The signs of ascendant, austere, political Islam are unmistakable in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The sharply Islamist party, the Renaissance Party, is expected to hold a plurality if not an outright majority in the new constituent assembly in Tunisia. In Libya, the outgoing head of the National Transitional Council (NTC) announced changes in banking and family law to make Libya more Shariah compliant. In Egypt, the Salifists who are the granddaddy of all the austere, politically oriented Muslim groups, are battling with the Muslim Brotherhood for the number one spot in the forthcoming government, with the inevitable result being the triumph of austere political Islam as the two entities share far more than not.
Throughout both Egypt and Libya, both Christian and Muslim communities are under direct, physical attack. The Sufi shrines, venerated graves, and mosques in both countries have been vandalized, even destroyed by armed men bearing the symbols of Salifist affiliation. As the world well knows, the Coptic Christians of Egypt have been brutalized, killed even, not only by mobs of the austere and violent but by security force personnel as well. In Egypt as in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Christians have become a highly endangered species, occupying the same slot in the local social and political ecology formerly possessed by Jews.
There can be no doubt but the austere groups--the Salifists, the Wahhibists, the Deobandis--are well on their way to establishing operational dominance in the countries of the "Arab Spring" as they are in Pakistan and the Arab Peninsula. The Shia equivalents have done the same in Iraq. The outcome in the next few months will not meet the expectations of the Western leaders and governments which embraced the purportedly democratic fervor of the "Arab Spring."
In the context of looming disappointment, the opinion molders of the West would be well advised to consider a chain of events which hit the tipping point twenty years ago in Algeria. Back in 1991, Algeria was experiencing the same basic problems as ignited the "Arab Spring." There was very high unemployment, particularly among the educated youth. The economy was stagnant despite oil riches. Internal divisions of tribal and class origin split the nation. The long running autocratic government was out of ideas, and, more importantly, out of perceived legitimacy.
The government decided to call for elections. The campaign was loud, enthusiastic, energetic. Algerians went to the polls with joy, believing a real future beckoned. When the votes were counted, the government, its supporting elite, and the armed forces were shocked. The parties of the austere, political Islamists had won.
The army nullified the elections. Next it took power directly. Then, quite predictably, violent unrest started. By the time the shooting stopped, more than 150,000 Algerians were dead. Scores of thousands more had been wounded. Even more had been jailed. Many of these had been tortured.
Even today, more than a decade after the internal war ended, the scars remain. Despite the return of a semblance of democracy, a sort of "guided democracy," the echoes of the police state soldier on. Voices are quiet and furtive. After sunset, streets are weirdly quiet, a testament to the curfews of the period of military rule. The government supported Gaddifi until the bitter and bloody end. And, jobs are still scarce, the economy still in doldrums, regardless of the special relation with France.
The more things change, the more they stay the same.
There is no real probability that rule by austere Muslims will see the end of the myriad economic and social problems which propelled the demonstrations which brought down ben-Ali, forced the military to toss Mubarak to the wolves, and led to the NATO enhanced violence in Libya. Prayer, beards, and putting women in garbage sacks will not assure jobs--particularly for the over educated, Western oriented youth which served as the shock troops in Tunisia and Egypt or provided many of the trigger pullers of the revolt in Libya.
Islam and the Koran will not, pace the Muslim Brotherhood's two best known slogans, be the answer. When the faces of disappointed revolutionaries are rubbed in the mud of reality, the most probable result will be another round of violence. Also, topping the list of outcomes to be expected will be the charges levied by the austere Muslims running affairs.
The folks in charge will accuse a sinister conspiracy on the part of the "Zionists" and the US for any and all failures. There will be calls for jihad to defend the new, faith based governments against the cabal of Jews and Americans. The path blazed by Iran (and to a lesser extent, Pakistan) will be traveled by the incoming regimes of Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.
The countries will either go the way of successfully focusing anger on the mythical enemies in Israel, the US, and Europe or dissolve in a welter of internal war and blood. In the latter case, it is to be expected that the military will step in to restore order in a manner akin to the process which drew a bright blood red line through Algeria twenty years back.
Absent a miracle of Biblical proportions which will do the impossible--squaring the circle of austere Islam with the real requirements for success in the contemporary world--the picture which will be painted across much of the Mideast and North Africa over the coming months and years will be ugly as hell. The challenge to opinion molders and senior governmental wallahs will be to watch. To watch while doing nothing.
Given the past record of Western colonialism, neo-colonialism, or plain vanilla intervention and interference, the West, including the US, has no viable alternative. Rightly or wrongly, many, perhaps most, citizens of the countries in the regions see the West, its governments, its institutions, its corporations, its policies, its militaries as the props and supporters of dictatorships, the adversaries of indigenous desires, internal perceptions of dignity, as both indirect and direct exploiters, and as "the Crusaders" bent on the destruction of Islam. The truth or falsity of this belief set is irrelevant. What is relevant is simply that the beliefs are widely and deeply held.
The only viable option for the West, for the US, is to keep out. The people in the several countries must travel the very rough road alone. We must not even seek to use "soft power" methods to shorten the journey or pave over the worst parts of the road.
All we can or should do is make it clear that internal affairs of any and every Muslim majority state is of no concern to us. Beyond this, we must make it plain that any export of political Islam, most importantly, any export by violent means, will be met by robust, very robust means. As long as the austere, politically motivated Muslim governments keep it at home, they will be left to their own devices, but should they cross their borders, we will stop them by means of our own choosing.
This posture will be difficult, very difficult for NGOs given to humanitarian goals to accept let alone support. It is an unfortunate truth that any approach other than patient watching and vigilant guarding of our interests will make life worse both for us and the people who live under the sway of Salifists and others of their ilk. This is a stinging nettle of the sharpest sort, but we all need to get a grip on it.
Showing posts with label Arab Spring. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arab Spring. Show all posts
Sunday, October 23, 2011
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
The Otherworldly Realism of T-Paw
Former Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty is stuck in the second tier of Republican hopefuls despite a strenuous effort to break to daylight. He has already taken a definite stand on matters economic with strong support from the media and no palpable result in the public polling. Now he is trying to do the same in the area of foreign affairs, putting distance between himself and the neo-isolationists of the GOP on the one hand and the neocons of the George W. Bush days on the other.
T-paw's essay in self-definition came yesterday n a speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations. While represented as a tour of the horizon, the candidate focused on the Mideast, Israel, and Obama's failures of policy in the region.
There is little doubt but the Obama approach to affairs in the Mideast specifically and the world generally have been marked by far more failure than success. The primary reason for this is to be found in the world view of the Nice Young Man From Chicago with its blame-America-first core. Being a perfect academic, Mr Obama is given to avoiding action in favor of words whenever possible. Then as a matter of personality, the Clueless Guy in the Oval resembles a Pearson's Puppeteer.
(For those of you who do not read science fiction, the Pearson Puppeteer was an alien species created by the fertile mind of Larry Niven. The species is characterized by a degree of caution which surpasses the merely cowardly. The "leader" of the Puppeteers is called the Hindmost--which rather resembles in concept the idea of "leading from behind" offered recently by a member of the administration in admiring tribute to Obama's presumed statesmanship in the Libyan Affair.)
The characterization of Mr Obama's approach(es) to the "Arab Spring" and the Israeli-Palestinian Question offered by Governor Pawlenty are unexceptional. So also is his emphasis on the importance of Israel to US national interests.
Where T-paw misses the cliched bus is in his fervently expressed belief in the ability of the US to act effectively in the creation of freedom and democracy in the Mideast in the wake of the recent and ongoing tumult. He is of the view that authentic democracy, genuine freedom, real Western style government with full fledged protections of minorities including women and non-Muslims can be created and maintained over time with the assistance and support of the US.
It would be very nice if the Pawlenty vision was accurate. It is not. Whether dealing with the environment of post-authoritarian Egypt or Tunisia, or contemplating how "reforms" might be facilitated by American efforts in kingdoms such as Jordan, Morocco or, most importantly of all, Saudi Arabia, Mr Pawlenty discounts the force and universality of Islam, particularly the form of Islam embraced and promoted by Salifists and Wahhibists.
The well-meaning Pawlenty (or his advisers and speechwriters) ignore the fundamental realities of Islamic thought which focus upon the deity as the source of all legitimate law. Also overlooked is the oft-repeated meme that neither democracy nor liberty as understood in the West is compatible with the dictates of the deity contained in the sacred literature as interpreted by generations of scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. The Pawlenty stance also overlooks the fundamental orientation of Islam on the duties of the believer. Not to put an inaccurately fine point on the matter, Islam elevates duty, duty to the deity over any and all personal rights. In short there is no concept of individual rights which equates in any way with the prevalent definitions of rights and responsibilities in the US or the West generally.
The failure to comprehend accurately the impact of faith and its all-inclusive nature constitutes the rock on which Mr Pawlenty's ideas of constructive engagement with the new forces of the Arab states must founder. While the people oriented toward secular concerns and world view dominated and continue to dominate the media coverage of events in the Arab states, these folk are a minority, even an endangered species. Many of the more secular minded are quite aware of this aspect of the post-authoritarian dynamic as is seen with the repeated calls in Egypt for a delay in the elections so as to allow the secularists to organize well enough to take on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups.
Mr Pawlenty's call for the next president to motivate the Saudi royal house to take the path of reform is also quite otherworldly. The House of Saud exists today because of the bargain made generations ago to link its fortunes with those of the Wahhibists. There is no way on this Earth that the austere world view of Wahhibism would continence let alone participate in any sort of reform such as mentioned by T-paw. There is no chance that the Wahhibist theology is about to go along with extending any rights to non-Muslims or see the error of Mohammad's ways regarding the status of women.
In his remarks Mr Pawlenty warns against the elections which produce results antithetical to genuine democracy, authentic freedom. He may have had Iran in mind when he said this as there is no better example of a people committing political suicide at the ballot box than that. It will take far more than support for the "reform" movement of 2009 for the verdict of self-destruction by vote to be reversed. The Iranians willingly and to the later regret of some surrendered all vestiges of political autonomy to the dictates of theology. The same may happen in at least some of the Arab states celebrated as having sounded the tocsin of freedom by Mr Pawlenty.
A central point made by the presidential aspirant deserved more emphasis. The reality of political Islam, particularly violent political Islam will be with us for many, many years to come. As long as that reality existss the US will be the major target of its hate and violence. This status will not be removed even if the US were to unilaterally withdraw from every last member state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference--or even if the US were to vote for the dissolution of Israel.
The necessary conclusion is the US must not retreat to some sort of Fortress America. Surrender to violent political Islam is not an option simply because surrender will not work. It will not immunize the US against future attacks, future terror, future war. Nothing short of every last American--all 312 million of us--facing east and banging our foreheads on the floor would grant immunity from the hatred of the groups dedicated to violent political Islam.
The US may have, as Mr Pawlenty suggested, one political party which argues for American decline, withdrawal, disengagement and isolation. He thinks that there is no need for a second. He is right. He would have been even more on target had he said that one such party is one too many.
T-paw's essay in self-definition came yesterday n a speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations. While represented as a tour of the horizon, the candidate focused on the Mideast, Israel, and Obama's failures of policy in the region.
There is little doubt but the Obama approach to affairs in the Mideast specifically and the world generally have been marked by far more failure than success. The primary reason for this is to be found in the world view of the Nice Young Man From Chicago with its blame-America-first core. Being a perfect academic, Mr Obama is given to avoiding action in favor of words whenever possible. Then as a matter of personality, the Clueless Guy in the Oval resembles a Pearson's Puppeteer.
(For those of you who do not read science fiction, the Pearson Puppeteer was an alien species created by the fertile mind of Larry Niven. The species is characterized by a degree of caution which surpasses the merely cowardly. The "leader" of the Puppeteers is called the Hindmost--which rather resembles in concept the idea of "leading from behind" offered recently by a member of the administration in admiring tribute to Obama's presumed statesmanship in the Libyan Affair.)
The characterization of Mr Obama's approach(es) to the "Arab Spring" and the Israeli-Palestinian Question offered by Governor Pawlenty are unexceptional. So also is his emphasis on the importance of Israel to US national interests.
Where T-paw misses the cliched bus is in his fervently expressed belief in the ability of the US to act effectively in the creation of freedom and democracy in the Mideast in the wake of the recent and ongoing tumult. He is of the view that authentic democracy, genuine freedom, real Western style government with full fledged protections of minorities including women and non-Muslims can be created and maintained over time with the assistance and support of the US.
It would be very nice if the Pawlenty vision was accurate. It is not. Whether dealing with the environment of post-authoritarian Egypt or Tunisia, or contemplating how "reforms" might be facilitated by American efforts in kingdoms such as Jordan, Morocco or, most importantly of all, Saudi Arabia, Mr Pawlenty discounts the force and universality of Islam, particularly the form of Islam embraced and promoted by Salifists and Wahhibists.
The well-meaning Pawlenty (or his advisers and speechwriters) ignore the fundamental realities of Islamic thought which focus upon the deity as the source of all legitimate law. Also overlooked is the oft-repeated meme that neither democracy nor liberty as understood in the West is compatible with the dictates of the deity contained in the sacred literature as interpreted by generations of scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. The Pawlenty stance also overlooks the fundamental orientation of Islam on the duties of the believer. Not to put an inaccurately fine point on the matter, Islam elevates duty, duty to the deity over any and all personal rights. In short there is no concept of individual rights which equates in any way with the prevalent definitions of rights and responsibilities in the US or the West generally.
The failure to comprehend accurately the impact of faith and its all-inclusive nature constitutes the rock on which Mr Pawlenty's ideas of constructive engagement with the new forces of the Arab states must founder. While the people oriented toward secular concerns and world view dominated and continue to dominate the media coverage of events in the Arab states, these folk are a minority, even an endangered species. Many of the more secular minded are quite aware of this aspect of the post-authoritarian dynamic as is seen with the repeated calls in Egypt for a delay in the elections so as to allow the secularists to organize well enough to take on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups.
Mr Pawlenty's call for the next president to motivate the Saudi royal house to take the path of reform is also quite otherworldly. The House of Saud exists today because of the bargain made generations ago to link its fortunes with those of the Wahhibists. There is no way on this Earth that the austere world view of Wahhibism would continence let alone participate in any sort of reform such as mentioned by T-paw. There is no chance that the Wahhibist theology is about to go along with extending any rights to non-Muslims or see the error of Mohammad's ways regarding the status of women.
In his remarks Mr Pawlenty warns against the elections which produce results antithetical to genuine democracy, authentic freedom. He may have had Iran in mind when he said this as there is no better example of a people committing political suicide at the ballot box than that. It will take far more than support for the "reform" movement of 2009 for the verdict of self-destruction by vote to be reversed. The Iranians willingly and to the later regret of some surrendered all vestiges of political autonomy to the dictates of theology. The same may happen in at least some of the Arab states celebrated as having sounded the tocsin of freedom by Mr Pawlenty.
A central point made by the presidential aspirant deserved more emphasis. The reality of political Islam, particularly violent political Islam will be with us for many, many years to come. As long as that reality existss the US will be the major target of its hate and violence. This status will not be removed even if the US were to unilaterally withdraw from every last member state of the Organization of the Islamic Conference--or even if the US were to vote for the dissolution of Israel.
The necessary conclusion is the US must not retreat to some sort of Fortress America. Surrender to violent political Islam is not an option simply because surrender will not work. It will not immunize the US against future attacks, future terror, future war. Nothing short of every last American--all 312 million of us--facing east and banging our foreheads on the floor would grant immunity from the hatred of the groups dedicated to violent political Islam.
The US may have, as Mr Pawlenty suggested, one political party which argues for American decline, withdrawal, disengagement and isolation. He thinks that there is no need for a second. He is right. He would have been even more on target had he said that one such party is one too many.
Saturday, June 18, 2011
If You Like Pakistan, You'll Love The "Arab Summer"
Now that all the hyperbolic prattling about the wave of democracy rushing tsunami like over the sands of Arabia is fading away, perhaps overpowered by the sounds of exploding NATO delivered ordnance in Libya, it is possible to take a less biased look at the most likely course of events for the long hot Arab "summer" which is looming like the smoke of an Arizona wildfire. While the details of the forthcoming "summer" are obscure, the broad outlines are coming more clear by the day.
It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months. This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment. It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military. Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.
In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed. This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism. Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.
Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence. There is a simple reason for this prediction. Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam. Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.
Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely. At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade. At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power. Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979. To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.
The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired. As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood. It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders. Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast. No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces. At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.
The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora. This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.
Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination. This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole. Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.
The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states. They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools. There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan. The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.
The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt. The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk. Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole. The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased. As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.
The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises. This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists. Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy. Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign. Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly. The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.
The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies. This disengagement will exclude Israel. The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.
With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense. The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems. As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium. In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.
If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM. The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0. With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.
The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building." We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention. This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.
The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible. The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition. The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest. To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.
On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan. All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring. The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad. The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training. Damn good training."
It is not inaccurate to posit Pakistan as the paradigm soon to apply to the countries of North Africa and the Mideast which were convulsed to a greater or lesser extent by the pseudo-revolutions of recent months. This means that there will be a contest for political supremacy pitting the interests of a microscopic economic and political elite against the rising expectations of the marginalized majority egged on by increasingly extremest members of the Muslim clerical establishment. It means the ultimate arbiter of authority will be the armed forces of those states which already possess a large, well organized, well equipped military. Finally, there will be an overlay of regional and tribal loyalties which can serve as effective king-makers.
In the North African states, most notably Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, the trappings and forms of democracy will be followed. This process will not apply to Libya unless and until Gaddafi is removed--and the date for this event is impossible to predict beyond saying there is no reason for optimism. Democratic processes are less important in Mideast centers of protest: Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. But even in these states there will be eventual genuflections before this prime totem of Western affections.
Despite the observance of democratic forms, the substance of representative democracy will be conspicuous by its absence. There is a simple reason for this prediction. Democracy per se is irrelevant to the majority of those who sought the overthrow the established regimes while the exercise of actual democracy is not in the interests of the major contestants for power: the elite and the adherents of political Islam. Insofar as either contestant favors the appearance of democratic processes, it is only to ensure that some middle ground movement comes to power in order to assure that the inevitable failure to bring prosperity to the many will be blamed on the scapegoat so as to allow the real contest to be waged and won.
Western governments and elites would be best advised to discount any and all blather about democracy in action completely. At best elections and the other accoutrement of vox populi is a charade. At worst it will be a mechanism for hijacking power. Elections, after all, sanctified not only the coming to power of the Nazis in 1933 but assured the creation of the statist theocracy in Iran in 1979. To look at the paradigm of Pakistan, elections matter not, for regardless of what party or individuals win at the polls, the army still runs the show.
The army will run the show as well in Egypt or Tunisia or anywhere else that sees the old regime involuntarily retired. As in Pakistan--and Turkey before--the army is the final custodian of nationhood. It is the ultimate guarantor of internal tranquility as it is the defender of the state's borders. Whether openly or from the shadows of the barracks, the army will do the same in the forthcoming governments of North Africa and the Mideast. No government will be allowed to act in a way which is not approved in advance by the armed forces. At the same time, the armed forces will have both the will and ability to direct the government to undertake specified actions or policies.
The limitations which can be imposed by the military are understood by even the most ardent supporter of political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has implicitly acknowledged this in various fora. This recognition along with the strategic consideration of assuring Islam and Islamists are not tarred with the brush of economic policy failure is behind the MG's entering into coalition agreements with a secular party.
Taking a longer term view, the primacy of the armed forces will be countered by the adherents of political Islam through a program of education and indoctrination. This path has been blazed by the Pakistanis for the past thirty years with the result that the percentage of adherents of political Islam including that of the violent sort is higher among armed forces personnel, including company and field grade officers, than among the population as a whole. Given both the Pakistani paradigm and the power of current social and economic pressures abroad in the several "Arab Spring" countries, there is no reason to believe that the lengthy time period need be followed.
The armed forces of Egypt and Tunisia are well aware of the limits which the West will apply to the foreign and military policies of their states. They also understand the tools available to the West and the effectiveness of these tools. There will be no false bravado operating as there has been with Pakistan. The states of the "Arab Spring" have learned from Pakistan's mistakes as they have from Islamabad's successes.
The backlash against the super-wealthy currently underway in Egypt will slow and halt. The fact is the country, all the "Arab Spring" countries, need these hated rich folk. Even if it is true that one hundred percent of the wealthy became so as the result of the old regime's corruption, the wealth and skills of the rich business types are needed greatly for the country as a whole. The narrow elite will be constricted and placed on the defensive, but it will not be erased. As it will continue to exist, so also will it continue to seek and retain power.
The economically marginal will remain so regardless of the government and its promises. This reality will be exploited by the most extreme elements within the political Islamists. Practically, the results will be a co-option to the "left" which will be expressed primarily in foreign policy. Terror attacks against the "Zionist entity" will increase as will strident diplomatic and propaganda support for the deligitimatization campaign. Anti-Americanism will also ramp up markedly. The armed forces will try to keep the level of attacks below the threshold triggering a robust Israeli response but will fail ultimately.
The evermore vituperative attacks on the US provided these are not matched with terrorist operations, will motivate the American people and its representatives to disengage from the region pleading financial exigencies. This disengagement will exclude Israel. The result will be the worst of all possible worlds for the US--diminished influence with the governments of the "Arab Summer" while making the commitment to Israel more and more of the "blank check" variety.
With the high probability of Yemen becoming a collapsed state, the US will become more and more involved with the assorted tribes on the ground as a mechanism of self-defense. The US will wage an undeclared war with AQAP using civilian personnel and civilian controlled weapons systems. As a "deniable" set of operations run by CIA, the US will be able to act in a more discrete, small footprint way enlisting tribal assistance, using paramilitary officers and UAVs with a sufficiently low public profile not to excite public or congressional opprobrium. In fact, as the experience in Pakistan has shown, the opposite will be the case--widespread approval in both public and congress.
If the Libyan Affray ends in stalemate or a collapsed state or should the Algerian monolith once more show its underlying cracks, the US would rightly apprehend the use of the new opportunities by AQIM. The only viable American response would be similar to that emerging in Yemen--think of it as FATA 3.0. With a civilian agency in the lead and assets from JSOC available on an "as-needed" basis, the US would have the capacity to inhibit the rise of violent political Islam--or at least its ability to operate abroad.
The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have taught all but the most terminally obtuse American policy and decision makers all the critical lessons regarding "nation-building." We have learned for the umpteeth time that nations cannot be built by foreign intervention. This means that the US has only two choices when confronted by violent political Islam: ignore it and hope it goes away or target it with the most lethal and finely focused tools (both human and technological) that are available.
The inherent dilemmas posed by the uprisings of the "Arab Spring" should have shown American decision and policy makers that there is no one-size-fits-all approach possible. The internal dynamics of each uprising as well as the regional and global contextual differences means that each event must be examined as a one-off proposition. The realities of the game of nations also has demonstrated once again that national ideals, values, and norms must support well defined national interest. To state categorically that national interest is predicated on ideals, norms, and values may make for good sound bites but provides a poor basis for effective policy.
On the upside, we can be thankful for our years of frustrating experience with Pakistan. All that we have come to know and dislike about Pakistani politics and international relations has prepared us for the overriding realities which will exist for years to come as a consequence of a few fun filled and exciting weeks last spring. The folks in Foggy Bottom and at the EOB should be pulling out the archives detailing the last twenty-five or so years of our dealings with Islamabad. The contents will be hard to read, embarrassing even, but when the day is done, one can look up and say with genuine feeling, "Good training. Damn good training."
Thursday, May 19, 2011
One More Speech--One More Missed Opportunity
President Obama made his long anticipated "major" address regarding the Mideast and US policy in the region today over at Foggy Bottom. It reads well and probably sounded even better. Overall, the hot wash has to be a gigantic, "so what?"
The ever ready to cheer WaPo seems to be of that view in its instant report on reaction from the "Arab street." If the account is accurate and representative of the larger understanding--and there is strong contextual reason to believe it is--Obama made the wrong speech, or the right speech many months too late. Many of those quoted in the piece were disappointed that Obama did not get on his knees and grovel in apology for past American "sins." Others were bitterly disappointed that the US still seemed to base policy on American national interest rather than the delusions, dreams, and dilemmas of (fill in one or another Arab nationality). The majority though reflected a sentiment of American irrelevance to the events of the recent future, an irrelevance which will continue into the future.
Of the various local takes on the Obama speech, the one which is both most trenchant and germane to US policy is the one of American irrelevance. To a large extent the support or lack thereof for the demonstrators of Tunisia or Egypt was irrelevant to the participants--even if not to the outcome of the protests. The Egyptians see themselves as having been solely responsible for the downfall of Mubarak. There is no general willingness to see let alone accept the proposition that US pressure was the final cause of Mubarak's reluctant retirement to private life. This is a classic case of not letting mere facts get in the way of creating and enjoying a pleasant exercise in national mythology.
The same dynamic albeit to a lesser degree was in play earlier in Tunisia. When neither France nor the US was willing to do other than turn a back to the embattled dictatorship, the repressive fossil had no option but to board the next plane to Saudi Arabia. Arguably, had the US taken a firmer, more public line with respect to the ouster of Gaddafi early in the protests, the matter would have been settled quickly and at far less cost in both lives and long term instability in the country. Ditto on steroids as regards Yemen.
The blunt and painful truth is that the US was totally behind the curve in all the early manifestations of the "Arab Spring." Whether this was the result of bad intelligence, bureaucratic inertia, lack of political vision and will, shootouts between the realpolikers and the idealists, or simple presidential indifference (or, most likely, some combination of the foregoing) is immaterial. All that matters is the US was running far behind (to use one of Obama's favorite formulations,) "the arc of history."
As an old maxim of naval warfare dating back to the days of sail held, "a stern chase is a long chase." The US is engaged in a stern chase right now with respect to Mideast policy. The length (and success) of the chase is in no way helped by a rhetorical focus on democracy and the other desirable aspects of a modern, Western nation-state. Nor is the chase made any less lengthy or more probably successful by a mere genuflection before the alter of economic development--the one billion dollar debt forgiveness and companion infrastructure development package promised to Cairo.
While Mr Obama made an appropriate bow to the young Tunisian man whose self-inflicted death by self-immolation served to ignite the demonstrations which escalated to the totality of the "Arab Spring," he failed to mention the man's motivation--poverty, lack of employment opportunity for himself, a college graduate, and harassment by the police over petty regulations. The man did not die in pursuit of the vote. He was not a sacrifice to the abstracts of democracy or transparent governance. His life was not pledged to any cause beyond the base and degrading reality of impoverished, hopeless unemployment resulting from a badly performing economy.
The hopelessness of joblessness--particularly within the class of young people with post-secondary educations, a modicum of technological sophistication, an acquaintanceship with Western political, social, and cultural values--coupled with systems of polity and economy which were both inefficient and unresponsive caused the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt and beyond. The change that was demanded was not so much political as economic.
The gloss of politics was an add-on. It was added not only by the more sophisticated and Western oriented of the local protesters but also by the applauding Western observers. Western media, Western academics, Western pundits, the Western molders of public opinion took the monolithic view that the demonstrators were eager democrats one and all. The protesters were all seeking to gain a political and (implicitly at least) a social system based on those of the West.
While there were no doubt individuals in all the countries who held this goal, it is easily arguable that most simply wanted a better, more just, more efficient economy where jobs might be plentiful and remunerative, sufficient at least to provide for a standard of living such as to allow the raising of a family with a reasonable expectation that the children's future would be better than their parents' present. That goal was sufficient as both motivation and goal for the vast majority of those who braved bullets and arrest. Anything beyond would be nice, but not a requisite.
Many observers of the "Arab Spring" have confessed themselves to be reminded of the uprisings which scarred Europe in 1848. Others call up the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. In both analogies, the pundits and politicians have concurred the motive was the quest for democracy.
The Geek is reminded not of those two major periods of political tumult. Being a guy of small mind and limited imagination, the Geek is put in mind of Poland. Specifically the events of the "Arab Spring" have reminded him of the Poland of the days of Solidarity. It will be remembered that this precursor of the far more sweeping and dramatic changes of a decade later emerged not from the suppressed desire of Polish shipyard workers for a meaningful vote, but rather from pervasive economic discontent. The combination of inflation and stagnant or falling wages was the consequence of very poor decision making on the part of the authoritarian government.
The result of the economic pressures was a push back of labor along the lines of a classic sit down strike. The intent of the strikers was economic reform which would benefit them directly and substantially. The reaction of the government transmogrified the sit down strike to a semi-violent demand for broad gauge political reform. When the government belatedly brought some reform to bear along with repressive action, then and only then did the movement fade to the underground where it waited for the shift in political winds which finally came at decade's end.
Even now with promises of elections having been made by the "temporary" and "transitional" regimes, the root causes of economic discontent wait to be addressed. Elections without any change in the economy will bring only further tumult and may eventually result in the election of more extremest governments in both Tunisia and Egypt. In short, democracy and elections in and of themselves are not a guarantee of stability. Far more likely to bring this result is the development of a more open, more equitable economic system.
At the risk of belaboring the all-too-obvious, the Geek is constrained to point out that rigging elections and creating the illusion of democracy is far easier to accomplish than is the remaking of economies into some semblance of efficiency--particularly when the states involved lack the essentials for this. The creation and support of democracies which are economically dependent upon international handouts is no service to either the people of the effected country or the stability of state and region.
By ignoring the economic aspects of the unrest in order to pander to the feel-good emotions of supporting democracy and its relatives, Mr Obama missed making a real mark on the region. He missed the chance to get on the "arc of history." He missed the opportunity to regain some of America's lost influence in the Mideast. He made the stern chase both longer and less likely to produce an outcome beneficial to the locals and suiting our national and strategic interests there.
Of course, the nature and impact of the Obama speech should have been drearily predictable. The current Guy in the Oval has botched every foreign policy challenge--and opportunity--to come his way to date. Why should this hazy mass of mood music at Foggy Bottom have been any different?
The ever ready to cheer WaPo seems to be of that view in its instant report on reaction from the "Arab street." If the account is accurate and representative of the larger understanding--and there is strong contextual reason to believe it is--Obama made the wrong speech, or the right speech many months too late. Many of those quoted in the piece were disappointed that Obama did not get on his knees and grovel in apology for past American "sins." Others were bitterly disappointed that the US still seemed to base policy on American national interest rather than the delusions, dreams, and dilemmas of (fill in one or another Arab nationality). The majority though reflected a sentiment of American irrelevance to the events of the recent future, an irrelevance which will continue into the future.
Of the various local takes on the Obama speech, the one which is both most trenchant and germane to US policy is the one of American irrelevance. To a large extent the support or lack thereof for the demonstrators of Tunisia or Egypt was irrelevant to the participants--even if not to the outcome of the protests. The Egyptians see themselves as having been solely responsible for the downfall of Mubarak. There is no general willingness to see let alone accept the proposition that US pressure was the final cause of Mubarak's reluctant retirement to private life. This is a classic case of not letting mere facts get in the way of creating and enjoying a pleasant exercise in national mythology.
The same dynamic albeit to a lesser degree was in play earlier in Tunisia. When neither France nor the US was willing to do other than turn a back to the embattled dictatorship, the repressive fossil had no option but to board the next plane to Saudi Arabia. Arguably, had the US taken a firmer, more public line with respect to the ouster of Gaddafi early in the protests, the matter would have been settled quickly and at far less cost in both lives and long term instability in the country. Ditto on steroids as regards Yemen.
The blunt and painful truth is that the US was totally behind the curve in all the early manifestations of the "Arab Spring." Whether this was the result of bad intelligence, bureaucratic inertia, lack of political vision and will, shootouts between the realpolikers and the idealists, or simple presidential indifference (or, most likely, some combination of the foregoing) is immaterial. All that matters is the US was running far behind (to use one of Obama's favorite formulations,) "the arc of history."
As an old maxim of naval warfare dating back to the days of sail held, "a stern chase is a long chase." The US is engaged in a stern chase right now with respect to Mideast policy. The length (and success) of the chase is in no way helped by a rhetorical focus on democracy and the other desirable aspects of a modern, Western nation-state. Nor is the chase made any less lengthy or more probably successful by a mere genuflection before the alter of economic development--the one billion dollar debt forgiveness and companion infrastructure development package promised to Cairo.
While Mr Obama made an appropriate bow to the young Tunisian man whose self-inflicted death by self-immolation served to ignite the demonstrations which escalated to the totality of the "Arab Spring," he failed to mention the man's motivation--poverty, lack of employment opportunity for himself, a college graduate, and harassment by the police over petty regulations. The man did not die in pursuit of the vote. He was not a sacrifice to the abstracts of democracy or transparent governance. His life was not pledged to any cause beyond the base and degrading reality of impoverished, hopeless unemployment resulting from a badly performing economy.
The hopelessness of joblessness--particularly within the class of young people with post-secondary educations, a modicum of technological sophistication, an acquaintanceship with Western political, social, and cultural values--coupled with systems of polity and economy which were both inefficient and unresponsive caused the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt and beyond. The change that was demanded was not so much political as economic.
The gloss of politics was an add-on. It was added not only by the more sophisticated and Western oriented of the local protesters but also by the applauding Western observers. Western media, Western academics, Western pundits, the Western molders of public opinion took the monolithic view that the demonstrators were eager democrats one and all. The protesters were all seeking to gain a political and (implicitly at least) a social system based on those of the West.
While there were no doubt individuals in all the countries who held this goal, it is easily arguable that most simply wanted a better, more just, more efficient economy where jobs might be plentiful and remunerative, sufficient at least to provide for a standard of living such as to allow the raising of a family with a reasonable expectation that the children's future would be better than their parents' present. That goal was sufficient as both motivation and goal for the vast majority of those who braved bullets and arrest. Anything beyond would be nice, but not a requisite.
Many observers of the "Arab Spring" have confessed themselves to be reminded of the uprisings which scarred Europe in 1848. Others call up the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. In both analogies, the pundits and politicians have concurred the motive was the quest for democracy.
The Geek is reminded not of those two major periods of political tumult. Being a guy of small mind and limited imagination, the Geek is put in mind of Poland. Specifically the events of the "Arab Spring" have reminded him of the Poland of the days of Solidarity. It will be remembered that this precursor of the far more sweeping and dramatic changes of a decade later emerged not from the suppressed desire of Polish shipyard workers for a meaningful vote, but rather from pervasive economic discontent. The combination of inflation and stagnant or falling wages was the consequence of very poor decision making on the part of the authoritarian government.
The result of the economic pressures was a push back of labor along the lines of a classic sit down strike. The intent of the strikers was economic reform which would benefit them directly and substantially. The reaction of the government transmogrified the sit down strike to a semi-violent demand for broad gauge political reform. When the government belatedly brought some reform to bear along with repressive action, then and only then did the movement fade to the underground where it waited for the shift in political winds which finally came at decade's end.
Even now with promises of elections having been made by the "temporary" and "transitional" regimes, the root causes of economic discontent wait to be addressed. Elections without any change in the economy will bring only further tumult and may eventually result in the election of more extremest governments in both Tunisia and Egypt. In short, democracy and elections in and of themselves are not a guarantee of stability. Far more likely to bring this result is the development of a more open, more equitable economic system.
At the risk of belaboring the all-too-obvious, the Geek is constrained to point out that rigging elections and creating the illusion of democracy is far easier to accomplish than is the remaking of economies into some semblance of efficiency--particularly when the states involved lack the essentials for this. The creation and support of democracies which are economically dependent upon international handouts is no service to either the people of the effected country or the stability of state and region.
By ignoring the economic aspects of the unrest in order to pander to the feel-good emotions of supporting democracy and its relatives, Mr Obama missed making a real mark on the region. He missed the chance to get on the "arc of history." He missed the opportunity to regain some of America's lost influence in the Mideast. He made the stern chase both longer and less likely to produce an outcome beneficial to the locals and suiting our national and strategic interests there.
Of course, the nature and impact of the Obama speech should have been drearily predictable. The current Guy in the Oval has botched every foreign policy challenge--and opportunity--to come his way to date. Why should this hazy mass of mood music at Foggy Bottom have been any different?
Monday, May 16, 2011
Another Stop On The Grand Apology Tour? Let's Hope Not!
The new but somewhat battered and confused White House flack, Jay Carney, has assured one and all that The Great Orator Of The Oval will be making a "major" address regarding "the Middle East and US policy in the Middle East" in the near future. Well, it is about time considering more than a few important developments have taken place in the region in the past few weeks.
One can be excused for harboring fugitive fears that once more Mr Obama will genuflect before the overarching totem of Islam and accompany this deep bow with apologies for real or invented sins of omission or commission on the part of the US. If the upcoming speech is a replay or a riff from the Cairo Address, it will be an insult to both residents of the region and Americans alike.
There is a real need for a clear statement of declaratory policy for the region. The reality is that a declaratory policy which is unmistakable in nature and character is long overdue. A companion reality is simply that without such a statement there is no reason for any government or citizen in the Mideast to consider the US relevant to the challenges currently confronting them.
Several themes suggest themselves for incorporation in a unitary statement of American declaratory policy. These themes are central to the needs of the region--and they are of a nature such that effective action can be taken so as to turn rhetoric into practical effect.
The first of these is the centrality of Israel to American policy. This is needed for several reasons. First, it is an essential clearing of the diplomatic decks. All hands in the region as well as those outsiders who involve themselves in regional dynamics must know that the US has a deep and abiding alliance with Israel which is predicated upon both coinciding national and strategic interests and shared values, norms, and aspirations. It is essential that both the realpolitik and idealistic nature of the relationship be clearly put forward.
By putting the pragmatic and the idealistic on an equal footing, the nature of the US-Israel relationship will be more accurately appreciated by Arab leaders--and by Israelis generally. Israel is currently embarked on a dangerous voyage in the rough waters of religious zeal, and it is critical that Israelis understand that shared ideals, values, and norms are at the foundation of our relations. These shared factors were created during Israel's long years of Zionist socialism, years which emphasized democracy, tolerance, open and free speech, law which, while congruent with deeply held Jewish precepts, was nonetheless not religious in nature.
By putting the subject of the American-Israeli alliance front and center, Arab leaders can be assured that US policy is constant. The tacking and yawing of the Obama administration on Israel's domestic actions, particularly the settlements question, over the past year and a half served only to enhance Arab doubts about the consistency and predictability of American policy. If we could, as it appeared, feed Israel to the wolves over the settlement question, we could not be relied upon in other, more salient matters such as firmly opposing Iran's hegemonic and nuclear ambitions.
In the context of American-Israeli relations, it will be possible as well to make it clear that the US was not going to carry water for either Israel or Palestine in the "peace process." While we would do what we could in conjunction with other members of the Quartet to facilitate the process, when night falls it is essential that Israel and Palestine talk directly and meaningfully.
This implies that it is requisite for the American president to take a firm position on the new "unity" government invoked by the Palestinians. The presence of Hamas complicates the search for a meaningful and comprehensive agreement with Israel, but only with the inclusion of Hamas would any final understanding be binding on both major wings of Palestinian politics. A clear statement of what the US will accept would provide the necessary impetus for (1) Hamas making the choice between being a real government or continuing as an exponent of violent political Islam and total irredentism regarding Israel; and (2) giving the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority pause for thought regarding the pragmatic wisdom of the reconciliation agreement.
Next, the US will have to take a position finally on the "Arab Spring." This is much more difficult than dealing with Israel and the "peace process." No matter what stance the US adopts in its declaratory policy, some important constituency will be offended.
It is easy and very attractive to argue as so many well informed observers have that the US must come out four square for democracy. Making this approach even more appealing is the simple fact that not only do most people around the region expect the US to do so but most Americans tilt that way as well. Certainly the US cannot come out as a pillar of support for authoritarian regimes--even under the less than plausible euphemism of being in favor of "stability" or "order."
At the same time it is most inadvisable for the US to alienate the oil shiekdoms of the Gulf Co-operation Council. The members of the GCC are already suspicious regarding the steadfastness of the US given the way in which the administration pulled the throne out from under Hosni Mubarak's rump. It must be borne in mind that several of the GCC have already sought reinsurance to balance the potential loss of American patronage.
One alternative to the false dichotomy of democracy or authoritarianism is economic liberalization. Close examination of the causes of the revolts of the ""Arab Spring" shows that politics per se was less of a factor by far than was the combination of poverty, lack of economic opportunity, maldistribution of wealth, corruption, and governmental domination for personal benefit of the economy. All of the featured countries--even Syria--exhibit all the negatives of economic stagnation, corruption, and wealth skewing in favor of an elite joined hip and shoulder with the authoritarian regime.
An American declaratory policy--particularly if followed by convincing actions including development assistance (which, of course, will be opposed by the woolly mammoths of the Republican Party) will go a very long way to addressing the root causes of popular political disaffiliation in the Mideast and North Africa. It might be noted in this connection that should the US not take this route, the Trolls of Beijing will--and they can point to the success of their efforts in fostering prosperity without bringing the specter of democracy into the foreground.
Finally the president needs to address violent political Islam. Our position should be simple and easily understood. The US will use all of its instruments of soft persuasion to encourage governments to live up to all the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example. We will not, however, use force in this area. How countries and their people choose to order their internal affairs is their concern, not ours. We may deplore restrictions on religious practices, or subordinating women, or criminal justice systems which exact inordinate punishments, but we will not be sending Predators or the Marines to indicate our displeasure.
Should a government give refuge or support to a group practicing violence which harms us, our national interests, or those of our allies, then we will use all necessary force to abate the threat. There is no justification for violence, for attacks on civilians, for terror. No excuses. Zero tolerance. In the event that a terror attack can be traced to a particular government, then the US reserves the sole right to act. The bright, shining line is violence directed against civilians outside the country of terrorist origin. The US is indifferent as to motives, unconcerned as to ideological or theological rationales--only the act.
Three major points is enough for any speech, no matter how long. While there are many other matters of US policy in the Mideast which deserve clear declaration, these should wait a future moment. Carving out three clear areas and then following up on them with action is challenge enough for any administration, any country.
Or the president can just say we are sorry for whatever and go off for another round of golf. That would be easier.
One can be excused for harboring fugitive fears that once more Mr Obama will genuflect before the overarching totem of Islam and accompany this deep bow with apologies for real or invented sins of omission or commission on the part of the US. If the upcoming speech is a replay or a riff from the Cairo Address, it will be an insult to both residents of the region and Americans alike.
There is a real need for a clear statement of declaratory policy for the region. The reality is that a declaratory policy which is unmistakable in nature and character is long overdue. A companion reality is simply that without such a statement there is no reason for any government or citizen in the Mideast to consider the US relevant to the challenges currently confronting them.
Several themes suggest themselves for incorporation in a unitary statement of American declaratory policy. These themes are central to the needs of the region--and they are of a nature such that effective action can be taken so as to turn rhetoric into practical effect.
The first of these is the centrality of Israel to American policy. This is needed for several reasons. First, it is an essential clearing of the diplomatic decks. All hands in the region as well as those outsiders who involve themselves in regional dynamics must know that the US has a deep and abiding alliance with Israel which is predicated upon both coinciding national and strategic interests and shared values, norms, and aspirations. It is essential that both the realpolitik and idealistic nature of the relationship be clearly put forward.
By putting the pragmatic and the idealistic on an equal footing, the nature of the US-Israel relationship will be more accurately appreciated by Arab leaders--and by Israelis generally. Israel is currently embarked on a dangerous voyage in the rough waters of religious zeal, and it is critical that Israelis understand that shared ideals, values, and norms are at the foundation of our relations. These shared factors were created during Israel's long years of Zionist socialism, years which emphasized democracy, tolerance, open and free speech, law which, while congruent with deeply held Jewish precepts, was nonetheless not religious in nature.
By putting the subject of the American-Israeli alliance front and center, Arab leaders can be assured that US policy is constant. The tacking and yawing of the Obama administration on Israel's domestic actions, particularly the settlements question, over the past year and a half served only to enhance Arab doubts about the consistency and predictability of American policy. If we could, as it appeared, feed Israel to the wolves over the settlement question, we could not be relied upon in other, more salient matters such as firmly opposing Iran's hegemonic and nuclear ambitions.
In the context of American-Israeli relations, it will be possible as well to make it clear that the US was not going to carry water for either Israel or Palestine in the "peace process." While we would do what we could in conjunction with other members of the Quartet to facilitate the process, when night falls it is essential that Israel and Palestine talk directly and meaningfully.
This implies that it is requisite for the American president to take a firm position on the new "unity" government invoked by the Palestinians. The presence of Hamas complicates the search for a meaningful and comprehensive agreement with Israel, but only with the inclusion of Hamas would any final understanding be binding on both major wings of Palestinian politics. A clear statement of what the US will accept would provide the necessary impetus for (1) Hamas making the choice between being a real government or continuing as an exponent of violent political Islam and total irredentism regarding Israel; and (2) giving the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority pause for thought regarding the pragmatic wisdom of the reconciliation agreement.
Next, the US will have to take a position finally on the "Arab Spring." This is much more difficult than dealing with Israel and the "peace process." No matter what stance the US adopts in its declaratory policy, some important constituency will be offended.
It is easy and very attractive to argue as so many well informed observers have that the US must come out four square for democracy. Making this approach even more appealing is the simple fact that not only do most people around the region expect the US to do so but most Americans tilt that way as well. Certainly the US cannot come out as a pillar of support for authoritarian regimes--even under the less than plausible euphemism of being in favor of "stability" or "order."
At the same time it is most inadvisable for the US to alienate the oil shiekdoms of the Gulf Co-operation Council. The members of the GCC are already suspicious regarding the steadfastness of the US given the way in which the administration pulled the throne out from under Hosni Mubarak's rump. It must be borne in mind that several of the GCC have already sought reinsurance to balance the potential loss of American patronage.
One alternative to the false dichotomy of democracy or authoritarianism is economic liberalization. Close examination of the causes of the revolts of the ""Arab Spring" shows that politics per se was less of a factor by far than was the combination of poverty, lack of economic opportunity, maldistribution of wealth, corruption, and governmental domination for personal benefit of the economy. All of the featured countries--even Syria--exhibit all the negatives of economic stagnation, corruption, and wealth skewing in favor of an elite joined hip and shoulder with the authoritarian regime.
An American declaratory policy--particularly if followed by convincing actions including development assistance (which, of course, will be opposed by the woolly mammoths of the Republican Party) will go a very long way to addressing the root causes of popular political disaffiliation in the Mideast and North Africa. It might be noted in this connection that should the US not take this route, the Trolls of Beijing will--and they can point to the success of their efforts in fostering prosperity without bringing the specter of democracy into the foreground.
Finally the president needs to address violent political Islam. Our position should be simple and easily understood. The US will use all of its instruments of soft persuasion to encourage governments to live up to all the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example. We will not, however, use force in this area. How countries and their people choose to order their internal affairs is their concern, not ours. We may deplore restrictions on religious practices, or subordinating women, or criminal justice systems which exact inordinate punishments, but we will not be sending Predators or the Marines to indicate our displeasure.
Should a government give refuge or support to a group practicing violence which harms us, our national interests, or those of our allies, then we will use all necessary force to abate the threat. There is no justification for violence, for attacks on civilians, for terror. No excuses. Zero tolerance. In the event that a terror attack can be traced to a particular government, then the US reserves the sole right to act. The bright, shining line is violence directed against civilians outside the country of terrorist origin. The US is indifferent as to motives, unconcerned as to ideological or theological rationales--only the act.
Three major points is enough for any speech, no matter how long. While there are many other matters of US policy in the Mideast which deserve clear declaration, these should wait a future moment. Carving out three clear areas and then following up on them with action is challenge enough for any administration, any country.
Or the president can just say we are sorry for whatever and go off for another round of golf. That would be easier.
Saturday, April 16, 2011
What's Really Interesting In The Mideast
In the great swath of territory extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Himalayans, the areas of North Africa, the Mideast, and Northwest Asia, the big noise has centered on the "Arab Spring," The main focus of interest over the past few weeks has been the shooting war in Libya. It isn't the only place where bullets, bombs, and IEDs are flying, falling, and exploding, but it is the most recent. So, the media, the politicians, the international organizations, and We the People are not yet suffering from attention overload disorder.
Subsidiary points of fascination are found with the incarceration of the two Mubarak boys and the impending arrest of their aged and ailing dad, the ongoing face off in Yemen and the repressions in Bahrain and Syria. The hardy perennial of the Israeli-Palestinian Question has wilted of late save only when a refreshing burst of outrageous violence is perpetrated by one or another of the Zany Congeries of Gaza.
While Libya and the other specific "hot spots" of the Mideast get the spotlight, they are actually quite boring, lacking fundamental and long term interest. The future is not impossible to predict in broad outline. A form of semi-democracy will come to pass in Tunisia and Egypt--primarily to the benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood in the second case. Libya will enter the stasis of stalemate unless and until Gaddafi catches a bullet or two--or until he has a sudden desire to decamp with his tent and his billions to some country which is not a signatory to the Statute of Rome. Then Libya will simply be in stasis, a set of more or less rival tribes in search of a common center--and not finding it.
In Yemen it really will not matter if or when Saleh departs. The place is either (1) a failed state or (2) a hollow one with operational dominance residing elsewhere. (Of this more in a moment or two.)
Bashir al-Assad will stay in power. A judicious mix of reforms more apparent than real plus repression will assure the Baathist regime stays where it has been for the past half century and more. However, the processes of reform and repression loop directly into the really interesting dynamics of the Mideast.
The same is true with respect to Bahrain. There is little to no chance of a sea change in the structure of authority in the kingdom. However, the details of how the game plays out, including the degree to which Bahrain becomes one more hollow state, relate directly to the really interesting dynamic at work in the Mideast.
The only matter of fundamental interest, fundamental importance, and potential long term significance currently extant in the Mideast is not the usual suspect--the Israeli-Palestinian Question--but rather the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This cold war, which has intensified continually for the past twenty years and with a high delta V in recent weeks, impacts directly and substantially the state of play in Yemen, the future of Bahrain, the direction of the Assad government--and the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian Question. It also exercises profound effect upon the internal affairs of Lebanon, the direction of Egyptian Islamist politics, and a host of other inter- and intra-state affairs.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have never been known for their close and amiable relationship. Part of the reason may be found in religion--Shiite Iran versus Wahhabist Sunni Saudi Arabia. Part of the reason has been purely geopolitical--which country will be the front porch dog in the Gulf region and exercise a large measure of operational dominance over the Mideast generally.
Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the rivalry has grown in a major way. The mullahs and ayatollahs are True Believers for whom the demands of Shia beliefs powerfully enhance the interests of state.
Iraq at one time played a very important role as a buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as being a force of its own acting to prevent regional hegemony by either Iran or the Kingdom. Those days ended with the American invasion.
The overthrow of Hosni Mubarak took another restraining player off the board. As the most populous Arab state with a long record of exercising leadership in the often fractured Arab world, Egypt served to both moderate Saudi ambitions for regional hegemony and buttress Saudi opposition to Iranian efforts in the direction of dominance.
The removal of both Iraq and Egypt has served to clear the decks for a more direct and higher stakes confrontation between Tehran and Riyadh. From the perspective of the ancient rulers of the Kingdom, the policies of the US have become a marker of despair. The reaction of King Abdullah and his closest relatives has not been anger so much as terminal frustration.
For years (decades would be more accurate) the Saudis have tried repeatedly to convince the US that Iran is the major threat to the region--and not Israel. Insofar as peace between the Israelis and Palestinians was an issue, it was such simply because the continued conflict served to advance Iranian interests. As far back as 2002 when the Saudis proposed peace and normalization of relations between all of the Arab League states and Israel in return for a peace agreement predicated upon Israel observing the pre-Six Day War borders, the justification offered to their American interlocutors was that of pulling Iran's fangs.
To the present day the position of the Kingdom on the Israeli-Palestinian Question is dictated by the Iranian strategic threat. This implies strongly that the Kingdom would accept significant modifications of the 2002 proposal. King Abdullah and company would, for example, be quite willing to see territorial modification by agreed upon land swaps, drop any Palestinian "right of return," and even accept a limited Israeli security presence along the Jordan valley. The comparative inflexibility of the Obama administration's stance on the "settlements" issue both surprised and disappointed the Saudis who were actually somewhat optimistic when the direct bi-lateral talks commenced all those months ago.
It is probable that the Saudis have been equally frustrated by the American position on Syria during the W. Bush administration and its Obama successor. From the viewpoint of Riyadh, the US pushed Syria into the Iranian embrace. It is self-evident that the fit between secularist Syria and Shiite Iran is both poor and unnatural. It is a marriage forced by the American pressure for isolation.
The sub-text of the unrest in Syria and the Assad government's responses to that unrest hints at a backroom battle between the Iranians and the Saudis. There is no doubt but the Iranians have provided assistance in the repression. The bouts of reformist rhetoric from Bashir including his most recent promise to end the forty-eight year long "state of emergency" sometime next week point to Saudi influence and (in highest probability) blandishments.
Much of Iran's status as an ally of Syria has been bought and paid for. Syria has a desperate need for infusions of cash on a scale that economically strapped Iran can no longer meet. The infinitely deep pockets of the Kingdom would have no such difficulty. Bashir is a very pragmatic and practical man who comes with instincts which push him in the direction of reform. He is also very much afraid of religious extremism. If (and this is a big if) the Saudis can restrain their predilection to export Wahhabism along with their cash, it would be far safer for Bashir to cozy up with the Kingdom than to continue his current flirtation with the ayatollahs.
The Baathists of Syria are very well aware that Wahhabism brings extremism as desert rains bring fast blooming flowers. As a result the Syrians will be very, very cautious about what may come along with any Saudi assistance. It is probable given the slight moves to reform at home made by King Abdullah that the Saudis are far more willing to disconnect Wahhabism from policy based aid now than in past years.
The Saudi monarchy has been watching American policy regarding Bahrain with the closest of scrutiny. After the US moved to help ease Hosni Mubarak from power, alarm bells went off throughout the Kingdom. If the US appears to be doing the same in Bahrain, there is no doubt but the Kingdom will simply take the place over. Bahrain is too strategically important to the Kingdom to allow otherwise. Riyadh is convinced (rightly) that Iran is neck deep in the unrest among the Shiite majority in Bahrain and will not sit back thumbs twiddling while Iran moves in. This is as unlikely as Riyadh kicking back and chilling out as Iranian agents move around freely in the Shiite (and oil) heavy Eastern Province.
The movers and shakers of the Kingdom are also dismayed by the seeming indifference of the US to Iranian efforts in subversion in countries as far removed as Afghanistan and Indonesia, Yemen and the Philippines. It boggles the Saudis collective mind that the US has not moved to counter even the Iranian's demonstrated efforts in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. If we can view that with equanimity, we must be totally out to lunch regarding the hostile nature of Iran everywhere in the world.
The greatest anxiety and distrust of the US revolves around the bootless American campaign to prevent the Iranian development of an atomic bomb. If Iran acquires a nuclear capability or even a credible breakout capacity, it is over for Saudi Arabia--game, set, and match. The most rudimentary nuclear arsenal either in hand or on the close horizon gives Iran regional hegemonic status. It would also make Iran immune to pressure generally as has been the case with nuclear capable Pakistan.
US policy under President Obama has been irresolute beyond the level of rhetoric. As far as the Kingdom is concerned, the purchasing of weapons is a prudent move but not one which will secure Saudi Arabia against the Iranian threat or achieve the hegemonic status desired by King Abdullah and the rest of the family. Even selling our most advanced ballistic missile defense system would be no more than one more prudential move. The ultimate interests and goals of the Kingdom demand a neutralization of the Iranian nuclear program. This is not likely to occur with the current administration, or so the Saudis have concluded.
The Saudis have acted on this conclusion recently. The House of Saud has made outreach moves toward the Trolls of Beijing as well as the Guys in the Kremlin. Such a demarche would have been unthinkable even a short year ago. The weakness of the current administration has given the Saudis no choice but to look for a strong horse wherever such might be found.
While the Saudis have sought either alternative strong horses or to man up the Obama administration, the Iranians have become more certain in their own success. This is not simply reflected in the typically overblown oratory of Ahmedinejad and others but in the increasing activity of Iranian agents of influence in Iraq, in Yemen, in Indonesia, and in the Central Asian Republics. It has been reflected as well in the enhanced flow of equipment to Taliban. And in the tighter connections with Turkey. And Venezuela. And elsewhere.
The correlation of forces (to use that fine old Soviet term) currently favors Iran in the cold war with Saudi Arabia. The House of Saud knows this. It knows the reason as well. The reason is simple. It can be expressed in one word: Obama.
Subsidiary points of fascination are found with the incarceration of the two Mubarak boys and the impending arrest of their aged and ailing dad, the ongoing face off in Yemen and the repressions in Bahrain and Syria. The hardy perennial of the Israeli-Palestinian Question has wilted of late save only when a refreshing burst of outrageous violence is perpetrated by one or another of the Zany Congeries of Gaza.
While Libya and the other specific "hot spots" of the Mideast get the spotlight, they are actually quite boring, lacking fundamental and long term interest. The future is not impossible to predict in broad outline. A form of semi-democracy will come to pass in Tunisia and Egypt--primarily to the benefit of the Muslim Brotherhood in the second case. Libya will enter the stasis of stalemate unless and until Gaddafi catches a bullet or two--or until he has a sudden desire to decamp with his tent and his billions to some country which is not a signatory to the Statute of Rome. Then Libya will simply be in stasis, a set of more or less rival tribes in search of a common center--and not finding it.
In Yemen it really will not matter if or when Saleh departs. The place is either (1) a failed state or (2) a hollow one with operational dominance residing elsewhere. (Of this more in a moment or two.)
Bashir al-Assad will stay in power. A judicious mix of reforms more apparent than real plus repression will assure the Baathist regime stays where it has been for the past half century and more. However, the processes of reform and repression loop directly into the really interesting dynamics of the Mideast.
The same is true with respect to Bahrain. There is little to no chance of a sea change in the structure of authority in the kingdom. However, the details of how the game plays out, including the degree to which Bahrain becomes one more hollow state, relate directly to the really interesting dynamic at work in the Mideast.
The only matter of fundamental interest, fundamental importance, and potential long term significance currently extant in the Mideast is not the usual suspect--the Israeli-Palestinian Question--but rather the cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This cold war, which has intensified continually for the past twenty years and with a high delta V in recent weeks, impacts directly and substantially the state of play in Yemen, the future of Bahrain, the direction of the Assad government--and the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian Question. It also exercises profound effect upon the internal affairs of Lebanon, the direction of Egyptian Islamist politics, and a host of other inter- and intra-state affairs.
Iran and Saudi Arabia have never been known for their close and amiable relationship. Part of the reason may be found in religion--Shiite Iran versus Wahhabist Sunni Saudi Arabia. Part of the reason has been purely geopolitical--which country will be the front porch dog in the Gulf region and exercise a large measure of operational dominance over the Mideast generally.
Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the rivalry has grown in a major way. The mullahs and ayatollahs are True Believers for whom the demands of Shia beliefs powerfully enhance the interests of state.
Iraq at one time played a very important role as a buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as being a force of its own acting to prevent regional hegemony by either Iran or the Kingdom. Those days ended with the American invasion.
The overthrow of Hosni Mubarak took another restraining player off the board. As the most populous Arab state with a long record of exercising leadership in the often fractured Arab world, Egypt served to both moderate Saudi ambitions for regional hegemony and buttress Saudi opposition to Iranian efforts in the direction of dominance.
The removal of both Iraq and Egypt has served to clear the decks for a more direct and higher stakes confrontation between Tehran and Riyadh. From the perspective of the ancient rulers of the Kingdom, the policies of the US have become a marker of despair. The reaction of King Abdullah and his closest relatives has not been anger so much as terminal frustration.
For years (decades would be more accurate) the Saudis have tried repeatedly to convince the US that Iran is the major threat to the region--and not Israel. Insofar as peace between the Israelis and Palestinians was an issue, it was such simply because the continued conflict served to advance Iranian interests. As far back as 2002 when the Saudis proposed peace and normalization of relations between all of the Arab League states and Israel in return for a peace agreement predicated upon Israel observing the pre-Six Day War borders, the justification offered to their American interlocutors was that of pulling Iran's fangs.
To the present day the position of the Kingdom on the Israeli-Palestinian Question is dictated by the Iranian strategic threat. This implies strongly that the Kingdom would accept significant modifications of the 2002 proposal. King Abdullah and company would, for example, be quite willing to see territorial modification by agreed upon land swaps, drop any Palestinian "right of return," and even accept a limited Israeli security presence along the Jordan valley. The comparative inflexibility of the Obama administration's stance on the "settlements" issue both surprised and disappointed the Saudis who were actually somewhat optimistic when the direct bi-lateral talks commenced all those months ago.
It is probable that the Saudis have been equally frustrated by the American position on Syria during the W. Bush administration and its Obama successor. From the viewpoint of Riyadh, the US pushed Syria into the Iranian embrace. It is self-evident that the fit between secularist Syria and Shiite Iran is both poor and unnatural. It is a marriage forced by the American pressure for isolation.
The sub-text of the unrest in Syria and the Assad government's responses to that unrest hints at a backroom battle between the Iranians and the Saudis. There is no doubt but the Iranians have provided assistance in the repression. The bouts of reformist rhetoric from Bashir including his most recent promise to end the forty-eight year long "state of emergency" sometime next week point to Saudi influence and (in highest probability) blandishments.
Much of Iran's status as an ally of Syria has been bought and paid for. Syria has a desperate need for infusions of cash on a scale that economically strapped Iran can no longer meet. The infinitely deep pockets of the Kingdom would have no such difficulty. Bashir is a very pragmatic and practical man who comes with instincts which push him in the direction of reform. He is also very much afraid of religious extremism. If (and this is a big if) the Saudis can restrain their predilection to export Wahhabism along with their cash, it would be far safer for Bashir to cozy up with the Kingdom than to continue his current flirtation with the ayatollahs.
The Baathists of Syria are very well aware that Wahhabism brings extremism as desert rains bring fast blooming flowers. As a result the Syrians will be very, very cautious about what may come along with any Saudi assistance. It is probable given the slight moves to reform at home made by King Abdullah that the Saudis are far more willing to disconnect Wahhabism from policy based aid now than in past years.
The Saudi monarchy has been watching American policy regarding Bahrain with the closest of scrutiny. After the US moved to help ease Hosni Mubarak from power, alarm bells went off throughout the Kingdom. If the US appears to be doing the same in Bahrain, there is no doubt but the Kingdom will simply take the place over. Bahrain is too strategically important to the Kingdom to allow otherwise. Riyadh is convinced (rightly) that Iran is neck deep in the unrest among the Shiite majority in Bahrain and will not sit back thumbs twiddling while Iran moves in. This is as unlikely as Riyadh kicking back and chilling out as Iranian agents move around freely in the Shiite (and oil) heavy Eastern Province.
The movers and shakers of the Kingdom are also dismayed by the seeming indifference of the US to Iranian efforts in subversion in countries as far removed as Afghanistan and Indonesia, Yemen and the Philippines. It boggles the Saudis collective mind that the US has not moved to counter even the Iranian's demonstrated efforts in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. If we can view that with equanimity, we must be totally out to lunch regarding the hostile nature of Iran everywhere in the world.
The greatest anxiety and distrust of the US revolves around the bootless American campaign to prevent the Iranian development of an atomic bomb. If Iran acquires a nuclear capability or even a credible breakout capacity, it is over for Saudi Arabia--game, set, and match. The most rudimentary nuclear arsenal either in hand or on the close horizon gives Iran regional hegemonic status. It would also make Iran immune to pressure generally as has been the case with nuclear capable Pakistan.
US policy under President Obama has been irresolute beyond the level of rhetoric. As far as the Kingdom is concerned, the purchasing of weapons is a prudent move but not one which will secure Saudi Arabia against the Iranian threat or achieve the hegemonic status desired by King Abdullah and the rest of the family. Even selling our most advanced ballistic missile defense system would be no more than one more prudential move. The ultimate interests and goals of the Kingdom demand a neutralization of the Iranian nuclear program. This is not likely to occur with the current administration, or so the Saudis have concluded.
The Saudis have acted on this conclusion recently. The House of Saud has made outreach moves toward the Trolls of Beijing as well as the Guys in the Kremlin. Such a demarche would have been unthinkable even a short year ago. The weakness of the current administration has given the Saudis no choice but to look for a strong horse wherever such might be found.
While the Saudis have sought either alternative strong horses or to man up the Obama administration, the Iranians have become more certain in their own success. This is not simply reflected in the typically overblown oratory of Ahmedinejad and others but in the increasing activity of Iranian agents of influence in Iraq, in Yemen, in Indonesia, and in the Central Asian Republics. It has been reflected as well in the enhanced flow of equipment to Taliban. And in the tighter connections with Turkey. And Venezuela. And elsewhere.
The correlation of forces (to use that fine old Soviet term) currently favors Iran in the cold war with Saudi Arabia. The House of Saud knows this. It knows the reason as well. The reason is simple. It can be expressed in one word: Obama.
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