What Did Anyone Expect?

There seems to be a subtext of shock with the latest twist of events in Libya.  Yet, there is nothing unexpected in the images of fleeing rebels totally unnerved, not to say unmanned, by a few shells from tanks and artillery fired by men loyal to Gaddafi.  After all, the legions of media experts in military affairs had previously declared that only the "allied" air assault had allowed for the rebel  successes, so why is there any surprise when a hiccup in that air support resulted in a speedy collapse of the rebel offensive?

The buzz from inside the Beltway, in large measure propelled by the Nice Young Man From Chicago, has centered around the possibility of the US and other outsiders providing arms to the rebels.  This notion is absurd.  The rebel forces have ample weapons of the individual and light crew served sorts.  The dissidents even have some heavier equipment, armored personnel carriers and tanks abandoned by their Gaddafi loyalist crews but still serviceable.

What the anti-Gaddafi "fighters" need is not hardware.  What they need is organization, leadership, and, most of all, training.  The skill level of the rebels is pathetic at best.  The imagery proliferating from Libya shows the anti-government individuals have utterly no knowledge of even the most rudimentary aspects of combat.  The bozos of the desert do not even dig in.  They do not use cover and concealment.  They do not even bother to emplace their tank killing recoilless rifles.

They have no fire discipline.  No small unit tactics.  No coordination of effort.  No recognized command and control system.  In short, they have none of the requisites for effective war fighting.  They are, therefore, doomed to lose.

In a way it is possible to take comfort in the sheer incompetence of the vast majority of the Libyan "freedom fighters."  The all too obvious inadequacies of the rebels indicate the influence or at least the numbers of combat experienced advocates of violent political Islam, veterans of the anti-US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is sparse.  There can be little doubt that the men who have survived combat against the US and its Western allies in either venue have gained the basic survival skills so desperately lacking with the majority of the Libyan amateurs.

While the greatest percentage of the opposition forces may be as are the majority of all Libyans, people who wear their Islam lightly, the existence of austere, Salafist derived advocates of violent political Islam has been documented in blood for a century.  These were the men, men from Cyrenaica and from the city of Darnah who were the spine, muscle, and sinew of the bloody defensive insurgency against the Italians.  These men have been the sharp point of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.  These men sought out jihad against the Americans in Muslim lands far, far away from Libya.  And, it is these men who are, right now, the only effective combatants in the struggle against Brother Leader.

In the event the US (or any other Western country) provided arms or other military equipment, it would be the same men, the Warriors of the Prophet, who would benefit the most.  Any force multiplying equipment or services would propel the advocates of violent political Islam to the top of the local tree.  This would not be in the best interests of the US, other civilized states, or the majority of the Libyan people.  Should the jihadists be given the wherewithal to wage more effective war, the first and largest loser would not be Gaddafi and his forces but the Libyans who do not share the zeal of those committed to violent political Islam.

In this context it is useful to reflect on some melancholy realities of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The largest number of victims of violence were not foreign troops or indigenous troops loyal to the central government but combatants affiliated with groups not approved of by the advocates of violent political Islam.  The other large group of victims were the non-combatants, civilians who were either in the wrong place at the wrong time or who were vocally opposed to the all encompassing goals of the jihadists.

Samantha Powers, Susan Rice, and Hilary Clinton pushed for the no-fly/civilian protection resolution for fear of "genocide."  They focused on the most attractive target, the target with the very big mouth, Gaddafi.  By so doing they overlooked completely the existence of a group--the advocates of violent political Islam--just as given to wholesale killing, just as prone to murder those who disagree or oppose as Gaddafi.  To compound the blunder of the no-fly/civilian protection resolution with providing weapons or other useful military equipment or services would be to favor one murderer over another--not prevent murder period.

The totality of the Obama administration's behavior during the past few weeks demonstrates a bunch of situationally naive people who are adrift at the policy level.  The Obama "team" was saved from the worst consequences of its lack of competence by the timely departure of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak.  The angels who had smiled protectively on the fools of the administration stopped doing so with the advent of the Libyan Question.

The air campaign if taken to the limit can assure the rebels are not destroyed quickly and totally.  Beyond that the best efforts of airmen and missile launchers alike can do little.  It is not possible to bomb the rebels into a position of winning at any acceptable political cost.  It is not possible to bomb Gaddafi out of power in a speedy fashion.  Nor can the rebels win in a matter of weeks--even with massive outside assistance in equipment, training, and organization.

In the longer term, Gaddafi cannot hang on indefinitely.  In the longer term, the advocates of violent political Islam will come to dominate the rebel councils.  When the down-the-tubes trajectory of Gaddafi intersects with the upward trending fortunes of the rebels, the real winners will be the advocates of violent political Islam.  When that happens, the US, the West, and the Libyan people will have much to regret.

Ripples And Fallout

No event exists or can exist in a vacuum.  Certainly no event punctuated by the noise of bombs, missiles, and gunfire can be considered to have no implications, no ramifications, no ripples and fallout.  So it is with the Western Answer to the Libyan Question.

If there had ever been any chance of the Six Power Talks resuming, there is none now.  The US led campaign to abate the North Korean nuclear nuisance died with the first Tomahawk hitting some Libyan target.  The view adopted by the Hermits of Pyongyang is simple and direct.  When Gaddafi wimped out in 2003 and abandoned his nuclear and chemical weapons research and development efforts, he placed himself at the mercy of the West. How merciful the West is can be seen through the dust and flames of the incoming missiles.

This North Korean understanding echoes the earlier contention in Pyongyang that the instant the Soviet Union dropped out of the arms race, gasping and retching with exhaustion, it was lost.  The loss of the nuclear option assured that the Cold War would be ended to the advantage of the US.  The Hermits took a similar position regarding Saddam Hussein.  His decision to allow UN inspectors roam Iraq in search of prohibited nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Pyongyang has animadverted, led inexorably to the American invasion and Saddam's fall.

The big QED is self-evident.  As long as North Korea has a nuclear capacity, even a very rudimentary one, it will be safe.  Lose that capacity and all is over.  The security of the North and its peculiar form of government can last only so long as it keeps stonewalling any and all attempts to end its nuclear program.  Or, to be accurate, all other programs oriented to obtaining and expanding the arsenal of weapons capable of mass destruction and associated delivery systems.

Anyone who believes that the logic tree in Tehran is different from that in Pyongyang is capable of buying the Golden Gate Bridge on EBay.  The mullahs have long pointed to Pakistan as the prime example of just how having a nuclear capability provided an impressive measure of both immunity and ability to extort.

So, the first major bit of fallout from Operation Odyssey Dawn is this: Nuclear weapons do make a country safe.  One must wonder if this easily foreseeable ramification was considered by The Nice Young Man From Chicago and the Three Weird Sisters who counseled him with such dramatic effect.

The partisans of consistency in American foreign policy have been wondering just when will the US and the rest of the "international community" do a Libya on Syria.  Senator Joe Leiberman has reportedly called for a no-fly zone over Syria if Bashir Assad employs the "same tactics" as did Gaddafi in Libya.  The senator invoked the Libyan "precedent" explicitly as he referenced the lethal means used already by Syrian security and military units.

Leiberman did not mention Hama.  He should have.  It would have made his case more convincing.  Bashir's father turned the Syrian army loose in that city back in 1982 after the Muslim Brotherhood raised the flag of rebellion.  At the least ten thousand people died under rocket, artillery, and air delivered fire.  The death toll might have been an order of magnitude greater.  In Syria, particularly among the aging "old guard" of the Syrian Baathist party, Hama constitutes precedent.  More than the omnipresent security services, the collective memory of Hama is the fear factor which has inhibited popular unrest until the past few days.

A couple of ground truths reinforce the trenchancy of the Hama precedent.  The first is the firm grip the old guard has on the military and security services of Syria as well as its demonstrated ability to inhibit the reformist tendencies of Bashir these past several years.  The second and more important governing reality is that Bashir and all the rest of the power elite in Syria are Alawites. The Alawites are a despised minority perceived by the majority Sunni population, particularly by hardliners such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as apostates deserving of death--death, not the power and preeminence they have enjoyed for more than sixty years now.  This means the current government and its adherents have nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, no safe haven should the levers of power slip from their grasp.

For Bashir and the rest, Syria is their Alamo.  They can neither expect nor give quarter.  Any internal dissent, any incipient rebellion, is existential from the perspective of the Alawite ruling structure.

With so much at stake, the Hama precedent must govern.  That is the essential starting point for any evaluation of US policy regarding the internal dynamics of Syria.  Bashir and the Baathists will do whatever is necessary to survive, to maintain power.  If that means piling corpses higher and higher, it will be done.

Hilary Clinton in a TV interview belabored the obvious with regard to Syria.  She averred that every country in the Mideast is different.  Duh?  Gosh, you don't say?

Syria certainly isn't Libya.  Syria is far from isolated.  While Gaddafi could count on the unstinting support of Hugo Chavez (so can Bashir, whom Hugo called a "brother" and a "humanitarian",) the Syrian leader can rely upon the support and assistance of Iran, Hezbollah, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and probably Saudi Arabia.  This means the current regime can gain access to money, diplomatic assistance, and even personnel from these countries.

Nor has Syria gone out of its way to alienate European and other states.  It has good to very good diplomatic and economic relations throughout most of the West.  It is not seen in other, lesser developed regions as a potential troublemaker, backer of coups, supporter of local terror groups, meddler in local politics.  This is quite unlike the situation in which Libya--or more properly, Gaddafi personally--placed itself.  This implies that even with a reenactment of Hama, the degree of official international condemnation would be lessened greatly.

Nor, in the event the balloon goes up in Syria is it at all probable that the mild mannered and soft-spoken Bashir would go on television ranting about how he would crush the rebels "without mercy" or go way over the line of sanity with wild accusations concerning drug use, or the involvement of al-Qaeda and the CIA.  The Syrian leader is constitutionally incapable of presenting himself as a Gaddafi style nutjob.  This coupled with the inevitable media (including Internet) blackout would make the task of overlooking any repetition of Hama relatively easy for any government so inclined.

Syria has a far more well equipped and trained military than did Libya.  It has a far more up to date air defense system.  In short, it would not be so easy a nut to hammer.  And, quite unlike Libya, any attack on Syria, even one approved of by the Arab League and UN Security Council (impossible as that hypothetical might be), would result in a response by Hezbollah and Hamas directed against Israel.  Any effort to impose a no-fly zone would touch off the next Arab-Israeli war.

Now, that, bucko, is a very unpleasant thought.  One which underscores just how far from Libya on the spectrum of doable targets one finds Syria.

Anyway the tofu is sliced, the result is the same: Libya is not a precedent as regards Syria.  If the current regime needs to kill a few score or a few thousand score of its citizens to maintain the political status quo, it will be done.  And, R2P to the contrary notwithstanding, the "international community" will do nothing beyond issue boiler plate denunciations and impose a few meaningless sanctions.  Well, if really motivated, there may be a move to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court, an action which would not simply be without meaning but would have the counterproductive effect of undercutting the notion of "accountability" for crimes against humanity.

There are other ripples sloshing around.  None are particularly positive as regards the international puissance of the West generally or the US in particular.  One of these is the highlighting of political divisions within the European states as well as between some of those and the US.  Another is a further underscoring of the adrift-at-the-policy-level approach to international affairs which characterizes the Obama administration.  Yet one more is the ease with which the Western public, and the American in particular, can delude itself about potential future developments in critical countries if the magic totem word, "democracy" is uttered often and loudly enough.

Bad as those might be, there is one ripple which is a tsunami in comparison.  The Libyan Question and the Wstern answer to it has demonstrated that the US and others have not learned a thing from the messes in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  What this means is simple.  We have not yet learned the crucial nature of answering the "what next?" question before taking the first action--a first action which will always, but always necessitate a second and a third and so on.

In the game of global chess, the US and the others have once more shown they are fine trumpet players--loud but irrelevant to the needs of reality.

The Irony Of R2P And The Ivory Coast

You all remember Rwanda, don't you?  It did make the news back about the time Whitewater was the lead story.  The butchery in Rwanda, the killing of Hutus by Tutsis and Tutsis by Hutus put enough bodies in local streams to cause impromptu dams and flooding.  The imagery was shockingly brutal enough--even in the pre-YouTube days of network censorship--to cause waves of revulsion throughout the US, Europe, and elsewhere.

There were mouthfuls of "deplore" and "unacceptable."  There were repeated calls for "restraint" and "moderation."  World leader after world leader denounced the ongoing slaughter.  But, no state did anything to impose a moratorium on mass murder.  The "international community" assembled on the banks of the Hudson was long on words and very, very short on deeds.

It was only a decade or so later that the "international community" and its great organization, the UN, did something other than talk.  Boosted by "concern" and even "alarm" over religiously motivated industrial strength killing in Bosnia, the member states of the UN finally did something in response to Rwanda.  The 192 members unanimously approved an "outcome document" which enshrined the Responsibility to Protect (R2P.)

The diplomats assembled in the General Assembly executed the will of their respective governments and declared that when a government failed to protect its citizens from genocide or war crimes or crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing, then the "international community" had the responsibility to extend protection to those in danger and need.  It was a feel-good move.  Some of the governments, particularly the legatees of the long Western movement by fits and starts to lessen the damage of war and enhance the rights of citizens against arbitrary government, might actually have intended that R2P would have real effect in the real world of real evil deeds.

Other states, no doubt, had no intent of ever honoring any obligation under the R2P formulation.  None would oppose it openly as such would be even more politically incorrect and liable to bring international disapproval than being against clean air and drinkable water.  International disapprobation brings with it a loss of influence and no state wishes that for itself.  So every country marched along with a light heart and a merry tune on its lips into a brave, bright future of greater safety for all.

Even the many governments which were authoritarian on a good day and brutally suppressive most of the time joined up.  Libya linked arms with Norway, Syria with Sweden, Iran with Denmark; Russia wrapped its arms around Canada while China did the same with the US.  It was such a sweet moment!  There was Zimbabwe; there was Sudan; there was the Ivory Coast.  All singing the R2P jive.

The R2P outcome document was long, almost infinitely long, on high minded and lofty sentiments.  It was short to the point of nonexistence on those pesky details such as what would trigger R2P or who would make the trigger decision or who would actually do the dirty work of protecting some group somewhere against some dire threat.  There were no mechanisms, no procedures, no substance which would serve to speedily and uniformly transform the fine sounding words of R2P to the dirty realities of imposing its requirements on a recalcitrant (or nonexistent) government.

All except the most starry-eyed and vapid minded of folks knew that the realities of international politics assured that R2P would have the impact of an ant's fart on a hurricane.  True, but with an important, indeed critical caveat, unless one or more major powers determined that national or strategic interest demanded the application of R2P in a particular venue--and worked with determination and purpose to gain sufficient support from states having coinciding national or strategic interests.

This is why the bombs have been falling in Libya and not Yemen or Bahrain.  Consistency is nice but not either necessary nor sufficient in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

For reasons endemic to the domestic political cultures of both France and the UK, Libya loomed large.  Facilitating the task of gaining sufficient consensus internationally was Colonel Gaddafi's record of global mischief making and domestic suppression.

The US could have sat out this particular dance.  The Americans had no direct dog in the fight even if there existed a longer term threat of a resurgent Gaddafi reverting to his pre-2003 type should he prevail domestically.  But, the Obama administration had taken lumps almost beyond count for its lack of a firm stance during the "Jasmine" and "Lotus" revolutions.  And, it should never be forgotten there were three potent members of the senior level personnel who had either been badly traumatized by Rwanda (Powers and Rice) or were abundantly proud of the American led intervention in Bosnia (Clinton).

Now comes the irony.

Of all the countries around the world currently undergoing internal political convulsions, there is one in which the impact of governmental sins of both omission and, more importantly, commission merit the immediate invocation of R2P.  That country is not Bahrain, despite the contentions of those who abhor inconsistency.  Nor is it Yemen even though that country has seen a respectable body count.  It is not even Syria, authoritarian as that country might be.  It is not even Libya even though the fighting is in full swing under the kindly eyes of US and other country's pilots.

The country is the Ivory Coast.

By all the metrics and standards customarily employed to measure such things, the Ivory Coast is in the throes of internal war in which one of the contestants is the internationally condemned incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo, and the other is the internationally recognized winner of the presidential election, Alassane Outtara.  Each claimant to the throne is backed by armed supporters, but Gbagbo has the army as well as less formal militias in his corner.

The weeks and months since the election have seen an escalation in violence which has taken a very obvious ramp up in the past few days.  There are, according to the UN, which has the typically ineffectual "peace keeping" force in country, currently as many as one million internally displaced persons, most of whom are fleeing the murder squads in Abidjan.

Fears of an increased body count have grown since Gbagbo now has one--that's right, one--attack helicopter at his disposal as well as some brand new multiple rocket launchers.  These fears have not resulted in any significant action by the UN or the "international community" or even the African Union.  There have been no economic sanctions imposed on Gbagbo or his intimates.  Nor have there been any travel bans.  None of the instant moves employed against Gaddafi in the earliest days of the popular uprising.

The UN Human Rights Counsel has taken time out from condemning Israel so that it might send a commission of inquiry to the Ivory Coast.  Apparently this bastion of concern over the wellbeing of all people everywhere cannot rely on media reports and must ascertain for itself as to whether or not there have been human rights abuses committed by Gbagbo and his forces.  In the same resolution, the Watchdog of Humanity called upon the state radio in Ivory Coast to "refrain" from inciting violence.

Wow!  That must have them shaking in their boots all around the presidential palace.  The boys had best be careful with their knee knocking, they might drop one of those dread rockets and hurt themselves.

The US has taken a firm, even hard, line on the Ivory Coast Question.  In a video message to the folks down there Ivory Coast way, President Obama has termed the election "fair and free" and has said that he recognizes Outtara as the real deal president.  He called for Gbagbo to hand over the keys to the presidential latrine.

Well, if that doesn't get Gbagbo's attention what good would sanctions or travel bans or no-fly zones do?  Right now it is impossible to say how many people have died since the 28 November 10 election.  But, given the impressive number who were killed in the crossfire during the last round of internal war as well as the more conservative reports out of Africa, the number must equal at the least the eight thousand or so killed in Libya prior to the establishment of the no-fly and no-go zones.

Considering that Susan Rice was reportedly shaken to her very core when she went to Rwanda shortly after the machetes stopped swinging and Samantha Powers has made her bones as an academic by studying genocide, it is of some interest that the US is seemingly indifferent to the looming massacres in the Ivory Coast.  Even if Ms Rice and Ms Powers are loath to see white American wings over a Black African country, they should be plumping for the symbolic sanctions and travel bans.  Admittedly, the Ivory Coast is a prime source of high quality chocolate and Americans are fond of eating this particular comestible, but even our collective sweet tooth should not be allowed to prevent action intended to halt killings.

By the appearance of indifference to African deaths at the hands of Africans, the US and Europe run the real risk of being accused once more of racism.  This happened, you might recall, during the Nineties with the contrast between Rwanda and Bosnia.  The French alone have taken some sort of lead at least in the UNHRC.  Perhaps Sarkozy is sensitive to sentiments arising in Africa.

The Geek has written this post not because he favors an intervention in the Ivory Coast.  He does not.  Rather the purpose of this exercise has been to demonstrate not simply the intellectual bankruptcy of the Obama administrations approach to foreign affairs but, more importantly, the failure, an inevitable and built in failure of the R2P and similar lofty minded moves by the "international community."

When night falls, like it or not, foreign policy is directed, even dictated, by a combination of domestic political imperatives and national interest, not abstract principle.  The only form of hypocrisy which matters is that of pretending otherwise.

Idiocy Epitomized: Libya And R2P--And Why It Is A Western Artifact

The ultimate justification for the current inchoate effort by France, the UK, and others including the less than eager US is The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which doctrine derives from a 2005 outcome document concerning the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly.  This action can be seen best as a collective catharsis of collective guilt by an "international community" awestruck by what it had "allowed" to occur.

The heart of R2P is the notion that should a state fail to protect its citizens from "genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity," the international community has the obligation to undertake the protective task.  The doctrine as adopted by the UN is an outgrowth of the earlier concept holding that the UN could call upon member states to intervene should internal political disruption produce a potentially destabilizing refugee stream.  Both artifacts of the General Assembly fall far outside the mandate of the UN as conceived.

(It is worth noting in this context, the framework of R2P, that the three people in the senior ranks of the Obama administration who pushed hardest for the Libyan intervention are connected in one way or another with both the doctrine and the two slaughter ridden venues from which it emerged.  Former Harvard professor and current National Security Council heavyweight Samantha Power is a specialist in genocide, our Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice has long been an advocate of robust intervention to prevent any repetition of Rwanda, and SecState Hilary Clinton has been proud of her presidential husband's brave move in mounting out the air and later ground intervention in Bosnia.)

The foundation of both R2P and its precursor can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and companion international agreements or conventions including those falling under the general term "Geneva Convention."  Despite the grandiose title of the Human Rights document and regardless of the expansive goals of the others, the Geneva Convention and all the rest, are not consensus documents representing any global set of norms and values.  They are creations of the West, of Europe and the US along with other, Western leaning societies and cultures such as those of South and Central America.

The adoption of the several conventions and declarations by all members of the UN in no way obviates the basic reality that the ideas, the norms and values to which official assent has been given, are Made in the West and are the unique outcome of Western history.  This ground truth can be inferred from the assorted reservations which have garlanded the official acceptances on file.  Many of these reservations, such as those entered by various Muslim majority states, demonstrate a rejection of Western norms, values, and ideas regarding both "universal" rights and limitations on acceptable means of waging war.

Don't get your knickers in a knot over the use of the word "Muslim" in the preceding paragraph.  The uniquely Western nature of the norms and values embodied in the referenced documents owes little to religion per se.  Back down, Christians or Jews, this is not a slam on the ideals contained in your sacred writings.  The core of all religions is universally in favor of peace, love, flower power, and urge the eschewing of war other than those of the "just" kind.  Of course there have been wars fought over the meaning of the word "just."

The Western origin of the norms, values, and ideals embodied in the referenced conventions emerge not from religion and sacred sentiments but rather from a more base emotion: disgust.  Over the centuries Europeans fought wars of a uniquely bloody nature.  They also fought wars with nauseating regularity.  And, Europeans, particularly the English and, later, the Americans, fought wars with a single minded absolutism which came to the highest fruition with the hectatomb of World War II.

From the Thirty Years War to the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon to World Wars I and II, the Western Way of War provided object lesson after object lesson in the need to somehow regulate and modulate war so as to ensure the lowest cost of lives, particularly the lives of non-combatants, and the least possible damage to non-military targets.  As a result there was a development of norms which were far more often honored in the breech than in the observance.

The attempts to regulate both war and governmental treatment of civilian populations which proved most likely to fail were those predicated upon religious strictures.  The Catholic Church made numerous moves to limit and control war.  All failed.  Far more efficacious were limitations on war were those based on national self-interest.  The long centuries of very limited (and quite inconclusive) war which spanned the period between the Thirty Years War and the conflicts of Napoleon were the result of self-interest pricked by the recognition that unlimited, absolute war was as destructive of the victor as the vanquished.

In a companion way the limits that governments increasingly imposed upon themselves in the suppression of internal unrest or mere interpersonal violence were the consequence of a growing recognition that social and political good order and stability required polite and restrained behavior.  The code of the gentleman which emerged in England and was copied faithfully in the US was the result of this recognition.  The growth in fits and starts of representative and increasingly democratic government was likewise the consequence of a blossoming realization that inclusion was far more beneficial than suppression.

After the suppression of the Paris Commune and the ending of the American War Between the States, the internal good order was more and more facilitated by a concern on the part of the government for the rights, dignities, and status of the civilian population.  During the same period the first stumbling efforts to codify the off and on practices of limiting inter-state conflict were made as well.

But it took the massive, unprecedented industrialized mass murder of the two World Wars to prod the West, or at least those states in the West left standing when the Second World War ended, to make a concerted effort to impose their collective internal and international values, norms, and ideals in a set of international conventions.  It is from this soil of blood and guts that the plant of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the expanded Geneva Convention grew.  The UDHR was adopted quickly with the formal inauguration of the UN.  The conventions, like the UN itself, were the product of Western experiences over centuries and the expression of norms, values, and ideals were forged in the fires of war.

This, then, is the background of the current idiocy in Libya.

The question which must be addressed is simply this: How relevant is this Made in the West artifact to the situation in Libya (and Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or others yet to be born?)

In plain point of fact R2P is a doctrine to be applied on an ad hoc basis only.  This means that there is no end to the implied hypocrisy of any specific application.  Is it not hypocritical to bomb one's way to peace, stability, and civilian safety in Libya but not the Ivory Coast?  Or, Yemen?  Or, should the body count cross some mythical line yet to be determined.  Bahrain?  Syria?

Then there is the necessary corollary of hypocrisy--base opportunism.  The existence of R2P allows cover for opportunism, for the disguised pursuit of national interest.  It is this rather than any legitimate apprehension of feeling the military wrath of the "international community" which propels the solid opposition of Russia and China to any UN interference in the internal affairs of a state.  Other countries, such as India, which have had experience with internal unrest and a concomitant bloodstained suppression, may view R2P and its precursor with a jaundiced eye.

The experiences of intervention under one name or guise or another also predisposes African and Latin American states against R2P and its companions.  The pervasive fear of intervention which can be seen throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Mideast is totally legitimate, every bit as legitimate and history based as the Western expression of "universal" norms and values.  The two are fundamentally antipodal and will remain that way into the future as far as one can see.

The uncertainties regarding the relevance of R2P as well as the potential narratives of "hypocrisy" and "opportunism" are in play with respect to the divisions which have become so evident in Europe.  The sharp distinctions between the Western created conventions and the culturally and historically determined "reservations" put in place by Arab and Muslim states have become every bit as high profile.  It is, for example, not naivete but a difference in perceptions of norms and values which provoked the expressions of shock and dismay from the Arab League over the reality that imposition of a no-fly zone required that bombs be dropped and missiles fired.

In short, the Libyan Affair has again demonstrated a long standing historical truism.  The best guide to foreign relations is self-determined national and strategic interest.  While principles can and have played a constructive role in determining both national interest and foreign policy, basing a war (for that is what it is, regardless of euphemism) on the "universal" principles embodied in R2P and its foundation conventions is not wise.  Nor is it likely to be productive in the longer term regardless of the specifics occurring in the shorter run.

In sum, President Obama was misguided in the extreme when he succumbed to the importuning and arguments of three special pleaders, Powers, Rice, and Clinton.  Grabbing the coattails of Sarkozy and his personal view of R2P was not a mistake: it was, as Talleyrand famously put it, "a blunder."

Well,Golly, Really, Someone Ought To Do Something

De facto, Libya has fissioned.  There is no longer one Libya other than within the lines on a map.  In the real world there is now an East Libya centered on Benghazi and Tobruk (or Tobruq, if you insist on current spelling) and a West Libya comprised of Tripoli and the oilfields to its south.  It merits mention that East Libya also has its own oilfields and loading facilities.

The residual government of Brother Leader and associates has no sway over any of East Libya which is now an independent if not yet sovereign entity.  The tribes of East Libya have withdrawn all allegiance to the Gaddafi regime while the armed forces have defected in wholesale lots to the insurrectionists.  The latter occurred because the attraction of region, of tribe, of clan outweighs all the artifices of Gaddafi's view of socialism, Libyan style.

In West Libya, the man who identified himself as "history," as "revolution," and other abstracts, is having more than a few problems killing enough and terrorizing enough to keep even the semblance of power in the capital and its environs.  The mercenary and militia forces currently loyal to the one time strongman have demonstrated a capacity and taste for killing people.  This has not yet translated into security for Brother Leader.

The greatest advantage Gaddafi has in West Libya is the absence of a coherent resistance.  The uprising in Tripoli unlike that in East Libya has been inchoate from the beginning.  While the leaderless uprising has some advantages--it is uniquely invulnerable to decapitation strikes by the status quo--it lacks the organizational and structural integrity which can  assure the survival of a resistance movement even under heavy and deadly pressure.

A critical question therefore is why the difference between East Libya, the home of an organized, long standing anti-government movement, and West Libya, the site of a genuine leaderless movement?  In a major way the difference between what happened in Benghazi or Tobruk on the one hand and Tripoli on the other is a reflection, even a consequence of Libyan history.

Prior to the forced unification of Libya by Italy in 1931 at the end of a twenty year campaign, Libya had been three quasi-states: Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica.  Cyrenaica is East Libya.  Tripolitania is West Libya--absent its oilfields.  These are found to the south in old Fezzan.  The three divisions are ancient, dating back to the days of Rome and Carthage.  The divisions are not simply geographic.  Nor are they simply lines on old maps.

The divisions run more across the human terrain than the merely physical.  They coincide with tribal and clan homelands, homelands which have existed since the mythic dawn of time.  As the Italians discovered when they embarked on their great adventure in imitating Rome, the differences between the three regions were starkest when expressed in the degree of opposition to the new colonials.  While none of the three were easy nuts to crack, Cyrenaica was the hardest by far.

The New Rome of Mussolini determined to erase the existence of the historical consciousness of the tribesmen of the newly conquered provinces and for that reason decreed the new "state" of Libya into existence.  Decreeing is easy, doing much harder.  The Italians were never able to create a unified Libyan state, and their efforts not only were unsuccessful, they became counterproductive.

The Anglo-American forces which occupied Libya from 1943 to the end of the war contented themselves with administering the territory for the convenience of the war effort.  This approach, which paid utterly no attention to the nature of the human terrain, continued into the post-war period with the creation of a monarchy far more artificial than organic.  The not made in Libya monarchy lasted until it fell to Gaddafi's 1969 coup having been kept alive until then by the Cold War needs of the US and its NATO partners as well as the development of the domestic oilfields.  The important fact to keep in mind is that at no time during the quarter century of its existence did the monarchy, the foreign supporters of the monarchy, or anyone else attempt to create a unified national identity for Libya.

At the time King Idris left to nobody's real sorrow, the old divisions continued to exist with some small changes.  Due to the development of the oilfields of West Libya there had been a degree of integration between Fezzan and Tripolitania.  There had been no such process with regard to Cyrenaica, the population centers of which were separated from Tripoli by some five or six hundred kilometers of sand crossed by a single all weather road and a number of ancient caravan tracks.

The proving of oilfields in Cyrenaica during the early Gaddafi years served to reinforce the separate identities of East and West Libya, or, to use the old terms, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania/Fezzan.  Then as a matter of policy driven by a deep fear of military coup, Colonel Gaddafi reinforced the ancient divisions by not only refusing to integrate tribes and regions in national institutions including the army, but by deepening and widening the divisions.

His version of divide and conquer may have been successful in precluding a military coup but did so at the price of assuring profound disaffiliation in Cyrenaica.  For at least the last quarter century there has been a palpable and growing sense of "Cyrenaica for the Cyrenaicians."  When Gaddafi ordered the prison massacre in Benghazi in 1996 he gave this growing movement a shot of growth hormone.

Since 1996 the anti-government sentiment in Cyrenaica has developed silently but profoundly with results which were stunningly obvious in the first seventy-two hours of the insurrection.  Bluntly put, the Gaddafi regime lost Benghazi and Tobruk and the other towns of East Libya almost instantly.  Local army units changed sides in a heartbeat and took their weapons with them.  Air force and navy units did something similar, at least defecting to foreign shores rather than shoot on fellow tribe and clan members.  Cyrenaica for the Cyrenaicians!

The fact that Gaddafi moved in foreign mercenaries from Chad and sub-Saharan Africa shows he well understood that the loyalties of tribe and clan would trump any appeal held by his "revolution."  He knew and knows that his heavy heel has an Achilles tendon.  The foreigners were the splint for this potentially fatal weakness.

Whether the Rent-A-Killer forces will prove sufficient along with those Libyans who have a vested or visceral interest in the status quo to keep Brother Leader in power in West Libya remains to be seen.  One can be more certain about Gaddafi;s political will.  If nothing else he both believes his own propaganda and understands that he has no retirement haven waiting for him.  He has to stay and fight it out, to die in place if that is the way it plays out.  The same applies to his two most visible sons.

The dissidents of Cyrenaica have the political will as well.  They well understand the price of failure and the Egyptian border may prove to be a line in the sand too far should the Colonel and his killers gain the upper hand.  The so far successful insurrectionists of East Libya (Cyrenaica) also have both the organizational and material means to wage prolonged defensive war.  In addition, the majority of the population is with them.

This implies the war within the borders of Libya could continue for a long and bloody time absent sufficient outside pressure to end it.  East and West Libya could exchange inconclusive blows for weeks, months, even years if the oil continues to flow in sufficient amounts and can be exchanged for the necessities of life and war. It would not be pretty.

It is this far from unlikely eventuality which makes the insipid reactions of the Obama administration and other governments so disheartening.  The Security Council limiting itself to a "press statement" would be risible were it not both tragic and, given the long standing policies of China and Russia, predictable.  Far more disturbing was the absence of UN Ambassador Susan Rice from the Security Council vote.

Ms Rice who has worked herself into an excellent imitation of war fever over the plight of people in Darfur was off to South Africa for a confab on "global sustainability" and thus too preoccupied to consider the situation in Libya.  Her boss, President Obama, is also absent.  Sure, his press flack assures us the Clueless Guy in the Oval will have something to say apropos Libya today or tomorrow, but that is scarcely the sort of laid back approach the situation demands.

Gaddafi has to be forced out quickly.  He has to be made to go--alive or dead--before the cycles of killing reach the point that Bosnia will look like a Baptist Sunday Social in comparison.  The US and other civilized states such as the UK and Italy can freeze bank accounts, impose travel bans, put sanctions in place, prohibit arms sales, order their national corporate citizens to halt all activity, even use NATO assets to impose naval and air blockades.  None of these require a great deal of head scratching, consultations, joint communiques, but all demand action.

Somebody really, really has to do something.  All the somethings are well understood.  All are easy to do.  None require the UN do anything.  All demand the civilized states including the US put pens on paper, sign the required orders, and apply the pressure.

Even symbolic actions, the freezing of funds for example, would undercut the willingness of the mercenaries to stay in Libya and embolden even the leaderless movement in West Libya to keep on keeping on.  If, at the same time, the civilized states would make the right sort of noises exempting low ranking trigger pullers from prosecution, the pro-Gaddifi forces would be weakened even more.  There are other easy to take and quick to operate measures as well, but this roster gives some indications of the great number of tools available to assist in the ending of the Gaddafi madness.

But, someone has to go first.  That is what the US formerly did.  What is wrong now, Mr Obama?

Sudan, The Next In Line

Sudan has been collapsing for years now. The country has been hit by two, count them, two, defensive insurgencies. One involved the primarily Christian and animist South which has sought for decades to free itself from the remote, predominately Arab Muslim North. The other is the ongoing morass called "Darfur."

Both have been expensive in lives lost. Both have been inconclusive to date. Both, but more importantly the one in the South, are on the brink of renewal.

At the same time the central government, the Muslim one in Khartoum under the unpleasant leadership of a born-again proponent of violent political Islam, Omar al-Bashir, is not given to compromise with US policy requirements. Nor is the indicted war criminal inclined to renounce violence either "official" or through the use of informal mechanisms resembling the pogroms of Imperial Russia.

Khartoum has much at stake. The territorial integrity of Africa's largest country is at risk, quite explicit risk given the referendum scheduled under the 2005 truce deal brokered by the Bush/Cheney administration. Also at great risk is the future of the oil rich land surrounding the city of Abyei and extending into the South.

The referendum on the status of the South is currently scheduled for January 2011. A second vote is to be held on the Abyei question. There is no doubt but the Black African population of the South will vote for independence. Not surprisingly the Arab Muslim North will take the opposite position.

A vote for succession in highest probability will restart the southern insurgency. It will be every bit as bloody and destructive as the the twenty-one years of fighting which ended with the truce. Too much is in play to allow either side to settle for much less than a total victory, a victory which will give the winner all or the vast majority of the cash flow from the extensive oil deposits.

Even without the enormous cash cow mooing away under the sands of the South, the legacy of the first round of insurgency as well as the generations of antipathy which preceded 1984 would be enough to assure an internal war viewed by both North and South as a total war of national survival. The long-standing animus held by Arab Muslim for African Christian or animist is returned measure for measure. That enough insures any future war will be fought without any restraint.

The passions both North and South are deep, hot, and sufficient to power Sudan into a condition tantamount to Somalia. That potential is more than enough to bring many a night without sleep to the Deep Thinkers responsible for US policy in the area.

The policies adopted and actions taken by outside powers have done nothing to facilitate a negotiated end to the brewing war. The indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court was notably ill-considered. This action provided instant support for Bashir by the majority of African states whose collective political leadership has come to conclude (with some justice) that the ICC singles out African rulers for unique attention. At the same time the indictment provided the Organization of the Islamic Conference and even the Arab League to rally around Bashir's flag.

No matter how distasteful any governmental figure in any member state of these several organizations might find Bashir and his government, the identity politics so central to each group demands solidarity in the face of "Western" threat. Beyond providing a diplomatic prop for the odious Omar, the support given him by these three international entities constitute a potent antidote to foreign pressure on Khartoum.

Not that the outsiders have much more potential pressure points at their disposal. As all American policy makers holding a brief for Sudan must recognize full well, Sudan is under sanctions equivalent to those applied to Iran or North Korea. This means there ain't a whole lot of options for those who believe against all odds in the efficacy of sanctions.

The only set of divisions rivaling those in Sudan are the splits in the Heavyweight Strategists of Team Obama. While Mr Obama has been concerned with the important matters such as where to take the next family vacation and Ms Clinton worried over how to pin the human rights violator's tail on the UN Human Rights Council donkey, the Sudan policy questions have been handed over to the bench.

The polar opposites on the bench are Susan Rice, the UN Ambassador, and J. Scott Gration, Mr Obama's Special Envoy. These two can agree on only one basic premise: Sudan is a mess and likely to get worse.

The opposing views of Ms Rice and Mr Gration were painted over last October when the administration after months of gestation and labor delivered itself of a non-policy policy. Depending upon whether or not the Sudanese government(s) met or did not meet specified milestones, the defaulter(s) would either be rewarded or punished.

"Duh" doesn't adequately cover the rational response to this monumental effort in diplomatic genius.

Ms Rice has been possessed of a deep, visceral distaste for the Bashir regime since she personally witnessed some of the consequences of Khartoum's version of counterinsurgency in Darfur. There can be little doubt but she favors "punishment," preferably of the sort awarded to Saddam Hussein.

Mr Gration for reasons which he has not articulated in a convincing way advocates a policy of "rewards." He is all for providing incentives to Khartoum. The nature of the incentives as well as the intended results are less than clear.

In the field Joe Biden has been doing what passes for heavy lifting. He has met with Silva Kiir the Honcho of All Honchos in South Sudan. Mr Kiir is all in favor of (a) peace, (b) independence and (c) the US doing "something." Joe I-Am-Too-An-Adult Biden also achieved a breakthrough of world historical importance in that he gained the support of Egypt for the referendum.

Not that Egypt hauls much freight in Khartoum. (What freight Cairo might haul is contained in the escalating dispute between Egypt and Sudan over water, the all-important water of the Nile.)

China hauls beaucoup more freight with Bashir (and Kiir.) Chinese influence in the two Sudans is predicated upon Chinese national interest. Specifically, the same interest which has occasioned Beijing's large position in Iran--the need for secure, long term oil supplies preferably at below world market prices.

The president apparently understands China's pivotal position in each of the two Sudans. He raised the issue of the referendum in his bilateral meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao. Their meeting was polite and the Troll From Beijing noncommittal. It was rather the same as the conversations the two men have had regarding Iran.

No matter how events play out in Sudan, the Trolls have covered their bets. Also it can be assumed the Chinese will throw decisive weight behind the contender providing the better deal.

Mr Obama also attended a meeting between his National Security Advisor, Gen. James Jones USMC (ret), and former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, who has been designated as the main man for implementing the results of the referendum. (Of course, for Mr Mbeki to be a player, the referendum must come to pass and the results not attended by overwhelming violence, but it seems Mr Obama is a perpetual optimist.)

It's a bit of a poser. The US and other Western countries have very little left in the sanctions area. The US and other Western countries have very little if any influence. While the subject of inducements is open, the only one likely to have a positive impact on Khartoum would be a quashing of the ICC indictment with guarantees it would not be reissued at some convenient future date.

This option would not prove popular with many countries of the EU where the abstract of "justice" has more potency than the avoidance of one more spectacle of African blood letting. (It probably would be no more popular with the American president considering his touching faith in equal justice under law in the international arena.)

There is no realistic way the administration might hope to play a "China card" as Beijing has no compelling reason to play a constructive role in the situation. Their interests are already covered, and the Trolls of Beijing have a well-founded belief in the competence of their intelligence and foreign services to know the right moment to make a move and the right move to make.

In principle one option is left by apparent default. This would be the Rice-favored Adventure in Regime Change. Real world constraints of a self-evident nature confine this option to the realm of the hypothetical.

In any even the administration has about a month, maybe two at a stretch, if there is going to be even a remote chance of the independence referendum being held early next year. Forget January. But, unless the Southerners have a firm belief the referendum will take place before the long, hot days of summer, the insurgency may start without delay.

A policy must be in place before the votes are counted here if there are going to be any votes to count in Sudan. Then, unless the policy can (a) defang Bashir, (b) assure with credible guarantees Southern independence, (c) demarcate the border in an agreeable way, (d) divide oil revenues in a way seen by both North and South as equitable, (e) provide a way to prevent the Darfur conflict from spreading, and (f) create an effective way to police and neutralize the border between North and South, the war will crank back up anyway.

Then, Sudan will become a blood soaked geographical expression rather resembling Somalia on a far grander scale. At this point al-Qaeda and other proponents of violent political Islam can genuflect deeply, bounce their foreheads on the mosque floor, and give heartfelt thanks to a most merciful and compassionate Allah for providing a new and improved base in their effort to bring "peace to the "House of War."

Ain't that a wonderful picture?

ADMIN NOTE: The Geek invites, welcomes and will post all on topic comments. Due to spam comments he has been forced to take defensive measures. He apologizes for any frustration which may ensue.

R2P Or Not R2P

At one time the United Nations had a simple, straightforward major mission. Protect the international peace. That was the one issue focused upon by the architects of the UN during the bloody years of World War II as it had been on the part of Woodrow Wilson and other visionaries during an earlier hectatomb.

The prevention or, at worst, the punishment of aggressive war waged in the face of international disapproval was the centerpiece at the launching of the UN in San Francisco more than a half century ago. While there were other items on the UN's plate--including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--these were seen as clearly secondary. They were conceived of as means of limiting the excuses used by nations to go to war.

That simple, unitary focus became increasingly fuzzy in the waning days of the Cold War particularly after President Jimmy Carter elevated the concept of "human rights" to the top priority of American foreign policy. While there is no doubt that President Carter was both sincere and somewhat pragmatically minded in his dedication to human rights, the Law of Unintended Consequences stood by ready to invoke itself.

The UN pushed its camel's nose into an entirely new area a few years ago when the congeries of diplomats meeting on the banks of the Hudson determined that a potential threat to international peace and stability was posed automatically when a government's policies or weakness resulted in refugee streams crossing international borders. The existence of a flow of refugees became de facto proof that some sort of international intervention was required not only to meet "humanitarian" needs but also to stave off any potential breach of the international peace.

This diplomatic artifice constructed a very steep slope paved with glare ice. It allowed, no, encouraged, the Security Council to determine when and if an internal matter had reached such a pitch of refugee generation (and high visibility flowing of blood and gore) that international intervention was required. If the five Permanent Members could agree on the necessity or desirability of invoking the presumed UN mandate to protect the citizens of the target county, the Boys in Blue Helmets could be deployed.

If and when (as was far from atypical) the Security Council could not agree on intervention, the fall back position was the invocation of a similar "responsibility to protect" (called in diplomatic and journalistic shorthand, "R2P") on the part of the UN or regional organisations. The European Union, the Organisation of American States, the African Union, even NATO, could determine that they had a "responsibility to protect" within their geographic bailiwicks.

Stripped to its essentials the "responsibility to protect" means that some external entity, a state, a regional organisation, the UN, determines on some basis or another that a country has reached such a sorry state of internal depravity and wretchedness that intervention is the necessary course of action. Since the intervention is not sought nor welcomed by the target country or its government, this means the incoming forces are armed and ready to use force to impose their will on the target.

In short, the "responsibility to protect" means making war.

Ironically, the UN, an entity created to keep the international peace, can invoke the "responsibility to protect" in order to wage war. Normally the use of the "R2P" is either by or at the behest of a Great Power against some country which is not a client of another Great Power.

Back in 2005 the "international community" visited the subject of "R2P" at some length. At the end of the visit some 150 world leaders endorsed the concept. Now, four years later, the UN General Assembly is back in the trenches of "R2P."

The NYT suggests that getting the member nations to agree on how and when to intervene so as to stop genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing should not "be much of a stretch." The mere fact that the weight of historical experience underscores the difficulty with agreeing on anything beyond muttering platitudes, the gaining of widespread agreement on the necessity of invading a country due to its internal difficulties is nearly impossible.

Not surprisingly the panjandrums of the UN bureaucracy are overwhelmingly in favor of an "R2P" protocol with real bite. The High Commissioner For Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has called for a "credible capacity for rapid responses." Madam Pillay, like UN SecGen Ban Ki-moon, referenced the massacres in Rwanda during which the world stood by and watched horrified as at least 800,000 were slaughtered.

There is an old cliche in jurisprudence, "Hard cases make bad law." In international politics there is (or should be) a similar saying, "Extreme examples make bad precedent."

To put it simply, there is no firebreak in mere numbers. Nor is there a bright and shining line contained in the swiftness of the slaughter. Once the precedent is enshrined there can be no meaningful distinctions between the fast mass murder of a Rwanda and the slow killing fields of a Zimbabwe or a Somalia. There can be no proper, policy related distinctions drawn between massive and bloody efforts at ethnic cleansing as in former Yugoslavia and the slow-motion ejection of Christians from Iraq.

Regardless of speed, efficiency, or numbers each is an example of abuse of human rights on a large scale. Each occurred because of either government action or government inaction. Each generated refugees. Each outraged (or should have) global sensibilities. Each was (or is) a candidate for "R2P."

The same may be said (and has been) regarding Chinese actions in Tibet or, more recently, in Xianjiang. The same may be said (and has been) regarding Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

The same was said in (partial) justification of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saddam Hussein's regime did engage in internal actions which resulted in massive death, dislocation, and refugee generation. Silent at the time Saddam's men used toxic gas against civilian Kurds, the US waved the bloody shirt of human rights violations nearly two decades later. ("Well," the administration might have said, "better late than never.")

The question of when--if ever--external actors have a "right" or a "responsibility" to intervene at bayonet point to "protect" civilian populations from harm at the hands of their own government or from non-governmental bodies not inhibited by the government is neither easy to parse nor simple to judge. This is the point behind the recent objections to "R2P" raised by General Assembly President Miguel d'Escoto and others including the renowned left-leaning American linguistic and general purpose critic, Noam Chomsky.

D'Escoto circulated a "Concept Note" in which he characterised the "R2P" idea as just one more form of neocolonialism. He has been joined in this position by Dr Chomsky who (correctly) pointed out that "R2P" has been used by Western advanced nations to impose their vision on countries in the non-Western world.

There is an uncomfortable degree of truth in these arguments, much as the Geek personally dislikes finding himself in agreement with d'Escoto, let alone Chomsky. The Great Powers have the influence, resources, and agendas necessary to support interventions under an appropriate color. The most appropriate cover in today's Era of Sensitivity is the protection of one or another of the numerous "lesser breeds without the law" (in Kipling's phrase.) "R2P" is in keeping with a long standing American tradition of couching armed interventions in lofty, humanitarian terms such as Wilson's famed idea of "teaching Mexicans to elect good men."

Another, less publicised danger of using "R2P" as a justification for military operations is the potential for frankly cynical abuse. Russia draped "R2P" over its tanks and jets during the incursion and occupation of disputed territory then under Georgian sovereignty. The Kremlin claimed with a straight face and in the most solemn terms that their army was simply protecting the human rights of the locals faced with genocide at the hands of the aggressive Georgian government.

The Chinese have made similar statements regarding their suppression of demonstrations in Tibet and Xianjiang. The army and police were simply protecting the human rights of the Han Chinese from abuse at the hands of ethnic minorities.

And, so it has gone. As it will continue to go. "Human rights" and the closely linked "R2P" will be exploited by governments to cover naked land grabs and regime maintenance actions.

At the same time governments will continue to be very, very cautious, reluctant really, to involve their forces in the vast majority of situations which might fall legitimately under the rubric, "R2P." That overarching reality is in high evidence today.

Somalia is and has been for years the very definition of human depravity and consequent misery. Ban Ki-moon has once more called upon the "international community" for "armed support" for the tottering artifact created by the same international community, the Transitional Federal Government. The African Union peace keeping force is so undermanned, so poorly equipped, and so lacking in motivation that its troops can barely protect their own base, let alone the TFG.

The members of the African Union show little stomach for further involvement in the Somali cesspit. There are very real reasons given for this. Lack of money. Deficient logistics. No transport. There are also other, equally valid and more compelling unstated reasons.

Chief among these silent justifications is this: What is in it for us? What national interest is served by seeing our troops killed in Somalia?

Abstracts are very poor reasons for getting killed. And, let's be honest about it. Human rights is an abstract. Each and every point referenced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is itself an abstract. They are the creations of a particular historical and philosophical tradition--Western Christianity and its precursors in Greece and Ancient Israel.

They are not real, organic, and emotive concepts in other traditions. They are not good reasons for a government, particularly one faced by its own problems at home to send off men to kill and die. Not even when the blood filled cesspit is right next door and the refugees are flooding your country.

Kenya is a major non-participant in Somalia. Similarly South Africa set back and watched Mugabe's thugs create a swamp of violence, death, poverty, and disease in Zimbabwe. The governments of these nations were not blind to what was happening. Nor were they morally indifferent.

There was simply no compelling national interest at stake. Lacking that, there was no justification for bearing the expenses in lives, treasure, and potential internal complications exercising some sort of abstract "R2P."

The weight of both history and practical realities is against "R2P." This may bother the high minded such as our UN Ambassador, Susan Rice, and the assorted capos of the UN. It may bother the editors of the NYT as the tone of their coverage makes clear.

But, it is a fact. A brute ground truth.

We the People may like to forget or overlook this truth. Just as we like to overlook the reality that when faced by a man with a gun we, each and every one of us, has the "human right" of life only if we can shoot faster and straighter than the other guy.

Another Lesson From The "Forgotten War"

The Geek is a fan of the Korean War. That's the three year war which many historians have correctly called the "Forgotten War." It was an inconclusive conflict which at the time was not acknowledged by the Truman Administration to be anything other than a "police action."

It was, of course, much more than that. It was America's first limited war in support of policy. There was no odor of crusade about it. Except for the brief, shining moment in the euphoria following the stunning success of the amphibious end run at Inchon, the men of the Truman Administration never lost sight of the policy goal as they had defined it.

That was the first crucial lesson learned in the bloody wastelands of Korea. In a limited war fought in support of a clearly defined policy, the aim of the war, the better state of peace, is the attainment of the policy goal. In the case of Korea the policy was containment. The better state of peace was showing the Communist Bloc it could not violate that policy without meeting firm, prolonged and fierce resistance.

The second lesson from the Korean War has been mentioned many times by the Geek in previous posts. The minimum definition of victory in a limited war in support of policy is "not-losing." In Korea it was not necessary--or, as events proved, possible--to achieve an absolute victory including the surrender of the North and the reunification of Korea under the South. At the opposite extreme, the military defeat of the US brokered "UN" coalition would have destroyed the policy of containment and fatally undercut the diplomatic credibility of the US.

As a result, the US discovered the "third option," that of "not-losing." De facto that became the definition of victory in Iraq with results that might not be entirely satisfying to the neocons and others who were behind the war at the giddy-up, but have been quite satisfactory to the Iraqis and overall, to the US position globally.

There is yet another lesson which must be taken from the Korean paradigm. It is a lesson which is immediately applicable with respect to our current diplomatic imbroglios with Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. It is also quite applicable along with the first two "lessons-learned" in the war underway in Afghanistan.

But, first, take a look at the advice of a master realist.

A diplomat's words must have no relation to actions--otherwise what sort of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or steel wood.

So said Joseph Stalin. Admittedly "Uncle Joe" was a man of many unpleasant habits. But, no person ever accused him of not having an accurate, cynical and above all, realistic understanding of the games nations played.

Americans and others, particularly Western Europeans of the post-World War II era, may not rush to agree with Stalin's view. However, there are many others in the world who do--even if they have never read the Collected Thoughts of the Great Teacher.

The US ran into the practical implications of Stalin's approach to diplomacy during the two years of negotiations which ultimately resulted in the cease-fire ending active combat in Korea (sort of, maybe, at least some of the time.) We found out the hard way that negotiations were the continuation of combat by other means. We also learned the hard way that without the pressure of combat--even bloody contests of King of the Hill waged on meaningless terrain features which gained at least transient fame such as Pork Chop Hill, Bloody Nose, Heartbreak Ridge--the war ending negotiations went nowhere--slowly.

Seemingly driven by some sort of institutional amnesia, the US relearned the same principles of Diplomacy According To Uncle Joe during the seemingly endless Paris Peace Talks. It's instructive to recall that more men died after the talks started than did before the diplomats started flapping their gums.

The interlocutors sitting across from the Americans at Panmunjom and Paris were Communists. That ideological label is far less important than the underlying reality. They and the governments they represented were True Believers.

True Belief is the critical fact. The power of the Belief is far more important than its ideological structure. True Belief describes a worldview, an existential stance. True Belief leaves no room for the nuances of compromise which constitutes the essential core of non-Stalinesque diplomacy--the sincere diplomacy which the Master of the Kremlin believed did not--could not--exist.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry speaking in South Korea the other day allowed that it "appeared that the more we talked, the more intransigent the North Koreans became." He is right on the appearance. The appearance is the reality.

The reason? You ask.

Simple.

The Men of the Hermit Kingdom of the North are not simply fossils of the Stalin era, they are True Believers in the right and destiny of North Korea to dominate the peninsula by whatsoever means might be necessary. To them as to their progenitors during the Korean War, talking is the extension of combat by other means. As the US found out on the killing hills of Korea, any sign of weakness, no matter how transitory, gives aid and comfort to the True Believers of the other side.

Iran is not communist. But, the Iranian regime is comprised of True Believers. The Belief is not simply nor solely in Shia Islam, even though that may be the larger part. The rest of the Belief is in Iranian nationhood and with it a presumed natural Iranian right to hegemony over the Persian Gulf and Northwest Asian region.

To achieve that end, the possession of nuclear weapons is not simply desirable, it is necessary. To pursue the goal of hegemony, to acquire the nuclear threat, requires that "good words hide bad actions." Considering that Islam, particularly the Islam of Shia, approves of lying in protection of the Believers and the Belief, the Stalin Formulation has great applicability.

Susan Rice, our new ambassador to the UN, said yesterday on NPR that the US "might" directly engage the Iranians in order to dissuade them from pursuing nuclear weapons. There is no inherent harm in that. Provided, and this is a major provision, the US recognises the lessons of the Korean War negotiations as a model. And, provided that we acknowledge the saliency for Tehran of the Stalin approach to diplomacy.

The Islamists of Pakistan who, along with their supporters and sympathizers in the government and military, are also True Believers. They also mix Islam with nationalism and the ambitions of hegemony which this mix so facilely propels. Our relations with Pakistan on a practical level are going to be conducted under the shadow of Stalin, in the orbit of his understanding of diplomacy.

With the Pakistanis as with the North Koreans and the Iranians, diplomacy in any form is always combat without bloodshed. Any slackening, any compromise, any hesitation, any uncertainty as to our policy goals and our definitions of success will be taken by the other side as an indication of weakening will and lost ability. Any metaphorical hill left without both strong defense and instant counterattack will be seen as defeat for us and victory for the other side.

There is one final critical lesson to be derived from the Korean War which is all too easily overlooked. During the course of the war the Chinese Army became progressively more capable, progressively better by all objective measurements. The myriads of lives lost by members of the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) did not buy Beijing a military victory.

No.

The CCF hectatombs bought China something far more important. Far more long lasting. It bought the Beijing regime international authority and internal self-confidence. Ultimately these were so strong and so durable that they were not erased by the monumental errors of Beijing--the Great Leap Forward, the Famine and the Cultural Revolution to mention a few. The dead bodies littering the landscape clothed in quilted uniforms and tennis shoes made the Peoples Republic of China what it is today. A Great Power.

Wars tend to improve the fighting capacities of those who fight them. This is particularly true of fighters who have no tours of duty, no guaranteed end of tour, no date of return to a faraway country. This implies what has already been observed in Afghanistan--and Pakistan. Under pressure, Taliban and other jihadists have gotten better.

The same has been observed in 2006 in Lebanon with the fighters of Hezbollah.

The experience of the CCF in Korea meshes with what we have seen in more recent wars. The lesson is simple but hard to put into practice. Win, lose or (as in Korea) draw, the major beneficiaries of the war may well be the enemy. And, the enemy may never change his nature no matter how much his tactics might alter.

Had the planners and executors of our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq taken a good, hard look at the "Forgotten War," it is highly probable that our approach and methods would have been far different. Far less likely to carry the negative effects extant today and extending into the future.

Now the challenge before the Obama Administration is either to study history or try--perhaps with awful consequences--to relearn the truth of the Stalin Formulation. It may not be nice, it certainly isn't pleasant, but the reality is that for our major diplomatic opponents today and in the near-term, diplomacy is unarmed combat.

There's Just One Little Problem--History

The Obama Administration is conducting a major peace offensive directed at Islamic countries. The UN Ambassador Susan Rice promised "direct" diplomacy with the Mullahocracy in Tehran. SecState Clinton magnified and focused the Rice position averring that it was up to Iran to choose whether or not to "unclench" its fist.

The President took to Arab TV seeking to reassure Muslims that "Americans are not your enemy." Obama also invoked the presumably good relations based on "mutual respect" which he alleged constituted the basis of US-Muslim relations "twenty or thirty years ago."

While the Geek is somewhat of a charm offensive mavin, having enjoyed the recurrent waves of Give-Peace-A-Chance rolling out of the Kremlin during the Cold War, he has to blow the historical whistle on the current Obama and Company effort.

You see, it just isn't enough to invoke the good-ole-days of peace, love and flower power as the President tried to do. The necessity is asking what has changed over the past generation which served to end the presumed Golden Years of US-Muslim relations.

Really only one slight factor has changed between then and now. That small matter is--ta! da!--religion.

Perhaps the simplest way to unpack this change is to ask a question: What event(s) transpiring in the transformative year 1979 powered the transmogrification of relations between the US and Muslim countries?

(Sound of patiently drumming fingers.)

That's right, kids. The Iranian Revolution.

The overthrow of the Shah and the installation of a rigorously Islamist regime was an event of world-historical importance. The impact of the revolution was potentiated by the intentional and prolonged humiliation of the United States during the hostage crisis. The overall effect of the Revolution was to thrust Islam of the most militant and uncompromising sort onto the global stage.

Prior to the success of the Ayatollah and his comrades, the mutterings of Islamic Revivalists such as those who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were confined to radical screeds and plots of little consequence. The assorted proponents of what we now know as Islamism/jihadism were like the Arab armies--failures with an attitude.

The Iranian Revolution changed all that. The Iranian Revolution proved that True Believers in the True Faith of Islam could triumph over apostates such as the Shah and infidels including the Great Satan, the United States.

Prior to the miracle year of 1979, the US could practice diplomacy with Muslim states in a manner akin to the way in which it engaged in diplomacy with all other countries. The rules and mechanisms of the game of nations were both well understood and adhered to by all players. Even the Soviets and the Communist Chinese played the game fairly (if ruthlessly.) All hands understood that the goal of diplomacy was the protection and advancement of defined national and strategic interests at the lowest risk and the greatest benefit.

Even the most ideologically besotted regimes recognised that compromise was necessary if inordinate risks were to be avoided. Nations behaved like sailboats heading upwind--tacking right and left in order to make incremental progress toward the goal. With very few and quite unimportant exceptions, countries during the period between 1945 and 1979 eschewed the "hey diddle-diddle, right up the middle" approach to international relations.

The victory of the mullahs in Iran changed that. At least with respect to the emerging Islamist entities. In the Islamist view of the world, there is no room for compromise. There is no room for incremental achievement of goals except in the most narrowly defined tactical way. In the eyes of Islamists, there is no making deals with the devil. In their playbook, there is no tolerance for any achievement less than total victory.

Apostates--perverting backsliders from the rigid demands of Islam--may make deals. These unworthy leaders may compromise. These blots upon the purity of Islam may look to the narrowly defined requirements of national and strategic interest.

True Muslims, the Islamists contend, do not stoop to dishonor their beliefs, their deity, the Prophet. True Muslims, the Islamists hold, go for the gold of complete and total victory over the infidel and the apostate regardless of risks and costs. It is what their warrior faith demands, their militant deity demands. It is the Message. It is the Will of the Prophet and the deity who speaks through the Prophet.

Unless and until the Obama Administration from the President on down the line get a firm grip on these realities, hopes for "direct" diplomacy and calls for the Iranians to "unclench" their fists will be bootless. Appeals for Muslims to change their view of Americans-as-enemies will have no useful result.

While Osama bin Ladin and other jihadists make recurrent reference to the success of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, the war against the occupier in that country was of far less importance in rise of Islamism than was the Iranian Revolution. This does not imply that the efforts of the jihadists were unimportant.

To the contrary the legends which have emerged in the Arab street regarding the efficacy of the Muslim fighters in Afghanistan have been an important reinforcement to the Iranian paradigm. The presumed success of the jihadists against the Red Army has been an important agent in developing a theory of war based on a unique concept.

Consider the oft-repeated assertion that Islamist jihadist "love death more than infidels love life." This conclusion is based in large measure on the Islamist/jihadist interpretation of how the Soviets lost in Afghanistan. True, this explanation simplifies to the point of absurdity the multiple factors which forced the eventual Soviet retreat.

However the we-love-death-they-love-life hypothesis was powerfully underscored by the US reaction to eighteen deaths in Somalia and the quite unrobust American responses to attacks on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, US embassies in Africa and even on a US warship. The reaction of the US to these events contrasted sharply and unfavorably with the evident willingness of Iranians to die in defense of the Revolution and Iranian soil during the long, bloody Iran-Iraq War.

The final conclusion of the Islamists and jihadists was simple, brutal and not easily countered. It is a conclusion well founded in the Quran, the Hadith and the history of expansionist Islam of centuries past.

The conclusion?

The True Muslim, the authentic follower of the Faith and the Prophet eagerly embraces death. By so doing he will defeat both the infidel and the apostate.

There is a necessary corollary. The True Muslim, the authentic follower of the Faith and the Prophet rejects compromise. Indeed, the idea of compromise is not to be found in the Islamic scripture. There can only be victory or death. There is no middle ground possible except for narrow, purely tactical reasons.

Apostates may bargain like merchants in the bazaar. Infidels may wheel and deal with compromise as the goal.

But, not the True Muslim. Not the authentic follower of the One True Faith and the Final Prophet. By loving death and rejecting accommodation, by seeking martyrdom and eschewing coexistence, by keeping the eyes on Paradise and overlooking the world, Islam not only can triumph. It will triumph.

The Obama Administration can and will engage in diplomacy with rulers of various Muslim states. It will play the game of nations with such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the other so-called "conservative" Muslim countries.

We will deal and bargain with the men seen by Islamists as apostates. But, these men are not the problem, they are probably not even part of the solution. Still, we will wine, dine, wheedle and cozen them. We will search for--and find--coinciding interests.

And, it won't matter. Neither will attempts to convince Muslims generally that "Americans are not your enemies."

Islamism and its armed, deadly twin, jihadism, are not to be countered by diplomacy or honeyed words. As the Iranian Revolution and its thirty year aftermath have shown the world, True Belief is not easily defeated. It is not subject to the rules of the game of nation.

Unpleasant reality to say the least. It is, however, the reality on which we and the new administration had best get a grip.

Human Rights And National Interest

Last Monday a group headed by two Clintonites, William Cohen, the one time Secretary of Defense and Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, released a report timed to coincide with the Sixtieth Anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. This report took the position that "genocide" and "mass atrocities" threatened American national security and interests.

The report urged the incoming Obama Administration to reorganise the National Security Council and other components of the national security establishment to reflect this conclusion. While cheerfully acknowledging that the Cohen-Albright report is filled with High Minded, Lofty Thinking, the Geek is unconvinced that enforcement of "human rights," however narrowly they may be defined, is necessarily in the national or strategic interests of the United States.

Even the matter of genocide is not necessarily one that the US should, let alone, must, respond to even in the context of multilateral action. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (ratified by the US in 1988) like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was the product of its time.

Specifically, the Genocide Convention was the product of revulsion throughout the Western world over the state sponsored slaughter of discrete ethno/linguistic/religious communities by the Nazi government of Germany. (It is doubtful that Joe Stalin was all that perturbed by the tales of extermination considering his extensive personal experience with liquidating undesirable populations.)

In 1948 the definition of genocide was easy. The example was right in front of the world's leaders and peoples. In more recent years, the edges of definition have become ever more fuzzy, ever more blurred by propagandists and ideologues alike. The political goals and ideological imperatives override any objective definition and consensual understanding of the actions which genuinely constitute genocide.

The charge of "genocide" is hurled at the Israelis by partisans of the Palestinians. It is heaved by the Kremlin to justify the Russian invasion of Georgia. Taliban chieftains accuse the US of pursuing genocide in Afghanistan. The central regime of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charges the government of Rwanda of genocide by proxy.

You get the point.

The highly undistinguished former Secretary of Defense and his equally-at-sea counterpart from State want the military to incorporate genocide prevention (and, presumably, punishment) in its official doctrine. (Hint to Mr Perry: It's already there in all the doctrinal corpus that covers interventionary operations.) The report also demands that the intelligence community add genocide and related human rights violations to its already overstocked plate of missions and tasks. (Hint to Mr Perry and Ms Albright: Such reporting is already present even if it is not labeled as such.)

The Geek does not contemplate genocide with total detachment and equanimity although he is willing to admit that life as a historian hardens one to the extent and brutality of calculating governmental brutality. He is not willing to buy into the proposition that genocide per se let alone violations of human rights constitutes a threat to American national interests and security which compels response beyond the rhetorical.

There are several historically rooted reasons buttressing the contention that massive violations of human rights including the starkest expression of violation, genocide, does not constitute a threat to national interests and security. Some of these should be self-evident to Mr Perry and Ms Albright as they witnessed them during the Clinton years.

The first of these historical experiences is a negative lesson from a generally positive outcome. The venue was the ruins of Yugoslavia. The time frame was the 1990s. The cause was "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia. The outcome was a seeming success with the atrocities ended and at least some of the major perpetrators arrested.

The important lesson is not that the intervention by NATO worked. While that is true, it is also less important than the negative lesson which must be taken away from the experience. The operation, including the low risk, high payoff bombing campaign worked simply because of the unique nature of the Bosnian context.

The venue was small, easily isolated. The ethnic rivals were easily identified. The support among the larger population for the atrocities committed by the ethnic cleansers was weak and easily eroded. The participants on all sides came to be revolted by their own excesses. Beyond that, there was a growing fear that if the chaos was not ended quickly, it would become an unendable monster as the dead increasingly dictated a policy of revenge and counter-revenge.

There was an almost palpable sense of relief in the disintegrating remnants of Yugoslavia when NATO and the US provided a way out. Promised a chance to end the mutual dance of slaughter without any particular group losing either face or internal cohesion.

In short, Mr Perry, Ms Albright, et al should take a firm grip on the ground truth of Bosnia. It constitutes a success which is nearly non-replicable.

There are other realities which the group headed by the ex-SecDef and ex-SecState should get a grip on. It is even more important that Susan Rice and others in the incoming Obama Administration get a grip on the limitations inherent to any attempt to prevent or punish genocide or other crimes against the purported rights of all humans.

Mr Perry and Ms Albright were around during the debacle of the US intervention in Somalia. They were witnesses if not architects of the disastrous adventure in mission creep which saw the US start out with the High Minded but achievable goal of protecting UN humanitarian relief convoys and distribution centers. Over the span of only a few months, the mission shifted from one of defending convoys and centers to one of suppressing warlords and building a nation.

Insufficient force combined with deficient planning and an excess of ignoring basic intelligence concerning the Somalis and an exuberance of ideology to assure an American defeat. Make no mistake about it. We were defeated in Somalia. Defeated in the field in the course of one botched commando style raid. Defeated in our political will by the televised imagery of American corpses dragged through the dust of Mogadishu.

The defeat of the US in Somalia had long term consequences. Consequences with which we are still dealing. The American defeat convinced Osama bin Ladin and others that the US lacked the stomach for killing and being killed. It convinced these prototypical jihadists that they could achieve their policy goal of forcing the US out of the Mideast if only they could inflict enough casualties in a high profile way on our citizens and troops.

The rest is, as they say, history. More properly, it is the Law of Unintended Consequences at work.

Another argument against taking action whenever and wherever violations of human rights occurs is the nature of international politics. Countries such as China and Russia have a sensitive regard for protecting "internal affairs" from the actions or even the inspection of outsiders. It is necessary to balance our national interests which may well require the understanding cooperation of major actors such as these two permanent members of the Security Council with emotional or ethical repugnance at the acts of governments such as that of Sudan.

In short, we must carefully assess where our genuine interests reside and not be driven by ideological considerations or the emotional gales of people outraged by gory media depictions of atrocities. Every Great Power from Great Britain in the Sudan over a hundred years ago to us in the past decade has suffered the negative consequences of emotional and ideologically driven policy decisions.

A final cautionary note for all of those eager to embrace the propositions of the Perry-Albright report (that means you, Ms Rice,) Well intended humanitarian actions may well have the result of freeing obnoxious governments from the necessity of basic reform. The efforts of High Minded, Lofty Thinking outsiders to alleviate human suffering in the short-term may well result in the paradoxical effect of assuring the suffering continues in the long run.

The paradoxical effects of well-intended efforts at humanitarian relief can be seen time after (literally) bloody time in Africa. Sometimes and under some conditions the best love is tough love, the best humanitarian gesture is doing nothing. There are times and places such as Zimbabwe today where only the absence of aid and the concomitant increase of human suffering will serve to cure the greater ill: The government of Kleptocrat in Chief Robert Mugabe.

It is neither pleasurable nor instructive to stand by with folded arms as people suffer and die. Neither is it pleasurable or instructive to watch as foreign troops fight, kill, and die in order to end atrocities or punish their perpetrators.

That's why foreign policy is usually a matter of choosing the least-worst option. That is why only cool assessment of genuine national interests and not feel good emotions or ideology must be the basis for foreign policy.