The Hermits And Governor Bill

The Geek has been conflicted over the question of whether or not Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico deserves the highly coveted "Bugs Bunny, What A Maroon! Award."  Finally, after more than a bit of dithering he has decided the outgoing (praise be to whoever) Governor Bill had not quite made the high bar of supreme idiocy demanded for the high honor.  He did come close, however.  You can decide if the Geek was right or not.

The fat faced one time US Ambassador to the UN and almost Obama cabinet member has long been Pyongyang's favored American interlocutor surpassing even Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.  The Hermits have accorded this position to Governor Bill (as he has been affectionately (?) known for his two terms here in New Mexico) because he is a reliable conveyor belt of the desired image and message.  Once again he has done his duty.

According to Bill's view the leadership of North Korea is far more "pragmatic" than the state controlled media.  This is an interesting take on the affair given that not a word is put out by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) without having been vetted and approved, if not written by, the factotums occupying the highest levels of power.  Even Governor Bill should realize that there is no daylight between the belligerent rhetoric of KCNA and the Hermits At The Top.

Governor Bill had barely unpacked his bags back in Santa Fe when the Hermit In Charge of the Military was blasting South Korea and assuring any Southern "aggression" would result in a "sacred" or, alternate translation, "holy" war of defense.  Kim Yong-chun is hardly the "North Korean media," governor.

Minister Kim's remarks as well as their amplification in the KCNA and other Hermit owned and operated media came at the end of the large three day live-fire maneuvers thirty miles from the DMZ.  This military exercise was not only the trigger for Minister Kim's bellicose declarations, it was also the motivator for Bill Richardson's call for Southern "restraint."

It is more than passingly strange that the high profile diplomatic "troubleshooter," whose trip to the Land of the Hermits was approved by the Obama administration, can demand restraint from the South while acknowledging that even the Hermits realize they may have gone a bit too far by "shooting those civilians on that island."  He "hopes" that the Hermits may now pull back a bit and avers that he has some new initiatives on arms control from the Hermits.

As the governor outlined, the "new" initiatives the result is one of "deja vue all over again."  The combination of inspections, an offer to sell fuel rods to the South, and let's-come-reason-together combine to be an offer to sell the US and South Korea the same old dead horse one more time.  To employ an analogy from US history, the offer is Pyongyang's version of the failed LBJ approach to North Vietnam of "progressive squeeze and talk."

The attack(s) of the past several months have been the "squeeze" portion of the exercise, the "initiatives" offered to Governor Bill are the "talk" part of the game.  As background noise, the North continues to wave the saber and make dark hints of yet one more test of a nuclear device--"See we can squeeze harder."

Governor Bill credited the Hermits with showing admirable restraint during the recently concluded military exercises.  He may even think his presence in country during the period may have contributed to the pacific nature of the Hermits.  If so, he shouldn't break his arm patting himself on the back.

A far more credible reason for Northern restraint is that China finally got the message and leaned on Pyongyang.  The thinking here is that the recent high level US delegation to Beijing advised the Trolls that the next time Pyongyang kicked the hornets' nest, Washington would do nothing to soften or stop a South Korean response.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not President Obama has the testicular fortitude necessary for this warning, the fact on the ground which makes the argument persuasive is simply that the US would not be able to counsel restraint in the face of another Northern attack.  Any holding back would be political suicide for the present South Korean government.  Any hesitation would result in not only electoral backlash but demonstrations in the street and even the possibility of a military coup.

Even the (Clueless) Guy in the Oval must be aware of the downside resident in any Southern hesitancy if attacked in the near future.  The Trolls of Beijing and the Boys in the Kremlin are undoubtedly aware of what might happen in the aftermath of one more military provocation by the Hermits.  So, with or without any specific word from the US diplomats, the message and its consequences would be evident in the Forbidden City.

Pace, Governor Bill, but your latest bid to be the Greatest Peacemaker of the Decade is not going to put you number one in line for the next Nobel Peace Prize.  You have served your role as a transmission belt of old, worn out Northern demarches, but these will prove no more the route to detente in the Korean peninsula than their predecessors.  Get a grip on it!

To reward North Korea for its latest extortion attempt is as self-defeating as is any giving in to any extortionate power.  The Hermits want much.  They will give nothing of significance.  That is the word of experience, the lesson of history.

Keeping to the policy which demands a real, verifiable move to denuclearization as a prerequisite for restarting the Six Power Talks--or any other diplomatic exchange--is the best way to go.  Indeed, it is the only way to go.  The administration is to be commended for having done so to date.  It will deserve even more if it stays the course and hangs tough even in the presence of Governor Bill's latest package.

Considering the totality of the circumstances including the transfer of North Korean centrifuge technology to Iran, there is no alternative to staring the Hermits down, even at the risk of inadvertent, unsought war in the Peninsula.  As night falls there can be no denying the fact that North Korea is the number one foreign policy troublemaker.  Compared to it the challenges presented by Venezuela or even Iran are as trifles.

Russia Chooses A Side

While it is not a surprise, the decision of Vladimir Putin's regime to join China in the support of North Korea (or, if not precisely that, in opposition to the South Koreans and thus the US) must be a disappointment to the Obama administration.  If the vaunted "Team of Rivals" which constitutes the Obama inner circle had a realpolitik view of life, the sharp turn against Seoul and Washington would not be a disappointing further rejection of the "Reset Button" policy.

In calling for an emergency closed door UN Security Council meeting on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the Russians were doing the expectable.  In the Russian condemnation of the US for not immediately convening the emergency meeting in its role as this month's chair, Moscow was doing the predictable.  When Moscow called for the cancellation of the impending South Korean live fire exercises on Yeonpyeong Island, the Masters of the Kremlin went over the edge.  No longer could they maintain the pretense of evenhandedness; the characterization of the military exercises as a "dangerous aggravation" demonstrates clear partisan orientation.

In so closely associating itself with China, the Russians have embarked on a risky course of diplomacy, a course with one intention which may well result in a defeat on another, far more important diplomatic front.

The Russian move is linked to the ratification of the new START pending in the Senate.  As the Russians have no bull in the Korean herd unlike Beijing, the goal of their demarche in the UNSC must be that of demonstrating to the Obama administration the consequences of a failure on the part of the "US side" to ratify the treaty without further delay or modification.  The Kremlin is flexing its trouble making muscles in a high profile venue to show unmistakably that there will be a price to be paid should the Republicans stall the ratification process or insist upon modifications which would necessitate reopening the entire negotiation effort.

In the present Korean context, the North Koreans continue to be very much in the wrong.  Their actions, whether sinking a South Korean warship or bombarding an island located to the south of the Northern Limit Line, Pyongyang has acted contrary to the provisions of the 1953 Armistice as well as relevant international law.  The South Korean responses to date including the live fire exercises have been both "restrained" (to use the favorite word of both Beijing and, now, Moscow) and completely within its rights as a sovereign state.  No observer unless blinded by the requirements of ulterior motives and objectives can deny that.

In its support of South Korea, which includes a refusal to engage in a re-run of the Six Power Talks without Pyongyang making serious and severe concessions in advance, the Obama administration is on the side of the angels.  To hold talks with the Hermits of the North without the Hermits first demonstrating a genuine repentance would be to reward aggression, submit to extortion, and unduly reinforce the foundations of a regime facing a possible succession crisis.  It would be, in short, counterproductive and self-defeating.

The Russian leadership is not comprised of situationally naive people.  Putin, Medvedev and company well understand that the US position is both realistic and justified by regional political dynamics.  More than most governments, that of Russia understands the political and diplomatic games of extortion from both sides of the relationship.

So there is no direct rationale for the Russian effort to muck about in the Korean swamp.  There is, however, a very powerful indirect one.  The Kremlin wants the new START ratified quickly and cleanly.  The Boys at the Top understand that there is a potent opposition to the new treaty within the Republicans of the Senate.  Thus they are hopeful that a bit of pressure might somehow, someway, push the Obama administration into doing something to pull the Republican fangs.

It is even possible that Putin, et al may even entertain the notion that the Republicans in the Senate might get the message, might come to understand what is at risk should the new START not be ratified.  If this is the case, the Geek fears they have vastly overestimated the mentality of the Republican opposition.  The current exhibition of Russian intransigence is more likely to stimulate left over Cold War apprehensions regarding the intentions of the Kremlin than to serve as an example of what might be expected absent START ratification.

The proposed treaty is not perfect from the American perspective particularly with respect to force modernization and anti-ballistic missile system development.  Objections in these areas are not figments of feverish Republican imaginations, nor are they baseless renewals of Cold War fears.

Even with the asymmetries built into the treaty, it deserves ratification.  There are benefits to the US.  The most important of these is the reestablishment of the inspection regime which lapsed with the expiry of the former treaty.  The reduction in (to use the old Soviet term) "nuclear charges" is to the advantage of the US as well given the expense of maintaining the larger number of active and reserve "charges" and delivery systems.  Provided that the current or some future administration does not use the new START as a cover for an unwillingness to pay the economic and political price of force modernization, that feature of the treaty should not serve as an obstacle.

This leaves the objections centering on ABM research, development, and deployment as a legitimate point.  This point along with the very ticklish problem of theater or tactical nuclear weapons can be put to one side for the moment without the US suffering any real disadvantage over time.

This implies that most of the Republican objections are not so much rooted in the language of START as they are in a general distrust or dislike of the Russian government today.  While superficially resembling the so-called "Cold War mentality" so often invoked by rhetoricians in both Beijing and Moscow, it is not the same.  The distrust and dislike of Russia's government stems instead from the highly nationalistic behavior of that government coupled with the perception that the Russian government is, in fact, a non-democratic regime tainted with corrupt authoritarianism.

These perceptions are accurate.  Russia is not and never has been a democracy.  It is not and never has been noted for honest, transparent governance.  Russia is not and never has been free of a strong authoritarian bent.

So what?

It matters not that Vladimir of the Bare Chest cannot live up to the requirements of the Boy Scout Oath.  It matters not that a Russian election is not open, fair, honest.  It is utterly irrelevant that corruption is rampant.  It is of no consequence that the rule of law consists of whatever the Person in Charge says it is.

All that really matters is the ground truth that Russia is what it always has been--a country strongly motivated by nationalism, by the unqualified pursuit of national interest.  The very fact that Russia is nationalistic to an extent that few in the American elite can comprehend is the greatest single reason in favor of ratifying START.  A new treaty puts some verifiable limits on Russian expansion in the nuclear arena.  It places a ring fence around nuclear deployment and the size of the ready use nuclear arsenal.

To put it in very simple words: The more nationalistic a government is, the more vital it is to put limits, verifiable limits on its actions.

While imperfect, this is what START does.  It is all it does.  And, doing so is very much in US interests.

This is why the Russian posture on Korea is so troublesome.  By its unnecessary skewing in favor of the Chinese defined line and totally unjustifiable tilt against South Korea exercising its sovereign rights, the Kremlin may have strengthened the opposition to START.  It may even have provided a political impetus or at least cover for some conservative Democrats to break with Obama administration and vote against the treaty.

If this assessment of Russian motives and goals is close to accurate, it implies something larger and more important about the current Russian leadership.  The implication is both simple and alarming.  The Kremlin Boys, or at least the one who counts most, Vladimir Putin, has no clear understanding of how American politics operate or how Americans at the top of the political pyramid think.

Of course, with its emphasis on the fiction of a "Rest Button," the Obama administration generally and the president in particular have done nothing to educate the Russians topside in the whys and ways of US politics.  If anything the administration and president have convinced the ever-so-muscular Putin that the US has gone soft, flabby, and irresolute, and, thus, is suitable for a bit of creative bullying.

If that is the case, the Kremlin has made another serious miscalculation.  One mile of bad diplomatic road almost always leads to another.