Ripples And Fallout

No event exists or can exist in a vacuum.  Certainly no event punctuated by the noise of bombs, missiles, and gunfire can be considered to have no implications, no ramifications, no ripples and fallout.  So it is with the Western Answer to the Libyan Question.

If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now.  The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target.  The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct.  When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.

This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost.  The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US.  The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein.  His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.

The big QED is self-evident.  As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe.  Lose that capacity and all is over.  The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program.  Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.

Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay.  The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.

So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe.  One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.

The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria.  Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya.  The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.

Leiberman did not mention Hama.  He should have.  It would have made his case more convincing.  Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion.  At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire.  The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater.  In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent.  More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.

A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent.  The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years.  The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now.  This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.

For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo.  They can neither expect nor give quarter.  Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.

With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern.  That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria.  Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power.  If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.

Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria.  She averred that every country in the Mideast is different.  Duh?  Gosh, you don't say?

Syria certainly isn't Libya.  Syria is far from isolated.  While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia.  This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.

Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states.  It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West.  It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics.  This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself.  This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.

Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA.  The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob.  This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.

Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya.  It has a far more up to date air defense system.  In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer.  And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel.  Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.

Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought.  One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.

Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria.  If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done.  And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions.  Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.

There are other ripples sloshing around.  None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular.  One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US.  Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration.  Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.

Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison.  The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  What this means is simple.  We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.

In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.

When The Feces Hits The Fan In North Korea, Where Will Obama Stand?

The President of the United States has managed to avoid taking a real, effective stand with respect to the opposition movement in Iran.  Sorry, words of regret and condemnation don't cut it.  On Egypt, the POTUS entered the lists both late and after a series of internal contradictions within members of his "team."

Then along came Libya.  Sure, it was convenient to excuse the absence of effective action on anxiety that Americans in Libya would be at risk.  The British managed to take a far stronger albeit primarily rhetorical stand before extracting their civilians by means which included a virtual commando operation aimed at the oilfield workers deep in the desert in isolated camps.  The declaration of unilateral sanctions has come late in the game and will have no genuine, immediate impact on the confused mind of Gaddafi.

The POTUS had the power to order the freezing of all Libyan assets in banks doing business in or with the US.  This act particularly if taken early on and accompanied with a loud pronouncement of what was being done and why might have lowered the zeal of Gaddafi's mercenaries.  Coming late, particularly after the drum roll of threats regarding criminal prosecution, presumably under the Statute of Rome and before the International Criminal Court, financial freezes, sanctions, and jawboning has served only to enhance Gaddafi's die-in-place political will as well as the akin sentiments of family and coterie.

As the game nears its end, a primary risk in Libya is the use of chemical munitions, primarily mustard agent, left over from Gaddafi's earlier flirtation with weapons of mass destruction.  The only thing (other than apprehension regarding the loyalty of his air force personnel) which will assure that Gaddafi does not employ chemicals against his own people will be the immediate enforcement of a no-fly zone over the entirety of Libya enforced by NATO.  The US may not, as Robert Gates has asserted, have the air assets available, but the rest of NATO certainly does.  It is past time for the US to urge its allies to do so--immediately.

The dilatory and poorly focused reaction of President Obama to events in the Mideast and Iran does not boost confidence that the US will handle a regime collapse in North Korea with the necessary speed and skill.  The US and other countries should not assume that the status quo in North Korea is any more permanent than that in Libya appeared to be say ten or fourteen days ago.  To do so is to invite disaster on a massive scale.

Not only is North Korea facing the challenge of an orderly succession, it is in the throes of the latest famine.  This particular episode of mass starvation has been exacerbated greatly by the outbreak of hoof and mouth disease in the animal stockpile of the Hermit Kingdom of the North.  The disease has had major impact on two key areas of food production.  It has been wasting the draft animal population upon which most North Korean agriculture depends at an awesome rate of knots.  Further, the hog farms which provide most of the protein eaten by the North Korean military have been devastated by the disease.

The North Korean regime has responded to the new crisis in the usual ways.  Internationally, the diplomats of the Hermit Kingdom have extended their begging bowls.  Backing this and aimed directly at opinion in both the South Korean population and the American, the North Koreans have been ostentatiously preparing facilities for a possible third nuclear test--the test which might actually go off well.  Additionally, the Hermits have moved at least half of their noisy, vulnerable troop carrying hovercraft to a new port convenient to South Korea.  This move has not been secret in the slightest.  Extortion is backing the begging ploy.

There is little doubt but the Pyongyang regime has been following events in the Mideast closely--particularly the role played by the Egyptian army in the end of Hosni Mubarak.  Given the matter of succession, there may be real cause for worry on the part of both Kim and his son regarding the reliability of the armed forces.  And, it must never be forgotten, of all North Korean institutions, the NKPA is most conservative, most fearful, and most resistant to change as well as most oriented toward carrying the blessings of the Northern way of life to the South.

The danger in the situation as it is developing currently is that Kim may in a sense emulate Gaddafi.  He may role the dice for a winner take all high risk, high payoff strategy which would involve a military strike of significant size against the South.  This option would be more attractive if either the military looks to be going all wobbly on the succession deal or the starvation reaches a level as to propel some sort of people power expression of desperation.

Even the lesser threat of a successful multi-kiloton test would constitute a severe challenge to the Obama administration.  Perhaps even a larger challenge than a large scale but time limited raid on Southern territory by Northern forces.  Each would require a prompt, firm, unequivocal response by the US.  Anything less would be to risk a wide spread war on the Korean peninsula with all that implies.

Mr Obama has demonstrated that not only is he naive about the workings of global politics but that he is totally uninterested in correcting his lacking in this area.  Nor has his foreign policy "team" inspired confidence despite the presence of Gates on it.  His cabinet level UN Ambassador has been absent, presumably with leave, when the dramatic end of Mubarak came as well as during the Security Council meeting last week which issued the pusillanimous "press statement" on Libya.  And, the Secretary of State has merely made fine words about "all options being considered" which is scarcely an act of resolute statesmanship.

The Obama administration has bobbled so much in two years.  Should North Korea pose a challenge, the betting has to be the Obama "team" will drop the ball one more time.  That probability is most likely a major factor in the decision making presently underway in Pyongyang.

The Hermits And Governor Bill

The Geek has been conflicted over the question of whether or not Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico deserves the highly coveted "Bugs Bunny, What A Maroon! Award."  Finally, after more than a bit of dithering he has decided the outgoing (praise be to whoever) Governor Bill had not quite made the high bar of supreme idiocy demanded for the high honor.  He did come close, however.  You can decide if the Geek was right or not.

The fat faced one time US Ambassador to the UN and almost Obama cabinet member has long been Pyongyang's favored American interlocutor surpassing even Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.  The Hermits have accorded this position to Governor Bill (as he has been affectionately (?) known for his two terms here in New Mexico) because he is a reliable conveyor belt of the desired image and message.  Once again he has done his duty.

According to Bill's view the leadership of North Korea is far more "pragmatic" than the state controlled media.  This is an interesting take on the affair given that not a word is put out by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) without having been vetted and approved, if not written by, the factotums occupying the highest levels of power.  Even Governor Bill should realize that there is no daylight between the belligerent rhetoric of KCNA and the Hermits At The Top.

Governor Bill had barely unpacked his bags back in Santa Fe when the Hermit In Charge of the Military was blasting South Korea and assuring any Southern "aggression" would result in a "sacred" or, alternate translation, "holy" war of defense.  Kim Yong-chun is hardly the "North Korean media," governor.

Minister Kim's remarks as well as their amplification in the KCNA and other Hermit owned and operated media came at the end of the large three day live-fire maneuvers thirty miles from the DMZ.  This military exercise was not only the trigger for Minister Kim's bellicose declarations, it was also the motivator for Bill Richardson's call for Southern "restraint."

It is more than passingly strange that the high profile diplomatic "troubleshooter," whose trip to the Land of the Hermits was approved by the Obama administration, can demand restraint from the South while acknowledging that even the Hermits realize they may have gone a bit too far by "shooting those civilians on that island."  He "hopes" that the Hermits may now pull back a bit and avers that he has some new initiatives on arms control from the Hermits.

As the governor outlined, the "new" initiatives the result is one of "deja vue all over again."  The combination of inspections, an offer to sell fuel rods to the South, and let's-come-reason-together combine to be an offer to sell the US and South Korea the same old dead horse one more time.  To employ an analogy from US history, the offer is Pyongyang's version of the failed LBJ approach to North Vietnam of "progressive squeeze and talk."

The attack(s) of the past several months have been the "squeeze" portion of the exercise, the "initiatives" offered to Governor Bill are the "talk" part of the game.  As background noise, the North continues to wave the saber and make dark hints of yet one more test of a nuclear device--"See we can squeeze harder."

Governor Bill credited the Hermits with showing admirable restraint during the recently concluded military exercises.  He may even think his presence in country during the period may have contributed to the pacific nature of the Hermits.  If so, he shouldn't break his arm patting himself on the back.

A far more credible reason for Northern restraint is that China finally got the message and leaned on Pyongyang.  The thinking here is that the recent high level US delegation to Beijing advised the Trolls that the next time Pyongyang kicked the hornets' nest, Washington would do nothing to soften or stop a South Korean response.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not President Obama has the testicular fortitude necessary for this warning, the fact on the ground which makes the argument persuasive is simply that the US would not be able to counsel restraint in the face of another Northern attack.  Any holding back would be political suicide for the present South Korean government.  Any hesitation would result in not only electoral backlash but demonstrations in the street and even the possibility of a military coup.

Even the (Clueless) Guy in the Oval must be aware of the downside resident in any Southern hesitancy if attacked in the near future.  The Trolls of Beijing and the Boys in the Kremlin are undoubtedly aware of what might happen in the aftermath of one more military provocation by the Hermits.  So, with or without any specific word from the US diplomats, the message and its consequences would be evident in the Forbidden City.

Pace, Governor Bill, but your latest bid to be the Greatest Peacemaker of the Decade is not going to put you number one in line for the next Nobel Peace Prize.  You have served your role as a transmission belt of old, worn out Northern demarches, but these will prove no more the route to detente in the Korean peninsula than their predecessors.  Get a grip on it!

To reward North Korea for its latest extortion attempt is as self-defeating as is any giving in to any extortionate power.  The Hermits want much.  They will give nothing of significance.  That is the word of experience, the lesson of history.

Keeping to the policy which demands a real, verifiable move to denuclearization as a prerequisite for restarting the Six Power Talks--or any other diplomatic exchange--is the best way to go.  Indeed, it is the only way to go.  The administration is to be commended for having done so to date.  It will deserve even more if it stays the course and hangs tough even in the presence of Governor Bill's latest package.

Considering the totality of the circumstances including the transfer of North Korean centrifuge technology to Iran, there is no alternative to staring the Hermits down, even at the risk of inadvertent, unsought war in the Peninsula.  As night falls there can be no denying the fact that North Korea is the number one foreign policy troublemaker.  Compared to it the challenges presented by Venezuela or even Iran are as trifles.

Russia Chooses A Side

While it is not a surprise, the decision of Vladimir Putin's regime to join China in the support of North Korea (or, if not precisely that, in opposition to the South Koreans and thus the US) must be a disappointment to the Obama administration.  If the vaunted "Team of Rivals" which constitutes the Obama inner circle had a realpolitik view of life, the sharp turn against Seoul and Washington would not be a disappointing further rejection of the "Reset Button" policy.

In calling for an emergency closed door UN Security Council meeting on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Russians were doing the expectable.  In the Russian condemnation of the US for not immediately convening the emergency meeting in its role as this month's chair, Moscow was doing the predictable.  When Moscow called for the cancellation of the impending South Korean live fire exercises on Yeonpyeong Island, the Masters of the Kremlin went over the edge.  No longer could they maintain the pretense of evenhandedness; the characterization of the military exercises as a "dangerous aggravation" demonstrates clear partisan orientation.

In so closely associating itself with China, the Russians have embarked on a risky course of diplomacy, a course with one intention which may well result in a defeat on another, far more important diplomatic front.

The Russian move is linked to the ratification of the new START pending in the Senate.  As the Russians have no bull in the Korean herd unlike Beijing, the goal of their demarche in the UNSC must be that of demonstrating to the Obama administration the consequences of a failure on the part of the "US side" to ratify the treaty without further delay or modification.  The Kremlin is flexing its trouble making muscles in a high profile venue to show unmistakably that there will be a price to be paid should the Republicans stall the ratification process or insist upon modifications which would necessitate reopening the entire negotiation effort.

In the present Korean context, the North Koreans continue to be very much in the wrong.  Their actions, whether sinking a South Korean warship or bombarding an island located to the south of the Northern Limit Line, Pyongyang has acted contrary to the provisions of the 1953 Armistice as well as relevant international law.  The South Korean responses to date including the live fire exercises have been both "restrained" (to use the favorite word of both Beijing and, now, Moscow) and completely within its rights as a sovereign state.  No observer unless blinded by the requirements of ulterior motives and objectives can deny that.

In its support of South Korea, which includes a refusal to engage in a re-run of the Six Power Talks without Pyongyang making serious and severe concessions in advance, the Obama administration is on the side of the angels.  To hold talks with the Hermits of the North without the Hermits first demonstrating a genuine repentance would be to reward aggression, submit to extortion, and unduly reinforce the foundations of a regime facing a possible succession crisis.  It would be, in short, counterproductive and self-defeating.

The Russian leadership is not comprised of situationally naive people.  Putin, Medvedev and company well understand that the US position is both realistic and justified by regional political dynamics.  More than most governments, that of Russia understands the political and diplomatic games of extortion from both sides of the relationship.

So there is no direct rationale for the Russian effort to muck about in the Korean swamp.  There is, however, a very powerful indirect one.  The Kremlin wants the new START ratified quickly and cleanly.  The Boys at the Top understand that there is a potent opposition to the new treaty within the Republicans of the Senate.  Thus they are hopeful that a bit of pressure might somehow, someway, push the Obama administration into doing something to pull the Republican fangs.

It is even possible that Putin, et al may even entertain the notion that the Republicans in the Senate might get the message, might come to understand what is at risk should the new START not be ratified.  If this is the case, the Geek fears they have vastly overestimated the mentality of the Republican opposition.  The current exhibition of Russian intransigence is more likely to stimulate left over Cold War apprehensions regarding the intentions of the Kremlin than to serve as an example of what might be expected absent START ratification.

The proposed treaty is not perfect from the American perspective particularly with respect to force modernization and anti-ballistic missile system development.  Objections in these areas are not figments of feverish Republican imaginations, nor are they baseless renewals of Cold War fears.

Even with the asymmetries built into the treaty, it deserves ratification.  There are benefits to the US.  The most important of these is the reestablishment of the inspection regime which lapsed with the expiry of the former treaty.  The reduction in (to use the old Soviet term) "nuclear charges" is to the advantage of the US as well given the expense of maintaining the larger number of active and reserve "charges" and delivery systems.  Provided that the current or some future administration does not use the new START as a cover for an unwillingness to pay the economic and political price of force modernization, that feature of the treaty should not serve as an obstacle.

This leaves the objections centering on ABM research, development, and deployment as a legitimate point.  This point along with the very ticklish problem of theater or tactical nuclear weapons can be put to one side for the moment without the US suffering any real disadvantage over time.

This implies that most of the Republican objections are not so much rooted in the language of START as they are in a general distrust or dislike of the Russian government today.  While superficially resembling the so-called "Cold War mentality" so often invoked by rhetoricians in both Beijing and Moscow, it is not the same.  The distrust and dislike of Russia's government stems instead from the highly nationalistic behavior of that government coupled with the perception that the Russian government is, in fact, a non-democratic regime tainted with corrupt authoritarianism.

These perceptions are accurate.  Russia is not and never has been a democracy.  It is not and never has been noted for honest, transparent governance.  Russia is not and never has been free of a strong authoritarian bent.

So what?

It matters not that Vladimir of the Bare Chest cannot live up to the requirements of the Boy Scout Oath.  It matters not that a Russian election is not open, fair, honest.  It is utterly irrelevant that corruption is rampant.  It is of no consequence that the rule of law consists of whatever the Person in Charge says it is.

All that really matters is the ground truth that Russia is what it always has been--a country strongly motivated by nationalism, by the unqualified pursuit of national interest.  The very fact that Russia is nationalistic to an extent that few in the American elite can comprehend is the greatest single reason in favor of ratifying START.  A new treaty puts some verifiable limits on Russian expansion in the nuclear arena.  It places a ring fence around nuclear deployment and the size of the ready use nuclear arsenal.

To put it in very simple words: The more nationalistic a government is, the more vital it is to put limits, verifiable limits on its actions.

While imperfect, this is what START does.  It is all it does.  And, doing so is very much in US interests.

This is why the Russian posture on Korea is so troublesome.  By its unnecessary skewing in favor of the Chinese defined line and totally unjustifiable tilt against South Korea exercising its sovereign rights, the Kremlin may have strengthened the opposition to START.  It may even have provided a political impetus or at least cover for some conservative Democrats to break with Obama administration and vote against the treaty.

If this assessment of Russian motives and goals is close to accurate, it implies something larger and more important about the current Russian leadership.  The implication is both simple and alarming.  The Kremlin Boys, or at least the one who counts most, Vladimir Putin, has no clear understanding of how American politics operate or how Americans at the top of the political pyramid think.

Of course, with its emphasis on the fiction of a "Rest Button," the Obama administration generally and the president in particular have done nothing to educate the Russians topside in the whys and ways of US politics.  If anything the administration and president have convinced the ever-so-muscular Putin that the US has gone soft, flabby, and irresolute, and, thus, is suitable for a bit of creative bullying.

If that is the case, the Kremlin has made another serious miscalculation.  One mile of bad diplomatic road almost always leads to another.

Big Surprise--China Counsels "Diplomacy" In Korean Affray

Diplomacy, what a marvelous word!  To many folks it is a term redolent of witchcraft, a magical fetish which, if waved properly and invoked with the correct ritualistic words, will neutralize threats, assure peace, and generally improve the lot of the human race.  To others the term brings to mind nothing more substantial than the optics of serious looking people hustling up and down impressive stairways, shaking hands while smiling in a uniquely Botox way, or, signing impressively bound documents.

In the real world diplomacy consists of either (1) a sincere exercise in (hard) bargaining based on identifiable, coinciding national interest with the intent of achieving a way of expanding or protecting these interests or (2) a creative way to expend much time in the hopes the underlying problem will go away or at least lose its initial force.  With respect to the Chinese call that the US and each of the two Koreas rely upon "diplomacy" in the wake of the latest bit of blatant provocation by Pyongyang, the latter interpretation is applicable.

The call for time wasting diplomacy is in China's interest.  This move along with the ever repeated urgings from the Trolls that both Pyongyang and Seoul show "calm" gives the appearance of an active Chinese interest in the affairs of the peninsula.  Imploring all parties to "talk," to "exercise restraint" and, above all, use "diplomacy" pumps the sweet fragrance of a Chinese love of rationality and peace.  The constant use of "diplomacy" also raises Chinese credit in the estimate of all those nice, well meaning folks who believe in the power of international institutions and meetings conducted by grimly smiling people around highly polished tables. This then is the magical power of "diplomacy."

By comparison any more realistic appraisal by a foreign leader to the effect that nothing will change in North Korean behavior unless and until there is a change in the North Korean regime is easily seen as some sort of primitive monger of war.  The less pleasant, but far more grounded in reality position holding that there is no call for diplomatic talks under whatsoever name until there is a firm reason to believe that some substantial end will emerge from the blue smoke and mirrors laden process is eclipsed by the higher moral position claimed by and granted to the Trolls for having used the words "diplomacy" and "calm" first and most.

The Trolls of Beijing long have been aware of the potency of invoking the diplomatic fetish, how it provides an appearance of high mindedness, of how it captures the debate by making more accurate and realistic approaches look almost barbaric in their bluntness.  The Trolls also realize that by moving quickly to wave the fetish, they can appear to be serious of purpose, mature global citizens, and world leaders for peace without having to do something in actuality.  It is a win-win for the Trolls.

It is also their only option given that Beijing has no intent of pulling in the leash on Pyongyang.  They have no desire to do anything which might perturb the succession of Kim Jong-un to the top spot in Pyongyang.  And, they well understand the processes at work to give the Number Three Son the street cred he needs to be even a nominal headman.  The occasional provocation, the deaths of a few or even a few dozen South Korean military personnel or civilians represent to the Trolls only the normal, expectable costs of an orderly change in government in Pyongyang.

The Chinese have far more to gain by their current course of support for Pyongyang than they have to lose.  Not only has the status quo in the Korean peninsula worked well from the perspective of Beijing, it is a object lesson to other states increasingly reliant upon Chinese support in the wacky world of diplomacy.

Consider Iran.  Iran and China have a web of interconnections ranging from the economic to the diplomatic.  These are equally vital to the national interests of both states.  Beijing desires to see the ties grow thicker and stronger as such will add much to China's benefit.

Iran and North Korea have a long history of close relations and mutual support.  The ties between the missile and nuclear weapons programs of both are quite strong and effective.  The Iranians have spent and will spend considerable sums to acquire devices and technology of North Korean origin in both areas.  The two countries have combined efforts on a number of fronts, most recently on the design of a re-entry vehicle suitable for the Nodong/Shihab missile.  The re-entry vehicle would, of course, be designed to hold a nuclear warhead.

More important than specific weapons or any given technology, the North Koreans have provided the example of how a country goes about the task of evading sanctions, ignoring diplomatic opprobrium, and generally cocking a snoot at the US and most of the other countries of the world.  Tehran has learned the most important lesson of all from its observations of North Korea versus the civilized states of the world.

That lesson is simple, even brutally so.  With China anything and everything is possible.

As long as the mullahs accommodate Chinese interests and desires, they can rely upon China's assistance and support.  China wants cheap oil, it gets it.  China wants lucrative contracts in Iran, these go to the Chinese.  For its part China gets oil, money, and further boosts for its domestic economy.  For Beijing and for Tehran it is a win-win game.

This is the model provided over the years by the infinitely less lucrative arrangements between Beijing and Pyongyang.  You might see the agreements between the Trolls and the Hermits as a sort of loss leader since it has led to the very profitable linkage between the Trolls and the Mullahs.

As long as China plays the right sort of mood music, the tunes of "diplomacy" and "calm," it has the necessary cover behind which it can do nothing.  As long as the Trolls go through the motions, mouth the correct mantras, Beijing can ignore the pleading of President Obama and others such as Australian ForMin Rudd to "exercise its influence" on Pyongyang.

One can be forgiven for believing that with the resources of the Agency and State Department at his disposal, the Guy in the Oval would have understood long ago that Beijing is a remorseless pursuer of its national and strategic interests.  Period.  Appeals to the mythical obligation to the "international community" are as bootless as would be depending upon the prognostications found in a Chinese fortune cookie.  Why the Nice Young Man From Chicago or members of his foreign policy "team" make these appeals boggles the mind.  Such a demonstration of pure out-to-lunchness is hard to understand--and impossible to forgive.

The real deal requires dropping the pretense that "diplomacy" can or will play any meaningful role unless and until the Hermits make necessary concessions on their nuclear and missile programs without any agreed upon in advance reciprocal actions.  The real deal requires accepting the high probability of more provocations in the future with the codicil of understanding that war is unlikely save by extreme miscalculation.

The realities of the situation also demand accepting the fact that the North has both an unlimited capacity for provocation and is inherently less prudent than the South.  This implies the US (and for its own reasons and in its own way, China) must be acutely situationally aware and fast to exercise a braking influence on precipitant actions by its junior partner.

This, in turn, is dependent upon a good eye and ear for nuance.  Understanding nuance, particularly during the inherently less stable and predictable period of regime change, is a foundational reality.  Whether the overly large, overly complicated, overly tardy American intelligence and foreign policy apparatus is up to the task of reading fine grain nuances of North Korean and Chinese behavior is questionable.

Even more questionable is the ability and willingness of President Obama and his closest senior advisors to both understand and act effectively upon the demands of nuance.  So far the record of the president and his administration gives no cause for optimism.

Gee, Mr Obama, wouldn't it be a lot more fun to be back in the Senate with nothing more important to do than to rail away at those obstructionist and reactionary people across the aisle?  It sure would be better for the world if that were the case.

Belaboring The Obvious Or Passing The Buck?

Adm Micheal Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has delivered in an appropriately stentorian tone his appreciation of the self-evident: China has a, even the, main role to play in convincing the North Korean regime to refrain from lobbing artillery shells on Southern territory, troops, and civilians.  Admiral Mullen is stating a position which is not only appealing but represents the consensus of the Obama administration.

The presumed ability of China to influence the actions of the rulers of the Hermit Kingdom of the North seems so obvious that it might appear foolish not to pass the baton on North Korean affairs to the Trolls of Beijing.  Of course, the contention that China should do the heavy lifting depends upon affirmative answers to a few key questions.

Do the Trolls really have as much juice as so often affirmed?  Do they have the influence equivalent to the dependence upon China normally attributed to North Korea?

Even more important: Does Beijing have any real interest in modifying Pyongyang's behavior in the way desired by the US, South Korea, and Japan?  What, if any, interests held by the Trolls to be important would be facilitated or advanced by becoming the carrier of American water in the Korean Peninsula?  What costs would the Trolls impose on the US for agreeing to be the point man on American policy?

Given the North Korean defining philosophy of juche, meaning national self-reliance and an absolute avoidance of even the slightest appearance of foreign "domination" even by a close "friend" and ally such as China, what grounds exist to believe that Pyongyang would capitulate in any manner to Chinese pressure or blandishments?  Can the centrality of a unique definition of nationalism and national strength trump even the capacity of China for influence?

None of these questions are without answer, but, for most of them the answer would be unpleasant to the eyes and ears of President Obama and most of his foreign policy "team."  Even more disturbing, at least for those Americans who are not part of the presidential inner circle, would be the answer to another, more basic question.

This foundation question?  By seeking to put China in the driver's seat is the administration acknowledging that  the US no longer has the ability or will to take the lead in advancing and protecting the interests not only of itself but of close and strategically critical allies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the other, smaller states of the Pacific littoral who increasingly have been looking to us as the barrier against China's more expansionist and aggressive policies?

The North Korean regime took advantage of the visit by a highly qualified American nuclear expert, Siegfried Hecker, to demonstrate just how effective their application of juche has been in the area of nuclear materials production. While the exhibit of their new centrifuge cascade as well as the construction of a new and much larger light water reactor near the site of the decommissioned one at Yongbyon can be interpreted as showing how important China has been in Pyongyang's evasion of the sanctions, it can also be seen as a tribute to juche.

The Hermit Kingdom of the North has been and remains willing to provide only one half the required daily calorie requirement to its citizens, telling them to scrounge for the rest.  In essence and in the internal messages given its population every day, the sacrifice is necessary in the name of juche, the need to maintain sufficient military strength to deter the main enemies and assure national independence.  The result is simple: Nobody is happy, but most all are willing to (literally) tighten their belts if doing such keeps the country sovereign.

To put it in a slightly different way, the linkage of sacrifice with the needs of juche and the constant threats presented by South Korea, the US, Japan, and others of the "imperialist camp," provides North Korea with a degree of monolithic political will virtually beyond the capacity of a Westerner to comprehend or even imagine.  Within the context of a multi-generational cult of personality which has engraved itself on the hearts and minds of nearly every North Korean, the sacrifice-equals-independence driven political will provides the Hermits Of Pyongyang with an instrument of remarkable durability.

The impending succession of Kim Jong-un has put stresses on the leadership mechanism as well as the ties that bind leadership to population.  Unlike the long preparatory period preceding the ascension of Kim Jong-il, the current transfer of both power and legitimacy to the number three son has been taking place at warp speed.  It has been and will continue to be critical for the smooth passing of the mantel of heaven from father to son for the son to win his bones with the very hardline bunch behind the throne.

This has meant that Kim Jong-un be perceived as a tough and shrewed man, a man capable of performing actions which would crush a lesser personality.  The sinking of the CheoAn as well as the artillery stonk on Yeonpyeong island are calculated provocations intended to demonstrate the new kid's capacity and willingness to take risks successfully.

Of course the risks were far more apparent than real.  Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul want to restart the Korean War.  Neither does China.  Nor the US.  All  hands agree that war is not a winner.

The Hermits of Pyongyang must have known quite well before the sinking of the CheoAn that there would be no real repercussions.  As had been demonstrated previously by the tepid responses to the nuclear weapons test and the partially successful test firing of a prototype ICBM, the talk might be tough and the UN sanctions apparently so as well, but where the rubber hits the road the consequences would be nonexistent.  The Hermits knew they could depend upon the Trolls to play the stall game effectively and, if necessary, either veto sanctions or conspire in their avoidance.

The Trolls and the Hermits alike had appreciated the American president as having a diplomatic backbone equivalent to that of President McKinley.  They also agreed in their view that the South Korean government and people were so enamored of peace and prosperity to respond with little beyond a few unpleasant words to the sinking of a warship and the killing of a few dozen sailors.

The artillery fire mission the other day was a small escalation of the CheoAn affair.  The difference resides in the presence of civilian bodies (two) among the dead.  That difference is not sufficient to ignite a war, and all concerned knew this before the first shot was fired.

Right now the primary interest of North Korea other than assuring the succession goes smoothly is the extortion of more food aid from the world generally and the West more particularly.  As an attention getting device the shelling has worked--quite well.  The probability the food will flow in greater quantity has been enhanced particularly as the need for food--even on the terms dictated by Pyongyang which contravene normal policy--has been embraced by one time South Korean foreign minister and now UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Longer term the Hermits of Pyongyang want much more than food aid.  This is why the Hermits insist to every  (in Lenin's famed formulation) "useful fool" who happens by that everything is on the table including the nuclear program provided North Korea is treated with "respect."  What the Hermits leave out of the discussion is that the only goal worth sacrificing the nuclear and other weapons related programs is the reunification of the two Koreas under Northern domination.  The Hermits have been convinced for some years now that the best way to achieve that goal is by slowly and surely reducing the political will of South Korea and its primary supporters.  Combining provocations with stalls is a good tactic in achieving that goal.

China has no problem with the goal of the Hermits.  If anything a reunification on the terms and conditions dictated by Pyongyang would mesh with Chinese regional interests.

Reunification is a long way off at best.  Thus China has short term goals with respect to North Korea.  Most of all the Trolls want transition to go down slick and sure.  No bumps, no surprises, one Kim out and another, younger one in without missing a beat.

Beijing understands the need for Number Three Son to have the correct credentials in the estimate of the assorted powers behind the throne.  Thus they have no difficulties with provocations, even an escalating series of such.  The Trolls have full confidence in President Obama to do nothing beyond words, symbols such as joint naval exercises, and showing continued faith in the UN.  They are also sure the South Korean government is in no hurry to see Seoul as an "ocean of flame."

A companion goal for the Trolls is a burnishing of the perceptions of their power in the region.  By being seen as the key player in the Korean affair it is probable that they will be seen more generally as being what they wish to become--regional hegemon.

By passing the buck to Beijing the Obama administration has given assistance to the Trolls in their goal of enhanced diplomatic and political influence and status in the region.  And, given the contagion of perceptions common in the world, greater influence and status throughout the globe.

To answer the question which is the title of this post: The Obama administration has both underscored the apparent but not necessarily real influence of China on North Korea and passed the buck to Beijing.  By doing so the administration has simultaneously boosted the Trolls in their quest for more influence and surrendered another portion of American diplomatic strength.

Wow!  What a great way to pursue the national and strategic interests of the United States.

The Fatal Appeal Of Negotiations

Currently the US is doing the same old, same old.  As it has been for a mort of frustrating years, the incumbant administration along with its counterparts present and past have been plugging away, singing the same tired song: Negotiations conquer all.  There are three critical sets of negotiations either sort of underway,  hoped to be underway soon, or prayed to be commenced sometime, anytime.

The first of these, the one which is more or less underway, is the US sponsored direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the stated goal of a comprehensive peace agreement within the next year (or so.)  The hoped to be started soon, say on 6 December, is the next round of talking at each other with the contestants being the P5+1 group on one side of the table and the Iranians on the other.  The third, the one policy makers hope and pray may take sometime soon is the Six Power Talks involving North Korea.

Three categories of similarity link the three totems to the appeal of negotiation.  All have been and are being pushed by the US.  In all three cases strong sets of pressure and inducements have been employed--or, in the case of inducements, promised--over an extended period of time.  Finally, all are replays of earlier failures.

What makes it any different this time around?  Why should any rational person argue that one more diplomatic engagement will accomplish what all the previous ones have failed to do?

The conventional wisdom offered by proponents of give-diplomacy-a-chance has two main parts.  The first is some variant of the contention that talking is better than fighting.  The second is this time,  unlike all the previous ventures, the context has changed: The sanctions have bit hard or the Israelis recognize the time is right and the PA knows it must produce peace or face Hamas sponsored regime change.

A number of high ranking members of the trust-us-we-are-statesmen crowd have assured the American public that the latest round of sanctions which include far more restrictive measures imposed by the US and the European Union have severely undercut the Iranian economy while the pro-democracy forces have refused to knuckle under to the repressive capacities of the Tehran regime.  Objective evidence including that from official Iranian sources does indicate the sanctions, particularly those affecting Western private investment in the oil sector, have made the already bad economic situation worse.  And, there is no doubt but the pro-democracy, Green movement continues to annoy the regime.

Both amount to a "so what?" in the the actions of the Iranian government.  The Iranians well understand that the contest between itself and the P5+1 generally and the US in particular is one of political wills.  They are betting that they possess the greater political will just as they have demonstrated in all the past diplomatic soirees.  If the Iranians and the P5+1 actually sit down somewhere (the venue has not yet been agreed upon) on 6 December, the Iranians will be willing to talk about Iran's role in matters of global import, about the need for revision of the UN Security Council, about the solving of mythic global warming, about almost any and everything other than the ongoing enrichment of uranium.  The US and the others of the P5+1 want to talk about fissioning atoms only.

The Iranians have already demonstrated their ability to teach Andre Gromyko and others of the legendary Iron Pants Brigade of Soviet negotiators a thing or two about how to stall, bob, and weave, and otherwise buy time and wear out the other side's political will.  Also, as the government and its supporters are members in good standing of the Shia sect of Islam, they take great pride in the capacity of the Iranian nation to suffer, to absorb pain in the service of belief.

The net effect of the sanctions has been to engage effectively the Shia commitment of pain for belief while simultaneously boosting the Iranian sense of nationalism.  That is a powerful combination, a combination guaranteed to promote political will.

In comparison the P5+1 lacks any genuine semblance of a coherent political will.  Two of the group have shown both will and ability at skirting or flatly avoiding the imposition of the most biting of the sanctions.  Two others have excellent records until very, very recently of looking the other way as private concerns violate the sanction regime.  And, at least four of the countries have a much higher priority in solving domestic economic concerns.  Overall this means the firmness of will on one side of the table is far less than on the other.

Takeaway: The results of any upcoming "negotiations" can be summarized by a line in a Herman's Hermits tune from the Sixties, "Second verse, same as the first."

The Israeli-Palestinian talks are still on hiatus.  What else can be expected?  The PA has been relying on the Obama administration to do the heavy lifting for them.  Despite its best efforts in pressure, inducements, and hortatory talk, Team Obama has not and will never be able to produce what the PA wants and thinks it must have.

The PA wants a lot.  It wants Israel back to the 1948 Green Line.  It wants East Jerusalem.  It wants either a
"right of return" or financial compensation for those who fled the land which became Israel during the wars of independence.  Most of all it wants a two state solution as an intermediary stop on the road to a one state solution which sees the end of Israel as constituted currently.

The Israeli government is not unaware of the PA's goals both short and long term.  No Israeli government will grant the PA a free pass to those goals.  No conceivable--which is to say, politically acceptable to the American electorate--amount of American pressures and inducements will work to get the PA what it wants.

This is not to imply the government of Israel is much more flexible than its PA interlocutor.  The Israelis may be willing to exchange some undeveloped semi-desert real estate on an acre for acre basis for the land on which the "settlements" exist, but they are not about to relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem which has been incorporated legally into the State of Israel regardless of any UN or US position to the contrary.

Nor is the Israeli government (this one or any other) willing to see a hostile state come into existence on its borders, even the more expansive ones defined by the line of settlements.  Thus the insistence of an Israeli armed presence in a security zone in the Jordan Valley.  It is doubtful that the government of Israel would accept a UN force there, given the record of that organization.

It is a certainty that the Israelis will not agree to any Arab "right of return."  Financial compensation might be possible--particularly if the US pays it.

The political will of the Israelis regarding a peace agreement is made explicit in a law pending before the Knesset.  This law, which is expected to pass easily, requires a super-majority (80 out of 120 members) in the Knesset to approve any agreement containing a territorial transfer.  The alternative to the super-majority will be a national referendum.  (Can we say, "Ice cube in a blast furnace?")

In short, it is hard to see what might exist to justify any continuation of the "peace talks."  Perhaps the US should abandon the effort and cut its political and diplomatic losses.

"But, wait, Geek," you protest.  "What about the Arab League/Saudi Arabian promise of diplomatic recognition and other goodies, like overflight rights?"

Yeah, right.  And, Hitler's Germany diplomatically recognized Poland even as the panzers crossed the common border.  What a concept, twenty or so Arab League members open embassies in Tel Aviv or wherever.  That will be a new challenge for Israeli security: Keeping tabs on legions of subversives and espionage agents.  And, overflights?  EL Al has done quite well without them--and imagine the restrictions for national security and air safety as well as protecting Mecca from "Jewish pollution" which would come as a part of the deal.

Finally there is the negotiation round we keep hoping for.  The one with North Korea.  In a fine exhibit of just how much the sanction regime has hurt the country the Hermits have not only started construction of a one megawatt, thermal, light water reactor equally useful for producing either electricity or plutonium but invited an American expert to tour their new uranium enrichment plant.  Built in a mere eighteen months the new plant definitely impressed the visiting American.

The North Koreans understand political will.  The twin nuclear developments show this.  So does history.  The seemingly endless talks which finally (due to Soviet action and Ike's nuclear threat) yielded the armistice were nothing but a joint Chinese-North Korean effort at outlasting the Americans in the interlocking processes of talking about peace while fighting a war.

The North Koreans are not going to abandon their nuclear effort without gaining something very, very important in return.  Promises of fuel, food, or even "safe" nuclear reactors will not cut it with the Hermits of Pyongyang.  We already know that from the events following the 1994 quasi-agreement brokered by the Clinton administration.

As long as Pyongyang has the tacit backing of Beijing (which will  be a day or two longer than forever), the Hermits see no percentage in settling for less than reunification of the two Koreas.  The reunification must be under terms and conditions of Pyongyang's liking if not dictation.  Acceptance of such by Seoul of a Pyongyang dictate is less likely than Nancy Pelosi showing a wrinkle.

So, reality asks the trenchant question, "What is there to negotiate about?"

The answer to that question is self-evident.

Perhaps the unwillingness of Americans to accept the self-evident and highly negative answers to this and similar questions demonstrates just why we are so addicted to diplomatic negotiations even when there is very little or no chance of such resulting in a good outcome.  We really are that strange and seemingly mythical creature--a peaceloving people.  Indeed we love peace so much we will keep on talking until the moment the first bullet (or missile) is fired at us.

A great strength, a great national value is also the major weakness our enemies can and do use against us.  Just comes with the territory, the territory of the unique American mind.

Here A Bomb, There A Bomb, Everywhere A Bomb

No.  Not those pesky and ubiquitous roadside bombs, not even the upscale models now being imported by Taliban in Afghanistan from those friendly mullahs across the border in Iran.  No.  Not the personal type of bomb so beloved by wannabe seekers after martyrdom.

The bomb(s) in question are those of a nuclear nature.  It seems the latest growth industry in such stable, peace loving countries as North Korea and Pakistan is making more plutonium and, in the fullness of time, more fission or (drum roll) fusion weapons.

The situation in North Korea is somewhat ambiguous as is to be expected, but there are rather alarming indications that the Hermit Kingdom of the North is either cranking up the supposedly decommissioned plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon or is taking another pass at reprocessing the spent fuel rods so as to extract more plutonium.  The South Koreans, who have both a tendency to get nervous and a set of good reasons for doing so, also believe the Northerners are enriching more uranium.

Recent satellite imagery shows construction work in progress near the foundations of the cooling tower destroyed by the North three years ago as part of the now moribund denuclearization process.  The indications are minor and give no hint as to what is--or is going to be--constructed.  There is even the possibility that the Northerners, knowing that the site is constantly monitored by both national and commercial imaging satellites, are engaged in a bit of creative chain rattling.

However, the impending transition of power from Dear Leader to his Number Three Son brings a number of imponderables into play.  These include necessary genuflections before the hardest of the military hardliners or counters to the new, improved South Korean psyops program, which can be commenced at any moment for any reason.  Or, it may simply be one more of those, take-us-seriously-damnit! gestures of which Pyongyang is so fond.

The capacity for Pyongyang to make mischief cannot be overstated and must not be underestimated.  The impending succession does nothing to lessen either the intentional making of mischief or the potential for miscalculation.  While the North may only have sufficient plutonium for a half dozen bombs, the amount of highly enriched uranium cannot be estimated with rigor.  It is within the realm of conservative plausibility to estimate the Hermits have sufficient fissile material to double the number of potential warheads on the shelf.  In addition, the fact that the North does not yet have warheads small enough to mate with their current stock of missiles in no way lessens the degree of threat.

Pending miniaturization--an accomplishment not likely to be in the distant offing--the North can wreak a sufficient degree of havoc simply by getting one or two truck borne devices across the DMZ.  Even a couple of small (Hiroshima sized) nudets in or near the Seoul metroplex would all but fatally cripple South Korea.  In short, the war could be over almost before anyone knows it had begun.

In this context it might be recalled that the Northerners are the tunnel rats from hell.  Their subterranean earth moving skills have provided a number of tunnels easily capable of passing five ton trucks under the Z.  Sure, the North would (to quote a line in Dr Strangelove) "get their hair mussed," but the costs to the South would be much greater, potentially quite unbearable.

That's enough for one depressing subject.  Time to go to the next, even more depressing one.

Pakistan.  That's right, our "ally" and "close friend," the always stable, ever reliable, constantly honest, and aboveboard "partner" in the Grand Campaign Against Violent Political Islam.

The context first.  Pakistan is broke.  It depends upon the success of its extortion program to keep the international (primarily US) money flowing.  The floods have made the basket case even more supine.  The army is allegedly engaged in both flood relief and fighting the Taliban in the FATA while actually standing ever vigilant on the Indian border facing a threat which will not come--no matter how much Islamabad may wish otherwise.  The government is an excellent definition of the term, "non functional."  At the same time the perceived existential and functional legitimacy of the government has sunk to levels which make President Obama's approval ratings seem stratospheric in comparison.

With this as background consider that Pakistan is plunging on at flank speed in the construction of a third reactor in its Kushab plutonium production facility.  Satellite imagery shows that the second reactor has been finished, tested, and may be in full scale production while the construction work on the third unit is proceeding at a rate faster than that of the second.

The Kushab complex exists for one primary purpose, the production of plutonium.  Plutonium for weapons.  The increase in production indicates that Pakistan is pushing for a thermonuclear capability as well as boosting the number of deployable weapons.  As the details of the reactor as well as its predecessors are not available in the open literature, the secondary purposes of the reactors cannot be determined.  However, it is fair to assume that at least one of the reactors is configured for the production of tritium, the form of hydrogen central to initiating fusion reactions.

There is undoubtedly a direct linkage between the forced draft expansion of the Kushab complex and the Pakistani resistance to the fissile materials limitation treaty which has been languishing for years now.  This makes the unopposed election of Pakistan to chair the IAEA all the more ironic.

Pakistan is not only a member of the nuclear club, it is a particularly ambitious one.  The Islamabad government and the army both justify the investment in nuclear weapons production as defensive, a necessary deterrent to any Indian employment of its arsenal.

That position is, to be polite, a mess of caca.  Pakistan already has a sufficient number of weapons to serve as a credible finite deterrent.  Considering the distances involved and the flight time of either missiles or manned aircraft, the Pakistanis must use a launch-under-warning approach.  This doctrine is most effective if the targeting philosophy is counter-value not counter-force.

Given the size of India and, thus, the number of alternative launch points as well as the near term potential of an Indian submarine launched cruise missile capacity, the notion of counter-force targeting in a second strike configuration makes no sense.  Only a form of mutually-assured-destruction predicated on counter-value targeting operates as a sufficient deterrent.

For this approach there is neither need nor justification for a large number of warheads and launchers.  A modest--less than one hundred deliverable warheads--is sufficient.  The enormous expense of expanding the Kushab complex cannot be justified on legitimate defense needs.  Complicating the situation for the government is that the expansion of the physical plant and concomitant work force enhances the problems of security.  The same applies to any proliferation of warheads or fissile materials stockpiles.

Other than a sort of military elephantiasis, there is no excuse for what the Pakistanis are doing at Kushab.  There is certainly no rational explanation.  But, considering the propensity for the grandiose often exhibited by Pakistani senior military personnel, the elephantiasis diagnosis may be correct.

The US has cause for enhanced anxiety with the expansion of Kushab.  The civilian government of Pakistan is, to be kind, not overly stable.  The military forces of Pakistan are riddled at all levels with adherents of violent political Islam.  The strategic ambitions of members of the armed forces, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the bureaucracies are no less than grandiose as all hands focus with an irrational but deeply historically rooted hostility on India.

For the US and other civilized states, the problem of securing the Pakistani nuclear facilities, arsenal, and fissile stockpile are real and pressing.  Bluntly, the possibility of violent political Islamists gaining a nuclear capability via Pakistan is greater than the nuclear threat presented by Iran.

Pakistani officials have proclaimed loud and long that their country is both stable and responsible.  These protestations ring hollow when considered in conjunction with the irresponsible action of expanding the Kushab complex at a time of very real, very great national peril.

There is an upside to the Pakistani nuclear dilemma.  The US and its Western European allies are not alone in this contretemps.  The prevailing winds--both those geographic in nature and those of armed political Islam--assure that both Russia and China have a dog in the fight, whether they either recognize or like the idea.  Any nudet in the sub-continent will have impact in both countries.  Similarly, any access via Pakistan to nuclear materials or weapons by advocates of violent political Islam will have effects deleterious to both.

The takeaway?  Simple.  To date the nuclear club has been able to exercise self-control.  Today, that reassuring state of affairs is under direct threat from both North Korea and Pakistan to a degree surpassing the danger represented by Iran.  And, it is up to the initial members of the club to keep matters from getting worse.

Well, It's (Almost) Palaver With North Korea Time

Reportedly the Deep Thinkers of the Obama Foreign Policy Team are giving serious consideration to opening some sort of (to use the fashionable term) dialog with North Korea. This wouldn't be done instantly but rather would occur after some more pressure is placed upon the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

Since the incremental approach employed to date has been notably lacking in success, it seems only logical that some more incrementalism be used. Then, after a bit, the US would graciously consent to enter into some sort of conversation about something other than the only issue which matters, the Hermit Kingdom's nuclear weapon development and procurement program.

Duh!

Rationality is the curse of the thinking class. Members of this august group are convinced that diplomacy is a supremely rational, ultimately logical endeavor. They are sincere believers in the proposition that coercion can be calibrated with a degree of precision such as to please the most exacting of experimental physicists. They are also blessed with a faith holding that all countries, all governments, share an identical calculus of rationality so every government will see and understand coercive measures in an identical manner and respond in a predictable way.

Diplomats of the US have had these touching articles of belief for generations now. Our faith in both gradualism and the identity of rationality has been proven wrong again and again, yet, with childlike certainty we use the same magic time after time.

Before we got involved in the shooting part of World War II, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, sought to use a carefully calibrated escalation of gradual economic sanctions to compel Imperial Japan to adjust its expansionist foreign policy in China to American policy requirements. Starting with a ban on the export of chopsticks (yes, kids, we were the OPEC of disposable eating utensils of this nature way back then) and proceeding by increments until a freezing of Japanese assets along with a total ban on the export of refined petroleum products was imposed in the summer of 1941, the US sought to coerce Japan into disgorging its conquests in China and abiding with American policy for the region.

The result of this carefully thought out exercise in rational pressure was the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Singapore. Most folks call this the start of WW II in the Pacific.

Twenty-five years later McGeorge Bundy, LBJ's National Security Advisor, used a calibrated campaign of rational coercion on North Vietnam. The Air Force called it Operation Rolling Thunder while Mr Bundy called it "progressive squeeze and talk." The idea was the US would increase the amount of "punishment" inflicted on North Vietnam for a bit and then would stop, stand back and inquire of Hanoi, "Are you ready to talk yet?"

As LBJ feared, the North Vietnamese matched us escalation for escalation. Each increase in bombing was followed by an increase of North Vietnamese presence in the war in the South. Each pause or hint of a pause was ignored by Hanoi particularly as the Northern leadership discovered that their population had the political will to resist and that bombing caused loathing of those who dropped the bombs not those who refused to talk.

As had been the case with the non-lethal coercion of twenty-five years earlier, the lethal sort engaged in by the ever-so-rational McGeorge Bundy proved to be an expensive and quite counterproductive failure. Of course, we didn't learn the limits of rational gradualism. Nor did we realize that not all governments have the same calculus of rationality or the same view of coercion.

After all we tried the same incremental approaches with respect to Panama in the late 1980s and Iraq in the aftermath of the Kuwait War. In both cases we finally concluded that there was no viable option other than waging aggressive, regime change oriented war.

The US in common with all democracies is very reluctant to go to war. Pace, progressives and other folks of the Left, but the US is quite loath to seek war, even to accept it as a viable, least-worst option. Other advanced, democratic countries see life in the same way with the result that there exists a conspiracy of diplomatic rationality.

The "conspiracy" seeks first, last, and always to employ non-lethal coercive mechanisms to persuade governments to come to the negotiating table and bargain in good faith to reach a compromise on some policy feature or another. Matters become more complicated when the members of the "conspiracy" attempt to reach agreement on the means and extent of any contemplated exercise in coercion by consensus.

The demand for consensus requires all parties to delicately balance domestic interests with foreign policy needs and interests. It also requires an equally difficult balance between short-term interests and those of a long-term nature.

Rendering effective consensus impossible is the necessity of involving countries which are either or both authoritarian and intensely self-interested. To put the matter short and sour, the necessity of achieving a consensus based understanding about coercive means and their extent with countries such as China or Russia makes the imposition of effective coercion impossible.

Even among democratic countries with more or less free enterprise economies, the need for consensus acts to insure that any and all coercive mechanisms are incremental in both design and implementation. This means in turn that the target country has ample time and warning to take measures intended to nullify the coercive intent.

The result is self-evident with respect to both Iran and North Korea. Consensus based incremental coercion be it diplomatic or economic in orientation may retard an obnoxious policy, impair an objectionable course of action, but it will not have significant effect. It will not end the policy or course of action which called the coercion into application.

Diplomatic coercion (aka "isolation") or economic coercion (aka "sanctions") must be applied swiftly and at the maximum rather than the minimum end of the scale if it is to be effective. More disturbingly to those who worship at the alter of "peace" in the temple of the "global community," diplomatic and economic coercion must reside ultimately on the credible will and capacity to employ military force in support of policy.

Coercive diplomacy in all its many forms is the effort to create an artificial coincidence of national interest. The target state seeks to end the coercion; the country or countries inflicting the coercion seek an end to a specific policy or course of action. Herein resides the coinciding national interests.

The US has violated most if not all the rules seen historically for the use of coercion in its policy toward North Korea over the past two decades. Any and all diplomatic and economic coercion has been applied through consensus approved incrementalism. As a result the effects in terms of altering North Korean behavior have been nil. The role played by China over the years has been instrumental in assuring the failure to date.

As the role of China is most unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, there is no reason to conclude any new coercion will prove effective. Even the unexpectedly muscular posture adopted by the US in its naval and military exercises with South Korea have not served to convince the Trolls of Beijing to adopt a more favorable (from the American perspective) stance.

Since South Korea has too much at risk, the use of military force is not a realistic option. In its occasional moments of lucidity, the Hermits of Pyongyang undoubtedly understand this. They also know that North Korea is too important as a physical and political buffer for China to allow the Pyongyang regime to go down the tubes.

It is quite legitimate for the Hermits of the North to conclude they can ignore the huffings and puffings of the US with impunity. Similarly, they can ignore any sweet words, mellow mood music, or blandishments Washington might say, play, or offer.

In short, the US has nothing to talk about with Pyongyang. We should save our effort. With respect to coercion, well, there is more we can do to make life unpleasant for the Hermits--if we are willing to inflict further misery on the population generally. Of course, that sort of thing would be anathema to the current administration.

The takeaway is simple and unpleasant for Uncle Sam's ego. The Pissants of Pyongyang can and will go their own way without the let or hindrance of the US. They will continue to be an annoying and potentially quite dangerous annoyance, but there is nothing the US can do about it realistically.

Sure, it is a diplomatic bramble but there is no choice beyond getting a grip on it.

ADMIN NOTE: The Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments but due to a recent spate of spam comments he has taken defensive measures. He apologizes for all frustration which may accrue.

Hey! Remember That Big Ocean Off California?

Somebody in the current administration, probably not the Clueless Guy In The Oval, has recalled the US in fact not only abuts the Pacific Ocean but is a Pacific Ocean power. That's right, just like Japan or, gasp!, the Peoples Republic of China. Gosh, if that's really true, maybe we ought to act like one.

Miraculous as it to relate, we are acting as if we are both a Pacific Ocean power and a Great Power. Specifically, the US has just engaged in a nifty little bit of force projection. Three of the four Ohio class SSBNs converted from hauling Trident ICBMs to carting 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each have been deployed to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

On 28 June the USS Ohio surfaced near Subic Bay in the Philippines. On the same day two other boats, the USS Michigan popped up off Pusan, South Korea while the USS Florida emerged from the depths at Diego Garcia.

The essentially simultaneous surfacing of three boats with a total of four hundred sixty-two Tomahawks was a guaranteed attention grabber. Governments which are not noted for their close and collaborative relations with the US (can we say, "China" or "North Korea") must have felt, as intended, a slight, cold chill run up their metaphorical spines. In an understated but quite dramatic way the US reminded all hands in Asia that it had an unrivaled capacity to project force anywhere the oceans of the world ran.

Four hundred sixty-two non-nuclear warheads--that's a quarter of million tons of high explosive in aggregate--were positioned to hit targets with a high degree of accuracy anywhere inside twenty-five hundred klicks of the launch site. That's a lot of bang, and, given the combination of targeting, air defense capacities, and saturation launching, a lot of bang with a high probability of getting through to the designated point on the map.

In large part, as the deployment points make clear, this show of force is a push back against the increasingly robust Chinese presence in the South China Sea as well as its installation of roughly a thousand missiles of various sorts near the Strait of Taiwan. For some time states in the West Pacific, ranging from Australia to Vietnam to Japan and South Korea have been urging the US government (and the Oval in particular) to show a calibrated degree of macho in the region.

And, finally, belatedly but effectively, the US has done just that. Taken in conjunction with the very large Rim of the Pacific war games off Hawaii, which involves no fewer than fourteen countries, and the smaller but closer CARAT 2010 exercises off Singapore in which ships from the US Navy and the navies of eight other countries are participating, the presence of the three Ohio class conversions is a very, very compelling shot across the bows of any adversarial government.

The Trolls of Beijing got the message. The Trolls' acknowledgement of the new reality was conveyed by the extremely restrained words of the Chinese foreign ministry. There were no shrill accusations of "Cold War mentality" or "retrogressive actions." No. There was simply a response showing that the Chinese government "hoped" the mission was intended to secure regional "stability, security and peace."

They got that right. There is nothing like a bit of quiet force projection to insure those three desirable states prevail.

China is not the only intended recipient of the message being sent by the one time boomers and the twin naval exercises. Three hundred plus of the BGM-109s are now uncomfortably close to the Democratic Republic of North Korea.

The Hermits of Pyongyang undoubtedly understand quite well that the potential barrage of reasonably accurate Tomahawks could not be stopped and could inflict unacceptable damage on critical targets. With only a few clicks of the mouse and turning of launch keys, North Korea would find itself caught in the "sea of fire" which it has so often and loudly proclaimed to be the fate of the South. And, that would occur without a single American coming into range.

North Korea has announced its sudden willingness to come back to the Six Power Talks. It is conceivable that Dear Leader and Associates made the decision out of gratitude for the milksop Security Council Statement on the sinking of the Choenan. Well, it is one theory.

If one wants to do so, one could credit the Chinese imposed restraint of the Security Council action plus creative Chinese diplomacy with the change in Pyongyang's attitude. Or, one could posit that the sudden and quite unstoppable presence of the Tomahawk carrying US submarines showed the Hermits that the limits of American patience were in sight.

It is possible that even Mr Obama has had it up to his dandruff with the stance taken by North Korea and decided that the US had big sticks which it might as well wave to good effect. At least it would be nice to conclude the US president had suffered a bout of realism. Or, that someone such as SecDef Gates had gotten through to the president. That the president had finally been made to realize the use of force, symbolically in this case, could do more to preserve both peace and American interests than the much loved open hand of outreach.

Whatever the reason and whoever made the decision to add the dramatic appearance of the Ohio class boats to the mix of previously scheduled exercises has done a real service to both the US and the cause of regional stability. A well timed and discretely executed show of force provides a fine sort of coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy focuses the mind of the recipient on the need, the imperative for the less robust form of diplomacy, the talks and memos of what used to be called the "striped pants set." In short, a bit of illustrative coercion creates the proper atmosphere for negotiations. Now it will be interesting to see how the US, China, North Korea, and the others progress at the bargaining table.

Throughout the talks, be they long or short, productive or sterile, the long shadow of the Tomahawks will be hanging over the proceedings. And, that may be the most potent force for good.

Fat Chance!

In yet one more of his accustomed exercises in tough sounding but utterly meaningless rhetoric, President Obama punctuated his appearance at the G-8 meeting by telling reporters, "There have to be consequences for such irresponsible behavior on the international stage." The practitioners of "irresponsible behavior" to whom the always eloquent if not reality connected POTUS was referring are the North Koreans. More specifically the North Korean government.

The sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, was scarcely "irresponsible behavior." That term applies rather more fittingly to running one's pickup off a cliff while holding a half empty bottle of Jack Black in one hand. Or, being a church organist who moonlights as the piano player in the local bordello.

The sinking by torpedo of a warship falls properly in the category of calculated deliberate act. A calculated, deliberate act of war. To call it anything else is mendacious at best, purely stupid at worse.

(It might help the president clarify his thinking were he to try a little thought experiment. If one of our Navy's billion dollar guided missile cruisers were to end up underwater following an encounter with, say, a torpedo fired by an Iranian submarine, would the Man in the Oval consider it merely "irresponsible behavior?" And, if he were to do so, would his interpretation be accepted by Congress? We the People?)

The Hermit Kingdom of the North made a decision at the highest levels of government. The decision to sink the South Korean naval vessel carried some slight degree of risk, but the regime calculated (quite possibly with the advice and counsel of the Trolls of Beijing) that the benefits accruing to the act far outweighed the potential adverse consequences.

There is that word again! "Consequences." The Obama administration as well as the president personally seem to be much enamored of the word, "consequences." It comes up with nauseating regularity in remarks by the president, by the SecState, by others whenever a government--usually Iran--does something of which we disapprove or fails to do something which meets our approbation.

It's a beautiful word, sort of menacing, in a polite and vague way. It carries a delicate whiff of threat, at least implied threat. It almost seems like an ultimatum, an understated one to be sure, but it has do-this-or-else! connotation which is the heart and soul of the classic ultimatum.

The overuse of the word, "consequences" by the current administration has robbed it of all the unpleasant force it may have possessed once. Experience over the past eighteen months demonstrates that the president and his "team" use the word instead of taking real action. It is not an ultimatum, but rather a substitute for one. Through the combination of overuse and subsequent inaction, "consequences" has come to imply that the irresponsibly behaving state has one more free pass.

Pyongyang, that is to say, Dear Leader, his number three son (and probable successor) and the rest of the top echelon, know perfectly well that no one is going to take any action of substance to inflict "consequences" for the "irresponsible behavior." There is absolutely nothing which can be done, no conceivable "consequence" which can be inflicted on the Hermit Kingdom.

No rational actor, certainly not the South Korean government, would consider even for a nanosecond going to war in response to the killing of forty-six sailors and the loss of an aging small surface combatant. Beyond this, anyone and everyone who is slightly oriented in time and place realizes that no sanction regime over and above all those currently in force will have any noticeable impact on Pyongyang. For reasons which are good and sufficient in their estimate, the Trolls of Beijing will make sure of that.

The realities which govern global politics assure that the Obama statement as well as the words in the official communique issued over the signatures of the G-8 leaders exercise precisely the same impact on Pyongyang as have the now traditional G-8 riots on international policy. Ironically but accurately the rioters have the same effect on high state policy as the presidents and prime ministers of the eight largest economies on Earth wield over the Hermit Kingdom. Zero equals zero.

One has to wonder why the Great Statesmen of the Big Eight bother. They, even President Obama, must know that all the thundering denunciations, all the demands for meaningful responses by the "international community," all the invocations of "consequences," are so much vapid bloviation.

Do they blather the fine sounding nothings because at least they can agree on the softer version of tough talk? Do these heads of the largest, most wealthy, most advanced, most powerful states posture with such monolithic determination over something none can influence because they cannot agree on a way to handle real problems, real rocks and shoals upon which any or all of their ships can founder?

North Korea, Iran, and even Karzai's Afghanistan will do their own thing, in their own way, regardless of the heaving and hectoring of the POTUS or even all of the Eight Really Huge Economies. The three referenced states will continue to pursue their own national interests each in its own way for its own reasons utterly immune to the "consequences." The Eight Biggies know this, for each will do the same--chase after its own subjectively defined national and strategic interest--again without regard to the importuning or promised "consequences."

Mr Obama found this truth to his personal embarrassment with the solid rejection of his plea to borrow and spend more in the American way. Whether Mr Obama's view that deficits are less of a concern than the need for further government spending in support of the "fragile" global recovery is correct is less important to the US in its foreign relations than the simple fact that his position was ignored by the others.

The Other Seven fired a very large warning shot very, very close across the bows of America. The warning is clear. US influence on the policies and behavior of other states, in this case states which are peers of the US by definition, is waning, waning rapidly. The other leaders assembled in Canada have told the US that it is not the "go-to" power it was as recently as two years ago.

Instead of trotting out old, tired, meaningless terms like "irresponsible behavior" or making dire mutters of "consequences," Mr Obama and his Team would be better off--and so would We the People, if he and they meditated upon the implications of being rejected or ignored in his policy stance by our economic peers. They would be well-advised to consider just what the future might bring as more and more countries conclude that they can go after their own national interests without the slightest regard to the views of the US.

This advice is doomed to be fruitless. Not simply because the exalted of Team Obama would never read the Geek's blog, but for a reason far more substantial. Mr Obama and, in all probability, many of those on his "team" have full bore cases of anosognosia. This means that not only does the president not know something critical, but that he does not even know that he does not know it. He is not only ignorant of ground truths governing the game of international politics--he does not even know that he is ignorant of them.

A hopeless case.

Neck Deep In Nukes

Life is becoming one big Xanax moment. First, there was the Pakistani bomb--and its twin, the Indian bomb. The came the North Korean bomb. And, one must never forget the Iranians and their quest for a Mahdi Bomb. That is a whole bunch of atoms waiting to fission.

Making life more anxiety producing is the basic consideration that all these actual or short-term potential atomic weapons--with one exception--are possessed by governments with a past history of less than responsible conduct. The prospect of "physics packages" in the hands of North Koreans, Iranians, or Pakistanis is one which is not conducive to sound sleep.

Comes now disturbing indications that another country headed by individuals whose commitment to peace, security, human rights, and other good things is at best debatable. The country in question is Burma--or, if you insist, Myanmar. Since the Australian defense analyst and scholar Desmond Ball first mooted the matter a bit over a year ago, more information has come out of the reclusive dictatorship. The skinny has come the usual way, from defectors and other malcontents finally fed up with the repressive regime and its evil effects upon the Burmese population.

As the information has fallen into an ever more complete mosaic, one cannot escape the conclusion that there is a good or better probability that Burma is pursuing an atomic weapons capacity with the assistance of North Korea and the (likely) knowledge and tacit agreement of China. The junta which has been running the Burmese show for over twenty years believes that a nuclear capability would insulate it from further Western meddling as well as provide a sovereign anodyne against any hypothetical future adventure in regime change.

While this view may be considered charitably as paranoid, there is little reason to reject the contention that the junta sees itself as under threat and facing the real possibility of an American led invasion of the Iraq 2003 style. An additional consideration which may be weighing on the minds of the junta members is the possession of an "ambiguous" nuclear capability of the Israeli model would confer real diplomatic advantages in the Southeast Asia Game of Nations.

At first sight the notion of Burma going after the Big Bomb seems more than a tad risible. Where is the complex of industry, research, and development facilities, universities that seem to be a necessary component of getting the bomb? Isn't Burma a backward, primarily agricultural place with little advanced technology, or, at least, very little technology of an indigenous nature?

Yes. Burma is all of that--and less. It has no industrial base worthy of note. It is agricultural. No first rank (or even fourth rank) universities blot its landscape. It isn't even filled with uranium ore.

However, getting your very own atomic bomb is not as difficult as many crack it up to be. For sure, the details can be difficult to master as the North Korean fizzle yield tests show, but, really all that is needed to acquire a personal capacity to plant mushroom clouds is found in three categories.

The first requirement is political will. The regime must be willing and able to run great risks, pay heavy prices in sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and a general bad rep. It must be willing to sacrifice the better interests of its citizens along the way. Even face the prospect of both covert and overt actions aimed at stopping the quest.

The Burmese regime has shown repeatedly over the past decades that it possesses the necessary political will. The members of the junta may be brutal, corrupt, inefficient, and generally incapable of living up to the Boy Scout Oath, but they have political will out the ying-yang.

The second requisite is money. Bombs do not come cheap. Neither does the technology necessary to produce a working nuclear weapon. The fact that Burma would be pursuing the bomb against the restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that is, "illegally," increases the expense.

Fortunately, the junta has massive amounts of money at its disposal. The exploitation of the country's hydrocarbon reserves and the assorted pipelines running across Burma have provided heaps and gobs of the money to the companies responsible as well as to the regime. The exact amount accruing to the junta can not be stated with precision but is in the billions. There have been more than enough billions to date (with more quite literally in the pipeline) to fund an ambitious nuclear acquisition program.

The third necessity is technical assistance from a state having reasonable competence in nuclear activities. Pakistan had help from China. Iran got aid from both Pakistan and North Korea. The North Koreans have been forced to take a more go-it-alone route, but they are good at the long, hard march sort of thing.

Burma has North Korea. A hermit-to-hermit or pariah-to-pariah program. The North Koreans constitute a not inconsiderable resource. They have a demonstrated competence in most of the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as a very high skill level in building hardened facilities far removed from prying eyes (even those of the overhead variety.) Since the North Koreans do not run on an eleemosynary philosophy, their help has not come cheap. Fortunately, the petrodollars provide the junta with the necessary ways and means.

To get from North Korea to Burma requires crossing China. Not that this presents a significant obstacle. The Trolls of Beijing will abide by any UN sanction regime provided it does not hinder their political, diplomatic, or economic interests. Turning a Nelsonian eye to shipments of material and people between Burma and North Korea in no way hurts the interests of China either short- or long-term. Best of all, the well neigh onto impenetrable Chinese cloak of secrecy will do much to assure that no prying outsiders will gain verifiable knowledge of what and whom is going from where to where.

Probably the Burmese regime has to pay handsomely for an understanding Chinese attitude, but, what is money for? It is not beyond the realm of plausibility that the Trolls of Beijing would welcome a UN sanction effort directed against the foreign companies involved in exploiting Burmese hydrocarbon resources, as the forced withdrawal of the French and American companies would be to the benefit of China.

The proliferation of relatively inexpensive and efficient uranium enrichment methods as well as the availability of proven designs of plutonium production reactors go a very long way to easing the task of the Burmese. It is a simple algorithm: The more countries that develop means of making fissionable materials and fabricating even 1950s style bombs of Hiroshima or Nagasaki level yield, the easier it becomes to join the nuclear club.

There is another fact to keep in mind. Not every country, not every public, not every leader of state or opinion has the visceral fear and loathing of nuclear weapons as afflicts most people in the West. The Trolls of Beijing, for example, or the Men of the Kremlin, take a far more measured view of nuclear weapons even in the hands of governments given to acting on ideological True Belief then is the case in most of the West. As a consequence, there is not likely to be a great hue and cry over the possibility of Burma getting the bomb.

Given that both Beijing and Moscow are not all that het up over the looming probability of the Iranians gaining their Mahdi Bomb. this certainly is no surprise. There is another consideration which bears mention.

That consideration is the demonstrable impotence of the US. Even though President Obama swears up and down that he personally is committed to the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons, there is little in practice that the US can do to inhibit proliferation. Iran and North Korea have shown clearly that one can pursue the bomb with impunity regardless of the huffing and puffing emanating from Washington, or London, or Paris. Even a country as small and remote as Burma has found out that sanctions are made to be broken or evaded, and the US is today what Mao said it to have been over forty years ago--a paper tiger.