The new but somewhat battered and confused White House flack, Jay Carney, has assured one and all that The Great Orator Of The Oval will be making a "major" address regarding "the Middle East and US policy in the Middle East" in the near future. Well, it is about time considering more than a few important developments have taken place in the region in the past few weeks.
One can be excused for harboring fugitive fears that once more Mr Obama will genuflect before the overarching totem of Islam and accompany this deep bow with apologies for real or invented sins of omission or commission on the part of the US. If the upcoming speech is a replay or a riff from the Cairo Address, it will be an insult to both residents of the region and Americans alike.
There is a real need for a clear statement of declaratory policy for the region. The reality is that a declaratory policy which is unmistakable in nature and character is long overdue. A companion reality is simply that without such a statement there is no reason for any government or citizen in the Mideast to consider the US relevant to the challenges currently confronting them.
Several themes suggest themselves for incorporation in a unitary statement of American declaratory policy. These themes are central to the needs of the region--and they are of a nature such that effective action can be taken so as to turn rhetoric into practical effect.
The first of these is the centrality of Israel to American policy. This is needed for several reasons. First, it is an essential clearing of the diplomatic decks. All hands in the region as well as those outsiders who involve themselves in regional dynamics must know that the US has a deep and abiding alliance with Israel which is predicated upon both coinciding national and strategic interests and shared values, norms, and aspirations. It is essential that both the realpolitik and idealistic nature of the relationship be clearly put forward.
By putting the pragmatic and the idealistic on an equal footing, the nature of the US-Israel relationship will be more accurately appreciated by Arab leaders--and by Israelis generally. Israel is currently embarked on a dangerous voyage in the rough waters of religious zeal, and it is critical that Israelis understand that shared ideals, values, and norms are at the foundation of our relations. These shared factors were created during Israel's long years of Zionist socialism, years which emphasized democracy, tolerance, open and free speech, law which, while congruent with deeply held Jewish precepts, was nonetheless not religious in nature.
By putting the subject of the American-Israeli alliance front and center, Arab leaders can be assured that US policy is constant. The tacking and yawing of the Obama administration on Israel's domestic actions, particularly the settlements question, over the past year and a half served only to enhance Arab doubts about the consistency and predictability of American policy. If we could, as it appeared, feed Israel to the wolves over the settlement question, we could not be relied upon in other, more salient matters such as firmly opposing Iran's hegemonic and nuclear ambitions.
In the context of American-Israeli relations, it will be possible as well to make it clear that the US was not going to carry water for either Israel or Palestine in the "peace process." While we would do what we could in conjunction with other members of the Quartet to facilitate the process, when night falls it is essential that Israel and Palestine talk directly and meaningfully.
This implies that it is requisite for the American president to take a firm position on the new "unity" government invoked by the Palestinians. The presence of Hamas complicates the search for a meaningful and comprehensive agreement with Israel, but only with the inclusion of Hamas would any final understanding be binding on both major wings of Palestinian politics. A clear statement of what the US will accept would provide the necessary impetus for (1) Hamas making the choice between being a real government or continuing as an exponent of violent political Islam and total irredentism regarding Israel; and (2) giving the Fatah dominated Palestinian Authority pause for thought regarding the pragmatic wisdom of the reconciliation agreement.
Next, the US will have to take a position finally on the "Arab Spring." This is much more difficult than dealing with Israel and the "peace process." No matter what stance the US adopts in its declaratory policy, some important constituency will be offended.
It is easy and very attractive to argue as so many well informed observers have that the US must come out four square for democracy. Making this approach even more appealing is the simple fact that not only do most people around the region expect the US to do so but most Americans tilt that way as well. Certainly the US cannot come out as a pillar of support for authoritarian regimes--even under the less than plausible euphemism of being in favor of "stability" or "order."
At the same time it is most inadvisable for the US to alienate the oil shiekdoms of the Gulf Co-operation Council. The members of the GCC are already suspicious regarding the steadfastness of the US given the way in which the administration pulled the throne out from under Hosni Mubarak's rump. It must be borne in mind that several of the GCC have already sought reinsurance to balance the potential loss of American patronage.
One alternative to the false dichotomy of democracy or authoritarianism is economic liberalization. Close examination of the causes of the revolts of the ""Arab Spring" shows that politics per se was less of a factor by far than was the combination of poverty, lack of economic opportunity, maldistribution of wealth, corruption, and governmental domination for personal benefit of the economy. All of the featured countries--even Syria--exhibit all the negatives of economic stagnation, corruption, and wealth skewing in favor of an elite joined hip and shoulder with the authoritarian regime.
An American declaratory policy--particularly if followed by convincing actions including development assistance (which, of course, will be opposed by the woolly mammoths of the Republican Party) will go a very long way to addressing the root causes of popular political disaffiliation in the Mideast and North Africa. It might be noted in this connection that should the US not take this route, the Trolls of Beijing will--and they can point to the success of their efforts in fostering prosperity without bringing the specter of democracy into the foreground.
Finally the president needs to address violent political Islam. Our position should be simple and easily understood. The US will use all of its instruments of soft persuasion to encourage governments to live up to all the requirements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example. We will not, however, use force in this area. How countries and their people choose to order their internal affairs is their concern, not ours. We may deplore restrictions on religious practices, or subordinating women, or criminal justice systems which exact inordinate punishments, but we will not be sending Predators or the Marines to indicate our displeasure.
Should a government give refuge or support to a group practicing violence which harms us, our national interests, or those of our allies, then we will use all necessary force to abate the threat. There is no justification for violence, for attacks on civilians, for terror. No excuses. Zero tolerance. In the event that a terror attack can be traced to a particular government, then the US reserves the sole right to act. The bright, shining line is violence directed against civilians outside the country of terrorist origin. The US is indifferent as to motives, unconcerned as to ideological or theological rationales--only the act.
Three major points is enough for any speech, no matter how long. While there are many other matters of US policy in the Mideast which deserve clear declaration, these should wait a future moment. Carving out three clear areas and then following up on them with action is challenge enough for any administration, any country.
Or the president can just say we are sorry for whatever and go off for another round of golf. That would be easier.
Showing posts with label Arab And Muslim States. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arab And Muslim States. Show all posts
Monday, May 16, 2011
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Let Somebody Else Do It
Secretary of Defense Gates' message was simple, blunt, and to the point. The US will do only those few things which other countries lack the capacity to do. We will provide midair refueling, surveillance, and reconnaissance, some forms of communication, and intelligence. We will not provide weapons or training to the anti-government forces in Libya. In his view there are numerous other states which can do these tasks just as there are others who can patrol the no-fly zone or provide strike sorties intended to protect civilians from harm.
Leaving aside the more than slightly evident tensions between protecting civilians from all harm and the needs of the anti-Gaddafi forces for close air support and the accompanying sour sounds of hypocrisy, the position staked out by Dr Gates in testimony today showed a coldly realistic understanding of what the US can and cannot, should and should not do in the turgid turbulence of Libya. The most realistic part of the Gates' view is its protective stance. The limits placed on the American contribution to the "international community's" effort to immunize civilians from the effects of living in a war zone were clearly intended to protect against both mission creep of the sort which destroyed the American effort in Afghanistan as well as to shield Washington from the inevitable charges coming from the Kremlin, the Forbidden City, and elsewhere to the effect that the strictures of the relevant UN Security Council resolution were being transgressed.
There may be mission creep; there will be violation of the spirit and letter of Resolution 1973, but the US will not be a party to either. This may not be the most courageous policy. It most assuredly is not in the damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead! tradition of American war fighting or diplomacy. It is, however, what is needed right now in the context of both Libya and the wider Mideast political tumult. The view espoused by Gates in such clear and unmistakable fashion serves to give the US needed distance, needed time. Both are necessary if the US is to formulate a genuine policy for facing the new political landscape of the region.
The Gates' formulation carries with it a very large downside. This was recognized quite specifically by both the Defense Secretary and Admiral Mullen. The downside is simply that when night falls Gaddafi may well still be in power. The prospect of a stalemate, a de facto division between Cyrenaica and the rest of Libya, is real. So is an outcome in which there is but one Libya under the direction of Gaddafi.
Either of these two outcomes would expose both Libyans and the world to the prospect of Gadaffi 1.0, the Brother Leader who never met a terrorist group he didn't want to fund, the international mischief maker whose wake was marked by downed airliners, blown up buildings, corpses, and failed states. Whether for a few months or a handful of years, the restoration of the old model Gaddafi would be the worst of bad news for the people of the world. The continuation in power of Brother Leader would be the worst conceivable development for Libyans, upon whose bodies the full fury of the man's sense of betrayal would lash.
Yet, in the real world, what alternative does the US have right now? One can construct alternatives, but the least-worst outcome sort would have had to have been put into place weeks before the passage of the UN Resolution and the imposition of the no-fly/civilian protection zones. Having come to the Libyan game too late and in an inherently overly limited way, the problem of constructing alternative policies to the one outlined by Robert Gates becomes far more problematical.
The problematical nature of the alternatives arise from the unique schizophrenia which afflicts the Arab mind. It is a schizoid world view which was seen quite clearly in Iraq. And, it has leaked around the edges of the political debates in recent weeks.
One prong of the schizophrenic view comes from the evident fact that the Libyan insurgents cannot fight in an effective, coordinated fashion. It is not that the government forces loyal to Gaddafi are all that much better trained or equipped than the rebels for they are not.
(In this context it is worthwhile to spend some time checking out the immense amount of imagery available. There is no essential difference between the equipment deployed by either the Gaddafi or rebel forces. Nor is there much apparent difference in competence in military basics from digging in on the defense to the combination of fire and movement on the attack.)
The only essential difference between rebels and government is that the latter but not the former possesses a command structure. Without a command structure, a coherent table of organization, none of the other features of military organization, communications, logistics, tactics, operational doctrine, are relevant. The presence or absence of a command structure makes it possible for a numerically inferior force to beat its superior. It allows a force comprised of men who are not a race of natural warriors (it there is such a critter) to defeat one comprised of heroes. Command is all in war.
Well, if not exactly all, command, the capacity to control violence from a central location with a fair certainty that orders will be obeyed, is the sine qua non of effective war fighting. The rebels have none. The Gaddafi forces have some. Therein lies the difference--and what a difference is clear from the imagery of the rabble running from a few distant incoming rockets or artillery shells.
There is nothing that can be done in a short span of time to address the critical lack of command in the rebel forces. The lack is not simply one of training or inexperience. Rather, the absence of command structure is organic to the society which produced the insurgents.
As a consequence the ability of outside "donors" be they NATO or Arab League to make up the deficiency is zero. Supplying weapons will not address the absence of command. Ditto training. The only way command and its concomitants, control and communication, could be provided in a timely fashion would be for some outside combat force to take over the ground operations. Sure, some Libyans could be attached to the "foreign" combat units, but they would be simply there for the optics.
In the alternative, the US and other outsiders can hope that the charade of the no-fly/civilian protection zones can be continued long enough for the insurgents to realize they must develop and put into effective practice their own command, control, and communication system--that they must gain a genuine command structure which is generally conceded to be legitimate in the eyes of the fighters it commands and controls.
The US and other countries may well introduce black and special operations forces both civilian and military, but this alone will not provide sufficient command capacity to offset the advantage enjoyed by the Gaddafi units in a timely enough fashion. Rather, the employment of these genera of capacities will provide some aid to the insurgents by allowing better coordination of air strikes and ground movement. This will enhance the staying power of the insurgents so as to provide time for these people to discover they need a command structure.
Of course, this brings yet another risk for the US and the other Western powers. The individuals most likely to realize that they need a command structure are those with prior experience fighting against the US and its allies in Iraq.
(After all, if these Fearless and Mighty Men of Islam are at all honest and possessed of a capacity for self-examination, they have come to understand that the single greatest reason the Bearded Warriors of the Prophet (PBUH) had their collective posteriors kicked by the infidels and apostates was the greater effectiveness of the infidel and apostate command, control, and communication systems.)
This means the advocates of violent political Islam will come to greater prominence in the effort to topple Gaddafi with results in the post-conflict environment not likely to promote Western norms, values, or interests. The Gates' approach coupled with the indigenous failings of the Libyan insurgents will prove harmful to our longer term interests in the country and the region.
However, we have no real alternative. Remember the Arab schizophrenia? The other prong of this world view arises from the antipathy Arab Muslims have for the notion of infidels killing Arab Muslims. As the pretended(?) horror expressed by the Arab League at the idea that Arab Muslims were dying downrange as the US and others imposed the no-fly/civilian protection zone showed dramatically, there is a genuine loathing aroused in the Arab mind at the killing of good Arab Muslims (even soldiers) by the infidels.
If the Americans or the British or the French put troops on the ground and these troops actually kill Gaddafi's fighters, the hatred will be both real and explosive. There would be a replay of the dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no way around that. It is an emotional reality which cannot be denied. It can only be exploited. And, exploited it would be. Not simply by AQIM but by every advocate of violent political Islam in the world. The wave of fear, loathing, and hatred would be ridden by others as well, by Muslim "moderates" eager to keep their heads above the political tide, by non-Muslims who are rivals, even enemies of the US and its Western allies.
That is why we cannot simply go in and square matters away. Matters would refuse to be squared away. The emotional sensitivities of Arab Muslims and their capacity to deny realities other than those conditioned by a narrative of religion would assure what should have been a simple, direct, and straight forward ending of a very nasty regime and its death squads would transmogrify into one more protracted war of religion and identity.
The Libyan Question admits of no good answer. The approach espoused by Secretary Gates is no more and no less than the least-worst way of dealing with the Question while honestly admitting that we have no capacity to answer it.
Leaving aside the more than slightly evident tensions between protecting civilians from all harm and the needs of the anti-Gaddafi forces for close air support and the accompanying sour sounds of hypocrisy, the position staked out by Dr Gates in testimony today showed a coldly realistic understanding of what the US can and cannot, should and should not do in the turgid turbulence of Libya. The most realistic part of the Gates' view is its protective stance. The limits placed on the American contribution to the "international community's" effort to immunize civilians from the effects of living in a war zone were clearly intended to protect against both mission creep of the sort which destroyed the American effort in Afghanistan as well as to shield Washington from the inevitable charges coming from the Kremlin, the Forbidden City, and elsewhere to the effect that the strictures of the relevant UN Security Council resolution were being transgressed.
There may be mission creep; there will be violation of the spirit and letter of Resolution 1973, but the US will not be a party to either. This may not be the most courageous policy. It most assuredly is not in the damn-the-torpedoes-full-speed-ahead! tradition of American war fighting or diplomacy. It is, however, what is needed right now in the context of both Libya and the wider Mideast political tumult. The view espoused by Gates in such clear and unmistakable fashion serves to give the US needed distance, needed time. Both are necessary if the US is to formulate a genuine policy for facing the new political landscape of the region.
The Gates' formulation carries with it a very large downside. This was recognized quite specifically by both the Defense Secretary and Admiral Mullen. The downside is simply that when night falls Gaddafi may well still be in power. The prospect of a stalemate, a de facto division between Cyrenaica and the rest of Libya, is real. So is an outcome in which there is but one Libya under the direction of Gaddafi.
Either of these two outcomes would expose both Libyans and the world to the prospect of Gadaffi 1.0, the Brother Leader who never met a terrorist group he didn't want to fund, the international mischief maker whose wake was marked by downed airliners, blown up buildings, corpses, and failed states. Whether for a few months or a handful of years, the restoration of the old model Gaddafi would be the worst of bad news for the people of the world. The continuation in power of Brother Leader would be the worst conceivable development for Libyans, upon whose bodies the full fury of the man's sense of betrayal would lash.
Yet, in the real world, what alternative does the US have right now? One can construct alternatives, but the least-worst outcome sort would have had to have been put into place weeks before the passage of the UN Resolution and the imposition of the no-fly/civilian protection zones. Having come to the Libyan game too late and in an inherently overly limited way, the problem of constructing alternative policies to the one outlined by Robert Gates becomes far more problematical.
The problematical nature of the alternatives arise from the unique schizophrenia which afflicts the Arab mind. It is a schizoid world view which was seen quite clearly in Iraq. And, it has leaked around the edges of the political debates in recent weeks.
One prong of the schizophrenic view comes from the evident fact that the Libyan insurgents cannot fight in an effective, coordinated fashion. It is not that the government forces loyal to Gaddafi are all that much better trained or equipped than the rebels for they are not.
(In this context it is worthwhile to spend some time checking out the immense amount of imagery available. There is no essential difference between the equipment deployed by either the Gaddafi or rebel forces. Nor is there much apparent difference in competence in military basics from digging in on the defense to the combination of fire and movement on the attack.)
The only essential difference between rebels and government is that the latter but not the former possesses a command structure. Without a command structure, a coherent table of organization, none of the other features of military organization, communications, logistics, tactics, operational doctrine, are relevant. The presence or absence of a command structure makes it possible for a numerically inferior force to beat its superior. It allows a force comprised of men who are not a race of natural warriors (it there is such a critter) to defeat one comprised of heroes. Command is all in war.
Well, if not exactly all, command, the capacity to control violence from a central location with a fair certainty that orders will be obeyed, is the sine qua non of effective war fighting. The rebels have none. The Gaddafi forces have some. Therein lies the difference--and what a difference is clear from the imagery of the rabble running from a few distant incoming rockets or artillery shells.
There is nothing that can be done in a short span of time to address the critical lack of command in the rebel forces. The lack is not simply one of training or inexperience. Rather, the absence of command structure is organic to the society which produced the insurgents.
As a consequence the ability of outside "donors" be they NATO or Arab League to make up the deficiency is zero. Supplying weapons will not address the absence of command. Ditto training. The only way command and its concomitants, control and communication, could be provided in a timely fashion would be for some outside combat force to take over the ground operations. Sure, some Libyans could be attached to the "foreign" combat units, but they would be simply there for the optics.
In the alternative, the US and other outsiders can hope that the charade of the no-fly/civilian protection zones can be continued long enough for the insurgents to realize they must develop and put into effective practice their own command, control, and communication system--that they must gain a genuine command structure which is generally conceded to be legitimate in the eyes of the fighters it commands and controls.
The US and other countries may well introduce black and special operations forces both civilian and military, but this alone will not provide sufficient command capacity to offset the advantage enjoyed by the Gaddafi units in a timely enough fashion. Rather, the employment of these genera of capacities will provide some aid to the insurgents by allowing better coordination of air strikes and ground movement. This will enhance the staying power of the insurgents so as to provide time for these people to discover they need a command structure.
Of course, this brings yet another risk for the US and the other Western powers. The individuals most likely to realize that they need a command structure are those with prior experience fighting against the US and its allies in Iraq.
(After all, if these Fearless and Mighty Men of Islam are at all honest and possessed of a capacity for self-examination, they have come to understand that the single greatest reason the Bearded Warriors of the Prophet (PBUH) had their collective posteriors kicked by the infidels and apostates was the greater effectiveness of the infidel and apostate command, control, and communication systems.)
This means the advocates of violent political Islam will come to greater prominence in the effort to topple Gaddafi with results in the post-conflict environment not likely to promote Western norms, values, or interests. The Gates' approach coupled with the indigenous failings of the Libyan insurgents will prove harmful to our longer term interests in the country and the region.
However, we have no real alternative. Remember the Arab schizophrenia? The other prong of this world view arises from the antipathy Arab Muslims have for the notion of infidels killing Arab Muslims. As the pretended(?) horror expressed by the Arab League at the idea that Arab Muslims were dying downrange as the US and others imposed the no-fly/civilian protection zone showed dramatically, there is a genuine loathing aroused in the Arab mind at the killing of good Arab Muslims (even soldiers) by the infidels.
If the Americans or the British or the French put troops on the ground and these troops actually kill Gaddafi's fighters, the hatred will be both real and explosive. There would be a replay of the dynamics of Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no way around that. It is an emotional reality which cannot be denied. It can only be exploited. And, exploited it would be. Not simply by AQIM but by every advocate of violent political Islam in the world. The wave of fear, loathing, and hatred would be ridden by others as well, by Muslim "moderates" eager to keep their heads above the political tide, by non-Muslims who are rivals, even enemies of the US and its Western allies.
That is why we cannot simply go in and square matters away. Matters would refuse to be squared away. The emotional sensitivities of Arab Muslims and their capacity to deny realities other than those conditioned by a narrative of religion would assure what should have been a simple, direct, and straight forward ending of a very nasty regime and its death squads would transmogrify into one more protracted war of religion and identity.
The Libyan Question admits of no good answer. The approach espoused by Secretary Gates is no more and no less than the least-worst way of dealing with the Question while honestly admitting that we have no capacity to answer it.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Idiocy Epitomized: Libya And R2P--And Why It Is A Western Artifact
The ultimate justification for the current inchoate effort by France, the UK, and others including the less than eager US is The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which doctrine derives from a 2005 outcome document concerning the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly. This action can be seen best as a collective catharsis of collective guilt by an "international community" awestruck by what it had "allowed" to occur.
The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task. The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream. Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.
(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged. Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)
The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention." Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values. They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.
The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history. This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file. Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.
Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph. The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se. Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings. The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind. Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."
The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust. Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature. They also fought wars with nauseating regularity. And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.
From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets. As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.
The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures. The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war. All failed. Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest. The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.
In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior. The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition. The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.
After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population. During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.
But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions. It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew. The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN. The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.
This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.
The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)
In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only. This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application. Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast? Or, Yemen? Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined. Bahrain? Syria?
Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism. The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest. It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state. Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.
The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions. The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values. The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.
The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe. The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile. It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.
In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism. The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest. While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise. Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.
In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton. Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."
The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task. The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream. Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.
(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged. Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)
The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention." Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values. They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.
The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history. This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file. Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.
Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph. The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se. Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings. The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind. Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."
The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust. Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature. They also fought wars with nauseating regularity. And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.
From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets. As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.
The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures. The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war. All failed. Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest. The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.
In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior. The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition. The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.
After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population. During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.
But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions. It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew. The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN. The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.
This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.
The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)
In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only. This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application. Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast? Or, Yemen? Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined. Bahrain? Syria?
Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism. The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest. It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state. Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.
The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions. The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values. The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.
The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe. The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile. It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.
In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism. The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest. While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise. Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.
In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton. Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."
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