When The Feces Hits The Fan In North Korea, Where Will Obama Stand?

The President of the United States has managed to avoid taking a real, effective stand with respect to the opposition movement in Iran.  Sorry, words of regret and condemnation don't cut it.  On Egypt, the POTUS entered the lists both late and after a series of internal contradictions within members of his "team."

Then along came Libya.  Sure, it was convenient to excuse the absence of effective action on anxiety that Americans in Libya would be at risk.  The British managed to take a far stronger albeit primarily rhetorical stand before extracting their civilians by means which included a virtual commando operation aimed at the oilfield workers deep in the desert in isolated camps.  The declaration of unilateral sanctions has come late in the game and will have no genuine, immediate impact on the confused mind of Gaddafi.

The POTUS had the power to order the freezing of all Libyan assets in banks doing business in or with the US.  This act particularly if taken early on and accompanied with a loud pronouncement of what was being done and why might have lowered the zeal of Gaddafi's mercenaries.  Coming late, particularly after the drum roll of threats regarding criminal prosecution, presumably under the Statute of Rome and before the International Criminal Court, financial freezes, sanctions, and jawboning has served only to enhance Gaddafi's die-in-place political will as well as the akin sentiments of family and coterie.

As the game nears its end, a primary risk in Libya is the use of chemical munitions, primarily mustard agent, left over from Gaddafi's earlier flirtation with weapons of mass destruction.  The only thing (other than apprehension regarding the loyalty of his air force personnel) which will assure that Gaddafi does not employ chemicals against his own people will be the immediate enforcement of a no-fly zone over the entirety of Libya enforced by NATO.  The US may not, as Robert Gates has asserted, have the air assets available, but the rest of NATO certainly does.  It is past time for the US to urge its allies to do so--immediately.

The dilatory and poorly focused reaction of President Obama to events in the Mideast and Iran does not boost confidence that the US will handle a regime collapse in North Korea with the necessary speed and skill.  The US and other countries should not assume that the status quo in North Korea is any more permanent than that in Libya appeared to be say ten or fourteen days ago.  To do so is to invite disaster on a massive scale.

Not only is North Korea facing the challenge of an orderly succession, it is in the throes of the latest famine.  This particular episode of mass starvation has been exacerbated greatly by the outbreak of hoof and mouth disease in the animal stockpile of the Hermit Kingdom of the North.  The disease has had major impact on two key areas of food production.  It has been wasting the draft animal population upon which most North Korean agriculture depends at an awesome rate of knots.  Further, the hog farms which provide most of the protein eaten by the North Korean military have been devastated by the disease.

The North Korean regime has responded to the new crisis in the usual ways.  Internationally, the diplomats of the Hermit Kingdom have extended their begging bowls.  Backing this and aimed directly at opinion in both the South Korean population and the American, the North Koreans have been ostentatiously preparing facilities for a possible third nuclear test--the test which might actually go off well.  Additionally, the Hermits have moved at least half of their noisy, vulnerable troop carrying hovercraft to a new port convenient to South Korea.  This move has not been secret in the slightest.  Extortion is backing the begging ploy.

There is little doubt but the Pyongyang regime has been following events in the Mideast closely--particularly the role played by the Egyptian army in the end of Hosni Mubarak.  Given the matter of succession, there may be real cause for worry on the part of both Kim and his son regarding the reliability of the armed forces.  And, it must never be forgotten, of all North Korean institutions, the NKPA is most conservative, most fearful, and most resistant to change as well as most oriented toward carrying the blessings of the Northern way of life to the South.

The danger in the situation as it is developing currently is that Kim may in a sense emulate Gaddafi.  He may role the dice for a winner take all high risk, high payoff strategy which would involve a military strike of significant size against the South.  This option would be more attractive if either the military looks to be going all wobbly on the succession deal or the starvation reaches a level as to propel some sort of people power expression of desperation.

Even the lesser threat of a successful multi-kiloton test would constitute a severe challenge to the Obama administration.  Perhaps even a larger challenge than a large scale but time limited raid on Southern territory by Northern forces.  Each would require a prompt, firm, unequivocal response by the US.  Anything less would be to risk a wide spread war on the Korean peninsula with all that implies.

Mr Obama has demonstrated that not only is he naive about the workings of global politics but that he is totally uninterested in correcting his lacking in this area.  Nor has his foreign policy "team" inspired confidence despite the presence of Gates on it.  His cabinet level UN Ambassador has been absent, presumably with leave, when the dramatic end of Mubarak came as well as during the Security Council meeting last week which issued the pusillanimous "press statement" on Libya.  And, the Secretary of State has merely made fine words about "all options being considered" which is scarcely an act of resolute statesmanship.

The Obama administration has bobbled so much in two years.  Should North Korea pose a challenge, the betting has to be the Obama "team" will drop the ball one more time.  That probability is most likely a major factor in the decision making presently underway in Pyongyang.

Talking With A Criminal State

Unless a person is a member of the North Korean Communist Party cadre, the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), or the internal security police, a citizen of the Hermit Kingdom of the North must see the place as the prototypical "failed state." The state and its command economy cannot--or, more accurately, will not--provide the necessities of life. You know, those small things like food, shelter, education, health care which make not only life but mere biological existence possible.

North Korea from an external perspective is not a failed state because it does very well at whatever the Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il, and his coterie from the military and party decide to do. It is in fact a criminal state. Not only does the state exploit the land and the people for its own advantage, its actions in the international arena are much more those of the criminal than, as Joe Biden and others have alleged, a temper tantrum given two year old with a national anthem.

The WaPo has an interesting article which advertently or otherwise provides a clear indictment of the North Korean regime as a criminal state. Along the way it identifies the usual suspect, China, as the number one accessory.

The linkage between the two countries is firm. It should be as it is based not only on the thin tissue of ideology or the almost as tenuous platform of diplomacy but upon the rock hard foundation of minerals.

North Korea has a lot of valuable minerals for which China has an insatiable need. The NKPA is an efficient miner and seller of these minerals. The value of the merchandise has risen from fifteen million dollars in 2003 to over two hundred megabucks five years later. For the North Korean state and its military, this is a nice piece of change.

And, the value may go much, much higher as the North is estimated to hold total extractable mineral reserves aggregating something on the order of six trillion dollars. Given that the North can effectively dragoon any number of shovel bums into action at the wave of Dear Leader's hand and the simple reality that China's appetite will grow rather than lessen, the probability of greatly increased commerce in the minerals market is very, very high.

The money which flows from the trade like that which comes from the sale of missiles, conventional weapons, and nuclear technology will not accrue to the benefit of North Korea's "toiling masses," (Don't you just love that Communist rhetorical term?) No. It will go to the NKPA and those who rely upon it for power.

Al Capone and the boys of the Chicago Outfit did not pass out food to the poor. Neither did they take the swag and endow hospitals or schools. No. The money which was not wasted on purely personal pleasures was spent on the boys and their necessary toys.

So it is with Dear Leader. Yes, he likes the high life as any number of anecdotes indicate. But far more than simple (and not so simple) pleasures, Dear Leader and the boys at the top want to both stay in power and, if (in)humanly possible, extend its sway.

North Korea talks defense incessantly. The Pyongyang noise machine constantly reiterates a single theme: The Capitalists Are Coming! But, the disposition of their armed forces and the rather impressive firepower it disposes show it is poised for offense.

It is true that much of North Korea's most critical military and security infrastructure is well dug in, hardened. So too are the offensive positions where some seventy percent of the NKPA is stationed within one hundred klicks of the ancient truce line--the Big Z. These fortified positions are not intended as defensive but rather as the secure launching point of an offensive of overwhelming proportions.

The South Korean capital and largest city, Seoul, as well as a very large chunk of the country's industrial base is in easy range of both tube artillery and rockets on the other side of the DMZ. The basic military doctrine of the NKPA is so offensively oriented it makes the US Marine equivalent appear rigidly defensive in comparison.

Again Al Capone and the Chicago Outfit are a decent paradigm. Like Dear Leader, Big Al believed that life was "get or get got" in nature, and the only reasonable way to deal with that reality was "the best defense is a very good offense."

Unlike President Theodore Roosevelt, the Lads in Pyongyang believe in talking loudly while waving a big stick. The waving went on as the North announced it was finished extracting the plutonium from the spent fuel rods of Yongbyong and was proceeding to weaponize the stuff.

At the same time the loud talk continued as the Hermit Kingdom of the North demanded once again that the US enter into bi-lateral talks as a precondition to reviving the moribund Six Power Talks. This attitude is a punch in the diplomatic chops for China whose jefes grandes have been urging Dear Leader et al to come back to the Six Power Table.

The goal of the North is to lever the US into slackening its commitment to South Korea, for it is only that commitment which stiffens the spine of the South against the looming intimidation coming from the big stick of the NKPA. Yes, the South Korean armed forces are impressive both in size and technology, but the capacity resident in the North for an overwhelming and highly destructive barrage gives Seoul much pause for thought.

The disposition of the Northern batteries is such that the first few minutes in an unannounced war would see damage inflicted on the highly developed and densely populated northwest of South Korea which beggars the imagination. Even without the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, the number of prompt casualties would be in the high six figures.

While the South could strike back and strike back very hard, the costs to the North would be acceptable given the potential gain of sway. The critical facilities and personnel of the North are well protected and Dear Leader and Company don't care what happens to those many, many poor schmucks who are left in the open.

All of this conspires to present the Obama administration with a pretty conundrum. Public support for our ongoing presence in Korea is mild at best. Budget constraints are great and growing greater. The US sees itself (at least at the highest levels of government) as being less and less of a unilateral actor in foreign affairs preferring to rely on the "international community."

Getting "tough" with North Korea would mean getting even more so with its protector, China, and quite possibly Russia as well. To the Obama folks this would be (to steal a word from one of the Geek's favorite TV series, The Prisoner) "unmutual." It would make for hard feelings and nasty words, and, heavens to Betsy, we can't have that, can we?

Once more it is time to invoke that old Chinese toast (and curse), "May you live in interesting times."

And, so we are.

Yer Mudder Wears Combat Boots To Bed!

The very serious matter of North Korea's extortionate and brutally repressive regime has been reduced by Secretary of State Clinton to an opportunity to make psycho-babble taunts. The current "vicar of foreign policy" (to use Al Haig's old term for the job) has chosen to characterise the behavior of the Hermit Kingdom of the North as being equivalent to small children and teenagers "acting up" to gain attention.

Showing restraint the North's ForMin responded by calling Ms Clinton "a very funny lady" among other things. These were minor league epithets considering Pyongyang has long mastered the blistering terms of opprobrium which were a hallmark of Cold War public diplomacy. (Ah, those were the days! The days of "running dog lackeys of the Wall Street warmongering imperialist claque.")

Ms Clinton has also declared North Korea to be "friendless" while announcing that the price of readmission to the "international community" would be complete denuclearization. Presumably there would be other tariffs assessed such as the abandonment of ballistic missile development, the ending of arms exports, and perhaps the renunciation of internal human rights abuses. She has made it clear that simply returning to the Six Power Talks would bring the Hermits no reward.

At least the we're-always-ready-to-talk bunch in the Obama administration has made one firm decision. The business of extortion as usual approach of Pyongyang won't work this time. No, this time, if Dear Leader and his coterie want swag, they will have to give up the nukes first.

Ms Clinton and, presumably, the other foreign policy makers of today think the sanctions will compel "friendless" North Korea to cave in, surrender its nukes, give up its missiles, and do whatever else the "international community" might demand to stop the pain being inflicted on its leaders by the assorted embargoes. Can't you just see it now--

Kim Jong-il is told that the Italian government has seized the two custom yachts being built for him as demanded by the Security Council resolutions. "Oh, no!" He cries. Stamps his feet. Waves his arms. "Give up the atoms, right now! I can't sail a bunch of atoms! I want my boats!"

In an international exchange monitored by Jimmy Carter, the North Koreans hand over all their plutonium. And, Kim gets his luxury aquatic rides. And, peace and good will reign forever more.

Yeah, fer sure, dude.

In Reality Land the critical player, China, will cooperate with the sanctions only as long as the internal stability of North Korea is not threatened. If instability looms as it will come the next transfer of power in Pyongyang, Beijing will find appropriate low profile ways to violate the UN expressed "will of the international community." To do anything other than that would be to place Chinese national interests at risk.

There is no sign that China is particularly concerned over recent developments in North Korea. There have been no major troop movements toward the border. Neither have the Chinese been issuing any warnings to Pyonyang as they have occasionally in the past. Given that Chinese intelligence has a greater degree of penetration in the Hermit Kingdom and has had such for over a half century, there is little probability of any alarming developments in Pyongyang eluding Beijing.

There are some other considerations which must be taken into account when evaluating the probability that the current US policy of stern demands and psycho babble insults will bear any useful result.

As Ruediger Frank pointed out at a conference last month at the University of British Columbia, the military ruling circle changed policy in 2006. North Korea's short-lived flirtation with more liberal internal policies came to a screeching halt in what he termed, "socialist neoconservatism." The state took back control of all aspects of the economy and reinstituted the most pervasive form of internal security. The long standing North Korean gulag filled quickly to the brim and would overflow were it not for the high death rate in the constellation of "reform through labor" camps.

Ideological control and indoctrination became universal and unrelenting. The state sought with great success to assure absolute and unquestionable authority over every aspect of individual life in the country. Warning of the need for continued sacrifice and of the ever present threat of attack by the US and others of the "imperialist camp," the regime has forged a submissive and long-suffering population ready (if not eager) to bear whatever might be necessary to maintain the state.

In keeping with the model of success in control and indoctrination, it might be noted that the vast majority of the refugees from North Korea are female, marginal in their economic value, and normally unemployed. The flood into both China and South Korea has been one of economic and not political refugees. They are not "voting with their feet." They are looking for a job.

Arguably, North Korea is facilitating the leaving of unemployable members of society. They are clearing the decks of what was called in Nazi Germany, "useless mouths." A closer examination of the refugee stream would probably show a high proportion of people with physical or mental illnesses which can't be afforded by the state.

While there are threats to the regime's control of perceptions and attitudes such as the circulation of DVDs and CDs smuggled in from China, these are not likely to threaten the state's authority over its population. These small leaks are certainly not going to pollute the large North Korean army's loyalty.

North Korea's army constitutes a real, constant, and major threat to South Korea. The most plausible "nightmare scenario" is one of a spasm war. While the American military states it is ready for all eventualities, this would in no way lessen, let alone obviate, the consequences of a spasm war.

With a suitable pretext, a "provocation" such as the South Korean navy or coast guard stopping and searching a North Korean vessel under the provisions of the Security Council resolution--an action Pyongyang has already characterised as "an act of war"--the North could unleash a fierce barrage of missile, rocket, and tube artillery. Since some sixty percent of the South Korean industrial establishment as well as Seoul are within range, the death and destruction would be impressive.

The US and South Korea can and will respond quickly and in great force. The North has long prepared for such an eventuality. Its military and critical civilian facilities are well dug in, hardened, and protected.

China and Russia would move fast, very fast to call a Security Council meeting with a view of passing a ceasefire resolution. North Korea would quickly accept the resolution. The US and South Korea would have no viable option but to do the same. The war would be over, probably in twenty-four hours or less.

China and Russia would insist that North Korea share in the "humanitarian" and "reconstruction" aid which would be a necessary aftermath. The badly hurt South Korea would have received a potent lesson in the advisibility of a genuine "reunification" effort. This bent would be potentiated by the powerful peace faction which has been a permanent and often noisy and politically important component of South Korean life.

Regional dynamics will be changed. Changed in ways which cannot be predicted in detail.

The North Korean regime with or without Dear Leader may see such a gambit as the least undesirable of all possible evils. A spasm war would be extortion taken to the ultimate high risk, high payoff level. That does not make it an unthinkable option for Pyongyang, particularly if it sees the risks as no greater than the long term impact of the American sanction based approach.

As we found out on 7 December 41, a country when presented with a choice between the humiliating surrender to American policy demands or war, may well opt for war. Back then the Japanese reckoned that the US was too preoccupied with Germany to do other than accept an accomplished feat in Asia and the Pacific. It turned out their calculations were wrong.

However, the current realities of the American internal economic and political agendas taken with the war-weariness of the American public and the powerful leverage enjoyed by China in the Security Council may give the leaders of the Hermit Kingdom reason to believe that the spasm war gambit will pay off more than it will cost. Now, that is a threat.

So, Madam Secretary, while it may feel good to heave psycho babble terms at North Korea and be so personally satisfying to term the North, "friendless," and seem so tough to demand captituation to US policy demands as the price of friendship, it shows a certain inability on your part to get a grip on reality in all its seamy ways. Theodore Roosevelt advised that one speak softly and carry a big stick. You, Secretary Clinton, prefer to talk loudly and carry no stick at all.

Cold Winds Of Reality Hit The Oval Office

The Obama "narrative" emphasizing engagement and intense diplomacy with North Korea using the medium of the Six Power Talks is fast receding into the haze of rhetorical fantasy. Regardless of the details of Dear Leader Kim Jong-il's health, there is no possibility in this universe that the long moribund diplomatic rhodomontade involving the US, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, and Japan will spring back to life.

Whether the president likes the reality or not, there are signs that he is being compelled to accept it. North Korea has never been interested in ending its nuclear capacity. Its only real goal has been the extortion of maximum benefits from the US, South Korea, and Japan at the lowest possible cost. The diplomatic context was simply cover for the state-to-state extortion effort, which paid off handsomely for the Hermit Kingdom of the North.

The dubious state of Dear Leader's health and the (perhaps) limited number of years left to him have marginally complicated the game of nations, North Korean style. The matter of succession makes the behavior of the North a little less predictable, but only in degree--not direction.

The Hermit Kingdom will continue its R&D efforts in both missile and nuclear technology. It will test more. It will produce more fissionable material, both plutonium and enriched uranium. It will aggressively seek to market the technology and products which it develops. And, there are customers with ready cash for these offers.

The only realistic alternative left to the US is that of containment. Of course, all along the way, from Clinton through W. Bush to Obama, the containment option has been the only one which had even the slightest toehold on reality. All the diplomacy, all the initialed and signed agreements, all the rushing from capital to capital, have been window dressing on a display of futility.

There is a fundamental question regarding the containment option. It is a critical question and the probable answer to it has always been the chief impediment to adopting the you-shall-not-cross-this-line approach before.

Will Russia and, more importantly, China, cooperate fully in enforcing a leakproof barrier against North Korea's importation of necessary technology and equipment as well as one prohibiting the export of nuclear and missile technology, components, and assembled systems?

Even though there is evidence that the Chinese government is irritated enough with the Pyongyang regime to impose some sanctions on key people in the North, this is not a reason to assume the Men of the Forbidden City are willing to go further. The Chinese will not push too hard, not because they are necessarily all that sympathetic with the Hermit Kingdom, but rather because they are apprehensive over the regional consequences of Pyongyang engaging in too risky behavior or imploding in a leadership crisis.

China is not convinced that the North Koreans if pushed too hard or gripped by an internal crisis would not attack the South. No matter how long such an attack might last (and the US commander in theater does not think it would last long), a move across the 38th parallel would be very, very destructive.

It can and has been argued that the assured destruction of the North and the highly probable termination of the current regime means the North Koreans are permanently deterred. A more pessimistic (realistic?) appraisal such as hypothesised for the Beijing leadership focuses on the what-is-there-to-lose? interpretation of motive.

Given sufficient hardship impinging on the ruling elite and the army which keeps the elite in power, there might be no reason to refrain from launching an attack in response to an arguable South Korean "provocation." This form of attack would be limited to firing missiles and artillery in a generally southern direction inflicting massive losses on the South Korean population and industrial plant. Heavily dug in North Korean ground forces would remain on the defensive with the result that casualties among any South Korean or US forces moving across the DMZ would be extensive.

American air operations would devastate exposed portions of the North Korean industrial, agricultural, and military systems but would probably not be decisive. Moscow and Beijing (the latter faced by a refugee flood) would demand an immediate UN action to secure a ceasefire.

Provided that the Pyongyang regime (with or without the presence of Kim Jong-il) could point to a plausible South Korean provocation, the ceasefire would be on terms and conditions favorable to the North. They would, undoubtedly, be accompanied by "humanitarian" aid.

This far from implausible potential is what will keep Beijing balanced carefully between appearing to cooperate with the US in the UN imposed sanction regime and doing all that it can to make certain the Pyongyang government (again with or without Kim) stays in power and does not unduly stir the Asian pot. And this, bucko, makes the containment option less than guaranteed in its outcome.

Even with its ambiguity, containment is today what it always has been--the last, best option of managing the emerging threat of North Korea as a proliferater of nuclear and missile technology. Once the Nice Young Man From Chicago now occupying the Oval can acknowledge the limits of his "narrative" regarding engagement and diplomacy, the US can focus on bringing the containment option to fruition.

Heck, keeping China and Russia on board in even a limited way will provide a Diplomats And Special Envoys Full Employment Act. There will be lots and lots of photo ops for men and women with briefcases and aides running up and down grand stairways pursued by breathless representatives of the media. And, isn't that what diplomacy is all about? Providing the appearance of getting something done without any underlying substance?