Ripples And Fallout

No event exists or can exist in a vacuum.  Certainly no event punctuated by the noise of bombs, missiles, and gunfire can be considered to have no implications, no ramifications, no ripples and fallout.  So it is with the Western Answer to the Libyan Question.

If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now.  The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target.  The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct.  When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.

This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost.  The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US.  The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein.  His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.

The big QED is self-evident.  As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe.  Lose that capacity and all is over.  The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program.  Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.

Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay.  The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.

So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe.  One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.

The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria.  Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya.  The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.

Leiberman did not mention Hama.  He should have.  It would have made his case more convincing.  Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion.  At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire.  The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater.  In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent.  More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.

A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent.  The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years.  The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now.  This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.

For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo.  They can neither expect nor give quarter.  Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.

With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern.  That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria.  Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power.  If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.

Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria.  She averred that every country in the Mideast is different.  Duh?  Gosh, you don't say?

Syria certainly isn't Libya.  Syria is far from isolated.  While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia.  This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.

Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states.  It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West.  It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics.  This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself.  This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.

Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA.  The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob.  This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.

Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya.  It has a far more up to date air defense system.  In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer.  And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel.  Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.

Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought.  One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.

Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria.  If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done.  And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions.  Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.

There are other ripples sloshing around.  None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular.  One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US.  Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration.  Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.

Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison.  The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  What this means is simple.  We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.

In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.

The Hermits And Governor Bill

The Geek has been conflicted over the question of whether or not Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico deserves the highly coveted "Bugs Bunny, What A Maroon! Award."  Finally, after more than a bit of dithering he has decided the outgoing (praise be to whoever) Governor Bill had not quite made the high bar of supreme idiocy demanded for the high honor.  He did come close, however.  You can decide if the Geek was right or not.

The fat faced one time US Ambassador to the UN and almost Obama cabinet member has long been Pyongyang's favored American interlocutor surpassing even Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.  The Hermits have accorded this position to Governor Bill (as he has been affectionately (?) known for his two terms here in New Mexico) because he is a reliable conveyor belt of the desired image and message.  Once again he has done his duty.

According to Bill's view the leadership of North Korea is far more "pragmatic" than the state controlled media.  This is an interesting take on the affair given that not a word is put out by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) without having been vetted and approved, if not written by, the factotums occupying the highest levels of power.  Even Governor Bill should realize that there is no daylight between the belligerent rhetoric of KCNA and the Hermits At The Top.

Governor Bill had barely unpacked his bags back in Santa Fe when the Hermit In Charge of the Military was blasting South Korea and assuring any Southern "aggression" would result in a "sacred" or, alternate translation, "holy" war of defense.  Kim Yong-chun is hardly the "North Korean media," governor.

Minister Kim's remarks as well as their amplification in the KCNA and other Hermit owned and operated media came at the end of the large three day live-fire maneuvers thirty miles from the DMZ.  This military exercise was not only the trigger for Minister Kim's bellicose declarations, it was also the motivator for Bill Richardson's call for Southern "restraint."

It is more than passingly strange that the high profile diplomatic "troubleshooter," whose trip to the Land of the Hermits was approved by the Obama administration, can demand restraint from the South while acknowledging that even the Hermits realize they may have gone a bit too far by "shooting those civilians on that island."  He "hopes" that the Hermits may now pull back a bit and avers that he has some new initiatives on arms control from the Hermits.

As the governor outlined, the "new" initiatives the result is one of "deja vue all over again."  The combination of inspections, an offer to sell fuel rods to the South, and let's-come-reason-together combine to be an offer to sell the US and South Korea the same old dead horse one more time.  To employ an analogy from US history, the offer is Pyongyang's version of the failed LBJ approach to North Vietnam of "progressive squeeze and talk."

The attack(s) of the past several months have been the "squeeze" portion of the exercise, the "initiatives" offered to Governor Bill are the "talk" part of the game.  As background noise, the North continues to wave the saber and make dark hints of yet one more test of a nuclear device--"See we can squeeze harder."

Governor Bill credited the Hermits with showing admirable restraint during the recently concluded military exercises.  He may even think his presence in country during the period may have contributed to the pacific nature of the Hermits.  If so, he shouldn't break his arm patting himself on the back.

A far more credible reason for Northern restraint is that China finally got the message and leaned on Pyongyang.  The thinking here is that the recent high level US delegation to Beijing advised the Trolls that the next time Pyongyang kicked the hornets' nest, Washington would do nothing to soften or stop a South Korean response.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not President Obama has the testicular fortitude necessary for this warning, the fact on the ground which makes the argument persuasive is simply that the US would not be able to counsel restraint in the face of another Northern attack.  Any holding back would be political suicide for the present South Korean government.  Any hesitation would result in not only electoral backlash but demonstrations in the street and even the possibility of a military coup.

Even the (Clueless) Guy in the Oval must be aware of the downside resident in any Southern hesitancy if attacked in the near future.  The Trolls of Beijing and the Boys in the Kremlin are undoubtedly aware of what might happen in the aftermath of one more military provocation by the Hermits.  So, with or without any specific word from the US diplomats, the message and its consequences would be evident in the Forbidden City.

Pace, Governor Bill, but your latest bid to be the Greatest Peacemaker of the Decade is not going to put you number one in line for the next Nobel Peace Prize.  You have served your role as a transmission belt of old, worn out Northern demarches, but these will prove no more the route to detente in the Korean peninsula than their predecessors.  Get a grip on it!

To reward North Korea for its latest extortion attempt is as self-defeating as is any giving in to any extortionate power.  The Hermits want much.  They will give nothing of significance.  That is the word of experience, the lesson of history.

Keeping to the policy which demands a real, verifiable move to denuclearization as a prerequisite for restarting the Six Power Talks--or any other diplomatic exchange--is the best way to go.  Indeed, it is the only way to go.  The administration is to be commended for having done so to date.  It will deserve even more if it stays the course and hangs tough even in the presence of Governor Bill's latest package.

Considering the totality of the circumstances including the transfer of North Korean centrifuge technology to Iran, there is no alternative to staring the Hermits down, even at the risk of inadvertent, unsought war in the Peninsula.  As night falls there can be no denying the fact that North Korea is the number one foreign policy troublemaker.  Compared to it the challenges presented by Venezuela or even Iran are as trifles.

Belaboring The Obvious Or Passing The Buck?

Adm Micheal Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has delivered in an appropriately stentorian tone his appreciation of the self-evident: China has a, even the, main role to play in convincing the North Korean regime to refrain from lobbing artillery shells on Southern territory, troops, and civilians.  Admiral Mullen is stating a position which is not only appealing but represents the consensus of the Obama administration.

The presumed ability of China to influence the actions of the rulers of the Hermit Kingdom of the North seems so obvious that it might appear foolish not to pass the baton on North Korean affairs to the Trolls of Beijing.  Of course, the contention that China should do the heavy lifting depends upon affirmative answers to a few key questions.

Do the Trolls really have as much juice as so often affirmed?  Do they have the influence equivalent to the dependence upon China normally attributed to North Korea?

Even more important: Does Beijing have any real interest in modifying Pyongyang's behavior in the way desired by the US, South Korea, and Japan?  What, if any, interests held by the Trolls to be important would be facilitated or advanced by becoming the carrier of American water in the Korean Peninsula?  What costs would the Trolls impose on the US for agreeing to be the point man on American policy?

Given the North Korean defining philosophy of juche, meaning national self-reliance and an absolute avoidance of even the slightest appearance of foreign "domination" even by a close "friend" and ally such as China, what grounds exist to believe that Pyongyang would capitulate in any manner to Chinese pressure or blandishments?  Can the centrality of a unique definition of nationalism and national strength trump even the capacity of China for influence?

None of these questions are without answer, but, for most of them the answer would be unpleasant to the eyes and ears of President Obama and most of his foreign policy "team."  Even more disturbing, at least for those Americans who are not part of the presidential inner circle, would be the answer to another, more basic question.

This foundation question?  By seeking to put China in the driver's seat is the administration acknowledging that  the US no longer has the ability or will to take the lead in advancing and protecting the interests not only of itself but of close and strategically critical allies such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the other, smaller states of the Pacific littoral who increasingly have been looking to us as the barrier against China's more expansionist and aggressive policies?

The North Korean regime took advantage of the visit by a highly qualified American nuclear expert, Siegfried Hecker, to demonstrate just how effective their application of juche has been in the area of nuclear materials production. While the exhibit of their new centrifuge cascade as well as the construction of a new and much larger light water reactor near the site of the decommissioned one at Yongbyon can be interpreted as showing how important China has been in Pyongyang's evasion of the sanctions, it can also be seen as a tribute to juche.

The Hermit Kingdom of the North has been and remains willing to provide only one half the required daily calorie requirement to its citizens, telling them to scrounge for the rest.  In essence and in the internal messages given its population every day, the sacrifice is necessary in the name of juche, the need to maintain sufficient military strength to deter the main enemies and assure national independence.  The result is simple: Nobody is happy, but most all are willing to (literally) tighten their belts if doing such keeps the country sovereign.

To put it in a slightly different way, the linkage of sacrifice with the needs of juche and the constant threats presented by South Korea, the US, Japan, and others of the "imperialist camp," provides North Korea with a degree of monolithic political will virtually beyond the capacity of a Westerner to comprehend or even imagine.  Within the context of a multi-generational cult of personality which has engraved itself on the hearts and minds of nearly every North Korean, the sacrifice-equals-independence driven political will provides the Hermits Of Pyongyang with an instrument of remarkable durability.

The impending succession of Kim Jong-un has put stresses on the leadership mechanism as well as the ties that bind leadership to population.  Unlike the long preparatory period preceding the ascension of Kim Jong-il, the current transfer of both power and legitimacy to the number three son has been taking place at warp speed.  It has been and will continue to be critical for the smooth passing of the mantel of heaven from father to son for the son to win his bones with the very hardline bunch behind the throne.

This has meant that Kim Jong-un be perceived as a tough and shrewed man, a man capable of performing actions which would crush a lesser personality.  The sinking of the CheoAn as well as the artillery stonk on Yeonpyeong island are calculated provocations intended to demonstrate the new kid's capacity and willingness to take risks successfully.

Of course the risks were far more apparent than real.  Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul want to restart the Korean War.  Neither does China.  Nor the US.  All  hands agree that war is not a winner.

The Hermits of Pyongyang must have known quite well before the sinking of the CheoAn that there would be no real repercussions.  As had been demonstrated previously by the tepid responses to the nuclear weapons test and the partially successful test firing of a prototype ICBM, the talk might be tough and the UN sanctions apparently so as well, but where the rubber hits the road the consequences would be nonexistent.  The Hermits knew they could depend upon the Trolls to play the stall game effectively and, if necessary, either veto sanctions or conspire in their avoidance.

The Trolls and the Hermits alike had appreciated the American president as having a diplomatic backbone equivalent to that of President McKinley.  They also agreed in their view that the South Korean government and people were so enamored of peace and prosperity to respond with little beyond a few unpleasant words to the sinking of a warship and the killing of a few dozen sailors.

The artillery fire mission the other day was a small escalation of the CheoAn affair.  The difference resides in the presence of civilian bodies (two) among the dead.  That difference is not sufficient to ignite a war, and all concerned knew this before the first shot was fired.

Right now the primary interest of North Korea other than assuring the succession goes smoothly is the extortion of more food aid from the world generally and the West more particularly.  As an attention getting device the shelling has worked--quite well.  The probability the food will flow in greater quantity has been enhanced particularly as the need for food--even on the terms dictated by Pyongyang which contravene normal policy--has been embraced by one time South Korean foreign minister and now UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Longer term the Hermits of Pyongyang want much more than food aid.  This is why the Hermits insist to every  (in Lenin's famed formulation) "useful fool" who happens by that everything is on the table including the nuclear program provided North Korea is treated with "respect."  What the Hermits leave out of the discussion is that the only goal worth sacrificing the nuclear and other weapons related programs is the reunification of the two Koreas under Northern domination.  The Hermits have been convinced for some years now that the best way to achieve that goal is by slowly and surely reducing the political will of South Korea and its primary supporters.  Combining provocations with stalls is a good tactic in achieving that goal.

China has no problem with the goal of the Hermits.  If anything a reunification on the terms and conditions dictated by Pyongyang would mesh with Chinese regional interests.

Reunification is a long way off at best.  Thus China has short term goals with respect to North Korea.  Most of all the Trolls want transition to go down slick and sure.  No bumps, no surprises, one Kim out and another, younger one in without missing a beat.

Beijing understands the need for Number Three Son to have the correct credentials in the estimate of the assorted powers behind the throne.  Thus they have no difficulties with provocations, even an escalating series of such.  The Trolls have full confidence in President Obama to do nothing beyond words, symbols such as joint naval exercises, and showing continued faith in the UN.  They are also sure the South Korean government is in no hurry to see Seoul as an "ocean of flame."

A companion goal for the Trolls is a burnishing of the perceptions of their power in the region.  By being seen as the key player in the Korean affair it is probable that they will be seen more generally as being what they wish to become--regional hegemon.

By passing the buck to Beijing the Obama administration has given assistance to the Trolls in their goal of enhanced diplomatic and political influence and status in the region.  And, given the contagion of perceptions common in the world, greater influence and status throughout the globe.

To answer the question which is the title of this post: The Obama administration has both underscored the apparent but not necessarily real influence of China on North Korea and passed the buck to Beijing.  By doing so the administration has simultaneously boosted the Trolls in their quest for more influence and surrendered another portion of American diplomatic strength.

Wow!  What a great way to pursue the national and strategic interests of the United States.

Hey! Remember That Big Ocean Off California?

Somebody in the current administration, probably not the Clueless Guy In The Oval, has recalled the US in fact not only abuts the Pacific Ocean but is a Pacific Ocean power. That's right, just like Japan or, gasp!, the Peoples Republic of China. Gosh, if that's really true, maybe we ought to act like one.

Miraculous as it to relate, we are acting as if we are both a Pacific Ocean power and a Great Power. Specifically, the US has just engaged in a nifty little bit of force projection. Three of the four Ohio class SSBNs converted from hauling Trident ICBMs to carting 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each have been deployed to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

On 28 June the USS Ohio surfaced near Subic Bay in the Philippines. On the same day two other boats, the USS Michigan popped up off Pusan, South Korea while the USS Florida emerged from the depths at Diego Garcia.

The essentially simultaneous surfacing of three boats with a total of four hundred sixty-two Tomahawks was a guaranteed attention grabber. Governments which are not noted for their close and collaborative relations with the US (can we say, "China" or "North Korea") must have felt, as intended, a slight, cold chill run up their metaphorical spines. In an understated but quite dramatic way the US reminded all hands in Asia that it had an unrivaled capacity to project force anywhere the oceans of the world ran.

Four hundred sixty-two non-nuclear warheads--that's a quarter of million tons of high explosive in aggregate--were positioned to hit targets with a high degree of accuracy anywhere inside twenty-five hundred klicks of the launch site. That's a lot of bang, and, given the combination of targeting, air defense capacities, and saturation launching, a lot of bang with a high probability of getting through to the designated point on the map.

In large part, as the deployment points make clear, this show of force is a push back against the increasingly robust Chinese presence in the South China Sea as well as its installation of roughly a thousand missiles of various sorts near the Strait of Taiwan. For some time states in the West Pacific, ranging from Australia to Vietnam to Japan and South Korea have been urging the US government (and the Oval in particular) to show a calibrated degree of macho in the region.

And, finally, belatedly but effectively, the US has done just that. Taken in conjunction with the very large Rim of the Pacific war games off Hawaii, which involves no fewer than fourteen countries, and the smaller but closer CARAT 2010 exercises off Singapore in which ships from the US Navy and the navies of eight other countries are participating, the presence of the three Ohio class conversions is a very, very compelling shot across the bows of any adversarial government.

The Trolls of Beijing got the message. The Trolls' acknowledgement of the new reality was conveyed by the extremely restrained words of the Chinese foreign ministry. There were no shrill accusations of "Cold War mentality" or "retrogressive actions." No. There was simply a response showing that the Chinese government "hoped" the mission was intended to secure regional "stability, security and peace."

They got that right. There is nothing like a bit of quiet force projection to insure those three desirable states prevail.

China is not the only intended recipient of the message being sent by the one time boomers and the twin naval exercises. Three hundred plus of the BGM-109s are now uncomfortably close to the Democratic Republic of North Korea.

The Hermits of Pyongyang undoubtedly understand quite well that the potential barrage of reasonably accurate Tomahawks could not be stopped and could inflict unacceptable damage on critical targets. With only a few clicks of the mouse and turning of launch keys, North Korea would find itself caught in the "sea of fire" which it has so often and loudly proclaimed to be the fate of the South. And, that would occur without a single American coming into range.

North Korea has announced its sudden willingness to come back to the Six Power Talks. It is conceivable that Dear Leader and Associates made the decision out of gratitude for the milksop Security Council Statement on the sinking of the Choenan. Well, it is one theory.

If one wants to do so, one could credit the Chinese imposed restraint of the Security Council action plus creative Chinese diplomacy with the change in Pyongyang's attitude. Or, one could posit that the sudden and quite unstoppable presence of the Tomahawk carrying US submarines showed the Hermits that the limits of American patience were in sight.

It is possible that even Mr Obama has had it up to his dandruff with the stance taken by North Korea and decided that the US had big sticks which it might as well wave to good effect. At least it would be nice to conclude the US president had suffered a bout of realism. Or, that someone such as SecDef Gates had gotten through to the president. That the president had finally been made to realize the use of force, symbolically in this case, could do more to preserve both peace and American interests than the much loved open hand of outreach.

Whatever the reason and whoever made the decision to add the dramatic appearance of the Ohio class boats to the mix of previously scheduled exercises has done a real service to both the US and the cause of regional stability. A well timed and discretely executed show of force provides a fine sort of coercive diplomacy.

Coercive diplomacy focuses the mind of the recipient on the need, the imperative for the less robust form of diplomacy, the talks and memos of what used to be called the "striped pants set." In short, a bit of illustrative coercion creates the proper atmosphere for negotiations. Now it will be interesting to see how the US, China, North Korea, and the others progress at the bargaining table.

Throughout the talks, be they long or short, productive or sterile, the long shadow of the Tomahawks will be hanging over the proceedings. And, that may be the most potent force for good.

Sure, The North Did It--Now What?

The MSM is all over the forthcoming report by the international panel investigating the sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, which will provide the "objective and scientific basis" for pointing the finger at the Hermit Kingdom of the North. From the information leaked to the media it appears as if the accusation of Northern culpability is well founded.

While no person at all grounded in the realities of modern ship building and handling as well as the state of play in regional politics could have concluded otherwise, it is reassuring to find out that the scene of the crime was rife with high quality forensic materials. The sinking is clearly the result of a torpedo hit. The torpedo is of a type furnished to North Korea by China during the eighties.

The North Koreans had an excellent motive for sinking the Cheonan. It was not, as some pundits have averred, a vengeance strike for the sinking by South Korean patrol boats of a Northern small surface combatant. Rather the sinking was motivated by a strong need in Pyongyang to assure the Six Power Talks remain in hiatus while sparing North Korea and its patrons in Beijing the embarrassment of taking direct responsibility.

The Chinese have indicated an ambivalent attitude toward the sinking ever since it took Beijing a full month to offer pro forma condolences. The Men of the Forbidden City also have more fundamental ambiguity regarding their relation to the Hermit Kingdom of the North and the continuation of the face-losing Six Power Talks which, after all, were a Chinese invention.

In a real sense North Korea is a tiger which the Chinese mounted back during the Korean War when they sent their legions of "volunteers" to rescue Pyongyang from disaster and protect their industial northeast against any potential US/UN air threat. First for reasons of an ideological nature and then for motives of a more practical sort, such as the need to protect social and economic stability from a flood of North Korean refugees, Beijing has had no choice other than that of propping up the decrepit dictatorship of Dear Leader and his father.

At the same time North Korea has become ever more dependent upon the subventions provided by Beijing. At one time, back when there was a Soviet Union, Pyongyang could play its two patrons off against each other as both Moscow and Beijing jockeyed for leadership of the "Socialist Camp." Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, China has been the sole source of whatever passes for economic stability in the North.

The tiny anemic tiger and its giant rider cannot abandon one another without unacceptable losses and damage. For the North Koreans the disaster of a Chinese abandonment would be almost instant governmental collapse and chaos or a spasm of war directed against the South with consequences massive and bad for both North and South. For the Chinese the consequence of letting the North go would be either internal Northern chaos or the (perhaps literal) fallout of war on the peninsula. Neither is desirable from the perspective of Beijing--although the second would be far less so.

Even if Pyongyang does not launch a spasm attack, any collapse in the North would result in a flood of people crossing the Tumen and Yalu rivers with a very negative impact on China. The northeast is China's rust belt and has seen more than a few outbreaks of social unrest in the past ten years. An influx of North Koreans would be an exacerbation which Beijing cannot contemplate with equanimity.

The North Korean regime is not one given to compromise. Nor is it given to abandoning its only diplomatic card, the nuclear program, without a payoff of truly stupendous nature. Even the largess promised by the US, South Korea, Japan, and others in previous efforts to defang the North Korean nuclear potential proved to be insufficient in the eyes of Dear Leader and the coterie surrounding the throne.

It is possible that the only payoff which would convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear quest, dismantle its miniature atomic arsenal, and act as if it were a mature and responsible government would be the reunification of the peninsula under terms highly favorable to Northern dominance. This is a price far too high for the South Koreans--or the US and Japan--to pay.

It may even be a price too high for Beijing to continence given the capacity of the South Korean economy and technological inventiveness. Beijing is well aware that South Korea like Japan has an off-the-shelf capability to become a nuclear weapons possessing power. It is also well aware that the ruling oligarchy with or without Dear Leader or a blood successor is not predictable in its behavior, so a North Korean dominated peninsula with a nuclear potential and a very productive infrastructure at present would be a game changer in regional dynamics.

As a result it is debatable that the Trolls of Beijing really, really want to see the Six Power Talks resume given that they are doomed to fail--and China resents being linked so intimately with a diplomatic failure of global proportions. So, if as a result of the Cheonan sinking the South Koreans reject reopening the talks, China will not be upset no matter how much rhetoric to the contrary spews from their foreign ministry.

This leaves the question of what the South Koreans can do to balance the books. War is not an option as even the rumor of the remotest possibility of war would spook investors so that capital would flee the South at an awesome rate of knots. If the evidence presented by South Korea is "objective and scientific" enough to impress both Beijing and Moscow, there is some chance that the Security Council would impose yet more sanctions on the North.

That, of course, would be a big "so what?" in the eyes of Pyongyang. The Hermits are secure in knowing that Beijing cannot let the North go down the tubes no matter what sanctions might be considered. If nothing else Beijing can always invoke "humanitarian" considerations to continue trade in essentials such as food, energy, and the exchange of raw materials for manufactured goods. And, the Hermits have a ready clientele for their top end products such as missiles and missile components--to say nothing of nuclear energy related technology. And, the record shows, the North with Chinese assistance can readily break any UN imposed quasi-blockade.

North Korea committed an act of mass murder on Southerners. It has been recognized as just that by South Koreans generally and the younger generation in particular. With the identification of the murder weapon as one of Chinese manufacture, the ire of the Southern population will include China as well as the trigger pullers in Pyongyang. This political reality complicates the matter of a Southern response.

It would take a gesture of an unprecedented nature on the part of Beijing to both cool animus directed against it but also to facilitate the ability and willingness of the South Korean government to heed Chinese admonitions to remain "calm." Just what that gesture might be remains to be seen, but the proposition that Beijing is considering that option cannot be dismissed lightly or quickly.

In a very real sense the ball is resting firmly not in the court of Seoul nor in that of Pyongyang but in that labeled "Beijing." There is no doubt but the Chinese want "calm" in the neighborhood. What also must not be doubted is that it is up to them to do all that is possible to assure that desired condition ensues.

Real Nice--If They Can Be Trusted

On the surface it appears as if the Obama administration has achieved a pair of diplomatic successes. The first is the response made by the Kremlin leadership to Obama's "brave move" (to quote Vladimir Putin) in cancelling the land-based ABM system in Central Europe planned by the Bush/Cheney team. The second is the new receptivity on the part of Kim Jong-il to multilateral efforts to end the Hermit Kingdom of the North's nuclear weapons program.

The Dear Leader has indicated that North Korea will re-enter the Six Power Talks following a chat with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese PM, who also delivered a personal letter from the Chinese president, Hu Jintao. The new Chinese demarche is critical as only the Peoples Republic can put credible pressure on the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

Ever since 6 October 1949 when the Peoples Republic extended diplomatic and fraternal relations to North Korea, it has been the primary supporter of the Hermit Kingdom. Without Chinese assistance the North Korean state would have ceased to exist back in the Fall of 1950. Subsequently, the Chinese have assured that the North Koreans have been fed, given military and economic development aid, and generally been protected against the worst effects of their rambunctious behavior.

When the Hermit Kingdom detonated its second nuclear test shot, it went over the line as far as Beijing was concerned. The Chinese government is (perhaps unrealistically) concerned that a nuclear armed North Korea would trigger an arms race in the region. There is little doubt that both South Korea and Japan could produce nuclear weapons in very short order, and this is an eventuality which Beijing wants to avoid at almost any cost.

At the same time Beijing has been concerned that pushing the Hermits too hard or too fast would result in a destabilization of the country. Any fracturing of the regime in Pyongyang would result in a flood of refugees across the Yalu and Tuman rivers. A flow of refugees would have an echo effect on the stability in northeast China, which has already experienced internal unrest as the aging rust belt industries of the area have been closed.

Apparently, Beijing has concluded that Kim Jong-il is in sufficient command of the situation and further that the succession "crisis" has been averted or sufficiently postponed that it can now put the screws to Dear Leader. As a result, the Chinese leadership has taken advantage of the sixtieth anniversary of the diplomatic relations and fraternal friendship to "suggest" that Pyongyang should return to the Six Power Talks.

If the Hermits follow through on the initial indications and come back to the multi-lateral talks, not only will this be a complete reversal of previous policy, but, more importantly from the perspective of Beijing, it will be a major diplomatic coup for their team. China has more to gain from bringing the long running in fits and starts Six Power talks to a successful conclusion than merely the avoidance of a nuclear arms race in their backyard.

In case no one has noticed, China is in the midst of a major multi-year effort to become a significant international actor not only in economic affairs but in global politics. The Six Power talks have been a prime component of this campaign, so the ultimate success of the talks is a matter of global importance to Beijing. If the talks resume and come to a conclusion agreeable to the US, then China will have established itself as the ultimate regional power and have a good shot at rivaling the US and eclipsing Russia globally.

With a goal of this magnitude in play, the Beijing government has decided it is worth the slight risk of the Hermit Kingdom being either intransigent or tottering toward the abyss of internal rupture. At the very least, the resumption of the Six Power Talks will place the US and the (new) Japanese government in Beijing's debt.

More, a successful resolution of the North Korean nuclear question will make Beijing's light of leadership all the more attractive to the (new) Japanese government in its quest to chart a course more independent of the US. The same light will beckon to the South Koreans, giving their present and future governments an alternative to the US.

While not constituting a shift in the seismic plates of Pacific Rim relations, the Chinese role in a (still hypothetical of course) success in the Six Power Talks will add leverage to the goal of Beijing of reabsorbing Taiwan into the homeland. As the center of diplomatic gravity shifts closer to Beijing and further from Washington, the opposition to the reclamation of Taiwan is automatically attenuated--significantly.

A Chinese guided success in the Six Power Talks will also put Washington somewhat in Beijing's debt with ramifications of importance to other looming problems. Like Iran. The success of the Six Power Talks--or merely their resumption--will assure that Beijing has a greater freedom of action with respect to Iran. That it can ignore calls for enhanced sanctions with impunity--an even greater impunity than currently exists.

The Obama administration and its State Department would be well advised to view the new Chinese efforts with a careful eye--even a jaundiced one. The Boys In Beijing are not running a global eleemosynary institution. Beijing is pursuing self-defined national and strategic interests with a view to enhancing its global authority while necessarily reducing that of the US.

The same degree of skepticism should be employed by the Deep Thinkers of the Obama crew with respect to the impact of the scuttling of the land-based Central European ABM system. To no great surprise the move has been hailed in Moscow. Not only has PM Putin greeted it as a "brave move;" Dmitry Medvedev has promised that American concerns will be listened to "more closely."

WOW! How shocking! So what?

At the same time the Obama reversal has lowered the credibility of the US as the ultimate guarantor of national self-determination and independence of countries uncomfortably close to the Russian frontier. In the estimate of realpolickers in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungry, the Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic States, the center of diplomatic gravity shifted overnight from the far reaches of the Atlantic Ocean to the walls of the Kremlin. The apparent capitulation of the Obama administration to long standing Russian demands hints (or more) at a lack of political will in Washington and a willingness to sacrifice the countries of Central Europe to the political and historical paranoia of the Russians.

Regardless of the intrinsic merits of the Obama administration's decision (and there are many including a rejection of the insultingly high-handed way in which the Bush/Cheney bunch rammed the ABM policy down the Kremlin's throat), the action was taken without any immediately evident quid pro quo. The absence of a "quo" from Moscow in return for the Obama "quid" in and of itself gives the appearance of surrender, of weakening political will, of a withdrawal from Central Europe.

Quid pro quo is the basic reserve currency of diplomacy. Mood music and honeyed words from Putin, Medvedev, and Company do not constitute a quid pro quo. Perhaps one will be forthcoming. Perhaps Moscow will reverse its course and join in the (proposed) next round of sanctions against Iran following the failure of the upcoming talks in Turkey. Perhaps whales will sprout wings and fly.

The Russians were the first to jump in bed with Ahmedinejad. They have consistently opposed sanctions as an unworkable approach--and continued to do so immediately after the Obama concession on the ABM matter. Moscow wants increased rights in the Caspian. It believes that the road to peace in the North Caucasus runs through Tehran. And, Iran is a good customer for Russia's major industrial exports--arms and nuclear reactors.

In short, what would Russia gain--and lose--if it were to listen more "closely" to US "concerns" regarding Iran? The quick answer is it would gain nothing and lose much.

The Obama administration gave a tasty morsel to the Russian Bear with the cancelling of the ABM project. Now the Bear is smiling. Who wouldn't after a free lunch?

Cold Winds Of Reality Hit The Oval Office

The Obama "narrative" emphasizing engagement and intense diplomacy with North Korea using the medium of the Six Power Talks is fast receding into the haze of rhetorical fantasy. Regardless of the details of Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's health, there is no possibility in this universe that the long moribund diplomatic rhodomontade involving the US, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan will spring back to life.

Whether the president likes the reality or not, there are signs that he is being compelled to accept it. North Korea has never been interested in ending its nuclear capacity. Its only real goal has been the extortion of maximum benefits from the US, South Korea, and Japan at the lowest possible cost. The diplomatic context was simply cover for the state-to-state extortion effort, which paid off handsomely for the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

The dubious state of Dear Leader's health and the (perhaps) limited number of years left to him have marginally complicated the game of nations, North Korean style. The matter of succession makes the behavior of the North a little less predictable, but only in degree--not direction.

The Hermit Kingdom will continue its R&D efforts in both missile and nuclear technology. It will test more. It will produce more fissionable material, both plutonium and enriched uranium. It will aggressively seek to market the technology and products which it develops. And, there are customers with ready cash for these offers.

The only realistic alternative left to the US is that of containment. Of course, all along the way, from Clinton through W. Bush to Obama, the containment option has been the only one which had even the slightest toehold on reality. All the diplomacy, all the initialed and signed agreements, all the rushing from capital to capital, have been window dressing on a display of futility.

There is a fundamental question regarding the containment option. It is a critical question and the probable answer to it has always been the chief impediment to adopting the you-shall-not-cross-this-line approach before.

Will Russia and, more importantly, China, cooperate fully in enforcing a leakproof barrier against North Korea's importation of necessary technology and equipment as well as one prohibiting the export of nuclear and missile technology, components, and assembled systems?

Even though there is evidence that the Chinese government is irritated enough with the Pyongyang regime to impose some sanctions on key people in the North, this is not a reason to assume the Men of the Forbidden City are willing to go further. The Chinese will not push too hard, not because they are necessarily all that sympathetic with the Hermit Kingdom, but rather because they are apprehensive over the regional consequences of Pyongyang engaging in too risky behavior or imploding in a leadership crisis.

China is not convinced that the North Koreans if pushed too hard or gripped by an internal crisis would not attack the South. No matter how long such an attack might last (and the US commander in theater does not think it would last long), a move across the 38th parallel would be very, very destructive.

It can and has been argued that the assured destruction of the North and the highly probable termination of the current regime means the North Koreans are permanently deterred. A more pessimistic (realistic?) appraisal such as hypothesised for the Beijing leadership focuses on the what-is-there-to-lose? interpretation of motive.

Given sufficient hardship impinging on the ruling elite and the army which keeps the elite in power, there might be no reason to refrain from launching an attack in response to an arguable South Korean "provocation." This form of attack would be limited to firing missiles and artillery in a generally southern direction inflicting massive losses on the South Korean population and industrial plant. Heavily dug in North Korean ground forces would remain on the defensive with the result that casualties among any South Korean or US forces moving across the DMZ would be extensive.

American air operations would devastate exposed portions of the North Korean industrial, agricultural, and military systems but would probably not be decisive. Moscow and Beijing (the latter faced by a refugee flood) would demand an immediate UN action to secure a ceasefire.

Provided that the Pyongyang regime (with or without the presence of Kim Jong-il) could point to a plausible South Korean provocation, the ceasefire would be on terms and conditions favorable to the North. They would, undoubtedly, be accompanied by "humanitarian" aid.

This far from implausible potential is what will keep Beijing balanced carefully between appearing to cooperate with the US in the UN imposed sanction regime and doing all that it can to make certain the Pyongyang government (again with or without Kim) stays in power and does not unduly stir the Asian pot. And this, bucko, makes the containment option less than guaranteed in its outcome.

Even with its ambiguity, containment is today what it always has been--the last, best option of managing the emerging threat of North Korea as a proliferater of nuclear and missile technology. Once the Nice Young Man From Chicago now occupying the Oval can acknowledge the limits of his "narrative" regarding engagement and diplomacy, the US can focus on bringing the containment option to fruition.

Heck, keeping China and Russia on board in even a limited way will provide a Diplomats And Special Envoys Full Employment Act. There will be lots and lots of photo ops for men and women with briefcases and aides running up and down grand stairways pursued by breathless representatives of the media. And, isn't that what diplomacy is all about? Providing the appearance of getting something done without any underlying substance?

Let George Do It

No. Not George W. Bush. The "George" here refers to an old idiom which was common in the US until about a half century ago. The phrase, "Let George do it," meant quite simply, let someone else do the job; it's not our department.

In this case the "George" in question is the Peoples Republic of China. And, the "it" in question is North Korea. More specifically, the "it" means dealing with the twin conundrums: one serious, the other quite trivial (except for those directly involved in the fate of the two American women journalists facing twelve years as prisoners in the Hermit Kingdom of the North's hellish prisons).

To put it bluntly: The US does not have, never has had, and will not suddenly gain, the leverage necessary to either force or induce the Pyongyang politburo to comply with our policy requirements. The US never, repeat, never, should have invested the high-profile, high-visibility diplomatic prestige in the North Korean drive to become a semi-hemi-demi nuclear power.

Nearly fifteen years ago when the Clinton administration made the grave error of wading in to the North Korean swamp, the Geek forecast that by so doing the US would only invite both failure and a repeated requirement to, as SecDef Gates put it the other day, "Buy the same horse twice." The noisy, prolonged and ultimately failed Clinton push to preclude the Hermit Kingdom from pursuing a rudimentary nuclear capacity was one more example of the worst features (and the most common characteristics) of American foreign policy: ad hoc reaction to a perceived threat and the intermixing of domestic political imperatives with the needs of diplomacy.

As anyone and everyone familiar with the history of North Korean diplomatic methods must have known, the Clinton era efforts came to nothing. The same was expected and occurred when the neocons of the George W. Bush White House went after the same goal a decade or so later. The muscular fellows of the W. Bush years no more had the leverage either positive or negative to gain Hermit Kingdom compliance with American objectives than had the more touchy-feely types of the Clinton crew.

Not only were bilateral efforts doomed to fail, so also was the collective approach of the Six Power Talks. Effective sanctions were bootless right out of the box due to the fundamental disagreement between at least one of the powers and the rest.

China had a completely different take on the potential threat posed by North Korean ambitions from that informing the policy stance of the US, South Korea and Japan. China had as well a view of its own interests which did not mesh well with the policy requirements of the US.

Quite frankly, the Beijing government did not and does not see North Korea as a threat in either the near or the far-term. Knees did not knock in the Forbidden City as they apparently did in Washington over the prospect of the Hermit Kingdom developing some pretense of a nuclear capability. This despite the fact that China is far, far closer to North Korea than the US or Japan.

China was (and is) comfortable with the capacity it possesses to abate any North Korean menace with purely conventional means should such prove necessary. (It helps that the formidable North Korean defenses face south.) Beyond that, China has abundant non-military means to either force or cozen Pyongyang's agreement to Beijing's "guidance."

Ignoring the geopolitical realities, both the Clinton and W. Bush administrations plunged ahead with a reckless abandon and a sense of certainty totally devoid of a real world basis. We tried--ultimately without success--to get the Chinese to sing from our sheet of music.

Instead both the Clinton and W. Bush crews should have been quietly asking Beijing just what tune should be sung to gain the most satisfactory outcome.

Now the Obama collective seems hell bent on following the same course to failure blazoned by the two previous administrations. The rhetoric has become ever more heated. The threats of "consequences" ever more brazen. The visibility of the American total commitment to a single outcome ever more visible. Prestige on the international scene ever more invested.

Stop! Time out! A whistle on the play.

The US must dial down the volume. It must sidle up to the Chinese. Quietly, very quietly so as to save some measure of face for Uncle Sam, we must turn the problem over to them. Let George do it.

This means recognising a pair of realpolitik realities. The first is that China is the operative regional hegemonic power in this case. The second is acknowledging that Beijing has operated a conservative and highly effective diplomacy since the Communist victory in 1949.

China has a long and close relationship with North Korea. The Chinese government has a far better understanding of the internal dynamics of the Hermit Kingdom than does the US. The specialists in North Korean affairs in Beijing know the strengths and weaknesses of the Pyongyang regime. They know the personalities. The inner rivalries and alliances. In short, they know the levers to pull and buttons to push in order to gain compliance.

Beijing has a clear interest in a stable North Korea. It has an equal interest in assuring that the Hermit Kingdom not only continues to exist but that it does nothing so rash as to result in a regionally destabilizing consequence. It has no desire to deal with hordes of North Korean refugees flooding across the Tuman and Yalu rivers bringing with them the attention of the human rights and humanitarian crisis oriented entities whether from the UN or the legion of NGOs.

China, in short, has much at stake in North Korea. It has a set of major imperatives in play which dictate constructive effort to protect stability and good order in the Korean peninsula.

The Obama administration and particularly its minions in Foggy Bottom would be well advised to take a dekko at the historical record of Chinese diplomacy and the foreign policy it supports. If they were to do so they might be surprised with what they find.

Regardless of the internal idiocies committed by Mao and his successors ranging from the Great Leap Forward with its attendant multi-million deaths-through-starvation to the Cultural Revolution to the bloody suppression of the pro-democracy movement twenty years ago, the foreign policy of the country has been conservative and careful in its execution. Even the seemingly rash action of entering the Korean War was cautious in its execution. Warnings were given, a demonstration attack was made. Only when both words and bullets were ignored by the US did the full-fledged intervention unfold.

Throughout the past sixty years Beijing has repeatedly shown itself to be a mature practitioner of the Great Game of Nations. In a way this is surprising given all the centuries during which the Center Kingdom simply ignored the lesser breeds of barbarian who lived beyond the pale of the Empire. Surprising or not, the fine record of Chinese diplomacy is there for any with the wit to read and heed.

Turning the North Korean portfolio over to the "Georges" of Beijing would be a tad humiliating to the diplomats and politicians who have invested ego in the failed policies of recent years, but it would be in the best interests of the US. On several levels.

The most obvious is it would both relieve the US of a responsibility it cannot discharge--getting the Hermit Kingdom to forsake the bomb. What should be equally obvious but seems not to be is that making this move would greatly enhance the bilateral relations between the US and China. Any improvement such as would result by the candid admission that China is both a regional hegemon and a global Great Power would benefit our need for Beijing's cooperation on other, more important vexing matters including Iran, the global economy and the achievement of an acceptable agreement on global climate change.

There are many in the US who would find this explicit recognition of American limits galling. These folks can take some measure of comfort in the reality that China has become the Great Power it is today in large measure because we made it so. Our (arguably) misguided emphasis on "globalization" during the Clinton years, which brought with it the trade liberalisation, served to make China rich. The riches sucked from the pockets of American consumers have provided Beijing with the means necessary to produce its current formidable military force and buy American treasury notes in multiples of billions.

Without Bill Clinton and the neocons who succeeded him as well as Walmart, China would not be the world class Great Power it is now. So, asking "George" to carry the water regarding North Korea is simply to accept the "success" of our foreign economic policies.

The fate of the two young ladies from Al Gore's "Current TV" operation can be best addressed by the Chinese. The two women in question would not be in a Hermit Kingdom slammer today had it not been for the sincere conviction in Pyongyang based upon their reading of history that the US can be extorted most efficiently by the taking of hostages--particularly female hostages.

Of course a realpolitik based diplomacy would simply write off the two journalists. The coldly realistic view of foreign policy rejects the notion that policy should be bent to protect the futures of two individuals who were so ill-advised as to prance about a poorly defined international frontier where agents of a despotic regime hostile to the US might seize their bodies under any or no pretext with a view toward extortion.

The idea that a country should, let alone must, act to save two awesomely stupid people from the easily foreseeable results of their stupidity runs against all dictates of realpolitik. However the demands of domestic politics insist that the US make every effort to gain the quick release of the two women.

And, so we must. But we have no leverage beyond giving into whatever requirements the hostage takers care to make. Unless---

That's right, unless we "let George do it." The Boys From Beijing know who to talk to and what to say. The road to freedom for these two unfortunate young women in the employ of Al Gore runs through Beijing. Not Washington. Not the UN. Beijing.

Bombs or hostage release--Let George Do It.

Benign Neglect--Why Not Try It?

The Hermit Kingdom of North Korea did the totally expected. Dear Leader and Company went ahead with the well-known and well-publicised plan to let go with another underground nuke test. As an added attraction for the world, the Merry Makers of Pyongyang fired off a set of short range surface to surface and surface to air missiles.

This temper tantrum from the Terrible Twos of the Hermit Kingdom was in no way shocking. It in no way caught any government--including that of the US--off guard. Unless no one bothered to read the news over the past month.

Now people all over the globe are tossing hissy-fits like confetti at New Year's Eve. Investors and speculators are shaking in their portfolios. Take a look at this alarm bell for market wallahs. Even the Mexican peso took it on the chin from the Great Nuke of the North surpassing the impact of the drug slaughter down south. In the US, market prices fell at first, but the Gnomes of Wall Street took comfort from consumer confidence and decided the world was not going to end in the near future just because the Hermits blasted a big hole in the mountains of their northeast.

Then, of course, there are the diplomats. The UN Security Council was in a tizzy. So also is the Obama administration. Susan Rice melded the two with her threat that the Hermit Kingdom of the North would "pay a price." Ms Rice's rhetoric almost matched the frothings of Senator Kerry speaking in China yesterday.

Heck, even Iran got in the act with a mild denunciation of the North Korean test. This remark should be considered along with the strong probability that the Tehran regime had observers present as they did during last month's ICBM test firing.

Underneath all the posturing, threatening noises and stock market pants wetting, there is a real dilemma. The best way to put it is in the words of a famous treatise by Lenin: "What Is To Be Done?"

To make a long and rather boring story short, there is not much that can be done. The Chinese are quite unlikely to support any more sanctions than those already in place. There is a good reason for this.

The Men of the Forbidden City do not want to deal with the consequences of more impoverishment, more hunger, more disease in North Korea. Quite simply Beijing does not want to face the flood of refugees which would pour across the porous border particularly along the shallow, slow moving Tuman river. The last thing the Chinese government needs considering the effects of the global economic slowdown is the expense and attendant dislocation imposed by hordes of North Koreans seeking a partially filled rice bowl. (Neither do they want the ministrations of those NGOs which leap into action at the first scent of a humanitarian crisis.)

Any other gambit, including some sort of promise of inducements would be counterproductive. One of the main reasons, if not the primary one, for the nuke test and surrounding missile shoots was that the Hermits in Pyongyang suffer from a form of Attention Deficit Disorder. As Dick Morris once wrote of the Clintons, when deprived of attention, Dear Leader and Company suffer from a disorder.

The real deal at work has nothing to do with the Six Power Talks or bluffing South Korea into returning to the Pyongyang loving days of deceased Prime Minister Roh. No. The North Korean regime wants to be bribed. The sort of attention Pyongyang desires, demands, is expressed in dollars and yen.

As the Geek has argued in previous posts, North Korea is a master at the fine art of extortion. They have taken extortion to the level of major economic input. Along with the export of weapons and weapons related knowledge, extortion is the only source of hard currency available to Pyongyang.

The money-for-cooperation gambit has been attempted. It failed. It failed as it must before the ever-escalating demands of the extorter.

A far better approach is that of benign neglect. It doesn't really matter if the Hermit Kingdom has a small--make that very small--nuclear arsenal. This reality, unpleasant as it might be in principle, in no way perturbs the balance of power in the region, let alone the world.

The North Koreans have never demonstrated that rare degree of insanity which would couple the assured destruction of the country and the regime with victory. Pyongyang is not about to go on a nuclear tipped rampage against the South. It is not going to send its low yield devices off on a one way trip to Tokyo. Or Beijing.

A North Korean nuclear capacity will not alter the realities of the region or the world in the slightest. The nuclear djinn is not going to leave North Korea quickly or easily. Not only does the Hermit Kingdom have such a small stockpile of plutonium that it must horde its widow's mite tightly even in the face of ready buyers with gobs of cash, the means to track and interdict shipments of fissile materials exist. While not absolutely leakproof, this capacity is sufficient to minimise the probability that North Korea will be the source of nuclear materials for al-Qaeda or Taliban or some other Islamist jihadist entity.

But wouldn't North Korea getting away with becoming a nuclear power make it all the harder to keep Iran from reaching the same goal?

Perhaps. However, is that consideration relevant? The Iranians have plugged on with their quest for the "Mahdi Bomb" regardless of sanctions and diplomatic disapproval. As the recent indictment sought by New York federal prosecutor Robart Morgenthau demonstrates, the Iranians have become very accomplished at sanctions busting using Chinese and British fronts. Beyond that approach, both Venezuela and Bolivia allegedly have been selling uranium to Iran regardless of any UN or US disapproval.

Ahmedinejad has been making points both at home and with anti-American, anti-West governments and entities abroad with his full-court defiance of the P5+1 and the Obama administration. If, as all indications point to, Ahmedinejad is re-elected next month, there is no reason to believe he is suddenly going to drop the highly successful hardline he has been following for years now.

In short, events on the small appendage on the far east edge of the Asian landmass are of no moment to Tehran. The mullahocracy is going to get the "Mahdi Bomb" unless stopped by force.

But, Geek, won't a failure to curb North Korea make the task of making the Earth a "nuclear free zone" as President Obama has said he wants even less possible? Won't a North Korean success make nuclear proliferation more likely?

The short answers? Yes. And, yes.

President Obama, progressive ideologue, is meeting realpolitik once again. While it is certainly undesirable that Pyongyang or Tehran possess a nuclear capacity, this eventuality does not bring the end of the world as we know it measurably closer. Dear Leader and those military commanders on whose support the regime depends for survival are not a collection of suicide inclined folks for whom death before dishonor is a watchword. While some of the clerics who are the power behind the Iranian government as well as Ahmedinejad may be of an eschatological bent, there is no plausible indication that the Apocalypse announcing the coming of the Mahdi is either a goal or a tool of state.

The record of the Tehran regime over the past thirty years points to the contrary. The gambits played by the mullahs and their front men have been conservative. They have taken no action which places Iran at risk of destruction. Just because the lot of them are Islamists, jihadists even, does not imply they are a passel of suicide bombers hoping to push the clicker on the nation which they rule.

To put it bluntly there is no reason to eschew a policy of benign neglect toward North Korea. There is no reason not to pat the Terrible Twos of the Hermit Kingdom on the head and say, "That's nice. You have a bomb all of your own. Join the club and pray for peace. Oh, by the way, how many people up there can eat your atoms?"

A Pair Of (At Least) Two Bowl Problems

As everyone familiar with the Master of Baker Street knows, the great detective was given to characterising his little problems by the number of bowls of shag which must be smoked before the correct solution might emerge. Those of the two bowl variety were above average in difficulty, sort of like a reverse two and a half with full twist in pike position off the low board.

Comes now North Korea and Afghanistan in unorchestrated symmetry each with a two bowler. (This must ruin the post-success celebration in the Erdogan Dictate Affair. NATO didn't blink and the Turkish PM received a face-saving way to back off.)

Actually, as the Geek thinks about it, the North Korean problem is closer to three bowls and the Afghan one closer to a single albeit very full bowl. Let's go with the tougher of the two first.

The Geek has to admit a more than sneaking admiration for the Commissars of Pongyang. No bunch, not even the mullahs of Tehran, have shown greater skill at sneering in the direction of the UN Security Council. The Dear Leader and his coterie have far surpassed all other regimes of whatsoever political stripe in pursuing national self-interest in the face of robust, continued opposition by the US and its associates, Japan and South Korea.

The US has drawn yet another line in the diplomatic sand. SecState Clinton and other members of the Obama administration have promised "consequences" after the Northerners launch their new, (hopefully) improved ICBM. The threatened "consequences" will undoubtedly follow the track blazed by the "consequences" imposed by the Security Council after the Pyongyang bunch pushed the Go-button on their nuclear test a few years back.

This means yet more economic sanctions.

The last time around the economic sanctions were as ineffective as pissing on a forest fire. The same crude judgement is appropriate even in advance as regards the next Security Council turn to bat.

The last time the implementation of the sanctions was left up to the individual member-states. This sort of non-enforced enforcement was the best which would sneak past Russia and China. Even if Russia continues in its current charm offensive, not much more can be expected in the near future.

The Chinese have a realistic view of the North Korean regime. In the informed view from Beijing harsh measures are ineffective in altering North Korean behavior. Certainly the historical record extending back to 1950 bears that out.

The Chinese believe, rightly or not, that they continue to have influence in Pyongyang. Beyond that, the integrity of North Korea as a buffer state is important to Beijing. That was true in the early Fall of 1950 and remains such today.

The two countries have been in a formal alliance for just shy of sixty years now. It is slightly possible that Beijing will be able to use that symbolic anniversary as a platform to nudge Pyongyang into a more cooperative stance in the Six Power Talks.

The Six Power Talks, particularly the verification of the North Korean nuclear declaration given last year, is far more important to the Chinese (and in highest probability the Americans) than the launch of an ICBM test bed. While even the most optimistic prediction for the Six Power Talks does not include Pyongyang relinquishing its current plutonium stockpile, it is not illegitimate to expect an accurate accounting of the amount of plutonium made and that on hand currently so as to assuage proliferation anxieties.

The Six Power Talks are not worth sacrificing on the alter of Security Council resolutions. The Chinese have taken this view. In all probability Russia has as well. It is debatable at best that the Kremlin is willing to fritter away the last of its diminishing influence on the Hermit Kingdom of the North in pursuit of the delusion of "punishing" Pyongyang.

If that mythical beast, a regime of tough, enforceable economic sanctions, is off the table of reality, what is left?

Military action? That's a real non-starter. And, the Denizens-in-Charge of the Hermit Kingdom know it. The issue at hand is not worth going to war over. No one is eager for a war, looking for an excuse a la Jenkin's Ear to start one.

It has been suggested that the US simply shoot the missile down. This could be done hypothetically as being a measure taken to "enforce" earlier Security Council measures. Such an action might have been in the world view of the W. Bush administration but would not comport in the slightest with the new policy matrix of the Obama administration. Dear Leader and his crew undoubtedly understand this.

Realistically, the probability for negative consequences, particularly any of a truly painful nature, range between nil and none. The probability of positive consequences coming is, regrettably, rather high.

Caught with no credible capacity to coerce, the US and its partners, Japan and South Korea, as well as its sometimes collaborators, China and Russia, have only inducements to offer. Bribery under whatever euphemism you prefer has a long and not completely dishonorable history in the practice of diplomacy.

In an important matter--and getting an accurate handle on the degree of intellectual or material proliferation the Northerners have or can engage in is important--the ends justify the means. A bribe, if it works to gain the necessary end, is completely justifiable. If the bribe does not work or if the recipient does not stay bribed, then the effort has failed. The other side has been more canny or resolute than our team.

So it goes in the whacky world of international politics.

Now for Article 132 of a draft law passed by the Afghan parliament. The language in question has effect only on the Shia minority of the population. That minority constitutes somewhere between fifteen and twenty percent. It is important to the electoral chances of President Karzai when the polls open next August.

Stripped to its essentials it requires that women unless ill in a way which would be exacerbated by the act of intercourse must provide sexual services to their husbands no less than once every four days. To Western eyes and ears this constitutes a species of marital rape.

Not that many years ago, less than twenty to err on the side of accuracy, there was scarcely a jurisdiction in the US where a man could be charged with spousal rape--even if the couple were living separately. The same legal context prevailed generally throughout the West.

Norms and the law have changed in the US as they have elsewhere to give due and proper regard to the autonomy and prerogatives of the wife even when sharing a bed with the guy. It is not surprising that reaction to Article 132 has been rapid, negative and virtually universal in Western countries.

The Article and the reaction bring into a very sharp focus the fundamental fissures in current policy for our efforts in Afghanistan. There are two in particular which have been highlighted in the past forty-eight hours.

The first, stated as a question is this: Is Afghanistan a sovereign country or not?

The second, also stated as a question is this: Is the mission of our and allied forces in Afghanistan one of defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda as a potential short term threat to our interests or is it building a modern nation-state with liberal institutions?

Both are digital questions. Each must be answered such that one and only one alternative is operative. Choosing one absolutely disallows the other. It's either zero or one, on or off.

Afghanistan is sovereign. Even Canadian Prime Minister Harper, who is High Minded even by the standards of High Minded Canada acknowledges that. Even Mr Harper admits that being sovereign means that the Afghan parliament can pass whatever legislation it wants and the president can sign it if he is of such a mind.

PM Harper qualified his admission with a statement to the effect that the Karzai government must understand that the assorted foreign assistance forces are present in Afghanistan because there are certain underlying and presumably shared understandings of human rights and kindred subjects. This position has been echoed without the bluntness of Harper's remarks by other Western leaders and highly placed officials.

The nature and extent of these presumptively shared assumptions is intimately connected with the second question: what is the goal of the war? As the Geek has argued in previous posts, a critical key to success in counterinsurgency is the existential and functional legitimacy of the government under attack. Intervenors, and keep a grip on the fact that we and our allies are just that, must refrain from any actions which serve or might serve to undercut the perceived legitimacy of the government. At the best the intervenors must take actions which serve to support the perceived legitimacy of the government.

If our goal is, as the Obama Strategy maintains, the limited one of defeating Taliban and al-Qaeda, then we must support (or at least appear to do so) the government even when it takes actions which are repugnant to some extent. This does not mean that we cannot argue to Karzai and the parliament that Article 132 may impair their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. But, if we do that, the basis must be factual not artificial. It must be documentable that the Article hurts the government with the majority to an extent which outweighs the help it may provide with the minority.

Beyond making that argument, any huffing, puffing and hyperventilating from the outsiders will simply undercut the government and hand the old but highly effective tool of linking the government to the "foreign occupiers" as a present to Taliban. Making threats, no matter how couched, how muted, how indirect to the effect that obnoxious measures such as Article 132 will result in a slackening of support for the government is a counterproductive measure.

If the American and allied forces mission in Afghanistan is more expansive than the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda and includes the end of nation-building with the goal of creating a liberal, pluralistic, democratic state from the congeries of ethno-linguistic groups collectively constituting the Afghan population, then Article 132 is irrelevant. We have failed already. It is time for buying a mass of one-way tickets back to the world.

From any real world perspective the only task for the US and its allies in Afghanistan is the defeat of Taliban and al-Qaeda. Any other task is doomed to failure. And, the attempt to add on tasks to the main mission assures the main mission will fail.

If our goal is what President Obama announced it to be: securing the US and the West from future terror attacks launched from Afghanistan, then get on with it.

The rights of Afghan women are important. So is the security of the United States and the West generally. Even the High Minded have to make a choice as to which has the greater priority.

North Korea Not Iran Is The Real Threat

The US government--including whoever takes over the Oval next January--needs to get a firm grip on a testes crushing reality. North Korea.

Some very unpleasant facts about the Hermit Kingdom of the North, need to be acknowledged as a base for policy.

Unpleasant fact number 1: North Korea has at least thirty kilos of Pu239.
UF #2: It has demonstrated mastery of implosion technology
UF #3: The Hermit Kingdom of the North can withstand diplomatic pressures and economic sanctions as it has demonstrated repeatedly.
UF #4: Even while its population faced malnutrition at best and starvation at worst, the North's rulers spent their scarce foreign exchange on weapons, not food. (Roughly sixty-five million dollars over the past five years. That figure should be considered conservative.)
UF#5: While the more-or-less decommissioned and aging Yongbyon is above ground, the Pu239 storage and potential weapons fabrication facilities are deep underground.
UF#6: The super-hardening of the nuclear weapons related sites is in keeping with the more than half century effort in the North to dig deeper and further, to make the country a virtual sea to sea bunker system.
UF#7: The NKPA is technologically unsophisticated by Western standards, but it is large (1.2 million troops) well fed, adequately supplied and as indicated, backed by the most extensive bunkering system in the world. Beyond that North Korea is rugged enough to make Afghanistan look as smooth and easygoing as Iowa. (And as any now-elderly veteran of the Korean War can attest, possessed of the most horrid weather in the known universe.)
UF#8: The North is willing and able to export its knowledge of nuclear weapons technology to any cash customer. It is probably willing and able to export some of its Pu239 for enough money. And, for an additional fee, quite possibly fabricate a nice Nagasaki level implosion device.

There are some other equally unpleasant facts, but these give the flavor adequately.

"Hell, Geek! Just go and nuke the little creeps!"

Ah, bucko, what an emotionally gratifying idea. The Geek will enter only one set of interlocking objections while skipping some technical drivel about the attenuating effects of deep gorges and high mountains on nuclear blasts and the percentage of stored fissionable material which might lend its small increment of energy to the detonation.

Whether conventional explosives or nuclear charges are employed, plutonium--and uranium for that matter--has the annoying habit of obeying the principles of physics.

In short, you blow up a stash of the stuff, it doesn't vaporize into nothingness. It will still be around. Finely distributed. In the atmosphere. Even in the stratosphere.

And, don't forget, the jet stream blows west to east. Remember just what major landmass exists a couple of thousand miles east of North Korea.

Explosive demolition of the North's stockpile is simply not a prudent, effective option.

So, what does that leave us?

Not much, the Geek fears. The Hermit Kingdom of Kim jong il is the toughest of tough targets whether viewed diplomatically, economically or militarily. Making the situation worse is the simple fact that the men who rule in Pyongyang know this.

They know perfectly well that there is bloody little we can do to them even with the agreement and support of Russia, the Peoples Republic of China, Japan and South Korea. Unless both Russia and the PRC are willing to commit ground forces to the effort, war is simply not an option.

Even in the (highly) unlikely event that these two countries are willing to send in their troops, war is not an option from the perspective of South Korea and Japan. Seoul lies within range of the massed artillery and surface-to-surface missile batteries of the NKPA. A goodly chunk of the country's forty-eight million people live literally under the guns of the NKPA. So also does a large portion of the South's economic infrastructure.

This means that win, lose or draw in the war, the South will be devastated.

Japan is apprehensive about the demonstrated North Korean ability to launch medium range ballistic missiles with a nuclear capacity. It is doubtful that even with the US having furnished both a limited ABM capacity and having emplaced an X band radar in country that Tokyo's anxieties would be offset enough to gain cooperation in some sort of preventative war.

The alternative is bribing our way to success. We, along with PRC, Russia, South Korea and Japan are doing that right now. To date the approach has not worked. At all.

"Why?" You ask.

The answer, at least in part, can be seen in the record of the seemingly interminable peace talks which ended the shooting phase of the Korean War fifty-five years ago last summer. In short, no matter what was offered, the North found it to be not quite enough. For every obstacle bridged, another was erected. Negotiating with North Korea is like conversing with a glacier--slow, cold and ultimately futile.

So where does that leave us?

Keep talking and keep upping the ante. Hope we reach their price before the hardliners of the NKPA decide to seek some more cash on the black market.

Will it work?

The Geek has his doubts. Severe doubts. About the only thing he is sure of is that the problem of North Korean nukes is both far greater and far, far more threatening than nukes in the mitts of the Iranian mullahocracy.

The mullahs have something to lose and they know it.

The Northern Hermits don't see that they are at any risk. No matter what they do.