There seems to be a subtext of shock with the latest twist of events in Libya. Yet, there is nothing unexpected in the images of fleeing rebels totally unnerved, not to say unmanned, by a few shells from tanks and artillery fired by men loyal to Gaddafi. After all, the legions of media experts in military affairs had previously declared that only the "allied" air assault had allowed for the rebel successes, so why is there any surprise when a hiccup in that air support resulted in a speedy collapse of the rebel offensive?
The buzz from inside the Beltway, in large measure propelled by the Nice Young Man From Chicago, has centered around the possibility of the US and other outsiders providing arms to the rebels. This notion is absurd. The rebel forces have ample weapons of the individual and light crew served sorts. The dissidents even have some heavier equipment, armored personnel carriers and tanks abandoned by their Gaddafi loyalist crews but still serviceable.
What the anti-Gaddafi "fighters" need is not hardware. What they need is organization, leadership, and, most of all, training. The skill level of the rebels is pathetic at best. The imagery proliferating from Libya shows the anti-government individuals have utterly no knowledge of even the most rudimentary aspects of combat. The bozos of the desert do not even dig in. They do not use cover and concealment. They do not even bother to emplace their tank killing recoilless rifles.
They have no fire discipline. No small unit tactics. No coordination of effort. No recognized command and control system. In short, they have none of the requisites for effective war fighting. They are, therefore, doomed to lose.
In a way it is possible to take comfort in the sheer incompetence of the vast majority of the Libyan "freedom fighters." The all too obvious inadequacies of the rebels indicate the influence or at least the numbers of combat experienced advocates of violent political Islam, veterans of the anti-US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is sparse. There can be little doubt that the men who have survived combat against the US and its Western allies in either venue have gained the basic survival skills so desperately lacking with the majority of the Libyan amateurs.
While the greatest percentage of the opposition forces may be as are the majority of all Libyans, people who wear their Islam lightly, the existence of austere, Salafist derived advocates of violent political Islam has been documented in blood for a century. These were the men, men from Cyrenaica and from the city of Darnah who were the spine, muscle, and sinew of the bloody defensive insurgency against the Italians. These men have been the sharp point of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. These men sought out jihad against the Americans in Muslim lands far, far away from Libya. And, it is these men who are, right now, the only effective combatants in the struggle against Brother Leader.
In the event the US (or any other Western country) provided arms or other military equipment, it would be the same men, the Warriors of the Prophet, who would benefit the most. Any force multiplying equipment or services would propel the advocates of violent political Islam to the top of the local tree. This would not be in the best interests of the US, other civilized states, or the majority of the Libyan people. Should the jihadists be given the wherewithal to wage more effective war, the first and largest loser would not be Gaddafi and his forces but the Libyans who do not share the zeal of those committed to violent political Islam.
In this context it is useful to reflect on some melancholy realities of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The largest number of victims of violence were not foreign troops or indigenous troops loyal to the central government but combatants affiliated with groups not approved of by the advocates of violent political Islam. The other large group of victims were the non-combatants, civilians who were either in the wrong place at the wrong time or who were vocally opposed to the all encompassing goals of the jihadists.
Samantha Powers, Susan Rice, and Hilary Clinton pushed for the no-fly/civilian protection resolution for fear of "genocide." They focused on the most attractive target, the target with the very big mouth, Gaddafi. By so doing they overlooked completely the existence of a group--the advocates of violent political Islam--just as given to wholesale killing, just as prone to murder those who disagree or oppose as Gaddafi. To compound the blunder of the no-fly/civilian protection resolution with providing weapons or other useful military equipment or services would be to favor one murderer over another--not prevent murder period.
The totality of the Obama administration's behavior during the past few weeks demonstrates a bunch of situationally naive people who are adrift at the policy level. The Obama "team" was saved from the worst consequences of its lack of competence by the timely departure of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. The angels who had smiled protectively on the fools of the administration stopped doing so with the advent of the Libyan Question.
The air campaign if taken to the limit can assure the rebels are not destroyed quickly and totally. Beyond that the best efforts of airmen and missile launchers alike can do little. It is not possible to bomb the rebels into a position of winning at any acceptable political cost. It is not possible to bomb Gaddafi out of power in a speedy fashion. Nor can the rebels win in a matter of weeks--even with massive outside assistance in equipment, training, and organization.
In the longer term, Gaddafi cannot hang on indefinitely. In the longer term, the advocates of violent political Islam will come to dominate the rebel councils. When the down-the-tubes trajectory of Gaddafi intersects with the upward trending fortunes of the rebels, the real winners will be the advocates of violent political Islam. When that happens, the US, the West, and the Libyan people will have much to regret.
Showing posts with label Samantha Powers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Samantha Powers. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Sunday, March 27, 2011
Ripples And Fallout
No event exists or can exist in a vacuum. Certainly no event punctuated by the noise of bombs, missiles, and gunfire can be considered to have no implications, no ramifications, no ripples and fallout. So it is with the Western Answer to the Libyan Question.
If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now. The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target. The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct. When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.
This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost. The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US. The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein. His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.
The big QED is self-evident. As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe. Lose that capacity and all is over. The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program. Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.
Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay. The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.
So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe. One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.
The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria. Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya. The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.
Leiberman did not mention Hama. He should have. It would have made his case more convincing. Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion. At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire. The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater. In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent. More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.
A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent. The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years. The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now. This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.
For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo. They can neither expect nor give quarter. Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.
With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern. That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria. Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power. If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.
Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria. She averred that every country in the Mideast is different. Duh? Gosh, you don't say?
Syria certainly isn't Libya. Syria is far from isolated. While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia. This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.
Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states. It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West. It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics. This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself. This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.
Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA. The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob. This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.
Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya. It has a far more up to date air defense system. In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer. And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel. Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.
Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought. One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.
Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria. If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done. And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions. Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.
There are other ripples sloshing around. None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular. One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US. Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration. Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.
Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison. The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What this means is simple. We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.
In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.
If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now. The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target. The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct. When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.
This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost. The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US. The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein. His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.
The big QED is self-evident. As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe. Lose that capacity and all is over. The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program. Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.
Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay. The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.
So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe. One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.
The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria. Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya. The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.
Leiberman did not mention Hama. He should have. It would have made his case more convincing. Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion. At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire. The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater. In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent. More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.
A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent. The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years. The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now. This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.
For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo. They can neither expect nor give quarter. Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.
With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern. That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria. Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power. If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.
Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria. She averred that every country in the Mideast is different. Duh? Gosh, you don't say?
Syria certainly isn't Libya. Syria is far from isolated. While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia. This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.
Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states. It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West. It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics. This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself. This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.
Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA. The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob. This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.
Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya. It has a far more up to date air defense system. In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer. And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel. Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.
Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought. One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.
Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria. If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done. And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions. Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.
There are other ripples sloshing around. None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular. One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US. Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration. Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.
Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison. The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What this means is simple. We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.
In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.
Saturday, March 26, 2011
The Irony Of R2P And The Ivory Coast
You all remember Rwanda, don't you? It did make the news back about the time Whitewater was the lead story. The butchery in Rwanda, the killing of Hutus by Tutsis and Tutsis by Hutus put enough bodies in local streams to cause impromptu dams and flooding. The imagery was shockingly brutal enough--even in the pre-YouTube days of network censorship--to cause waves of revulsion throughout the US, Europe, and elsewhere.
There were mouthfuls of "deplore" and "unacceptable." There were repeated calls for "restraint" and "moderation." World leader after world leader denounced the ongoing slaughter. But, no state did anything to impose a moratorium on mass murder. The "international community" assembled on the banks of the Hudson was long on words and very, very short on deeds.
It was only a decade or so later that the "international community" and its great organization, the UN, did something other than talk. Boosted by "concern" and even "alarm" over religiously motivated industrial strength killing in Bosnia, the member states of the UN finally did something in response to Rwanda. The 192 members unanimously approved an "outcome document" which enshrined the Responsibility to Protect (R2P.)
The diplomats assembled in the General Assembly executed the will of their respective governments and declared that when a government failed to protect its citizens from genocide or war crimes or crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing, then the "international community" had the responsibility to extend protection to those in danger and need. It was a feel-good move. Some of the governments, particularly the legatees of the long Western movement by fits and starts to lessen the damage of war and enhance the rights of citizens against arbitrary government, might actually have intended that R2P would have real effect in the real world of real evil deeds.
Other states, no doubt, had no intent of ever honoring any obligation under the R2P formulation. None would oppose it openly as such would be even more politically incorrect and liable to bring international disapproval than being against clean air and drinkable water. International disapprobation brings with it a loss of influence and no state wishes that for itself. So every country marched along with a light heart and a merry tune on its lips into a brave, bright future of greater safety for all.
Even the many governments which were authoritarian on a good day and brutally suppressive most of the time joined up. Libya linked arms with Norway, Syria with Sweden, Iran with Denmark; Russia wrapped its arms around Canada while China did the same with the US. It was such a sweet moment! There was Zimbabwe; there was Sudan; there was the Ivory Coast. All singing the R2P jive.
The R2P outcome document was long, almost infinitely long, on high minded and lofty sentiments. It was short to the point of nonexistence on those pesky details such as what would trigger R2P or who would make the trigger decision or who would actually do the dirty work of protecting some group somewhere against some dire threat. There were no mechanisms, no procedures, no substance which would serve to speedily and uniformly transform the fine sounding words of R2P to the dirty realities of imposing its requirements on a recalcitrant (or nonexistent) government.
All except the most starry-eyed and vapid minded of folks knew that the realities of international politics assured that R2P would have the impact of an ant's fart on a hurricane. True, but with an important, indeed critical caveat, unless one or more major powers determined that national or strategic interest demanded the application of R2P in a particular venue--and worked with determination and purpose to gain sufficient support from states having coinciding national or strategic interests.
This is why the bombs have been falling in Libya and not Yemen or Bahrain. Consistency is nice but not either necessary nor sufficient in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.
For reasons endemic to the domestic political cultures of both France and the UK, Libya loomed large. Facilitating the task of gaining sufficient consensus internationally was Colonel Gaddafi's record of global mischief making and domestic suppression.
The US could have sat out this particular dance. The Americans had no direct dog in the fight even if there existed a longer term threat of a resurgent Gaddafi reverting to his pre-2003 type should he prevail domestically. But, the Obama administration had taken lumps almost beyond count for its lack of a firm stance during the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions. And, it should never be forgotten there were three potent members of the senior level personnel who had either been badly traumatized by Rwanda (Powers and Rice) or were abundantly proud of the American led intervention in Bosnia (Clinton).
Now comes the irony.
Of all the countries around the world currently undergoing internal political convulsions, there is one in which the impact of governmental sins of both omission and, more importantly, commission merit the immediate invocation of R2P. That country is not Bahrain, despite the contentions of those who abhor inconsistency. Nor is it Yemen even though that country has seen a respectable body count. It is not even Syria, authoritarian as that country might be. It is not even Libya even though the fighting is in full swing under the kindly eyes of US and other country's pilots.
The country is the Ivory Coast.
By all the metrics and standards customarily employed to measure such things, the Ivory Coast is in the throes of internal war in which one of the contestants is the internationally condemned incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and the other is the internationally recognized winner of the presidential election, Alassane Outtara. Each claimant to the throne is backed by armed supporters, but Gbagbo has the army as well as less formal militias in his corner.
The weeks and months since the election have seen an escalation in violence which has taken a very obvious ramp up in the past few days. There are, according to the UN, which has the typically ineffectual "peace keeping" force in country, currently as many as one million internally displaced persons, most of whom are fleeing the murder squads in Abidjan.
Fears of an increased body count have grown since Gbagbo now has one--that's right, one--attack helicopter at his disposal as well as some brand new multiple rocket launchers. These fears have not resulted in any significant action by the UN or the "international community" or even the African Union. There have been no economic sanctions imposed on Gbagbo or his intimates. Nor have there been any travel bans. None of the instant moves employed against Gaddafi in the earliest days of the popular uprising.
The UN Human Rights Counsel has taken time out from condemning Israel so that it might send a commission of inquiry to the Ivory Coast. Apparently this bastion of concern over the wellbeing of all people everywhere cannot rely on media reports and must ascertain for itself as to whether or not there have been human rights abuses committed by Gbagbo and his forces. In the same resolution, the Watchdog of Humanity called upon the state radio in Ivory Coast to "refrain" from inciting violence.
Wow! That must have them shaking in their boots all around the presidential palace. The boys had best be careful with their knee knocking, they might drop one of those dread rockets and hurt themselves.
The US has taken a firm, even hard, line on the Ivory Coast Question. In a video message to the folks down there Ivory Coast way, President Obama has termed the election "fair and free" and has said that he recognizes Outtara as the real deal president. He called for Gbagbo to hand over the keys to the presidential latrine.
Well, if that doesn't get Gbagbo's attention what good would sanctions or travel bans or no-fly zones do? Right now it is impossible to say how many people have died since the 28 November 10 election. But, given the impressive number who were killed in the crossfire during the last round of internal war as well as the more conservative reports out of Africa, the number must equal at the least the eight thousand or so killed in Libya prior to the establishment of the no-fly and no-go zones.
Considering that Susan Rice was reportedly shaken to her very core when she went to Rwanda shortly after the machetes stopped swinging and Samantha Powers has made her bones as an academic by studying genocide, it is of some interest that the US is seemingly indifferent to the looming massacres in the Ivory Coast. Even if Ms Rice and Ms Powers are loath to see white American wings over a Black African country, they should be plumping for the symbolic sanctions and travel bans. Admittedly, the Ivory Coast is a prime source of high quality chocolate and Americans are fond of eating this particular comestible, but even our collective sweet tooth should not be allowed to prevent action intended to halt killings.
By the appearance of indifference to African deaths at the hands of Africans, the US and Europe run the real risk of being accused once more of racism. This happened, you might recall, during the Nineties with the contrast between Rwanda and Bosnia. The French alone have taken some sort of lead at least in the UNHRC. Perhaps Sarkozy is sensitive to sentiments arising in Africa.
The Geek has written this post not because he favors an intervention in the Ivory Coast. He does not. Rather the purpose of this exercise has been to demonstrate not simply the intellectual bankruptcy of the Obama administrations approach to foreign affairs but, more importantly, the failure, an inevitable and built in failure of the R2P and similar lofty minded moves by the "international community."
When night falls, like it or not, foreign policy is directed, even dictated, by a combination of domestic political imperatives and national interest, not abstract principle. The only form of hypocrisy which matters is that of pretending otherwise.
There were mouthfuls of "deplore" and "unacceptable." There were repeated calls for "restraint" and "moderation." World leader after world leader denounced the ongoing slaughter. But, no state did anything to impose a moratorium on mass murder. The "international community" assembled on the banks of the Hudson was long on words and very, very short on deeds.
It was only a decade or so later that the "international community" and its great organization, the UN, did something other than talk. Boosted by "concern" and even "alarm" over religiously motivated industrial strength killing in Bosnia, the member states of the UN finally did something in response to Rwanda. The 192 members unanimously approved an "outcome document" which enshrined the Responsibility to Protect (R2P.)
The diplomats assembled in the General Assembly executed the will of their respective governments and declared that when a government failed to protect its citizens from genocide or war crimes or crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing, then the "international community" had the responsibility to extend protection to those in danger and need. It was a feel-good move. Some of the governments, particularly the legatees of the long Western movement by fits and starts to lessen the damage of war and enhance the rights of citizens against arbitrary government, might actually have intended that R2P would have real effect in the real world of real evil deeds.
Other states, no doubt, had no intent of ever honoring any obligation under the R2P formulation. None would oppose it openly as such would be even more politically incorrect and liable to bring international disapproval than being against clean air and drinkable water. International disapprobation brings with it a loss of influence and no state wishes that for itself. So every country marched along with a light heart and a merry tune on its lips into a brave, bright future of greater safety for all.
Even the many governments which were authoritarian on a good day and brutally suppressive most of the time joined up. Libya linked arms with Norway, Syria with Sweden, Iran with Denmark; Russia wrapped its arms around Canada while China did the same with the US. It was such a sweet moment! There was Zimbabwe; there was Sudan; there was the Ivory Coast. All singing the R2P jive.
The R2P outcome document was long, almost infinitely long, on high minded and lofty sentiments. It was short to the point of nonexistence on those pesky details such as what would trigger R2P or who would make the trigger decision or who would actually do the dirty work of protecting some group somewhere against some dire threat. There were no mechanisms, no procedures, no substance which would serve to speedily and uniformly transform the fine sounding words of R2P to the dirty realities of imposing its requirements on a recalcitrant (or nonexistent) government.
All except the most starry-eyed and vapid minded of folks knew that the realities of international politics assured that R2P would have the impact of an ant's fart on a hurricane. True, but with an important, indeed critical caveat, unless one or more major powers determined that national or strategic interest demanded the application of R2P in a particular venue--and worked with determination and purpose to gain sufficient support from states having coinciding national or strategic interests.
This is why the bombs have been falling in Libya and not Yemen or Bahrain. Consistency is nice but not either necessary nor sufficient in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.
For reasons endemic to the domestic political cultures of both France and the UK, Libya loomed large. Facilitating the task of gaining sufficient consensus internationally was Colonel Gaddafi's record of global mischief making and domestic suppression.
The US could have sat out this particular dance. The Americans had no direct dog in the fight even if there existed a longer term threat of a resurgent Gaddafi reverting to his pre-2003 type should he prevail domestically. But, the Obama administration had taken lumps almost beyond count for its lack of a firm stance during the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions. And, it should never be forgotten there were three potent members of the senior level personnel who had either been badly traumatized by Rwanda (Powers and Rice) or were abundantly proud of the American led intervention in Bosnia (Clinton).
Now comes the irony.
Of all the countries around the world currently undergoing internal political convulsions, there is one in which the impact of governmental sins of both omission and, more importantly, commission merit the immediate invocation of R2P. That country is not Bahrain, despite the contentions of those who abhor inconsistency. Nor is it Yemen even though that country has seen a respectable body count. It is not even Syria, authoritarian as that country might be. It is not even Libya even though the fighting is in full swing under the kindly eyes of US and other country's pilots.
The country is the Ivory Coast.
By all the metrics and standards customarily employed to measure such things, the Ivory Coast is in the throes of internal war in which one of the contestants is the internationally condemned incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and the other is the internationally recognized winner of the presidential election, Alassane Outtara. Each claimant to the throne is backed by armed supporters, but Gbagbo has the army as well as less formal militias in his corner.
The weeks and months since the election have seen an escalation in violence which has taken a very obvious ramp up in the past few days. There are, according to the UN, which has the typically ineffectual "peace keeping" force in country, currently as many as one million internally displaced persons, most of whom are fleeing the murder squads in Abidjan.
Fears of an increased body count have grown since Gbagbo now has one--that's right, one--attack helicopter at his disposal as well as some brand new multiple rocket launchers. These fears have not resulted in any significant action by the UN or the "international community" or even the African Union. There have been no economic sanctions imposed on Gbagbo or his intimates. Nor have there been any travel bans. None of the instant moves employed against Gaddafi in the earliest days of the popular uprising.
The UN Human Rights Counsel has taken time out from condemning Israel so that it might send a commission of inquiry to the Ivory Coast. Apparently this bastion of concern over the wellbeing of all people everywhere cannot rely on media reports and must ascertain for itself as to whether or not there have been human rights abuses committed by Gbagbo and his forces. In the same resolution, the Watchdog of Humanity called upon the state radio in Ivory Coast to "refrain" from inciting violence.
Wow! That must have them shaking in their boots all around the presidential palace. The boys had best be careful with their knee knocking, they might drop one of those dread rockets and hurt themselves.
The US has taken a firm, even hard, line on the Ivory Coast Question. In a video message to the folks down there Ivory Coast way, President Obama has termed the election "fair and free" and has said that he recognizes Outtara as the real deal president. He called for Gbagbo to hand over the keys to the presidential latrine.
Well, if that doesn't get Gbagbo's attention what good would sanctions or travel bans or no-fly zones do? Right now it is impossible to say how many people have died since the 28 November 10 election. But, given the impressive number who were killed in the crossfire during the last round of internal war as well as the more conservative reports out of Africa, the number must equal at the least the eight thousand or so killed in Libya prior to the establishment of the no-fly and no-go zones.
Considering that Susan Rice was reportedly shaken to her very core when she went to Rwanda shortly after the machetes stopped swinging and Samantha Powers has made her bones as an academic by studying genocide, it is of some interest that the US is seemingly indifferent to the looming massacres in the Ivory Coast. Even if Ms Rice and Ms Powers are loath to see white American wings over a Black African country, they should be plumping for the symbolic sanctions and travel bans. Admittedly, the Ivory Coast is a prime source of high quality chocolate and Americans are fond of eating this particular comestible, but even our collective sweet tooth should not be allowed to prevent action intended to halt killings.
By the appearance of indifference to African deaths at the hands of Africans, the US and Europe run the real risk of being accused once more of racism. This happened, you might recall, during the Nineties with the contrast between Rwanda and Bosnia. The French alone have taken some sort of lead at least in the UNHRC. Perhaps Sarkozy is sensitive to sentiments arising in Africa.
The Geek has written this post not because he favors an intervention in the Ivory Coast. He does not. Rather the purpose of this exercise has been to demonstrate not simply the intellectual bankruptcy of the Obama administrations approach to foreign affairs but, more importantly, the failure, an inevitable and built in failure of the R2P and similar lofty minded moves by the "international community."
When night falls, like it or not, foreign policy is directed, even dictated, by a combination of domestic political imperatives and national interest, not abstract principle. The only form of hypocrisy which matters is that of pretending otherwise.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Idiocy Epitomized: Libya And R2P--And Why It Is A Western Artifact
The ultimate justification for the current inchoate effort by France, the UK, and others including the less than eager US is The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which doctrine derives from a 2005 outcome document concerning the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly. This action can be seen best as a collective catharsis of collective guilt by an "international community" awestruck by what it had "allowed" to occur.
The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task. The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream. Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.
(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged. Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)
The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention." Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values. They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.
The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history. This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file. Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.
Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph. The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se. Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings. The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind. Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."
The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust. Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature. They also fought wars with nauseating regularity. And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.
From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets. As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.
The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures. The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war. All failed. Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest. The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.
In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior. The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition. The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.
After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population. During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.
But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions. It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew. The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN. The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.
This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.
The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)
In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only. This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application. Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast? Or, Yemen? Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined. Bahrain? Syria?
Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism. The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest. It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state. Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.
The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions. The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values. The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.
The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe. The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile. It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.
In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism. The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest. While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise. Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.
In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton. Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."
The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task. The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream. Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.
(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged. Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)
The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention." Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values. They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.
The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history. This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file. Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.
Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph. The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se. Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings. The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind. Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."
The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust. Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature. They also fought wars with nauseating regularity. And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.
From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets. As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.
The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures. The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war. All failed. Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest. The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.
In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior. The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition. The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.
After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population. During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.
But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions. It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew. The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN. The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.
This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.
The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)
In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only. This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application. Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast? Or, Yemen? Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined. Bahrain? Syria?
Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism. The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest. It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state. Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.
The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions. The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values. The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.
The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe. The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile. It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.
In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism. The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest. While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise. Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.
In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton. Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."
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