effect. The so-called "Catastrophe" was made by Arabs. Period. End of discussion.
The same applies in the main to the production of the pitiful columns of refugees and the long, bitter aftermath in the camps. The important phrase here is, "in the main." For the Jews do not have clean hands in the matter of forced evacuations.
It is important to remember that to the shame and discredit of Israel then and now, some Jewish militia units, particularly those of the Palmach, engaged in atrocities intended to force Arabs from their ancestral homes, to ethnically cleanse land which would be incorporated in the Jewish state. Unarmed civilians including old men, women, and children were massacred on a scale not different from that practiced by Serbians against their Muslim fellow citizens. To the further discredit of the government of Israel, it did its best to cover up the evidence of the atrocities for decades. It has been only recently that the relevant documents have come to light--due to the efforts of Israeli historians whose dedication to their craft overpowered feelings of patriotism.
However, the primary responsibility resides with Arab governments and Muslim clerics who used all manner of persuasion to convince Arabs to pack up and leave in the full (and false) expectation of a speedy and victorious return. In the wars of independence, as in the Six Day War nearly twenty years later, the Arab states and Muslim clerics were co-conspirators in crimes against the Arabs of the disputed lands.
However, the Arab states and Muslim cleric were not alone in the commission of the offense. They were aided and abetted by the UN. The UN formed an office tasked with the resettlement, relief, and care of the refugees.
Admittedly, the UN sincerely if misguidedly conceived of the operation as short-lived, a temporary humanitarian expedient which would end with the coming of peace. Unfortunately, the oft-seen process of the temporary becoming permanent worked once again with the UN effort at relief, resettlement, and reintegration of the Palestinian displaced persons. The ever expanding network of refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and elsewhere took on a life of its own. A new, always growing bureaucracy of refugee relief workers became a permanent feature of the human terrain of the Mideast.
The reason for this resides not so much with the UN bureaucrats as it does with the Arab states. To the various governments of the so-called "frontline" states, the refugees and their camps became welcome pawns and tools in the forever war being waged by these states against Israel. There was no desire on the part of any of these governments to see the Palestinian refugees effectively integrated into their own populations.
At the same time, assorted ambitious political leaders within the refugee population saw their way to power, status, and (dare it be written) wealth rested with keeping the refugees in their degraded and alienated position. And, in the shadow, there were more than a few clerics of the political Islam tendency who saw advantage in having the rootless refugees available as potential recruits in the overarching holy war against Jews and infidels alike.
An unintended combination of international aid workers, agenda driven clerics, and self-interested states assured the camps and their wretched inhabitants would stay as a major feature of the social and political landscape of the region. And, so it is today. And, so it will stay tomorrow absent a severe alteration of the stances of the frontline governments as well as the leadership of the new unity government of Hamas and the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority.
Arguably, the UN office, now called UNRWA, is the single major player in altering the terrain of camps and refugees. Considering the existence of the Palestinian Authority, it can be asserted fairly that the camps as well as the UN bureaucracy no longer needs to exist. Further, it is not inaccurate to argue that the best thing that UNRWA can do on behalf of its wards is to go out of existence.
By ceasing to exist, UNRWA would compel the Palestinian Authority including its Hamas branch to take proper responsibility for the well being of its citizens. The reality now is that Palestinians are not and should not be wards of a giant and hugely expensive but inefficient welfare bureaucracy. Rather, they are citizens of a nascent state with a government which exists in all but name.
UNRWA must go. That is it must go if the UN is serious about being concerned about the best interests of the refugees and their descendants. The wars which produced the refugees ended more than forty years ago. The youngest of the authentic refugees are in their mid-sixties. It is long overdue to blow the whistle on UNRWA and tell the refugees and their third generation descendants that they are not going home--that where they live right now is home.
Of course UNRWA will not do the right thing. The bureaucrats, the international aid workers, are not about to give up their phony jobs. The chiefs and their chief assistants are not about to say give us no more money, our work here is done.
That is evident in the latest sob story out of UNRWA. The violins are weeping in the background as the high minded, lofty thinking folks at the agency dry their tears over the very high unemployment in Gaza. There is no end of gnashing of teeth, beating of breasts, and pulling of hair over the human costs of the unemployment which (stand by to be shocked) is caused solely by the Israeli "blockade" of Gaza.
Of course this interpretation is a mass of pooh-pooh. The real deal is that Gaza under Hamas has no economic reason to exist. Beyond that, it has been the policies and actions of Hamas which have made the Israeli "blockade" necessary. As long as UNRWA exists to take up the slack, to feed, to house, to educate, to medicate, to apologize for, and generally tend to the so-called refugees, there will be no effective pressure on either Hamas or the Palestinian Authority to act like a responsible government and create the conditions and context necessary to assure that Palestine has an economic reason to exist as well as the ability to attract investment capital and create employment.
Down in the religious and political mire of the Arab states, deep under the cover of the "Arab Spring," each and every government continues to cynically exploit the "refugees" as part of their forever war against the Jews and their infidel supporters. Commensual with the cynics of mosque and chancery are the self-serving and self-preserving international bureaucrats and aid workers of UNRWA. This unlikely but lethal troika keeps its collective boot firmly on the neck of the Palestinian "refugees."
Pity the poor Palestinians. Not for their unemployment. Not for their alleged poverty. Not for their purported longing for long lost olive groves and stone huts. Pity them for their delusions. Pity them for having been manipulated, propagandized, used, and exploited by cynics in the mosque, cynics in the chanceries of all the Arab states, and cynics at Turtle Bay. Pity the Palestinians most of all for having died in their spirit, for having thrown away their own autonomy in order to become an army of automatons ordered, directed, and controlled by people who have nothing but contempt for them.
Pity the Palestinians, hollow shells of one time humanity, sacrificed on the alters of ambition. Look at them in their mobs, their multitudes of misery, and remind yourself that once they were human.
One result of the affray was the generation of a generation of refugees. It is critical to understand that the refugees were not simply a mass of ever-so-innocent civilian victims caught between the millstones of events and forces far outside their control. Nor was there any thought at the time of the affrays and their concomitant refugee streams that the displaced individuals and their descendants would be the pawns of governments and ideological devotees for years, decades, and finally generations.
On occasions, social and political forces have a power which transcends the capacity of any government or group of governments to control. The months and years immediately following the end of World War II in Europe and the revelations regarding the magnitude of the Nazi campaign of racial extermination now called the "Holocaust" was such an occasion.
The movement to create (or, perhaps more accurately, to recreate) the ancient Jewish homeland in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire known as Palestine had been underway in a series of fits and starts since the late Nineteenth Century. The confusingly ambiguous bit of British political expediency executed during the worst days of World War I known as the Balfour Declaration provided some seeming basis for the creation of a "Jewish National Homeland" in the Ottoman occupied territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. A brilliantly worded bit of diplomatic gibberish, the Balfour Declaration appeared to provide either (A) the foundation of a Jewish state or (B) a Jewish homeland inside an Arab state or (C) both.
The Arabs resident in the land more or less affected by the Declaration both cooperated with and bitterly opposed the transfer of land from Arab to Jewish ownership. Some Arabs, primarily absentee landowners, were quite willing to sell their land to Jews. Other Arabs, primarily lesser landholders and ambitious Muslim clerics, frothed with opposition. Several times the opposition turned violent particularly when the crowds were lashed by sermons preached by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a man who was so antisemitic as to make Adolph Hitler seem a Hebrewphile in comparison.
The British ran the place as they did the neighboring territory called back then "the Trans-Jordan." The British government was at best given to vacillation regarding the settlement of Jews in the territory given to their mandate by the League of Nations. Most of the time both the British Army and Foreign Ministry were dominated by Arabists given to a romantic view of the Arabs. In practice this meant the relevant officials on the ground in the region as well as back in London tilted British policy to fit the desires, not to say demands, of the Arabs. Even as the Nurenberg War Crimes Tribunal was hearing the evidence of the mass slaughter of the Jews of Europe as a state policy, the British government and its minions in Palestine consistently favored the Arab position of total opposition to the creation of even a minimalist form of Jewish National Homeland.
The revelations of the Nazi state policy of mass slaughter did have a profound impact on many people both in Europe and the US. Americans were notably disturbed by the images and testimony of gas chambers and death transports. While mild and "gentlemanly" antisemitism had been a common currency in the US prior to the end of the war, all such attitudes and behaviors were set aside with rapidity and vigor under the impact of the tales of savage, premeditated murder on a scale previously unthinkable.
The US became a supporter of the more expansive interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. This support was not highly visible. It was not one of loud voices in Congress or demonstrations in the street. This was not the American way in those more innocent days. Still, the mood of We the People was evident. There was a sense of collective guilt within much of the American elite. We had stood silent on the sidelines during the Thirties. We had refused to believe the first horrifying stories of persecution as they oozed out of Germany and German occupied territory. During the war, we had done nothing to impede the machinery of slaughter even as our government (like that of the UK) became increasingly aware of its existence.
Guilt required atonement. The atonement took the form of supporting the creation of a Jewish state in the mandated territory of Palestine. It can and has been argued that the American guilt feelings had the net result of transferring misery from the Jews of Europe to the Arabs of Palestine. There may be a shred of truth to this. But, if so, it is irrelevant.
The US did its dead level best to see the Jewish state brought into existence peacefully with the least possible ill-effects for the already resident Arab population. We bent much diplomatic influence to this task. The influence was backed with money. We invoked the UN. We tried negotiation. We urged the Arab governments to step back, work with us in solving a problem which had an impact on the Jews of Europe, the Arab Muslims of the Mideast, and other people and religions far from both the Mideast and Europe. To us, the problem of the Jewish state was an affair which had meaning and impact for humanity generally.
The crux of the problem, the single reason a diplomatic question became a shooting war rests not with the Jews of Europe seeking a permanent sanctuary nor with the ideology of Zionism. The responsibility for the wars does not reside with the US or with the European states. Most assuredly, it does not rest with the pro-Arab men of the British government and military. No. None of these can have the tail of fault pinned on their behinds.
All the responsibility for the war and the refugees rests solely with the Arab governments of the day. Well. to err on the side of accuracy, some of the blame must rest with the Muslim clerics who preached not only holy war against the hated Jews and their infidel supporters but also called upon Arab Muslims to leave their homes, to flee to the protection of the armies of the faithful so as to return in victory behind the conquering tanks of the believers.
Arab tanks were rolling. Arab artillery was firing. Arab infantry were shooting. All even before the new state of Israel proclaimed its existence. The war was on, declared not by words but by shooting, shelling, and bombing long before any state could recognize the existence of the new state.
The Arab armies moved long before the UN could urge peace. The Arab armies sought to extinguish the nascent Jewish state before any UN resolution seeking a peaceful ending could be introduced let alone passed and put into effect. The so-called "Catastrophe" was made by Arabs. Period. End of discussion.
The same applies in the main to the production of the pitiful columns of refugees and the long, bitter aftermath in the camps. The important phrase here is, "in the main." For the Jews do not have clean hands in the matter of forced evacuations.
It is important to remember that to the shame and discredit of Israel then and now, some Jewish militia units, particularly those of the Palmach, engaged in atrocities intended to force Arabs from their ancestral homes, to ethnically cleanse land which would be incorporated in the Jewish state. Unarmed civilians including old men, women, and children were massacred on a scale not different from that practiced by Serbians against their Muslim fellow citizens. To the further discredit of the government of Israel, it did its best to cover up the evidence of the atrocities for decades. It has been only recently that the relevant documents have come to light--due to the efforts of Israeli historians whose dedication to their craft overpowered feelings of patriotism.
However, the primary responsibility resides with Arab governments and Muslim clerics who used all manner of persuasion to convince Arabs to pack up and leave in the full (and false) expectation of a speedy and victorious return. In the wars of independence, as in the Six Day War nearly twenty years later, the Arab states and Muslim clerics were co-conspirators in crimes against the Arabs of the disputed lands.
However, the Arab states and Muslim cleric were not alone in the commission of the offense. They were aided and abetted by the UN. The UN formed an office tasked with the resettlement, relief, and care of the refugees.
Admittedly, the UN sincerely if misguidedly conceived of the operation as short-lived, a temporary humanitarian expedient which would end with the coming of peace. Unfortunately, the oft-seen process of the temporary becoming permanent worked once again with the UN effort at relief, resettlement, and reintegration of the Palestinian displaced persons. The ever expanding network of refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and elsewhere took on a life of its own. A new, always growing bureaucracy of refugee relief workers became a permanent feature of the human terrain of the Mideast.
The reason for this resides not so much with the UN bureaucrats as it does with the Arab states. To the various governments of the so-called "frontline" states, the refugees and their camps became welcome pawns and tools in the forever war being waged by these states against Israel. There was no desire on the part of any of these governments to see the Palestinian refugees effectively integrated into their own populations.
At the same time, assorted ambitious political leaders within the refugee population saw their way to power, status, and (dare it be written) wealth rested with keeping the refugees in their degraded and alienated position. And, in the shadow, there were more than a few clerics of the political Islam tendency who saw advantage in having the rootless refugees available as potential recruits in the overarching holy war against Jews and infidels alike.
An unintended combination of international aid workers, agenda driven clerics, and self-interested states assured the camps and their wretched inhabitants would stay as a major feature of the social and political landscape of the region. And, so it is today. And, so it will stay tomorrow absent a severe alteration of the stances of the frontline governments as well as the leadership of the new unity government of Hamas and the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority.
Arguably, the UN office, now called UNRWA, is the single major player in altering the terrain of camps and refugees. Considering the existence of the Palestinian Authority, it can be asserted fairly that the camps as well as the UN bureaucracy no longer needs to exist. Further, it is not inaccurate to argue that the best thing that UNRWA can do on behalf of its wards is to go out of existence.
By ceasing to exist, UNRWA would compel the Palestinian Authority including its Hamas branch to take proper responsibility for the well being of its citizens. The reality now is that Palestinians are not and should not be wards of a giant and hugely expensive but inefficient welfare bureaucracy. Rather, they are citizens of a nascent state with a government which exists in all but name.
UNRWA must go. That is it must go if the UN is serious about being concerned about the best interests of the refugees and their descendants. The wars which produced the refugees ended more than forty years ago. The youngest of the authentic refugees are in their mid-sixties. It is long overdue to blow the whistle on UNRWA and tell the refugees and their third generation descendants that they are not going home--that where they live right now is home.
Of course UNRWA will not do the right thing. The bureaucrats, the international aid workers, are not about to give up their phony jobs. The chiefs and their chief assistants are not about to say give us no more money, our work here is done.
That is evident in the latest sob story out of UNRWA. The violins are weeping in the background as the high minded, lofty thinking folks at the agency dry their tears over the very high unemployment in Gaza. There is no end of gnashing of teeth, beating of breasts, and pulling of hair over the human costs of the unemployment which (stand by to be shocked) is caused solely by the Israeli "blockade" of Gaza.
Of course this interpretation is a mass of pooh-pooh. The real deal is that Gaza under Hamas has no economic reason to exist. Beyond that, it has been the policies and actions of Hamas which have made the Israeli "blockade" necessary. As long as UNRWA exists to take up the slack, to feed, to house, to educate, to medicate, to apologize for, and generally tend to the so-called refugees, there will be no effective pressure on either Hamas or the Palestinian Authority to act like a responsible government and create the conditions and context necessary to assure that Palestine has an economic reason to exist as well as the ability to attract investment capital and create employment.
Down in the religious and political mire of the Arab states, deep under the cover of the "Arab Spring," each and every government continues to cynically exploit the "refugees" as part of their forever war against the Jews and their infidel supporters. Commensual with the cynics of mosque and chancery are the self-serving and self-preserving international bureaucrats and aid workers of UNRWA. This unlikely but lethal troika keeps its collective boot firmly on the neck of the Palestinian "refugees."
Pity the poor Palestinians. Not for their unemployment. Not for their alleged poverty. Not for their purported longing for long lost olive groves and stone huts. Pity them for their delusions. Pity them for having been manipulated, propagandized, used, and exploited by cynics in the mosque, cynics in the chanceries of all the Arab states, and cynics at Turtle Bay. Pity the Palestinians most of all for having died in their spirit, for having thrown away their own autonomy in order to become an army of automatons ordered, directed, and controlled by people who have nothing but contempt for them.
Pity the Palestinians, hollow shells of one time humanity, sacrificed on the alters of ambition. Look at them in their mobs, their multitudes of misery, and remind yourself that once they were human.
Labels:
Gaza Strip,
Gaza Strip Blockade,
Hamas,
Israel,
Palestine,
Palestinian Authority,
Palestinians,
Refugees,
UNRWA
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