When The Feces Hits The Fan In North Korea, Where Will Obama Stand?

The President of the United States has managed to avoid taking a real, effective stand with respect to the opposition movement in Iran.  Sorry, words of regret and condemnation don't cut it.  On Egypt, the POTUS entered the lists both late and after a series of internal contradictions within members of his "team."

Then along came Libya.  Sure, it was convenient to excuse the absence of effective action on anxiety that Americans in Libya would be at risk.  The British managed to take a far stronger albeit primarily rhetorical stand before extracting their civilians by means which included a virtual commando operation aimed at the oilfield workers deep in the desert in isolated camps.  The declaration of unilateral sanctions has come late in the game and will have no genuine, immediate impact on the confused mind of Gaddafi.

The POTUS had the power to order the freezing of all Libyan assets in banks doing business in or with the US.  This act particularly if taken early on and accompanied with a loud pronouncement of what was being done and why might have lowered the zeal of Gaddafi's mercenaries.  Coming late, particularly after the drum roll of threats regarding criminal prosecution, presumably under the Statute of Rome and before the International Criminal Court, financial freezes, sanctions, and jawboning has served only to enhance Gaddafi's die-in-place political will as well as the akin sentiments of family and coterie.

As the game nears its end, a primary risk in Libya is the use of chemical munitions, primarily mustard agent, left over from Gaddafi's earlier flirtation with weapons of mass destruction.  The only thing (other than apprehension regarding the loyalty of his air force personnel) which will assure that Gaddafi does not employ chemicals against his own people will be the immediate enforcement of a no-fly zone over the entirety of Libya enforced by NATO.  The US may not, as Robert Gates has asserted, have the air assets available, but the rest of NATO certainly does.  It is past time for the US to urge its allies to do so--immediately.

The dilatory and poorly focused reaction of President Obama to events in the Mideast and Iran does not boost confidence that the US will handle a regime collapse in North Korea with the necessary speed and skill.  The US and other countries should not assume that the status quo in North Korea is any more permanent than that in Libya appeared to be say ten or fourteen days ago.  To do so is to invite disaster on a massive scale.

Not only is North Korea facing the challenge of an orderly succession, it is in the throes of the latest famine.  This particular episode of mass starvation has been exacerbated greatly by the outbreak of hoof and mouth disease in the animal stockpile of the Hermit Kingdom of the North.  The disease has had major impact on two key areas of food production.  It has been wasting the draft animal population upon which most North Korean agriculture depends at an awesome rate of knots.  Further, the hog farms which provide most of the protein eaten by the North Korean military have been devastated by the disease.

The North Korean regime has responded to the new crisis in the usual ways.  Internationally, the diplomats of the Hermit Kingdom have extended their begging bowls.  Backing this and aimed directly at opinion in both the South Korean population and the American, the North Koreans have been ostentatiously preparing facilities for a possible third nuclear test--the test which might actually go off well.  Additionally, the Hermits have moved at least half of their noisy, vulnerable troop carrying hovercraft to a new port convenient to South Korea.  This move has not been secret in the slightest.  Extortion is backing the begging ploy.

There is little doubt but the Pyongyang regime has been following events in the Mideast closely--particularly the role played by the Egyptian army in the end of Hosni Mubarak.  Given the matter of succession, there may be real cause for worry on the part of both Kim and his son regarding the reliability of the armed forces.  And, it must never be forgotten, of all North Korean institutions, the NKPA is most conservative, most fearful, and most resistant to change as well as most oriented toward carrying the blessings of the Northern way of life to the South.

The danger in the situation as it is developing currently is that Kim may in a sense emulate Gaddafi.  He may role the dice for a winner take all high risk, high payoff strategy which would involve a military strike of significant size against the South.  This option would be more attractive if either the military looks to be going all wobbly on the succession deal or the starvation reaches a level as to propel some sort of people power expression of desperation.

Even the lesser threat of a successful multi-kiloton test would constitute a severe challenge to the Obama administration.  Perhaps even a larger challenge than a large scale but time limited raid on Southern territory by Northern forces.  Each would require a prompt, firm, unequivocal response by the US.  Anything less would be to risk a wide spread war on the Korean peninsula with all that implies.

Mr Obama has demonstrated that not only is he naive about the workings of global politics but that he is totally uninterested in correcting his lacking in this area.  Nor has his foreign policy "team" inspired confidence despite the presence of Gates on it.  His cabinet level UN Ambassador has been absent, presumably with leave, when the dramatic end of Mubarak came as well as during the Security Council meeting last week which issued the pusillanimous "press statement" on Libya.  And, the Secretary of State has merely made fine words about "all options being considered" which is scarcely an act of resolute statesmanship.

The Obama administration has bobbled so much in two years.  Should North Korea pose a challenge, the betting has to be the Obama "team" will drop the ball one more time.  That probability is most likely a major factor in the decision making presently underway in Pyongyang.

The Hermits And Governor Bill

The Geek has been conflicted over the question of whether or not Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico deserves the highly coveted "Bugs Bunny, What A Maroon! Award."  Finally, after more than a bit of dithering he has decided the outgoing (praise be to whoever) Governor Bill had not quite made the high bar of supreme idiocy demanded for the high honor.  He did come close, however.  You can decide if the Geek was right or not.

The fat faced one time US Ambassador to the UN and almost Obama cabinet member has long been Pyongyang's favored American interlocutor surpassing even Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.  The Hermits have accorded this position to Governor Bill (as he has been affectionately (?) known for his two terms here in New Mexico) because he is a reliable conveyor belt of the desired image and message.  Once again he has done his duty.

According to Bill's view the leadership of North Korea is far more "pragmatic" than the state controlled media.  This is an interesting take on the affair given that not a word is put out by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) without having been vetted and approved, if not written by, the factotums occupying the highest levels of power.  Even Governor Bill should realize that there is no daylight between the belligerent rhetoric of KCNA and the Hermits At The Top.

Governor Bill had barely unpacked his bags back in Santa Fe when the Hermit In Charge of the Military was blasting South Korea and assuring any Southern "aggression" would result in a "sacred" or, alternate translation, "holy" war of defense.  Kim Yong-chun is hardly the "North Korean media," governor.

Minister Kim's remarks as well as their amplification in the KCNA and other Hermit owned and operated media came at the end of the large three day live-fire maneuvers thirty miles from the DMZ.  This military exercise was not only the trigger for Minister Kim's bellicose declarations, it was also the motivator for Bill Richardson's call for Southern "restraint."

It is more than passingly strange that the high profile diplomatic "troubleshooter," whose trip to the Land of the Hermits was approved by the Obama administration, can demand restraint from the South while acknowledging that even the Hermits realize they may have gone a bit too far by "shooting those civilians on that island."  He "hopes" that the Hermits may now pull back a bit and avers that he has some new initiatives on arms control from the Hermits.

As the governor outlined, the "new" initiatives the result is one of "deja vue all over again."  The combination of inspections, an offer to sell fuel rods to the South, and let's-come-reason-together combine to be an offer to sell the US and South Korea the same old dead horse one more time.  To employ an analogy from US history, the offer is Pyongyang's version of the failed LBJ approach to North Vietnam of "progressive squeeze and talk."

The attack(s) of the past several months have been the "squeeze" portion of the exercise, the "initiatives" offered to Governor Bill are the "talk" part of the game.  As background noise, the North continues to wave the saber and make dark hints of yet one more test of a nuclear device--"See we can squeeze harder."

Governor Bill credited the Hermits with showing admirable restraint during the recently concluded military exercises.  He may even think his presence in country during the period may have contributed to the pacific nature of the Hermits.  If so, he shouldn't break his arm patting himself on the back.

A far more credible reason for Northern restraint is that China finally got the message and leaned on Pyongyang.  The thinking here is that the recent high level US delegation to Beijing advised the Trolls that the next time Pyongyang kicked the hornets' nest, Washington would do nothing to soften or stop a South Korean response.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not President Obama has the testicular fortitude necessary for this warning, the fact on the ground which makes the argument persuasive is simply that the US would not be able to counsel restraint in the face of another Northern attack.  Any holding back would be political suicide for the present South Korean government.  Any hesitation would result in not only electoral backlash but demonstrations in the street and even the possibility of a military coup.

Even the (Clueless) Guy in the Oval must be aware of the downside resident in any Southern hesitancy if attacked in the near future.  The Trolls of Beijing and the Boys in the Kremlin are undoubtedly aware of what might happen in the aftermath of one more military provocation by the Hermits.  So, with or without any specific word from the US diplomats, the message and its consequences would be evident in the Forbidden City.

Pace, Governor Bill, but your latest bid to be the Greatest Peacemaker of the Decade is not going to put you number one in line for the next Nobel Peace Prize.  You have served your role as a transmission belt of old, worn out Northern demarches, but these will prove no more the route to detente in the Korean peninsula than their predecessors.  Get a grip on it!

To reward North Korea for its latest extortion attempt is as self-defeating as is any giving in to any extortionate power.  The Hermits want much.  They will give nothing of significance.  That is the word of experience, the lesson of history.

Keeping to the policy which demands a real, verifiable move to denuclearization as a prerequisite for restarting the Six Power Talks--or any other diplomatic exchange--is the best way to go.  Indeed, it is the only way to go.  The administration is to be commended for having done so to date.  It will deserve even more if it stays the course and hangs tough even in the presence of Governor Bill's latest package.

Considering the totality of the circumstances including the transfer of North Korean centrifuge technology to Iran, there is no alternative to staring the Hermits down, even at the risk of inadvertent, unsought war in the Peninsula.  As night falls there can be no denying the fact that North Korea is the number one foreign policy troublemaker.  Compared to it the challenges presented by Venezuela or even Iran are as trifles.

The Fatal Appeal Of Negotiations

Currently the US is doing the same old, same old.  As it has been for a mort of frustrating years, the incumbant administration along with its counterparts present and past have been plugging away, singing the same tired song: Negotiations conquer all.  There are three critical sets of negotiations either sort of underway,  hoped to be underway soon, or prayed to be commenced sometime, anytime.

The first of these, the one which is more or less underway, is the US sponsored direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority with the stated goal of a comprehensive peace agreement within the next year (or so.)  The hoped to be started soon, say on 6 December, is the next round of talking at each other with the contestants being the P5+1 group on one side of the table and the Iranians on the other.  The third, the one policy makers hope and pray may take sometime soon is the Six Power Talks involving North Korea.

Three categories of similarity link the three totems to the appeal of negotiation.  All have been and are being pushed by the US.  In all three cases strong sets of pressure and inducements have been employed--or, in the case of inducements, promised--over an extended period of time.  Finally, all are replays of earlier failures.

What makes it any different this time around?  Why should any rational person argue that one more diplomatic engagement will accomplish what all the previous ones have failed to do?

The conventional wisdom offered by proponents of give-diplomacy-a-chance has two main parts.  The first is some variant of the contention that talking is better than fighting.  The second is this time,  unlike all the previous ventures, the context has changed: The sanctions have bit hard or the Israelis recognize the time is right and the PA knows it must produce peace or face Hamas sponsored regime change.

A number of high ranking members of the trust-us-we-are-statesmen crowd have assured the American public that the latest round of sanctions which include far more restrictive measures imposed by the US and the European Union have severely undercut the Iranian economy while the pro-democracy forces have refused to knuckle under to the repressive capacities of the Tehran regime.  Objective evidence including that from official Iranian sources does indicate the sanctions, particularly those affecting Western private investment in the oil sector, have made the already bad economic situation worse.  And, there is no doubt but the pro-democracy, Green movement continues to annoy the regime.

Both amount to a "so what?" in the the actions of the Iranian government.  The Iranians well understand that the contest between itself and the P5+1 generally and the US in particular is one of political wills.  They are betting that they possess the greater political will just as they have demonstrated in all the past diplomatic soirees.  If the Iranians and the P5+1 actually sit down somewhere (the venue has not yet been agreed upon) on 6 December, the Iranians will be willing to talk about Iran's role in matters of global import, about the need for revision of the UN Security Council, about the solving of mythic global warming, about almost any and everything other than the ongoing enrichment of uranium.  The US and the others of the P5+1 want to talk about fissioning atoms only.

The Iranians have already demonstrated their ability to teach Andre Gromyko and others of the legendary Iron Pants Brigade of Soviet negotiators a thing or two about how to stall, bob, and weave, and otherwise buy time and wear out the other side's political will.  Also, as the government and its supporters are members in good standing of the Shia sect of Islam, they take great pride in the capacity of the Iranian nation to suffer, to absorb pain in the service of belief.

The net effect of the sanctions has been to engage effectively the Shia commitment of pain for belief while simultaneously boosting the Iranian sense of nationalism.  That is a powerful combination, a combination guaranteed to promote political will.

In comparison the P5+1 lacks any genuine semblance of a coherent political will.  Two of the group have shown both will and ability at skirting or flatly avoiding the imposition of the most biting of the sanctions.  Two others have excellent records until very, very recently of looking the other way as private concerns violate the sanction regime.  And, at least four of the countries have a much higher priority in solving domestic economic concerns.  Overall this means the firmness of will on one side of the table is far less than on the other.

Takeaway: The results of any upcoming "negotiations" can be summarized by a line in a Herman's Hermits tune from the Sixties, "Second verse, same as the first."

The Israeli-Palestinian talks are still on hiatus.  What else can be expected?  The PA has been relying on the Obama administration to do the heavy lifting for them.  Despite its best efforts in pressure, inducements, and hortatory talk, Team Obama has not and will never be able to produce what the PA wants and thinks it must have.

The PA wants a lot.  It wants Israel back to the 1948 Green Line.  It wants East Jerusalem.  It wants either a
"right of return" or financial compensation for those who fled the land which became Israel during the wars of independence.  Most of all it wants a two state solution as an intermediary stop on the road to a one state solution which sees the end of Israel as constituted currently.

The Israeli government is not unaware of the PA's goals both short and long term.  No Israeli government will grant the PA a free pass to those goals.  No conceivable--which is to say, politically acceptable to the American electorate--amount of American pressures and inducements will work to get the PA what it wants.

This is not to imply the government of Israel is much more flexible than its PA interlocutor.  The Israelis may be willing to exchange some undeveloped semi-desert real estate on an acre for acre basis for the land on which the "settlements" exist, but they are not about to relinquish the Old City of Jerusalem which has been incorporated legally into the State of Israel regardless of any UN or US position to the contrary.

Nor is the Israeli government (this one or any other) willing to see a hostile state come into existence on its borders, even the more expansive ones defined by the line of settlements.  Thus the insistence of an Israeli armed presence in a security zone in the Jordan Valley.  It is doubtful that the government of Israel would accept a UN force there, given the record of that organization.

It is a certainty that the Israelis will not agree to any Arab "right of return."  Financial compensation might be possible--particularly if the US pays it.

The political will of the Israelis regarding a peace agreement is made explicit in a law pending before the Knesset.  This law, which is expected to pass easily, requires a super-majority (80 out of 120 members) in the Knesset to approve any agreement containing a territorial transfer.  The alternative to the super-majority will be a national referendum.  (Can we say, "Ice cube in a blast furnace?")

In short, it is hard to see what might exist to justify any continuation of the "peace talks."  Perhaps the US should abandon the effort and cut its political and diplomatic losses.

"But, wait, Geek," you protest.  "What about the Arab League/Saudi Arabian promise of diplomatic recognition and other goodies, like overflight rights?"

Yeah, right.  And, Hitler's Germany diplomatically recognized Poland even as the panzers crossed the common border.  What a concept, twenty or so Arab League members open embassies in Tel Aviv or wherever.  That will be a new challenge for Israeli security: Keeping tabs on legions of subversives and espionage agents.  And, overflights?  EL Al has done quite well without them--and imagine the restrictions for national security and air safety as well as protecting Mecca from "Jewish pollution" which would come as a part of the deal.

Finally there is the negotiation round we keep hoping for.  The one with North Korea.  In a fine exhibit of just how much the sanction regime has hurt the country the Hermits have not only started construction of a one megawatt, thermal, light water reactor equally useful for producing either electricity or plutonium but invited an American expert to tour their new uranium enrichment plant.  Built in a mere eighteen months the new plant definitely impressed the visiting American.

The North Koreans understand political will.  The twin nuclear developments show this.  So does history.  The seemingly endless talks which finally (due to Soviet action and Ike's nuclear threat) yielded the armistice were nothing but a joint Chinese-North Korean effort at outlasting the Americans in the interlocking processes of talking about peace while fighting a war.

The North Koreans are not going to abandon their nuclear effort without gaining something very, very important in return.  Promises of fuel, food, or even "safe" nuclear reactors will not cut it with the Hermits of Pyongyang.  We already know that from the events following the 1994 quasi-agreement brokered by the Clinton administration.

As long as Pyongyang has the tacit backing of Beijing (which will  be a day or two longer than forever), the Hermits see no percentage in settling for less than reunification of the two Koreas.  The reunification must be under terms and conditions of Pyongyang's liking if not dictation.  Acceptance of such by Seoul of a Pyongyang dictate is less likely than Nancy Pelosi showing a wrinkle.

So, reality asks the trenchant question, "What is there to negotiate about?"

The answer to that question is self-evident.

Perhaps the unwillingness of Americans to accept the self-evident and highly negative answers to this and similar questions demonstrates just why we are so addicted to diplomatic negotiations even when there is very little or no chance of such resulting in a good outcome.  We really are that strange and seemingly mythical creature--a peaceloving people.  Indeed we love peace so much we will keep on talking until the moment the first bullet (or missile) is fired at us.

A great strength, a great national value is also the major weakness our enemies can and do use against us.  Just comes with the territory, the territory of the unique American mind.

Well, It's (Almost) Palaver With North Korea Time

Reportedly the Deep Thinkers of the Obama Foreign Policy Team are giving serious consideration to opening some sort of (to use the fashionable term) dialog with North Korea. This wouldn't be done instantly but rather would occur after some more pressure is placed upon the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

Since the incremental approach employed to date has been notably lacking in success, it seems only logical that some more incrementalism be used. Then, after a bit, the US would graciously consent to enter into some sort of conversation about something other than the only issue which matters, the Hermit Kingdom's nuclear weapon development and procurement program.

Duh!

Rationality is the curse of the thinking class. Members of this august group are convinced that diplomacy is a supremely rational, ultimately logical endeavor. They are sincere believers in the proposition that coercion can be calibrated with a degree of precision such as to please the most exacting of experimental physicists. They are also blessed with a faith holding that all countries, all governments, share an identical calculus of rationality so every government will see and understand coercive measures in an identical manner and respond in a predictable way.

Diplomats of the US have had these touching articles of belief for generations now. Our faith in both gradualism and the identity of rationality has been proven wrong again and again, yet, with childlike certainty we use the same magic time after time.

Before we got involved in the shooting part of World War II, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, sought to use a carefully calibrated escalation of gradual economic sanctions to compel Imperial Japan to adjust its expansionist foreign policy in China to American policy requirements. Starting with a ban on the export of chopsticks (yes, kids, we were the OPEC of disposable eating utensils of this nature way back then) and proceeding by increments until a freezing of Japanese assets along with a total ban on the export of refined petroleum products was imposed in the summer of 1941, the US sought to coerce Japan into disgorging its conquests in China and abiding with American policy for the region.

The result of this carefully thought out exercise in rational pressure was the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Singapore. Most folks call this the start of WW II in the Pacific.

Twenty-five years later McGeorge Bundy, LBJ's National Security Advisor, used a calibrated campaign of rational coercion on North Vietnam. The Air Force called it Operation Rolling Thunder while Mr Bundy called it "progressive squeeze and talk." The idea was the US would increase the amount of "punishment" inflicted on North Vietnam for a bit and then would stop, stand back and inquire of Hanoi, "Are you ready to talk yet?"

As LBJ feared, the North Vietnamese matched us escalation for escalation. Each increase in bombing was followed by an increase of North Vietnamese presence in the war in the South. Each pause or hint of a pause was ignored by Hanoi particularly as the Northern leadership discovered that their population had the political will to resist and that bombing caused loathing of those who dropped the bombs not those who refused to talk.

As had been the case with the non-lethal coercion of twenty-five years earlier, the lethal sort engaged in by the ever-so-rational McGeorge Bundy proved to be an expensive and quite counterproductive failure. Of course, we didn't learn the limits of rational gradualism. Nor did we realize that not all governments have the same calculus of rationality or the same view of coercion.

After all we tried the same incremental approaches with respect to Panama in the late 1980s and Iraq in the aftermath of the Kuwait War. In both cases we finally concluded that there was no viable option other than waging aggressive, regime change oriented war.

The US in common with all democracies is very reluctant to go to war. Pace, progressives and other folks of the Left, but the US is quite loath to seek war, even to accept it as a viable, least-worst option. Other advanced, democratic countries see life in the same way with the result that there exists a conspiracy of diplomatic rationality.

The "conspiracy" seeks first, last, and always to employ non-lethal coercive mechanisms to persuade governments to come to the negotiating table and bargain in good faith to reach a compromise on some policy feature or another. Matters become more complicated when the members of the "conspiracy" attempt to reach agreement on the means and extent of any contemplated exercise in coercion by consensus.

The demand for consensus requires all parties to delicately balance domestic interests with foreign policy needs and interests. It also requires an equally difficult balance between short-term interests and those of a long-term nature.

Rendering effective consensus impossible is the necessity of involving countries which are either or both authoritarian and intensely self-interested. To put the matter short and sour, the necessity of achieving a consensus based understanding about coercive means and their extent with countries such as China or Russia makes the imposition of effective coercion impossible.

Even among democratic countries with more or less free enterprise economies, the need for consensus acts to insure that any and all coercive mechanisms are incremental in both design and implementation. This means in turn that the target country has ample time and warning to take measures intended to nullify the coercive intent.

The result is self-evident with respect to both Iran and North Korea. Consensus based incremental coercion be it diplomatic or economic in orientation may retard an obnoxious policy, impair an objectionable course of action, but it will not have significant effect. It will not end the policy or course of action which called the coercion into application.

Diplomatic coercion (aka "isolation") or economic coercion (aka "sanctions") must be applied swiftly and at the maximum rather than the minimum end of the scale if it is to be effective. More disturbingly to those who worship at the alter of "peace" in the temple of the "global community," diplomatic and economic coercion must reside ultimately on the credible will and capacity to employ military force in support of policy.

Coercive diplomacy in all its many forms is the effort to create an artificial coincidence of national interest. The target state seeks to end the coercion; the country or countries inflicting the coercion seek an end to a specific policy or course of action. Herein resides the coinciding national interests.

The US has violated most if not all the rules seen historically for the use of coercion in its policy toward North Korea over the past two decades. Any and all diplomatic and economic coercion has been applied through consensus approved incrementalism. As a result the effects in terms of altering North Korean behavior have been nil. The role played by China over the years has been instrumental in assuring the failure to date.

As the role of China is most unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, there is no reason to conclude any new coercion will prove effective. Even the unexpectedly muscular posture adopted by the US in its naval and military exercises with South Korea have not served to convince the Trolls of Beijing to adopt a more favorable (from the American perspective) stance.

Since South Korea has too much at risk, the use of military force is not a realistic option. In its occasional moments of lucidity, the Hermits of Pyongyang undoubtedly understand this. They also know that North Korea is too important as a physical and political buffer for China to allow the Pyongyang regime to go down the tubes.

It is quite legitimate for the Hermits of the North to conclude they can ignore the huffings and puffings of the US with impunity. Similarly, they can ignore any sweet words, mellow mood music, or blandishments Washington might say, play, or offer.

In short, the US has nothing to talk about with Pyongyang. We should save our effort. With respect to coercion, well, there is more we can do to make life unpleasant for the Hermits--if we are willing to inflict further misery on the population generally. Of course, that sort of thing would be anathema to the current administration.

The takeaway is simple and unpleasant for Uncle Sam's ego. The Pissants of Pyongyang can and will go their own way without the let or hindrance of the US. They will continue to be an annoying and potentially quite dangerous annoyance, but there is nothing the US can do about it realistically.

Sure, it is a diplomatic bramble but there is no choice beyond getting a grip on it.

ADMIN NOTE: The Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments but due to a recent spate of spam comments he has taken defensive measures. He apologizes for all frustration which may accrue.