The President of the United States has managed to avoid taking a real, effective stand with respect to the opposition movement in Iran. Sorry, words of regret and condemnation don't cut it. On Egypt, the POTUS entered the lists both late and after a series of internal contradictions within members of his "team."
Then along came Libya. Sure, it was convenient to excuse the absence of effective action on anxiety that Americans in Libya would be at risk. The British managed to take a far stronger albeit primarily rhetorical stand before extracting their civilians by means which included a virtual commando operation aimed at the oilfield workers deep in the desert in isolated camps. The declaration of unilateral sanctions has come late in the game and will have no genuine, immediate impact on the confused mind of Gaddafi.
The POTUS had the power to order the freezing of all Libyan assets in banks doing business in or with the US. This act particularly if taken early on and accompanied with a loud pronouncement of what was being done and why might have lowered the zeal of Gaddafi's mercenaries. Coming late, particularly after the drum roll of threats regarding criminal prosecution, presumably under the Statute of Rome and before the International Criminal Court, financial freezes, sanctions, and jawboning has served only to enhance Gaddafi's die-in-place political will as well as the akin sentiments of family and coterie.
As the game nears its end, a primary risk in Libya is the use of chemical munitions, primarily mustard agent, left over from Gaddafi's earlier flirtation with weapons of mass destruction. The only thing (other than apprehension regarding the loyalty of his air force personnel) which will assure that Gaddafi does not employ chemicals against his own people will be the immediate enforcement of a no-fly zone over the entirety of Libya enforced by NATO. The US may not, as Robert Gates has asserted, have the air assets available, but the rest of NATO certainly does. It is past time for the US to urge its allies to do so--immediately.
The dilatory and poorly focused reaction of President Obama to events in the Mideast and Iran does not boost confidence that the US will handle a regime collapse in North Korea with the necessary speed and skill. The US and other countries should not assume that the status quo in North Korea is any more permanent than that in Libya appeared to be say ten or fourteen days ago. To do so is to invite disaster on a massive scale.
Not only is North Korea facing the challenge of an orderly succession, it is in the throes of the latest famine. This particular episode of mass starvation has been exacerbated greatly by the outbreak of hoof and mouth disease in the animal stockpile of the Hermit Kingdom of the North. The disease has had major impact on two key areas of food production. It has been wasting the draft animal population upon which most North Korean agriculture depends at an awesome rate of knots. Further, the hog farms which provide most of the protein eaten by the North Korean military have been devastated by the disease.
The North Korean regime has responded to the new crisis in the usual ways. Internationally, the diplomats of the Hermit Kingdom have extended their begging bowls. Backing this and aimed directly at opinion in both the South Korean population and the American, the North Koreans have been ostentatiously preparing facilities for a possible third nuclear test--the test which might actually go off well. Additionally, the Hermits have moved at least half of their noisy, vulnerable troop carrying hovercraft to a new port convenient to South Korea. This move has not been secret in the slightest. Extortion is backing the begging ploy.
There is little doubt but the Pyongyang regime has been following events in the Mideast closely--particularly the role played by the Egyptian army in the end of Hosni Mubarak. Given the matter of succession, there may be real cause for worry on the part of both Kim and his son regarding the reliability of the armed forces. And, it must never be forgotten, of all North Korean institutions, the NKPA is most conservative, most fearful, and most resistant to change as well as most oriented toward carrying the blessings of the Northern way of life to the South.
The danger in the situation as it is developing currently is that Kim may in a sense emulate Gaddafi. He may role the dice for a winner take all high risk, high payoff strategy which would involve a military strike of significant size against the South. This option would be more attractive if either the military looks to be going all wobbly on the succession deal or the starvation reaches a level as to propel some sort of people power expression of desperation.
Even the lesser threat of a successful multi-kiloton test would constitute a severe challenge to the Obama administration. Perhaps even a larger challenge than a large scale but time limited raid on Southern territory by Northern forces. Each would require a prompt, firm, unequivocal response by the US. Anything less would be to risk a wide spread war on the Korean peninsula with all that implies.
Mr Obama has demonstrated that not only is he naive about the workings of global politics but that he is totally uninterested in correcting his lacking in this area. Nor has his foreign policy "team" inspired confidence despite the presence of Gates on it. His cabinet level UN Ambassador has been absent, presumably with leave, when the dramatic end of Mubarak came as well as during the Security Council meeting last week which issued the pusillanimous "press statement" on Libya. And, the Secretary of State has merely made fine words about "all options being considered" which is scarcely an act of resolute statesmanship.
The Obama administration has bobbled so much in two years. Should North Korea pose a challenge, the betting has to be the Obama "team" will drop the ball one more time. That probability is most likely a major factor in the decision making presently underway in Pyongyang.
Showing posts with label Libyan Protests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Libyan Protests. Show all posts
Saturday, February 26, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
I Am A Chinese Citizen! Trolls, You Must Protect Me!
From the time of Rome through the eras of the British Empire and the American "Century," the citizens of assertive Great Powers have demanded their government protect them and their interests whenever threatened by the acts of "lesser breeds without the law." And, so it is now with the thirty thousand or so Chinese living and working in Libya.
The WSJ reports that the Chinese version of Twitter is filled with demands for governmental action to assure the safety of Chinese and Chinese property in Libya. Pictures as well as text accounts of the actions of "gangsters" harming Chinese abound in these and similar Internet postings. In response, the Trolls of Beijing have stated they will take all necessary measures. Don't you like the ambiguous phrasing? That term "all necessary" can cover a multitude of options including the one the Trolls do not yet possess--a blue water naval capacity and the force projection ability such confers.
It is worth noting the Trolls have worked faster and more effectively to retrieve their citizens than has the Obama administration. The Chinese have evacuated more than four thousand of their nationals primarily via chartered Greek flagged vessels. The US has managed to stash a couple of hundred Americans including diplomatic personnel on a ferry which has not yet left port due to "high waves." This means the Americans are still living under the guns of Gaddafi's hired hands with itchy trigger fingers.
The current violence in the Mideast has caught the Trolls both exposed and unprepared. The Chinese presence in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere in the region has increased geometrically in the past few years as Beijing controlled enterprises have proliferated in all areas of economic activity from resource extraction and agriculture to the sale of manufactured products both durable and consumer oriented. At the same time the Chinese have taken a higher profile in the internal affairs of these states.
While not receiving much play in the American or European media, the Chinese have shown an ability to make themselves personally unpopular with the "natives" not only in the Mideast but elsewhere, most notably Africa. The "native" press in a number of places over the past few years have compared the Chinese unfavorably not only with Americans but the previous colonials. It appears that Chinese working in areas scattered around the globe have managed to engender a perception in the minds of the "natives" to the effect that China is a land of arrogant xenophobes laden with contempt for others.
Every now and then the local appreciation of Chinese manners and mores will hit the radar screen of Western MSM as in the case of the Chinese managers of a mine pulling and using guns with lethal effect on some striking workers who made so bold as to challenge the conduct of their "betters." True, this was in the Congo, a place not noted for civilized behavior, but even the pathetic excuse for a government did take a dim view of gunning down strikers. Not that the dim view resulted in prosecution, and the whole matter faded away covered by the shadow of Chinese money.
The Geek has great respect for both the age and unchanging nature of so much of Chinese culture and world view. He has noted in prior posts the accomplishments of Chinese and the Chinese emperors in the days when Europeans were barely beyond painting themselves blue and tossing one another into the nearest bog, but the notion of the "Central Empire" which has colored Chinese attitudes toward all those so benighted as to have been born outside the sacred precincts of the Empire has never been a particularly admirable feature of the Chinese mental landscape.
After having been submerged by the all conquering wave of European (and, later, American) advance and expansion, it appears the ancient sense of "Central Empire" superiority has reemerged with a vengeance. Powered by money flowing from the US and Western Europe as the inevitable and fully predicted result of the Clinton era fascination with "globalization," the old Central Empire is flexing its muscles in every conceivable way. This includes treating the "natives" wherever they may exist with triumphalist contempt.
This context helps explain why the insurrectionists in Libya may target Chinese and their enterprises. He who has not only cozied up with the dictator but also cocked the snoot repeatedly at the locals will not be the recipient of bouquets when the worm turns even a little.
One result of the clamor for protection coming from Chinese in Libya will be a move to increase the interventionary capacity of the Chinese military. It is not as if the Trolls need any excuse. The very impressive qualitative (and quantitative) increase in Chinese military capabilities has been underway even before the vast expansion in offshore economic activities. The impact of the events in Libya and elsewhere will simply give a plausible justification for further enhancement of power projection capabilities.
This coupled with an ever more assertive Chinese diplomacy puts the squeeze on the US. We can either assure a continued superiority in air, naval, and other, newer forms of defense capacities or we can accept the Chinese as an equal--or superior--in global affairs with all that implies to American freedom of action. Given the perilous state of American fiscal affairs in the wake of the global recession and the inept attempts by the current administration to deal with both the recession and the installation of its own ideologically driven agenda, the defense budget is not likely to be up to the challenge.
There is no use in talking of how trade makes for good, peaceful neighbors. The Chinese government is highly nationalistic in its definition and pursuit of interest. It is also driven by the notion of the "Central Empire." This implies that there will be many places and occasions where the interests of China and the US will not coincide sufficiently for conventional diplomacy to have any utility. And, absent both a credible military capacity and the perceived political will to employ that capacity, no coercive diplomacy is or can be effective.
In a very real sense the US has a last best hope in the ability of the Trolls and the Chinese working abroad to make themselves detested. We can and should take cheer in the attacks on Chinese facilities in Libya. They are a symptom of the weakness of China--its Central Empire way of thinking. To the extent that Chinese working in countries around the world can alienate the "natives" by their attitudes and actions, the US benefits, If at the same time Americans exhibit attitudes and undertake actions which convey our openness to others, our ability to listen and learn from the locals, our respect for the traditions and customs of the locals, we put more and more positive space between ourselves and the minions of the Trolls.
There are places and people where the US will not be able to make itself look good. In spots like Pakistan, there is no hope the locals will abandon quickly or easily the decades of increasing hatred of all things American. But, there is reason to hope--even believe--that the Chinese will be able to make themselves even more disliked, distrusted.
Admittedly it ain't much. But, given the current realities--including the dilatory conduct of the Obama administration in the face of what has been happening in Libya and the Mideast generally--we do not have much else going for us. Disgusting, isn't it, bucko?
The WSJ reports that the Chinese version of Twitter is filled with demands for governmental action to assure the safety of Chinese and Chinese property in Libya. Pictures as well as text accounts of the actions of "gangsters" harming Chinese abound in these and similar Internet postings. In response, the Trolls of Beijing have stated they will take all necessary measures. Don't you like the ambiguous phrasing? That term "all necessary" can cover a multitude of options including the one the Trolls do not yet possess--a blue water naval capacity and the force projection ability such confers.
It is worth noting the Trolls have worked faster and more effectively to retrieve their citizens than has the Obama administration. The Chinese have evacuated more than four thousand of their nationals primarily via chartered Greek flagged vessels. The US has managed to stash a couple of hundred Americans including diplomatic personnel on a ferry which has not yet left port due to "high waves." This means the Americans are still living under the guns of Gaddafi's hired hands with itchy trigger fingers.
The current violence in the Mideast has caught the Trolls both exposed and unprepared. The Chinese presence in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere in the region has increased geometrically in the past few years as Beijing controlled enterprises have proliferated in all areas of economic activity from resource extraction and agriculture to the sale of manufactured products both durable and consumer oriented. At the same time the Chinese have taken a higher profile in the internal affairs of these states.
While not receiving much play in the American or European media, the Chinese have shown an ability to make themselves personally unpopular with the "natives" not only in the Mideast but elsewhere, most notably Africa. The "native" press in a number of places over the past few years have compared the Chinese unfavorably not only with Americans but the previous colonials. It appears that Chinese working in areas scattered around the globe have managed to engender a perception in the minds of the "natives" to the effect that China is a land of arrogant xenophobes laden with contempt for others.
Every now and then the local appreciation of Chinese manners and mores will hit the radar screen of Western MSM as in the case of the Chinese managers of a mine pulling and using guns with lethal effect on some striking workers who made so bold as to challenge the conduct of their "betters." True, this was in the Congo, a place not noted for civilized behavior, but even the pathetic excuse for a government did take a dim view of gunning down strikers. Not that the dim view resulted in prosecution, and the whole matter faded away covered by the shadow of Chinese money.
The Geek has great respect for both the age and unchanging nature of so much of Chinese culture and world view. He has noted in prior posts the accomplishments of Chinese and the Chinese emperors in the days when Europeans were barely beyond painting themselves blue and tossing one another into the nearest bog, but the notion of the "Central Empire" which has colored Chinese attitudes toward all those so benighted as to have been born outside the sacred precincts of the Empire has never been a particularly admirable feature of the Chinese mental landscape.
After having been submerged by the all conquering wave of European (and, later, American) advance and expansion, it appears the ancient sense of "Central Empire" superiority has reemerged with a vengeance. Powered by money flowing from the US and Western Europe as the inevitable and fully predicted result of the Clinton era fascination with "globalization," the old Central Empire is flexing its muscles in every conceivable way. This includes treating the "natives" wherever they may exist with triumphalist contempt.
This context helps explain why the insurrectionists in Libya may target Chinese and their enterprises. He who has not only cozied up with the dictator but also cocked the snoot repeatedly at the locals will not be the recipient of bouquets when the worm turns even a little.
One result of the clamor for protection coming from Chinese in Libya will be a move to increase the interventionary capacity of the Chinese military. It is not as if the Trolls need any excuse. The very impressive qualitative (and quantitative) increase in Chinese military capabilities has been underway even before the vast expansion in offshore economic activities. The impact of the events in Libya and elsewhere will simply give a plausible justification for further enhancement of power projection capabilities.
This coupled with an ever more assertive Chinese diplomacy puts the squeeze on the US. We can either assure a continued superiority in air, naval, and other, newer forms of defense capacities or we can accept the Chinese as an equal--or superior--in global affairs with all that implies to American freedom of action. Given the perilous state of American fiscal affairs in the wake of the global recession and the inept attempts by the current administration to deal with both the recession and the installation of its own ideologically driven agenda, the defense budget is not likely to be up to the challenge.
There is no use in talking of how trade makes for good, peaceful neighbors. The Chinese government is highly nationalistic in its definition and pursuit of interest. It is also driven by the notion of the "Central Empire." This implies that there will be many places and occasions where the interests of China and the US will not coincide sufficiently for conventional diplomacy to have any utility. And, absent both a credible military capacity and the perceived political will to employ that capacity, no coercive diplomacy is or can be effective.
In a very real sense the US has a last best hope in the ability of the Trolls and the Chinese working abroad to make themselves detested. We can and should take cheer in the attacks on Chinese facilities in Libya. They are a symptom of the weakness of China--its Central Empire way of thinking. To the extent that Chinese working in countries around the world can alienate the "natives" by their attitudes and actions, the US benefits, If at the same time Americans exhibit attitudes and undertake actions which convey our openness to others, our ability to listen and learn from the locals, our respect for the traditions and customs of the locals, we put more and more positive space between ourselves and the minions of the Trolls.
There are places and people where the US will not be able to make itself look good. In spots like Pakistan, there is no hope the locals will abandon quickly or easily the decades of increasing hatred of all things American. But, there is reason to hope--even believe--that the Chinese will be able to make themselves even more disliked, distrusted.
Admittedly it ain't much. But, given the current realities--including the dilatory conduct of the Obama administration in the face of what has been happening in Libya and the Mideast generally--we do not have much else going for us. Disgusting, isn't it, bucko?
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Well,Golly, Really, Someone Ought To Do Something
De facto, Libya has fissioned. There is no longer one Libya other than within the lines on a map. In the real world there is now an East Libya centered on Benghazi and Tobruk (or Tobruq, if you insist on current spelling) and a West Libya comprised of Tripoli and the oilfields to its south. It merits mention that East Libya also has its own oilfields and loading facilities.
The residual government of Brother Leader and associates has no sway over any of East Libya which is now an independent if not yet sovereign entity. The tribes of East Libya have withdrawn all allegiance to the Gaddafi regime while the armed forces have defected in wholesale lots to the insurrectionists. The latter occurred because the attraction of region, of tribe, of clan outweighs all the artifices of Gaddafi's view of socialism, Libyan style.
In West Libya, the man who identified himself as "history," as "revolution," and other abstracts, is having more than a few problems killing enough and terrorizing enough to keep even the semblance of power in the capital and its environs. The mercenary and militia forces currently loyal to the one time strongman have demonstrated a capacity and taste for killing people. This has not yet translated into security for Brother Leader.
The greatest advantage Gaddafi has in West Libya is the absence of a coherent resistance. The uprising in Tripoli unlike that in East Libya has been inchoate from the beginning. While the leaderless uprising has some advantages--it is uniquely invulnerable to decapitation strikes by the status quo--it lacks the organizational and structural integrity which can assure the survival of a resistance movement even under heavy and deadly pressure.
A critical question therefore is why the difference between East Libya, the home of an organized, long standing anti-government movement, and West Libya, the site of a genuine leaderless movement? In a major way the difference between what happened in Benghazi or Tobruk on the one hand and Tripoli on the other is a reflection, even a consequence of Libyan history.
Prior to the forced unification of Libya by Italy in 1931 at the end of a twenty year campaign, Libya had been three quasi-states: Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. Cyrenaica is East Libya. Tripolitania is West Libya--absent its oilfields. These are found to the south in old Fezzan. The three divisions are ancient, dating back to the days of Rome and Carthage. The divisions are not simply geographic. Nor are they simply lines on old maps.
The divisions run more across the human terrain than the merely physical. They coincide with tribal and clan homelands, homelands which have existed since the mythic dawn of time. As the Italians discovered when they embarked on their great adventure in imitating Rome, the differences between the three regions were starkest when expressed in the degree of opposition to the new colonials. While none of the three were easy nuts to crack, Cyrenaica was the hardest by far.
The New Rome of Mussolini determined to erase the existence of the historical consciousness of the tribesmen of the newly conquered provinces and for that reason decreed the new "state" of Libya into existence. Decreeing is easy, doing much harder. The Italians were never able to create a unified Libyan state, and their efforts not only were unsuccessful, they became counterproductive.
The Anglo-American forces which occupied Libya from 1943 to the end of the war contented themselves with administering the territory for the convenience of the war effort. This approach, which paid utterly no attention to the nature of the human terrain, continued into the post-war period with the creation of a monarchy far more artificial than organic. The not made in Libya monarchy lasted until it fell to Gaddafi's 1969 coup having been kept alive until then by the Cold War needs of the US and its NATO partners as well as the development of the domestic oilfields. The important fact to keep in mind is that at no time during the quarter century of its existence did the monarchy, the foreign supporters of the monarchy, or anyone else attempt to create a unified national identity for Libya.
At the time King Idris left to nobody's real sorrow, the old divisions continued to exist with some small changes. Due to the development of the oilfields of West Libya there had been a degree of integration between Fezzan and Tripolitania. There had been no such process with regard to Cyrenaica, the population centers of which were separated from Tripoli by some five or six hundred kilometers of sand crossed by a single all weather road and a number of ancient caravan tracks.
The proving of oilfields in Cyrenaica during the early Gaddafi years served to reinforce the separate identities of East and West Libya, or, to use the old terms, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania/Fezzan. Then as a matter of policy driven by a deep fear of military coup, Colonel Gaddafi reinforced the ancient divisions by not only refusing to integrate tribes and regions in national institutions including the army, but by deepening and widening the divisions.
His version of divide and conquer may have been successful in precluding a military coup but did so at the price of assuring profound disaffiliation in Cyrenaica. For at least the last quarter century there has been a palpable and growing sense of "Cyrenaica for the Cyrenaicians." When Gaddafi ordered the prison massacre in Benghazi in 1996 he gave this growing movement a shot of growth hormone.
Since 1996 the anti-government sentiment in Cyrenaica has developed silently but profoundly with results which were stunningly obvious in the first seventy-two hours of the insurrection. Bluntly put, the Gaddafi regime lost Benghazi and Tobruk and the other towns of East Libya almost instantly. Local army units changed sides in a heartbeat and took their weapons with them. Air force and navy units did something similar, at least defecting to foreign shores rather than shoot on fellow tribe and clan members. Cyrenaica for the Cyrenaicians!
The fact that Gaddafi moved in foreign mercenaries from Chad and sub-Saharan Africa shows he well understood that the loyalties of tribe and clan would trump any appeal held by his "revolution." He knew and knows that his heavy heel has an Achilles tendon. The foreigners were the splint for this potentially fatal weakness.
Whether the Rent-A-Killer forces will prove sufficient along with those Libyans who have a vested or visceral interest in the status quo to keep Brother Leader in power in West Libya remains to be seen. One can be more certain about Gaddafi;s political will. If nothing else he both believes his own propaganda and understands that he has no retirement haven waiting for him. He has to stay and fight it out, to die in place if that is the way it plays out. The same applies to his two most visible sons.
The dissidents of Cyrenaica have the political will as well. They well understand the price of failure and the Egyptian border may prove to be a line in the sand too far should the Colonel and his killers gain the upper hand. The so far successful insurrectionists of East Libya (Cyrenaica) also have both the organizational and material means to wage prolonged defensive war. In addition, the majority of the population is with them.
This implies the war within the borders of Libya could continue for a long and bloody time absent sufficient outside pressure to end it. East and West Libya could exchange inconclusive blows for weeks, months, even years if the oil continues to flow in sufficient amounts and can be exchanged for the necessities of life and war. It would not be pretty.
It is this far from unlikely eventuality which makes the insipid reactions of the Obama administration and other governments so disheartening. The Security Council limiting itself to a "press statement" would be risible were it not both tragic and, given the long standing policies of China and Russia, predictable. Far more disturbing was the absence of UN Ambassador Susan Rice from the Security Council vote.
Ms Rice who has worked herself into an excellent imitation of war fever over the plight of people in Darfur was off to South Africa for a confab on "global sustainability" and thus too preoccupied to consider the situation in Libya. Her boss, President Obama, is also absent. Sure, his press flack assures us the Clueless Guy in the Oval will have something to say apropos Libya today or tomorrow, but that is scarcely the sort of laid back approach the situation demands.
Gaddafi has to be forced out quickly. He has to be made to go--alive or dead--before the cycles of killing reach the point that Bosnia will look like a Baptist Sunday Social in comparison. The US and other civilized states such as the UK and Italy can freeze bank accounts, impose travel bans, put sanctions in place, prohibit arms sales, order their national corporate citizens to halt all activity, even use NATO assets to impose naval and air blockades. None of these require a great deal of head scratching, consultations, joint communiques, but all demand action.
Somebody really, really has to do something. All the somethings are well understood. All are easy to do. None require the UN do anything. All demand the civilized states including the US put pens on paper, sign the required orders, and apply the pressure.
Even symbolic actions, the freezing of funds for example, would undercut the willingness of the mercenaries to stay in Libya and embolden even the leaderless movement in West Libya to keep on keeping on. If, at the same time, the civilized states would make the right sort of noises exempting low ranking trigger pullers from prosecution, the pro-Gaddifi forces would be weakened even more. There are other easy to take and quick to operate measures as well, but this roster gives some indications of the great number of tools available to assist in the ending of the Gaddafi madness.
But, someone has to go first. That is what the US formerly did. What is wrong now, Mr Obama?
The residual government of Brother Leader and associates has no sway over any of East Libya which is now an independent if not yet sovereign entity. The tribes of East Libya have withdrawn all allegiance to the Gaddafi regime while the armed forces have defected in wholesale lots to the insurrectionists. The latter occurred because the attraction of region, of tribe, of clan outweighs all the artifices of Gaddafi's view of socialism, Libyan style.
In West Libya, the man who identified himself as "history," as "revolution," and other abstracts, is having more than a few problems killing enough and terrorizing enough to keep even the semblance of power in the capital and its environs. The mercenary and militia forces currently loyal to the one time strongman have demonstrated a capacity and taste for killing people. This has not yet translated into security for Brother Leader.
The greatest advantage Gaddafi has in West Libya is the absence of a coherent resistance. The uprising in Tripoli unlike that in East Libya has been inchoate from the beginning. While the leaderless uprising has some advantages--it is uniquely invulnerable to decapitation strikes by the status quo--it lacks the organizational and structural integrity which can assure the survival of a resistance movement even under heavy and deadly pressure.
A critical question therefore is why the difference between East Libya, the home of an organized, long standing anti-government movement, and West Libya, the site of a genuine leaderless movement? In a major way the difference between what happened in Benghazi or Tobruk on the one hand and Tripoli on the other is a reflection, even a consequence of Libyan history.
Prior to the forced unification of Libya by Italy in 1931 at the end of a twenty year campaign, Libya had been three quasi-states: Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. Cyrenaica is East Libya. Tripolitania is West Libya--absent its oilfields. These are found to the south in old Fezzan. The three divisions are ancient, dating back to the days of Rome and Carthage. The divisions are not simply geographic. Nor are they simply lines on old maps.
The divisions run more across the human terrain than the merely physical. They coincide with tribal and clan homelands, homelands which have existed since the mythic dawn of time. As the Italians discovered when they embarked on their great adventure in imitating Rome, the differences between the three regions were starkest when expressed in the degree of opposition to the new colonials. While none of the three were easy nuts to crack, Cyrenaica was the hardest by far.
The New Rome of Mussolini determined to erase the existence of the historical consciousness of the tribesmen of the newly conquered provinces and for that reason decreed the new "state" of Libya into existence. Decreeing is easy, doing much harder. The Italians were never able to create a unified Libyan state, and their efforts not only were unsuccessful, they became counterproductive.
The Anglo-American forces which occupied Libya from 1943 to the end of the war contented themselves with administering the territory for the convenience of the war effort. This approach, which paid utterly no attention to the nature of the human terrain, continued into the post-war period with the creation of a monarchy far more artificial than organic. The not made in Libya monarchy lasted until it fell to Gaddafi's 1969 coup having been kept alive until then by the Cold War needs of the US and its NATO partners as well as the development of the domestic oilfields. The important fact to keep in mind is that at no time during the quarter century of its existence did the monarchy, the foreign supporters of the monarchy, or anyone else attempt to create a unified national identity for Libya.
At the time King Idris left to nobody's real sorrow, the old divisions continued to exist with some small changes. Due to the development of the oilfields of West Libya there had been a degree of integration between Fezzan and Tripolitania. There had been no such process with regard to Cyrenaica, the population centers of which were separated from Tripoli by some five or six hundred kilometers of sand crossed by a single all weather road and a number of ancient caravan tracks.
The proving of oilfields in Cyrenaica during the early Gaddafi years served to reinforce the separate identities of East and West Libya, or, to use the old terms, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania/Fezzan. Then as a matter of policy driven by a deep fear of military coup, Colonel Gaddafi reinforced the ancient divisions by not only refusing to integrate tribes and regions in national institutions including the army, but by deepening and widening the divisions.
His version of divide and conquer may have been successful in precluding a military coup but did so at the price of assuring profound disaffiliation in Cyrenaica. For at least the last quarter century there has been a palpable and growing sense of "Cyrenaica for the Cyrenaicians." When Gaddafi ordered the prison massacre in Benghazi in 1996 he gave this growing movement a shot of growth hormone.
Since 1996 the anti-government sentiment in Cyrenaica has developed silently but profoundly with results which were stunningly obvious in the first seventy-two hours of the insurrection. Bluntly put, the Gaddafi regime lost Benghazi and Tobruk and the other towns of East Libya almost instantly. Local army units changed sides in a heartbeat and took their weapons with them. Air force and navy units did something similar, at least defecting to foreign shores rather than shoot on fellow tribe and clan members. Cyrenaica for the Cyrenaicians!
The fact that Gaddafi moved in foreign mercenaries from Chad and sub-Saharan Africa shows he well understood that the loyalties of tribe and clan would trump any appeal held by his "revolution." He knew and knows that his heavy heel has an Achilles tendon. The foreigners were the splint for this potentially fatal weakness.
Whether the Rent-A-Killer forces will prove sufficient along with those Libyans who have a vested or visceral interest in the status quo to keep Brother Leader in power in West Libya remains to be seen. One can be more certain about Gaddafi;s political will. If nothing else he both believes his own propaganda and understands that he has no retirement haven waiting for him. He has to stay and fight it out, to die in place if that is the way it plays out. The same applies to his two most visible sons.
The dissidents of Cyrenaica have the political will as well. They well understand the price of failure and the Egyptian border may prove to be a line in the sand too far should the Colonel and his killers gain the upper hand. The so far successful insurrectionists of East Libya (Cyrenaica) also have both the organizational and material means to wage prolonged defensive war. In addition, the majority of the population is with them.
This implies the war within the borders of Libya could continue for a long and bloody time absent sufficient outside pressure to end it. East and West Libya could exchange inconclusive blows for weeks, months, even years if the oil continues to flow in sufficient amounts and can be exchanged for the necessities of life and war. It would not be pretty.
It is this far from unlikely eventuality which makes the insipid reactions of the Obama administration and other governments so disheartening. The Security Council limiting itself to a "press statement" would be risible were it not both tragic and, given the long standing policies of China and Russia, predictable. Far more disturbing was the absence of UN Ambassador Susan Rice from the Security Council vote.
Ms Rice who has worked herself into an excellent imitation of war fever over the plight of people in Darfur was off to South Africa for a confab on "global sustainability" and thus too preoccupied to consider the situation in Libya. Her boss, President Obama, is also absent. Sure, his press flack assures us the Clueless Guy in the Oval will have something to say apropos Libya today or tomorrow, but that is scarcely the sort of laid back approach the situation demands.
Gaddafi has to be forced out quickly. He has to be made to go--alive or dead--before the cycles of killing reach the point that Bosnia will look like a Baptist Sunday Social in comparison. The US and other civilized states such as the UK and Italy can freeze bank accounts, impose travel bans, put sanctions in place, prohibit arms sales, order their national corporate citizens to halt all activity, even use NATO assets to impose naval and air blockades. None of these require a great deal of head scratching, consultations, joint communiques, but all demand action.
Somebody really, really has to do something. All the somethings are well understood. All are easy to do. None require the UN do anything. All demand the civilized states including the US put pens on paper, sign the required orders, and apply the pressure.
Even symbolic actions, the freezing of funds for example, would undercut the willingness of the mercenaries to stay in Libya and embolden even the leaderless movement in West Libya to keep on keeping on. If, at the same time, the civilized states would make the right sort of noises exempting low ranking trigger pullers from prosecution, the pro-Gaddifi forces would be weakened even more. There are other easy to take and quick to operate measures as well, but this roster gives some indications of the great number of tools available to assist in the ending of the Gaddafi madness.
But, someone has to go first. That is what the US formerly did. What is wrong now, Mr Obama?
Monday, February 21, 2011
Watching A Regime Crumble?
Saif al-Islami Gaddifi, the usually well oiled, politely mannered, western-style number one son of the Libyan Brother Leader has become the public face of the embattled regime. Given Brother Leader's unusual shyness this is an expectable move. Saif is seen both inside Libya and by foreign observers as a rational, reform-minded, and totally adult sort of guy, quite unlike either his father or younger brothers.
However the message delivered by Saif was not one of peace, reform, and good feelings. Rather he warned darkly of "civil war" and "hundreds of thousands dead" in appearances on state television. Events over the past twenty-four hours show his remark must not be taken as hyperbole.
Neither should his observation that his father would fight to the "last man, last woman and last bullet." The blood spilled in Benghazi coupled with the horizontal escalation of the violent protests to other cities including Tripoli show the matter has become existential to the regime--and family. The uprising is already existential for the protesters. If they fail in their goal of ending the Gaddafi regime, the agents of the regime will end them, if not today than certainly in the days and weeks to come.
When conflicts are seen by both sides as directly existential, it not only increases political will, it assures the struggle will become continually more lethal until one side or the other in effect is obliterated. This has raised the Libyan internal conflict well above those waged in Egypt or Tunisia--and perhaps above that in Bahrain where voices of compromise are still speaking.
As the Gaddafi government stepped up its suppression with the use of fast mover aircraft, it accompanied the purely military and Saif's propaganda with pro-Brother Leader demonstrations in Green Square, Tripoli. The carefully orchestrated show of popular support for the Gaddafi regime was unintentionally undercut by reports of both airstrikes and automatic weapons fire being heard not far from the Square as the demo went down.
Nor is the legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime enhanced by such high profile kicks in the crotch as the mass resignation of the Libyan delegation to the UN under the leadership of its deputy permanent representative. It is not known if the Libyan ambassador to the UN shares the views of his mission. What is certain is the families of the dissident diplomats back home in Libya are not good life insurance risks now--unless the regime collapses.
Perhaps more alarming to the Gaddafi family enterprise is the reported defection of members of the armed services. Reportedly the defectors include two air force officers who took their jets to Malta rather than attack civilians in Benghazi. One of the two pilots, both of whom claim to be colonels, has taken the wise precaution of requesting political asylum. Can't be too safe--if the insurrection fails of its goal.
Other, far lower ranking defections from the army and other security forces have also been alleged. The allegations are most probably accurate, particularly if those changing sides belong to the same tribe or clan as those being attacked. Clan, tribal, and regional loyalties trump mere institutional affiliations in Libyan life. They can even trump religion qua religion.
The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the primary opposition group among the rudimentary political culture which has survived the forty years of suppression, is ginning up for a return home. Its Washington based spokesman, Ibrahim Sahad, has not received much play in American media but has been quoted overseas as predicting that this time the Brother Leader cannot survive. He offers no reasons for this conclusion beyond the self-evident and widely known failures of the Gaddifi regime and the impetus given by the use of mercenaries, heavy weapons, and aircraft against the demonstrators.
While no objections can be offered as to Mr Sahad's arguments regarding the weakness of the regime, his group can not yet offer a clear vision of what must be done the day after the regime collapses. Nor does he make any useful suggestions for the role which might be played by Western governments in facilitating regime change in Libya. These lacks are indicative of the large, very large problems which will confront the Libyans in the wake of a collapse of the Gaddafis, particularly if the collapse is preceded by a welter of blood letting, a potential which must be taken seriously by outside observers.
Considering that the web of internal security and domestic intelligence organizations involves as many as one in six Libyans, there are a lot of asses in the sling potentially. This implies there will be no going gently into that good night of exile. Considering further the conflicting tangle of tribal, clan, and family alliances both for and against the status quo and the large number of potential scores to be settled, betting on a peaceful and orderly transition (such as is pro forma called for by any number of outsiders) is about as likely as a cold day in August in the dunes south of Tobruk.
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is, sadly, almost certainly correct in averring that "rivers of blood" will ensue unless the protests stop. As there is no high likelihood of the anti-government folk packing it in and waiting to be arrested by the internal security wallahs, the number of bodies is doomed to grow--perhaps exponentially.
The US, the EU, and the UN have been dithering too long already. It is more than passingly strange that the Security Council can get its collective panties in a twist over a person being killed in Lebanon but remain totally unconcerned about the looming slaughter in Libya. It is equally interesting that the US, which has shown a remarkable capacity to work itself into a lather over other, less bloody exercises in repression, has been tongue tied about Libya. Then there is the EU. That organization can work itself into the highest of high dudgeons over the allegation of a single Palestinian dying at the hands of the IDF but has confined itself to the barest sighs of concern over the use of heavy weapons against civilians in Libya.
Italy and the UK both have large direct investments in Libya, Italy is the preferred destination of any and all of those who can board a boat on the Libyan coast. It surpasses understanding why both London and Rome have not become directly, substantially, and materially involved in ending the crisis in Libya before the worst realistic case comes to pass.
Admittedly, Brother Leader is not the poster boy of rational policy or carefully considered reaction to outside influences, but that is no reason to sit back with folded hands as the escalating dance of death continues in Libya. As the American ambassador to the Court of St James is reported to have said yesterday, Her Majesty's Government bears a measure of responsibility for enhancing the international legitimacy of the Libyan dictator.
The fact that the enhancement occurred during the previous New Labor government is all the more reason the Coalition has both the political freedom and ethical responsibility to take the lead in the EU to seek ways of effective intervention in the Libyan crisis. While Italy may have a greater direct stake in the outcome of the events in Libya, the current political state of affairs in that country shifts the load to the UK, which has both means and justification for seeking action on the part of the EU and UN.
The US can and should play a supporting role to any British initiative. The current weakness of the US not only in the region following the incomprehensible veto of the West Bank settlement resolution in the Security Council as well as the all too obvious working both sides of the street during the "Lotus revolution" has drastically curtailed our diplomatic influence and prestige and thus ability to directly operate in Libya. But, we can still back the play of another responsible actor--and the UK is the best candidate for the role.
It is critical that the end of Gaddafi come before the body count grows much more. As is the case in every internal war in human history (and most all inter-state wars as well) the dead dictate policy. The more protesters who are killed the more vengeance will be demanded. The more vengeance which is feared by partisans of the status quo, the more desperate and lethal the attempt to suppress. The cycle is clear, and, once started, not easy to interrupt before it has run the full course, until people are simply sickened by the slaughter they have perpetrated and suffered.
Time is running out. It is running out for the Gaddafi regime. It is running out for the international community (whatever that might mean in this context) to take measures intended to limit the suffering, end the killing, and start a new clock on a new future.
However the message delivered by Saif was not one of peace, reform, and good feelings. Rather he warned darkly of "civil war" and "hundreds of thousands dead" in appearances on state television. Events over the past twenty-four hours show his remark must not be taken as hyperbole.
Neither should his observation that his father would fight to the "last man, last woman and last bullet." The blood spilled in Benghazi coupled with the horizontal escalation of the violent protests to other cities including Tripoli show the matter has become existential to the regime--and family. The uprising is already existential for the protesters. If they fail in their goal of ending the Gaddafi regime, the agents of the regime will end them, if not today than certainly in the days and weeks to come.
When conflicts are seen by both sides as directly existential, it not only increases political will, it assures the struggle will become continually more lethal until one side or the other in effect is obliterated. This has raised the Libyan internal conflict well above those waged in Egypt or Tunisia--and perhaps above that in Bahrain where voices of compromise are still speaking.
As the Gaddafi government stepped up its suppression with the use of fast mover aircraft, it accompanied the purely military and Saif's propaganda with pro-Brother Leader demonstrations in Green Square, Tripoli. The carefully orchestrated show of popular support for the Gaddafi regime was unintentionally undercut by reports of both airstrikes and automatic weapons fire being heard not far from the Square as the demo went down.
Nor is the legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime enhanced by such high profile kicks in the crotch as the mass resignation of the Libyan delegation to the UN under the leadership of its deputy permanent representative. It is not known if the Libyan ambassador to the UN shares the views of his mission. What is certain is the families of the dissident diplomats back home in Libya are not good life insurance risks now--unless the regime collapses.
Perhaps more alarming to the Gaddafi family enterprise is the reported defection of members of the armed services. Reportedly the defectors include two air force officers who took their jets to Malta rather than attack civilians in Benghazi. One of the two pilots, both of whom claim to be colonels, has taken the wise precaution of requesting political asylum. Can't be too safe--if the insurrection fails of its goal.
Other, far lower ranking defections from the army and other security forces have also been alleged. The allegations are most probably accurate, particularly if those changing sides belong to the same tribe or clan as those being attacked. Clan, tribal, and regional loyalties trump mere institutional affiliations in Libyan life. They can even trump religion qua religion.
The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the primary opposition group among the rudimentary political culture which has survived the forty years of suppression, is ginning up for a return home. Its Washington based spokesman, Ibrahim Sahad, has not received much play in American media but has been quoted overseas as predicting that this time the Brother Leader cannot survive. He offers no reasons for this conclusion beyond the self-evident and widely known failures of the Gaddifi regime and the impetus given by the use of mercenaries, heavy weapons, and aircraft against the demonstrators.
While no objections can be offered as to Mr Sahad's arguments regarding the weakness of the regime, his group can not yet offer a clear vision of what must be done the day after the regime collapses. Nor does he make any useful suggestions for the role which might be played by Western governments in facilitating regime change in Libya. These lacks are indicative of the large, very large problems which will confront the Libyans in the wake of a collapse of the Gaddafis, particularly if the collapse is preceded by a welter of blood letting, a potential which must be taken seriously by outside observers.
Considering that the web of internal security and domestic intelligence organizations involves as many as one in six Libyans, there are a lot of asses in the sling potentially. This implies there will be no going gently into that good night of exile. Considering further the conflicting tangle of tribal, clan, and family alliances both for and against the status quo and the large number of potential scores to be settled, betting on a peaceful and orderly transition (such as is pro forma called for by any number of outsiders) is about as likely as a cold day in August in the dunes south of Tobruk.
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is, sadly, almost certainly correct in averring that "rivers of blood" will ensue unless the protests stop. As there is no high likelihood of the anti-government folk packing it in and waiting to be arrested by the internal security wallahs, the number of bodies is doomed to grow--perhaps exponentially.
The US, the EU, and the UN have been dithering too long already. It is more than passingly strange that the Security Council can get its collective panties in a twist over a person being killed in Lebanon but remain totally unconcerned about the looming slaughter in Libya. It is equally interesting that the US, which has shown a remarkable capacity to work itself into a lather over other, less bloody exercises in repression, has been tongue tied about Libya. Then there is the EU. That organization can work itself into the highest of high dudgeons over the allegation of a single Palestinian dying at the hands of the IDF but has confined itself to the barest sighs of concern over the use of heavy weapons against civilians in Libya.
Italy and the UK both have large direct investments in Libya, Italy is the preferred destination of any and all of those who can board a boat on the Libyan coast. It surpasses understanding why both London and Rome have not become directly, substantially, and materially involved in ending the crisis in Libya before the worst realistic case comes to pass.
Admittedly, Brother Leader is not the poster boy of rational policy or carefully considered reaction to outside influences, but that is no reason to sit back with folded hands as the escalating dance of death continues in Libya. As the American ambassador to the Court of St James is reported to have said yesterday, Her Majesty's Government bears a measure of responsibility for enhancing the international legitimacy of the Libyan dictator.
The fact that the enhancement occurred during the previous New Labor government is all the more reason the Coalition has both the political freedom and ethical responsibility to take the lead in the EU to seek ways of effective intervention in the Libyan crisis. While Italy may have a greater direct stake in the outcome of the events in Libya, the current political state of affairs in that country shifts the load to the UK, which has both means and justification for seeking action on the part of the EU and UN.
The US can and should play a supporting role to any British initiative. The current weakness of the US not only in the region following the incomprehensible veto of the West Bank settlement resolution in the Security Council as well as the all too obvious working both sides of the street during the "Lotus revolution" has drastically curtailed our diplomatic influence and prestige and thus ability to directly operate in Libya. But, we can still back the play of another responsible actor--and the UK is the best candidate for the role.
It is critical that the end of Gaddafi come before the body count grows much more. As is the case in every internal war in human history (and most all inter-state wars as well) the dead dictate policy. The more protesters who are killed the more vengeance will be demanded. The more vengeance which is feared by partisans of the status quo, the more desperate and lethal the attempt to suppress. The cycle is clear, and, once started, not easy to interrupt before it has run the full course, until people are simply sickened by the slaughter they have perpetrated and suffered.
Time is running out. It is running out for the Gaddafi regime. It is running out for the international community (whatever that might mean in this context) to take measures intended to limit the suffering, end the killing, and start a new clock on a new future.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
The Game Is Getting Much Rougher In Libya
The Geek has to admit his hot wash on the initial unrest in Benghazi missed the mark. He discounted the demonstrations too much because Benghazi has been the epicenter of Hate-Brother-Leader since the prison massacre in 1996. He also overestimated the positive impact of Gaddafi's unique brand of tribal based politics which is omnipresent even in the army.
It is true that the ongoing protests have centered on Benghazi. The second largest city in Libya has had the greatest butchers' bill by far. And, most importantly, the protesters have matched the government in the escalation game.
Not only have the anti-government forces matched the security wallahs in vertical escalation, they have engaged in successful horizontal escalation as well. Other cities in eastern Libya have now joined the violence. Tobruk of World War II fame as well as Al-Bayda, Ajdabiya, and Darnah have seen violent unrest. In Darnah the insurrectionists briefly seized and held an arsenal, finally leaving with an unknown amount of weaponry.
In Ajdabiya the protesters burned down several buildings including the local headquarters of Gaddafi's political party and declared the burg to be a "free city." In Benghazi, the central government in effect has been run out of town. The anti-government groups attacked the military base (which contains Gaddafi's "Eastern Palace") with an explosives laden vehicle at one point--and with an armored vehicle at another.
The focus on the military installation is understandable given that hours earlier security forces had sallied forth from it in order to attack the funeral demonstration which was carrying the bodies of those killed the previous day to the graveyard. In an important development, reports from Benghazi indicate that Gaddafi has brought in mercenary troops from Chad to do the dirty work.
The mercenaries whether from Chad or elsewhere were described by locals as kill crazy, a sort of "wild eyed pistol waver not afraid to die." Grisly tales of people jumping from a bridge to avoid the mercenaries and their bullets compete for attention with stories of helicopter gunships spraying machinegun fire on fleeing civilians.
While it is not possible to divine the truth in the welter of words, it is unmistakable that Brother Leader has decided to ramp up coercion to a degree surpassing that employed in Bahrain or Yemen. He must be feeling more than a tad desperate.
The desperation is powered by a fear that the entire east of Libya will go the way of Benghazi, setting the stage either for a tumbling row of dominoes ending in Tripoli or a resumption of the inter-regional warfare which existed prior to the Italian occupation a century ago. Either development would be fatal to Gaddafi's idiosyncratic forty-two year old regime.
So far Brother Leader has kept a low profile, appearing on state television only briefly. Apparently, he has given over day-to-day control of the security operation to his number three son, Saadi. The son is a thirty-seven year old former vocational soccer player who has been described as "fiercely loyal" to dear old dad as well as a potential follow on to Gaddafi senior in running the family business. He is probably more than tough enough to oversee very robust repression.
In addition to using mercenaries, automatic and even heavy weapons, the Gaddafi regime has taken the customary step of pulling the plug on the Internet and blocking other horizontal communications methods. Libya is already one of the most isolated countries on the planet and became even more so with the ending of cell phone and Internet communication. Given the vast distances involved (Benghazi is a thousand kilometers from Tripoli), this does hurt the anti-government movement significantly.
Merely impairing the communications capacities of the protesters does not address the basic conditions which have produced the violent unrest. Unemployment is at least thirty percent. Housing is scarce and usually allocated on the basis of political connections. There is no true national identity but rather a patchwork of clan, tribal, and regional affiliations which are reflected in every institution of state including the armed forces. There is absolutely no organized political opposition to the Gaddafi regime and its political party expression. Nor is there any excuse for an open and free media. In comparison, Egypt was a wide open boisterous democracy and Tunisia a free for all.
The Gaddafi regime has expended (squandered?) vast amounts of its oil and natural gas revenues on utter non-essentials including support for foreign insurgencies, a quest for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, a military without a real mission, and grandiose schemes to drill deep wells in the south to bring water to the north. Very little money has gone to long term development needs whether in infrastructure or education or economic alternatives to the oil and gas. What did not go to the quixotic delusions of Brother Leader went to the pockets of the well-connected. The combination has assured damn little has been left over to benefit the Libyan in the street or provide any basis for either long term order or the slow emergence of stability in an evolving national system.
The overthrow of Gaddafi would be a good thing for the Libyans--maybe. The caveat comes from the simple fact that the four decades of dictatorship have left the country without any semblance of a political culture. This means Libya is starting from less than Tunisia or Egypt. In both of those countries there had been a long history of organized opposition. The opposition might have been suppressed but it was never eliminated. Even if in exile the opposition continued to develop, to plan, to prepare. The suppression by Brother Leader has been so complete, so absolute, so far reaching that there is little in the way of an organized and forward looking political alternative to the status quo.
The situation in Libya is also complicated by its having no clear national identity well supported by national institutions. When even the army reflects tribal and clan roots, it is hard to see from where a unified sense of being Libyan will be found. Taken in aggregate these factors assure that any overthrow of Gaddafi will not result in a quick transition to a democratic government. It is not easy to see just who will run the country on even a caretaker basis should Brother Leader and his sons catch the next flight to the Land of Unemployed Dictators.
Both Italy and the UK have large exposures in the Libyan oil and natural gas industry. Both governments should be working overtime right now on just what can be done practically to keep the trains running on time as well as dissuade the Gaddafi family from further very robust exercises in suppression and set the ground rules for a post-Gaddafi government. It is not practical to suggest that some foreign or international entity step in to secure a peaceful transition, such would not be acceptable to any Libyan in the street, but the so called international community needs to shoulder a legitimate burden in the sense of aiding the endgame and the emergence of an organic Libyan government.
At least the Obama administration has been mainly silent on events in Libya. This is as it should be. Libya is one of the few spots in the Mideast or North Africa where the US interests are minimal. But, our government would be well advised to nudge the UK, Italy, and the EU generally in the area of contingency planning for the day after the revolts succeed in their goal--or the day the security forces violate any sense of decency in their shedding of demonstrators blood.
It's called being "proactive." Sadly, the record shows this is an area where the US (and the West) is more than a little deficient.
The situation in Libya is also complicated by its having no clear national identity well supported by national institutions. When even the army reflects tribal and clan roots, it is hard to see from where a unified sense of being Libyan will be found. Taken in aggregate these factors assure that any overthrow of Gaddafi will not result in a quick transition to a democratic government. It is not easy to see just who will run the country on even a caretaker basis should Brother Leader and his sons catch the next flight to the Land of Unemployed Dictators.
Both Italy and the UK have large exposures in the Libyan oil and natural gas industry. Both governments should be working overtime right now on just what can be done practically to keep the trains running on time as well as dissuade the Gaddafi family from further very robust exercises in suppression and set the ground rules for a post-Gaddafi government. It is not practical to suggest that some foreign or international entity step in to secure a peaceful transition, such would not be acceptable to any Libyan in the street, but the so called international community needs to shoulder a legitimate burden in the sense of aiding the endgame and the emergence of an organic Libyan government.
At least the Obama administration has been mainly silent on events in Libya. This is as it should be. Libya is one of the few spots in the Mideast or North Africa where the US interests are minimal. But, our government would be well advised to nudge the UK, Italy, and the EU generally in the area of contingency planning for the day after the revolts succeed in their goal--or the day the security forces violate any sense of decency in their shedding of demonstrators blood.
It's called being "proactive." Sadly, the record shows this is an area where the US (and the West) is more than a little deficient.
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